Christian Apologetics Journal, 10:1 (Spring 2012)

© 2012 Southern Evangelical Seminary

A Critique of Trinity Monotheism

Brian Huffling
For millennia, the doctrine of the Trinity has been a subject of great
debate for theologians and philosophers. Skeptics have used it to ridi-
cule the faith by calling its veracity into question. The coherence and
truth of Christianity are thus intimately tied to this doctrine. Therefore,
philosophical theologians should take great care in addressing it.
In this work the author will explicate the logical problem that the
Trinity poses and examine the normal models that scholars present
in attempting to defend the doctrine, such as Latin (psychological)
models and Greek (social) models. Special attention will be given to
Trinity monotheism, particularly understood by J. P. Moreland and
William Lane Craig. This view will be evaluated to see if it can ex-
plain the Trinity while remaining orthodox.

THE PROBLEM
The doctrine of the Trinity states there is one God that exists in
three persons: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Each person is just as

Brian Huffling is Assistant Professor at Southern Evangelical Seminary

and Bible College in Charlotte, NC.

79
80 Christian Apologetics Journal / Spring 2012

fully God as the next; one person is not more God than the others.
This is a difficult concept, and the problem for theologians is to give
an orthodox explanation of the Trinity. Scripture, for Protestants, is
the ultimate standard for matters of doctrine and orthodoxy. However,
the creeds, such as the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, are greatly im-
portant as well. In order to be considered orthodox, one must adhere
to both a scriptural and creedal view of the Trinity. The Nicene Creed
reads thus:

We believe in one God, the Father, the almighty [pantocrator],

the maker of all things seen and unseen.

And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God; begotten from
the Father; only –begotten –that is, from the substance of the
Father; God from God; light from light; true God from true
God; begotten not made; being of one substance with the
Father [homoousion tō patri]; through whom all things in
heaven and on earth came into being; who on account of us
human beings and our salvation came down and took flesh,
becoming a human being [sarkōthenta, enanthrōpōsanta];
he suffered and rose again on the third day, ascended into the
heavens; and will come again to judge the living and the dead.

And in the Holy Spirit.

As for those who say that “there was when he was not,” and
“before being born he was not,” and “he came into existence
out of nothing,” or who declare that the Son of God is of a
different substance or nature, or is subject to alteration or
change –the catholic and apolostolic church condemns these.1

Thus, in order for one to be orthodox and free from heresy, he

must admit to “one God,” and that the Father, Son, and Spirit are all
equally God.
Michael C. R ea lays the doctrine out as follows:
(T1)There is exactly one God, the Father almighty.
(T2)Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not identical.

1. Alister E. McGrath, ed. The Christian Theology Reader, 3rd ed. (Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 10.
 A Critique of Trinity Monotheism 81

(T3)Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are consubstantial.2

To further illustrate the problem, say that Matthew, Mark, and
Luke are three persons, but only one being. The problem is that it
seems contradictory to say that three persons are one in being or es-
sence. This is the problem with the Trinity. Saying that there are three
persons that are equally God but also saying there is only one God
appears to be contradictory.
At this point it might be helpful to define what is meant by a con-
tradiction. A contradiction is a state of affairs where x is both x and
non –x at the same time and in the same sense. For example, if one
says he owns a Corvette, and then referring to the same exact time
says he does not own a Corvette, then that would be a contradiction,
since either he does or does not own a Corvette. It is a contradiction
since both states of affairs cannot coexist at the same time.
Likewise, the Trinity is said to be a contradiction because a be-
ing cannot be both three and one at the same time and in the same
sense.3 The argument as laid out by Rea hinges on the meaning of
‘consubstantial’.4 According to Rea,

To say that x and y are consubstantial, or of the same substance

is, it seems, just to say that x and y share a common nature—
i.e. they are members of one and the same kind. To say that
two divine beings are consubstantial, then, would be to say
that the two beings in question are identical with respect to
their divinity: neither is subordinate to the other; they are not
divine in different ways; and if one is a God, then the other
one is too.5

To further clarify the problem, Rea states the argument thus:

(LPT1) There is exactly one God, the Father Almighty. [From
(T1)]
(LPT2) The Father is a God. [From (LPT1)]

2. Michael C. Rea, “The Trinity,” in Thomas P. Flint and Michael C. Rea, eds., The
Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009),
405.
3. Of course, God traditionally is seen to exist apart from time; however, this does not
change the definition of a contradiction in terms of the Trinity.
4. Cf. Rea, “The Trinity,” 405.
5. Ibid.
82 Christian Apologetics Journal / Spring 2012

