THE REVISED PENAL CODE

 Act No. 3815

 Committee created by Administrative Order No. 94 of Department of Justice on October 18, 1927
o Anacleto Diaz (chairman), Quintin Paredes, Guillermo Guevara, Alex Reyes, Mariano H. de Joya (members)
 OLD PENAL CODE – July 14, 1887 to December 31, 1931
 Approved on December 8, 1930; Took effect on January 1, 1932

BOOK 1 – Article 1-20, basic principles affecting criminal liability

- Article 21-113, define felonies with the corresponding penalties classified and grouped under 14 different titles
TWO THEORIES OF CRIMINAL LAW
 Classical Theory
 Positivist Theory

FRENCH RULE – such crimes are not triable in the courts of that country, unless their commission affects the peace and
security of the territory or the safety of the state
ENGLISH RULE – such crimes are triable in that country, unless they merely affect things within the vessel or they refer
to the internal management thereof
(French rule and English rule only apply when the merchant vessel entered the territory of foreign country)

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9372 – “Human Security Act of 2007”, passed into law on March 6, 2007
- Has extra-territorial application

FELONIES – acts and omission punishable by laws

- Committed by means of deceit (dolo) and fault (culpa)
- DECEIT – act performed with deliberate intent
- FAULT – wrongful act is result of imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, lack of skill
ELEMENTS OF FELONIES
1. There must be an act or omission.
2. That the act or omission must be punishable by revised penal code.
3. That the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of dolo or culpa.

ACT – constituting a felony or at least an overt act of that felony, that is, an external act which has direct connection with
the felony intended to be committed. (Only external act is punished)

OMISSION – inaction; failure to perform a positive duty which one is bound to do

NULLUM CRIMEN, NULLA POENA SINE LEGE – there is no crime when there is no crime punishing it

CLASSIFICATION OF FELONIES
1. Intentional Felonies – act or omission of offender is malicious; act is performed with deliberate intent (with
malice)
2. Culpable Felonies – act or omission of offender is not malicious; injury caused is unintentional, without malice;
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill

ARTICLE 217 – punishes malversion through negligence

ARTICLE 224 – punishes evasion through negligence
ARTICLE 365 – punishes acts by imprudence or negligence, which had they been intentional, would constitute grave, less
grave or light felnies

A person who caused an injury, without intention to cause an evil, may be held liable for culpable felony.

IMPRUDENCE – deficiency of action (lack of skill)

NEGLIGENCE – deficiency of perception (lack of foresight)

RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE – consist in voluntary but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
damage results (Art. 365)

THREE REASONS WHY THE ACT OR OMISSION IN FELONIES MUST BE VOLUNTARY

1. The Revised Penal Code continues to be based on the Classical Theory, according to which the basis of criminal
liability is human free will.
2. Acts or omissions punished by law are always deemed voluntary, since man is a rational being. One must prove that
his case falls under Art. 12 to show that his act or omission is not voluntary.
3. In felonies by dolo, the act is performed with deliberate intent which must necessarily be voluntary; and in felonies by
culpa, the imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
injury results.

REQUISITES OF DOLO OR MALICE

1. He must have FREEDOM while doing an act or omitting to do an act;
2. He must have INTELLIGENCE while doing the act or omitting to do the act;
3. He must have INTENT while doing the act or omitting to do the act.

VOLUNTARY ACT – free, intelligent and intentional act

 One who acts without freedom necessarily has no intent to do an injury to another. One who acts without intelligence
has no such intent.
 But a person who acts with freedom and with intelligence may not have the intent to do an injury to another. Thus, a
person who caused an injury by mere accident had freedom and intelligence, but since he had no fault or intention of
causing it, he is not criminally liable.

ACTUS NON FACIT REUM, NISI MENS SIT REA – a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing to
act complained be innocent.

There is no felony by dolo if there is no intent.

MISTAKE OF FACT – misapprehension of fact on the part of the person who caused injury to another. He is not
criminally liable because he did not act with criminal intent.

IGNORANTIA LEGIS NON EXCUSAT – ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith
IGNORANTIA FACTI EXCUSAT – ignorance or mistake of fact relieves the accused from criminal liability

Requisites of mistake of fact as a defense:

1. That the act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed them to be.
2. That the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful.
3. That the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the accused.

In mistake of fact, the act done by the accused would have constituted (1) a justifying circumstance under Art. 11, (2) an
absolutory cause, such as that contemplated in Art. 247, par. 2, or (3) an involuntary act.

o Lack of intent to commit a crime may be inferred from the facts of the case.
o In mistake of fact, the act done would have been lawful, had the facts been as the accused believed them to be.
o The mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the accused.
o Lack of intent to kill the deceased, because his intention was to kill another, does not relieve the accused from
criminal responsibility.
o In mistake of fact, the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful. Thus, in error in personae or
mistake in the identity of the victim, the principle of mistake of fact does not apply.
o No crime of resistance when there is a mistake of fact.
o When the accused is negligent, mistake of fact is not a defense.
o The defense of mistake of fact is untenable when the accused is charged with a culpable felony. In mistake of fact,
what is involved is lack of intent on the part of the accused. In felonies committed through negligence, there is no
intent to consider, as it is replaced by imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.

CRIMINAL INTENT is necessary in felonies committed by means of dolo because of the legal maxims —
ACTUS NON FACIT REUM NISI MENS SIT REA - "the act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention were
so."
ACTUS ME INVITO FACTUS NON EST MEUS ACTUS - "an act done by me against my will is not my act."

When the accused is charged with intentional felony, absence of criminal intent is a defense.
 In the absence of criminal intent, there is no liability for intentional felony. All reasonable doubt intended to
demonstrate error and not crime should be indulged in for the benefit of the accused.
 If there is only error on the part of the person doing the act, he does not act with malice, and for that reason he is not
criminally liable for intentional felony.

Criminal intent is replaced by negligence and imprudence in felonies committed by means of culpa.
In felonies committed by means of culpa, since the doing of or failing to do an act must also be voluntary, there must
be freedom and intelligence on the part of the offender, but the requisite of criminal intent, which is required in felonies
by dolo, is replaced by the requisite of imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequence is, in law, equivalent to criminal intent.
But in felonies committed by means of culpa, the mind of the accused is not criminal. However, his act is wrongful,
because the injury or damage caused to the injured party results from the imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack
of skill of the accused.
Therefore, in order that the act or omission in felonies committed by means of fault or culpa may be considered
voluntary, the following requisites must concur:
(1) He must have FREEDOM while doing an act or omitting to do an act;
(2) He must have INTELLIGENCE while doing the act or omitting to do the act;
(3) He is IMPRUDENT, NEGLIGENT or LACKS FORESIGHT or SKILL while doing the act or omitting to do the
act.

In culpable felonies, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice.

Mistake in the identity of the intended victim is not reckless imprudence.

 A deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. Where such
an unlawful act is willfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
imprudence.

A person causing damage or injury to another, without malice or fault, is not criminally liable under the Revised Penal
Code.
 Since felonies are committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or by means of fault (culpa), if there is neither malice
nor negligence on the part of the person causing damage or injury to another, he is not criminally liable under the
Revised Penal Code.
 In such case, he is exempt from criminal liability, because he causes an injury by mere accident, without fault or
intention of causing it.

The third class of crimes are those punished by special laws.

 There are three classes of crimes. The Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the first two classes of crimes, (1)
the intentional felonies, and (2) the culpable felonies. The third class of crimes are those defined and penalized by
special laws which include crimes punished by municipal or city ordinances.
Dolo is not required in crimes punished by special laws.
 When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that
the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law.
 Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously
intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime
itself.
 In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act), it is
enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously.

No intent to perpetrate the act prohibited.

In those crimes punished by special laws, the act alone, irrespective of its motives, constitutes the offense.

Reasons why criminal intent is not necessary in crimes made such by statutory enactment.
 When the doing of an act is prohibited by a special law, it is considered that the act is injurious to public welfare and
the doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself.

Good faith and absence of criminal intent not valid defenses in crimes punished by special laws.

MALA IN SE – wrongful from their nature; there must be a criminal intent; theft, rape, homicide
MALA PROHIBITA – wrong merely because prohibited by statute; sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done

Crimes mala in se are those so serious in their effects on society as to call for almost unanimous condemnation of its
members; while crimes mala prohibita are violations of mere rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly
regulation of the affairs of society.
(1) In acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in those mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?
(1) Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy, as in illegal possession
of firearms.
(2) The term mala in se refers generally to felonies denned and penalized by the Revised Penal Code. When the acts
are inherently immoral, they are mala in se, even if punished by special laws. On the other hand, there are crimes
in the Revised Penal Code which were originally defined and penalized by special laws. Among them are
possession and use of opium, malversation, brigandage, and libel.
The term mala prohibita refers generally to acts made criminal by special laws.

Intent distinguished from motive.

 Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result. Intent is the purpose to use a particular
means to affect such result.
 Motive is not an essential element of a crime, and, hence, need not be proved for purposes of conviction.
 An extreme moral perversion may lead a man to commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake of
committing it. Or, the apparent lack of a motive for committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there is
none, but that simply it is not known to us, for we cannot probe into the depths of one's conscience where it may be
found, hidden away and inaccessible to our observation.
 One may be convicted of a crime whether his motive appears to be good or bad or even though no motive is proven. A
good motive does not prevent an act from being a crime. In mercy killing, the painless killing of a patient who has no
chance of recovery, the motive may be good, but it is nevertheless punished by law.
 Where the identity of a person accused of having committed a crime is in dispute, the motive that may have impelled
its commission is very relevant.
 Generally, proof of motive is not necessary to pin a crime on the accused if the commission of the crime has been
proven and the evidence of identification is convincing.
 Motive is essential only when there is doubt as to the identity of the assailant. It is immaterial when the accused has
been positively identified.
 Where the defendant admits the killing, it is no longer necessary to inquire into his motive for doing the act.
 Motive is important in ascertaining the truth between two antagonistic theories or versions of the killing.
 Where the identification of the accused proceeds from an unreliable source and the testimony is inconclusive and not
free from doubt, evidence of motive is necessary.
 Where there are no eyewitnesses to the crime, and where suspicion is likely to fall upon a number of persons, motive
is relevant and significant.
 If the evidence is merely circumstantial, proof of motive is essential.
 Proof of motive is not indispensable where guilt is otherwise established by sufficient evidence.
 While the question of motive is important to the person who committed the criminal act, yet when there is no longer
any doubt that the defendant was the culprit, it becomes unimportant to know the exact reason or purpose for the
commission of the crime.

How motive is proved.

 Generally, the motive is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or
immediately after the commission of the offense. Such deeds or words may indicate the motive.

Disclosure of the motive is an aid in completing the proof of the commission of the crime.
But proof of motive alone is not sufficient to support a conviction.
 The existence of a motive, though perhaps an important consideration, is not sufficient proof of guilt.
 Mere proof of motive, no matter how strong, is not sufficient to support a conviction if there is no reliable evidence
from which it may be reasonably deduced that the accused was the malefactor.
 Even a strong motive to commit the crime cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt, sufficient to
overthrow the presumption of innocence. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the mainstay of our accusatorial system of
criminal justice.

Lack of motive may be an aid in showing the innocence of the accused.

 In a case, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with which he was
charged, were not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.
 Lack of motive to kill the deceased has been held as further basis for acquitting the accused, where the lone testimony
of the prosecution witness is contrary to common experience and, therefore, incredible.

Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful ac t done be different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally and logically result
therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not.
 Ordinarily, when a person commits a felony with malice, he intends the consequences of his felonious act. But there
are cases where the consequences of the felonious act of the offender are not intended by him. In those cases, "the
wrongful act done" is "different from that which he intended."
 One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural consequences of one's illegal acts, merely because one does
not intend to produce such consequences.

Rationale of rule in paragraph 1 of Article 4.

 The rationale of the rule in Article 4 is found in the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal
causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused).

1. COMMITTING A FELONY.
 Paragraph 1 of Art. 4 says that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person "committing a felony," not merely
performing an act. A felony is an act or omission punishable by the Revised Penal Code. If the act is not punishable
by the Code, it is not a felony. But the felony committed by the offender should be one committed by means of dolo,
 that is, with malice, because paragraph 1 of Art. 4 speaks of wrongful act done "different from that which he
intended."
 If the wrongful act results from the imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill of the offender, his
liability should be determined under Art. 365, which defines and penalizes criminal negligence.
 The act or omission should not be punished by a special law, because the offender violating a special law may not
have the intent to do an injury to another. In such case, the wrongful act done could not be different, as the offender
did not intend to do any other injury.
 When a person has not committed a felony, he is not criminally liable for the result which is not intended.

2. ALTHOUGH THE WRONGFUL ACT DONE BE DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH HE INTENDED.
 The causes which may produce a result different from that which the offender intended are:
(1) mistake in the identity of the victim;
(2) mistake in the blow, that is, when the offender intending to do an injury to one person actually inflicts it on
another; and
(3) the act exceeds the intent, that is, the injurious result is greater than that intended.

Person committing a felony is still criminally liable even if –

1. ERROR IN PERSONAE – mistake in the identity of the victim
2. ABERRATIO ICTUS – mistake in the blow
3. PRAETER INTENTIONEM – injurious result is greater than that intended

REQUISITES OF PARAGRAPH 1 OF ART. 4.

In order that a person may be held criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to commit, the
following requisites must be present:
a. That an intentional felony has been committed; and
b. That the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed
by the offender.

 No felony is committed (1) when the act or omission is not punishable by the Revised Penal Code, or (2) when the act
is covered by any of the justifying circumstances enumerated in Art. 11.
 An act which is not punishable by the Revised Penal Code is attempting to commit suicide.
 One who shoots at another in self-defense, defense of relative, defense of a stranger, or in the fulfillment of duty is not
committing a felony, the act being justified.
 The act of defense or fulfillment of duty must be exercised with due care; otherwise, the accused will be liable for
culpable felony.

Any person who creates in another's mind an immediate sense of danger, which causes the latter to do something resulting
in the latter's injuries, is liable for the resulting injuries.
 It was held that "if a man creates in another person's mind an immediate sense of danger, which causes such person to
try to escape, and, in so doing, the latter injures himself, the man who creates such a state of mind is responsible for
the resulting injuries."

Wrong done must be the direct, natural and logical consequence of felonious act.
 It is an established rule that a person is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of the law and
for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom.

The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury.
 PROXIMATE CAUSE is "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."
 Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
 "Natural" refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events, while "logical" means that there is a
rational connection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The felony committed must be
the proximate cause of the resulting injury.
 Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately, or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor.
 There must be a relation of "cause and effect," the cause being the felonious act of the offended, the effect being the
resultant injuries and/or death of the victim.
 The "cause and effect" relationship is not altered or changed because of the pre-existing conditions, such as the
pathological condition of the victim (las condiciones patologica del lesionado); the predisposition of the offended
party (la constitucion fisica del herido); or the concomitant or concurrent conditions, such as the negligence or fault of
the doctors (la falta de medicos para sister al herido); or the conditions supervening the felonies act such as tetanus,
pulmonary infection or gangrene.
 The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:
a) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting injury, and the active force
is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or
b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.

When death is presumed to be the natural consequence of physical injuries inflicted.

The death of the victim is presumed to be the natural consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, when the
following facts are established:
1. That the victim at the time the physical injuries were inflicted was in normal health.
2. That death may be expected from the physical injuries inflicted.
3. That death ensued within a reasonable time.

Not direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed.

 If the consequences produced have resulted from a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the criminal act, the
offender is not responsible for such consequences.
 A person is not liable criminally for all possible consequences which may immediately follow his felonious act, but
only for such as are proximate.

The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when —
1. There is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting injury, and the active
force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or
2. The resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.

IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES.
 The commission of an impossible crime is indicative of criminal propensity or criminal tendency on the part of the
actor. Such person is a potential criminal. According to positivist thinking, the community must be protected from
anti-social activities, whether actual or potential, of the morbid type of man called "socially dangerous person."
 The penalty for impossible crime is provided in Article 59 of this Code.
 The 2nd paragraph of Art. 4 defines the so-called impossible crimes (impossible attempts).
 In impossible crime the act performed should not constitute a violation of another provision of the Code.

REQUISITES OF IMPOSSIBLE CRIME:

1. That the act performed would be an offense against persons or property.
2. That the act was done with evil intent.
3. That its accomplishment is inherently impossible, or that the means employed is either inadequate or ineffectual.
4. That the act performed should not constitute a violation of another provision of the Revised Penal Code.

1. "Performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property."

 In committing an impossible crime, the offender intends to commit a felony against persons or a felony against
property, and the act performed would have been an offense against persons or property. But a felony against persons
or property should not be actually committed, for, otherwise, he would be liable for that felony. There would be no
impossible crime to speak of.

FELONIES AGAINST PERSONS ARE:

a. Parricide (Art. 246)
b. Murder (Art. 248)
c. Homicide (Art. 249)
d. Infanticide (Art. 255)
e. Abortion (Arts. 256, 257, 258 and 259)
f. Duel (Arts. 260 and 261)
g. Physical injuries (Arts. 262, 263, 264, 265 and 266)
h. Rape (Art. 266-A)

FELONIES AGAINST PROPERTY ARE:

a. Robbery (Arts. 294, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302 and 303)
b. Brigandage (Arts. 306 and 307)
c. Theft (Arts. 308, 310 and 311)
d. Usurpation (Arts. 312 and 313)
e. Culpable insolvency (Art. 314)
f. Swindling and other deceits (Arts. 315, 316, 317 and 318)
g. Chattel mortgage (Art. 319)
h. Arson and other crimes involving destruction (Arts. 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325 and 326)
i. Malicious mischief (Arts. 327, 328, 329, 330 and 331)

 If the act performed would be an offense other than a felony against persons or against property, there is no
impossible crime.
 That the act was done with evil intent. Since the offender in impossible crime intended to commit an offense against
persons or against property, it must be shown that the actor performed the act with evil intent, that is, he must have the
intent to do an injury to another.

2. "Were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means."
 In impossible crime, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or property,
because: (1) the commission of the offense (against persons or against property) is inherently impossible of
accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate; or (b) ineffectual.
a. "INHERENT IMPOSSIBILITY OF ITS ACCOMPLISHMENT."
o This phrase means that the act intended by the offender is by its nature one of impossible accomplishment.
There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act.
b. "EMPLOYMENT OF INADEQUATE MEANS.”
o But where the means employed is adequate and the result expected is not produced, it is not an impossible
crime, but a frustrated felony.
c. EMPLOYMENT OF "INEFFECTUAL MEANS."

