ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 09-94 June 14, 1994 Section 32 (2) of B.P. Blg.

129 which fixed original

exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
TO: THE COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, REGIONAL TRIAL Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL over offenses punishable with a fine of not more than
COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL four thousand pesos. If the amount of the fine exceeds
COURT, ALL MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION four thousand696 pesos, the Regional Trial Court shall
SERVICE AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE have 00000yu,jurisdiction, including offenses committed
PHILIPPINES by public officers and employees in relation to their
office, where the amount of the fine does not exceed six
thousand pesos.
SUBJECT: GUIDELINES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 7691. ENTITLED "AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF
THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS However, this rule does not apply to offenses involving
AND MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL damage to property through criminal negligence which
COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. are under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
ACT OF 1980." Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, irrespective of the amount
of the imposable fine.
For the guidance of the bench and the Bar, the following
guidelines are to be followed in the implementation of Republic Manila, June 14, 1994.
Act No. 7691, entitled "An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, Otherwise Known as the 'Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980":

1. The new jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts,

Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil and original cases,
and in cadastral and land registration cases, under
Section 19, 32, 33 and 34 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended
by R.A. No. 7691. Was effective on April 15, 1994, fifteen
(15) days after the publication in the Malaya and in the
Times Journal on March 30, 1994, pursuant to Section 8
of the R.A. No. 7691.

2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever

kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount under
Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the
damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of
the main cause of action. However, in cases where the
claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of
the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.

3. The criminal jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial

Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Trial
Courts under Section 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended
by R.A. No. 7691, has been increased to cover offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years irrespective of the amount of the fine. As a
consequence, the Regional Trial Courts have no more
original jurisdiction over offenses committed by public
officers and employees in relation to their office, where
the offense is punishable by more than four (4) years
and two (2) months up to six (6) years.

4. The provisions of Section 32 (2) of B.P. 129 as

amended by R.A. No. 7691, apply only to offenses
punishable by imprisonment or fine, or both, in which
cases the amount of the fine is disregarded in
determining the jurisdiction of the court. However, in
cases where the only penalty provided by law is a fine,
the amount thereof shall determine the jurisdiction of
the court in accordance with the original provisions of

1
 the Regional Trial Court of Manila where the corresponding civil
registry is located was the proper venue, pursuant to Section 1,
G.R. No. 243288, August 28, 2019 Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 15

In either case, the RTC found that the evidence adduced was not
DR. RUBEN C. BARTOLOME, PETITIONER, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
sufficient to support petitioner's claim that he had been habitually
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
and continuously using the name 'Ruben C. Bartolome' since
childhood.16
DECISION
Petitioner thus appealed to the CA, claiming that Rule 103 was the
CAGUIOA, J.: applicable remedy.17

This is a petition for review on certiorari (Petition) under Rule 45 The Ruling of the CA
of the Rules of Court (Rules) assailing the April 26, 2018
Decision1 and November 26, 2018 Resolution 2 of the Court of The CA denied the appeal. The CA noted that petitioner was
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 106384. The CA Decision denied seeking to change his first name and to correct his surname as
the appeal and affirmed the October 21, 2015 Decision of Branch indicated in his birth certificate. 18 Thus, the CA held that petitioner
258, Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City (RTC) in S.P. Proc. Case should have filed a petition for the correction of entries in his
No. 14-0100, which denied petitioner's petition for change of birth certificate under R.A. 9048,19 instead of a Rule 103 petition
name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for failure to exhaust for change of name. The CA likewise held that petitioner failed to
administrative remedies, insufficiency of evidence, and improper adduce sufficient evidence to show that his father and his siblings'
venue. last name was actually spelled "Bartolome."20

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied.

In 2014, petitioner, a resident of Parañaque City,3 filed a petition Hence, petitioner filed the instant Petition insisting that Rule 103
for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court before is the proper remedy.21 Petitioner argues that, contrary to the
the RTC, seeking "to correct the name 'Feliciano Bartholome' as ruling of the CA, R.A. 9048 covers changes in the "first name or
appearing in his birth certificate x x x. He stated that he has been nickname [only]"22 and does not cover petitions to "correct [his]
using the name 'Ruben [Cruz] Bartolome'  since his childhood." 4 surname."23 Thus, petitioner claims that it would be "splitting [his]
cause of action" if he were compelled to file separate petitions for
After posting and publication, 5 petitioner was allowed to present change of name and correction of entries.
the following documents to support his claim: 1) Doctor of
Medicine Diploma dated May 18, 1965; 2) CSC Certificate for In its Comment, the OSG argued that the CA correctly denied the
Medical Examiners Physician dated December 6, 1965; 3) PRC ID appeal.24 The OSG claims that petitioner should have first filed a
No. 0030981 dated December 6, 1968; 4) Marriage Contract No. petition before the local civil registrar pursuant to R.A. 9048 in
894-2-68 dated May 18, 1968; 5) Philippine Passport No. EB order to change his first name and to correct the spelling of his
1611302 dated December 23, 2010; 6) Senior Citizens ID Card No. last name.25 The OSG claims that there was no splitting of cause of
2006661 dated December 11, 2002; and 7) NBI Clearance No. action as both reliefs are covered by R.A. 9048.26
15050159 dated November 25, 2011,6 which all bore the name,
"Ruben C. Bartolome." Issue

It appears from the records that although the Office of the Whether the change/correction sought in petitioner's first name,
Solicitor General (OSG) was notified and the Office of the City middle name, and surname, as appearing in his birth certificate,
Prosecutor of Parañaque City was deputized to appear on behalf from "Feliciano Bartholome" to "Ruben Cruz Bartolome" should
of the State,7 no motion to dismiss was filed questioning the be filed under R.A. 9048, Rule 103, or Rule 108 of the Rules.
jurisdiction of the court or the venue of the petition. 8 In fact, the
State did not present any controverting evidence nor file any The Court's Ruling
comment or opposition to the petition. 9 It likewise appears from
the records that petitioner's father and siblings were never The Petition lacks merit. The CA and the OSG correctly found that
impleaded.10 the administrative proceeding under R.A. 9048 applies to all
corrections sought in the instant case.
The Ruling of the RTC
Application of Rules 103 and 108 in
After trial, the RTC denied the petition for failure to exhaust relation to R.A. 9048, as amended by
administrative remedies, insufficiency of evidence, and improper R.A. 10172
venue.11
In Republic v. Gallo,27 the Court outlined the difference between
As regards petitioner's first name,  the RTC held that petitioner Rule 103 and Rule 108 of the Rules and the effects brought about
availed of the wrong procedure. The RTC explained that a petition by the enactment of R.A. 9048 as amended by R.A. 10172, 28 on the
for change of first name should have been filed in accordance with aforementioned rules. The Court explained:
Republic Act (R.A.) 9048,12 which vested the power and authority
to entertain petitions for change of first name with the city or Names are labels for one's identity. They facilitate social
municipal registrar or consul general concerned. 13 interaction, including the allocation of rights and determination of
liabilities. It is for this reason that the State has an interest in one's
As regards the prayer for correction of petitioner's surname,  the name.
RTC denied the petition for improper venue. 14 The RTC held that
2
The name through which one is known is generally, however, not nationality of a person. The proceedings under this rule may
chosen by the individual who bears it. Rather, it is chosen by one's either be summary, if the correction pertains to clerical mistakes,
parents. In this sense, the choice of one's name is not a product of or adversary, if it pertains to substantial errors.
the exercise of autonomy of the individual to whom it refers.
x x x x
In view of the State's interest in names as markers of one's
identity, the law requires that these labels be registered. Following the procedure in Rule 103, Rule 108 also requires a
Understandably, in some cases, the names so registered or other petition to be filed before the Regional Trial Court. The trial court
aspects of one's identity that pertain to one's name are not then sets a hearing and directs the publication of its order in a
reflected with accuracy in the Certificate of Live Birth filed with newspaper of general circulation in the province. After the
the civil registrar. hearing, the trial court may grant or dismiss the petition and serve
a copy of its judgment to the Civil Registrar.
Changes to one's name, therefore, can be the result of either one
of two (2) motives. The first, as an exercise of one's autonomy, is Mercadera clarified the applications of Article 376 and Rule 103,
to change the appellation that one was given for various reasons. and of Article 412 and Rule 108, thus:
The other is not an exercise to change the label that was given to
a person; it is simply to correct the data as it was recorded in the The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule
Civil Registry. 103 must not be confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change
of one's name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds
x x x x provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name,
there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and
Under Article 407 of the Civil Code, the books in the Civil Register proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of
include "acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked
status of persons," which are prima facie evidence of the facts therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.
stated there.
In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and
Entries in the register include births, marriages, deaths, legal other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised.
separations, annulments of marriage, judgments declaring Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also
marriages void from the beginning, legitimations, adoptions, includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently
acknowledgments of natural children, naturalization, loss or misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all
recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of alterations allowed in one's name are confined under Rule 103.
filiation, voluntary emancipation of a minor, and changes of Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.
name.
This rule in "names." however, does not operate to entirely limit
As stated, the governing law on changes of first name [and Rule 108 to the correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries
correction of clerical and typographical errors in the civil register] by way of a summary proceeding. As explained
is currently Republic Act No. 10172, which amended Republic Act above. Republic  v. Valencia  is the authority for allowing
No. 9048. Prior to these laws, the controlling provisions on substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil status, and
changes or corrections of name were Articles 376 and 412 of the paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an
Civil Code. adversary proceeding. "After all, the role of the Court under Rule
108 is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein." x
Article 376 states the need for judicial authority before any person xx
can change his or her name. On the other hand, Article 412
provides that judicial authority is also necessary before any entry
However, Republic Act No. 9048 amended Articles 376 and 412 of
in the civil register may be changed or corrected.
the Civil Code, effectively removing clerical errors and changes of
the name outside the ambit of Rule 108 and putting them under
Under the old rules, a person would have to file an action in court
the jurisdiction of the civil registrar.
under Rule 103 for substantial changes in the given name or
surname provided they fall under any of the valid reasons
In Silverio  v. Republic:
recognized by law, or Rule 108 for corrections of clerical errors.

x x x x The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and

entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a
Applying Article 412 of the Civil Code, a person desiring to change privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled
his or her name altogether must file a petition under Rule 103 by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code
with the Regional Trial Court, which will then issue an order provides:
setting a hearing date and directing the order's publication in a ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without
newspaper of general circulation. After finding that there is proper judicial authority.
and reasonable cause to change his or her name, the Regional This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error
Trial Court may grant the petition and order its entry in the civil Law) x x x
register.
x x x x
On the other hand, Rule 108 applies when the person is seeking to
correct clerical and innocuous mistakes in his or her documents RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.  It vests the power
with the civil register. It also governs the correction of substantial and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the
errors in the entry of the information enumerated in Section 2 of city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under
this Rule and those affecting the civil status, citizenship, and the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first
3
name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned
administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to The foregoing rules may be summarized as follows:
exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103
(Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an  1. A person seeking 1) to change his or her first name, 2)
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and to correct clerical or typographical errors in the civil register, 3) to
subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding change/correct the day and/or month of his or her date of birth,
venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the and/or 4) to change/correct his or her sex, where it is patently
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake,
administrative in nature, not judicial. x x x must first file a verified petition with the local civil registry office
of the city or municipality where the record being sought to be
corrected or changed is kept, in accordance with the
In Republic v. Cagandahan:
administrative proceeding provided under R.A. 904830 in relation
to R.A. 10172.31 A person may only avail of the appropriate judicial
The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth
remedies under Rule 103 or Rule 108 in the aforementioned
certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes.
entries after  the petition in the administrative proceedings is filed
In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
and later denied.
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
 2. A person seeking 1) to change his or her surname or 2) to
without a judicial order.
change both his or her first name and  surname may file a petition
for change of name under Rule 103, provided that the
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was
jurisprudential grounds32 discussed in Republic v. Hernandez33 are
amended by Republic Act No. 9048 in so far as  clerical or
present.
typographical  errors are involved. The correction or change of
such matters can now be made through administrative
3. A person seeking substantial cancellations or corrections of
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
entries34 in the civil registry may file a petition for cancellation or
Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the
correction of entries under Rule 108. As discussed in Lee  v. Court
Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies
of Appeals35 and more recently, in Republic v. Cagandahan,36 R.A.
only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
9048 "removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
register. x x x
the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register."
In Republic v. Sali:
In the instant case, petitioner seeks to change his first name, to
The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among include his middle, and to correct the spelling of his
other grounds, if the new first name has been habitually and surname,37i.e.,  from "Feliciano Bartholome" as stated in his birth
continuously used by the petitioner and he or she has been certificate to "Ruben Cruz Bartolome"
publicly known by that first name in the community. The local city
or municipal civil registrar or consul general has the primary The Court agrees with the CA and the OSG that the
jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It is only when such petition aforementioned changes and corrections are covered by Section 1
is denied that a petitioner may either appeal to the civil registrar of R.A. 9048 as amended by R.A. 10172, which provides:
general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court. x x x
Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and
Change of First Name or Nickname. — No entry in a civil register
Republic Act No. 9048 also dispensed with the need for judicial
shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except
proceedings in case of any clerical or typographical mistakes in the
for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
civil register or changes in first names or nicknames.
nickname, the day and month in the date of birth or sex of a
person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or
x x x x
typographical error or mistake in the entry, which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
Thus, a person may now change his or her first name or correct
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of
clerical errors in his or her name through administrative
this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. (Underscoring
proceedings. Rules 103 and 108 only apply if the administrative
supplied)
petition has been filed and later denied.

In 2012, Republic Act No. 9048 was amended by Republic Act No. The change of petitioner's first name
10172. is covered by R.A. 9048, as amended

In addition to the change of the first name, the day and month of While the grounds for change of name under Rule 103 are found
birth, and the sex of a person may now be changed without in jurisprudence, the grounds for change of first name or
judicial proceedings. Republic Act No. 10172 clarifies that these nickname are expressly provided in R.A. 9048, Section 4, viz.:
changes may now be administratively corrected where it is
patently clear that there is a clerical or typographical mistake in SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname.  —
the entry. It may be changed by filing a subscribed and sworn The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed
affidavit with the local civil registry office of the city or in any of the following cases:
municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or
changed is kept.29 (1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or

4
pronounce; 1988 and prior to the enactment of R.A. 9048 as amended, the
Court, in Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,44 (Labayo-Rowe) held that a
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and correction in the spelling of therein petitioner's surname from
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly "Labayo/Labayu" to "Labayo" was a mere clerical error that could
known by that first name or nickname in the community; or   be corrected through a summary proceeding under Rule 108.