(LPT3) The Son is consubstantial with but not identical to the

Father. [From (T2) and (T3)]
(LPT4) If there are x and y such that x is a God, x is not identical
to y, and y is consubstantial with x, then it is not the case that
there is exactly one God. (Premise)
(LPT5) Therefore: It is not the case that there is exactly one God.
[From (LPT2), (LPT3), (LPT4)]
***Contradiction6
To avoid the contradiction, Rea says that one must redefine the
Trinity or reject (LPT4).7 In order to avoid the contradiction, he wants
to define consubstantial in such a way that one does not end in a con-
tradiction and does not abandon the orthodox view of the Trinity. In
order to do this, Rea argues that one must be wary of crossing into one
of three heresies. These heresies include “subordinationism, modal-
ism, and polytheism.”8
Subordinationism is the idea that the Son and the Spirit are not
divine in the same sense that the Father is divine. They are thought to
be less than fully divine. Thus, they are subordinate to the Father. This
may logically solve the problem of the Trinity since the persons do not
constitute one God; however, it does not actually solve the problem
since the Scriptures and creeds teach that the three persons are each
fully and equally divine. Thus, orthodox Christians see subordination-
ism as heretical.
Modalism is the belief that there is one God who takes on dif-
ferent modes of personhood. Sometimes God takes on the mode of
the Father, sometimes the Son, and sometimes the Holy Spirit. In this
view God is only one person at a time. Thus God is not said to be three
persons in one being. Again, this solves the logical problem of three
persons being one God, but it results in heresy as well since the Bible
teaches that each person is distinct from the other [f. (T2)].
Finally, polytheism is the view that there is more than one God.
This view describes the three persons of the Trinity as three separate
beings. Again, while this avoids the apparent logical difficulty of the

6. Ibid., 406.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., 407.
 A Critique of Trinity Monotheism 83

Trinity, the Bible teaches that there is only one God, not three. Thus,
polytheism is a heretical view.
In summary, the logical problem of the Trinity is how three per-
sons can coexist as one being. Further, in attempting to solve the logi-
cal problem of the Trinity one needs to endeavor to provide a solution
while avoiding the above heresies.

ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS
There have been many attempts to solve the problem of the Trinity.
These solutions have historically fallen under either Latin or Greek
models. While Rea and others express doubt as to whether this method
of bifurcating the modes is accurate, this method shall be assumed for
the purposes of this paper.

Latin Models
Latin models of solutions to the problem of the Trinity are so
called because they typically arise out of the West, with such think-
ers as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. They tend to stress the unity
of God and attempt to explicate how God can be a unity of essence
and a plurality of persons. These models are commonly referred to as
psychological and relational models because the examples used to il-
lustrate the Trinity often involve the mind and how various faculties
of the mind relate to each other.
For example, one of Augustine’s analogies for illustrating the
Trinity attempts to demonstrate that the “Father, Son, and Holy Spirit
are like the mind, its understanding of itself, and its love for itself.
Another—his preferred analogy—compares Father, Son and Holy
Spirit with the mind’s memory of itself, the mind’s understanding of
itself, and the act(s) of will whereby the mind obtains self –under-
standing from its own memory of itself.”9
These models reveal that the persons in the Trinity are like the
different faculties of the mind and how they relate to each other. Thus,
what differentiates one person or faculty from another is how it relates
to the other persons or faculties. However, Rea charges Augustine
with modalism. This is understandable if one believes that his view

9. Ibid., 409. Cf. Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. 9 chs. 3ff; Bk. 10 chs. 10 –12; and
Bk. 15 ch. 3.
84 Christian Apologetics Journal / Spring 2012

simply argues that each of the faculties is the mind acting or perform-
ing in a certain way. Regardless of whether Augustine’s view is actu-
ally susceptible to modalism, one can see why some may charge him
with that heresy. With this example from Augustine, one may argue
that each activity of the mind is simply a ‘mode’ of the mind at work.
However, Rea recognizes that what Augustine actually has in mind
here is relations.10
It is at this point that Rea discusses the Thomistic account of the
Trinity and Thomas’ use of relations. Thomas states,

Now distinction in God is only by relation of origin, as stated

above (Q[28], AA[2] ,3), while relation in God is not as an
accident in a subject, but is the divine essence itself; and so
it is subsistent, for the divine essence subsists. Therefore, as
the Godhead is God so the divine paternity is God the Father,
Who is a divine person. Therefore a divine person signifies a
relation as subsisting. And this is to signify relation by way
of substance, and such a relation is a hypostasis subsisting in
the divine nature, although in truth that which subsists in the
divine nature is the divine nature itself. Thus it is true to say that
the name “person” signifies relation directly, and the essence
indirectly; not, however, the relation as such, but as expressed
by way of a hypostasis. So likewise it signifies directly the
essence, and indirectly the relation, inasmuch as the essence
is the same as the hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is
expressed as distinct by the relation: and thus relation, as such,
enters into the notion of the person indirectly. Thus we can
say that this signification of the word “person” was not clearly
perceived before it was attacked by heretics. Hence, this
word “person” was used just as any other absolute term. But
afterwards it was applied to express relation, as it lent itself to
that signification, so that this word “person” means relation not
only by use and custom, according to the first opinion, but also
by force of its own proper signification.11

10. Ibid.
11. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, 29, 4. Distinctio autem in divinis
non fit nisi per relationes originis, ut dictum est supra. Relatio autem in divinis non est
sicut accidens inhaerens subiecto, sed est ipsa divina essentia, unde est subsistens, sicut
essentia divina subsistit. Sicut ergo deitas est Deus, ita paternitas divina est Deus pater,
qui est persona divina. Persona igitur divina significat relationem ut subsistentem. Et hoc
est significare relationem per modum substantiae quae est hypostasis subsistens in natura
divina; licet subsistens in natura divina non sit aliud quam natura divina. Et secundum
 A Critique of Trinity Monotheism 85

