INSTITUT FUR KULTUR- UND GEISTESGESCHICHTE ASIENS

DER ~STERREICHISCHENAKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN

-
INSTITUT FUR SUDASIEN-, TIBET- UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE
DER UNIVERSITAT WIEN

WIENER ZEITSCHRIFT
FUR DIE
KUNDE SUDASIENS
VIENNA JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES

Herausgegeben von

GERHARD OBERHAMMER
KARIN PREISENDANZ
CHLODWIG H. WERBA

Band XLV
200 1

VERLAG
DER OSTERREICHISCHEN AKADEMIE D E R WISSENSCHAFTEN
WIEN 2001
58 0. von Hinuber

Gegenwartig lassen sich also Fragen stellen, doch nur wenige vorlaufig
beantworten. Letzteres gilt fur die Entwicklung des Piitimokkha-Sutta.
Denn a u s den nochmals vorgetragenen und in Einzelheiten genauer
gefaftten Grunden kann man durchaus an der entworfenen Vor-
geschichte dieses Textes festhalten, soweit denn eben die Quellen tragen
und einen Einblick in diese friihe Entwicklung erlauben.
 Tilmann Vetter

Once Again on the Origin of MahiiyZna Buddhism*

Edited & Translated by Anne MacDonald

As is well known, a textual source which might be pinpointed as "the

original" Mahiiyiina document, the source of all later Mahayana devel-
opment, is not available to us. Even the oldest extant texts presuppose
the existence of the movement, and present the new strain of Buddhist
thought a n d practice a s one already distinguished by a certain histori-
city.l Yet even without one o r more "Ur"-documents, one may still
attempt, on the basis of the existing text material and its presupposi-
tions, t o determine a n d trace specific lines of influence and t o recon-
struct early features of the movement. The present paper aims t o refine
- and e x p a n d on points of argumentation set forth in my paper entitled
"On the Origin of Mahgyiina Buddhism and the Subsequent Introduc-
tion of Prajfiiipiiramitii,"2 in which I argued against the generally held
notion t h a t Mahiiygna and Prajfi%p&ramitiiare identical, a n d for the
thesis that the two came together to merge a t a certain moment in time,
and y e t did not always and everywhere remain united.
The o l d e s t Mahiiygna documents a t our disposal are. nine Chinese trans-
lat'ions f r o m Indic texts that were produced under the direction of the
so-called Lokaksema a n d can be dated with some certainty t o 160-180
CE.3 They consist for the most p a r t of curious transliterations of Indian
names, places and concepts4 which render them practically unreadable

* The present article is a revised and enlarged version of my lecture "Ma-

hayana historisch." presented in the lecture series "Buddhismus in Geschichte
und Gegenwart" at the University of Hamburg, May 31, 2000. I wish t o express
my sincere appreciation t o K. Preisendanz and A. MacDonald for t h e i r editorial
engagement.
' Cf. Harrison 1993: 139f.
Cf. Vetter 1994.
D e t a i l e d in Harrison 1993: 141-177.
For example, the beginning of the Asta a t T 224.425~4-6reads: \% f6
(= Buddha) resided on the mountain "I?M@ qi dii jue (= Grdhrakuta) [at]
3 % luo yuk qi (= Rajagrha) [with] an inestimable @$!JbkE@ m6 he bi qio
seng (= maha-bhiksu-sangha): the 6ravakas &$'J% she 11 fu (= 6ariputra), %%%
xu pu ti (= Subhuti), etc., [and] innumerable E@5"!%%mo he pu sa (= Maha-
bodhisattva): ^SibgRimi le pu sa (= Maitreya Bodhisattva), 3?:%i%i%lJ wen shu

WZKS 45 (2001) 59-90

60 T. Vetter

for both Chinese persons untrained in Buddhology and pure Sinolo-

g i s h 5 Of t h e s e nine m a s , three have been, in whole or in part, made
accessible through scholarly studies and/or translations into European
languages, albeit additionally and sometimes primarily on the basis of
other textual versions? 1) "The Samsdhi of Direct Encounter with the
Buddhas of the Present" (henceforth, for the text in general, Samadhi of
Direct Encounter: for t h e oldest version, ama ad hi of Direct Encoun-
terciJ, translated from t h e Tibetan, with consideration of the Chinese
versions, i n t o English by H a r r i ~ o n ,2)~ the K&syapaparivarta (hence-
forth. for t h e text in general, Kgiyapaparivarta; for the oldest version,
KiGyapaparivarta,-,,,J,* translated from different versions into German by

s h i li (1Maiijusri), etc." Prajfiap&ramit&is transliterated throughout as &^T&^I@?

b0 rub b6 luo m i , for the first time in line 4 2 5 ~ 8in ; the first two chapters it is an
expression for a spiritual method, later i t is also used as an expression for a text
containing this method.
Japanese Buddhologists tend also t o be challenged by the Chinese of these
texts; the pioneer work of a few of them is only slowly gaining some influence.
By "other textual versions" I mean 1) the other Chinese translations of the
Indic texts; t h e earliest ones are, generally speaking, the least extensive, occasion-
ally presenting a form of t h e t e x t which differs from t h a t of the Sanskrit versions
now available and from the Tibetan translations, which tend to correspond t o these
later Sanskrit versions, and 2 ) the transmitted Sanskrit versions and the Chinese
translations of o t h e r Prajfi&p~rarnit% texts. As regards l ) ,the succession of trans-
lations i& as follows. For the Samgdhi of Direct Encounter: T 418 (second century
CE),T4l7, a n abridgement of 418, T 419 (third century), T 416 (sixth century); see
Harrison 1990: xv-xvi. For t h e Kasyapaparivarta: T 350 (second century CE), T
351 (thiri t o f i f t h centuries), T 310 (43) [the text appears as the 43rdpart of a sfitra
collection] ( t h i r d t o fifth centuries, but later than T 351) and T 352 (around 900 CE;
i t is remarkable t h a t the t e x t survived until then in a n independent form); see
Stael-Holstein 1926: VIII-XII. For the Asta: T 224 (second century CE), T 225
(third century), T 226 (fourth century), T 227 (fifth century), T 220-5 a n d T 220-4
(seventh century), T 228 (tenth century); for the first three versions, see Lancaster
1968: 11-22;for all versions, see Conze 1978: 46. As concerns 2), let me refer at least
t o the AstSda&as5hasrika, of which important sections of the Gilgit manuscript
h a v e been edited and translated into English in Conze 1962 and 1974, a n d t o the
Paiicaviqiatika, of which N. D u t t has edited a Nepalese manuscript ( D u t t 1934)
a n d Verboom, i n an 82 page appendix t o his dissertation (Verboorn 1 9 9 8 ) , has
edited the section of the Gilgit manuscript corresponding to the first c h a p t e r of
t h e Asta.
Cf. H a r r i s o n 1990.
Stael-Holstein states t h a t he has chosen the title The Kdgyapapariuarta for
his Sanskrit t e x t edition, which is accompanied by a Tibetan text edition a n d the
f o u r Chinese translations of t h e same text, "in order to avoid confusion" (1926:VI).
He explains t h a t t h e text had originally circulated as an independent work entitled
Ratnakiita a n d o n l y later came to be incorporated as a parivarta in a larger cyclus
 Once Again on the Origin of Mahgygna Buddhism 61

Weller9 a n d 3) the Astasiihasriks Prajfigpiiramitii (henceforth, for the

text in general, Asta; for the oldest version, Astach,),for which ground-
breaking work has been done on the first chapter by Schmithausen1Â
and Verboom.ll The first of these three sfitras contains elements of a
devotional Buddhism, elements which are, in my opinion, much older
than either Mahayiina or Prajfiiip&ramit&.12 Where, however, reference
to M a h s y ~ n aand Prajfiiip%ramit% occurs in it, neither appears in a very
early form, a n d I thus leave this sutra, already dealt with in my 1994
article, for t h e most part to the side. My primary focus here will be the
first chapter of the Astachi and the K5iyapaparivartachi,since the two,
specifically t h e beginning of the Astachl and the supplement to the
KGyapaparivartach,, contain the textual passages most pertinent to
this study, o n whose basis one can infer that Mahiiysna and Prajfiapii-
ramitii originated in separate, distinct environments. Both the Kaiya-
paparivarta and the Asta are extant in Sanskrit, although the former
presents large lacunae. The oldest Chinese translations of the two that I
base myself o n are, as is oft the case, shorter than the more extensive
Sanskrit versions. I shall first consider, here in reliance on all three
texts, t h e original meaning of t h e name "Mahayana," and then, on
the basis of the sections in the Astach, and the K&yapaparivartachl,
discuss w h a t was originally meant by Prajfiiipiiramitg and how the two
eventually came together. A look a t two other somewhat later texts,
where Mahaysna and Prajfi&p%ramit&are once again separated, or,
better said, have become largely irrelevant for each other, will conclude
the paper.

which appropriated, probably in the fourth century CE, the name Ratnakfita for
itself. It would seem that the text came to be known as Kssyapaparivarta only
subsequent t o its inclusion in the larger collection of sfitras (V-VI). Frauwallner,
referring t o t h e text as Ratnakfita in his Philosophic des Buddhismus (1956: 163, n.
l),does n o t deem that i t should be cited as the Kiisyapaparivarta. There is little to
say against designating the text Ratnakuta if, especially in this case of an anthol-
ogy. it is m a d e clear to the reader that the text, and not the collection, is intended.
The oldest version is translated in Weller 1970 (henceforth W).
Cf. Schmithausen 1977.
l 1 Cf. Verboom 1998. - Mention should also be made of Lancaster 1968. This
study includes an English translation of the Chinese version of the Sadgprarudita
story (p. 234-309),a version deviating notably from the Sanskrit one (see V, chap-
ters 30-31). Of less importance is Conze 1975 because the translation is based on a
Sanskrit version of the Asta which seems to have been completed only around 1000
CE.
l2 Cf. Vetter 1999a.
 T. Vetter

