Delegation of powers

I. The Principle of non-delegation of powers - Potestas delegata non

delegari potest - “What has been delegated cannot be delegated”

Based upon the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes:
➢ A right and a
➢ Duty to be performed
By the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through
the intervening mind of another.

Further delegation would constitute a negation of his duty in violation of the trust
reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly.

II. Permissible Delegation

Delegation of legislative powers is permitted in the following cases

1. Delegation of tariff powers to the president

2. Delegation of emergency powers to the president
3. Delegation to the people at large
4. Delegation to the local governments
5. Delegation to administrative bodies

A. Tariff Powers

Legal basis: Art. VI Sec. 28 (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

Reason: Is the necessity, not to say expediency, of giving the chief executive the
authority to act immediately on certain matters affecting the national economy lest
delay result in hardship to the people

AKBAYAN V. AQUINO - The Supreme Court clarified that the subject of this
constitutional provision is not the power to negotiate treaties and international
agreements, but the power to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, and other
taxes, and should not be considered as a source of the power of the president.
 B. Emergency Powers

Basis: Art VI Sec. 23 (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by
law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.

Emergency must be solved within the shortest possible time to prevent them from
aggravating the difficulties of the nation.

The Congress may authorize the president to exercise emergency powers

Conditions for the vesture of emergency powers in the president are the ff:

1) There must be war or other national emergency

2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by the congress.

Other national emergency - may include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or

epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe, of nation-wide proportions or
effect.

Conferment of emergency powers on the president is not mandatory on the

Congress. In the face of the worst crisis,
➢ the Congress may choose to hold on to its legislative powers and validly
refuse to delegate it.
➢ Limit its duration and terminate it even before the end of the emergency
➢ Chief Justice Paras - “Emergency itself cannot and should not create power by
the same token, the mere continuance of the emergency does not necessarily
continue the president’s emergency powers if they have been granted to him
for a shorter period.
C. Delegation to the people

Cooley: “ the prevailing doctrine in the court appears to be, that, except in those
cases where, by the constitution, the people have expressly reserved to themselves a
power of decision, the function of legislation cannot be exercised by them, even to
the extent of accepting or rejecting a law which has been framed for their
consideration. The people have voluntarily surrendered that power when they
adopted the constitution. The government of the state is democratic, but is a
representative democracy, and in passing general laws the people act only through
their representatives in the legislature. Such reference of the law to the people at
large for acceptance or rejection is plain surrender of the law-making power.

People V. Vera our Supreme Court observed that “courts have also sustained the
delegation of legislative power to the people at large,” But, “some authorities
maintain that this may not be done.”

R.A. 6735 - implements Sec. 32 Art. VI - Initiatives on the Constitution. Under said
law :
➢ A referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation
through an election called for purpose.
➢ A plebiscite is “the electoral process by which an initiative on the constitution
is approved or rejected by the people.

D. Delegation to Local Governments

Basis: Local legislature are more knowledgeable than the national lawmaking body
on matters of purely local concern and are therefore in a better position to enact the
necessary and appropriate legislation.

Cardinal principle of our system that:

● Local affairs shall be managed by local authorities
● General affairs shall be managed by the central authority

Not a transfer of general legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to
prescribe local regulations.

E. Delegation to Administrative Body

The “power of subordinate legislation” In cases of People Vs. Rosenthal and

Osmena G.R nos. 46076 and 46077 and Pangasinan Transportation vs. the Public
Service Commission G.R. No. 47065 the Supreme court had occasion to observe that
the principle of separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to the
complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain
limits.

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down
in a statue by “filling in” the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide.

For an administrative regulation to be valid:

1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature
3. Must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, and it
must be reasonable.

Test of delegation

Question: WON the delegation has been validly made.

To be valid:
1. The delegation itself must be circumscribed by legislative restrictions not a
roving commission that will give the delegate unlimited legislative authority.
2. The regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the
regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with the standards
prescribed by the law.

These requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test.

The Completeness Test

The law must be complicated in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves
the legislature so that there will be nothing left for the delegate to do when it reaches
him except enforce it.