Rea shows that depending on how one interprets Aquinas, his

view of relations could result in modalism. He argues, “But even on
somewhat more careful interpretations, the Augustinian view at least
suggests that the persons are to be identified with relations. And the
Thomistic view is explicit on that score.”12 It is here that Aquinas is
charged with modalism. Relations, it is argued, typically seen to be
properties of something, not substances. “But if neither Father, Son,
nor Holy Spirit is a substance—if they are mere properties—then mo-
dalism is true.”13 However, Aquinas rejects modalism in his discussion
of whether or not there is procession from God. He argues,

Divine Scripture uses, in relation to God, names which signify

procession. This procession has been differently understood.
Some have understood it in the sense of an effect, proceeding
from its cause; so Arius took it, saying that the Son proceeds
from the Father as His primary creature, and that the Holy
Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as the creature of
both. In this sense neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost would
be true God: and this is contrary to what is said of the Son,
“That . . . we may be in His true Son. This is true God” (1
Jn. 5:20). Of the Holy Ghost it is also said, “Know you not
that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost?” (1 Cor.
6:19). Now, to have a temple is God’s prerogative. Others take
this procession to mean the cause proceeding to the effect,
as moving it, or impressing its own likeness on it; in which
sense it was understood by Sabellius, who said that God the
Father is called Son in assuming flesh from the Virgin, and
that the Father also is called Holy Ghost in sanctifying the
rational creature, and moving it to life. The words of the Lord

hoc, verum est quod hoc nomen persona significat relationem in recto, et essentiam in
obliquo, non tamen relationem inquantum est relatio, sed inquantum significatur per
modum hypostasis. Similiter etiam significat essentiam in recto, et relationem in obliquo,
inquantum essentia idem est quod hypostasis; hypostasis autem significatur in divinis ut
relatione distincta; et sic relatio, per modum relationis significata, cadit in ratione personae
in obliquo. Et secundum hoc etiam dici potest, quod haec significatio huius nominis
persona non erat percepta ante haereticorum calumniam, unde non erat in usu hoc nomen
persona, nisi sicut unum aliorum absolutorum. Sed postmodum accommodatum est hoc
nomen persona ad standum pro relativo, ex congruentia suae significationis, ut scilicet
hoc quod stat pro relativo, non solum habeat ex usu, ut prima opinio dicebat, sed etiam ex
significatione sua.
12. Rea, “Trinity,” 409.
13. Ibid., 410.
86 Christian Apologetics Journal / Spring 2012

contradict such a meaning, when He speaks of Himself, “The

Son cannot of Himself do anything” ( Jn. 5:19 ); while many
other passages show the same, whereby we know that the
Father is not the Son.14

Thus, Aquinas rejects the notion of modalism, as argued by

Sabellius. So, whatever he means by relation would at least seem to
be safeguarded from modalism.
Another example that Rea interacts with has to do with a different
aspect of psychological models, viz., on how the brain is constituted
and how it functions in relation to disorders. Trenton Merricks argues
that the Trinity might be viewed as “centers of consciousness” that are
linked with the separate hemispheres of the brain. According to Rea,

In experimental situations, commissurotomy patients—people

who have undergone a surgical procedure that severs the
bundle of nerves that allows the two hemispheres of the brain
to communicate with one another—show behavior that seems
to indicate that their consciousness is divided, as if there is a
separate stream of thought associated with each hemisphere.15

Rea argues, however, that rather than calling them “distinct psy-
chological subjects,” they should be called “fragmented psychological
subjects.”16 He sees modalism as the result of this illustration as well,
since in a person with a multiple personality disorder, the different

14. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, 27, 1. Respondeo dicendum quod
divina Scriptura, in rebus divinis, nominibus ad processionem pertinentibus utitur. Hanc
autem processionem diversi diversimode acceperunt. Quidam enim acceperunt hanc
processionem secundum quod effectus procedit a causa. Et sic accepit Arius, dicens filium
procedere a patre sicut primam eius creaturam, et spiritum sanctum procedere a patre et filio
sicut creaturam utriusque. Et secundum hoc, neque filius neque spiritus sanctus esset verus
Deus. Quod est contra id quod dicitur de filio, I Ioan. ult., ut simus in vero filio eius, hic
est verus Deus. Et de spiritu sancto dicitur, I Cor. VI, nescitis quia membra vestra templum
sunt spiritus sancti? Templum autem habere solius Dei est. Alii vero hanc processionem
acceperunt secundum quod causa dicitur procedere in effectum, inquantum vel movet
ipsum, vel similitudinem suam ipsi imprimit. Et sic accepit Sabellius, dicens ipsum Deum
patrem filium dici, secundum quod carnem assumpsit ex virgine. Et eundem dicit spiritum
sanctum, secundum quod creaturam rationalem sanctificat, et ad vitam movet. Huic autem
acceptioni repugnant verba domini de se dicentis, Ioan. V, non potest facere a se filius
quidquam; et multa alia, per quae ostenditur quod non est ipse pater qui filius.
15. Rea, “Trinity,” 410.
16. Ibid. (emphasis in original).
 A Critique of Trinity Monotheism 87