(3) The change will avoid confusion. In Labayo-Rowe, the Court defined clerical errors as "those
harmless and innocuous changes such as the correction of names
clearly misspelled, occupation of parents, errors that are visible to
In Republic  v. Sali,38 the Court held that a change of therein
the eye or obvious to the understanding, errors made by a clerk or
respondent Lorena Omapas Sali's first name from "Dorothy" to
transcriber, or a mistake in copying or writing." 45 It can be readily
"Lorena" was primarily administrative in nature and should be
seen that this jurisprudential definition was expressly
filed under the procedure provided in R.A. 9048. 39
incorporated into R.A. 9048, which, as already
discussed, expressly removed the correction of clerical or
In the instant case, petitioner seeks to change his first name
typographical errors from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of
from "Feliciano " to "Ruben, "  on the ground that he has been
Court.46To obviate any further confusion on the matter, the Court
using the latter since childhood. 40 Contrary to petitioner's claims
categorically holds that typographical or clerical errors in a
therefore, the change sought is covered by R.A. 9048 and should
person's surname must likewise be corrected through the
have been filed with the local civil registry of the city or
administrative proceeding under R.A. 9048.
municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or
changed is kept.41
As herein petitioner's allegedly misspelled surname,
"Bartholome," may be readily corrected by merely referring to the
The inclusion of petitioner's middle
existing records of the civil registrar, such as the surnames of
name is covered by R.A. 9048, as
petitioner's parents and immediate family members, the petition
amended
should have been filed under R.A. 9048 and not under Rule 103 of
the Rules. It likewise follows that the petition should have been
While substantial corrections of entries in the civil register are still
filed with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality
covered by Rule 108, typographical or clerical corrections must
where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept,
now be filed under R.A. 9048 as amended. Section 2 of the said
in accordance with Section 3 of R.A. 9048 and not in accordance
law defines clerical or typographical errors as follows:
with the venue provided in Rule 103.
(3) 'Clerical or typographical error' refers to a mistake committed
In sum, all changes sought by the petitioner fall within the ambit
in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying,
of R.A. 9048. Petitioner may only avail of the appropriate  judicial
transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless
remedies when the changes/corrections sought through the
and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of
administrative proceeding are denied. By "appropriate," the Court
birth, mistake in the entry of day and month in the date of birth or
holds that if the prayer to administratively change  petitioner's
the sex of the person or the like, which is visible to the eyes or
first name is denied, the same may be brought under Rule 103 of
obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed
the Rules of Court. If the prayers to
only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided,
administratively correct petitioner's middle name and surname
however,  That no correction must involve the change of
are denied, the same may be brought under Rule 108 of the Rules
nationality, age, or status of the petitioner. 42 (Underscoring
of Court.
supplied)
A final note
Evidently the test for whether a correction is clerical or substantial
is found in the provision itself. Misspelled names or missing Petitioner alleges that he is now 76 years old 47 and prays that his
entries are clerical corrections if they are visible to the eyes or petition be granted, given that the "government messed-up his
obvious to the understanding and if they may be readily verified birth certificate when he was an infant and is now giving him a
by referring to the existing records in the civil register. They must hard time. He just wants to fix this legally murky but relatively
not, however, involve any change in nationality, age or status. simple problem before he dies for the sake of and love for his
children and grandchildren."48
In Republic  v. Gallo,43 the Court unequivocally held that a prayer
to enter a person's middle name is a mere clerical error, which In this regard, even if the Court were inclined to give due course
may be corrected by referring to existing records. Thus, it is to petitioner's Rule 103 petition in the interest of substantial
primarily administrative in nature and should be filed pursuant to justice, it should be emphasized that both the RTC and the CA
R.A. 9048 as amended. identically found that the evidence adduced by petitioner was
insufficient to support his claim that he has been habitually and
Applying the aforementioned ruling to the instant case therefore, continuously using the name "Ruben Cruz Bartolome " since
petitioner's prayer that his middle name, "Cruz"  be entered, is a childhood.49 As well, the Court notes that petitioner did not also
mere clerical correction, and must therefore be likewise adduce evidence to show that his father or his siblings' surnames
undertaken through the administrative proceeding provided were actually spelled as "Bartolome.  "50 It is a threshold doctrine
under R.A. 9048. that the resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts,
whose findings are generally binding on the Court. 51 While the
The correction in the spelling of Court recognizes several exceptions, none of these exceptions
petitioner's surname is likewise applies.52
covered by R.A. 9048, as amended
In view of the foregoing, the instant petition is denied, without
As regards petitioner's misspelled surname, it bears noting that in prejudice to the filing of the appropriate administrative action

5
under R.A. 9048, as amended by R.A. 10172. refusal of the mortgagor to pay the obligations when due, the
entire principal, interest, penalties and other charges shall be
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The April 26, 2018 Decision immediately demandable and payable without need of notice or
and November 26, 2018 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- demand; and the mortgagee shall have the absolute discretion to
G.R. CV. No. 106384 are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to foreclose the mortgage extrajudicially pursuant to Act No. 3135,
the filing of the appropriate administrative proceeding under R.A. as amended.
9048, as amended by R.A. 10172.
Pursuant to the parties’ agreements, petitioner released to
SO ORDERED. respondents the principal amounts of the loans as evidenced by
various promissory notes, thus:

However, respondents failed to pay the loans which matured on

February 14, 2001. Thus, petitioner sought to foreclose the
mortgages extrajudicially.

On February 28, 2001, respondents filed with the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 56, Mandaue City, a Complaint 4 for Declaratory
Relief, Injunction, Damages, Annulment of Promissory Notes,
Documents, and Contracts against petitioner, docketed as Civil
Case No. MAN-4045. The complaint alleges that prior to 1998,
G.R. No. 163878             December 12, 2006
respondents obtained credit accommodations from petitioner.
The latter required respondents’ representatives to sign "standard
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, pre-printed bank forms in fine print, such as Credit Line
vs. Agreements (CLA), Promissory Notes (PN), Real Estate Mortgages
SHEMBERG MARKETING CORPORATION, MACKIE INDUSTRIES (REM), Chattel Mortgages (CM), Trust Receipts (TR), Surety
CORPORATION, BENSON INDUSTRIES, INC., KAMARO Agreements (JSS) and other bank forms and documents."
ENTERPRISES CORP., POLYSACCHARIDE CORP., PRIME CRAFTS, Respondents complied since they trusted petitioner. However, it
INC., CEBU UNITED POLYMER CORP., SHEMBERG NATURES tuned out that petitioner’s employees filled the blanks with "false
CRAFT INC., MARY U. DACAY 1, HENRY U. DACAY, BENSON U. and inaccurate entries." Respondents deny and dispute the
DACAY, RAMON U. DACAY AND ERNESTO U. DACAY, genuineness and due execution of the documents and pray for the
JR., respondents. following reliefs:

DECISION 1. Immediately upon filing, to issue ex parte a 72-hour

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: temporary restraining order and thereafter upon
summary hearing, to issue a temporary restraining order
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the for a maximum period of twenty (20) days restraining
Decision2 and enjoining defendants, their agents, representatives
or any other persons acting on their behalf from doing
and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals dated February 16, 2004 or proceeding with the following:
and May 28, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 67270.
a) proceeding with the auction sale of the
Far East Bank & Trust Company (FEBTC), petitioner, is a domestic properties under the REMs,
banking corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws.
It is now managed and operated by the Bank of the Philippine b) execution of Certificate of Sale;
Islands with main office in Makati City.
c) registering Certificate of Sale with the
Shemberg Marketing Corporation, Mackie Industries Corporation, Registry of Deeds;
Benson Industries Incorporated, Kamaro Enterprises Corporation,
Polysaccharide Corporation, Prime Crafts Incorporated, Cebu d) execution of the Deed of Final Sale and
United Polymer Corporation, Shemberg Natures Craft Inc., other consolidation documents;
respondents herein, are all duly registered domestic corporations
based in Pakna-an, Mandaue City. The individual respondents, all
e) publication of Notices of Sale;
surnamed Dacay, are directors and corporate officers of the said
corporations.
f) posting of Notices of Sale;
Respondents are the registered owners of several realties located
in Mandaue City described as follows: g) using the questioned documents, like the
TRs, to seek administrative, civil, or criminal
remedies;
Prior to 1998, respondents entered into several credit
transactions with petitioner secured by several real estate
mortgages, thus: h) disturbing the status quo prior to the
litigation.
In their respective mortgage contracts, duly annotated on
respondents’ titles, the parties stipulated that upon failure or 2. After due notice and hearing, a Preliminary Injunction
be issued upon posting of a bond enjoining defendant,
6
 its employees, agents, representatives, or any other proceedings, as well as the consequent damage
persons acting on its behalf from doing the above acts resultant thereto;
complained against;
c) the purpose of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
3. After trial, it is prayed that judgment be rendered in which is merely to suspend proceedings until there may
favor of plaintiffs and against defendant as follows: be an opportunity to inquire whether any injunction
should be granted.
a) Declaring null and void the CLA, REMs, CMs,
PNs, JSS, TRs, and other related documents, WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered and in the
the notices of sale, the entire foreclosure interest of substantial justice, the defendant is hereby
proceedings, including the auction sale, the ordered to cease and desist and/or its agents,
amount claimed by the bank to be the representatives or any other person acting in its behalf
outstanding account, the amount claimed by to immediately stop foreclosure proceedings of
the bank to be the principal, the interest plaintiffs’ properties subject matter of the said
unilaterally imposed by the bank, the penalties foreclosure proceedings, including but not being limited
imposed by the bank and the PNs made basis to publication for foreclosure and subsequent auction
for default and foreclosure; sale of the said properties.

b) Declaring the CLA, REMs, CMs, PNs, JSS, SO ORDERED.

TRs, and other related documents as without
consideration, invalid, inoperative, ineffective, Petitioner filed its Answer with Affirmative Defenses,
unenforceable, null and void and to cancel the Counterclaim, and Vigorous Opposition to the Order directing the
same; issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary mandatory injunction.
Likewise, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Based On Affirmative
c) To make the injunction permanent; Defenses alleging that: (1) the venue is improperly laid; (2) the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for non-
d) To order the bank to comply with its payment of proper docket fees; (3) there is non-joinder of
commitments, assurances and representations indispensable parties; and (4) the trial court has no jurisdiction to
to help in the rehabilitation of the Dacay enjoin the foreclosure proceedings.
Group and the restructuring of its obligations,
if any; On March 27, 2001, the trial court issued an Order 6 denying
petitioner’s motion to dismiss, thus:
e) To award to plaintiffs moral damages
of P300,000.00, exemplary damages This resolves defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
of P200,000.00, attorney’s fees of P200,000.00
plus P1,000.00 per billable hour, and litigation Defendant in his motion insists that the case should be
expenses of P300,000.00; dismissed on the following affirmative defenses: (a)
venue is improperly laid; (b) lack of jurisdiction
f) Declaring that the defendant cannot validly considering the non-payment of docketing fees; (c) non-
do, perform or suffer to be done the acts joinder of indispensable parties and (d) lack of
complained of. jurisdiction or authority to enjoin foreclosure
proceedings.
On March 9, 2001, the trial court issued an Order 5 granting
respondents’ prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining VENUE
order (TRO), thus:
Records show that the office address of plaintiffs is in
In resolving the petition for the issuance of a TRO the Mandaue City. In fact, defendant’s annexes to its answer
court, without going into the merits of the case has (Annex "I" and "L") admit that plaintiffs’ business
taken into consideration: address and principal place of business are at Pakna-an,
Mandaue City. Likewise similarly situated are the
a) the fact that petitioners/plaintiffs are presently in the properties sought to be foreclosed. Apparently,
process of rehabilitating their business concerns and for foregoing considered, venue has been properly laid.
which purpose, a consortium of banks/creditors has
been put into existence and that Far East Bank and Trust JURISDICTION
Company (FEBTC) even had initially approved and led
such effort as indicated by the participation of one of its It is to be noted that the question of jurisdiction has not
Senior Vice Presidents Ricardo G. Lazatin; been raised by defendant except with the cause of
action regarding annulment of mortgages on
b) the admission by respondent/defendant, in open defendant’s insistence that the tax declaration attached
court, that it has already initiated foreclosure is not the latest. Considering however that annulment of
proceedings against petitioners/plaintiffs and that it has mortgage is incapable of pecuniary estimation the court
in fact scheduled on March 30, 2001 the auction sale of feels that jurisdiction is proper.
petitioners’ properties subject matter of the foreclosure

7
 What determines the nature of an action and On August 16, 2001, the trial court issued the following Order: 8
the court which has jurisdiction over it are the
allegations made by the plaintiff. Sandel v. For consideration by the court are the defendant’s (1)
Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 101, Motion for Reconsideration of the Denial of the Motion
to Dismiss and (2) the Motion for Reconsideration of the
A court’s jurisdiction cannot be made to Grant of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.
depend upon defenses set up in the answer or
in a motion to dismiss but upon the allegations After a careful and exhaustive consideration of the
of the complaint. Sandel v. Court of Appeals, arguments adduced in Movant’s Motion for
262 SCRA 101, Reconsideration of the Denial of its Motion to Dismiss,
the court finds that the arguments advanced for
INDISPENSABLE PARTY consideration had already been treated and passed
upon by this court.
Evidence has not been introduced, to the satisfaction of
the court that indeed Far East Bank and Trust Company The same finding also holds true with respect to
(FEBTC) no longer exists and BPI has taken over its defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Grant of
assets and liabilities. Besides, the commercial linkage Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.
was between FEBTC and Shemberg as records show.
Accordingly, both motions are hereby DENIED.
AUTHORITY
SO ORDERED.
It is an inherent power of the court concomitant to its
very existence to issue provisional remedies, like Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
injunction, to protect the rights and interest of parties certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
pending litigation. 67270, contending that the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
Premises considered, the court feels and finds no basis following: (1) Order dated March 9, 2001 granting respondents’
to grant defendant’s motion. Accordingly, the Motion to prayer for a TRO; (2) Order dated March 27, 2001 ordering the
Dismiss is, as it is hereby, DENIED. issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; (3) Order also dated
March 27, 2001 denying its motion to dismiss; and (4) Order dated
SO ORDERED. August 16, 2001 denying its motion for reconsideration of the
Order denying its motion to dismiss and motion for
reconsideration of the Order granting respondents’ application for
Likewise on the same day, March 27, 2001, the trial court issued
a preliminary injunction.
another Order7 directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction in favor of respondents, thus:
On February 16, 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
Decision dismissing the petition for certiorari.
WHEREFORE, let a writ of injunction issue enjoining
defendant, its employees, agents or representatives,
and all those who may be acting in their behalf, from: The appellate court held that as the trial court has jurisdiction
over the case, its orders or decisions upon all questions therein,
cannot be corrected by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
(1) Taking further actions to foreclose the real estate
and chattel mortgage collaterals of plaintiffs;
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by
the Court of Appeals in its Resolution of May 28, 2004.
(2) To maintain the status quo during the pendency of
the proceedings and to refrain from performing the acts
complained of including but not being limited to the Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues: (a)
publication and notice of sale, conducting any whether the trial court has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. MAN-
foreclosure auction sale and other similar acts which will 4045; and (b) whether petitioner bank is entitled to the writs of
violate the status quo. certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