A law is complete when:

● It sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate.

Invalid delegation - If there are gaps in the law that will prevent its enforcement
unless they are first filled, the delegate will then have been given the opportunity to
step into the shoes of the legislature and to exercise a discretion essentially
legislative in order to repair the omissions
United V. Ang Tang Ho - A law authorized the governor general “Whenever, for
any cause, conditions arise resulting in extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice
or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the council of state, temporary
rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act.” pursuant
to this authorization, he issued regulations fixing ceiling prices for the said cereals.
The appellant, who was being prosecuted for selling above the said ceiling prices
challenged the law on the ground that it constituted an invalid delegation of
legislative power for failure to conform to the completeness test. The Supreme Court
sustained his contention, declaring:

By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the
discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define
under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the
proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any cause," and leaves the question as to
what is "any cause" to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says: "For any
cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn."
The Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to
the discretion of the Governor-General.

The Sufficient Standard Test

According to the Supreme Court A sufficient standard is one which defines

legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies th public
agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected.”

A law lays down sufficient standard test when it provides:

1. Adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of
the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
2. Must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority
3. Announce the legislative policy
4. And identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented

Pelaez Case: It ruled that the completeness and sufficient standard test, which had
theretofore or concurrently Justice Roberto Conceptio, speaking for the court
declared:

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to
fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said
law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate2 — and

(b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable
— to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make
or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable
certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority.2b Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to
make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures
inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus
nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican
system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement
of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the
President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects
above referred to.”

Jaworski v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 144463, January 14, 2004 (EB)

Facts:

On March 31, 1998, PAGCOR’s board of directors approved an instrument denominated as

“Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet
Gaming”, which granted SAGE the authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting station
in PAGCOR’s casino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service local and
international bettors, provided that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate safeguards
and procedures are established to ensure the integrity and fairness of the games.

On September 1, 1998, PAGCOR, represented by its Chairperson, Alicia Ll. Reyes, and
SAGE, represented by its Chairman of the Board, Henry Sy, Jr., and its President, Antonio D.
Lacdao, executed the above-named document.

Pursuant to the authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commenced its operations by

conducting gambling on the Internet on a trial-run basis, making pre-paid cards and
redemption of winnings available at various Bingo Bonanza outlets.
Petitioner Jaworski, in his capacity as member of the Senate and Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports, files the instant petition, praying that the
grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet. He contends that PAGCOR is not
authorized under its legislative franchise, P.D. 1869, to operate gambling on the internet for
the simple reason that the said decree could not have possibly contemplated internet
gambling since at the time of its enactment on July 11, 1983 the internet was yet inexistent
and gambling activities were confined exclusively to real-space. Further, he argues that the
internet, being an international network of computers, necessarily transcends the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines, and the grant to SAGE of authority to operate internet
gambling contravenes the limitation in PAGCOR’s franchise, under Section 14 of P.D. No.
1869.

Moreover, according to petitioner, internet gambling does not fall under any of the
categories of the authorized gambling activities enumerated under Section 10 of P.D. No.
1869 which grants PAGCOR the “right, privilege and authority to operate and maintain
gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports gaming pools,
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines.” He contends that
internet gambling could not have been included within the commonly accepted definition of
“gambling casinos”, “clubs” or “other recreation or amusement places” as these terms refer
to a physical structure in real-space where people who intend to bet or gamble go and play
games of chance authorized by law.

Issues:

(a) Whether respondent Pagcor is authorized under PD No. 1869 to operate gambling
activities on the internet?

(b) Whether Pagcor acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it authorized respondent Sage to operate
internet gambling on the basis of its right “to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs,
and other amusement places” under Section 10 of PD 1869?

(c) Whether Pagcor acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted authority to Sage to
operate gambling activities in the internet?