PURPOSE OF THE LAW IN PUNISHING THE IMPOSSIBLE CRIME.

 To suppress criminal propensity or criminal tendencies. Objectively, the offender has not committed a felony, but
subjectively, he is a criminal.

Art. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in
cases of excessive penalties. — Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it ma y dee m proper to repress and
which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal
legislation.
In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as
may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of
this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and
the injury caused by the offense.

"In connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law."
The 1st paragraph of this article which contemplates a trial of a criminal case requires the following:
1. The act committed by the accused appears not punishable by any law;
2. But the court deems it proper to repress such act;
3. In that case, the court must render the proper decision by dismissing the case and acquitting the accused;
4. The judge must then make a report to the Chief Executive, through the Secretary of Justice, stating the reasons which
induce him to believe that the said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.

BASIS - The provision contained in paragraph 1 of Art. 5 is based on the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sine
lege," that is, that there is no crime if there is no law that punishes the act.

"In cases of excessive penalties."

The 2nd paragraph of Art. 5 requires that —
1. The court after trial finds the accused guilty;
2. The penalty provided by law and which the court imposes for the crime committed appears to be clearly excessive,
because —
a. the accused acted with lesser degree of malice, and/ or;
b. there is no injury or the injury caused is of lesser gravity.
3. The court should not suspend the execution of the sentence.
4. The judge should submit a statement to the Chief Executive, through the Secretary of Justice, recommending
executive clemency.

COURTS HAVE THE DUTY TO APPLY THE PENALTY PROVIDED BY LAW.

 A trial judge expressed in his decision his view against the wisdom of the death penalty and refused to impose it.
Held: It is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law, regardless of their private opinions.
 It is a well-settled rule that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question
falls exclusively within the province of the Legislature which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or
vetoes them. The only function of the judiciary is to interpret the laws and, if not in disharmony with the Constitution,
to apply them.
 A trial judge sentenced the accused to life imprisonment, although the commission of the crime of robbery with
homicide was attended by the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and in band, "in view of the attitude of the
Chief Executive on death penalty." Held: The courts should interpret and apply the laws as they find them on the
statute books, regardless of the manner their judgments are executed and implemented by the executive department.

JUDGE HAS THE DUTY TO APPLY THE LAW AS INTERPRETED BY THE SUPREME COURT.
 If a Judge of a lower court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that the application of a doctrine
promulgated by the Supreme Court is against his way of reasoning, or against his conscience, he may state his opinion
on the matter, but rather than disposing of the case in accordance with his personal view, he must first think that it is
his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the land, and that any deviation from a principle laid
down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses to the
litigants.
 Accused-appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh a penalty and pleads for
sympathy. Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of courts is to apply the law, disregarding their
feeling of sympathy or pity for an accused. DURA LEX SED LEX. The remedy is elsewhere — clemency from the
executive or an amendment of the law by the legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court can but apply the law.
"WHEN A STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CODE."
 The second paragraph of Art. 5 of the Revised Penal Code has no application to the offense defined and penalized by
a special law.
 The reason for this ruling is that second paragraph of Art. 5 specifically mentions "the provisions of this Code."
 Art. 5 of the Revised Penal Code may not be invoked in cases involving acts mala prohibita, because said article
applies only to acts mala in se, or crimes committed with malice or criminal intent. The ruling is based on the phrase,
"TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE DEGREE OF MALICE."
 Before the case of People vs. Salazar, supra, was decided by the Supreme Court, it applied the second paragraph of
Art. 5 in cases involving illegal possession of firearms, a crime punishable by a special law, and to the offenses
punished by the Price Control Law.

Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. — Consummated felonies, as well as those which are frustrated
and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and
it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is a n attempt when the offender commences the commission o f a felony directly by overt acts, and doe s
no t perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
ow n spontaneous desistance.

CONSUMMATED FELONY, DEFINED.

 A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present.

FRUSTRATED FELONY, DEFINED.

 It is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence
but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

ATTEMPTED FELONY, DEFINED.

 There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance.

DEVELOPMENT OF CRIME.
From the moment the culprit conceives the idea of committing a crime up to the realization of the same, his act passes
through certain stages.

These stages are: (1) internal acts; and (2) external acts.
1. INTERNAL ACTS, such as mere ideas in the mind of a person, are not punishable even if, had they been carried out,
they would constitute a crime. Intention and effect must concur. Mere intention producing no effect is no more a
crime than a mere effect without the intention is a crime.
2. EXTERNAL ACTS cover (a) preparatory acts; and (b) acts of execution.
a. PREPARATORY ACTS — ordinarily they are not punishable.
o Ordinarily, preparatory acts are not punishable.
o Hence, proposal and conspiracy to commit a felony, which are only preparatory acts, are not punishable, except
when the law provides for their punishment in certain felonies. (Art. 8)
o But preparatory acts which are considered in themselves, by law, as independent crimes are punishable.
b. ACTS OF EXECUTION — they are punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
o The stages of acts of execution — attempted, frustrated, and consummated — are punishable. (Art. 6)
o The first stage of the acts of execution of a felony is the attempted; the second stage, the frustrated; and the last
stage, the consummated.
 o In performing the acts of execution of a felony, the offender may reach only the first stage or the second stage.
o In either case, he does not produce the felony he intends to commit. But he is liable for attempted felony or
frustrated felony, as the case may be.

ATTEMPTED FELONY.
There is an attempt when the offender begins the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. He has not performed all
the acts of execution which should produce the felony.

ELEMENTS OF ATTEMPTED FELONY:

1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3. The offender's act is not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance.

1. "Commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts."

o When is the commission of a felony deemed commenced directly by overt acts? When the following two requisites
are present:
(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.
o The external acts must be related to the overt acts of the crime the offender intended to commit.
o The external acts referred to in the first requisite must be related to the overt acts of the crime the offender intended to
commit. They should not be mere preparatory acts, for preparatory acts do not have direct connection with the crime
which the offender intends to commit.

"OVERT ACTS," DEFINED.

An overt act is some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere
planning or preparation, which if carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated
by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense.

To constitute attempted homicide the person using a firearm must fire the same, with intent to kill, at the offended party,
without however inflicting a mortal wound on the latter.

If a blow with the bolo was struck and there was intent to kill on the part of the accused, the act of striking the offended
party with the bolo would be an overt act of the crime of homicide.

The external acts must have a direct connection with the crime intended to be committed by the offender.

WHAT IS AN INDETERMINATE OFFENSE?

It is one where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain. Its nature in relation to its objective is
ambiguous.

The intention of the accused must be viewed from the nature of the acts executed by him, and not from his admission.
 The intention of the accused must be ascertained from the facts and, therefore, it is necessary that the mind be able to
directly infer from them the intention of the perpetrator to cause a particular injury.

1. "DIRECTLY BY OVERT ACTS."

 The law requires that "the offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts."
 Only offenders who personally execute the commission of a crime can be guilty of attempted felony. The word
"directly" suggests that the offender must commence the commission of the felony by taking direct part in the
execution of the act.
2. "DOES NOT PERFORM ALL THE ACTS OF EXECUTION."
 If the offender has performed all the acts of execution — nothing more is left to be done — the stage of execution is
that of a frustrated felony, if the felony is not produced; or consummated, if the felony is produced.
 If anything, yet remained for him to do, he would be guilty of an attempted crime.
3. "BY REASON OF SOME CAUSE OR ACCIDENT."
 In attempted felony, the offender fails to perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony because of
some cause or accident.
4. "OTHER THAN HIS OWN SPONTANEOUS DESISTANCE."
 If the actor does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of his own spontaneous desistance, there is no
attempted felony. The law does not punish him.
REASON:
 It is a sort of reward granted by law to those who, having one foot on the verge of crime, heed the call of their
conscience and return to the path of righteousness.
 One who takes part in planning a criminal act but desists in its actual commission is exempt from criminal liability.
For after taking part in the planning, he could have desisted from taking part in the actual commission of the crime by
listening to the call of his conscience.

The desistance should be made before all the acts of execution are performed.
The desistance which exempts from criminal liability has reference to the crime intended to be committed, and has no
reference to the crime actually committed by the offender before his desistance.

SUBJECTIVE PHASE OF THE OFFENSE.

 In attempted felony, the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense.
 It is that portion of the acts constituting the crime, starting from the point where the offender begins the commission
of the crime to that point where he has still control over his acts, including their (acts') natural course.
 If between these two points the offender is stopped by any cause outside of his own voluntary desistance, the
subjective phase has not been passed and it is an attempt. If he is not so stopped but continues until he performs the
last act, it is frustrated, provided the crime is not produced. The acts then of the offender reached the objective phase
of the crime.

FRUSTRATED FELONY.
ELEMENTS:
1. The offender performs all the acts of execution;
2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence;
3. But the felony is not produced;
4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

THE REQUISITES OF A FRUSTRATED FELONY ARE:

(1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony; and
(2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will.

1. "PERFORMS ALL THE ACTS OF EXECUTION."

In frustrated felony, the offender must perform all the acts of execution. Nothing more is left to be done by the
offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. This element distinguishes frustrated
felony from attempted felony.
In attempted felony, the offender does not perform all the acts of execution. He does not perform the last act necessary
to produce the crime. He merely commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts.