aspects of consciousness are not different natures, but rather different

aspects of one nature.17
Rea examines Brian Leftow’s view where the persons in the
Trinity are compared to a time traveler. In this example, a Rockette
named Jane discovers that two other Rockettes who are supposed to be
in the show are not going to arrive on time. So she gets in a time ma-
chine twice—once each time to cover the place of each other Rockette
that is not going to make it. Thus, Jane dances in three separate spots
in the show. There are three persons but only one Jane.18
It is not exactly clear what Leftow has in mind here, since, as Rea
notices, he is not as precise as one might like him to be. There are at
least two interpretations of Leftow’s scenario. In scenario one Jane oc-
cupies three separate positions on the stage, call them ‘L’ for left, ‘M’
for middle, and ‘R’ for right. Jane exists at once, but she takes up three
positions. However, in scenario two, Jane still occupies three posi-
tions, but since she has been transported via a time machine, the three
positions occur at different times in her life. They are three separate
‘events’. There are thus three separate Rockettes.19
Rea argues that none of the above models solve the problem of
the Trinity, at least not in the way in which they are understood in this
passage. He claims, “The reason they don’t [solve the problem] is that,
though they offer ‘senses’ in which God is both three and one, they do
not explain how it is that numerically distinct consubstantial beings
count as one God.”20

Greek Models
Greek models of the Trinity tend to be regarded as social models.
Rea states, “First and foremost, social Trinitarian theories are identi-
fied by their reliance on analogies that compare the persons of the
Trinity to things that are numerically distinct but share a common na-
ture—usually rational creatures of some sort, like human beings.”21 It
is referred to as social because these models typically set God in some

17. Ibid.
18. Brian Leftow, “A Latin Trinity,” in Faith and Reason 21, no. 3 (July 2004): 307.
19. Rea, “Trinity,” 411.
20. Ibid., 412 (emphasis in original).
21. Ibid., 413.
88 Christian Apologetics Journal / Spring 2012

type of relation such as a family or in some aspect of being in unison

with other divine members.
Rea lists the following points as characterizations of social
Trinitarianism:
1. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not numerically the same
substance. Rather, the persons of the Trinity are consubstantial
only in the sense that they share a common nature; and the
sharing is to be understood straightforwardly on analogy with
the way in which three human beings share a common nature.
2. Monotheism does not imply that there is exactly one divine
substance. Rather it implies at most only that all divine
substances—all gods, in the ordinary sense of the term
‘god’—stand in some particular relation R to one another, a
relation other than being the same divine substance.
3. The persons of the Trinity stand to one another in the relation
R that is required for monotheism to be true.22
The first point seems to result in polytheism. If the “Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit are not numerically the same substance,” then there
is more than one substance. By definition, then, there is a plurality of
substances that are divine. In other words, there is more than one God,
and hence, polytheism. This is especially drawn out when it explains
that the persons in the Trinity are three beings just like three humans
are three beings. Three humans are three beings; thus, it would logi-
cally follow that the persons in the Trinity would be three gods.

The second point seems to simply redefine what ‘monotheism’

is. If it is the case that “monotheism does not imply that there
is exactly one divine substance,” then monotheism could
be true if there was more than one divine substance, which
is the standard definition of polytheism. Thus, the term
‘monotheism’ seems to simply be redefined to fit the definition
of polytheism, while retaining the term ‘monotheism’. Further,
saying that “all divine substances” simply have some relation
to each other sounds like set theory where all members of a
group belong to the same set. Thus, what seems to be said here
is that all divine beings, no matter how many there are, simply
relate to one another as members in the set of divine beings.

22. Ibid., 413 –414 (emphasis in original).

 A Critique of Trinity Monotheism 89

Rea further goes on to offer many characteristics of what social

Trinitarians consider to allow for monotheism. He lists the most popu-
lar as follows:
(a) Being parts of a whole that is itself divine
(b) Being the only members of the only divine kind
(c) Being the only members of the community that rules the
cosmos
(d) Being the only members of a divine family
(e) Being necessarily mutually interdependent, so that nonecan
exist without the others
(f) Enjoying perfect love and harmony of will with one another,
unlike the members of pagan pantheons.23
Rea recognizes that most proponents of social Trinitarianism hold
to a mixture of these points. Many of these points are in contrast with a
traditional, classic view of God, and lead to polytheism. For example,
(b) sounds like set theory, where any number of deities may exist and
be members of that set, viz., the set of divine being. The number of de-
ities is irrelevant for this to be true. All this point seems to state is that
whatever that number happens to be, they are all members of whatever
it means to be divine. One wonders how this definition or point can
fit the definition of monotheism, and if it does not fit the definition
of monotheism, it would also appear that it would not be consistent
with the doctrine of the Trinity as set forth by such authorities as the
Nicene Creed, that posits that there is only one God. (c) is susceptible
to the same criticism because this point only seems to reword what
the members of the class do. Once again, (d) seems to suffer the same
shortcomings as the previous two points, just with a new description
of what is in the set or what they are called. (e) introduces a sense of
interdependence, but this says nothing regarding the number of per-
sons and how they relate to substances. (f), like (e), does not shed light
on how this affects the Trinity.