Held:

In their separate Comments, respondents PAGCOR and SAGE insist that petitioner has no
legal standing to file the instant petition as a concerned citizen or as a member of the
Philippine Senate on the ground that he is not a real party-in-interest entitled to the avails of
the suit. In this light, they argue that petitioner does not have the requisite personal and
substantial interest to impugn the validity of PAGCOR’s grant of authority to SAGE.
Ordinarily, before a member of Congress may properly challenge the validity of an official
act of any department of the government there must be an unmistakable showing that the
challenged official act affects or impairs his rights and prerogatives as legislator. However in
a number of cases, we clarified that where a case involves an issue of utmost importance, or
one of overreaching significance to society, the Court, in its discretion, can brush aside
procedural technicalities and take cognizance of the petition. Considering that the instant
petition involves legal questions that may have serious implications on public interests, we
rule that petitioner has the requisite legal standing to file this petition.

Respondents likewise urge the dismissal of the petition for certiorari and prohibition
because under Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, these remedies should
be directed to any tribunal, board, officer or person whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial, or ministerial functions. They maintain that in exercising its legally-mandated
franchise to grant authority to certain entities to operate a gambling or gaming activity,
PAGCOR is not performing a judicial or quasi-judicial act. Neither should the act of granting
licenses or authority to operate be construed as a purely ministerial act. According to them,
in the event that this Court takes cognizance of the instant petition, the same should be
dismissed for failure of petitioner to observe the hierarchy of courts.

In the case at bar, PAGCOR executed an agreement with SAGE whereby the former grants
the latter the authority to operate and maintain sports betting stations and Internet gaming
operations. The petition is GRANTED. The “Grant of Authority and Agreement to Operate
Sports Betting and Internet Gaming” executed by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE is declared
NULL and VOID.

Pelaez v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965 (EB)

Facts:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines,
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders No...
creating thirty-three (33) municipalities petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice-President of
the Philippines and as a taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of
prohibition with a preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as
well as his representatives... and agents,... from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in the implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said
municipalities.

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said
Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act 2370 and constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power.

Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action is premature and
that not all proper parties referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in
question have been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities were
adversely affected by the aforementioned executive orders because the latter have taken
away from the former the barrios composing the new political subdivision intervened in the
case. Hence, since Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or
their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the
corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the... areas
affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in
which the proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President,
under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is...
composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?"

Petitioner contends that the President has no power to create a municipality by executive
order.

Issues:
Whether or not Section 68 of the RAC provides a valid delegation of legislative power to the
President of the Philippines to create municipalities through the issuance of the questioned
Executive Orders.

Held:
No, Section 68 of the RAC does not provide a valid delegation of legislative power which
would qualify the President of the Philippines to create municipalities through the issuance
of the various Executive Orders. Although, Congress may delegate to another branch of the
Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration
of a law, it is essential, to prevent a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that
said law: (a) must be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) must fix a standard — the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions. Without the statutory declaration of policy by the
Congress, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence
of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the
scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby assume upon himself the power, not only to
make the law, but, also to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought
to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers
and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation
of our Republican system. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet
these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the
enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by
the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects
above referred to.

Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 101273, July 3, 1992 (EB)

Facts:
On 27 November 1990, the President issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in
addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into
the Philippines, an additional duty of five percent (5%) ad valorem. This additional duty
was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil
products imported into the Philippines. This additional duty was subsequently increased
from five percent (5%) ad valorem to nine percent (9%) ad valorem by the promulgation of
Executive Order No. 443, dated 3 January 1991.

Subsequent to this, Executive Order No. 475 was issued by the President, on 15 August 1991
reducing the rate of additional duty on all imported articles from nine percent (9%) to five
percent (5%) ad valorem, except in the cases of crude oil and other oil products which
continued to be subject to the additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem.

Petitioner assails the validity of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. He argues that
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 are violative of Section 24[1], Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue
bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders
Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

Petitioner further argues that Executive Orders No. 475 and 478 contravene Section 401 of
the Tariff and Customs Code, which Section authorizes the President, according to
petitioner, to increase, reduce or remove tariff duties or to impose additional duties only
when necessary to protect local industries or products but not for the purpose of raising
additional revenue for the government.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed Executive Orders are constitutional.

Held:
Yes, under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation,
revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative
rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are
prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the
Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.