The Clerk of Court is hereby directed to issue the writ On the first issue, petitioner contends that in real actions, the
prayed for. assessed value of the property or if there is none, the estimated
value thereof, must be alleged in the complaint, and shall serve as
the basis for computing the fees. Nowhere in the complaint in Civil
Plaintiffs are ordered to put a bond of One Million Pesos
Case No. MAN-4045 did respondents allege the assessed values of
(P1,000,000.00)
their realties. Hence, there is no adequate basis for computing the
proper filing fees. It necessarily follows that the fees paid are
SO ORDERED. deficient. The trial court, therefore, did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case.
Petitioner then filed with the trial court the following: (a) Motion
to Resolve the Motion to Dismiss; (b) Motion to Dissolve Respondents counter that a perusal of the complaint in Civil Case
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction; (c) Motion for Reconsideration No. MAN-4045 shows that the suit primarily involves cancellation
of the Order Dated March 27, 2001; and (d) Opposition to the of mortgages, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Sufficiency of Bond.
8
Consequently, petitioner’s contention that there is a deficiency in perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
the payment of docket fees is without merit. of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reasons of passion or personal hostility. 15 It is
A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of such whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is
the prescribed fees.9 The importance of filing fees cannot be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
gainsaid for these are intended to take care of court expenses in
the handling of cases in terms of costs of supplies, use of The Court of Appeals found that the trial court acted in fair,
equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, and others, reasonable, and expeditious manner, thus:
computed as to man-hours used in the handling of each
case.10 Hence, the non-payment or insufficient payment of docket Thus, on the 6th of March 2001, His Honor held a hearing
fees can entail tremendous losses to the government in general on the application for temporary restraining order. He
and to the judiciary in particular. conducted at least three trial-type hearings on the 19 th,
20th, and 23rd of March 2001, complete with direct
Is an action for cancellation of mortgage incapable of pecuniary examination, cross-examination, re-direct examination,
estimation? re-cross examination and marking and offer of exhibits
vis-à-vis the application for the issuance of a writ of
Under Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 180, as amended by preliminary injunction. Four witnesses testified during
Republic Act No. 7691, Regional Trial Courts have sole, exclusive, the hearings – two for the Dacay Group and two for the
and original jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide "all civil actions in bank. Both parties were even required to submit
which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary memoranda.
estimation."
Indeed, the records are bereft of any indication that the trial court
In Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill,11 this Court laid the test for committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged
determining whether the subject matter of an action is incapable Orders. Verily, the Court of Appeals correctly held that certiorari
of pecuniary estimation, thus: Ascertain the nature of the will not lie, the sole office of the writ being to correct grave abuse
principal action or remedy sought. If the action is primarily for of discretion. Where a court has jurisdiction over the person and
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of the subject matter of the action, as in the instant case, its
pecuniary estimation. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction decisions on all questions arising from the case are but exercises
would depend upon the amount of the claim. However, where of such jurisdiction.16 If its findings are not correct, these would at
the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a best be questions of law, not abuse of discretion correctible by
sum of money, where the money claim is only incidental or a the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. 17
consequence of the principal relief sought, the action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. WHEREFORE, this Court DENIES the petition. The assailed Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67270
Here, the primary reliefs prayed for by respondents in Civil Case are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner, now the Bank of the
No. MAN-4045 is the cancellation of the real estate and chattel Philippine Islands.
mortgages for want of consideration. In Bumayog v. Tumas,12 this
Court ruled that where the issue involves the validity of a SO ORDERED.
mortgage, the action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation. In
the more recent case of Russell v. Vestil,13 this Court,
citing Bumayog,14 held that an action questioning the validity of a
mortgage is one incapable of pecuniary estimation. Petitioner has
not shown adequate reasons for this Court to
revisit Bumayog and Russell. Hence, petitioner’s contention can
not be sustained. Since respondents paid the docket fees, as
computed by the clerk of court, consequently, the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case No. MAN-4045.

Concerning to the second issue, it should be noted that CA-G.R. SP

No. 67270 is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
alleging that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the following
Orders: (1) Order dated March 9, 2001 granting respondents’
prayer for a TRO; (2) Order dated March 27, 2001, directing the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; (3) Order also dated
March 27, 2001 denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss; and (4)
Order dated August 16, 2001 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the denial of the motion to dismiss and motion
for reconsideration of the grant of preliminary injunction.

This Court holds that the Court of Appeals did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Orders.

There is grave abuse of discretion where the acts complained of

amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
9
 That he exerted earnest efforts to settle amicably since they all
belong to the same family but defendants refused to appear for
conciliation and continued to be adamant about it. After failing to
bring the defendants to the negotiation table, he sought the
intervention of the Lupong Pambarangay but still failed. Hence,
the issuance of a Certification to file action issued by the Barangay
Captain of Barangay Ajong, Sibulan.

Plaintiff Inocencio averred that he suffered sleepless nights an[d]

serious anxieties due to the unjustified refusal of defendant
Eustaquia to execute the deed of conveyance in her favor, thus
award of P200,000.00, as and for moral damages is proper.
Moreover, to teach defendants a lesson and to deter them and
others from doing similar acts in the future, they should be
condemned to pay exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00. Finally, as he was compelled to litigate, defendants
should, likewise, pay him attorney's fees of P15,000.00 plus cost
of litigation in the amount of P10,000.00.

In their Answer,[8] defendants Eustaquia and Spouses Fredeswinda

and Alfredo Ybiosa (hereafter defendant-[s]pouses) denied the
material allegations in the complaint, maintaining that the
questioned Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of defendant-
spouses was executed freely and voluntarily by the late Gabriel
Drilon and defendant Eustaquia; and that plaintiff Inocencio has
long known about this sale and did not contest the same. That it is
[ G.R. No. 212866, April 23, 2018 ] not true that plaintiff Inocencio purchased the subject property, in
fact, this allegation of payment is a mere afterthought, made only
SPOUSES FREDESWINDA DRILON YBIOSA AND ALFREDO YBIOSA, after the death of Gabriel Drilon.
PETITIONERS, V. INOCENCIO DRILON, RESPONDENT. For their defense, defendants insisted that plaintiff Inocencio has
no cause of action against them and that the instant action has
DECISION long been barred by prescription and laches; and that the trial
DEL CASTILLO, J.: court acquired no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assails the August 23, 2012
Decision[2] and May 14, 2014 Resolution [3] of the Court of Appeals By way of counterclaim, defendants alleged that as a result of
(CA) partially granting the respondent's appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. plaintiff Inocencio's filing of this baseless suit, they suffered
01729 and denying herein petitioners' Motion for sleepless nights, wounded feelings and anxieties, thus, justifying
Reconsideration. [4] the award of moral damages in the amount of P60,000.00. They
Factual Antecedents further ask payment of the following sums: P5,000.00, as and for
As found by the CA, the facts of the case are as follows: actual damages, and P10,000.00 and P15,000.00, as and for
attorney's fees and litigation expenses, respectively.
In his complaint[5] for 'Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale,
Original Certificate of Title and Damages' filed on 11 July 1997, Trial proceeded in due time, with the presentation by the parties
plaintiff Inocencio[6] alleged that he is the owner of the subject of their evidence, both testimonial and documentary. [9]
property after he purchased the same from the late Gabriel Drilon Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
as evidenced by the receipts. He further alleged that defendant On August 29, 2006, the Dumaguete City Regional Trial Court
Eustaquia Eumague Drilon connived with co-defendants, Spouses (RTC), Branch 40 issued its Decision [10] in Civil Case No. 11985,
Fredeswinda Drilon Ybiosa and Alfredo Ybiosa, [7] in effecting a which contains the following pronouncement:
deed of sale in favor of the said spouses where the signature of The plaintiff prays for the annulment of Original Certificate of Title
the late Gabriel Drilon was written by another person. He added No. 7266 alleging that Lot No[.] 3667 covered by the title is not an
that the late Gabriel Drilon could not have signed the said Deed in agricultural land but a residential lot thereby beyond the coverage
1992 as he was already old and sickly as shown by the fact that of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform.
when he signed another document denominated as Affidavit of
Consent on 03 January 1992, his signature thereon showed signs
of difficulty. This difficulty is shown further on the other Indeed, Original Certificate of Title was issued pursuant to
documents which Gabriel Drilon executed later, such as an Certificate of Land Ownership Award No. 00113116 of the
Affidavit dated 04 August 1982, Notice of Appeal dated 22 Department of Agrarian Reform.
September 1988, and Answer with Counterclaim, Etc. dated 31
July 1991, among others.
Plaintiff Inocencio prayed that the deed of sale be annulled, that
the Original Certificate of Title No. 7266, Certificate of Land
Ownership Award No. 00113116 covering the subject lot issued by
the Register of Deeds for Negros Oriental on 30 June 1995, be
canceled as this was issued on the strength of the questioned
deed of sale.

10
Under this circumstance, this court does not have jurisdiction to Granting that there was a sale of Lot 3667 to the plaintiff, there is
annul a Certificate of Land Ownership Award. The Department of a marked absence of consent on the part of Eustaquia Eumague
Agrarian Refonn Adjudication Board (DARAB) has jurisdiction over Drilon, Gabriel Drilon's wife. Consequently, the disposition is void
those involving the correction, partition, cancellation, secondary but the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer and
and subsequent issuances of Certificates of Land Ownership may be perfected upon acceptance by the other spouse.
Awards (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are
registered with the Land Registration Authority (Section 1, Rule II Thus, the plaintiff cannot claim a better right over the property as
of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure; CENTENO V. CENTENO, against Gabriel Drilon's widow. Having no better right, the plaintiff
G.R. No. 140825, October 13, 2000.) cannot claim any injury as to warrant an award of damages.

The second issue involves the genuineness of the signature of WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered as
Gabriel Drilon on Exhibit "I" which is the Deed of Absolute Sale of follows:
Lot 3667 in favor of Fredeswinda Ybiosa. This document is assailed
because the signature and residence certificate of Gabriel Drilon
was [sic] falsified. 1. The Deeds of Absolute Sale (Exhibits "I" and "7") are declared
Void due to badges of fraud and defendant Fredeswinda Ybiosa is
directed to hold Lot 3667 in trust for Eustaquia Eumague and the
On the signature, Adelia Cruz Demetillo, Senior Document heirs of Gabriel Drilon;
Examiner of the National Bureau of Investigation, categorically
testified that the signature of Gabriel Drilon on Exhibit "I" was not
written by the same person identified in earlier documents 2. The oral sale of Lot 3667 in favor of the plaintiff is declared Void
showing the signature of Gabriel Drilon. as it is contrary to Article 124 of the Family Code;

xxxx 3. The respective claims for damages, not having been adequately
established are Dismissed.

An examination of Exhibit "I" will bear out this fact. Likewise,

when Exhibit "I" is compared to Exhibit "7" (the original of Exhibit SO ORDERED.[11]
"I"), there is a marked difference in the manner the signatures of Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Gabriel Drilon were made. While the signature on Exhibit "7" Both petitioners and the respondent interposed their respective
appears to be squiggly, the signature on Exhibit "I" is firm. Yet, appeals before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 01729.
these documents are identical in all other respects. The signature
of Eustaquia Eumague and the witnesses are likewise identical in On August 23, 2012, the CA issued the assailed Decision,
both documents. decreeing as follows:

The conclusion of the National Bureau of Investigation and an WHEREFORE, the partial appeal is partially GRANTED, the Decision
examination of both documents lend to the conclusion that there dated 29 August 2006, of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial
are badges of fraud on Exhibit "I" and "7" sufficient to warrant the Region, Branch 40 of Dumaguete City, in Civil Case No. 11985 is
nullification of these document [sic]. hereby SET ASIDE and new one is rendered to read as follows, to
wit:
Finally, the plaintiff prays that a new Original certificate of Title
over Lot 3667 be issued him. As proof that he bought the property 1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 28 February 1992
and has a superior right to the same, he offered in evidence three (Exhibit[s] "I" and "7") executed in favor of
receipts (Exhibits "D" to "F") purporting to be receipts issued by Fredeswinda Drilon Ybiosa, married to Alfredo
Gabriel Drilon having received installment payments for the sale Ybiosa, is declared void.
of Lot No. 3667. While issued during the period from 1990 to
1991, it would seem that the paper is one of more recent vintage 2. The sale of Lot 3667 in favor of plaintiff-appellant
and appear to be recently issued than that of the Deed of Inocencio is declared valid and subsisting. He is,
Absolute Sale (Exhibit "I"). Moreover, these receipts appear to however, DIRECTED to pay the balance of P4,200,00,
have been executed near and or about the same time to each plus legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum to
other. commence in 1991, within fifteen (15) days from
receipt hereof.
However, the more important fact is that only Gabriel Drilon
signed these receipts. 3. The respective claims for damages, not having been
adequately established are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The evidence on record, however shows that Lot 3667 is a
The CA ruled that Gabriel Drilon's (Gabriel) signature in the deed
conjugal property of Gabriel Drilon and Eustaquia Eumague, which
of sale executed in petitioners' favor was a forgery, and that the
they bought from Maximiana Alviola in July 1980. In fact Eustaquia
sale by Gabriel in respondent's favor was duly proved. On a final
Eumague have [sic] been paying taxes on the property registered
note, the appellate court held that -
in their names. In this instance, since the property was acquired
during the coverture of Gabriel Drilon and Eustaquia Eumague,
then it forms part of the conjugal partnership of gains. It would be well to stress that it is only the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) that can cancel Original Certificate of Title
No. 726. [sic] (CLOA No. 00113116). 'The cases involving the
xxxx
issuance, correction and cancellation of the CLOAs by the DAR in
the administrative implementation of agrarian reform laws, rules

11
and regulations to parties who are not agricultural tenants or petitioners or respondent - is considered null and void unless the
lessees are within the jurisdiction of the DAR and not of the contrary is proved, on the principle that one cannot sell or dispose
DARAB.'[13] (Citation omitted) what he does not own. This is underscored by the fact that
Petitioners moved to reconsider, but in a May 14, 2014 petitioners were able to obtain a CLOA over the subject property -
Resolution, the CA held its ground. Hence, the present Petition. and, later on, an original certificate of title in their favor.