23. Ibid., 414.

90 Christian Apologetics Journal / Spring 2012

Trinity Monotheism and Part –Whole Relations

Rea believes that J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig hold to
(a), viz., a part –whole view of the Trinity.24 Trinity monotheism, and
particularly the part –whole view, shall be the focus of the remainder
of this work.
Before one can fully understand and appreciate Moreland and
Craig’s view on Trinity monotheism (and the part –whole distinction,
which will be introduced shortly), it is imperative to understand their
criticism of Thomas Aquinas’s view of the Trinity, as well as the doc-
trine of divine simplicity. Moreland and Craig offer Aquinas’s view as
an example of a critique of social Trinitarianism.
Moreland and Craig briefly state Aquinas’s position on the Trinity,
especially his view of subsisting relations. As Moreland and Craig un-
derstand him, “Aquinas holds that there is a likeness of the Trinity in
the human mind insofar as it understands itself and loves itself (Summa
contra gentiles 4.26.6). We find in the mind the mind itself, the mind
conceived in the intellect, and the mind beloved in the will.”25 Thus,
Moreland and Craig criticize Aquinas’s attempt at trying to demon-
strate that there are multiple persons in the Godhead by showing this
by the fact that God understands and loves himself in light of his doc-
trine of divine simplicity.26 They argue, “Despite his commitment to
divine simplicity, Aquinas regards these relations as subsisting enti-
ties in God (Summa contra gentiles 4.14.6, 11).”27 Further, “Because
the one knowing generates the one known and they share the same
essence, they are related as Father to Son. Moreover, God loves him-
self, so that God as beloved is relationally distinct from God as loving
(4.19.7 –12) and is called the Holy Spirit.”28
After describing Aquinas’s position, Moreland and Craig cri-
tique it. The first critique mentioned is that “Thomas’s doctrine of the
Trinity is doubtless inconsistent with his doctrine of divine simplicity.
Intuitively, it seems obvious that a being that is absolutely without

24. Ibid.
25. J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian
Worldview (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 585.
26. Ibid., 586.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
 A Critique of Trinity Monotheism 91

composition and transcends all distinctions cannot have real relations

subsisting within it, much less three distinct persons.”29 They go on to
insist that if, given divine simplicity, each person is identical with the
divine essence, they must each be identical to each other. Hence, ac-
cording to Moreland and Craig, “Anti –social Trinitarianism seems to
reduce to classical modalism.”30
After rejecting anti –social Trinitarianism, Moreland and Craig
offer three solutions, all of which have problems except Trinity mono-
theism. Moreland and Craig define Trinity monotheism as a view that
“holds that while the persons of the Trinity are divine, it is the Trinity
as a whole that is properly called God.”31 They further recognize that
“if this view is to be orthodox, it must hold that the Trinity alone is
God and that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, while divine, are not
Gods.”32 Further, Moreland and Craig reject the idea that the Father,
Son, and Spirit are instantiations of the divine essence. To them, there
is only one divine essence, and that is the Trinity as a whole. They
argue, “The Father, Son and Holy Spirit are not instances of the divine
nature, and that is why there are not three Gods. The Trinity is the sole
instance of the divine nature, and therefore there is but one God. So
while the statement ‘The Trinity is God’ is an identity statement, state-
ments about the persons like ‘The Father is God’ are not.”33
After saying what the Trinity is not, Moreland and Craig go on
to give an analogy of what they think is a better way of illuminating
it. Their analogy entails demonstrating how something can be a cat.
One way is simply to be an instance of a cat. Moreland and Craig
claim, “A cat’s DNA or skeleton is feline, even if neither is a cat. Nor
is this a sort of downgraded or attenuated felinity: A cat’s skeleton is
fully and unambiguously feline. Indeed, a cat just is a feline animal,
as a cat’s skeleton is a feline skeleton.”34 While a cat is a cat due to
its instantiation of the feline nature, Moreland and Craig argue that a
cat’s DNA or skeleton are parts of a cat. With this in mind, they argue,

29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., 586 –587.
31. Ibid., 589.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., 590.
34. Ibid., 591.
92 Christian Apologetics Journal / Spring 2012