There is thus explicit constitutional permission 1 to Congress to authorize the President

“subject to such limitations and restrictions is [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific
limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . .”
The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, and
Sections 104[2] and 401[3], the pertinent provisions thereof. These are the provisions which
the President explicitly invoked in promulgating Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. There
is nothing in the language of either Section 104 or of 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code that
suggest a sharp and absolute limitation of authority. The entire contention of petitioner is
anchored on just two (2) words, one found in Section 401 (a)(1): “existing protective rates of
import duty,” and the second in the proviso found at the end of Section 401 (a): “protection
levels granted in Section 104 of this Code .” We believe that the words “protective” and
”protection” are simply not enough to support the very broad and encompassing limitation
which petitioner seeks to rest on those two (2) words.

Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code establishes general standards with which the
exercise of the authority delegated by that provision to the President must be consistent: that
authority must be exercised in “the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or
national security.”

[1] Sec. 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

[2] Sec. 104. All tariff sections, chapters, headings and subheadings and the rates of import
duty under Section 104 of Presidential Decree No. 34 and all subsequent amendments issued
under Executive Orders and Presidential Decrees are hereby adopted and form part of this
Code.

There shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all imported articles the rates of duty
indicated in the Section under this section except as otherwise specifically provided for in
this Code: Provided, that, the maximum rate shall not exceed one hundred per cent ad
valorem.

The rates of duty herein provided or subsequently fixed pursuant to Section Four Hundred
One of this Code shall be subject to periodic investigation by the Tariff Commission and
may be revised by the President upon recommendation of the National Economic and
Development Authority.

[3] Sec. 401. Flexible Clause. —

a. In the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security, and subject
to the limitations herein prescribed, the President, upon recommendation of the National
Economic and Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as NEDA), is hereby
empowered: (1) to increase, reduce or remove existing protective rates of import duty
(including any necessary change in classification). The existing rates may be increased or
decreased but in no case shall the reduced rate of import duty be lower than the basic rate of
ten (10) per cent ad valorem, nor shall the increased rate of import duty be higher than a
maximum of one hundred (100) per cent ad valorem; (2) to establish import quota or to ban
imports of any commodity, as may be necessary; and (3) to impose an additional duty on all
imports not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem, whenever necessary; Provided, That
upon periodic investigations by the Tariff Commission and recommendation of the NEDA,
the President may cause a gradual reduction of protection levels granted in Section One
hundred and four of this Code, including those subsequently granted pursuant to this
section.

b. Before any recommendation is submitted to the President by the NEDA pursuant to the
provisions of this section, except in the imposition of an additional duty not exceeding ten
(10) per cent ad valorem, the Commission shall conduct an investigation in the course of
which they shall hold public hearings wherein interested parties shall be afforded
reasonable opportunity to be present, produce evidence and to be heard. The Commission
shall also hear the views and recommendations of any government office, agency or
instrumentality concerned. The Commission shall submit their findings and
recommendations to the NEDA within thirty (30) days after the termination of the public
hearings.

c. The power of the President to increase or decrease rates of import duty within the limits
fixed in subsection “a” shall include the authority to modify the form of duty. In modifying
the form of duty, the corresponding ad valorem or specific equivalents of the duty with
respect to imports from the principal competing foreign country for the most recent
representative period shall be used as bases.

Araneta v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. L-2044, August 26, 1949 (EB)

FACTS:
The five cases are consolidated for all of them present the same fundamental question.
Antonio Araneta is being charged for violating EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and
lots for residential buildings. Another case is of Leon Ma. Guerrero seeking to have a permit
issued for the exportation of his manufactured shoes. Another is of Eulogio Rodriguez
seeking to prohibit the Treasury from disbursing funds pursuant to EO 225, while another is
of Antonio Barredo attacking EO 226 which appropriated funds to hold the national
elections. They all contend that CA 671 or the Emergency Powers Act is already inoperative
and that all EOs issued under said Act also ceased

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Emergency Powers Act has ceased to have any force and effect.