ON THE ORIGINALMEANINGO F THE NAMEMAHAY~NA

maha. the initial member of the compound mah6yana. means "great";

yana is rendered in the developed Chinese and Tibetan translation tra-
ditions-a s "vehicle" (% sheng; theg-pa).What might be termed a "luxury
object."13b y means of which a n individual is able to proceed from point
A to point B more comfortably and/or more speedily than by foot,
serves in t h e later tradition as the image for a spiritual practice which
conveys one from an undesirable t o a desirable state. Although the
image suggests that one moves, via the practice, toward the goal with
increased ease, it does not bring with it the connotations t h a t the prac-
tice would be a n absolutely necessary one or that the individual in-
volved would personally have t o invest any additional effort.
I have n o t f o u n d this image of a vehicle in the oldest versions of the
three aforementioned texts (cf. also below, p. 65ff.) in which, it might be
noted, a Chinese equivalent for mah@ana only rarely occurs. I n the
passage in t h e first chapter of the Astach, (T 224) about to be discussed,
where m a h a y m a is explained from the point of view of Prajii&p&ramit%,
t h e Perfection of Wisdom, the word is merely transliterated with @fi^@J
mo he yen, as it also is i n one1*of the two m a h a y h a references I was
able to locate in T 418 with the aid of Harrison's glossary t o the Sa-
miidhi of D i r e c t Encounter.15 It might be surmised, on the basis of the
later translations, that t h e meaning of "vehicle" would also be intended
b y these transliterations. However, a t the other reference in the Sa-
madhi of D i r e c t Encounter^,,, and at three places in the Kiisyapapari-
vartaph,,all of which latter can be compared with existing Sanskrit text
passages, yana is translated, not transliterated, and a different image is
evoked, namely, the "way" (i.e., the "way" indispensible for progress
from A to B, which has t o be traversed on the basis of one's own efforts),
t h u s speaking against such a n assumption. @J~M f6 dao "Buddha-way,"
or, more freely, the way leading t o Buddhahood, at the second reference
in the Samadhi of Direct E n c o ~ n t e r ~is, found
, ~ ~ where equivalents for
l 3 The Chinese character 3 % was, according to U. Unger, used to stand for a
"Viergespann," t h a t is, a carriage drawn by four animals (1989: 99); the Tibetan
expression includes, so H.A. Jaschke, also animals ridden such as elephants and
horses (1881: 2 3 5 ) . The designations were obviously not used to describe necessary,
unavoidable and thus non-luxury means of transportation, such as those utilized
for transporting persons over natural obstacles like rivers.
T 4l8.910al7.
l 5 Harrison 1990: 327.

l6 T 4 l8.904a7.
64 T. Vetter

I n the passage already referred to in the first chapter of the Astami

which m a h q a n a is discussed from the standpoint of PrajEiparamit
t h e expression is, as previously stated, merely transliterated. The c
t e x t reveals little about how mahayana is to be interpreted, since t
Buddha's focus here is on the demolishing of existing ideas about
r n a h q ~ a This
. section presents considerable grammatical difficulties
towards its end, but what is understandable, specifically, the questions
posed b y Subhfiti and part of the Buddha's answer, brings us a step
further. Subhati asks the Buddha 1) how a person becomes one who has
set him~elfin motion the m a h w n a , 2) what this rnahayana is, 3)
what has been left behind when one is on the r n a h d ~ a n a4) , ~ how
~ one
comes [toward the goal] on [this] ~ 6 n a ~ ~ [ a n5)d who
] , realizes the yana
-
water {jala-@a), and perhaps gods and men who carry gods or men on their
shoulders or backs (deva-yana; manussa-yana). Additionally, PTSD calls attention
t o two much older passages where ydna obviously does not refer to any sort of a
vehicle and r a t h e r means "way," although this is not made explicit in the PTSD.
T h i s shade of meaning as found in y m a in the compound deva-ydna in the first of
t h e passa,ges, viz., Sn v. 139, is close t o the old upanishadic idea of a way (not a
vehicle) to t h e gods (see also in the same verse brahmalokupago; cp. DN I 215,27:
devayliniyo maggo). "Way" m a y , however, be meant in a metaphorical sense in Sn
v. 139: one choses the way, t h a t is, the conduct, which will bring one to the world of
t h e gods. In Therigatha v. 389, where the second occurrence of ydna in this mean-
i n g is found, t h e demands of t h e metre and the attempt for tonal effect result in
m a g g a t ~ g i k a y a n a y a y i mexpressing, rather awkwardly, the fact that a nun treds
the eight-fold w a y . ydna here is not something with which she has herself trans-
ported: rather, she herself effects her movement, i.e., by her practice of an eightfold
discipline. This discipline is normally indicated b y the word magga, but magga of
t h e relevant compound, its meaning superseded by that of ydna, has become only a
superfluous qualifier for atthangikayana.
24 T 224.427~27-428al3;cp. V 11,30-12,24.
25 Where I here and in the following read "on" (referring to "way"), one could
a l s o read "in," all the more t o test if "vehicle" is not after all meant here. B u t also
associated with t h e idea of a vehicle are the ideas t h a t one has oneself transported
and does not have t o exert oneself, neither of which seems t o me to be implied in the
questions posed.
26 Lokaksema may here a n d in the next have found [mahdlyane i n his
text, and not mahayanam, as attested in the corresponding question in the Sanskrit
version available t o us (kuto va tan mahayanam nirymyati). In the question as
found in the Chinese text t h a t which is referred t o as departing is not mahdyma,
b u t rather the person who moves on it.
27 The grammar of the fourth question as it appears in Chinese is somewhat
opaque, but t h e above translation, if various Sanskrit parallels are taken into
consideration (see Verboom 1998: 139ff.), may reproduce the intention adequately.
See also the second answer of t h e Buddha's, where he apparently in reaction t o this
question speaks of all-knowingness.
 Once Again on the Origin of Mahiiygna Buddhism 65

(which would mean: who moves toward t h e goal on the yana). The
Buddha answers: "mhayana, mahay-, it has no measure, one finds
no limits." Subhiiti asks t h e Buddha [again]: "I want t o know, as re-
g a r d s this y a m , whence one departs [on it] (also possible here: whence it
departs)." T h e Buddha answers: "One (or: it) departs from the triple
world and o n e (or: it) comes t o a stop in j@Z'^r sa yun ruo (= sarvafiata,
'all-knowingness'). There is, however, no one (or: nothing) who (or:
which) departs from something, [moves] on it [and] arrives [some-
where]."
F r o m the continuing, in p a r t q u i t e complicated text, I shall for the time
b e i n g refer t o only one more passage,28where m a h w n a is compared
w i t h dkdsa; it is stated t h a t one can count t h e beings on it as little as one
c a n count the beings in m a .
Although an explanation for mafia ("great"), namely, "measureless"
a n d "limitless," appears in this section of t h e Asta?,,, one for yana does
not. The possibility of relating verbs of movement and of coming t o a
standstill t o y h a as subject -which might speak for the interpretation
of yam as "vehicle" - is initially lacking, and later on only minimally
given. Moreover, the comment t h a t beings on this yana are innumer-
a b l e would a p p e a r to point t o a n interpretation of the word as Loka-
ksema understands it in t h e K2&yapaparivartachiand the Samadhi of
Direct EncountercH,namely, as way." Certainly the image of a way
(.(.

lends itself m o r e easily t o being imagined as something relied on by

innumerable individuals t o reach a goal than t h a t of a singular vehicle.
O f interest i n this regard is t h e fact that t h e yana mentioned in a n oft
occurring formula in the Pali Suttapitaka refers to a relatively small
wagon or carriage, and certainly not to a vehicle designed t o transport
a large p a r t y of individuals. It is stereotypically stated there, regard-
l e s s of whether the concerned individual is a courtesan (qanika, e.g.
V i n I 231,12), a householder (qahapati, e.g. Vin I 242,18) or a king
(raja e.g. MN I1 118,10), t h a t these persons have vehicles reined
(plural: y a n i yojapetva), mount a vehicle (singular: yanam abhiru-
h i t % and t h e n with [these] vehicles (plural: yanehi) take leave of a
certain place in order to visit the Buddha who is staying somewhere on
t h e outskirts of this place. Thus even the persons making up t h e en-
tourage of m o r e ordinary persons of means would not have found room
i n the same wagon their master(s) traveled in, and probably had t o
distribute themselves into several wagons, as was the case w i t h the
66 T. Vetter

entourage of the highest dignitaries. These observations support, or in

any case d o n o t refute, t h e idea, inspired primarily by the early scrip?
tures where y h a is translated with "way," t h a t mahayana originally
meant "great way" or "great career." It might alternatively be prof
posed t h a t some sort of over-dimensional bus in which all living beings
could travel is implied by the Buddha's assertion that this yana is
limitlessness, and one in which, like in &aka, beings are innumerable,
yet this idea of a bus would entail their not having t o exert themselves
any longer, a n d nowhere in the first chapter of the Astach, does there
occur any allusion to t h e idea t h a t one attains Buddhahood without
effort. The Praj&p%ramit&offered tlo the Bodhisattvas guarantees only
a reduction i n the exertion required. I have further not found the idea of
joint traveling in a great vehicle in connection with the word rnahayana
even in t h e basic texts of the Pure Land tradition, where it might be
expected. In t h e few passages in which the word mafwyana occurs in the
Chinese translations - posterior t o Lokaksema's translations - of these
basic texts,2g the translation A?@"great wagon7' is indeed employed,
b u t - the repeated appeal that m a h w n a not be reviled aside (which
many a Conservative Buddhist of t h a t time seems to have engaged in,
a n d which is of no consequence for the question at hand) - there occurs,
in The Stitra of the Contemplation on the Buddha of Immeasurable
Life,30even a contrary piece of evidence. There the Buddha states of
someone: i^6%@. Both the Ryukoku team and Inagaki3I translate:
' Y o u have practised the M a h g y ~ n a . "From this it is clear that maha-
yana is a n object of exertion. We can further see that the character
reflecting y a n a , i.e., the character for "wagon" - perhaps introduced
because t h e Chinese Buddhists had by then come to know "vehicle" as
t h e almost exclusive literal meaning of yana in the traditional siitras -
causes problems in such sentences, for even if y m a is to be taken in a

I base myself on the "Glossarial Index7' in Inagaki 1994.

