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THIRD DIVISION

POLICE SR. SUPT. ROMEO G.R. No. 232814

UY, SPOl .FELMANDIE
TATLONGHARI, SPOl Present:
MICHAEL AYCARDO, SPOl
GERRY GENTALLAN" AND LEONEN, .1., Chairperson,
SPOl ROMMEL FLORES AND HERNANDO,
JOHN DOES, INTING,
Petitioners, DELOS SANTOS, and
LOPEZ, J., JJ.
- versus -

SERGIO JR. AND SALES V. Promulgated:

JACALAN,
Respondents. February 3, 2021
X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~\~~S--~~~ - - - - - - - - - - - - X

RESOLUTION

INTING, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule

45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision2 dated April 6, 2017 and
1

the Resolution3 dated July 5, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 04444-MIN. The assailed Decision and Resolution
affirmed the Judgment4 dated June 30, 2014 of Branch 17, Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City docketed as Civil
Case No. 2008-067 that found Police Senior Superintendent Romeo Uy
(PS/Supt. Uy), Senior Police Officer I Felmandie Tatlonghari (SPOl
Tatlonghari), SPOl Michael Aycardo (SPOl Aycardo), SPOl Gerry
Gentallan (SPOI Gentallan), SPOl Rommel Flores (SPOl Flores), and
John Does (collectively, petitioners) solidarily liable for the payment of
Referred to as Gentalian in some parts of the rollo.
' Rollo, pp. 4-20.
Id at 37-56; penned by Associate Justice Rafael Antonio M. Sant0s with Associate Justices Oscar
V. Badelles and Ruben Reynaldo G. Roxas, concuning.
3
Id at 69-71.
' Id at 22-33; penned by Presiding Judge Florencia D. Sealana-Abb~.
Resolution 2 G.R. No. 232814

the actual value of the seized vehicle with interest plus moral damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs of the suit.

The Antecedents

The present controversy stemmed from a case for replevin filed by

respondents wherein they sought to recover possession of a second hand
Isuzu Wagon with Chassis No. PABT BR 54F32015320, Motor/Engine
No. BD 9614, and Plate Number LMD 295 (subject vehicle). 5

The subject vehicle was registered in the names of respondents

after they acquired it from Ryan Gallego at Oro Cars, Bulua, Cagayan de
Oro City for a sum of P475,000.00. 6 In connection with the sale, PNP
Motor Vehicle Clearance Certificate (MVCC) dated August 29, 2006
was issued by the Philippine National Police (PNP)-Traffic Management
Group (TMG) which stated that as of date, the subject vehicle "is not in
the list of wanted/stolen vehicles," with a Macro-Etching Certificate that
indicated that the engine and chassis numbers of the subject vehicle were
found to be "Not Tampered". 7

Two years after the sale or on March 7, 2008, respondents' driver

Manuel Tabornal Yana, Jr. was driving the subject vehicle when he was
apprehended by SPOI Tatlonghari, SPOl Aycardo, SPOl Gentallan, and
SPOl Flores for driving without a seat belt, and over the suspicion that
the Official Receipt (OR) and Certificate of Registration (CR) of the
subject vehicle were spurious. The subject vehicle was then issued an
Impounding Receipt dated March 14, 2008. 8

On account t.½.ereof, respondents inquired as to the reason for the

impounding of the subject vehicle and demanded its release, but
petitioners refused on the ground that the chassis and engine numbers of
the subject vehicle were allegedly tampered. 9

The petitioners' obstinate refusal to return the subject vehicle

prompted respondents to file a complaint for replevin before the RTC.
5
Id at 22, 38.
6
Id
' Id at 38-39.
' Id at 39.
' Id
Resolution 3 G.R. No. 232814

Thty sought the issuance of a writ of replevin for the return of the
subject vehicle in their favor; or, if the physical delivery thereof can no
longer be effected, the payment of its actual value plus interest,
attorney's fees, moral damages, and cost of the suit. Pursuant to the
service of the writ of replevin, a Sheriffs Return dated April 9, 2008
showed that the subject vehicle could not be seized onreplevin as it was
already transported to the TMG Head Office at Camp Crame, Quezon
City for further clarification and verification of its chassis and engine
numbers. 10