“This suggests that we could think of the persons of the Trinity as

divine because they are parts of the Trinity, that is, parts of God.”35
“Now obviously,” they continue, “the persons are not parts of God in
the sense in which a skeleton is part of a cat; but given that the Father,
for example, is not the whole Godhead, it seems undeniable that there
is some sort of part –whole relation obtaining between the persons of
the Trinity and the entire Godhead.”36
Since, according to Moreland and Craig, parts can possess cer-
tain properties, then so can the whole. Thus, the divine nature has
the properties of omniscience, omnipotence, etc., because the parts, or
persons, do. The parts, or persons share other attributes such as neces-
sity, because the whole (Godhead) possesses them. “The point is,” for
Moreland and Craig, “that if we think of the divinity of the persons
in terms of a part –whole relation to the Trinity that God is, then their
deity seems in no way diminished because they are not instances of
the divine nature.”37
Next is the question of whether Moreland and Craig think that the
part –whole relation is orthodox. On the one hand they believe that the
church fathers seemed to allow for their view, which is simply that the
Father is not the complete Godhead. However, “on the other hand,”
they recognize “that a number of post –Nicene creeds, probably under
the influence of the doctrine of simplicity, do include statements that
can be construed to identify each person of the Trinity with God as a
whole.”38 They give several illustrations. “For example, the Eleventh
Council of Toledo (675) affirms, ‘Each single person is wholly God
in Himself,’ the so –called Athanasian Creed (fifth century) enjoins
Christians to acknowledge every Person by himself to be God and
Lord. . . .”39 The problem that Moreland and Craig see with this is that
if the creeds have in mind identity relations, such as “The Father is
God,” then that would seem to imply that the Father is the Son, and
so forth.

35. Ibid.
36. Ibid. (emphasis in original).
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
 A Critique of Trinity Monotheism 93

Moreland and Craig seem to argue that Protestants should evalu-

ate these creeds with Scripture, claiming, “Nothing in Scripture war-
rants us in thinking that God is simple and that each person of the
Trinity is identical to the whole Trinity. Nothing in Scripture prohibits
us from maintaining that the three persons of the Godhead stand in
some sort of part –whole relation to the Trinity.”40 “Therefore,” they
conclude, “Trinity monotheism cannot be condemned as unorthodox
in a biblical sense.”41
Moreland and Craig recognize that they are still faced with a prob-
lem: how three beings that are said to be parts of a whole do not com-
prise three separate beings rather than just one. Once again Moreland
and Craig offer an analogy. There was a three headed dog in Greco
–Roman mythology that guarded the gates of Hades. The dog’s name
was Cerberus. The heads can be supposed to have a brain each, and
thus a center of consciousness. Moreland and Craig give each head,
or center of consciousness a name: Rover, Bowser, and Spike. While
each person, or center of consciousness may have certain differences
with the others, Cerberus was one dog. According to Moreland and
Craig, “Rover, Bowser and Spike may be said to be canine too, though
they are not three dogs, but parts of the one dog Cerberus.”42 Thus,
if one member of Cerberus, says Spike, bit someone, Moreland and
Craig argue that it would be correct to say that Cerberus bit the person.
Moreland and Craig continue, “Although the church fathers rejected
analogies like Cerberus, once we give up divine simplicity, Cerberus
does seem to represent what Augustine called an image of the Trinity
among creatures.”43
In an attempt to better elucidate the analogy with the Trinity,
Moreland and Craig ask the reader to imagine that Cerberus dies, but
retains the three centers of consciousness. Cerberus still retains three
centers of consciousness after death, but no longer has a body. Next,
Moreland and Craig liken this analogy with the human soul in com-
parison to the divine nature and three persons. Moreland and Craig

40. Ibid., 593.

41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
94 Christian Apologetics Journal / Spring 2012

compare God to a soul, or “a mental substance.”44 When people think

of human souls, Moreland and Craig argue, they typically only think
of one person, because souls of humans are part of one center of con-
sciousness, or one person. However, this is not true of God, Moreland
and Craig explain. God can exist as one soul with three centers of
consciousness.45

EVALUATION OF TRINITY MONOTHEISM

A Word about Simplicity

The first item to note is that Trinity Monotheism is based on a re-
jection of divine simplicity. Thus, if divine simplicity were true, then
Trinity monotheism would be false. This would be the case because
if God is simple, that is, without parts or composition, then it would
make no sense to talk about parts of a being that has no parts. Since
there would be no parts, the three persons of the Trinity could not be
said to be parts of the Trinity. Thus, it is important to understand, at
least briefly, why Moreland and Craig reject divine simplicity.
Besides claiming that divine simplicity “enjoys no biblical sup-
port and even is at odds with the biblical conception of God in vari-
ous ways,” Moreland and Craig cite several philosophical arguments
against the doctrine.46 They argue, “According to the doctrine of di-
vine simplicity God has no distinct attributes, he stands in no real rela-
tions, his essence is not distinct from his existence, he just is the pure
act of being subsisting.”47 Further, they claim, “While we can say what
God is not like, we cannot say what he is like, except in an analogi-
cal sense. But these predications must in the end fail, since there is no
univocal element in the predicates we assign to God, leaving us in a
state of genuine agnosticism about the nature of God.”48
Moreland and Craig’s first philosophical objection is that “God
has no distinct attributes,” and that “all such distinctions exist only