Issues For the above reasons, the RTC had no jurisdiction over Civil Case
Petitioners submit the following legal issues to be resolved; No. 11985, as it primarily seeks to cancel the CLOA and certificate
of title issued to petitioners. Under the 1994 DARAB Rules of
1. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS Procedure, which were in force at the time,
ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE COURT HAS
NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, AND THUS, ALL RULE II - Jurisdiction Of The Adjudication Board
PROCEEDINGS THEREIN ARE NULL AND VOID.
SECTION 1. Primary And Exclusive Original and Appellate
2. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS Jurisdiction. The Board shall have primary and exclusive
ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE ACTION OF jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT (RESPONDENT) FOR adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of
ANNULMENT OF DEED OF SALE AS HAVING the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under
PRESCRIBED. Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228, 229, and 129-A,
Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389,
3. WHETHER x x x THE HONORABLE COURT OF Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their
APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE DEED OF SALE implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction
DATED FEBRUARY 28, 1992 OF DEFENDANT- shall include but not be limited to cases involving the following:
APPELLANT (PETITIONERS) AS VOID.
x x x x'
4. WHETHER x x x THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE IS [A]
PERFECTED SALE BETWEEN GABRIEL DRILON AND f) Those involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of
INOCENCIO DRILON OVER A PORTION [OF] LOT 3667 Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation
BY REASON OF ORDINARY RECEIPTS.[14] Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration
Petitioners'Arguments Authority;
In their Petition and Reply, [15] petitioners pray that this Court 1) set
aside the assailed CA dispositions, 2) declare as valid the February xxxx
28, 1992 deed of sale in their favor, and 3) dismiss Civil Case No.
11985. They argue that Civil Case No. 11985 is an action for
g) Those cases previously falling under the original and exclusive
cancellation of CLOA No. 00113116, from which Original
jurisdiction of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations under
Certificate of Title No. 7266 was derived - in which case the
Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 946, except sub-paragraph
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) - and not the RTC - has
(q) thereof and Presidential Decree No. 815.
jurisdiction. They add that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
case for failure of respondent to allege the assessed value of the
subject property in his complaint. It is understood that the aforementioned cases, complaints or
Petitioners further argue that respondent's action has prescribed, petitions were filed with the DARAB after August 29, 1987.
and that there is actually no sale between respondent and Gabriel
covering the subject property. Matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of
Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Finally, petitioners argue that contrary to the findings of the RTC Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as
and CA, the February 28, 1992 deed of sale in their favor has been enunciated by pertinent rules shall be the exclusive prerogative of
proved to be valid and subsisting, and not mere forgery or and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR.
fabrication.
In Heirs of Santiago Nisperos v. Nisperos-Ducusin, [17] this Court
Respondent's Arguments held that -
Respondent, in his Comment, [16] submits that petitioners are The complaint should have been lodged with the Office of the DAR
adopting inconsistent positions; that the issue of prescription is Secretary and not with the DARAB.
being raised for the first time in these proceedings; that the CA
did not err when it voided the February 28, 1992 deed of sale in Section 1, Rule II of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, the rule
petitioners' favor; and that he was able to competently prove the in force at the time of the filing of the complaint by petitioners in
validity of the sale in his favor. Thus, he prays for the denial of the 2001, provides:
instant Petition.
Our Ruling
The Petition is granted. SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate
Jurisdiction. The Board shall have primary and exclusive
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and
The subject property was originally an unregistered land, meaning adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of
it is public land owned by the State. It is presumed to belong to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under
the State, and not privately owned by Gabriel. Thus, any sale Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228, 229 and 129-A,
made by Gabriel covering the subject property - whether to Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389,
12
Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their What the PARAD should have done is to refer the complaint to the
implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction proper office as mandated by Section 4 of DAR Administrative
shall include but not be limited to cases involving the following: Order No. 6, Series of 2000:

xxxx SEC. 4. Referral of Cases.- If a case covered by Section 2 herein is

filed before the DARAB, the concerned DARAB official shall refer
f) Those involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of the case to the proper DAR office for appropriate action within
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation five (5) days after said case is determined to be within the
Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration jurisdiction of the Secretary. x x x (Citations omitted)
Authority;
Thus, it is the DAR Secretary who had jurisdiction over the instant
xxxx case for cancellation of petitioners' CLOA and certificate of title;
respondent should have filed his case against petitioners before
the said office, and not the RTC. To this day, this very same
However, it is not enough that the controversy involves the procedure is applicable, pursuant to the more recent 2009 DARAB
cancellation of a CLOA registered with the Land Registration Rules of Procedure; Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9700, or the
Authority for the DARAB to have jurisdiction. What is of primordial CARPER Law;[18] and DAR Administrative Order No. 3, series of
consideration is the existence of an agrarian dispute between the 2009.[19] Thus, by law and administrative regulation, the RTC had
parties. no jurisdiction over respondent's cause of action.
With the above disquisition, the proceedings in the RTC and the
Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an agrarian dispute as 'any dispositions therein are rendered null and void. The CA's
controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, pronouncements are likewise set aside and annulled for being
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to patently erroneous. Having said that it is only the DAR that can
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' cancel the CLOA and title of petitioners, it should not have
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, proceeded to rule on the question of ownership - for the simple
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions reason that all proceedings before the RTC, including the trial and
of such tenurial arrangements' and includes 'any controversy reception of evidence, are deemed null and void; there is no
relating to compensation of lands acquired under' this Act and evidence upon which to base its judgment. Such issue should be
other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from threshed out in the appropriate venue and proceedings.
landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed
relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, August 23, 2012 Decision and May 14, 2014 Resolution of the
or lessor and lessee.' Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01729 are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. 11985 is ordered DISMISSED FOR LACK OF
Thus, in Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, this Court held that there must JURISDICTION, AND ALL PROCEEDINGS TAKEN THEREIN ARE
be a tenancy relationship between the parties for the DARAB to DECLARED NULL AND VOID AND OF NO EFFECT.
have jurisdiction over a case. It is essential to establish all of the SO ORDERED.
following indispensable elements, to wit: (1) that the parties are
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the
subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that
there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that
the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
xxxx

Considering that the allegations in the complaint negate the

existence of an agrarian dispute among the parties, the DARAB is
bereft of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same as it is the
DAR Secretary who has authority to resolve the dispute raised by
petitioners. As held in Heirs of Julian dela Cruz v. Heirs of Alberto
Cruz:
The Court agrees with the petitioners' contention that, under
Section 2(f), Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the DARAB
has jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and
cancellation of CLOAs which were registered with the LRA.
However, for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in such cases, they
must relate to an agrarian dispute between landowner and
tenants to whom CLOAs have been issued by the DAR Secretary.
The cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of
the CLOAs by the DAR in the administrative implementation of
agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations to parties who are not
agricultural tenants or lessees are within the jurisdiction of the
DAR and not of the DARAB.

13
 Acting upon such claim, PDIC sent a letter/notice dated November
22, 2013, requiring petitioner to submit additional documents,
which petitioner averred of having complied with.7

Upon investigation, the PDIC found that petitioner's account

originated from and was funded by the proceeds of a terminated
SISA (mother account), jointly owned by a certain Reyes
family.8 Thus, based on the determination that petitioner's
account was among the product of the splitting of the said mother
account which is prohibited by law, PDIC denied petitioner's claim
for payment of deposit insurance. 9 Petitioner filed a Request for
Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the PDIC on
January 6, 2016.10

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari11 under Rule 65

before the RTC.

RTC Ruling

In its November 7, 2016 assailed Decision, the RTC upheld the

factual findings and conclusions of the PDIC. According to the RTC,
based on the records, the PDIC correctly denied petitioner's claim
for insurance on the ground of splitting of deposits which is
prohibited by law.12

It also declared that, pursuant to its Charter (RA 3591), PDIC is

empowered to determine and pass upon the validity of the
insurance deposits claims, it being the deposit insurer. As such,
when it rules on such claims, it is exercising a quasi-judicial
function. Thus, it was held that petitioner's remedy to the
dismissal of his claim is to file a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals under Section 4,13 Rule 65, stating that if the
petition involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency,
unless otherwise provided by law or the rules, it shall be filed in
G.R. No. 230020, March 19, 2018
and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals (CA).14

PETER L. SO, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE

In addition, the RTC also cited Section 22 15 of Republic Act (RA)
CORPORATION, Respondent.
No. 3591, as amended, which essentially states that only the CA
shall issue temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions or
DECISION preliminary mandatory injunctions against the PDIC for any action
under the said Act.
TIJAM, J.:
The RTC disposed, thus:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the Decision 2 dated November 7, 2016 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, for lack of jurisdiction, the
and Order3 dated February 17, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner is hereby DISMISSED.
(RTC) of Makati, Branch 138, in Special Civil Case No. 16-031,
which dismissed Peter L. So's (petitioner's) Petition
SO ORDERED.16
for Certiorari4 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

In its February 17, 2017 Order, the RTC denied petitioner's motion
Factual Antecedents
for reconsideration.

Petitioner opened an account with the Cooperative Rural Bank

Hence, this petition, filed directly to this Court on pure question of
Bulacan (CRBB) on April 17, 2013, amounting to P300,000, for
law.
which he was assigned the Special Incentive Savings Account
(SISA) No. 05-15712-1.5
Issue
On the same year, however, petitioner learned that CRBB closed
its operations and was placed under Philippine Deposit Insurance Does the RTC have jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari filed
Corporation's (PDIC's) receivership. This prompted petitioner, under Rule 65, assailing the PDIC's denial of a deposit insurance
together with other depositors, to file an insurance claim with the claim?
PDIC on November 8, 2013.6
Our Ruling

14
The petition lacks merit. Caubang,19 this Court explained the nature of a quasi-judicial
agency, viz.:
There is no controversy as to the proper remedy to question the
PDIC's denial of petitioner's deposit insurance claim. Section 4(f) Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other
of its Charter, as amended, clearly provides that: hand is the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the
rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine
xxx questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law
itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The
The actions of the Corporation taken under this section shall be
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it
final and executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by
performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an
the court, except on appropriate petition for certiorari  on the
executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in
ground that the action was taken in excess of jurisdiction or with
such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to a lack or excess of
performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to
jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari  may only be filed within
it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative
thirty (30) days from notice of denial of claim for deposit
officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain
insurance. (emphasis supplied)
the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them as basis for their official action and
The issue, however, is which court has jurisdiction over such exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.
petition.
The Court has laid down the test for determining whether an
Petitioner's stance is that the petition for certiorari, questioning administrative body is exercising judicial or merely investigatory
PDIC's action, denying a deposit insurance claim should be filed functions: adjudication signifies the exercise of the power and
with the RTC, arguing in this manner: PDIC is not a quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the
agency and it does not possess any quasi-judicial power under its parties. Hence, if the only purpose of an investigation is to
Charter; It merely performs fact-finding functions based on its evaluate the evidence submitted to an agency based on the facts
regulatory power. As such, applying Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not
of Court, as amended by A.M. 07-7-12-SC, which in part states authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties,
that if the petition relates to an act or omission of a corporation, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.
such as the PDIC, it shall be filed with the RTC exercising (emphasis supplied)
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by this Court; Also,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act
Thus, the legislative intent in creating PDIC as a quasi-judicial
provides that this Court, the CA, and the RTC have original
agency is clearly manifest. Indeed, PDIC exercises judicial
concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
discretion and judgment in determining whether a claimant is
and mandamus. Applying the principle of hierarchy of courts, the
entitled to a deposit insurance claim, which determination results
RTC indeed has jurisdiction over such petition for certiorari.
from its investigation of facts and weighing of evidence presented
before it. Noteworthy also is the fact that the law considers PDIC's
We do not agree. action as final and executory and may be reviewed only on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion.
On June 22, 1963, PDIC was created under RA 3591 as an insurer
of deposits in all banks entitled to the benefits of insurance under That being established, We proceed to determine where such
the said Act to promote and safeguard the interests of the petition for certiorari should be filed. In this matter, We cite the
depositing public.17 As such, PDIC has the duty and authority to very provision invoked by the petitioner, i.e., Section 4, Rule 65 of
determine the validity of and grant or deny deposit insurance the Rules, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC:
claims. Section 16(a) of its Charter, as amended, provides that
PDIC shall commence the determination of insured deposits due
Sec. 4. When and where to file the petition. - The petition shall be
the depositors of a closed bank upon its actual take over of the
filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
closed bank. Also, Section 1 of PDIC's Regulatory Issuance No.
order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new
2011-03, provides that as it is tasked to promote and safeguard
trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
the interests of the depositing public by way of providing
petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from
permanent and continuing insurance coverage on all insured
the notice of the denial of the motion.
deposits, and in helping develop a sound and stable banking
system at all times, PDIC shall pay all legitimate deposits held by
bona fide depositors and provide a mechanism by which If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial
depositors may seek reconsideration from its decision, denying a court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall
deposit insurance claim. Further, it bears stressing that as stated be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over
in Section 4(f) of its Charter, as amended, PDIC's action, such as the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also
denying a deposit insurance claim, is considered as final and be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan,
executory and may be reviewed by the court only through a whether or not the same is in aid of the court's appellate
petition for certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a
quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these
rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by
Considering the foregoing, the legislative intent in creating the
the Court of Appeals. (emphasis supplied)
PDIC as a quasi-judicial agency is clearly manifest.

Clearly, a petition for certiorari, questioning the PDIC's denial of a

In the case of Lintang Bedol v. Commission on Elections,18 cited
deposit insurance claim should be filed before the CA, not the
in Carlito C. Encinas v. PO1 Alfredo P. Agustin, Jr. and PO1 Joel S.
15
RTC. This further finds support in Section 22 of the PDIC's Charter, the lot owner managing the properties of Manila Newtown
as amended, which states that: Development Corporation, which covers portions of the subject
land.5
Section 22. No court, except the Court of Appeals, shall issue any
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary Environmental Case No. 8548-R entitled "Enforcement/Violations
mandatory injunction against the Corporation for any action of the Provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA)
under this Act. xxx. (Republic Act No. 8371);6 Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1586;7 and
Other Pertinent Laws with Prayer for the Issuance of
Environmental Protection Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies
Mandatory/Prohibitory Injunction, and Writ of Mandamus" was
instituted by a private party, the insured bank, or any shareholder
filed by the petitioners against respondents. 8
of the insured bank. xxx.
In the Complaint, petitioners averred that the subject property is
xxxx an ancestral land that they have been occupying in the concept of
an owner since time immemorial through their ancestors; that
Finally, the new amendment in PDIC's Charter under RA 10846, such ownership was recognized under the IPRA, which includes
specifically Section 5(g) thereof, confirms such conclusion, viz.: the right to sustainable traditional resource, the right against
unlawful or unauthorized intrusion, and the right against
The actions of the Corporation taken under Section 5(g) shall usurpation;9 and that their applications for the issuance of
be final and executory, and may only be restrained or set aside Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles (CALTs) over their properties,
by the Court of Appeals, upon appropriate petition including the subject land, are now pending before the National
for certiorari on the ground that the action was taken in excess of Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). 10
jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to
a lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari may only Petitioners argued that respondents' acts of demolishing and
be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of denial of claim for bulldozing the subject land, which caused the destruction of small
deposit insurance. (Emphasis Ours) and full grown trees and sayote plants and other resources of the
petitioners, violated their rights pursuant to the IPRA; violated
environmental laws, specifically PD 1586, as respondents' project
As it stands, the controversy as to which court has jurisdiction poses grave and/or irreparable danger to environment, life, and
over a petition for certiorari filed to question the PDIC's action is property, and also violated the Environmental Compliance
already settled. Therefore, We find no reversible error from the Certificate (ECC) issued to them.11
findings and conclusion of the court a quo.
For its part, Baguio Properties, Inc. invoked ownership over the
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO subject land and as such, they argued that petitioners' complaint
ORDERED. is a collateral attack to its Torrens Titles. 12

On March 2, 2017, the RTC, sitting as an environmental court,

dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC held that
the recognition of the petitioners' rights as IPs is not the proper
EN BANC
subject of an environmental case, as such, it should be threshed
out in an appropriate proceeding governed by the very law relied
G.R. No. 231737, March 06, 2018 upon by the petitioners, i.e., the IPRA. The RTC cited Section
1113 of the IPRA stating that the rights of IPs to their ancestral
HEIRS OF TUNGED NAMELY: ROSITA YARIS-LIWAN, VIRGIE S. domains by virtue of native title shall be recognized and
ATIN-AN, BELTRAN P. SAINGAN, MABEL P. DALING, MONICA Y. respected. The said formal recognition, when solicited, shall be
DOMINGO, AND ELIZABETH Q. PINONO, Petitioners, v. STA. embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), and
LUCIA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT, INC. AND BAGUIO the power to issue the same is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
PROPERTIES, INC., Respondents. the NCIP.14