HELD:
CA 671 does not fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the act has to be sought
for in its nature, object to be accomplished, the purpose to be subserved and its relation to
the Constitution. Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue
thereof should be “for a limited period”. It is presumed that CA 671 was approved with this
limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the Constitution
and is contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the
Constitutional scope of its power. CA 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular
session of May 25, 1946, and that EO Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority
of law. In a regular session, the power of Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by
the limitations imposed by the organic law.

David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

FACTS:
President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a state of national emergency. This case covers the
seven consolidated petitions for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of PP1017 and
General Order No. 5 implementing the former. it is alleged that in doing so, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion and that respondent officials of the
Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions are
actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PP1017 and GO No. 5 are constitutional?

HELD:
The assailed PP1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate decrees. legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature,
Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “the legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives”.
To be sure, neither martial law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. It follows that these
decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to “laws”, she cannot call
the military to enforce or implement certain laws such as customs laws, laws governing
family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts, and the like. She can only
order the military under PP1017, to enforce laws pertaining to its duty to suppress lawless
violence.

Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, G.R. No.

162272, April 7, 2009

Facts:
Respondents Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) and People’s Broadcasting
Service, Inc. (PBS) are radio networks both involved in the operation of radio broadcasting
services in the Philippines, they being the grantees of legislative franchises. Following the
enactment of these franchise laws, NTC issued Provisional Authorities allowing them to
install, operate and maintain various AM and FM broadcast stations in various locations
throughout the nation. Petitioner Santiago C. Divinagracia, alleging that he was a
stockholder of respondent companies, filed two complaints with the NTC alleging that
despite the provisions of the law mandating the public offering of at least 30% of the
common stocks of Respondents, both entities had failed to make such offering. Petitioner
prayed for the cancellation of all the Provisional Authorities or CPCs of Respondents. The
NTC dismissed both complaints, positing that although it had full jurisdiction to revoke or
cancel a Provisional Authority or CPC for violations or infractions of the terms and
conditions, it refrained from exercising the same.

Issue:

Whether or not NTC has the power to cancel Provisional Authorities and CPCs of entities
which Congress has issued franchises to operate

HELD:
NO. We earlier replicated the various functions of the NTC, as established by E.O. No. 546.
One can readily notice that even as the NTC is vested with the power to issue CPCs to
broadcast stations, it is not expressly vested with the power to cancel such CPCs, or
otherwise empowered to prevent broadcast stations with duly issued franchises and CPCs
from operating radio or television stations.

Petitioner relies on the power granted to the Public Service Commission to revoke CPCs or
CPCNs under Section 16(m) of the Public Service Act. That argument has been irrefragably
refuted by Section 14 of the Public Service Act, and by jurisprudence, most especially RCPI
v. NTC. As earlier noted, at no time did radio companies fall under the jurisdiction of the
Public Service Commission as they were expressly excluded from its mandate under Section
14. In addition, the Court ruled in RCPI that since radio companies, including broadcast
stations and telegraphic agencies, were never under the jurisdiction of the Public Service
Commission except as to rate-fixing, that Commission’s authority to impose fines did not
carry over to the NTC even while the other regulatory agencies that emanated from the
Commission did retain the previous authority their predecessor had exercised. No provision
in the Public Service Act thus can be relied upon by the petitioner to claim that the NTC has
the authority to cancel CPCs or licenses.

People v. Vera, G.R. No. L-45685, November 16, 1937 (EB)

FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a motion
for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He was then elevated
to the Supreme Court of United States for review, which was also denied. The SC denied the
petition subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for new trial and thereafter
remanded the case to the court of origin for the execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila
referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended
denial of the same. Later, the 7th branch of CFI Manila set the petition for a hearing. The
Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other
things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of
the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the
Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The private prosecution also filed a
supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221,
as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces
(sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.

HELD:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful
delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason,
unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 reads as follows: "This Act shall apply
only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the
salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial
fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be
subject to the direction of the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application
of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the
provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is
to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole
context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative
action of the different provincial boards through the appropriation of the salaries for
probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such
action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into
provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces — and this is
the actual situation now — appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation
officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without
a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system.

Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino, G.R. No. 210500, April 02, 2019 (EB)

Facts:

This Court is called to determine the validity of the Social Security System premium hike,
which took effect in January 2014. The case also involves the application of doctrines on
judicial review, a valid delegation of powers, and the exercise of police power.
Issued to annul the Social Security System premium hike embodied in the following
issuances: (1) Resolution No. 262-s. 2013 dated April 19, 2013;(2) Resolution No. 711-s. 2013
dated September 20, 2013;and (3) Circular. Kilusang Mayo Uno, together with
representatives from recognized labour centres, labor federations, party-list groups, and
Social Security System members (collectively, Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al.), filed the case
against government officials and agencies involved in issuing the assailed issuances.
Lastly, petitioners pray that temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction be issued to stop the implementation of the increase in contributions.
provisions of the Constitution on the protection of workers, promotion of social justice, and
respect for human rights.

Issues:
First, whether or not this Court can exercise its power of judicial review;

Second, whether or not there is an actual case or controversy;

Third, whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies;

Fourth, whether or not petitioners have legal standing to file the Petition; and

Finally, whether or not the assailed issuances were issued in violation of laws and with
grave abuse of discretion.

In connection with the fifth issue, this Court further resolves:

First, whether or not the assailed issuances are void for having been issued under vague and
unclear standards contained in the Social Security Act;

Second, whether or not the increase in Social Security System contributions is reasonably
necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought and is unduly oppressive upon the labor
sector; and

Finally, whether or not the revised ratio of contributions between employers and employees
is grossly unjust to the working class and beyond respondent Social Security Commission's
power to enact.

Ruling:

The president is the head of the executive branch,[23] a co-equal of the judiciary under the
Constitution. His or her prerogative is entitled to respect from other branches of
government.[24] Inter-branch courtesy[25] is but a consequence of the doctrine of separation
of powers.
As such, the president cannot be charged with any suit, civil or criminal in nature, during
his or her incumbency in office. This is in line with the doctrine of the president's immunity
from suit.

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,
may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head
of State if he can be dragged into court litigations while s

Francisco v. The House of Representatives recognized that this expanded jurisdiction was
meant "to ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of
discretion by 'any branch or instrumentalities of government.'

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of
the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final
arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has
acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only
a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari
is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the
re-examination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or
proceeding in the lower court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative
remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is direct... petitioners filed a Petition for both
certiorari and prohibition to determine whether respondents Social Security System and
Social Security Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in releasing the assailed
issuances. According to them, these issuances violated

Petitioners must, thus, comply with the requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial
review: (1) there must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before this Court; (2) the
question before this Court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act
must be a proper party; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case.

The existence of an actual case or controversy depends on the allegations pleaded.

Here, petitioners allege that the premium hike, through the assailed issuances, violates their
rights as workers whose welfare is mandated to be protected under the Constitution.[54]
They further allege that the issuances are grossly unjust to the working class and were
issued beyond the scope of constitutional powers. how the assailed issuances violated
workers' constitutional rights such that it would warrant a judicial review

Petitioners cannot merely cite and rely on the Constitution without specifying how these
rights translate to being legally entitled to a fixed amount and proportion of Social Security
System contributions.
the case is ripe for adjudication when the challenged governmental act is a completed action
such that there is a direct, concrete, and adverse effect on the petitioner.[58]... something had
been performed by the government branch or instrumentality before the court may step in,
and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as
a result of the challenged act.

Courts may only take cognizance of a case or controversy if the petitioner has exhausted all
remedies available to it under the law.

Furthermore, jurisdiction is determined by laws enacted by Congress. The doctrine of

exhaustion of administrative remedies ensures that this legislative power is respected by
courts. Co

Courts cannot ignore Congress' determination that the Social Security Commission is the
entity with jurisdiction over any dispute arising from the Social Security Act with respect to
coverage, benefits, contributions, and penalties.