44. Ibid., 594.

45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., 524. Moreland and Craig do not cite any examples of how divine simplicity
is “at odds with the biblical conception of God.”
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid. (emphasis in original).
 A Critique of Trinity Monotheism 95

in our minds.” This is simply false. It is correct that the distinction

between God’s attributes is in one’s mind, but it is not only in the
mind. God is one in terms of his existence and essence, as well as his
attributes. However, the distinction is also found in God. While rec-
ognizing that there is a distinction of God’s attributes in one’s mind,
Maurice R. Holloway states, “But this distinction of reason is not due
merely to the one reasoning. It is also due to the very thing reasoned
about, namely God and the perfections of God.”49 “And the reason for
the distinction,” according to Holloway’s argument, “is fundamentally
the same. Just as our intellect cannot exhaust in a single concept the
fullness of being, but must exploit this fullness by more and more ex-
press and explicit concepts . . . God’s Being as knowable through crea-
tures . . . must express that fullness in many and distinct concepts.”50
Thus, it is false that God does not have distinct attributes.
Moreland and Craig’s next argument is that God stands in no real
relations. It is true that God is not related to creation, but creation is
related to him. Moreland and Craig understand that this is Aquinas’s
position, but they argue, “Thus God is perfectly similar in all logically
possible worlds we can imagine, but in some worlds either different
creatures stand in relation to God or no creatures at all exist and are
related to God. Thus the same simple cognitive state counts as knowl-
edge of one conjunction of propositions in a [sic] another world.”51 To
them, “Thomas’s doctrine only serves to make divine simplicity more
incredible. For it is incomprehensible how the same cognitive state
can be knowledge that ‘I exist alone’ in one world and that ‘I have
created myriads of creatures in another.’”52 They continue, “Moreover,
what God knows is still different, even if God’s cognitive state is the
same; and since God is his knowledge, contingency is introduced into
God . . . Thus to contend that God stands in no real relations to things
is to make the existence or nonexistence of creatures . . . independent
of God and . . . mysterious.”53

49. Maurice R. Holloway, An Introduction to Natural Theology (Saint Louis: Saint

Louis University Press, 1959), 248.
50. Ibid., 248 –249.
51. Moreland and Craig, Foundations, 525.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid. (emphasis in original).
96 Christian Apologetics Journal / Spring 2012

In response, it is unclear what Moreland and Craig mean when

they say “in some worlds either different creatures stand in relation to
God or no creatures at all exist and are related to God” since something
that does not exist cannot have a relation, for in order for something to
relate to something else, it must exist. Further, it seems that Moreland
and Craig assume that God’s knowledge is dependent on things that
exist external to him. However, this is false. God does not know things
in the same way that humans do. He does not have to “look” outside
of himself and “find out” what the situation is. God knows all things
intuitively. Thus, there is no contingency found in God, for his knowl-
edge is not contingent on anything external to himself. Last, God is
not changed in the least by the existence of creatures, or their relation
to him. Thus, Moreland and Craig’s argument that God must be re-
lated to creatures is false. God is not related to creation, but creation
is related to God.
The next objection is that it makes no sense to say that God’s
essence is his existence. They claim, “Finally, to say that God’s es-
sence just is his existence seems wholly obscure, since then there is in
God’s case no entity that exists; there is just the existing itself without
any subject. Things exist; but it is unintelligible to say that exists just
exists.”54 It seems that Moreland and Craig are essentialists. Further,
there is nothing unintelligible about saying that God is pure existence.
Further, this is a conclusion based on a demonstration that God is not
composed of act and potency; rather, he is pure act. Since act is syn-
onymous with existence, it is right to say that God is pure existence.
Concerning Moreland and Craig’s assertion that one cannot know
what God is like, this does not depend on divine simplicity, but this
problem exists even for those who do not hold divine simplicity.
However, the fact that one is left in some aspect of agnosticism about
God should not require one to reject simplicity so that one can say that
he can know something positive about God. It seems to be the case
that what one knows about God’s nature is greatly left in agnosticism.
However, this should not do any damage to divine simplicity.
If the doctrine of divine simplicity is found to be true, then Trinity
monotheism is false, since it relies on God having parts. The author
believes that Moreland and Craig’s arguments against the doctrine do

54. Ibid. (emphasis in original).

 A Critique of Trinity Monotheism 97

not withstand careful scrutiny, and thus, the doctrine still stands. Thus,
it is incorrect to claim that God has parts, even in referring to the per-
sons of the Trinity.

Subsisting Relations
Aquinas foresaw Moreland and Craig’s objection that his subsist-
ing relations and view simplicity result in modalism. The objection is
stated: “It would seem that the persons are not distinguished by the
relations. For simple things are distinct by themselves. But the persons
are supremely simple. Therefore they are distinguished by themselves,
and not by the relation.”55 Aquinas responds to the objection by not-
ing, “The persons are the subsisting relations themselves. Hence it is
not against the simplicity of the divine persons for them to be distin-
guished by the relations.”56 Rather than each person being identical to
each other, as Moreland and Craig maintain, the persons are distinct
because the persons are the relations.