30 Sec p . 86 (section IV 8). The sfitra has been [edited,] translated and anno-
t a t e d by the Ryukoku University Translation Center under the direction of Meiji
Yamada, K y o t o 1984. The introduction states that according to the tradition, the
si&z was translated in the fifth century by a monk stemming from Central Asia,
a n d that it w a s apparently n o t known in India. It is assumed that the translation
w a s made f r o m a satra written in Central Asia or that the text as such was com-
posed only in China. I t is amazing how long mahaydna continued to appear as the
object of the verb $7, which, according t o Unger 1989, means "to go, travel, act,
c a r r y out," a n d which could have a vehicle as object a t the most in the sense of one
which is pushed o r pulled.
31 Inagaki 1994: 341.
 Once Again on the Origin of Mahgyana Buddhism 67

metaphorical sense, it is difficult t o imagine a wagon or a ship as some-

thing which i s "practised." The Japanese translators have thus rightly
avoided using the common English equivalent "Great Vehicle."
But just how a r e we then to understand the text of the Astach,when it
speaks of t h e limitlessness of the mahayana, on which there is room for
innumerable beings? I suspect that it aims to communicate that this is a
path which every being without exception may (eventually) enter. This
is not yet t h e same as the claim found in the Lotussfitra that all in-
dividuals are i n the end obliged t o participate. The case here is that
anyone and everyone may become a n omniscient Buddha. Any misgiv-
ings that t h e extended access to the path could result in the immediate
universe becoming over-populated with Buddhas at a given moment are
unfounded; there exist infinite worlds offering room for an infinity of
Buddhas .32

The s t a t e m e n t that i t is impossible for two Buddhas to arise a t the same time
for (or: in) a single lokadhatu (at*- . .. yam ekissd lokadhatuyd dve arahanto
s a ~ s a m b u d d h aapubbam acarimam uppajjeyyum}, appearing a t four places in
the Pali S u t t a p i t a k a (DN I1 225,3; DN I11 114,24;MN I11 65,14; AN I 27,38), finds
a context only in DN I1 224 (Mahggovindasutta): When the "thirty-three gods,"
upon hearing S a k k a praise the Buddha in eight points, express their wish for four
Buddhas t o e x i s t simultaneously in the world, Sakka answers that it is impossible
for two (or more) Buddhas t o exist at t h e same time for (or: in) a single lokadhdtu.
What seems implicit here - in the response found here and in the other passages
where it is a t t r i b u t e d to the Buddha - is the acceptance of the existence of several
lokudhatus. A r a t h e r developed idea is found in AN I 227,28ff.: A loka (here loka
appears without Odhatu; the character for dhatu is attested in the Chinese parallel T
991.11~9-10)extends as far as the sun a n d moon travel and illuminate; this would
include Mount Sineru as well as four surrounding continents, four oceans, six
classes of gods living on t'he peak of or above Mount Sineru, which are later termed
"gods of the desire realm," a n d a Brahmaloka. A thousand such lokas form what is
called a small world system made up of a thousand [lokas] (sahassf c$anih% loka-
dhatu): a t h o u s a n d such small world systems form what is called a medium world
system made u p of a 1,0002(= million) [lokas] (dvi-sahassimajjhimanikti lokadhatu) ,
and a thousand such medium world systems form what is called a "great thousand-
fold" world s y s t e m made up of a 1,0003 (= billion) [lokas] (ti-sahassCmahasahassf
lokudhdtu). T h e explication is occasioned by the news of a student of the previous
Buddha Sikhin called Abhibhu who, residing in the Brahmaloka of o u r world,
informs the s m a l l world system made u p of a thousand lokas to which o u r world
belongs (of his existence?) (brahmaloke thito sahassi-lokadhatum sarena vifintipesi),
Ananda asks t h e Buddha if he too can d o this, and is told that this was (only) a
student (savaka), the Tathagatas are immeasurable, that is, as the rest of t h e text
indicates, their radiance and voices can reach so far that the extent is indescribable.
This passage is interesting in that it states t h a t a Tathiigata can make himself
visible and h e a r d over a world system made up of a billion worlds and can perceive
68 T. Vetter

The .$&ach,passage clearly informs that mahayana was expected to lead

to omniscience, originally and also after application of the method
known as Prajfi&p&ramit&. There existed, in fact, within Bodhisattva
circles, the quite firmly held belief that the founder of a teaching tradi-
tion had t o b e omniscient, the minimal content of omniscience being, we
might p r e s u m e , the four Noble Truths, all previous births, all ripenings
of adions, all processes occurring i n the minds of other persons, and all
world s y s t e m s . I n the Buddha's Prajfi%p%ramit&-toned reply to Subhii-
ti, however, all such concrete content which this goal synonymous with
Buddhahood had for t h e Bodhisattvas seems to vanish. If solely the
passage u n d e r discussion were available, one might be led to conclude
that omniscience is nothing other than the wisdom which arises from
the practice of the Prajfi&p&ramit%, the wisdom verbalized in t h e Bud-
dha's s t a t e m e n t that n o one ever moves toward or attains any goal. But
only a t e m p o r a r y effect would seem to be aimed a t by such passages, for
the Bodhisattvas would lose all goal-orientation if the negation of all
defmitiveness were intended as a n enduring one; indeed, the Prajfisp&-
ramit%is offered in t h e Astam t o Bodhisattvas who truly aspire and
endeavour t o become Buddhas. T h e Prajfi&p&ramitti,the Astam. would
appear to s a y , ought t o be offered only t o those Bodhisattvas who,
when confronted with t h e insight into the non-existence of things, do
not despair o r become disheartened and continue striving toward the
final goal, O n e might a d d t o this: It should be offered only in "doses"

everything w i t h i n it. but does not declare that he preaches the Dharma t o all the
beings living i n it. These capabilities of a Tathsgata thus do not preclude that
another B u d d h a may arise in another world, just as t h e statement that two Bud-
d h a s cannot arise at the same time in the same world equally does not rule i t out. It
d o e s not seem, however, t h a t a t the time of the composition of the above-cited
passages a n y consideration h a d been made regarding either the possibility of the
arisal of .i belief in Buddhas existing in others worlds concurrently with Sakyamuni
(from whom o n e expected more, or different, help than from ~iikyamuni)or of a
movement recommending t h a t everyone become a Buddha (in a Buddhaless
world). The n o t i o n of an inconceivable number of worlds thus certainly did not
c o m e to be a f e a t u r e of the Mahayankt movement because additional worlds had to
be invented t o geographically accommodate the new ideal of becoming a Buddha
on&elf; it was r a t h e r , as a fully developed and recognized doctrine already found in
t h e Hmayana schools, appropriated from them because it (without serving as
sufficient cause for it) stimulated the new ideal. - The different picture emerging
from a passage i n the Milindapafiha (237,14ff.)which is not yet found in the text's
Chinese ta anslation made in t h e second century reflects t h e attempt of a conserva-
t i v e l v thinking a u t h o r t o stop the numerical inflation of Buddhas in the Mahayana
Sutras.
 Once Again on the Origin of Mahgysna Buddhism 69

even to t h e Bodhisattvas who can tolerate i t t o a considerable degree,

and this with an awareness of the limits. Prajfiaparamitii thus partaken
of, qualitatively and quantitatively, with great care, need not interfere
with the goal of omniscience.
A discussion of mah&mttvas, "great beings, " precedes the somewhat
elusive description of mahayana here in t h e Astami, and is itself pre-
ceded b y a discussion of bodhisattvas. During these discussions, too,
presupposed concepts are dealt with in unexpected ways, but the fun-
damental idea seems t o be t h a t one has t o be a great being or hero in
order to be a bodhisattva, Ke., a person who strives for the awakening of
a Buddha, specifically a n awakening characterized b y omniscience.
Achievement of the end goal puts one in t h e position t o ground a teach-
ing tradition in one of the infinite worlds and also t o reign there as
spiritual leader for a sometimes immeasurable length of time.33
The word bodhisattva (Pali: bodhisatta) also occurs in the canon belong-
ing to Conservative Buddhism (today represented by T h e r a v ~ d a )but, it
is used o n l y as an epithet for the historical Buddha prior t o his awaken-
ing, and f o r certain mythological predecessors of the Buddha prior t o
their own awakening .34 There is no mention there of rnahayana connot-
ing a recommendation which encourages as many persons as possible t o
betake themselves to t h e path t o Buddhahood; this was simply not a n
interest of Conservative Buddhism. I t , according to the Mahayana for-
mulation, offered only the career of a iravaka, a "Hearer," t h a t is, a n
individual w h o in reliance on the word of t h e Buddha aspires t o become
a n Arhat f o r the sake of overcoming personal suffering. Conservative
Buddhism was not only uninterested in t h e Mahgyana career, i t quite
likely additionally openly rejected the invitation to affiliate itself with
the Mahaysna movement and its objective, pointing out t h a t according
t o its Canon, the Buddha did not recommend such an objective. It is
only a public refusal of this sort, it seems t o me, which could explain
33 The claim that the Buddha Amitabha, although not yet called Amitiiyus,
would have a n indeterminable lifespan is found already in T 361 (e.g. 290c20),
perhaps the oldest Pure Land siitra preserved in Chinese translation. The tradition
assigns T 361 to Lokaksema, but this attribution is held suspect by modern scho-
lars; the t e x t also does not appear in Harrison 1993. T 361 may, however, have been
translated i n Lokaksema's school around 200 CE or a little later, and need not be a
late forgery. The term iH dao is a dominant feature of this text.
34 See, e . g . the Mahfipadsnasutta (DN sutta no. 14);the Sanskrit fragments
have been published and studied by E. Waldschmidt in Das Mahavadanasfitra
(1-11.Berlin 1953-1956).This is the first stitra in the Chinese Dirghsgama transla-
tion T 1.
70 T. Vetter

why t h e old Mahgyana documents present passages which are abusive

of the sravakas or Arhats and inveigh against their goal, and yet on
other occasions let i t be known t h a t one is obliged t o them for the
Prajfi%p&ramitii.I n the polemic passages, where the dominating back-
drop seems to be the resentment stemming from the rejection, the
career of the f i r ~ v a k ais contrasted with the career of the Bodhisattva
- t h a t of the latter very likely originally termed "great" purely out of
admiration for it - as a h a y m a , a small and contemptible career. In
the Kasyapaparivarta, concerning oneself with the Jiznayana is com-
pared t o association with bad friends.35 The end point of this small
career, namely, the knowledge of a n Arhat, is compared to a hole
chewed in a mustard seed b y an insect,36and the Arhat himself to t'he
son born of the union of the chief wife of a great king and a pauper;37he
is n o t , a s the Mahayana Bodhisattva is, a true son of the Buddha.