In response, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint

for lack of cause of action, and the quashal of the writ of replevin. They
countered that the subject vehicle was under custodia legis as a product
of an administrative seizure by a government agency pursuant to its
implementation of Republic Act No. (RA) 6539 or the Anti-Camapping
Act of 1972; hence, it could not be the subject of a writ of replevin.
Petitioners averred i:hat the subject vehicle was reported to have been
stolen on April 19, 2004 while parked along Baconga St., San Juan 1,
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City per validation from the Vehicular
Information Management System (VIMS). Further, petitioners
contended that based on their investigation, the subject vehicle belonged
to Milamdec Foundation Inc./Fr. Emeterio Ba.rcelon, SJ of Xavier
University, who purchased it from Southern Motors Corporation located
in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. 11

As to the whereabouts of the subject vehicle, petitioners confirmed

that after the PNP Crime Laboratory Office Region 10, Cagayan de Oro
City refused to conduct macro-etching, they transported it to the PNP
Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City pursuant to the verbal
instruction of PS/Supt Uy in order to reexamine i.ts chassis and engine
numbers. 12

Ruling of the RTC

On June 30, 2014, the RTC rendered a Judg,'Ilent 13 the dispositive

portion of which is cited herein, to wit:

0
' Id. at 39-40.
11
Id. at 40-41.
12
Id. at 40.
13
id at 22-33.
 Resolution 4 G.R. No. 232814

WHEREFORE, premises [sic] the court finds a case in favor

of plaintiff[ s] and against defendants. Defendants are hereby ordered
to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following:

(a) the actual value of the vehicle is P475,000 plus 6%

interest from the date the complaint was filed;

(b) attorney's fees of P45,000.00;

(c) Mornl damages of P50,000.00 for the humiliation and

anxiety of the plaintiffs,

(d) Litigation expenses of PI0,999 plus payment of replevin

bond [sic] 27,302.50,

(e) Pay the cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED. 14

According to the RTC, respondents were able to prove by

preponderance of evidence that they are the legitimate owners of the
subject vehicle having purchased it in good faith and for value. 15 It ruled
that the subject vehicle was cleared by the PNP Crime Laboratory Office
Region l 0, Cagayan de Oro City; thus, the latter refused to conduct
another macro-etching examination upon petitioners' request. 16 The RTC
likewise ruled that a certification from the Cebu Southern Motors, Inc. to
the effect that the subject vehicle was sold to Milandec Foundation
Inc./Fr. Emeterio Barcelon, SJ as shown from its production number is
not conclusive as there was also no evidence presented by petitioners to
rebut the findings of the PNP Crime Laboratory Office Region 10,
Cagayan de Oro City. 17

Moreover, the RTC found that petitioners acted in bad faith and
with malice when the subject vehicle was turned over to Prudential
Insurance Company instead of undergoing another macro-etching as
what petitioners impressed upon respondents. For the RTC, there was
also no proof that the chassis and engine numbers were tampered to
establish that the suL~ect vehicle was carnapped; thus, petitioners acted
beyond the scope of their authority making them liable for damages. 18
14
Id at 33.
15
Td.at31.
i, Id.
17
/d.at3i-32.
is Id.
 Resolution 5 G.R. No. 232814

Petitioners elevated the case to the CA through a Notice of

Appeal. 19

Ruling ofthe CA

Petitioners argued that they acted within the parameters of their

regular and official functions when they flagged down, apprehended, and
impounded the subject motor vehicle which appeared to be stolen. They
also justified their s.ctions on the basis of the Certification, Invoice,
Certificate of Sale, P:-oduction Number, Car Truck Invoice, and Delivery
Receipt issued by Cebu Southern Motors, Inc., which supported the
ownership of Milamdec Foundation Incorporated over the subject
vehicle. This was in addition to the discrepancy in the CR of the seller
from whom respondents acquired it. 20

On April 6, 2017, the CA rendered the assailed Decision21 denying

the appeal for lack of merit. It upheld the findings of the RTC that
respondents have proven their ownership over the subject vehicle by
preponderance of evidence; that in the absence of controverting evidence
to establish that the OR/CR were falsified or obtained illegally, there is a
strong presumption c,f ownership in favor of one in whose name the CR
was issued; 22 and that the dismissal of the · criminal action against
respondents for camapping for insufficiency of evidence is a strong
indication that the sF.bject vehicle was not stolen. 23 The CA furthermore
noted that it cannot consider the Macro-Etching Examination conducted
by the PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City, which
allegedly showed tampering of the chassis and engine numbers,
considering that it was belatedly attached to petitioners' Appellants'
Brief and not presented nor offered before the trial court; and assuming
otherwise, it is still inconclusive and insufficient to prove tampering in
the absence of proof of the original engine, chassis, and "alternate"
numbers. 24