Finite Parts Do Not Add Up To an Infinite Whole

Moreland and Craig believe that each person of the Trinity is not
the Trinity. They also argue that each person in the Trinity is a part of
the Trinity. Further, they want to demonstrate that each part contrib-
utes something to the whole, such as omnipotence. However, other
attributes, such as “necessity, aseity and eternity,” exist because “God
as a whole has them.”57 It would seem that adding parts that do not
inherently contain something, such as necessity, the whole would not
either. For, how can three parts that do not contain property x contrib-
ute x to the whole? Either they have x or they do not. If they have x,
then the whole would also have x. If they do not, then the whole would
not. Brian Leftow makes this same observation. He says:

If the Trinity is just a collection, it does not literally know

anything. A fortiori it is not omniscient. If the Trinity is a

55. Aquinas, Summa, I, 40, 2. Videtur quod personae non distinguantur per relationes.
Simplicia enim seipsis distinguuntur. Sed personae divinae sunt maxime simplices. Ergo
distinguuntur seipsis, et non relationibus.
56. Ibid. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod personae sunt ipsae relationes subsistentes.
Unde non repugnat simplicitati divinarum personarum, quod relationibus distinguantur.
57. Moreland and Craig, Foundations, 591.
98 Christian Apologetics Journal / Spring 2012

collection, talk of what it knows is in this case just an ellipsis

for talk of what all the Persons know, in common or else as
a sum. But what the Persons know in common cannot be
greater than what any one Person knows, for the intersection
of the Persons’ bodies of knowledge cannot be larger than any
single Person’s body of knowledge. And if there is a sum of
knowledge greater than that which any Person possesses, but
the Trinity is not literally a knower, what still follows from
this is not that the Trinity is omniscient but that there is no
omniscient knower at all.58

Thus, if the persons in the Trinity do not posses property x, then

neither will the whole.

The Fourth Case Argument

Brian Leftow levels another criticism against Trinity monotheism.
He asserts:

Either the Trinity is a fourth case of the divine nature, in

addition to the Persons, or it is not. If it is, we have too many
cases of deity for orthodoxy. If it is not, and yet is divine, there
are two ways to be divine—by being a case of deity, and by
being a Trinity of such cases. If there is more than one way to
be divine, Trinity monotheism becomes Plantingian Arianism.
But if there is in fact only one way to be divine, then there are
two alternatives. One is that only the Trinity is God, and God
is composed of non –divine Persons. The other is that the sum
of all divine Persons is somehow not divine. To accept this last
claim would be to give up Trinity monotheism altogether.59

In other words, either the Trinity is a fourth thing or it is not. If it

is, Trinity monotheism is not orthodox. If it is not, there are different
ways of being divine, supposing the Trinity is thus divine, by either
being an instance of a divine person, or by being a Trinity. However,
as Leftow argues, if there is more than one way of being God, then
Arianism would seem to follow. If there is just one way to be divine,
either it seems that Trinity monotheism is true, where God is made up

58. Brian Leftow, “Anti Social Trinitarianism,” in The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary

Symposium on the Trinity, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 211 –212.
59. Ibid., 221.
 A Critique of Trinity Monotheism 99

of persons who are not divine, or that even adding all of the divine
persons still does not produce a divine being. Moreland and Craig are
aware of Leftow’s criticism. They answer by asserting that the Trinity
is the only instance of the divine nature. The persons of the Trinity
do not instantiate the divine nature, but make up the divine nature.
The Trinity is a property of divinity that none of the persons share
alone. Further, they claim that the phrase, “The Trinity is God,” is a
statement of identity, whereas statements such as “The Father is God”
which pick out persons are not.60 In the latter type statement, the term
‘God’ has more to do with a function then a nature, such as one being
king. However, this seems problematic, for being God does not seem
to be a function or an office, but rather a nature. It would be incorrect
to say that one is a human in simply a functional sense. Rather, be-
ing human, or divine, seems to concern something’s nature. Thus, for
Moreland and Craig, there is just one divine nature, and they believe
they have escaped Leftow’s criticism.61
In the author’s view, rather than answering Leftow’s criticism,
they merely circumvent it. If the Trinity is what it means to be divine,
and the three persons are not divine in themselves, then something
else is necessary, namely a fourth thing. For three non –divine beings
cannot be added together to make a divine being. Moreland and Craig
simply restate their position. The author believes that Leftow’s argu-
ment stands.

Orthodoxy
While Moreland and Craig claim that they are orthodox, this
would seem to not be the case. They even admit that the creeds, par-
ticularly the post –Athanasian creeds, hold that each of the persons of
the Trinity is fully God. The Father is God. The Son is God. The Holy
Spirit is God. To say that the three persons simply comprise the divine
being is an explicit rejection of the divinity of the three persons. Thus,
the author believes that Moreland and Craig are unorthodox in their
position of Trinity monotheism.

60. Cf. Moreland and Craig, Foundations, 590 –591.

61. Cf. Ibid., 590 –592.
100 Christian Apologetics Journal / Spring 2012

CONCLUSION
The Trinity is an incredibly difficult doctrine to understand. There
have been many types of solutions, such as psychological and social.
The former stresses the unity of God while the latter stresses the plu-
rality of the persons.
Trinity monotheism is an example of social Trinitarianism, which
argues that each of the three persons while not divine themselves make
up the divine being, viz., the Trinity. It has been shown that Trinity
monotheism has serious problems, which might result in unorthodoxy.