Let us t u r n to the two sections in A@achiand K%yapaparivarta,^,

briefly addressed above (cf. p. 61) which are most important for the
assumption of independent origins for Mahsyana (i.e., the heroic career
of the Bodhisattva) and Prajfi&piirarnita. At the beginning of the first
chapter of the Astach,, the Buddha requests the monk Subhati to con-
sider how the Prajfi%paramita, the Perfection of Wisdom, ought to be
taught t o the B o d h i ~ a t t v a sParticularly
.~~ notable is the fact t h a t his

Cf. W $ 22; see St $ 25 and T 350.190b8.

:5

Cf. W $ 62; see S t 5 78 and T 350.191bl2.

36
37 Cf. W  66; see S t  80 a n d T 350.191b20. I n W 8 67 (see S t fj 81 and T
350.191b24), the Arhat is compared with the illegitimate son produced through the
union of a Cakravartin and a servant woman.
3 3 Cf. T 224.425~7-8; cp. V 2,l-2. The Sanskrit reads: pratibhdtu te subhiite
bodhisattvan&? mahdsattv- prajndpdramitam drabhya ... "Let [something] oc-
cur i,o you ( t h a t is. let yourself be inspired by somethinglthink of something) as
concerns t h e Prajfiiipgramitg for the Bodhisattvas, the great beings ...;" the Chi-
nese translates: "As regards the Bodhisattvas, speak about the Prajiiap~rarnita;
the Bodhisattvas should realize it." Conze, ignoring te and interpreting pratibhatu
as if it would be a causative, translates: "Make i t clear now, Subhati, t o the
Bodhisattvas, the great beings, starting from perfect wisdom, . . ." (1975: 83),
thereby giving the impression t h a t ~riivakasdirectly teach Bodhisattvas in the
Asta. Neither this passage nor the rest of the text supports this: only conversations
about t h e teaching of the Bodhisattvas and the result to be expected from the
 Once Again on the Origin of Mahsysna Buddhism 71

question takes for granted t h a t 1) Bodhisattvas designated as such

already existed and 2) these Bodhisattvas were not yet aware of the
Prajiisparamitii. These presuppositions can also be noticed in Subhtiti's
response in which he states t h a t a Bodhisattva may be instructed
[further] in the Prajfiiip%ramit&if, upon hearing that a Bodhisattva
cannot b e grasped a s an existing entity, he does not become dejected,
which probably means that t h e Bodhisattva does not abandon striving
towards B u d d h a h ~ o d . ~ ~
We can also gather from this passage t h a t those who, in contradistinc-
tion t o t h e Bodhisattvas, knew the Prajfi%p&ramit&a n d could be
termed, as Frauwaller has suggested,40mystics, did not concern them-
selves w i t h the goal of universal Buddhahood. The mysticism in the
possession of these individuals was not, however, as Frauwallner would
have i t , a factor responsible for or contributing t o the arising of Maha-
ygna p e r se, for it is obviously not an inherent feature of this mysticism
to stimulate interest in the attainment of universal Buddhahood. Su-
bhtiti, a s one with access to this mysticism, belongs in fact t o the group
of A r h a t s who in the opening scene of the Asta accompany the Buddha.
These Arhats are generally described as those who have [already] at-
tained their t h a t is, having been inspired by and interested in a
goal o t h e r than t h a t of becoming a n all-knowing Buddha they have
reached t h e end of their enterprise; t h e Asta and related texts do not,

teaching occur. and these between the Buddha, srgvakas (Subhtiti, s%riputra,
Ananda, P u m a Maitrayagiputra and, in chapter 23. an anonymous monk) and/
or Indra (also, in chapter 15, Brahma and, in chapters 12, 13 and 15, all gods of the
desire a n d form realms). In two passages in chapters 6 and 19 a Bodhisattva also
takes p a r t , but to teach, not to be taught; it is Maitreya, who is believed to be an
accomplished Bodhisattva and future Buddha even by Conservative Buddhists. In
the story of the teaching of Sadsprarudita in chapters 30-31. the general scenario
found throughout the Astach, of non-Bodhisattvas (or perfected Bodhisattvas)
speaking about how Bodhisattvas are to be taught is superficially retained. Here,
the B u d d h a relates a story to Subhiiti, but the narrative situation has a structure
different from that found in earlier discussions: A lay Bodhisattva (Sadsprarudita)
appears seeking instruction in the Prajfispsramitii and receives it not from an
Arhat like Subhati, but from another Bodhisattva, the king Dharmodgata. I n
the entire story, at least in the Lokaksema version, no sriivakas appear.
39 Cf. T 224.425~18-22.
40 Cf. Frauwallner 1956: 144.
F o r example, V 1,6: anupraptasvakartha~;the Arhats are not described in
any detail a t the beginning of the Astach,. This predicate and other comparable
ones are, however, attested in other relatively early Chinese translations; see in this
regard Vetter 1993: 52 and 65-67 (n. 49).
72 T. Vetter

as already asserted, share the idea proclaimed in the Lotussntra that

everyone must become a Buddha whether they wish to or not. Subhiiti
indeed, in one of t h e following sentences, clearly counts himself as a
firgvaka, a "Hearer."^ H e is thus, i t may be inferred, in contradistinc-
tion t o t h e Bodhisattvas he speaks of, not interested in grounding a
teaching tradition of his own.
All of t h e above can be distilled from the introduction t o t h e Astaai if
the passages which can be considered as relating to an actual spiritual
p ~ a c t i c e , *regardless
~ of the historical and mythological fiction which
shapes their context, are taken seriously and the staging is dealt with
carefully. By "staging" I refer t o the Buddha's directing of a question
regarding the edification of the Bodhisattvas to one of his disciples.
Dealing with it carefully means rejecting the idea that we have to do
with authentic st,atements of the Buddha and his direct disciples here -
this would contradict diverse observations and arguments of modern
scholarly research - but nevertheless making use of the fact t h a t here a
~ r ~ v a k cast a , in t h e more authoritative role of Subhiiti, informs other
~ r : i v a k a show one should teach the Bodhisattvas the Prajfi%p&ramit&.
It is possible that this specific narrative piece was originally composed
by s r a v a k a s and later acknowledged and taken over by Bodhisattvas,
or it m a y , on the other hand, have been an original composition by
certain Bodhisattvas who aimed to express by way of their choice of
characters their debt to the ~ r a v a k a sfor the Prajfi%paramit&The not
infrequent passages elsewhere in t'he text in which the ~ r ~ v a ' k are as
spoken of with derision clearly stem from the hand of a Bodhisattva
and, inasmuch as this narrative about Subhiiti indicates a relationship
of dependence with regard t o the esteemed teaching of Prajfi&p&ramit%,
it can hardly be fictitious. I consider it t o be even possible t h a t the
Prajfiiipsramita strand goes back in part t o spiritual practices which
Subhiiti a n d certain other disciples of the Buddha had devoted them-
selves to. Subhnti is characterized in a n old list (AN I 24) and i n tlhefirst
chapter of the Astach, as the first of those who dwell without strife
(a~anavihdrin).~~ This characterization associates him with probably

T 224.425~11:%?. Cp. V 2,9.

T h i s would be precluded, of course, b y the assumption t>hatBuddhism was a
mere ideology.
44 If one can view 9% % (T 224.426a4) as the reflection for this expression. The
passage in the Astam. leading up t o this characterization is difficult t o understand
(T 224.426a2-4); cp. Verboom's attempt a t a translation (Verboom 1998: 71, n. 75).
I understand i t as follows: " ~ a r i ~ u tsays:
r a Good, Subhati. Those who, i n order to
 Once Again on the Origin of Mahgyana Buddhism 73

partially pre-Buddhist ideas about the avoidance of discussions, indeed

of all conceptual determinations, as found in suttas of the Atthakavagga
of the Suttanipata; the latter idea, namely the avoidance of all concep-
tual determinations, comes quite close to the intention of the teaching
of the Prajfi&piiramit&, New to this teaching and nowhere to be found in
the Theravada Canon is, however, a conceptual method facilitating the
attainment of a non-conceptual state. But before proceeding to discuss
it, it m a y be of value to turn first to the K&iyapaparivartami for a
further argument supporting the thesis of the Prajfiapararnitii origin-
ally being a method limited t o 6rsvaka circles. Earlier I referred t o the
K%6yapaparivartach,declaration that the knowledge of an Arhat is no
better t h a n the hole chewed by an insect in a mustard seed. Yet at the
end of t h e same satra, a long section (two-fifths of the oldest Chinese