19
Id. at 34.
20
Id. at 42-43.
21
Id. at 37-56.
22
Id. at 49.
n Id.
" Id. at 48.
Resolution 6 G.R. No. 232814

The CA likewise observed that, again assumir1g that the subject

vehicle was actually stolen, the immediate seizure of the subject vehicle
without any warrant, or court order four years after it was reported to
have been stolen runs counter to respondents' constitutionally guaranteed
rights against unreasonable searches and seizure. 25 As admitted by
petitioners, they only conducted an investigation which yielded that the
subject vehicle was stolen after the subject vehicle was already
impounded. In essence, its immediate seizure and impounding was
without probable cause and merely grounded on the OR/CR which
allegedly appeared suspicious without any personal knowledge of a
report that it was indeed stolen. 26

Furthermore, the CA concluded that the subject vehicle was not in

custodia legis. Its seizure and impounding was unlawful, invalid, and
illegal. At the very least, it is not sanctioned under RA 8750 27 which
provides for a penalty of a fine or suspension of a driver's license to be
imposed on a driver ~pprehended for driving without using a seat belt. 28

With regard to petitioners' liability, the CA classified their acts as

ultra vires which made them personally liable for P475,000.00, which is
the actual value of the subject vehicle as appearing in the Deed of Sale
for their failure to return it to respondents. 29

On July 5, 2017, the CA denied the subsequent motion for

reconsideration filed thereto. 30 Aggrieved by the CA ruling, petitioners
elevated the case to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue

The main issue in this case is whether the CA committed

reversible error in: (1) directing the return of the actual value of the
seized vehicle to respondents; and (2) ordering the payment of moral
damages.

25
Id. at 50.
26 Id.
27
Seat Belts Use Act of 1999, approved on August 5, 1999.
28
Rollo, pp. 51-52.
29
Id. at 54-55.
30
Id. at 69-71.
 Resulution 7 G.R. No. 232814

Our Ruling

The petition must fail.

Prefatorily, well-settled is the rule that factual findings of the trial

court as affirmed by the CA are generally binding and conclusive on the
parties and not reviewable by the Court, wanting the application of any
of the exceptions to warrant a review thereof. 31 The ownership by the
respondents over the subject vehicle has been ciearly set out in both
decisions of the RTC and the CA. Thus, there is no compelling reason to
disturb the factual findings which are firmly anchored on sufficient and
competent evidence.

In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show

that he is either the owner, or clearly entitled to the possession of the
object sought to be recovered and that the defendant, who is in actual or
legal possession tl:ereof, wrongfully detains it. 32 In BA _Finance
Corporation v. CA/° the Supreme Court explained the nature of a
replevin suit in this wise:

Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal

remedy and of .a provisional relief. It may refer either to the action
itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels being
wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the
provisional remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing
during the pendency of the action and hold it pendente lite. The action
is primarily pos.-,essory in nature and generally determines nothing
more than the right of possession. Replevin is so usually described as
a mixed action, being partly in rem and partiy in personam-in
rem insofar as the recovery of specific property i, concerned, and in
personam as regards to damages involved. As an "action in rem," the
gist of the replevin action is the right of the plaintiff to obtain
possession of sp,:,cific personal property by reason of his being the
owner or of his having a special interest therein. x x x. Rule 60 of
the Rules of Court allows an application for the immediate possession
of the property but the plaintiff must show that he has a good legal
basis, i.e., a clear title thereto, for seeking such interim possession. 34

31
Sama/av. Court ofAppeals, 467 Phil. 563, 568 (2004).
32
Superlines Transportation Co., Inc. v. Philippine National Constn<ction Company, 548 Phil. 354,
364 (2007). citing Distil!eria Washington, Inc. v. Hon. CA, 331 Phil. 622, 629-630 (1996) and
Twin Ace Holdings Corpeation v Rufina and Company, 523 Phil. ")66, 779 (2006).
33
327 Phil. 716, 726-727 (' )96).
34
Id. at 724-725.
 Resolution 8 G.R. No. 232814

Petitioners justified their act of impounding the subject vehicle in

furtherance of their implementation of the Anti-Camapping Act of 1972.
After respondent's driver was apprehended for violation of the Seat Belts
Use Act of 1999, petitioners demanded the subject vehicle's CR and OR.
Petitioners, who were bona fide members of the PNP assigned at the
Regional Traffic Management Office-10 and tasked with the
implementation of the Anti-Camapping Act of 1972 and other related
laws, admitted that they impounded the subject vehicle because they
found the CR and OR suspicious. Thus, it appears that the subject
vehicle was placed under custodia legis for having a spurious OR and
CR.