DECISION The RTC also held that assuming arguendo that the case falls
within the coverage of Administrative Matter (AM) No. 09-6-8-SC
or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, Sec. 4, 15 Rule 2
TIJAM, J.:
thereof requires that an action under said Rules must be filed by a
real party-in-interest for the enforcement or violation of any
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules environmental law. The RTC found that as the main relief prayed
of Court, petitioners assail the Order2 dated March 2, 2017 of the for by the petitioners is the recognition of their right of ownership
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch V, which over the subject property, it is in effect an admission that their
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction in Environmental Case asserted right over the same, if any, is yet to be established.
No. 8548-R. Its Order3 dated April 3, 2017, denying petitioners' According to the RTC, without the confirmation of their rights as IP
motion for reconsideration4 is likewise impugned herein. to the property, the filing of this case is premature. As such, the
petitioners do not have the legal personality to initiate the
The Antecedents same.16 The RTC disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction, the above-captioned case is
Petitioners are recognized Indigenous People (IP), being members hereby DISMISSED.
of the Ibaloi tribe, who are the original settlers in Baguio City and
Benguet Province. Respondent Sta. Lucia Realty is a real estate SO ORDERED.17
developer, while respondent Baguio Properties, Inc. claims to be

16
In its motion for reconsideration, the petitioners argued that NCIP involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided, however, That no such
has no jurisdiction over their complaint as its jurisdiction covers dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have
only claims and disputes involving rights of Indigenous Cultural exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For
Communities (ICCs) and IPs only. 18 Respondents are not ICC/IP this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of
members, hence, the RTC, not the NCIP, has jurisdiction. Further, Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the
petitioners pointed out that they are not praying for the issuance dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification
of CALTs/CADTs in their favor but merely for the recognition of shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the
rights under the IPRA to their ancestral land by virtue of their. NCIP.
native title.19
On the other hand, Administrative Order (AO) No. 23-2008,23 in
relation to Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129,24 designated the court a
Their motion for reconsideration, however, suffered the same
quo as a special court to hear, try, and decide violations of
fate. The RTC ruled that the such arguments do not put the case
environmental laws committed within its territorial jurisdiction.
within the operation of AM No. 09-6-8-SC. Also, petitioners' cause
of action based on alleged violations of the ECC issued to the
Having stated the jurisdiction of the NCIP and the RTC sitting as a
respondents in relation to the provisions of PD 1586 will not
special environmental court, We proceed to examine the
prosper as petitioners are not real parties-in interest under the
pertinent allegations in the Complaint 25 constituting petitioners'
contemplation of the Rules as explained in its assailed Order.
cause of action.
Thus:
WHEREFORE, the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated March
To reiterate, petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they are
3, 2017 filed by the petitioners is DENIED.20
members of the Ibaloi Tribesmen and that their rightful ownership
Hence, this petition. and possession over the subject property had already been
established by testimonial and documentary evidence as far back
The Issue as 1924.26 They averred that after their ancestor's death, they
continued to possess and exercise ownership over their ancestral
Was the court a quo's outright dismissal of the case proper? land. Respondents' intrusion and usurpation was also alleged, and
that respondents' earthmoving activities therein caused
The Court's Ruling destruction of small and full grown trees and sayote plants in their
ancestral land. Further, a violation of the Environmental
We answer in the negative. Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued in favor of the respondents
was likewise alleged.
In precis, the RTC dismissed the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, finding that petitioners' case is grounded upon their Petitioners, therefore, prayed for the following reliefs, to wit: (1)
claim of being members of the IPs and their assertion of issuance of an ex parte 72-hour Environmental Protection Order
ownership as such over their ancestral land. In ruling that it has no to immediately stop respondents from their earthmoving
jurisdiction over the case, the RTC discussed the exclusive activities not only because they violate petitioners' rights under
jurisdiction of the NCIP to issue CALTs/CADTs to formally the IPRA above-cited, but also because they failed to comply with
recognize the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral the ECC and/or because they operate without such ECC, violative
lands/domains by virtue of native title. Further, the RTC ruled that of PD 1586 for posing grave and/or irreparable danger to the
even if the case is covered by A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, the same is still environment, life and property; (2) after trial, make the
dismissible considering that petitioners' right over the subject Environmental Protection Order and/or writ of preliminary
property is yet to be established as can be gleaned from their injunction permanent; (3) recognize the rights of the petitioners
prayer for the recognition of ownership rights as IPs over the as IPs to their ancestral land subject of this case; and (4) compel
subject land. respondents to restore the denuded areas within the subject land
to maintain ecological balance and to compensate petitioners of
We do not agree. their damaged resources, among others. 27

In determining which body or court has jurisdiction in this case, Guided by the foregoing, We find that the outright dismissal of the
Our pronouncement in the recent case of Unduran, et al. v. case was not proper.
Aberasturi, et al.,21 is instructive, viz:
[J]urisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law First. The court a quo patently erred in ruling that the NCIP has
and determined by the allegations in the complaint which jurisdiction over the case.
comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting
the plaintiffs cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as Foremost, in Unduran,28 this Court had already delimited the
which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based jurisdiction of the NCIP as provided under Section 66 of the
on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, IPRA, viz.:
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover A careful review of Section 66 shows that the NCIP shall have
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs
the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the
to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, same ICC/IP. This can be gathered from the qualifying provision
jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not that "no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the
the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their
asserted therein.22 (emphasis supplied) customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by
the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to
The jurisdiction of the NCIP is stated under Section 66 of the IPRA, settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which
to wit: certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a
Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP, through its regional petition with the NCIP.
offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
17
The qualifying provision requires two conditions before such alleged earthmoving activities and operations of the respondents
disputes may be brought before the NCIP, namely: (1) exhaustion within petitioners' ancestral land, which violated and continue to
of remedies under customary laws of the parties, and (2) violate petitioners' environmental rights under the IPRA and PD
compliance with condition precedent through the said 1586 as the said activities were averred to have grave and/or
certification by the Council of Elders/Leaders. This is in recognition irreparable danger to the environment, life, and property. Clearly,
of the rights of ICCs/IPs to use their own commonly accepted such cause of action is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as
justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace building a special environmental court, pursuant to AO No. 23-2008 in
processes or mechanisms and other customary laws and practices relation to BP 129 and A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC. Whether or not
within their respective communities, as may be compatible with petitioners are entitled to their claim is irrelevant in the
the national legal system and with internationally recognized preliminary issue of jurisdiction. Again, once jurisdiction is vested
human rights. by the allegations in the complaint, it remains vested regardless of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some
Section 3(f) of the IPRA defines customary laws as a body of of the claims asserted therein. 33
written and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs and practices
traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and observed Third. The court a quo erred in finding that the petitioners have no
by respective ICCs/IPs. From this restrictive definition, it can be legal personality to file the complaint. It is noteworthy that
gleaned that it is only when both parties to a case belong to the petitioners supported their allegations with pertinent documents
same ICC/IP that the above-said two conditions can be complied such as the report and recommendation 34 of the NCIP on
with. If the parties to a case belong to different ICCs/IPs which are petitioners' Petition for the Identification, Delineation and
recognized to have their own separate and distinct customary Recognition of Ancestral Claim and Issuance of CALTs pending
laws and Council of Elders/Leaders, they will fail to meet the before the said Commission. In the said document, the NCIP
above-said two conditions. The same holds true if one of such concluded that, among others, the petitioners have established
parties was a non-ICC/IP member who is neither bound by themselves as the heirs of Tunged and that the subject land was
customary laws as contemplated by the IPRA nor governed by proven to be part of the vast tract of land that Tunged and his
such council. Indeed, it would be violative of the principles of fair successors possessed and occupied.35 Hence, petitioners'
play and due process for those parties who do not belong to the averments in their Complaint taken together with such supporting
same ICC/IP to be subjected to its customary laws and Council of documents are sufficient to establish petitioners' locus standi in
Elders/Leaders. instituting this action, as well as to bring petitioners' case within
the purview of the court a quo's jurisdiction as conferred by the
Therefore, pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall law.
have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties Fourth. At any rate, assuming arguendo that the case is not within
belonging to the same ICC/IP. When such claims and disputes the jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as an environmental court, the
arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same outright dismissal of the case was still not proper, especially
ICC/IP, i.e., parties belonging to different ICC/IPs or where one of considering that We have already established that it is the regular
the parties is a non ICCIIP, the case shall fall under the courts and not the NCIP, which has jurisdiction over the same.
jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice, instead of the Section 3,36 Rule 2 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC explicitly states that if the
NCIP. In this case, while most of the petitioners belong to complaint is not an environmental complaint, the presiding judge
Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP. shall refer it to the executive judge for re-raffle to the regular
Thus, even if the real issue involves a dispute over land which court.
appear to be located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig
Tribe, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which shall have the power to With this, it is not only proper but also necessary that the other
hear, try and decide this case.29 (emphasis supplied) issues obtaining in this case should be addressed in the
proceedings before the trial court.
Indeed, non-ICCs/IPs cannot be subjected to the special and
limited jurisdiction of the NCIP even if the dispute involves rights
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
of ICCs/IPs since the NCIP has no power and authority to decide
is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
on a controversy involving rights of non-ICCs/IPs which should be
Baguio City, Branch V, dated March 2, 2017 and April 3, 2017 are
brought before the courts of general jurisdiction within the legal
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Environmental
bounds of rights and remedies.30 Plainly, contrary to the court a
Case No. 8548-R is REINSTATED for proper disposition.
quo's conclusion, this case cannot be subjected to the NCIP's
jurisdiction as respondents are clearly non-ICCs/IPs.
SO ORDERED.
Second. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the
nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in
the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the
relief sought are the ones to be consulted. 31

As can be gleaned from the aforecited allegations in the

Complaint, the case at bar is not an action for the claim of
ownership, much less, an application for the issuance of
CALTs/CADTs, contrary to the court a quo's findings. In fact,
petitioners categorically stated in the said Complaint that their
Petition for the Identification, Delineation and Recognition of
Ancestral Claim and Issuance of CALTs is already pending before
the NCIP.32

Ultimately, petitioners' cause of action is grounded upon the

18
 (Mayor Osmeña), which seeks to reverse or set aside the
Decision2 dated December 15, 2016 and Resolution 3 dated March
14, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 004WK,
that granted the privilege of the writ of kalikasan and ordered
Mayor Osmeña, and/or his representatives, to permanently cease
and desist from dumping or disposing garbage or solid waste at
the Inayawan landfill and to continue to rehabilitate the same.

The Antecedents

On April 6, 1993, the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources (DENR) issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) to the Solid Waste Sanitary Landfill Project at Inayawan
landfill proposed by the Metro Cebu Development Project Office
(MCDPO). Thereafter, the Inayawan landfill served as the garbage
disposal area of Cebu City.4

Sometime in 2011, the Cebu City Local Government (City

Government) resolved to close the Inayawan landfill per Cebu City
Sangguniang Panlunsod (SP) Resolution and Executive Order of
former Cebu City Mayor Michael Rama (former Mayor Rama). 5

Subsequently, SP Resolution No. 12-0582-20116 dated August 24,

2011, was issued to charge the amount of P1,204,500 in the next
supplemental budget to cover the cost in the preparation of
closure and rehabilitation plan of Inayawan landfill. 7 Another SP
Resolution with No. 12-2617 20128 dated March 21, 2012 was
issued to proceed with the bidding process for the said
preparation of closure and rehabilitation plan. As a result, the
Inayawan landfill was partially closed and all wastes from Cebu
City were disposed in a privately operated landfill in Consolacion. 9

On June 15, 2015, through former Mayor Rama's directive,

Inayawan landfill was formally closed.10

In 2016, however, under the administration of Mayor Osmeña,

the City Government sought to temporarily open the Inayawan
landfill, through a letter dated June 8, 2016, by then Acting Cebu
City Mayor Margot Osmeña (Acting Mayor Margot) addressed to
Regional Director Engr. William Cuñado (Engr. Cuñado) of the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR. 11 In
response thereto, Engr. Cuñado invited Acting Mayor Margot to a
technical conference. Thereafter, on June 27, 2016, Acting Mayor
Margot sent another letter to Engr. Cuñado submitting the City
Government's commitments for the establishment of a new Solid
Waste Management System pursuant to the mandate under
EN BANC Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9003,12 and accordingly, requested for the
issuance of a Notice to Proceed for the temporary reopening of
G.R. No. 231164, March 20, 2018 the Inayawan landfill.13

MAYOR TOMAS R. OSMEÑA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CITY MAYOR In his reply letter dated June 27, 2016, Engr. Cuñado informed
OF CEBU, Petitioner, v. JOEL CAPILI GARGANERA, FOR AND ON Acting Mayor Margot that although the EMB had no authority to
HIS BEHALF, AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE OF THE issue the requested notice, it interposed no objection to the
CITIES OF CEBU AND TALISAY, AND THE FUTURE GENERATIONS, proposed temporary opening of the Inayawan landfill provided
INCLUDING THE UNBORN, Respondent. that the Cebu City will faithfully comply with all its commitments
and subject to regular monitoring by the EMB.14

DECISION
Thus, in July 2016, the Inayawan landfill was officially re-opened
by Acting Mayor Margot. 15
TIJAM, J.:

On September 2, 2016, a Notice of Violation and Technical

Before Us is Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Conference16 was issued by the EMB to Mayor Osmeña, regarding
Rules of Court, as provided under the Rules of Procedure for City Government's operation of the Inayawan Landfill and its
Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC) filed by petitioner violations of the ECC.
Mayor Tomas R. Osmeña, in his capacity as City Mayor of Cebu
19
On September 6, 2016, the Department of Health (DOH) issued an landfill is complete and sufficient according to the standards of
Inspection Report17 wherein it recommended, among others, the the DENR-EMB.
immediate closure of the landfill due to the lack of sanitary
requirements, environmental, health and community safety SO ORDERED.26
issues, as conducted by the DOH Regional Sanitary Engineer,
Henry D. Saludar.18
Mayor Osmeña's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
by the CA in its Resolution 27 dated March 14, 2017, to wit:
On September 23, 2016, Joel Capili Garganera for and on his
behalf, and in representation of the People of the Cities of Cebu
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises. the Motion for
and Talisay and the future generations, including the unborn
Reconsideration filed by respondent Mayor Osmeña is hereby
(respondent) filed a petition for writ of kalikasan with prayer for
DENIED.
the issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order
(TEPO) before the CA.19
The Compliances with attached Compliance Monitoring Reports
for the months of January and February 2017, which were filed by
Respondent asserted that the continued operation of the
the public respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General
Inayawan landfill causes serious environmental damage which
(OSG), are hereby NOTED.
threatens and violates their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology.20 Respondent also asserted that the Inayawan landfill has
already outgrown its usefulness and has become ill-suited for its Pursuant to the recommendation of the public respondents in
purpose.21 Respondent further asserted that its reopening and their Compliance Monitoring Reports, the Court hereby DIRECT'S
continued operation violates several environmental laws and respondent Mayor Osmeña to comply with the DENR-EMB's
government regulations, such as: R.A. 9003; R.A. 8749 or the request for the submission of the local government's Safe Closure
"Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999"; R.A. 9275 or the "Philippine and Rehabilitation Plan (SCRP) for the Inayawan landfill within
Clean Water Act of 2004"; Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 856 or thirty days (30) days from notice.
the "Code on Sanitation of the Philippines"; and DENR
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2003-30 or the "Implementing SO ORDERED.28
Rules and Regulation (IRR) for the Philippine Environmental
Impact Statement System."22 Hence, this instant petition.