become a Buddha, train in regard to this do not speak about the insight (d)
relating t o a n empty ( 2 )complex (3, fcdya; on this meaning of kdya, see Vetter
2000b: 120, n. 39) [of body (riipa),feeling ( v e d a ~ )etc.]
, (that is, they do not speak
about t h e insight that no citta which could be understood as a substance [as dis-
cussed in t h e previous paragraph] or mental substance under another name exists
in this complex; perhaps also included here is the insight that the body and psychic
factors themselves do not possess real being). [But] of those who [do not find
themselves on the way to Buddhahood and] speak about this insight, you are
the best." This interpretation is based on a comparison with W 5 119-122 (see S t
141-144 a n d T 350.193b25ff.) in the Arhat section of the Kaiyapapari~arta~,,,
where Subhiiti likewise appears. I n W Â 120 (see S t $ 142 and T 350.193~41,being
without strife (5%) is presented as a dharma of bhik+s who seek solitude and
practise d h y m . There is reference first to the avoidance of discussions, but then
also t o a n internal attitude and the experience resulting from it: by way of the
insight t h a t no mental substance exists in the complex (kayo)of body and psychic
factors, a nirvana consisting in the annihilation of desire, hatred and confusion is
experienced in the here and now (W $ 120-121; this definition of nirvana is also
found in SN I V 251,19). However, this nirvana is further distinguished by the
surmounting of all words and concepts, including those which might refer to it
(W Â 122). The expression *aranavihdrin, which is here in this part of the Arhat
section of t h e KfiiyapaparivartaCh,first interpreted as "dwelling in [a state] with-
out strife," thus in the end means "dwelling in [a state] without passion and con-
cepts." The Astach,passage translated at the beginning of this note seems to me t o
be best understood as showing a portion of the way visible in this Arhat section of
the K%yapaparivartaCh,,viz., where one still works with concepts and negations to
determine t h a t the complex (kaya) of body and psychic factors is empty, i.e., is
without a substantial mental center. This corresponds to the dominant an6tmavada
found i n t h e preceding passages of the Astach, (see Schmithausen 1977: 45). The
expression aranavihh-in thus most probably stood in the text that served as the
basis for Lokaksema's translation, but has been represented only with one shade of
its meaning through referring to a preliminary aspect.
74 T. Vetter

version)45is concerned quite unexpectedly with demonstrating the way

in w h i c h t o gain the knowledge of an Arhat. The method recommended
in t h i s regard is in some respects similar to t h e one advocated in the first
chapter of the Astach, to be taught t o the B o d h i ~ a t t v a s Subhati
.~~ ap-
-
45 Cf. W 79-128; see St  97-149 and 166, and T 350.192a8ff.
46 See note 44. The similarity between the two may be further elucidated with

the following. At the very beginning of what I refer t o as the Arhat section of the
K&5yapaparivartaai ( W  79: see S t  97), the existence of a n individual Self is
negated, after which t h e non-existence of citta - so important for Buddhist psy-
chology and liberation theory, a n d appearing in many formulations in place of an
individual Self - is gone into in detail (W  79-90; see St  97-109). I n the A+tachl
(T 224.425~24:cp. V 3,19), a short a n d not all so clear discourse about the existence
and non-existence of citta, which is easier t o understand if one is already aware of
the mentioned paragraph in the K&5yapaparivartaChlof which it may be an echo,
corresponds to this section. The citta passages in the K a i y a p a p a r i ~ a r t a are ~ , dis-
tinguished b y a certain ambivalence: citta cannot be assigned real existence, but the
concept is needed in various teachings; moreover, a fixation on a denial is un-
wanted, for this would be spiritually damaging. It is rather the denial of an in-
d i ~ i d u a lSelf, at that time becoming a means to demarcate oneself from non-Bud-
dhists, which would seem bound t o encourage such a fixation, but the Astach,
obviously attempts t o counteract i t by stating that the ~riivakasshould nonethe-
less e x e r t themselves in teaching t h e Bodhisattvas, who in turn, as i t is asserted
toward t h e end of the first chapter (T 224.428b; cp. V 14,15),wish t o help inestim-
able people (A)whom they regard a s father, mother, son, [even] themselves. The
Arhat section of the K%yapaparivartach, aims to check this fixation by asserting
that liberation is (according to Weller's translation) "both without that which
relates t o a Self and t h a t which does not relate t o a Self' (W Â 86; see S t 5 104
and T 350.192bll). - Following t h e reference to a preliminary aspect of aranavi-
tenn i n t h e Astach,(see again n. 44), the lines of the next step in the met'hod called
Prajfi%pi%ramit& (a step not yet made explicit) become visible (T 224.426a26ff; cp.
V 4,26ff.) : i t is implied t h a t after t h e denial of the real existence of a personal Self or
ofcitta, t h e remaining constituents such as rtipa, vedana, etc., are negated as having
real existence; the text then later expressly states t h a t they are d w a (T 224.426~5,
V 6 18) a n d comparable with a magical show ( m a w ) (T 225.427al8; cp. V 8,28).
But t h e following and last step t o b e expressed and taught in words is explicitly
already there: one should not be attached t o these constituents (in t h e Sanskrit
version: o n e should seek no support in them), an attachment which, a s the con-
turn n g t e x t shows, also includes attachment to their denial. The specific passage
indicated above in which t h e word &@ iaj, appears states: If one trains oneself in the
awareness t h a t rupa, etc., are i-a, then one still trains in conception (Sanskrit: in
an object of conception [nimitta]), which may be necessary in a specific moment,
but in the end should be gone beyond. In the Arhat section of the KGyapapar-
n-arts?,,, t h e surmounting of the denial of the constituents is contained in the
above-mentioned (cf. n. 44) demand for the surmounting of all words a n d concepts
(W5 122; see St  144). I n the Bodhisattva section of the text, the constituents,
together w i t h a core of t h e person, are characterized a s non-existent (W Â 41; see St
 Once Again on the Origin of Mahiiyana Buddhism 75

pears here too, and we are met with the statement that it is the task of
the m o n k t o avoid discussions (see note 44); a number of other state-
ments related to the attainment of the knowledge of a n Arhat found in
this section also appear in the main part of the text, where they are
presented as pertaining to the task of the B ~ d h i s a t t v aBut
. ~ ~ for one
exception,** Bodhisattvas are strikingly absent in the supplement. Giv-
en the unique features of this section, and especially after all the in-
vective against the Arhats in the main part of the K%6yapaparivartaph1,
the conclusion is unavoidable that this extensive closing piece with its
positive focus on the knowledge of the Arhat can hardly have been
written by the same author, and must be a n addition representing an
older source.49The transition to this supplementary material goes un-
52). T h e danger of a fixation on this denial - most probably referred to by
Niigiirjuna in Miilamadhyamakak5rikfi (MMK) XIII.8 - is expressly combatted
in W $49-50 (St 5 64-65; see Frauwallner 1956: 169-170): if a medicine is taken but
is not evacuated and remains in the intestines, then one's state of health will only
worsen; similarly, if one holds onto finyatti as a view ( d ~ t i )one , will not attain
spiritual well-being.
47 See Frauwallner 1956: 164-170.

48 The only exception occurs in W  99 (see St  118, T 350.192~14) where it is

stated t h a t there are two things a i r a m m (the word is transliterated; the Sanskrit
parallel, however. attests pravrajita) abandons only with difficulty. The second is:
'[Wanting] to deflect persons who have set out on the way of a Bodhisattva
(#?$@ill.; t h e Sanskrit parallel has mh&@nasamprasthita) from it." I do not
think t h i s single exception justifies the opposite hypothesis that this appendix
represents a text produced by the Bodhisattvas for the misesteemed Arhats. Nor
do I w a n t t o assume that it is a n early addition meaning, "one should not set
anything i n the way of Bodhisattvas," even though this would be a possibility.
The simplest conclusion would be that Bodhisattvas already existed a t the time of
the composition of this Arhat section and that the passage advises iramaws
against l e t t i n g themselves be held back from their goal of nirvana through at-
tempts t o deflect the Bodhisattvas (probably viewed as day-dreaming idealists)
from t h e i r p a t h .
T h i s assumption t h a t an already existing text was affixed is supported by
the fact that Bodhisattvas are allso missing in the last paragraph of the KGyapa-
parivartacn (W 5 128: see S t  166 and T 350.194al6), while they are mentioned a t
the beginning as forming the majority of the audience (1,250 monks vs. 12,000
Bodhisattvas). The final paragraph in Weller's translation reads: "When Buddha
proclaimed t h e teaching, the Bhiksus, B h i k s u ~ sUpiisakas,
, Upasikas, all the gods,
people o f t h e world. demonic spirits and snake-demons rejoiced together. (After
they) h a d first paid their respects to Buddha, they departed." The second version
of the K ~ k y a p a p a r i v a r t atranslated into Chinese, viz., T 351, also does not refer to
any Bodhisattvas in this paragraph. but they do appear in the later versions T 310
and T 352 a n d in the Tibetan translation. The Sanskrit manuscript has a lacuna
here.
 76 T. Vetter

noticed because t h e preceding section deals with the spiritual pharma-

copeia o f the Bodhisattvas a n d the attached Arhat source commences
with a n observation regarding the spiritual pharmacopeia in the teach-
ing of the Buddha. The piece, besides dealing with the method produ-
cing t h e knowledge of an Arhat, additlionally addresses rules of behav-
iour, mentioning i n this regard monks, ascetics (iramana) and forest
hermits, who neither in the Bodhisattva section of the Kaiyapaparivar-
tachl n o r in the first chapter of the Astach, are associated with the
M a h i i ~ i i n aNoteworthy
.~~ too is the fact that in the earlier section of
the K&syapaparivartach,dealing with rules of behaviour for t>heBodhi-
sattva (honouring t h e scriptures, non-arrogance and so forth), nothing
is mentioned which compels one to associate the discussion exclusively
with cloistered monks or forest hermits. On the contrary, there occurs
an admonition to honesty which can only be made sense of when one
thinks of persons who stand in the midst of daily life: "Should he lose on
account o f the truth his life or domain or his wealth, still he is not
double-tongued."51
B u t w h a t was originally meant by Prajfiiiparamitii, and how did Maha-
ysna and Prajfiaparamita come together? The spiritual method called
Prajfi~piiramitain t h e Astami, also found in the K ~ i y a p a p a r i v a t a ~ ~ ,
but; n o t endowed there with this name, culminates, as will be shown
with reference to t h e Astach, in the following, in the relinquishing of
words and a state termed sumadhi, which in the K a s y a p a p a r i ~ a r t a ~ ~
would correspond t o a here-and-now experience of nirvana. A cert'ain
idea of t h i s culmination point - apparently the actual focus - can be
gained if t h e teachings said t o lead to it and the expectations for one's