For a valid exercise of delegation, this Court enumerated the following requisites:

All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the
regulation must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that the regulation is
not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. Under
the first test or the so-called completeness test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only
thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test or the sufficient standard test
mandates that there should be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
To determine completeness, all of the terms and provisions of the law must leave nothing to
the delegate except to implement it. "What only can be delegated is not the discretion to
determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be
enforced."

Not only is the Social Security Act complete in its terms; it also contains a sufficient standard
for the Social Security Commission to fix the monthly contribution rate and the minimum
and maximum monthly salary credits

Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v. POEA, G.R. No.

114714, April 21, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner, Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., is an incorporated
association of licensed Filipinomanning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed
manning agencies who hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of the irrespective
foreign ship-owner-principals, seek to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the
Governing Board of the POEA and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05.
Issue:
WON the resolution and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional because they
violate the equal protection and non-impairment of the obligation of contracts clauses of the
Constitution.

RULING:
Yes. There is, as well, no merit to the claim that the assailed resolution and memorandum
circular violate the equal protection and contract clauses of the Constitution. To support its
contention of inequality, the petitioners claim discrimination against foreign shipowners
and principals employing Filipino seamen and in favor of foreign employers employing
overseas Filipinos who are not seamen. It is an established principle of constitutional law
that the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on
reasonable classification. And for the classification to be reasonable, it (1) must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same
class. 14 There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities between land-based and sea-based
Filipino overseas workers in terms of, among other things, work environment, safety,
dangers and risks to life and limb, and accessibility to social, civic, and spiritual activities

United States v. Ang Tang Ho, G.R. No. 17122, February 27, 1922 (EB)

FACTS:
The Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868 “An Act penalizing the monopoly and
holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances,
regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General xxx to
issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor xxx”.

Pursuant thereto, the Governoe-General issued Executive Order No. 53 fixing the price at
which rice should be sold. Defendant Ang Tang Ho who sold rice at a price greater than that
fixed by Executive Order No. 53 was found guilty of violation thereof. He contested the
validity of said law averring that it constituted invalid delegation of legislative power.

ISSUE:
Did Act No. 2868 validly delegate legislative power to the Governor-General?

Held:
No. A law must be complete in all its terms and provision. When it leaves the legislative
branch of the government, nothing must be left to the judgment of the delegate of the
legislature. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or
for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be
issued “for any cause,” and leaves the question as to what is “any cause” to the discretion of
the Gov-Gen.
The Act also says it may be issued” whenever conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary
rise in the price of palay, rice or corn.” The Legislature does not specify or define what is “an
extraordinary rise.”

The Act also says that the Governor-General, “with the consent of the Council of State,” is
authorized to issue and promulgate “temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying
out the purposes of this Act.” It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an
emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain
in force and effect, or when they shall take effect.

That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for
the order, but has left it to the sole judgment and discretion of the Governor-Gener to say
what is or what is not “a cause,” and what is or what is not “an extraordinary rise in the
price, and as to what is a “temporary rule” or an “emergency measure” for the carrying out
the purposes of the Act.

The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a
power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to
make, its own action to depend. (US v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1)

Gerochi v. Department of Energy, G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007 (EB)

FACTS:
RA 9136 was enacted. Petitioners assail the validity of Section 34 that imposes a monthly
“Universal Charge” to all electricity end users that would serve as payment for government
debts, equalization of taxes and, environmental charge, among others, for being an undue
delegation of the power of taxation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an undue delegation of the power to tax on the part of the ERC.

HELD:
No, the universal charge as provided for in section 34 is not a tax but an exaction of the
regulatory power (police power) of the state. It is incidental to the regulatory duties of the
ERC, and for the generation of revenue. It cannot be considered as tax, but an execution of
the states police power thru regulation.

Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 210503, October 08, 2019 (EB)

FACTS:
Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the
GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum,
discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be
declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of
discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents

ISSUE: Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative

HELD:
Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the
areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions
of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties
that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of
separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere oversight that must be
confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
constitution. Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of
law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as
violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987 (EB)

FACTS:

Petitioner in this case transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on
January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac
Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the slaughter of carabaos
except under certain conditions. Petitioner sued for recovery, and the trial Court of Iloilo
issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of twelve thousand pesos (P
12, 000.00). After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of
the said carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of
the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the E.O, as raised by the
petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said Executive Order is unconstitutional.