The CA, in a Resolution dated October 6, 2016, granted a writ The Issues
of kalikasan, required petitioner to file a verified return and a
summary hearing was set for the application of TEPO.23
For resolution of the Court are the following issues: 1) whether
the 30-day prior notice requirement for citizen suits under R.A.
In petitioner's verified return, he alleged that respondent failed to 9003 and R.A. 8749 is needed prior to the filing of the instant
comply with the condition precedent which requires 30-day notice petition; 2) whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirements
to the public officer concerned prior to the filing of a citizens suit for the grant of the privilege of the writ of kalikasan were
under R.A. 9003 and R.A. 8749. Respondent further alleged that sufficiently established.
Inayawan landfill operated as early as 1998 and it conformed to
the standards and requirements then applicable.24
The Ruling of the Court

The CA, in a Decision25 dated December 15, 2016, granted the

privilege of the writ of kalikasan which ordered Mayor Osmeña The petition is without merit.
and/or his representatives to permanently cease and desist from
dumping or disposing of garbage or solid waste at the Inayawan Petitioner argues that respondent brushed aside the 30-day prior
landfill and to continue to rehabilitate the same. The dispositive notice requirement for citizen suits under R.A. 9003 29 and RA.
portion of the CA Decision, provides: 8749.30

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the privilege of Petitioner's argument does not persuade.
the writ of kalikasan is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, pursuant to
Section 15, Rule 7 of the RPEC: Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases (RPEC), is instructive on the matter:
1) the respondent Mayor and/or his representatives are ordered
to permanently cease and desist from dumping or disposing or Section 5. Citizen suit.—Any Filipino citizen in representation of
garbage or solid waste at the Inayawan landfill; others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an
2) the respondent Mayor and/for his representatives are ordered action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws.
to continue the rehabilitation of the Inayawan landfill; Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order
3) the DENR-EMB is directed to regularly monitor the City which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and
Government's strict compliance with the Court's judgment herein; the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest
4) in case of non-compliance, the DENR-EMB is directed to file their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from
and/or recommend the filing of appropriate criminal, civil and notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a
administrative charges before the proper authorities against the newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all
responsible persons; and affected barangays copies of said order.
5) the DENR-EMB is ordered to submit to the Court a monthly
progress report on the City Government's compliance/non-
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be
compliance until such time that the rehabilitation of the Inayawan
governed by their respective provisions. (Underscoring Ours)
20
Section 1, Rule 7 of RPEC also provides: resumption of the garbage dumping operations at the Inayawan
landfill has raised serious environmental concerns. As aptly and
Section 1. Nature of the writ.- The Writ is a remedy available to a extensively discussed by the appellate court in its Decision based
natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people's from the EMB Compliance Evaluation Report (CER) 37 dated August
organization, non-governmental organization, or any public 18, 2016 and the Notice of Violation and Technical
interest group accredited by or registered with any government Conference38 dated September 2, 20 16, issued by the EMB to
agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a Mayor Osmeña, to wit:
balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or Moreover, based on the CER drafted by the EMB, the dumping
employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental operation at the Inayawan landfill has violated the criteria
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or specified under DENR Administrative Order No. 34-01 specifically
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. as to the proper leachate collection and treatment at the landfill
and the regular water quality monitoring of surface and ground
Here, the present petition for writ of kalikasan under the RPEC is a waters and effluent, as well as gas emissions thereat. At the same
separate and distinct action from R.A. 9003 and R.A. 8749. A writ time, as admitted by Mr. Marco Silberon from the DENR-7 during
of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy covering environmental the Cebu SP Executive Session 39 dated 16 August 2016, the
damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or Inayawan landfill has already been converted to a dumpsite
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. 31 It is operation despite its original design as sanitary landfill which is
designed for a narrow but special purpose: to accord a stronger violative of Section 17(h)40 of R.A. 9003 expressly prohibiting open
protection for environmental rights, aiming, among others, to dumps as final disposal sites.41
provide a speedy and effective resolution of a case involving the
violation of one's constitutional right to a healthful and balanced xxxx
ecology that transcends political and territorial boundaries, and to
address the potentially exponential nature of large-scale Contrary to respondents' belief, the magnitude of the
ecological threats.32 environmental damage can be gleaned from the fact that the air
pollution has affected resident not just from Cebu City but also
Moreover, Section 3, Rule 7 of RPEC allows direct resort to this from the neighboring city of Talisay. Also, in light of the EMB's
Court or with any of the stations of the CA, which states: finding that the proper treatment of the leachate at the Inayawan
landfill has not been complied with prior to its discharge to the
Section 3. Where to file. - The petition shall be filed with the Cebu strait, there is no question that the scope of the possible
Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of Appeals. environmental damage herein has expanded to encompass not
just the City of Cebu but other localities as well that connects to
such strait. Since leachate is contaminated liquid from
Given that the writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy and
decomposed waste,42 it is not difficult to consider the magnitude
the RPEC allows direct action to this Court and the CA where it is
of the potential environment harm it can unleash if this is released
dictated by public welfare, 33 this Court is of the view that the prior
to a receiving water body without being sufficiently treated first,
30 day notice requirement for citizen suits under R.A. 9003 and
as in this case. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that that
R.A. 8749 is inapplicable. It is ultimately within the Court's
(sic) the closure of the Inayawan landfill is warranted in this case. 43
discretion whether or not to accept petitions brought directly
before it.34
It may not be amiss to mention that even the EMB's own official
has recognized the need of closing the Inayawan landfill due to
We affirm the CA when it ruled that the requirements for the
the environmental violations committed by the City Government
grant of the privilege of the writ of kalikasan were sufficiently
in its operation. This was the sentiment expressed by Mr. Amancio
established.
Dongcoy, a representative from the DENR-EMB, during the Cebu
SP Executive Session on 20 February 2015, thus: 44
Under Section 1 of Rule 7 of the RPEC, the following requisites
must be present to avail of this extraordinary remedy: (1) there is
xxxx
an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened
violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official Actually, DENR, way back in late 2010, my companion conducted
or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or Water Quality Monitoring and we took samples of the waste
threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental water coming from the leachate pond and it is not complying with
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or the Clean Water Act We wrote a letter to Mayor Rama, advising
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. 35 him to take measures, so that the Clean Water Act can be
complied with. So, that's why, the first reaction of Mayor Rama, is
to decide that it must be closed because it is necessary that it
Expectedly, the Rules do not define the exact nature or degree of
must stop operation. 45
environmental damage but only that it must be sufficiently grave,
in terms of the territorial scope of such damage, so as to call for
the grant of this extraordinary remedy. The gravity of Also, the air and water quality impact assessment of the EMB
environmental damage sufficient to grant the writ is, thus, to be Compliance Evaluation Report (CER)46 dated August 18, 2016,
decided on a case-to-case basis.36 made remarks that the air quality poses a threat to nearby
surroundings/habitat while the water quality (leachate) poses
threat of water pollution.47 The report also stated that the foul
The Court is convinced from the evidence on record that the
odor from the landfill already reached neighboring communities
respondent has sufficiently established the aforementioned
as far as SM Seaside and UC Mambaling which have disrupted
requirements for the grant of the privilege of the writ
activities causing economic loss and other activities for
of kalikasan. The record discloses that the City Government's
21
improvement particularly for SM Seaside. 48 Further, most of the garbage or solid waste at the Inayawan landfill and to continue to
conditions stipulated in the ECC were not complied with. 49 rehabilitate the same, are hereby AFFIRMED.

In addition, the EMB's findings particularly as to the air quality is SO ORDERED.

corroborated by 15 affidavits executed by affected residents
and/or business owners from Cebu and Talisay Cities who
affirmed smelling a foul odor coming from the Inayawan landfill,
and some even noted the appearance of flies.50

Moreover, the DOH Inspection Report 51 dated September 6, 2016,

observed that the Inayawan landfill had been in operation for 17
years, which exceeded the 7-year estimated duration period in the
projected design data. This caused the over pile-up of
refuse/garbage in the perimeter and boarder of the landfill,
having a height slope distance of approximately 120 meters at the
side portion of Fil-Invest Subdivision, Cogon Pardo Side portion
has approximately height of 40 meters and at Inayawan side
portion is approximately from 10-20 meters from the original
ground level. The standard process procedure management was
poorly implemented.52

As to the health impact, the DOH found that the residents,

commercial centers, shanties and scavengers near the dump site
are at high risk of acquiring different types of illness due to
pollution, considering the current status of the dump site. 53

The DOH highly recommended the immediate closure of the

Inayawan sanitary landfill. It was further stated that the disposal
area is not anymore suitable as a sanitary landfill even if
rehabilitated considering its location within the city, the number
of residents and the increasing population of the city, the
neighboring cities and towns, and the expected increase in
number of commercial centers, transportation and tourist
concerns.54

Prescinding from the above, the EMB, DOH, Mr. Amancio

Dongcoy, a representative from the DENR-EMB, and the Cebu and
Talisay residents are all in agreement as to the need of closing the
Inayawan landfill due to the environmental violations committed
by the City Government in its operation. The Court, while it have
the jurisdiction and power to decide cases, is not precluded from
utilizing the findings and recommendations of the administrative
agency on questions that demand "the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact. 55

Lastly, as much as this Court recognizes the parties' good intention

and sympathize with the dilemma of Mayor Osmeña or the City
Government in looking for its final disposal site, considering the
garbage daily disposal of 600 tons generated by the city and its
duty to provide basic services and facilities of garbage collection
and disposal system,56 We agree with the appellate court that the
continued operation of the Inayawan landfill poses a serious and
pressing danger to the environment that could result in injurious
consequences to the health and lives of the nearby residents,
thereby warranting the issuance of a writ of kalikasan.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated

December 15, 2016 and Resolution dated March 14, 2017 of the
Court of Appeals, which granted the privilege of the writ
of kalikasan and ordered petitioner Mayor Tomas R. Osmeña, in
his capacity as City Mayor of Cebu and/or his representatives, to
permanently cease and desist from dumping or disposing of

22
 This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 urges this
Court to reverse and set aside the November 27, 2013
Decision2 and April 28, 2014 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 99994, and to affirm instead the June 4,
2012 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 92, in Civil Case No. Q-11-70338. The court a quo had
granted the Motion to Dismiss5 of Specified Contractors &
Development Inc. (Specified Contractors), and Spouses Architect
Enrique O. Olonan and Cecilia R. Olonan (collectively referred to
as petitioners), thereby dismissing the action for specific
performance filed by respondent Jose A. Pobocan. The dismissal
of the case was subsequently set aside by the CA in the assailed
decision and resolution.

It is undisputed that respondent was in the employ of Specified

Contractors until his retirement sometime in March 2011. His last
position was president of Specified Contractors and its subsidiary,
Starland Properties Inc., as well as executive assistant of its other
subsidiaries and affiliates.

Architect Olonan allegedly6 agreed to give respondent one (1) unit

for every building Specified Contractors were able to construct as
part of respondent's compensation package to entice him to stay
with the company Two (2) of these projects that Specified
Contractors and respondent were able to build were the
Xavierville Square Condominium in Quezon City and the Sunrise
Holiday Mansion Bldg. I in Alfonso, Cavite. Pursuant to the alleged
oral agreement, Specified Contractors supposedly ceded, assigned
and transferred Unit 708 of Xavierville Square Condominium and
Unit 208 of Sunrise Holiday Mansion Bldg. I (subject units) in favor
of respondent.

In a March 14, 2011 letter7 addressed to petitioner Architect

Enrique Olonan as chairman of Specified Contractors, respondent
requested the execution of Deeds of Assignment or Deeds of Sale
over the subject units in his favor, along with various other
benefits, in view of his impending retirement on March 19, 2011.

When respondent's demand was unheeded, he filed a

Complaint8 on November 21, 2011 before the RTC of Quezon City
praying that petitioners be ordered to execute and deliver the
appropriate deeds of conveyance and to pay moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees.

On January 17, 2012, petitioners, instead of filing an answer,

interposed a Motion to Dismiss9 denying the existence of the
alleged oral agreement. They argued that, even
assuming arguendo that there was such an oral agreement, the
alleged contract is unenforceable for being in violation of the
statute of frauds, nor was there any written document, note or
memorandum showing that the subject units have in fact been
ceded, assigned or transferred to respondent. Moreover,
assuming again that said agreement existed, the cause of action
FIRST DIVISION had long prescribed because the alleged agreements were
supposedly entered into in 1994 and 1999 as indicated in
respondent's March 14, 2011 demand letter, supra, annexed to
G.R. No. 212472, January 11, 2018
the complaint.

SPECIFIED CONTRACTORS & DEVELOPMENT, INC., AND SPOUSES

The RTC, in granting10 the motion, dismissed the respondent's
ARCHITECT ENRIQUE O. OLONAN AND CECILIA R.
complaint in its June 4, 2012 Order. While the RTC disagreed with
OLONAN, Petitioners, v. JOSE A. POBOCAN, Respondent.
petitioners that the action had already prescribed under Articles
114411 and 114512 of the New Civil Code, by reasoning that the
DECISION complaint is in the nature of a real action which prescribes after
30 years conformably with Article 1141 13, it nonetheless agreed
TIJAM, J.: that the alleged agreement should have been put into writing, and

23
that such written note, memorandum or agreement should have Not all actions involving real property are real actions. In Spouses
been attached as actionable documents to respondent's Saraza, et al. v. Francisco19, it was clarified that:
complaint.
x x x Although the end result of the respondent's claim was the
On appeal, the CA reversed14 the RTC's June 4, 2012 Order, transfer of the subject property to his name, the suit was still
reasoning that the dismissal of respondent's complaint, anchored essentially for specific performance, a personal action, because it
on the violation of the statute of frauds, is unwarranted since the sought Fernando's execution of a deed of absolute sale based on a
rule applies only to executory and not to completed or partially contract which he had previously made.
consummated contracts. According to the CA, there was allegedly
partial performance of the alleged obligation based on: (1) the Similarly, that the end result would be the transfer of the subject
respondent's possession of the subject units; (2) the respondent's units to respondent's name in the event that his suit is decided in
payment of condominium dues and realty tax for Unit 708 his favor is "an anticipated consequence and beyond the cause for
Xavierville Square Condominium; (3) the endorsement by which the action [for specific performance with damages] was
petitioners of furniture/equipment for Unit 208 Sunrise Holiday instituted."20 Had respondent's action proceeded to trial, the crux
Mansion I; and (4) that shares on the rental from Unit 208 Sunrise of the controversy would have been the existence or non-
Holiday Mansion I were. allegedly received by the respondent and existence of the alleged oral contract from which would flow
deducted from his monthly balance on the furniture/equipment respondent's alleged right to compel petitioners to execute deeds
account. of conveyance. The transfer of property sought by respondent is
but incidental to or an offshoot of the determination of whether
Petitioners countered that while there is no dispute that or not there is indeed, to begin with, an agreement to convey the
respondent had been occupying Unit 708 - previously Unit 803 - of properties in exchange for services rendered.
Xavierville Square Condominium, this was merely out of tolerance
in view of respondent's then position as president of the company Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction & Development
and without surrender of ownership. Petitioners also insisted that Corporation21 explains thus:
Unit 208 of Sunrise Holiday Mansion I continues to be under their
possession and control. Thus, finding that the motion to dismiss
A close scrutiny of National Steel and Ruiz  reveals that the prayers
was predicated on disputable grounds, the CA declared in its
for the execution of a Deed of Sale were not in any way connected
assailed decision that a trial on the merits is necessary to
to a contract, like the Undertaking in this case. Hence, even if
determine once and for all the nature of the respondent's
there were prayers for the execution of a deed of sale, the actions
possession of the subject units.
filed in the said cases were not for specific performance.