Monks and Bodhisattvas are even presented as two different groups in the
first sentence of the K a k y a p a p a r i ~ a r t a(T
~ 350.189b6) and in the first sentence of
the Astach, (T 224.425~4).At V 1,5, however, the audience consists only of monks,
which seems t o make more sense. I n the present connection, it is interesting to note
that Lokaksema's text, or he himself, refers t o these groups as two apparently co-
existing b u t mutually exclusive groups. The co-existence of a bhik+usamgha and
bodhisattvasamgha mentioned a t V 188,15, however, does not have a parallel a t T
224.459bl2. It may be t h a t no sentence in the AstacM (or in V) states or implies
. that monks traverse "the great way," but I have not had the opportunity to check
the entire t e x t in this regard. The complicated findings from the Samadhi of Direct
Encounter which I discussed in Vetter 1994: 1263-1265 demand that one proceed
with caution.
j1 Cp. W  8,2; see S t  8 and T 350.189~12.The English translation follows

Weller's, which is close t o the structure of the Sanskrit. Lokaksema's t e x t is struc-

tured as follows: "'Truth causes [under certain conditions] the loss of life, the loss of
a domain, t h e loss of belongings; [still the Bodhisattva] is not double-tongued."
 Once Again on the Origin of Mahfiygna Buddhism 77

future connected with its attainment a r e taken into consideration. The

Astami passage which offers itself first for this purpose contains Su-
b h ~ t i ' sanswer t o the question as t o t h e way in which one teaches the
Bodhisattvas the Prajii&paramit&.A first attempt a t the grammatically
challenging passage in this oldest version of the Asta reads as follows:
Subhiiti said to the Blessed One: The Blessed One wants me to teach the
Bodhisattvas the Prajfi&p&ramit%. Following [this teaching] the Bodhi-
s a t t v a s should train in [the Prajfiiip5rarnitgl and bring [it] to perfec-
tion. T h e Blessed One wants me to teach the Bodhisattvas [something].
[In t h i s context, he employs] "Bodhisattva" [like] a word [related to]
something existing. [If one does not notice that it is not related to
something existing], then one clings t o the Bodhisattvas. A word which
[seems t o relate to] something existing is [in reality] a word that relates
to something non-existing. How [should] the word "Bodhisattva" [re-
fer] t o a[n existing] entity? I perceive absolutely no existing entity
'Bodhisattva." The entity "Bodhisattva" is completely non-existing
[and] t h e word [baseless]. When I neither see a Bodhisattva, nor see
his whereabouts, who are then the Bodhisattvas whom I should instruct
in the PrajiXpiiramita? [Still,] I have t o teach [them] the Prajfigpa-
r a m i t s . [If] a Bodhisattva hears [that he himself and the beings he
wishes t o help do not exist in reality and his] mind does not become
weak, n o t scared, not frightened, not depressed, not fearful, then the
Bodhisattva may regard himself as [suitable] to carry out this prac-
t i ~ e . ~ ~
Most conspicuous here is the expression of the contradiction which all
Buddhists who want t o assist others b y teaching them t h a t their Self
does n o t exist have t o deal with, but generally do not voice.53I t s articu-
la'tion h e r e in the Astaai I explain as follows. The quite similar succes-
sions o f exhortations in the Astach, a n d in the Arhat section of the
K ~ i y a p a p a x i v a r t a ~suggest
, t'hat the spiritual method, designated
Prajfi%p%ramit%in t h e Astami, commences with the negation of the
existence of a personal Self and of citta, the central psychic faculty
which o f t e n substitutes for a Self, and then continues on with the nega-
tion of the existence of the empirical constituents of a person, namely)
body, feeling, ideation, impulses and sensation, and of the constituents

02 Cf. T 224.425~15 ff. (cp. V 3,3 ff.): see also Frauwallner 1956: 152 and Ver-
boom 1998: 255.
53 Exceptions are, e.g., Visuddhimagga chapter XVI, 436,6: atthi nibbuti, na
nibbuto puma 1 rnaggarn atthi, g a d 0 na vijjati, and Pramsnavgrttika 11.19Zab (in
Vetter 1990):mithydhyaropahwrtham yatno 'saty api d t a r i .
78 T. Vetter

of t h e entire world.54 The claim that the individual who desires t

released from rebirth must relinquish the belief in the existence
personal Self, although not found in the sermons of tlhePali Suttapi
assigned to the Buddha,55occurs in other (and mostly later) Budd
texts, but with hardly any mention t h a t the idea of the absence o
person who would participate in this release disturbed the liberation-
seekers addressed, from which it might be ~onject~ured tha-fc they did no
experience it as problematic. The instruction in the path t o a Nirvana
experienced here and now a s found in the Arhat section of the Kgiya-
paparivartachpa p a t h involving the negation of the existence of both a
personal Self/citta a n d the constituents. seems also not to have caused
problems for those taught; in any case, there are no paradoxical for-
mulations there in regard t o it. The Astach,, on the other hand, aims to
demonstrate how this method can be taught t o individuals who are not
interested in escaping from the world, i.e., the individuals who aspire
instead t o ground a tradition for the sake of teaching the way t o achieve
release t o those who do want t o escape, and for the sake of teaching
others t h e way in which meritorious acts improve one's personal state in
the world and thereby improve the world itself, and finally issue in the
perfection of a Buddha. There is awareness here that the persons
wishing t o improve themselves and therewith also the world have great
difficulty in tolerating the negation of the reality of a personal core, not
to mention that of t h e empirical constituents of the person and of the
whole world. They have, nevertheless, t o be confronted with the nega-
tions if they want t o experience the samadhi reached via them (itself
beyond t h e negations)-which, as the Astaphiavers, allows one t o reach

j4 In t h e Astach, (at T 224.425cl5ff.), the denial of the existence of a Bodhi-

sati,va presupposes t h e denial of a personal Self. Shortly thereafter ( T 224.

425c24ff.) i t is stated t h a t citta has no real existence. There follow various allusions
to the f a c t that one should eventually not base oneself on any claims or ideas/
concepts, which presupposes t h a t as an intermediate step the negation of the
reality of t h e personal constituents has been learned; the constituents are after-
wards described as E n y a (T 224.426~5)and compared to r n w (T 224.427al8). The
Arhat section of the K&6yapaparivartacu,begins with a denial of the existence of an
"I" ( W 3 79; see St  97) and then demonstrates ( W 3 79-84; see S t 5 97-102) that
citta, of t h e highest importance in all kinds of Buddhist formulations, cannot be
assigned real existence. The assertion somewhat later that one should not base
oneself a n y longer on a n y claims or ideas/concepts reveals, as in the passage of
the Astach,just analyzed, that one has in the meantime learned to view the con-
stituents as &nya (W Â 122-126; see S t 144-148). See also n. 44 and 46.
See Vetter 2000b: 11-12.
 Once Again on the Origin of Mahayma Buddhism 79

the goal of Buddhahood quickly.56The instruction in the non-existence

of a personal core which Bodhisattvas must brave, and which a t the
same time serves as a test to indicate whether the teaching should be
continued, would be more easily borne if the paradox, announced by
Subhati as an instructor's problem with the teaching, would also be
declared t o the Bodhisattvas. The acknowledgement of the paradox
relativizes the negation of a personal core, a negation which is indeed
surmounted in the samadM. At the relevant place in the Astaml,57how-
ever, t h e Bodhisattvas are not explicitly addressed as concerns it. It
may be t h a t a Bodhisattva was t o be tested in a very direct and almost
brusque manner, and if he was not completely shocked by this first
taste of t h e teaching, he could be taught further. But it cannot com-
pletely be excluded t h a t the paradox actually was announced to him a t
some point. Somewhat later in the Astachl,58it is overtly stated that a
Bodhisattva should be clear about the fact that the innumerable beings
he wishes to lead to Nirvana do not exist a t all, and, as might be
expected, he is not advised to abandon his intention on account of this;
rather, t h e text goes on as in the previous passage: If he, in view of this
situation, does not despair, then he is to be considered a Bodhisattva
who is equipped with the great armour. The paradox probably does not,
however, either in this later passage or in the previous one (should it
have been announced to the Bodhisattva in this context), belong to the
spiritual method proper. The spiritual method begins, as the Arhat
section of the K&yapaparivartachi suggests, with the simple negation
of a personal Self and the somewhat more complicated one of citta.
Bodhisattvas who want to employ this method for reaching their goal
must here proceed through a difficult phase; the situation becomes even
less tolerable when they later hear t'hat the empirical constituents of the
living beings to be liberated - a t least something they, in the face of the
lack of a Self, could hold onto with their will for liberating them - and
the whole world are without substantiality ( i a n y a ) and like a magical
illusion ( M y @ ) .But the AstaCn also reveals the solution to the mental
conflict: When the Bodhisattva experiences the insight into the non-

56 T 224.426~20; cp. V 7,13. I n my Hamburg lecture I did not refer to an earlier

passage on reaching sumadhi on the basis of Prajfi%p&ramit&(Astach,426al3 ff.;
vgl. V 4,19 ff,).Recently, in a paper read a t the Eko-Haus in Dusseldorf on August
29,2001, I pointed out the difference between the two passages, which shows t h a t
even t h e first chapter of the Asta is a compilation, as demonst'rated already by
Schmithausen (1977) in other respects.
57 T 224.425cl5ff.
58 T 224.4276-13; cp. V 10,24-11,4.
80 T. Vetter

substantiality of all constituents, he must also abandon this insight and

no longer base himself on words or concepts.59The Bodhisattva realizes
that all entities are inaccessible to words or concepts and attains a
meditative concentration re-presented as unlimit'ed and free of all ap-
propriation, said t o facilitate the reaching of Buddhahood quickly,60
more quickly, I assume, than the Bodhisattva until now could have
hoped for. Just how this meditative concentration is able t o facilitate
the speedy achievement of Buddhahood is not explained. I n an attempt
to try t o understand it, one might assume it is a state of calm of the
highest quality, from which one returns t o active life more ~trengt~hened
and invigorated t h a n from the usual, more common restful states. There
WAS perhaps early on no need t o fear t h a t the attracting power of this
state could be so strong that a Bodhisattva. by repeatedly returning to
it via t h e negation of the reality of all persons and their constituents,
a n d of t h e surrounding world, could be seduced into letting go of the
intention t o become a Buddha; I have in any case not found any ref-
erence t o fear of such side-effects in the first chapter of the Astaphi.In
chapter seventeen of the AstacW6l however, this problem does show
itself. T h e Bodhisattva is counselled, among other things, to develop
skill i n dealing with t h e means known as diirqata-samadhi so t h a t the
goal of gaining all t h e qualities of a Buddha does not become lost.
In summary, the following can be said about this method: The negation
of t h e reality held a s valid in daily and religious life - without it really
bong brought into danger - and the negation, in turn, of this negation,
a step which is not intended t o bring back the old condition but rather
ushers in something new, can without hesitation be characterized as
mysticism. Texts of other religious traditions which may be styled as
mystical also present such negations as one of their characteristics.
They convey by way of these negations an intimation of t h e true nature
of oneself a n d of all things which is accessible to everyone; a nature, so it
seems, which can be experienced by way of different methods, not last
through this intensive application of such negations. The above-men-
tioned meditative concentration, the samadhi characterized by non-ap-
propriation of any factors of existence whatsoever, seems t o point to
such a n experience.