To be entitled to replevin, it must first be established that the

plaintiff is clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be
recovered. The Court agrees with the unanimous findings of the CA and
the RTC as to the ownership of the subject vehicle by respondents:

In this case, the plaintiffs-appellees were able to prove -by

preponderance of evidence that they are the legitimate owners of the
subject vehicle and that they are entitled to recover the possession
thereof from the defendants-appellants who unlav.ially or wrongfully
impounded it. To support the claim of the plaintiffs-appellees, they
presented the foHowing: (I) Deed of Sale of Motor Vehicle showing
that they legally acquired it from Ryan Gallego; (2) the PNP Motor
Vehicle Clearance Certificate stating that the subject vehicle is not in
the list of wanted/stolen vehicles; (3) Macro-Etching Certificate
showing that the chassis and engine numbers of the subject vehicle
are not tampered; and (4) the Official Receipt (OR) and the Certificate
of Registration (CR) of the subject vehicle showing that it is indeed
registered with the LTO-Cagayan de Oro City Field Office in their
names. These pieces of evidence were presented by the plaintiffs-
appellees to the defendants-appellants to proved [sic] their ownership
thereof and the regularity of the procedure undertaken by them to
have the subject vehicle registered in their names. 35

As petitioners admit, the identity and ownership of. a motor

vehicle can be ascertained through the CR issued by the Land
Transportation Offic:: (LTO) wherein the chassis and engine numbers,
and plate number are stated. 36 A CR of a motor vehicle in one's name
creates a strong presumption of ownership. For all practical purposes,
the person in whose favor it has been issued is virtually the owner
thereof unless proved otherwise. This presumption is rebuttable by
35
Rollo, p. 47.
36
Id. at 12.
Resolution 9 G.R. No. 232814

competent proof. 37 In this case, respondents presented their CR on the

subject vehicle and tl1e OR of payment thereby lending credence to their
claim that they are indeed the owners thereof. Their OR and CR enjoy
the presumption of regularity in the absence of proof that their issuance
was tainted with fraud or irregularity.

Furthermore, petitioners' assertion that the subject vehicle was

camapped was a mere afterthought considering their admission that they
discovered that it was a stolen car only after it was already impounded.
As cited by the RTC in its Decision in the recital of evidence for the
defendants, petitioners discovered that the subject vehicle which they
imrounded was carnapped only after the conduct of an investigation:

Witness then told his Regional Chief about the result of the
examination conducted by Cebu Southern Motors Corporation. His
chief instructed :heir encoder to include in the carnapping list, the
Vehicle Informa:ion Management System (VIMS) the information
about the subject vehicle xx x. 38

Despite the subject vehicle's MVCC which showed no tampering

of the chassis and engine numbers, petitioners still unjustifiably refused
to release it and even transported it outside Mindanao without
respondents' consenc, or a court order. Undeniably, instead of showing
that there was irregul.arity in the issuance of the MVCC, petitioners took
it upon themselves to counter-verify the status of the subject vehicle on
the basis of mere suspicion, without due regard to respondents'
constitutionally enshrined rights against unreasonable searches and
seizure.

More importantly, the lack of immediacy, or the lapse of time from

when the subject vehicle was allegedly stolen until it was impounded,
coupled with the absence of probable cause to jm,tify its seizure witliout
a warrant, made the impounding of the subject vehicle unlawful and
unjustified. Thus, petitioners are not in custodia legis · thereof. While
petitioners' zealousness to enforce the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 is
commendable, their actions should be guided and exercised within the
bounds of the law in recognition of every person's basic rights and
liberties in consonance with the legal adage that we are a government of
law and not of men.