Aggrieved, petitioners sought reconsideration of the CA decision,

In the present case, petitioner seeks payment of her services in
but were unsuccessful. Hence, the present petition raising three
accordance with the undertaking the parties signed.
issues:

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is

1. Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the
conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the
respondent's complaint considering that the allegations
complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of
therein invoked a right over the subject condominium
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims
units as part of his compensation package, thus a claim
asserted therein.22 We therefore find that respondent correctly
arising out of an employer-employee relationship
designated his . complaint as one for specific performance
cognizable by the labor arbiter;15
consistent with his allegations and prayer therein. Accordingly,
2. Whether or not the respondent's cause of action had
respondent's suit is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation
already prescribed;16 and
and indeed cognizable by the RTC of Quezon City where both
3. Whether or not the action was barred by the statute of
parties reside. As stated in Surviving Heirs of Alfredo R. Bautista v.
frauds.17
Lindo:23

Resolution of the foregoing issues calls for an examination of the

Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of
allegations in the complaint and the nature of the action instituted
pecuniary estimation, viz:
by respondent. As will be discussed later, there is merit in
petitioners' insistence that respondent's right of action was
already barred by the statute of limitations. 1. Actions for specific performance;

What determines the nature of the action and which court has While the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage
jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the complaint and the of an action, nevertheless, the party raising such question may be
character of the relief sought. 18 In his complaint, respondent estopped if he has actively taken part in the very proceedings
claimed that petitioners promised to convey to him the subject which he questions and he only objects to the court's jurisdiction
units to entice him to stay with their company. From this, because the judgment or the order subsequently rendered is
respondent prayed that petitioners be compelled to perform their adverse to him.24 In this case, petitioners' Motion to Dismiss,
part of the alleged oral agreement. The objective of the suit is to Reply25 to the opposition on the motion, and Sur-rejoinder 26 only
compel petitioners to perform an act specifically, to execute invoked the defenses of statute of frauds and prescription before
written instruments pursuant to a previous oral contract. Notably, the RTC. It was only after the CA reversed the RTC's grant of the
the respondent does not claim ownership of, nor title to, the motion to dismiss that petitioners raised for the first time the
subject properties. issue of jurisdiction in their Motion for Reconsideration. 27 Clearly,
petitioners are estopped from raising this issue after actively
taking part in the proceedings before the RTC, obtaining a

24
favorable ruling, and then making an issue of it only after the CA the complaint, was issued on September 11, 1997 or more than 13
reversed the RTC's order. years before respondent's March 14, 2011 demand letter. CCT No.
CT-61333 for Unit 208 of Sunrise Holiday Mansion Building I; also
Even if this Court were to entertain the petitioners' belated annexed to the complaint, was issued on March 12, 1996 or 14
assertion that jurisdiction belongs to the labor arbiter as this case years before respondent's March 14, 2011 demand letter.
involves a claim arising from an employer-employee relationship, Indubitably, in view of the instant suit for specific performance
reliance by petitioners on Domondon v. NLRC28 is misplaced. being a personal action funded upon an oral contract which must
In  Domondon, the existence of the agreement on the transfer of be brought within six years from the accrual of the right,
car-ownership was not in issue but rather, the entitlement of a prescription had already set in.
former employee to his entire monetary claims against a former
employer, considering that the said employee had not paid the Inasmuch as the complaint should have been dismissed by the
balance of the purchase price of a company car which the RTC on the ground of prescription, which fact is apparent from the
employee opted to retain. In the present case, the existence of complaint and its annexes, it is no longer necessary to delve into
the alleged oral agreement, from which would flow the right to the applicability of the statute of frauds.
compel performance, is in issue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court of
As the Court has ascertained that the present suit is essentially for Appeals' November 27, 2013 Decision and April 28, 2014
specific performance - a personal action - over which the court  a Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 99994 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
quo had jurisdiction, it was therefore erroneous for it to have We sustain the dismissal of Civil Case No. Q-11-70338, but on the
treated the complaint as a real action which prescribes after 30 ground that the action for specific performance had already
years under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code. In a personal prescribed.
action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the
enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of damages. 29 Real SO ORDERED.
actions, on the other hand, are those affecting title to or
possession of real property, or interest therein. 30 As a personal
action based upon an oral contract, Article 1145 providing a
prescriptive period of six years applies in this case instead. The
shorter period provided by law to institute an action based on an
oral contract is due to the frailty of human memory. Nothing
prevented the parties from reducing the alleged oral agreement
into writing, stipulating the same in a contract of employment or
partnership, or even mentioning the same in an office
memorandum early on.

While the respondent's complaint was ingeniously silent as to

when the alleged oral agreement came about, his March 14, 2011
demand letter annexed to his complaint categorically cites the
year 1994 as when he and Architect Olonan allegedly had an oral
agreement to become "industrial partners" for which he would be
given a unit from every building they constructed. From this, Unit
208 of Sunrise Holiday Mansion I was allegedly assigned to him.
Then he went on to cite his resignation in October of 1997 and his
re-employment with the company on December 1, 1999 for which
he was allegedly given Unit 803 of the Xavierville Square
Condominium, substituted later on by Unit 708 thereof.

The complaint for specific performance was instituted on

November 21, 2011, or 17 years from the oral agreement of 1994
and almost 12 years after the December 1, 1999 oral agreement.
Thus, the respondent's action upon an oral contract was filed
beyond the six-year period within which he should have instituted
the same.

Respondent argued that the prescriptive period should not be

counted from 1994 because the condominium units were not yet
in existence at that time, and that the obligation would have
arisen after the units were completed and ready for occupancy.
Article 134731 of the New Civil Code is, however, clear that future
things may be the object of a contract. This is the reason why real
estate developers engage in pre-selling activities. But even if we
were to entertain respondent's view, his right of action would still
be barred by the statute of limitations.

Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. N-18347 32 for Unit 708

of Xavierville Square Condominium, copy of which was annexed to

25
 STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE
MAISIP, respondents.

Tanjuatco, Oreta and Tanjuatco for petitioners.

Pecabar Law Offices for private respondents.

RESOLUTION

GANCAYCO, J.:

Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the

Second Division of January 28,1987 and another motion to refer
the case to and to be heard in oral argument by the Court En
Banc filed by petitioners, the motion to refer the case to the
Court en banc is granted but the motion to set the case for oral
argument is denied.

Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must

be assessed on the basis of the amended complaint cite the case
of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. 1 They contend that the Court of
Appeals erred in that the filing fee should be levied by considering
the amount of damages sought in the original complaint.

The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in

that —

1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and

possession of a parcel of land with damages. 2 While the present
case is an action for torts and damages and specific performance
with prayer for temporary restraining order, etc.3

2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only
the annulment of title of the defendant to the property, the
declaration of ownership and delivery of possession thereof to
plaintiffs but also asks for the payment of actual moral, exemplary
damages and attorney's fees arising therefrom in the amounts
specified therein. 4 However, in the present case, the prayer is for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction during
the pendency of the action against the defendants' announced
forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the
property in question, to attach such property of defendants that
maybe sufficient to satisfy any judgment that maybe rendered,
and after hearing, to order defendants to execute a contract of
purchase and sale of the subject property and annul defendants'
illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff, ordering defendants
jointly and severally to pay plaintiff actual, compensatory and
exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as maybe
proved during the trial as attorney's fees and declaring the tender
of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and producing
the effect of payment and to make the injunction permanent. The
amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although
the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78
Million as damages suffered by plaintiff.5

3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference

G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987 of opinion as to the nature of the action in the Magaspi case. The
complaint was considered as primarily an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The damages stated
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners, were treated as merely to the main cause of action. Thus, the
vs. docket fee of only P60.00 and P10.00 for the sheriff's fee were
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, paid. 6

26
In the present case there can be no such honest difference of the Court. 13 For an legal purposes there is no such original
opinion. As maybe gleaned from the allegations of the complaint complaint that was duly filed which could be amended.
as well as the designation thereof, it is both an action for damages Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all
and specific performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are
complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by considering the action null and void.
to be merely one for specific performance where the amount
involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation is obviously The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case
erroneous. Although the total amount of damages sought is not that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the
stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out in the amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in
body of the complaint totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 the amended complaint.
which should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee.
The Court cannot close this case without making the observation
4. When this under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case was that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original
brought to the attention of this Court together with similar other complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount
cases an investigation was immediately ordered by the Court. of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million
Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with leave of court is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for
filed an amended complaint on September 12, 1985 for the no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing
inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff and fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the
by emanating any mention of the amount of damages in the body filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when, even
of the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an
maintained. After this Court issued an order on October 15, 1985 investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an
ordering the re- assessment of the docket fee in the present case amended complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of
and other cases that were investigated, on November 12, 1985 damages being asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only
the trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint when in obedience to the order of this Court of October 18, 1985,
by stating the amounts which they are asking for. It was only then the trial court directed that the amount of damages be specified
that plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of the in the amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the
complaint in the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00. 7 Still no damages sought in the much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00
amount of damages were specified in the prayer. Said amended in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The
complaint was admitted. design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is obvious.

On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a
the plaintiffs to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee covering repetition of this unethical practice.
the damages alleged in the original complaint as it did not
consider the damages to be merely an or incidental to the action
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints,
for recovery of ownership and possession of real property. 8 An
petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the
amended complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of court to
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
include the government of the Republic as defendant and
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be
reducing the amount of damages, and attorney's fees prayed for
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any
to P100,000.00. Said amended complaint was also admitted. 9
pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the
In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for record.
recovery of ownership but also for damages, so that the filing fee
for the damages should be the basis of assessment. Although the
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found to be
payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the
insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that since the payment was
complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in
the result of an "honest difference of opinion as to the correct
the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the
amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired
amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the
jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had
Magaspi case 14 in so far as it is inconsistent with this
were proper and regular." 10 Hence, as the amended complaint
pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
superseded the original complaint, the allegations of damages in
the amended complaint should be the basis of the computation of
the filing fee. 11 WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of
merit.
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was
possible as the allegations of the complaint, the designation and SO ORDERED.
the prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages and
specific performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by
considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original
complaint.

As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a

case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of filing in court . 12 Thus, in the G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989
present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J.
the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon WARBY, petitioners,
27
vs. On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, filed by petitioners. On August 30,1984, an amended complaint
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO was filed by private respondent including the two additional
TIONG, respondents. defendants aforestated.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles Law Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q41177
Offices for petitioners. Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & was thereafter assigned, after his assumption into office on
Sanvicente Law Offices for private respondent. January 16, 1986, issued a Supplemental Order requiring the
parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-
report signifying her difficulty in complying with the Resolution of
this Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings filed by private
respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be
GANCAYCO, J.:
recovered. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a
"Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a
Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a claim of "not less than Pl0,000,000. 00 as actual compensatory
court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said second amended
proper docket fee has not been paid. complaint however, private respondent alleges actual and
compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of
On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL about P44,601,623.70.
for brevity) filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Metro Manila for the consignation of a premium refund On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order
on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration admitting the second amended complaint and stating therein that
of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. the same constituted proper compliance with the Resolution of
Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the this Court and that a copy thereof should be furnished the Clerk of
required answer within the reglementary period. Court for the reassessment of the docket fees. The reassessment
by the Clerk of Court based on private respondent's claim of "not
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages"
complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the refund amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently
of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment paid by private respondent.
which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially against
petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Warby as additional defendants. The complaint sought, among Appeals questioning the said order of Judie Asuncion dated
others, the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary January 24, 1986.
and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and
costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental
quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be
complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as
inferred from the body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million
d.qmages so the total claim amounts to about P64,601,623.70. On
Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
October 16, 1986, or some seven months after filing the
supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as additional docket fee of P80,396.00.1
docket fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his
objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent Judge
On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case. Upon the
ruling, among others, as follows:
order of this Court, the records of said case together with twenty-
two other cases assigned to different branches of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City which were under investigation for WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
under-assessment of docket fees were transmitted to this Court.
The Court thereafter returned the said records to the trial court 1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-
with the directive that they be re-raffled to the other judges in G.R. SP No. 1, 09715 insofar as it seeks
Quezon City, to the exclusion of Judge Castro. Civil Case No. Q- annulment of the order
41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was then vacant.
(a) denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in complaint, as amended, and
Administrative Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges in
said cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of (b) granting the writ of preliminary
deficiency, to order its payment. The Resolution also requires all attachment, but giving due course to the
clerks of court to issue certificates of re-assessment of docket portion thereof questioning the reassessment
fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in their of the docketing fee, and requiring the
pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their complaints. Honorable respondent Court to reassess the
docketing fee to be paid by private respondent
On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala on the basis of the amount of
Civil Case No. Q-41177 was temporarily assigned, issuedan order P25,401,707.00. 2
to the Clerk of Court instructing him to issue a certificate of
assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and, in Hence, the instant petition.
case of deficiency, to include the same in said certificate.