THE SUPREME COURT IN CERTAIN CASES HAS EMPHASIZED THE BELIEF OF THE ACCUSED.
 In other cases, the Supreme Court stated —
 Deadly weapons were used, blows were directed at the vital parts of the body, the aggressors stated their purpose
to kill and thought they had killed. The subjective phase of the crime was entirely passed, and subjectively
speaking, the crime was complete. The felony is not produced by reason of causes independent of the will of the
 perpetrators; in this instance, the playing possum by the victim, that is, he escaped death from the aggressors by
the ruse of feigning death.
 The defendant believed that he had performed all of the acts necessary to consummate the crime of murder, and,
therefore, of his own will, desisted from striking further blows. He believed that he had killed Keng Kin. Death
did not result for reasons entirely apart from the will of the defendant. This surely stamps the crime as frustrated
murder. If, after the first blow, someone had rushed to the assistance of Keng Kin and by his efforts had prevented
the accused from proceeding further in the commission of the crime, the defendant not believing that he had
performed all of the acts necessary to cause death, he would have been guilty of attempted murder. (U.S. vs. Lim
San, cited in People vs. Dagman, 47 Phil. 771)
 The aggressor stated his purpose to kill, thought he had killed, and threw the body into the bushes. When he gave
himself up, he declared that he had killed the complainant.
 But as death did not result, the aggressor was guilty of frustrated murder. (U.S. vs. Eduave, 36 Phil. 210)
 The belief of the accused need not be considered. What should be considered is whether all the acts of execution
performed by the offender "would produce the felony as a consequence."
 In crimes against persons, as homicide, which requires the victim's death to consummate the felony, it is
necessary for the frustration of the same that a mortal wound be inflicted, because then the wound could produce
the felony as a consequence. (People vs. Guihama, et al., 13 C.A. Rep. 557)

2. "WOULD PRODUCE THE FELONY AS A CONSEQUENCE."

All the acts of execution performed by the offender could have produced the felony as a consequence.

3. "DO NOT PRODUCE IT."

In frustrated felony, the acts performed by the offender do not produce the felony, because if the felony is produced it
would be consummated.

4. "INDEPENDENT OF THE WILL OF THE PERPETRATOR."

 Even if all the acts of execution have been performed, the crime may not be consummated, because certain causes
may prevent its consummation. These certain causes may be the intervention of third persons who prevented the
consummation of the offense or may be due to the perpetrator's own will.
 If the crime is not produced because of the timely intervention of a third person, it is frustrated.
 If the crime is not produced because the offender himself prevented its consummation, there is no frustrated felony,
for the 4th element is not present.
 Note that the 4th element says that the felony is not produced "by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator." Hence, if the cause which prevented the consummation of the offense was the perpetrator's own and
exclusive will, the 4th element does not exist.

Is there frustration due to inadequate or ineffectual means?

Such a frustration is placed on the same footing as an impossible attempt.

Frustrated felony distinguished from attempted felony.

1. In both, the offender has not accomplished his criminal purpose.
2. While in frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence, in attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts
and does not perform all the acts of execution.
In other words, in frustrated felony, the offender has reached the objective phase; in attempted felony, the offender
has not passed the subjective phase.
The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is no
intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the consummation of the crime and the
moment when all of the acts have been performed which should result in the consummated crime; while in the former
there is such intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts which should produce
the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his own voluntary desistance.
ATTEMPTED OR FRUSTRATED FELONY DISTINGUISHED FROM IMPOSSIBLE CRIME.
(1) In attempted or frustrated felony and impossible crime, the evil intent of the offender is not accomplished.
(2) But while in impossible crime, the evil intent of the offender cannot be accomplished, in attempted or frustrated
felony the evil intent of the offender is possible of accomplishment.
(3) In impossible crime, the evil intent of the offender cannot be accomplished because it is inherently impossible of
accomplishment or because the means employed by the offender is inadequate or ineffectual; in attempted or
frustrated felony, what prevented its accomplishment is the intervention of certain cause or accident in which the
offender had no part.

CONSUMMATED FELONY.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present.

IMPORTANT WORDS AND PHRASES.

 "All the elements" necessary for its execution and accomplishment "are present."
 In consummated felony, all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment must be present. Every
crime has its own elements which must all the present to constitute a culpable violation of a precept of law.

WHEN NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF A FELONY ARE PROVED.

When a felony has two or more elements and one of them is not proved by the prosecution during the trial, either
(1) the felony is not shown to have been consummated, or
(2) the felony is not shown to have been committed, or
(3) another felony is shown to have been committed.

Hence, all the elements of the felony for which the accused is prosecuted must be present in order to hold him liable
therefor in its consummated stage.

HOW TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE CRIME IS ONLY ATTEMPTED OR FRUSTRATED OR IT IS

CONSUMMATED.
In determining whether the felony is only attempted or frustrated or it is consummated,
(1) the nature of the offense,
(2) the elements constituting the felony, as well as
(3) the manner of committing the same, must be considered.

NATURE OF CRIME.
Arson (Arts. 320-326). — In arson, it is not necessary that the property is totally destroyed by fire. The crime of
arson is therefore, consummated even if only a portion of the wall or any other part of the house is burned. The
consummation of the crime of arson does not depend upon the extent of the damage caused. (People vs. Hernandez, 54
Phil. 122) The fact of having set fire to some rags and jute sacks, soaked in kerosene oil, and placing them near the
wooden partition of the house, should not be qualified as consummated arson, inasmuch as no part of the house began to
burn. It is only frustrated arson. (U.S. vs. Valdes, 39 Phil. 240)
When a person had poured gasoline under the house of another and was about to strike a match to set the house on
fire when he was apprehended, he was guilty of attempted arson. The acts performed by him are directly connected with
the crime of arson, the offense he intended to commit. The pouring of the gasoline under the house and the striking of the
match could not be for any other purpose.
If there was blaze, but no part of the house is burned, the crime of arson is frustrated. If any part of the house, no
matter how small, is burned, the crime of arson is consummated.

ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING THE FELONY.

In theft, the crime is consummated when the thief is able to take or get hold of the thing belonging to another,
even if he is not able to carry it away. In estafa, the crime is consummated when the offended party is actually damaged or
prejudiced.
THEFT - Actual taking with intent to gain of personal property, belonging to another, without the latter's consent, is
sufficient to constitute consummated theft. It is not necessary that the offender carries away or appropriates the property
taken.

MANNER OF COMMITTING THE CRIME.

1. FORMAL CRIMES — consummated in one instant, no attempt.
There are crimes, like slander and false testimony, which are consummated in one instant, by a single act. These are
formal crimes.
As a rule, there can be no attempt at a formal crime, because between the thought and the deed there is no chain of
acts that can be severed in any link. Thus, in slander, there is either a crime or no crime at all, depending upon whether or
not defamatory words were spoken publicly. (Albert)
In the sale of marijuana and other prohibited drugs, the mere act of selling or even acting as broker consummates the
crime. (People vs. Marcos, G.R. No. 83325, May 8, 1990, 185 SCRA 154, 166)
2. CRIMES CONSUMMATED BY MERE ATTEMPT OR PROPOSAL OR BY OVERT ACT.
FLIGHT TO ENEMY'S COUNTRY (Art. 121). — In this crime the mere attempt to flee to an enemy country is a
consummated felony.
CORRUPTION OF MINORS (Art. 340). — A mere proposal to the minor to satisfy the lust of another will
consummate the offense.
There is no attempted crime of treason, because the overt act in itself consummates the crime. (63 C.J., Sec. 5, p. 814)
3. FELONY BY OMISSION.
There can be no attempted stage when the felony is by omission, because in this kind of felony the offender does not
execute acts. He omits to perform an act which the law requires him to do.
But killing a child by starving him, although apparently by omission, is in fact by commission. (Albert)

4. CRIMES REQUIRING THE INTERVENTION OF TWO PERSONS TO COMMIT THEM ARE CONSUMMATED
BY MERE AGREEMENT.
In those crimes, like betting in sport contests and corruption of public officer (Art. 197 and Art. 212), which require
the intervention of two persons to commit them, the same are consummated by mere agreement. The offer made by one of
the parties to the other constitutes attempted felony, if the offer is rejected. (U.S. vs. Basa, 8 Phil. 89)

5. MATERIAL CRIMES — There are three stages of execution.

Thus, homicide, rape, etc., are not consummated in one instant or by a single act. These are the material crimes.
(a) CONSUMMATED RAPE.
(b) FRUSTRATED RAPE
(c) ATTEMPTED RAPE
(d) CONSUMMATED HOMICIDE
(e) FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE
(f) ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE

THERE IS NO ATTEMPTED OR FRUSTRATED IMPOSSIBLE CRIME.

 In impossible crime, the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for the execution of the
same, but nevertheless the crime is not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended is by its nature one of
impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially inadequate or ineffectual
to produce the result desired by him. (See Art. 59, Revised Penal Code)
 Therefore, since the offender in impossible crime has already performed the acts for the execution of the same, there
could be no attempted impossible crime. In attempted felony, the offender has not performed all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony as a consequence.
 There is no frustrated impossible crime, because the acts performed by the offender are considered as constituting a
consummated offense.