37
Chiao Uong Tan v. Court ofAppeals, 298-A Phil. 14, 20 (I 993).
38
Rollo, p. 27.
 Resolution 10 G.R. No. 232814

Indeed, it was persuasively shown that respondents had no

knowledge that the car was an object of a fraud, or that it was stolen as
petitioners rebut or contradict respondents' evidence of their valid
acquisition thereof. for valuable consideration, including its proper
registration with the LTO. With respondents' registered ownership of the
subject vehicle and its seizure having been found as unlawful,
respondents are entitled to recover it from petitioners. Respondents are
entitled to its possession and use until appropriate lawful proceedings
would have been tak:cn by petitioners to establish that the subject vehicle
is a proper subject for impounding for having a fake OR and CR, 39 or
that it is a stolen car. Absent the mentioned proceedings or evidence to
support the foregoing, petitioners were correctly found liable for
impounding the subject vehicle and its return is in order.

Under Section 9, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, [a]fter trial of the

issues, the court shall determine who has the right ofpossession to and
the value of the property and shall render judgment in the alternative for
the delivery thereof to the party entitled to the same, or for its value in
case delivery cannot be made, and also for such damages as either party
may prove, with costs. Petitioners cannot escape liability by invoking
regularity in the performance of their duty when there is evidence th<1t
show otherwise. Respondents were able to prove that they are the
registered and rightful owners of the subject vehicle and that petitioners
unlawfully seized it without a legal or court order thereby depriving
them of its possession.

As a general rule, public officials can be held personally

accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with
official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is a
showing of bad faith. 40 It is also paramount that tortious acts Qr crimes
committed while discharging official functions are not covered by
sovereign immunity. 41 An action at law or suit in equity against a
government official who violates or invades the personal and property
rights of a plaintiff under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption
39
lmpoundable Violations DOTC - LTO (MC-89-105) (Updated April 10, 2017) provides that
a motor vehicle shali be impounded if it has a fake Official Receipt and Certificate
of Registration; http:: 1 Nww.mmda.gov. ph/20-faq/284-impoundable-violations-dotc-lto-mc-89-
105 .htrnl <last accessed on October 23, 2020>.
'° Cha:vez v. Sandiganbayan (]" Div.), 271 Phil. 293, 300 (1991).
" See Concurring Opinioi:, of Associate Justice Marvic M. V.F. Leon en in the case of Most Rev.
Arigo, et al. v. Swift, et al.-, 743 Phil. 8, 128 (2014).
Resolution 11 G.R. No. 232814

of authority which he does not have, with a claim to have acted for the
State, is not a suit against the State. 42 The actions of petitioners herein as
government officials could not be considered as authorized by the State
for the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers.

Indubitably, the impounding of the subject vehicle by petitioners

without any valid ground or legal justification as ,hown by the evidence
is unwarranted and aosolutely beyond the scope of their authority. In the
same manner, petitioners' misrepresentation as to the whereabouts of the
subject vehicle which likewise remained unrebutted, was an indicia of
bad faith or malice and in no possible way related to the official
performance of their duties. Veritably, the Court conforms with the RTC
and the CA that petitioners should be personally held accountable for
their unauthorized impounding of the subject vehicle making them
solidarily liable for the payment of its actual value, with interest:

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds that the award of

attorney's fees in favor of respondents is baseless as the RTC failed to
state in the body o~· the decision its reason for the award, hence its
unheralded appearance in the dispositive portion is not allowed. 43

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated

April 6, 2017 and the Resolution dated July 5, 2017 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 04444-NIIN are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION '.n that the award of attorney's fees is hereby
DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

HEN
Associate Justice

42
Director or Officer-in-Ch:~rge of the Bureau of Telecommunications, etc., et al. v. Hon. Aligaen,
etc., et al., 144 Phil. 257, ~•57 (1970) as cited in Most Rev. Arigo, et al. v. Swift, et al., id. at 47.
" Alcatel Philippines, Inc _-, lM Bongar. & Co., inc., et al., 674 Phil. 529, 533 (2011), citing
Pagsibigan v. People, et a!., 606 Phil. 233,242 (2009).
Resolution 12 G.R. No. 232814

WE CONCUR:

Associate Justice
Chairperson

;/
EDGARDO L. DELOS SANTOS
Associate Justice Associate Justice

JHOSE~PEZ
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Conscitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been n~ached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opini0n of the Court's Division.

DIOSDAU M. PERALTA
Chie1\Justice