59 T 224.426~3-17;cp. V 6,15-7,lO.
Cf. T 224.426~17-20;cp. V 7,lO-13.
Cp. V chapter 20.
 Once Again on the Origin of Mahiiyana Buddhism 81

But I h a v e still not addressed how t h e Prajfiiipiiramitii, originally the

spiritual property of certain sravaka circles, came t o merge with Maha-
yana. T h e Astaal informs t h a t the Prajfiiipgramitii was to be offered t o
Bodhisattvas who could bear it, and most of them in time obviously
accepted it. Without t h e inclusion of t h e element of the surmounting of
! all negations this would not have been possible. But what was the
reason behind its being offered, and why was it accepted in spite of
the risk that the goal could be forfeited through its careless application?
A reason as to why ~ r a v a k a might
s have offered the Prajfigparamita t o
Bodhisattvas is not detectable in the first chapter of the Astamp A t the
' beginning of the second chapter, however, there occurs a passage which
names gratitude as t h e motive, in particular, gratitude for the gift of the
teaching.62It is stated t h a t the Buddha took care of the Sriivakas, and
therefore they must care for the future Buddhas by teaching them the
Prajfiap&ramit%which is expected to lead quickly t o Buddhahood. As
stated earlier, the sumadhi which results from the teaching may have
been seen as a station of calm and a source of energy; but it is also
possible t h a t the teaching was offered and used t o relativize the final
objective of Buddhahood characterized b y all-knowingness. Omni-
science would then n o longer mean the knowledge of all details, but
the knowledge that all the details are without essence and real exis-
tence. S u c h a result is easier t o reach than a n omniscience of individual
details, and a t the same time leaves open the option for the subsequent
instruction of a limited number of people who desire the same. Both
possibilities as to the understanding of the role of this sarnadhi occur in
later t e x t s .
What, o n t h e other hand, might have moved the Bodhisattvas to accept
the offer? I am not aware of any explicit textual passage which might
aid in answering the question, but believe t h a t the attraction t o a place
of calm and source of energy can be named as a possible reason. Rested,
restored a n d provided with new strength, the Bodhisattva could apply
himself i n the aftermath of the sumadhi more intensively t o t h e means
he trusted would lead him to the true omniscience; he could in this way
arrive sooner, even if not right away, at the goal. As for t h e means the
Bodhisattva was accustomed t o devote his energy to, the first chapter

62 Cf. T 224.429a26; cp. V 17,21. The idea presented in Vetter 2000a: 375, n. 10,
namely, t h a t ~ r s v a k a staught the Buddha this method prior t'o his awakening, is
not supported by T 224.
 82 T. Vetter

of t h e Astami mentions only unpleasant exertions,63and I presume that

with t h i s heroic acts are meant, specifically heroic acts by way of which
the Bodhisattva imitates the actions of the Buddha narrated in stories
about his past existences: the Buddha, and now the Bodhisattva, in the
name of certain principles, patiently endures all difficulties, relinquish-
ing his belongings and, when necessary, even his life. It was believed
that g r e a t karmic merit would arise from such acts of heroism and that
this m e r i t , by virtue of the wish t o become a Buddha, would ripen
ex elusively in the goal of Buddhahood. The adherence to this old heroic
concern, which with the acceptance of the Prajfiiipiiramit6 only under-
goes modification, seems to me to be the reason why further Perfections
appear n e x t to t h a t of insight in the later chapters of the Astach,.These
Perfections must represent t h e old practice of the Bodhisattvas before
they, a s t h e first chapter suggests, were offered the Perfection of Insight
as t h e singular relevant discipline. The five other Perfections which
appear i n the third chapter, namely, generosity, correct behaviour,
patient endurance, constant exertion, and meditation (dhyma, prob-
ably of a visionary kind) seem t o belong t o the time prior t o the gift
of t h e Prajfi&p%ramitii.Subsequent t o that gift, meditations of a more
technical kind may have been offered by the 6ravakas t o the Bodhi-
sat t v a s . These meditations only appear in Prajfiapiiramitii literature
composed after the first chapter of the Astach,.

Brief reference to two texts, Naggrjuna's Karikgs and the Lotussfitra,

should suffice to show that practitioners of the Prajfiap%ramit%who
knew of t h e ideal of all-knowingness did not necessarily become adher-
ents of t h e Mahgyana (in the oldest meaning of the term), and that
adherents of the Mahsyiina who came to know the Prajfi%piiramit%
either rejected, or only superficially integrated the Prajfigpararnita into
the Bodhisattva p a t h . The mnemonic verses (Mulamadhyamakakgrik~)
ascribed to Niiggrjuna, possibly written around 200 CE, mention once
- (MMK 24.32) the ideal of a Bodhisattva path leading to Buddhahood,
but do n o t recommend it; only the Prajfi&piiramit&,albeit not under
this n a m e , is commended, a n d this not for Buddhahood b u t for the
achievement of the calming of all manifoldness (MMK 25.24), i.e., for
an experience of nirvana here and now (MMK 24-10).The KGyapapari-

: Cf. T 224.428bl6; cp. V 14,lO

 Once Again on the Origin of Mahgyana Buddhism 83

rta (see W Â 49-50 and St 64-65) may have inspired MMK 13.8, and
e Astadaias&hasrika, with its differentiation of lokavyavahara and
ramartha made by the Buddha,64may be the point of reference for
MK 24.8, but neither text has been relied on to transmit more than
the old method, independent of Mahgyana, of the attrition of all con-
cepts. L a t e r traditions of the realization of the Buddhahood within can
additionally be reckoned to this Prajfigparamita without Mahaygna,
once t h i s PrajiGpararnita has become, or is again, not more than a
sumadhi utilized solely for the experience of surmounting or comprising
all manifoldness and does not serve the further function of temporary
rest-station on an extended spiritual journey. These traditions can thus,
in spite o f their use of the word Mahgygna, be assigned t o t h e Prajfia-
paramit& strand when none of the old striving to become a world teach-
er remains to be seen.
An example of the flip side of the coin, Mahayana without Prajfigpa-
ramits, is provided by the Lotussfitra. At least in the second chapter of
the Lotussfitra, the kernel of the a h a , estimated by A. Hirakawa to
belong t o the first century CE,65and in chapters three and four which
from t h e point of view of content stand closest to this kernel, we witness
the a t t e m p t once again, or still, to achieve realization of true Buddha-
hood without reliance on the Prajfiaparamitg. In these chapters it is
proclaimed that everyone without exception must embark upon the
career of a Bodhisattva in order to become a t last an all-knowing Bud-
dha. However, Prajfi%paramit%is neither directly nor indirectly recom-
mended as the means t o this goal in chapters two to four, even though
those responsible for the chapters are aware of it; it is, as Dragonetti has
correctly determined,66referred to on four occasions (three of which are

64 See Conze 1974: 74. The Asta, as far as I can see, does not contain this clear

opposition of terms.
65 Cf. Hirakawa 1990: 283. See also Abbott 1985: 44-54.

66 Cf. Dragonetti 2000. This article was obviously inspired by the urge t o find
proof for t h e presence of Prajfiaparamita in the Lotussfitra, where it is mentioned
only three times and with little pretension. The thirty-four sentence and verse
parts found by Dragonetti have, however, been presented out of context and with-
out appraisal of the meaning of the passages they are found in. - As to the scarce
occurrences of the term Prajfi&p%ramit& (occurrences which have not been dealt
with b y Dragonetti) I found, with the aid of the Index to the Saddharrnapundar~-
kasutra, three passages in which it is mentioned: 1) At the beginning of the Lotus-
stitra (K 3 , 2 ) ,in the description of the qualities of the great Bodhisattvas such as
Maqukri, Avalokiteivara, etc., present a t the sermon a t the end of this description.
2) In t h e sixteenth chapter (K 333,1), where it is stated that listening to the
84 T. Vetter

Tristubh-Jagati verses) but - and this she had not pointed out - is in the
process obviously set at a distance. In chapter two there occurs a pas-
sage where t h e Buddha states (K 48, v. 68ab) he teaches that all dhar-
mas are always ceased (nityanirvrta) and pacified from the beginning
(adipraianta). The singular true nirvana, which for the Lotussutra in-
cludes Buddhahood, is obviously not referred to by this. If indeed
everything is always so, i t no longer makes sense if someone, as v.
68cd suggests, (after t h e realization of this insight) fulfills his activity
as Bodhisattva in order t o become a Buddha in the future (anagate
'dhvani). T h e reference t o the eternal pacification of all dharmas is
therefore, as the immediately preceding and subsequent usage of the
word up* in v. 67 a n d 68 suggests, a precursory, strategic "truth,"
used in order to gain influence over those persons who seek the calm of
nirvana here and now a n d who only after the realization of this calm can
be confronted with t h e path to Buddhahood.
A similar passage can be found in the third chapter (K 62, v. 12b). It
states t h a t (all) dharmas are empty (ianya),but teaches no method for
the attainment of Buddhahood, or a t most, as earlier, a precursory
method. Comparable, b u t somewhat more critical, are two passages in
chapter four: If Sravakas reach the mental state indicated by sum/atd-
nimittapra@hita (K 101, I ) ,or are saturated over a long time period with
the idea t h a t everything is empty (K 111,v. 45ab), the wish to become a
Buddha (independent of outside influence) ceases to arise. These prob-
ably oldest chapters of the Lotussutra thus distance themselves from
the P r a j f i ~ p ~ r a r n i t a . ~ ~

discourse o n t h e immeasurable lifespan of the Tathsgata creates more merit for