Art. 7. When light felonies are punishable. — Light felonies are punishable only when they have been consummated, with
the exception of those committed against persons or property.
WHAT ARE LIGHT FELONIES?
Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos, or both, is provided. (Art. 9, par. 3)

The light felonies punished by the Revised Penal Code:

1. Slight physical injuries. (Art. 266)
2. Theft. (Art. 309, pars. 7 and 8)
3. Alteration of boundary marks. (Art. 313)
4. Malicious mischief. (Art. 328, par. 3; Art. 329, par. 3)
5. Intriguing against honor. (Art. 364)

The penalty for the above-mentioned crimes is arresto menor (imprisonment from one day to thirty days), or a fine not
exceeding P200.

1. "With the exception of those committed against persons or property."

GENERAL RULE: Light felonies are punishable only when they have been consummated.
EXCEPTION: Light felonies committed against persons or property, are punishable even {{attempted or frustrated.

REASON FOR THE GENERAL RULE.

Light felonies produce such light, such insignificant moral and material injuries that public conscience is satisfied
with providing a light penalty for their consummation. If they are not consummated, the wrong done is so slight that there
is no need of providing a penalty at all.

REASON FOR THE EXCEPTION:

The commission of felonies against persons or property presupposes in the offender moral depravity. For that
reason, even attempted or frustrated light felonies against persons or property are punishable.

EXAMPLES OF LIGHT FELONIES AGAINST PERSON: Art. 266 — Slight physical injuries and maltreatment.

EXAMPLES OF LIGHT FELONIES AGAINST PROPERTY:

1. Art. 309, No. 7 — Theft by hunting or fishing or gathering fruits, cereals or other forest or farm products upon an
enclosed estate or field where trespass is forbidden and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed f*5.00.
2. Art. 309, No. 8 — Theft, where the value of the stolen property does not exceed f*5.00 and the offender was
prompted by hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood.
3. Art. 313 — Alteration of boundary marks.
4. Art. 328, No. 3; Art. 329, No. 3 — Malicious mischief where the damage is not more than P200.00 or if it cannot be
estimated.

Art. 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony. — Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are punishable only in
the case s in which the la w specially provides a penalty therefor.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it.
There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony propose s its execution to some other
person or persons.

IMPORTANT WORDS AN D PHRASES.

1. "Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony."
Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are two different acts or felonies: (1) conspiracy to commit a felony, and
(2) proposal to commit a felony.
2. "Only in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefor."
 Unless there is a specific provision in the Revised Penal Code providing a penalty for conspiracy or proposal to
commit a felony, mere conspiracy or proposal is not a felony.

CONSPIRACY IS NOT A CRIME EXCEPT WHEN THE LAW SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES A PENALTY
THEREFOR.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. (Art. 8) Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the law specifically provides a penalty
therefor as in treason (Art. 115), rebellion (Art. 136) and sedition (Art. 141). The crime of conspiracy known to the
common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. (U.S. vs. Lim Buanco, 14 Phil. 472; U.S. vs. Remigio, 37 Phil.
599, 614; People vs. Asaad, 55 Phil. 697) An agreement to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the viewpoint of
morality, but as long as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent design, the
sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed. However, when in resolute
execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes
pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. (People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA 759)

GENERAL RULE: Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are not punishable.
EXCEPTION: They are punishable only in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefor.

REASON FOR THE RULE.

Conspiracy and proposal to commit a crime are only preparatory acts, and the law regards them as innocent or at least
permissible except in rare and exceptional cases.

THE REVISED PENAL CODE SPECIALLY PROVIDES A PENALTY FOR MERE CONSPIRACY IN ARTS.
115,136, AND 141.
 Art. 115. Conspiracy xxxto commit treason — Penalty. — The conspiracy to commit the crime of treason shall be
punished by prision mayor and a fine not exceeding 10,000 pesos
 Art. 136. Conspiracy to commit coup d'etat, rebellion or insurrection. — The conspiracy to commit coup d'etat shall
be punished by prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine which shall not exceed 8,000 pesos.
 The conspiracy to commit rebellion or insurrection shall be punished by prision correccional in its maximum period
and a fine which shall not exceed 5,000 pesos xxx. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 6968)
 Art. 141. Conspiracy to commit sedition. — Persons conspiring to commit the crime of sedition shall be punished by
prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos. (As amended by P.D. No. 942)

TREASON, COUP D'ETAT REBELLION OR SEDITION SHOULD NOT BE ACTUALLY COMMITTED.

 The conspirators should not actually commit treason, coup d'etat rebellion or sedition. It is sufficient that two or more
persons agree and decide to commit treason, rebellion or sedition.
 If they commit, say, treason, they will be held liable for treason, and the conspiracy which they had before committing
treason is only a manner of incurring criminal liability. It is not a separate offense.

CONSPIRACY AS A FELONY, DISTINGUISHED FROM CONSPIRACY AS A MANNER OF INCURRING

CRIMINAL LIABILITY.
 When the conspiracy relates to a crime actually committed, it is not a felony but only a manner of incurring criminal
liability, that is, when there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
 Even if the conspiracy relates to any of the crimes of treason, rebellion and sedition, but any of them is actually
committed, the conspiracy is not a separate offense; it is only a manner of incurring criminal liability, that is, all the
conspirators who carried out their plan and personally took part in its execution are equally liable. The offenders are
liable for treason, rebellion, or sedition, as the case may be, and the conspiracy is absorbed.
 When conspiracy is only a manner of incurring criminal liability, it is not punishable as a separate offense.

INDICATIONS OF CONSPIRACY.
 When the defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and the other performing another
part so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts, though apparently
 independent, were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action
and concurrence of sentiments, the court will be justified in concluding that said defendants were engaged in a
conspiracy. (People vs. Geronimo, No. L-35700, Oct. 15,1973, 53 SCRA 246, 254)
 Thus, an accused has been held as a co-conspirator as the circumstances of his participation indubitably showed unity
of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful acts, gleaned from that fact that he knew of the plot to
assassinate the victim as he too had been ordered to scout for a man who could do the job; he also knew exactly the
place where the killing was to take place and also the date and approximate time of the assault. (People vs. Cantuba,
G.R. No. 79811, March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA 289, 298)
 For a collective responsibility among the accused to be established, it is sufficient that at the time of the aggression,
all of them acted in concert, each doing his part to fulfill their common design to kill their victim, and although only
one of them may have actually stabbed the victim, the act of that one is deemed to be the act of all. (People vs.
Hernandez, G.R. No. 90641, Feb. 27,1990,18 2 SCRA 794, 798)

THE ACTS OF THE DEFENDANTS MUST SHOW A COMMON DESIGN.

 It is fundamental for conspiracy to exist that there must be unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful
objective. Here, appellants did not act with a unity of purpose. Even assuming that appellants have joined together in
the killing, such circumstances alone do not satisfy the requirement of a conspiracy because the rule is that neither
joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof of conspiracy. It must be shown to exist as clearly and
convincingly as the commission of the offense itself. Obedience to a command does not necessarily show concert of
design, for at any rate it is the acts of the conspirators that show their common design.
 Although the defendants are relatives and had acted with some degree of simultaneity in attacking their victim,
nevertheless, this fact alone does not prove conspiracy.
PERIOD OF TIME TO AFFORD OPPORTUNITY FOR MEDITATION AND REFLECTION, NOT REQUIRED IN
CONSPIRACY.
 Unlike in evident premeditation, where a sufficient period of time must elapse to afford full opportunity for
meditation and reflection and for the perpetrator to deliberate on the consequences of his intended deed (U.S. vs. Gil,
13 Phil. 330), conspiracy arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and
forthwith decide to pursue it. Once this assent is established, each and everyone of the conspirators is made criminally
liable for the crime, committed by anyone of them. (People vs. Monroy, et al., 104 Phil. 759)

ART. 186 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE PUNISHING CONSPIRACY.

Art. 186. Monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period
or a fine ranging from two hundred to six thousand pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who shall enter into any contract or agreement or shall take part in any conspiracy or combination in
the form of a trust or otherwise, in restraint of trade or commerce or to prevent by artificial means free
competition in the market.
2. 2. xx x
3. 3. Any person who, being a manufacturer, producer, shall combine, conspire or agree with any person for the
purpose of making transactions prejudicial to lawful commerce, or of increasing the market price of any such
merchandise.

REQUISITES OF CONSPIRACY:
1. That two or more persons came to an agreement;
2. That the agreement concerned the commission of a felony; and
3. That the execution of the felony be decided upon.

1ST ELEMENT — agreement presupposes meeting of the minds of two or more persons.
Thus, the fact that a document is discovered purporting to be a commission appointing the defendant an officer of
armed forces against the Government does not prove conspiracy, because it was not shown that defendant received or
accepted that commission. (U.S. vs. Villarino, 5 Phil. 697)
2ND ELEMENT — the agreement must refer to the commission of a crime. It must be an agreement to act, to effect, to
bring about what has already been conceived and determined.
Thus, the mere fact that the defendant met and aired some complaints, showing discontent with the Government
over some real or fancied evils, is not sufficient. (U.S. vs. Figueras, 2 Phil. 491)

3RD ELEMENT — the conspirators have made up their minds to commit the crime. There must be a determination to
commit the crime of treason, rebellion or sedition.

DIRECT PROOF IS NOT ESSENTIAL TO ESTABLISH CONSPIRACY.

Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a crime
and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, and may be inferred from the collective acts
of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime.
Conspiracy can be presumed from and proven by acts of the accused themselves when
the said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests. It is not necessary to show
that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. Conspiracy renders all the conspirators as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character of their participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one conspirator is
the act of all. (People vs. Buntag, G.R. No. 123070, April 14, 2004)

QUANTUM OF PROOF REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH CONSPIRACY.

Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Settled is the rule that to establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere
cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required.
A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It must be shown to exist as clearly and
convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. Mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him
a conspirator for conspiracy transcends companionship.
The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any participation in the commission of
the crime and must therefore be set free. Their mere presence at the scene of the crime as well as their close relationship
with Antonio are insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that they performed no positive act in furtherance of the
crime.
Neither was it proven that their act of running away with Antonio was an act of giving moral assistance to his
criminal act. The ratiocination of the trial court that "their presence provided encouragement and sense of security to
Antonio," is devoid of any factual basis. Such finding is not supported by the evidence on record and cannot therefore be a
valid basis of a finding of conspiracy. (People vs. Comadre, G.R. No. 153559, June 8, 2004)

THE REVISED PENAL CODE SPECIALLY PROVIDES A PENALTY FOR MERE PROPOSAL IN ARTS. 115 AND
136.
Art. 115. proposal to commit treason — Penalty. — The proposal to commit the crime of treason shall be
punished by prision correccional and a fine not exceeding 5,000 pesos.
Art. 136. proposal to commit coup d'etat rebellion or insurrection. — The proposal to commit coup d'etat shall be
punished by prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine which shall not exceed 8,000 pesos.
The proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium period
and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos. (As amended by Rep. Act. No. 6968)

TREASON OR REBELLION SHOULD NOT BE ACTUALLY COMMITTED.

In proposal to commit treason or rebellion, the crime of treason or rebellion should not be actually committed by
reason of the proposal.
If the crime of treason or rebellion was actually committed after and because of the proposal, then the proponent
would be liable for treason or rebellion as a principal by inducement (Art. 17, par. 2), and in such case the proposal is not
a felony.

REQUISITES OF PROPOSAL:
1. That a person has decided to commit a felony; and
2. That he proposes its execution to some other person or persons.

THERE IS NO CRIMINAL PROPOSAL WHEN —

1. The person who proposes is not determined to commit the felony.
2. There is no decided, concrete and formal proposal.
3. It is not the execution of a felony that is proposed.

It is not necessary that the person to whom the proposal is made agrees to commit treason or rebellion.
 Note that what constitutes the felony of proposal to commit treason or rebellion is the making of proposal. The law
does not require that the proposal be accepted by the person to whom the proposal is made.
 If it is accepted, it may be conspiracy to commit treason or rebellion, because there would be an agreement and a
decision to commit it.

The crimes in which conspiracy and proposal are punishable are against the security of the State or economic security.
 Treason is against the external security of the State. Coup d'etat, rebellion and sedition are against internal security.
Monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade are against economic security.

Reason why conspiracy and proposal to commit a crime is punishable in crimes against external and internal security of
the State.
 In ordinary crimes, the State survives the victim, and the culprit cannot find in the success of his work any impunity.
Whereas, in crimes against the external and internal security of the State, if the culprit succeeds in his criminal
enterprise, he would obtain the power and therefore impunity for the crime committed.

ART. 9. GRAVE FELONIES, LESS GRAVE FELONIES, AND LIGHT FELONIES. — Grave felonies are those to
which the law attaches the capital punishment or penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive, in accordance with
Article 25 of this Code.
Less grave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which in their maximum period are
correctional, in accordance with the above-mentioned article.
Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos, or both, is provided.

CLASSIFICATION OF FELONIES ACCORDING TO THEIR GRAVITY.

Art. 9 classifies felonies according to their gravity. The gravity of the felonies is determined by the penalties
attached to them by law.
1. "To which the law attaches the capital punishment."
Capital punishment is death penalty.
2. "Or penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive."
Although the word "any" is used in the phrase, when the penalty prescribed for the offense is composed of two or
more distinct penalties, the higher or highest of the penalties must be an afflictive penalty.
If the penalty prescribed is composed of two or more periods corresponding to different divisible penalties, the higher
or maximum period must be that of an afflictive penalty.
If the penalty is composed of two periods of an afflictive penalty or of two periods corresponding to different
afflictive penalties, the offense for which it is prescribed is a grave felony.

THE AFFLICTIVE PENALTIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH ART. 25 OF THIS CODE ARE:

Reclusion perpetua,
Reclusion temporal,
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,
Prision mayor.
"Penalties which in their maximum period are correctional."
 When the penalty prescribed for the offense is composed of two or more distinct penalties, the higher or highest
of the penalties must be a correctional penalty.

If the penalty prescribed is composed of two or more periods corresponding to different divisible penalties, the
higher or maximum period must be that of correctional penalty.
If the penalty is composed of two periods of a correctional penalty or of two periods corresponding to different
correctional penalties, like destierro and arresto mayor, the offense for which it is prescribed is a less grave felony.

The following are correctional penalties:

 Prision correccional,
 Arresto mayor,
 Suspension,
 Destierro.
"The penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, or both, is provided."

 When the Code provides a fine of exactly P200.00 for the commission of a felony, it is a light felony. If the amount of
the fine provided by the Code is more than P200.00, then it is a less grave felony, because according to Art. 26, a fine
not exceeding P6,000.00 is a correctional penalty. If the amount of the fine provided by the Code is more than
P6,000.00, it is a grave felony, because according to Art. 26, a fine exceeding P6,000.00 is an afflictive penalty.
 Although Art. 26 provides that a fine not less than P200.00 is a correctional penalty, Art. 9 which defines light
felonies should prevail, because the latter classifies felonies according to their gravity, while the former classifies the
fine according to the amount thereof.
 Gambling punished with arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00 is a light felony. (People vs. Canson, Jr.,et al.,
101 Phil. 537)
 A felony punishable by a fine not exceeding P200.00 and censure (Art. 365, paragraph 4) is a light felony, because
public censure, like arresto menor, is a light penalty.

Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. — Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable
under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code.
This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.

Are offenses punishable under special laws subject to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code?
 Article 10 is composed of two clauses. In the first, it is provided that offenses under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of the Code. The second makes the Code supplementary to such laws.

The two clauses of Art. 10, reconciled.

 The first clause should be understood to mean only that the Penal Code is not intended to supersede special penal
laws. The latter are controlling with regard to offenses therein specially punished. Said clause only restates the
elemental rule of statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail over general ones.
 The second clause contains the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the
provision that the "Code shall be supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary.

1. "SPECIAL LAWS."
 A "special law" is defined in U.S. vs. Serapio, 23 Phil. 584, as a penal law which punishes acts not denned and
penalized by the Penal Code.
 Special law is a statute enacted by the Legislative branch, penal in character, which is not an amendment to the
Revised Penal Code. Special laws usually follow the form of American penal law. The penal clause, for example,
provides a penalty of from five to ten years or a fine not exceeding P5,000.00, or both, in the discretion of the court.

The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on penalties cannot be applied to offenses punishable under special laws.
 Art. 6 relative to attempted and frustrated stages of execution, Arts. 18 and 19 regarding accomplices and accessories,
and Arts. 50 to 57 which provide that the penalty for the principal in an attempted felony is two degrees and in a
frustrated felony one degree lower than the penalty for the consummated felony, that the penalty for the accomplice is
one degree lower and for the accessory two degrees lower than that for the consummated felony, Arts. 13 and 14
which provide for mitigating and aggravating circumstances, respectively, and Art. 64 which provides for the rules for
the application of penalties with three periods, cannot be applied to offenses punishable under special laws. The
reasons are that the special laws do not provide for a scale of penalties, as that in Art. 71 of the Code, where a given
penalty could be lowered by one or two degrees, and that the penalty provided by the special law does not contain
three periods.
 The term "imprisonment" and not "prision correccional" should be used in reference to the penalty for the crime of
illegal possession of firearms and other crimes punished by special laws, because the term "prision correccional,"
"prision mayor," or "arresto mayor" is peculiar to penalties for crimes punished by the Revised Penal Code.

The special law has to fix penalties for attempted and frustrated crime.
 The penalty for the consummated crime cannot be imposed when the stage of the acts of execution is either attempted
or frustrated, because the penalty for the attempted and frustrated crime is two degrees or one degree lower,
respectively. The special law does not provide for a penalty one or two degrees lower than that provided for the
consummated stage. The special law has to fix a penalty for the attempt and a penalty for the frustration of the crime
defined by it, in order that the crime may be punished in case its commission reached only the attempted or frustrated
stage of execution.

When a special law covers the mere attempt to commit the crime defined by it, the attempted stage is punishable by the
same penalty provided by that law.

Art. 10, R.P.C. is not applicable to punish an accomplice under the special law.
Plea of guilty is not mitigating in illegal possession of firearms, punished by special law.
 The plea of guilty as mitigating circumstance under the Revised Penal Code (Art. 13, par. 7) is not available to
offenses punishable under special laws. (People vs. Noble, 77 Phil. 1086)
 Offenses which are punishable under the special laws are not subject to the provisions of Art. 64 of the Revised Penal
Code, and it has been held that the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, relative to the application of the
circumstances modifying the criminal liability of the accused are not applicable to special laws. (People vs. Respecia,
107 Phil. 995)
 Art. 64 of the Revised Penal Code prescribing the rules for the graduation of penalties containing three periods when
mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, was held inapplicable to offenses
penalized by special laws, because the penalty prescribed by special law is usually indeterminate and does not contain
three periods. For this reason, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty is not considered to mitigate the
liability of one accused of illegal possession of firearms. (People vs. Ramos, 44 O.G. 3288; People vs. Gonzales, 82
Phil. 307)

2. "Supplementary"
 The word "supplementary" means supplying what is lacking; additional.
 This Code considered supplementary to special laws.