HELD:
Yes, though police power was invoked by the government in this case for the reason that the
present condition demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of
the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs, it does not, however, comply with the
second requisite for a valid exercise of the said power which is, "that there be a lawful
method." The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought
to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.

The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of Police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law
and, worse, is unduly oppressive. To justify the State in the imposition of its authority in
behalf of the public, it must be:
1) The interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require such interference;
2) that the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

Edu v. Ericta, G.R. No. L-32096, October 24, 1970 (EB)

FACTS:
Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner, petitioned the SC to rule
squarely on the constitutionality of the Reflector Law in this proceeding for certiorari and
prohibition against respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to annul and set aside his order for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction directed against Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner for
the enforcement of the aforesaid statute, in a pending suit in his court for certiorari and
prohibition, filed by the other respondent Teddy C. Galo assailing; the validity of such
enactment as well as such administrative order.

Such administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors
in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act. Thus: “No motor vehicles of whatever
style, kind, make, class or denomination shall be registered if not equipped with reflectors.
Such reflectors shall either be factory built-in-reflector commercial glass reflectors, reflection
tape or luminous paint. The luminosity shall have an intensity to be maintained visible and
clean at all times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100 meters away at
night.” 35 Then came a section on dimensions, placement and color.

As to dimensions the following is provided for: “Glass reflectors — Not less than 3 inches in
diameter or not less than 3 inches square; Reflectorized Tape — At least 3 inches wide and
12 inches long. The painted or taped area may be bigger at the discretion of the vehicle
owner.” Provision is then made as to how such reflectors are to be “placed, installed, pasted
or painted.”

There is the further requirement that in addition to such reflectors there shall be installed,
pasted or painted four reflectors on each side of the motor vehicle parallel to those installed,
pasted or painted in front and those in the rear end of the body thereof. The color required
of each reflectors, whether built-in, commercial glass, reflectorized tape or reflectorized
paint placed in the front part of any motor vehicle shall be amber or yellow and those placed
on the sides and in the rear shall all be red.
Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be imposed. Thus: “Non-compliance with
the requirements contained in this Order shall be sufficient cause to refuse registration of the
motor vehicle affected and if already registered, its registration maybe suspended in
pursuance of the provisions of Section 16 of RA 4136; Provided, however, that in the case of
the violation of Section 1 (a) and (b) and paragraph (8) Section 3 hereof, a fine of not less
than ten nor more than fifty pesos shall be imposed.

The respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of injunction.

ISSUE:
1.) WON Reflector Law is unconstitutional.
2.) WON A.O No. 2 is invalid and contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power.

HELD:
NO. both are valid and constitutional.
It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power
to promote public safety. What is delegated is the authority which is non-legislative in
character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being
assumed.

1. Police Power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of
government. “the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable of powers,” (Justice
Holmes) aptly pointed out “to all the great public needs.”
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice
Cardozo: “Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the
present with the well-being of the nation.

2. Delegation of Legislative Power. It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of

separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other
branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local
affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the
Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the
statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To
determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must
be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not
abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is
the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in
which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made
between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or
discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no
valid objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the
legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the
very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down
fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A
standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be
carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance
of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be
implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law,
clearly, the legislative objective is public safety.

Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005 (EB)

Facts:
ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition o questioning the
constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on the sale of goods and properties;
Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods; and
Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on the sale of services and use or lease of properties;

These provisions contain a provision which authorizing the President, upon

recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January
1, 2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied.

Issues:
Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.

Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec
28(2) of the Constitution.

Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection of the
Constitution.

HELD:
No, the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was
acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it
included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage,
and excise and franchise taxes.
No, there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its
functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do
it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only
way in which the legislative process can go forward. In this case, it is not a delegation of
legislative power but a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and
administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent.

No, the power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of
taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of
property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment,
valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to the presumption of validity. As a
rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of
unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.