Buddhahood than practice of the five Perfections without the Prajfi%p%ramitii
does. One h a s apparently heard the claim (found in the third chapter of t h e Astam,)
that the five Perfections together with the Prajfi%p&ramit% bring with them a
tremendous amount of merit, does not want t o contradict it, yet does nothing with
it and rather sets, by implication, the faithful hearing of the discourse on the
immeasurable lifespan of the Buddha in place of the Prajfiiiparamita. 3) In the
twenty-fifth chapter (K 457,12), which must have been added only quite late to the
Lotussatra, t h e Prajfi&p%ramit&together with the five other perfections is pre-
'sented as a quality of two princes from the misty past.
67 According to Kajiyama (2000: 76), Karashima seems to consider t h e Prajfia-
paramit%passages in chapters 11-IV t o be later additions. This is not very likely, as
the tendency in later chapters of the Lotussfitra is t,opay at least some lip service to
the Prajfisparamita. Acceptance of these passages as a part of the original t e x t does
however n o t mean Karashima is wrong in assuming that the Tristubh-Jagati verses
of chapters 11-IX of the Lotussatra (better t o be reduced to the chapters 11-IV)
represent t h e oldest surviving text of the Mahgysna. Prajfi&p%ramit& is originally
 Once Again on the Origin of Mahayana Buddhism 85

In chapter five, however, twelve of the passages found by Dragonetti

which point to the PrajfiCipCiramitii in a similar way can, with one
exception (K 116,13), be understood as an attempt to integrate the
Prajfiaparamitii into the Bodhisattva path of the Lotussutra. However,
ten of these passages, occur in the part of the fifth chapter which is not
found in Kum~irajiva'sChinese translation (completed 406 CE; T 262)
and thus, in spite of their occurrence in the earlier translation by Dhar-
maraksa (completed 268 CE; T 263))must not belong to the oldest part
. ~ ~ these ten is a passage (K 138, v. 52cd) which
of the L o t ~ s s t i t r aAmong
to a certain extent describes the high-point of these integration at-
tempts i n t h a t it - in contradiction to chapters two to four - associates
the knowledge of emptiness of things with the awakening of the Bud-
dhas, a n d characterizes a ~ r i i v a k aeven through the non-possession of
this knowledge (&nyajn@nav&natvac chravakah samprabhasyate). In
Dharrnaraksa's translation (T 263.86al2), on the other hand, this claim
appears thus: Only the Bodhisattva knows emptiness; the sravaka re-
lies on i t without really understanding it. In service of the integration
attempt is t h e mention for the first time in chapter five (K 142 v. 76b) -
after two passages (K 17,15; 18,13) in the first chapter which probably
does n o t belong to the earliest stratum of the text - of the "six
pdramitas," among which PrajfiCipiiramitii must be implicated (in T
263.86b8 however, only perfections without specification of the number
6 are mentioned).
Of the remaining chapters, seven (K 186,8-10) and eight (K 200, 9-10)
respectively contain a passage which must have served a t least the
outer acknowledgement of the PrajfiiipsramitCi. They suggest that a
Bodhisattva should know that all dharmas are empty (sunya), but lack
any more elaboration as to the purpose of this knowledge. Similar are

not a method for Bodhisattvas and is not invented in the first chapter of Astach,.
The acceptance of these passages in chapters 11-IV of the Lotusstitra as originally
belonging t o the text does therefore not imply that the first chapter of Astam,
temporally precedes these chapters and is the oldest Mahayana text surviving.
However, the arguments employed by Kajiyama to show that the oldest layer of
the Lotusstitra is older than the Asta need revision (2000: 75-76). One cannot
juxtapose a n d compare a layer of the Lotussutra with the Asta as a whole and
in the process base oneself on passages such as sections of the third chapter of the
Astach, dealing with memorising and copying the text for producing merit that
clearly show that the authors of this chapter were not able or willing to understand
the PrajfiSparamita as preached in chapters 1-11 of the Astami.
68 See Vetter 1999b: 132, where the arguments in Pye 1978, Appendix B, have
been somewhat expanded. For another opinion see Yuyama 1996.
 86 T. Vetter

t w o passages in chapter ten (K 234,lO; 236 vers

c h a p t e r eleven (K 262,Z). I n the latter the
references t,o the fulfilling of six paramitas (
264,10),69but they too lack a supporting cont
of chapter eleven (K 266,l) an attainment co
e n d u r e / fully accept (ksanti) the fact t h a t the
is i n addition assigned t o a great mass of peo
p r e t e d as acknowledgement of the Prajfiiipiir
theless is neither based on the immediately
firmed by T 262.35~24or T 263.106 a23. A
also occurs with the abrupt naming of the a t
kadharmaksnti in chapters sixteen (K 32
twenty-two (K 419,6) a n d twenty-three (K 437,
b y T 262 and T 263.
N e x t to chapter five, chapter thirteen is disti
so brief, allusions t o the Prajfi&p&rarnita;
four. In terms of content they deviate littl
cussed. The theme is, however, not (at least
of Buddhahood, b u t the preaching of the me
t h e end-time and how one might retain a goo
Prajfi&p%ramit% which appears there following
concrete rules concerning behaviour seems parti
of a i d i n g one to better endure difficult', repulsiv
application relativizes all occurrences. Whether.
benefit for the final goal is not addressed.
I n a somewhat longer passage in chapter fifteen
t h e T a t h ~ g a t asees t h e triple world not as fool
w i t h o u t birth and death, samsdra and nirvana,
etc.; o n e might even understand this as a call
F r a j fiapiiramits. However, the context suggest
m i t a here confirms t h e immediately followin
B u d d h a , since it serves t o relativize other st
such as, for example, the one asserting t h a t he h
- full nirvana and t h u s is no longer present.

w i t h correspondences in chapter twelve of T 262, w

69
t'o Kumsrajiva's translation (see Hirakawa 1990: 282) na
and c9 (in c9 without the specification of the number
in T 262, namely in 105a28 and b20, but neither in
Kashgar manuscript; see Toda 1981: 128) nor in 106al3
Again on the Origin of Mahgyana Buddhism 87

aid tlha8tthe without doubt oldest chapters, i.e.,

inst the Praji%%pi%ra,mit%, while other chapters
on it a t all or. by way of a couple of references,
n being t h e most notable in this respect, suggest
even in five and thirteen we are limited to mere
ra is thus spa,red a discussion of the problem how
tJothe contents oft repeated and em-
t everyone is destined to full Buddha-
arily collect merit for its sake, particularly by
message (presumably inclusive of the myths nar-
ulgated in the Lotussutra, worship of
caching of this message, and so forth. Authen-
the Prajii%p&ramit& appear only in the later
ba'ses itself on the Lotussutra, such as the T'ien-
n Lotusstitra sects in Japan, especially if their
ond mere worship and recitation of t'he &a to the
to the Prajfi%p%ramit~ occurs, as far as I am

t'inne's L a Splendeur de I 'lnkbranlable (Aka-

uvain-la-Neuve 1983),where, in addition to
ed to Lokaksema (T 313) is also taken into
uss t,he contents of t,his text in the near fut'ure.

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 88 T. Vetter

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Herman Tieken

The piirvarafiga, the prastdvanG, and the sthlipaka*

A classical Sanskrit play invariably-openswith the so-called prastavam,

a scene in which the s~tradhtira,or the director of the troupe of actors,
announces the play. The prastavana or prologue, which is also called
dmukha, has been described in Natya&stra XX 30-39. The performance
as a whole is believed to have been preceded by the p w a r a n g a , de-
scribed in chapter V of the N&tya&stra,which is a ritual carried out by
that s a m e siitradhtira. The transition from the p m a r a n g a to the prolo-
gue would have been punctuated by the exit and entrance of the siitra-
dhara. Occasionally the role of the etradhara in the prologue has been
taken over by the sthtipaka.
The role and the function of this latter figure have been explained in the
fifth chapter of the NatyaGstra. In the dramatic literature itself we
come across the sthdpaka only rarely. His name is found in some manu-
scripts of the prologue of the Karpfiramaiijari as a variant reading for
~iitradhara.~ Furthermore, the name sthapaka is echoed by the term
sthapana, which in South Indian drama texts is used as a synonym
for prastavana "prologue" in the North-Indian texts. As it is, for details
concerning the role and function of the sthapaka we have t o fall back
entirely o n the N%ya&stra. The relevant passage (V 16lcd-169) has
been d e a l t with exhaustively by Feistel (1969) and Kuiper (1978 and
1979). According to these scholars the sthapaka came on stage after the
completion of the purvaranga, a t that point taking over the part of the
sutradhlira in order t o introduce the topic of the play. The siitradhara is
part of t h e piirvaraqa and the sthapaka of the following prologue.
However, according to Kuiper the roles of siitradhtira and sthdpaka
could be played by one and the same actor. The switch would merely

* I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Dr. Karin C. Preisendanz

and Professor Dr. Chlodwig H. Werba for their comments and suggestions.
O n l y in the manuscripts P and U; the other manuscripts have s ~ t r a d h a r aSee
.
o ~ a , the sutradh&-a is first called
also Harihara's ~ a n k h a ~ a r 5 b h a v a v ~ &in~ which
sthapaka, but after that regularly sfitradhara again.

WZKS 45 (2001) 91-124