Indemnity and subsidiary imprisonment in the Revised Penal Code applied to violation of Motor Vehicle Law.
No accessory penalty, unless the special law provides therefor.
Article 12, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code, applied to minor over nine but less than fifteen years old who violated
a special law.

3. "Unless the latter should specially provide the contrary."

 The fact that Commonwealth Act No. 46 5 punishes the falsification of residence certificates in the cases mentioned
therein does not prevent the application of the general provisions of the Revised Penal Code on other acts of
falsification not covered by the special law, since under Art. 10 of the Revised Penal Code it has supplementary
 application to all special laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary, and Commonwealth Act No. 465
makes no provision that it exclusively applies to all falsifications of residence certificates. (People vs. Po Giok To, 96
Phil. 913, 919-920)

Special laws amending the Revised Penal Code are subject to its provisions.
 P.D. No. 533 is not a special law, entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised Penal Code. From the nature of
the penalty imposed which is in terms of the classification and duration of penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal
Code, which is not for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws, the intent seems clear that P.D. No. 533
shall be deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle (Art.
310), or otherwise to be subject to applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code on
civil liability of the offender, a provision which is not found in the decree, but which could not have been intended to
be discarded or eliminated by the decree.
 Article 64 of the same Code should, likewise, be applicable, under which the presence of two mitigating
circumstances, that of plea of guilty and extreme poverty, without any aggravating circumstances to offset them,
entitles the accused to a lowering by one degree of the penalty for the offense. (People vs. Macatanda, No. L-51368,
Nov. 6, 1981, 109 SCRA 35, 40-41)

JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY

The circumstances affecting criminal liability are:
I. Justifying circumstances (Art. 11)
II. Exempting circumstances (Art. 12), and other absolutory causes (Arts. 20; 124, last par.; 280, last par.; 332;
344; etc.)
III. Mitigating circumstances (Art. 13)
IV. Aggravating circumstances (Art. 14)
V. Alternative circumstances (Art. 15)

IMPUTABILITY, DEFINED.
 Imputability is the quality by which an act may be ascribed to a person as its author or owner. It implies that the act
committed has been freely and consciously done and may, therefore, be put down to the doer as his very own. (Albert)

RESPONSIBILITY, DEFINED.
 Responsibility is the obligation of suffering the consequences of crime. It is the obligation of taking the penal and
civil consequences of the crime. (Albert)

IMPUTABILITY, DISTINGUISHED FROM RESPONSIBILITY.

 While imputability implies that a deed may be imputed to a person, responsibility implies that the person must take
the consequence of such a deed. (Albert)

MEANING OF "GUILT."
 Guilt is an element of responsibility, for a man cannot be made to answer for the consequences of a crime unless he is
guilty. (Albert)

I. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES.
1. Justifying circumstances are those where the act of a person is said to be in accordance with law, so that such
person is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and civil liability.
There is no civil liability, except in par. 4 of Art. 11, where the civil liability is borne by the persons benefited by the act.
2. Basis of justifying circumstances.
The law recognizes the non-existence of a crime by expressly stating in the opening sentence of Article 11 that
the persons therein mentioned "do not incur any criminal liability."

Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:
a. First. Unlawful aggression;
b. Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
c. Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural, or
adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the
fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisite s prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are
present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making
defense ha d no part therein.

3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second requisites
mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are present and that the person defending be not induced by revenge,
resentment or other evil motive.

4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to another, provided that the
following requisites are present:
a. First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
b. Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it.
c. Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.

6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.

There is no crime committed, the act being justified.

 In stating that the persons mentioned therein "do not incur any criminal liability," Article 11 recognizes the acts of
such persons as justified. Such persons are not criminals, as there is no crime committed.

BURDEN OF PROOF.
 The circumstances mentioned in Art. 11 are matters of defense and it is incumbent upon the accused, in order to avoid
criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him to the satisfaction of the court.

SELF-DEFENSE.
 Well-entrenched is the rule that where the accused invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not on the weakness of the prosecution. For, even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it could not be disbelieved
after the accused himself had admitted the killing.
 Self-defense, must be proved with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any
vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it and it cannot be justifiably entertained where it is
not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but, in itself, is extremely doubtful.
 In self-defense, the burden of proof rests upon the accused. His duty is to establish self-defense by clear and
convincing evidence, otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he killed the victim. He must rely
on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that for the prosecution.
 The plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate
competent evidence but in itself is extremely doubtful.

Par. 1. - SELF-DEFENSE.
Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:
1. First. Unlawful aggression;
 2. Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
3. Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION
 Indispensable requirement
 There must be actual physical assault or aggression or an immediate and imminent threat, which must be
offensive and positively strong
 The defense must have been made during the existence of aggression, otherwise, it is no longer justifying
 While generally an agreement to fight does not constitute unlawful aggression, violation of the terms of the
agreement to fight is considered ban exception

REASONABLE NECESSITY OF THE MEANS EMPLOYED TO PREVENT OR REPEL IT

Test of reasonableness depends on:
1. Weapon used by the aggressor
2. Physical condition, character, size and other circumstances of aggressor
3. Physical condition, character, size and circumstances of person defending himself
4. Place and occasion of assault

LACK OF SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF THE PERSON DEFENDING HIMSELF

 Perfect equality between the weapons used, nor material commensurability between the means of attack and
defense by the one defending himself and that of the aggressor is not required.
 REASON: the person assaulted does not have sufficient opportunity or time to think and calculate.

SEF-DEFENSE – no civil or criminal liability, except in paragraph 4; defense of honor, person, property;

RIGHTS INCLUDED IN SELF-DEFENSE.

 Defense of person, defense of rights protected by law, defense of property (only if there is also an actual and
imminent danger on the person of the one defending), defense of chastity
 Self-defense includes not only the defense of the person or body of the one assaulted but also that of his rights, that is,
those rights the enjoyment of which is protected by law.
 "Aside from the right to life on which rests the legitimate defense of our person, we have the right to property
acquired by us, and the right to honor which is not the least prized of man's patrimony."

KINDS OF SELF-DEFENSE
1. Self-defense of chastity – there must be an attempt to rape the victim
2. Defense of property – must be coupled with an attack on the person of the owner, or on one entrusted with the
care of such property
3. Self-defense in libel – justified when the libel is aimed at a person’s good name

 STAND GROUND WHEN IN THE RIGHT – the law does not require a person to retreat when his assailant is
rapidly advancing upon him with deadly weapon.
 Under RA 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004), victim survivors who are found by
the courts to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) do not incur any criminal or civil liability despite
absence of the necessary elements for the justifying circumstance of self-defense in the RPC. BWS is a scientifically
defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering relationships as a result
of cumulative abuse.

REQUISITES OF SELF-DEFENSE.
There are three requisites to prove the claim of self-defense as stated in paragraph 1 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code, namely:
(1) unlawful aggression;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
 (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

FIRST REQUISITE OF SELF-DEFENSE.

 The first requisite of self-defense is that there be unlawful aggression on the part of the person injured or killed by the
accused.

UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE.

 Actual or physical attack; imminent danger; aggression must come from the offended party; cause of action must be
reasonable (imminent danger, self-preservation, nature and quality of weapon used, crime inducing situation)
 It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement that for the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the presence of unlawful
aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has
committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself.
 For the right of defense to exist, it is necessary that we be assaulted or that we be attacked, or at least that we be
threatened with an attack in an immediate and imminent manner, as, for example, brandishing a knife with which to
stab us or pointing a gun to discharge against us.

PARAGRAPH 2 DEFENSE OF RELATIVE

Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural
or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the
fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present,
and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no
part therein.

REQUISITES OF DEFENSE OF RELATIVES:

1. Unlawful aggression;
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
3. In case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the one making a defense had no part therein.

Relatives that can be defended.

1. Spouse.
2. Ascendants.
3. Descendants.
4. Legitimate, natural or adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity in the same degrees.
5. Relatives by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree.
Relatives by affinity, because of marriage, are parents-in-law, son or daughter-in-law, and brother or sister-in-law.
CONSANGUINITY refers to blood relatives. Brothers and sisters are within the second civil degree; uncle and niece
or aunt and nephew are within the third civil degree; and first cousins are within the fourth civil degree.

Must unlawful aggression exist as a matter of fact, or can it be made to depend upon the honest belief of the one making a
defense?
 Yes, it can be made to depend upon the honest belief of the one making a defense.

THIRD REQUISITE OF DEFENSE OF RELATIVE.

 The clause, "in case the provocation was given by the person attacked," used in stating the third requisite of defense of
relatives, does not mean that the relative defended should give provocation to the aggressor. The clause merely states
an event which may or may not take place.
 The phrase "in case" means "in the event that."
 There is still a legitimate defense of relative even if the relative being defended has given provocation, provided that
the one defending such relative has no part in the provocation.

REASON FOR THE RULE:

 That although the provocation prejudices the person who gave it, its effects do not reach the defender who took no
part therein, because the latter was prompted by some noble or generous sentiment in protecting and saving a relative.