28
During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the requirement that such declaration should be filed at least one
said judgment of respondent court, private respondent paid the year before the filing of the petition for citizenship. Citing Lazaro,
additional docket fee of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988. 3 this Court concluded that the filing of petitioner's declaration of
intention on October 23, 1953 produced no legal effect until the
The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred required filing fee was paid on May 23, 1956.
in not finding that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over
Civil Case No. Q-41177 on the ground of nonpayment of the In Malimit vs. Degamo,  9 the same principles enunciated in Lazaro
correct and proper docket fee. Petitioners allege that while it may and Lee were applied. It was an original petition for  quo
be true that private respondent had paid the amount of warranto contesting the right to office of proclaimed candidates
P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above related, and which was mailed, addressed to the clerk of the Court of First
considering that the total amount sought to be recovered in the Instance, within the one-week period after the proclamation as
amended and supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the provided therefor by law.10 However, the required docket fees
docket fee that should be paid by private respondent is were paid only after the expiration of said period. Consequently,
P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the same, petitioners this Court held that the date of such payment must be deemed to
contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all incidents be the real date of filing of aforesaid petition and not the date
arising therefrom should be annulled. In support of their theory, when it was mailed.
petitioners cite the latest ruling of the Court in Manchester
Development Corporation vs. CA, 4 as follows: Again, in  Garica vs, Vasquez, 11 this Court reiterated the rule that
the docket fee must be paid before a court will act on a petition or
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case complaint. However, we also held that said rule is not applicable
only upon the payment of the prescribed when petitioner seeks the probate of several wills of the same
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint decedent as he is not required to file a separate action for each
or similar pleading will not thereby vest will but instead he may have other wills probated in the same
jurisdiction in the Court, much less the special proceeding then pending before the same court.
payment of the docket fee based on the
amounts sought in the amended pleading. The Then in Magaspi,  12 this Court reiterated the ruling
ruling in the Magaspi Case in so far as it is in Malimit and Lee  that a case is deemed filed only upon payment
inconsistent with this pronouncement is of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in court.
overturned and reversed. Said case involved a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land with damages filed in the Court of
On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling First Instance of Cebu. Upon the payment of P60.00 for the docket
in Manchester cannot apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q41177 fee and P10.00 for the sheriffs fee, the complaint was docketed as
for at the time said civil case was filed in court there was no Civil Case No. R-11882. The prayer of the complaint sought that
such Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of the
that what is applicable is the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. defendant be declared as null and void. It was also prayed that
Ramolete, 5 wherein this Court held that the trial court acquired plaintiff be declared as owner thereof to whom the proper title
jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was should be issued, and that defendant be made to pay monthly
insufficient. rentals of P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948 up to the time the
property is delivered to plaintiff, P500,000.00 as moral damages,
The contention that Manchester  cannot apply retroactively to this attorney's fees in the amount of P250,000.00, the costs of the
case is untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts action and exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00.
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay
retrospective in that sense and to that extent. 6 the correct amount of the docket fee to which an opposition was
filed by the plaintiff alleging that the action was for the recovery
In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres, 7 this Court held that the of a parcel of land so the docket fee must be based on its assessed
payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable value and that the amount of P60.00 was the correct docketing
step for the perfection of an appeal. In a forcible entry and fee. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay P3,104.00 as filing
detainer case before the justice of the peace court of Manaoag, fee.
Pangasinan, after notice of a judgment dismissing the case, the
plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with said court but he deposited The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint
only P8.00 for the docket fee, instead of P16.00 as required, to include the Republic as the defendant. In the prayer of the
within the reglementary period of appeal of five (5) days after amended complaint the exemplary damages earlier sought was
receiving notice of judgment. Plaintiff deposited the additional eliminated. The amended prayer merely sought moral damages as
P8.00 to complete the amount of the docket fee only fourteen the court may determine, attorney's fees of P100,000.00 and the
(14) days later. On the basis of these facts, this court held that the costs of the action. The defendant filed an opposition to the
Court of First Instance did notacquire jurisdiction to hear and amended complaint. The opposition notwithstanding, the
determine the appeal as the appeal was not thereby perfected. amended complaint was admitted by the trial court. The trial
court reiterated its order for the payment of the additional docket
In Lee vs. Republic,  8 the petitioner filed a verified declaration of fee which plaintiff assailed and then challenged before this Court.
intention to become a Filipino citizen by sending it through Plaintiff alleged that he paid the total docket fee in the amount of
registered mail to the Office of the Solicitor General in 1953 but P60.00 and that if he has to pay the additional fee it must be
the required filing fee was paid only in 1956, barely 5V2 months based on the amended complaint.
prior to the filing of the petition for citizenship. This Court ruled
that the declaration was not filed in accordance with the legal

29
The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff acquire jurisdiction over the case by payment of only P410.00 for
may be considered to have filed the case even if the docketing fee the docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint
paid was not sufficient. In Magaspi, We reiterated the rule that thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes
the case was deemed filed only upon the payment of the correct there was no such original complaint duly filed which could be
amount for the docket fee regardless of the actual date of the amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended
filing of the complaint; that there was an honest difference of complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by
opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee in that the trial court were declared null and void.13
as the action appears to be one for the recovery of property the
docket fee of P60.00 was correct; and that as the action is also The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases
one, for damages, We upheld the assessment of the additional of under-assessment of docket fee which were investigated by
docket fee based on the damages alleged in the amended this Court together with Manchester. The facts and circumstances
complaint as against the assessment of the trial court which was of this case are similar to Manchester. In the body of the original
based on the damages alleged in the original complaint. complaint, the total amount of damages sought amounted to
about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount of damages asked for
However, as aforecited, this Court was not stated. The action was for the refund of the premium and
overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester  involves an the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment with damages.
action for torts and damages and specific performance with a The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, etc. The January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint
prayer in said case is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than
prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action against P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the body
the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is
paid by the plaintiffs for the property in question, the attachment approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was
of such property of defendants that may be sufficient to satisfy admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the
any judgment that may be rendered, and, after hearing, the additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less
issuance of an order requiring defendants to execute a contract of than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.
purchase and sale of the subject property and annul defendants'
illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff. It was also prayed that On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental
the defendants be made to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally, complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in
actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of damages so that his total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70.
said amounts as may be proved during the trial for attorney's fees. On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional
The plaintiff also asked the trial court to declare the tender of docket fee of P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the decision
payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and sufficient for of the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private
purposes of payment, and to make the injunction permanent. The respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket
amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although fee, and during the pendency of this petition, and after the
the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private
Millon allegedly suffered by plaintiff. respondent paid an additional docket fee of P62,132.92. Although
private respondent appears to have paid a total amount of
Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total amount of his
only P410.00 for the docket fee based on the nature of the action claim in the amended and supplemental complaint amounting to
for specific performance where the amount involved is not about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private respondent
capable of pecuniary estimation. However, it was obvious from must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.
the allegations of the complaint as well as its designation that the
action was one for damages and specific performance. Thus, this The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the
court held the plaintiff must be assessed the correct docket fee present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud the
computed against the amount of damages of about P78 Million, government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the
although the same was not spelled out in the prayer of the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second
complaint. amended complaint.

Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of court, However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional
filed an amended complaint on September 12, 1985 by the docket fee until] the case was decided by this Court on May 7,
inclusion of another co-plaintiff and eliminating any mention of 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the
the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer government, this Court held that the court a quo  did not acquire
in the original complaint was maintained. jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could
not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was
On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of the null and void.
docket fee in the said case and other cases that were investigated.
On November 12, 1985, the trial court directed the plaintiff to In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is
rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent
were asking for. This plaintiff did as instructed. In the body of the demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
complaint the amount of damages alleged was reduced to additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the
P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of damages was specified in decision in Manchester must have had that sobering influence on
the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted. private respondent who thus paid the additional docket fee as
ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change of stance
Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as
only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date may be ordered.
of filing in court," this Court held that the trial court did not
30
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was EN BANC
paid is still insufficient considering the total amount of the claim.
This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or  
his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should
determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998
require the private respondent to pay the same. ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner,
vs.
Thus, the Court rules as follows: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO
ARICAYOS, respondents.
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee,
that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is
not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may REGALADO, J.:
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for
illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent before the
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration
claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent
until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of
may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However,
also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary there was no contract of employment executed between him and
period. petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll.
On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for
filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau
filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not of Internal Revenue (BIR). 1
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the
the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said owner of petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995,
lien and assess and collect the additional fee. private respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas
contract worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private
of Court of the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in
determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by private overseeing the business.
respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought in
the original complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter
gleaned from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to then took over the management of the business. She then
require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any, without discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and
pronouncement as to costs. other government fees, although the records purported to show
that the same were already paid. Amelita then made some
SO ORDERED. changes in the business operation and private respondent and his
wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management
thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging
that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. 2

Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter

rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996
declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed
between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction
over the case. 3

Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed

to the NLRC contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not
giving credence to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding
that he worked as a "volunteer" and not as an employee of St.
Martin Funeral Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996,
or a period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no
employer-employee relationship between him and petitioner. 4

On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside

the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor
arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings. 5 Petitioner then
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC
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in its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit, 6 hence for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations if
the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave filed within the reglementary period under Rule 65. 14
abuse of discretion.7
Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions,
Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the B.P. No. 129 originally provided as follows:
Court feels that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the
functional validity and systemic practicability of the mode of Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Intermediate Appellate Court shall
judicial review it has long adopted and still follows with respect to exercise:
decisions of the NLRC. The increasing number of labor disputes (1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of  mandamus,
that find their way to this Court and the legislative changes prohibition, certiorari,  habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
introduced over the years into the provisions of Presidential auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines and jurisdiction;
Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980) now stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
that procedural aspect. judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and

We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
established in the Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts
14, 1972, and its decisions were expressly declared to be and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or
appealable to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction
President of the Philippines. of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Philippines, the same to take effect six months after its Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
promulgation. 8 Created and regulated therein is the present NLRC
which was attached to the Department of Labor and Employment The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try
for program and policy coordination only.9 Initially, Article 302 cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any
(now, Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases
remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the Secretary falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the
of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
and abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since then
been provided for. These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory
orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the
Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no Central Board of Assessment Appeals. 15
provision for appeals from the decision of the NLRC. 10 The present
Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was
instead merely provides that the Commission shall decide all cases amended by R.A. No. 7902 effective March 18, 1995, to wit:
within twenty days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
and that such decision shall be final and executory after ten
calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties. (1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
this Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, jurisdiction;
and formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal
provision for appellate review thereof, the Court nevertheless (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
rejected that thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of
law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts
administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission,
checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation
forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. 11 Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the
decisions of this Court, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the
timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
further or subsequent remedy, 12 and then seasonably avail of the paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
special civil action of  certiorari under Rule 65, 13 for which said Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from
notice of the decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and
finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts
contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its
that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant

32
and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be completed with the Labor Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and
within, three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice. Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since
there are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions,
It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name orders or awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of
of the lower appellate court, 16 the following amendments of the the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter.
original provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 were effected by
R.A. No. 7902, viz.: A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No.
7902 persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the
1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the
Code of the Philippines and the Central Board of Assessment terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide
Appeals was deleted and replaced by a new paragraph granting for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases
the Court of Appeals limited powers to conduct trials and hearings by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term
in cases within its jurisdiction. used for the intended mode of review. This conclusion which we
2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the
transposed to paragraph (3) of the section, such that the original considerations extant in the records of Congress, more particularly
exclusionary clause therein now provides "except those falling on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452. 18
accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the his sponsorship speech 19 from which we reproduce the following
provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third excerpts:
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948." (Emphasis supplied). The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the same time
3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among expanded its jurisdiction and powers. Among others, its appellate
the quasi-judicial agencies over which the Court of Appeals shall jurisdiction was expanded to cover not only final judgment of
have exclusive appellate jurisdiction are the Securities and Regional Trial Courts, but also all final judgment(s), decisions,
Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies,
Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service instrumentalities, boards and commissions, except those falling
Commission. within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impassè, both in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg. 129
point of purpose and terminology. As earlier explained, our mode and of subparagraph 1 of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4
of judicial review over decisions of the NLRC has for some time of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
now been understood to be by a petition for certiorari under Rule Mr. President, the purpose of the law is  to ease the workload of
65 of the Rules of Court. This is, of course, a special original action the Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its burden of review
limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or of factual issues to the Court of Appeals. However, whatever
excess of jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that have been benefits that can be derived from the expansion of the appellate
brought to us, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was cut short by the last
jurisdiction. paragraph of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which
It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. excludes from its coverage the "decisions and interlocutory orders
129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central
Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts Board of Assessment Appeals.
and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the
therein except, among others, "those falling within Supreme Court are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495
the  appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance seeks to eliminate the exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and,
with . . . the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential additionally, extends the coverage of appellate review of the
Decree No. 442, as amended, . . . ." This would necessarily Court of Appeals in the decision(s) of the Securities and Exchange
contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does Commission, the Social Security Commission, and the Employees
not lie from decisions of the NLRC. 17 Yet, under such excepting Compensation Commission to reduce the number of cases
clause literally construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be elevated to the Supreme Court. (Emphases and corrections ours)
brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary
implication. x x x           x x x          x x x

The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from
declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction Laguna provides the ideal situation of drastically reducing the
over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the workload of the Supreme Court without depriving the litigants of
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions the privilege of review by an appellate tribunal.
of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief
excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Justice Teehankee in 1986 in the Annual Report of the Supreme
Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned amendment by Court:
transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within
33
. . . Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the legislative intendment was that the special civil action
Supreme Court of the burden of reviewing these cases which of certiorari  was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review
present no important issues involved beyond the particular fact of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation
and the parties involved, so that the Supreme Court may wholly thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been
devote its time to cases of public interest in the discharge of its a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original
mandated task as the guardian of the Constitution and the action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed
guarantor of the people's basic rights and additional task expressly to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them,
vested on it now "to determine whether or not there has been a however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the is that the special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of
Appeals; 23 whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals
We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr. by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not
President. It has been cut down to 300,000 cases some five years subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as
ago. I understand we are now back to 400,000 cases. Unless we expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
distribute the work of the appellate courts, we shall continue to
mount and add to the number of cases pending. Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some
quarters were of the opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the
In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the Court of Appeals as an initial step in the process of judicial review
reasons we have submitted, the Committee on Justice and Human would be circuitous and would prolong the proceedings. On the
Rights requests the support and collegial approval of our contrary, as he commendably and realistically emphasized, that
Chamber. procedure would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this
x x x           x x x          x x x reasoning:

Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be
Committee Amendment was introduced by the said sponsor and appealed to the Court of Appeals would give litigants the
the following proceedings transpired: 20 advantage to have all the evidence on record be reexamined and
reweighed after which the findings of facts and conclusions of said
Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line "Supreme Court in bodies are correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed.
accordance with the Constitution," add the phrase "THE LABOR
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED." So Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly
that it becomes clear, Mr. President, that issues arising from the the axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final
Labor Code will still be appealable to the Supreme Court. and may not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A
perusal of the records will reveal appeals which are factual in
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the nature and may, therefore, be dismissed outright by minute
amendment is approved. resolutions. 24

Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on
deleted. This was also discussed with our Colleagues in the House the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the
of Representatives and as we understand it, as approved in the further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases
House, this was also deleted, Mr. President. being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at
times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court
amendment is approved. of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from
the increased number of its component divisions; and that there is
Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr.
President. undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor
cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.
Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of
Committee amendments. Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129
to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions
amendment is approved. (Emphasis supplied). for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions
should hence forth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
x x x           x x x          x x x observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired.
Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate
Bill No. 1495 was passed on second reading and being a certified Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be
bill, its unanimous approval on third reading followed. 21 The made in accordance with their hierarchical order, this
Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and House pronouncement in Santiago vs. Vasquez, et al. 25 should be taken
Bill No. 10452, having theretofore been approved by the House of into account:
Representatives, the same was likewise approved by the Senate
on February 20, 1995, 22 inclusive of the dubious formulation on One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a
appeals to the Supreme Court earlier discussed. propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the
same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial
appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact
34
that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of
their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by
law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only
because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court
but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be
remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum
under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the
issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore,
reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for
the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition

for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records
thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate action and disposition consistent with the views and
ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

35