When the third requisite is lacking.

 The accused was previously shot by the brother of the victim. It cannot be said, therefore, that in attacking the victim,
the accused was impelled by pure compassion or beneficence or the lawful desire to avenge the immediate wrong
inflicted on his cousin. Rather, he was motivated by revenge, resentment or evil motive because of a running feud
between them.

Suppose, the person defending his relative was also induced by revenge or hatred, would there be a legitimate defense of
relative?
 As long as the three requisites of defense of relatives are present, it will still be a legitimate defense.

PARAGRAPH 3 - DEFENSE OF STRANGER.

Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second requisites mentioned in
the first circumstance of this article are present and that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or
other evil motive.

REQUISITES:
1. Unlawful aggression; (indispensable requirement)
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
3. The person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.

BASIS OF DEFENSE OF STRANGER.

 What one may do in his defense, another may do for him. Persons acting in defense of others are in the same
condition and upon the same plane as those who act in defense of themselves. The ordinary man would not stand idly
by and see his companion killed without attempting to save his life.

THIRD REQUISITE OF DEFENSE OF STRANGER.

 This Code requires that the defense of a stranger be actuated by a disinterested or generous motive, when it puts down
"revenge, resentment, or other evil motive" as illegitimate. (Albert)

WHO ARE DEEMED STRANGERS?

 Any person not included in the enumeration of relatives mentioned in paragraph 2 of this article, is considered
stranger for the purpose of paragraph 3. Hence, even a close friend or a distant relative is a stranger within the
meaning of paragraph 3.

THE PERSON DEFENDING "BE NOT INDUCED."

 Paragraph 3 of Art. 11 uses the phrase "be not induced." Hence, even if a person has a standing grudge against the
assailant, if he enters upon the defense of a stranger out of generous motive to save the stranger from serious bodily
harm or possible death, the third requisite of defense of stranger still exists. The third requisite would be lacking if
such person was prompted by his grudge against the assailant, because the alleged defense of the stranger would be
only a pretext.

PARAGRAPH 4 - AVOIDANCE OF GREATER EVIL OR INJURY.

Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to another, provided that the
following requisites are present:
 First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
 Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
 Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

The necessity must not be due to the negligence or violation of any law by the actor.
"DAMAGE TO ANOTHER."
 This term covers injury to persons and damage to property.
 The Court of Appeals applied paragraph 4 of Art. 11 in a case of slander by deed, a crime against honor, where the
accused (a woman) who was about to be married to the offended party eloped with another man, after the offended
partly had made preparations for the wedding, the Court holding that there was a necessity on the part of the accused
of avoiding a loveless marriage with the offended party, and that her refusal to marry him and her eloping with the
man whom she loved were justified and did not amount to the crime of slander by deed.

"THAT THE EVIL SOUGHT TO BE AVOIDED ACTUALLY EXISTS."

 The evil must actually exist. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the
future, paragraph 4 of Art. 11 is not applicable.

 "THAT THE INJURY FEARED BE GREATER THAN THAT DONE TO AVOID IT."
 The greater evil should not be brought about by the negligence or imprudence of the actor.
 When the accused was not avoiding any evil, he cannot invoke the justifying circumstance of avoidance of a greater
evil or injury.
 The evil which brought about the greater evil must not result from a violation of law by the actor.
 There is civil liability under this paragraph.
 Although, as a rule there is no civil liability in justifying circumstances, it is only in paragraph 4 of Art. 11 where
there is civil liability, but the civil liability is borne by the persons benefited.
 In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented, shall be
civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.

PARAGRAPH 5. - FULFILLMENT OF DUTY OR LAWFUL EXERCISE OF RIGHT OR OFFICE.

Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.

REQUISITES:
1. That the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office;
2. That the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or
the lawful exercise of such right or office.

NOTE: The accused must prove that he was duly appointed to the position claimed he was discharging at the time of the
commission of the offense. It must also be shown that the offense committed was the necessary consequence of such
fulfillment of duty, or lawful exercise of a right or office.

PARAGRAPH 6. - OBEDIENCE TO AN ORDER ISSUED FOR SOME LAWFUL PURPOSE.

Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.

REQUISITES:
1. That an order has been issued by a superior.
2. That such order must be for some lawful purpose.
3. That the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.
Both the person who gives the order and the person who executes it, must be acting within the limitations prescribed by
law.

When the order is not for a lawful purpose, the subordinate who obeyed it is criminally liable.

The subordinate is not liable for carrying out an illegal order of his superior, if he is not aware of the illegality of the order
and he is not negligent.
 When the accused acted upon orders of superior officers, which he, as military subordinate, could not question, and
obeyed the orders in good faith, without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence on his part, he
is not liable because he had no criminal intent and he was not negligent.
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES.
1. Definition
Exempting circumstances (non-imputability) are those grounds for exemption from punishment because there is
wanting in the agent of the crime any of the conditions which make the act voluntary or negligent.
2. Basis
The exemption from punishment is based on the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on
the absence of negligence on the part of the accused.
Under the Revised Penal Code, a person must act with malice or negligence to be criminally liable. One who acts
without intelligence, freedom of action or intent does not act with malice. On the other hand, one who acts without
intelligence, freedom of action or fault does not act with negligence.

Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — The following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall
order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be
permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
2. A person under nine years of age.
3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment, in which case, such
minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Article 80 of this Code.
A child fifteen years of age or under is exempt from criminal liability under Rep. Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006).
When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformity with the provisions of this and
the preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody of his family who shall be charged with his
surveillance and education; otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some institution or person mentioned in said
Article 80. **
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or
intention of causing it.
5. Any person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force.
6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause.

In exempting circumstances, there is a crime committed but no criminal liability arises.

Technically, one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances commits a crime, although by the
complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arise.
(Guevara)
Burden of proof.
Any of the circumstances mentioned in Art. 12 is a matter of defense and the same must be proved by the
defendant to the satisfaction of the court

Par. 1 — An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
Imbecility distinguished from insanity.
This paragraph establishes the distinction between imbecility and insanity, because while the imbecile is exempt
in all cases from criminal liability, the insane is not so exempt if it can be shown that he acted during a lucid interval.
During lucid interval, the insane acts with intelligence.
An imbecile is one who, while advanced in age, has a mental development comparable to that of children between
two and seven years of age.
An imbecile within the meaning of Art. 12 is one who is deprived completely of reason or discernment and
freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime.

To constitute insanity, there must be complete deprivation of intelligence or that there be a total deprivation of the
freedom of the will.
 The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that the exempting circumstance of insanity may be taken into
account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act, that is, that the
accused be deprived of reason; that he acts without the least discernment; or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of
the will.
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is
deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment, because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or
that there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
Thus, mere abnormality of mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of
his acts. At most, it is only a mitigating circumstance. (Art. 13, par. 9)

Procedure when the imbecile or the insane committed a felony.

The court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons afflicted, which
he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the court.
But the court has no power to permit the insane person to leave the asylum without first obtaining the opinion of
the Director of Health that he may be released without danger.

Who has the burden of proof to show insanity?

The defense must prove that the accused was insane at the time of the commission of the crime, because the
presumption is always in favor of sanity.
Sanity being the normal condition of the human mind, the prosecution may proceed upon the presumption that the
accused was sane and responsible when the act was committed. The presumption is always in favor of sanity and the
burden of proof of insanity is on the defense.

How much evidence is necessary to overthrow the presumption of sanity?

The wife of the accused and his cousin testified that the accused had been more or less continuously out of his
mind for many years. The assistant district health officer who, by order of the court, examined the accused found that the
accused was a violent maniac. The physician expressed the opinion that the accused was probably insane when he killed
the deceased. The total lack of motive on the part of the accused to kill the deceased bears out the assumption that the
former was insane.
In order to ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the
condition of his mind during a reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct testimony is not required, nor are
specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense. Mind can be known only by outward acts.
Thereby, we read the thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person and come to determine whether his acts conform to
the practice of people of sound mind. To prove insanity, therefore, circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, will
suffice.

Insanity at the time of the commission of the felony distinguished from insanity at the time of the trial.
When a person was insane at the time of the commission of the felony, he is exempt from criminal liability.
When he was sane at the time of the commission of the crime, but he becomes insane at the time of the trial, he is
liable criminally. The trial, however, will be suspended until the mental capacity of the accused be restored to afford him a
fair trial.

Evidence of insanity.
The evidence of insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its
execution. If the evidence points to insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime, the accused cannot be acquitted.
He is presumed to be sane when he committed it.
If the insanity is only occasional or intermittent in its nature, the presumption of its continuance does not arise. He
who relies on such insanity proved at another time must prove its existence also at the time of the commission of the
offense. Where it is shown that the defendant had lucid intervals, it will be presumed that the offense was committed in
one of them. But a person who has been adjudged insane, or who has been committed to a hospital or to an asylum for the
insane, is presumed to continue to be insane.
Dementia praecox is covered by the term insanity.
Thus, when a person is suffering from a form of psychosis, a type of dementia praecox, homicidal attack is
common, because of delusions that he is being interfered with sexually, or that his property is being taken. During the
period of excitement, such person has no control whatever of his acts.
The unlawful act of the accused may be due to his mental disease or a mental defect, producing an "irresistible
impulse," as when the accused has been deprived or has lost the power of his will which would enable him to prevent
himself from doing the act.