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MANU/SC/0374/1978

Equivalent Citation: AIR1979SC460, (1979)1SCC361, [1979]2SCR409

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Decided On: 29.11.1978

Appellants: B.N. Mutto and Anr.

Vs.
Respondent: Dr. T.K. Nandi

Hon'ble Judges:
A. D. Koshal, D. A. Desai and P. S. Kailasam, JJ.

Subject: Tenancy

Catch Words

Mentioned IN

Acts/Rules/Orders:
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - Section 14A, Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - Section
14A(1), Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - Section 14(1), Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 -
Section 25B, Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - Section 25C; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC)
1809 - Order 37 Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) 1809 - Order 37 Rule 3(1);

Citing Reference:

Discussed
 
 4

Mentioned
 
 1

Case Note:
Tenancy - Eviction - 14A of Delhi Rent Control Act (Amendment) Ordinance (No.
24 of 1975), 1975 - High Court allowed Respondent's Petition and set aside
order of eviction passed by Rent Controller - Hence, this Appeal - Whether,
Government servant who had retired before notice was served, was entitled to
benefit of Section 14A(1) of Act - Held, perusal of Section 14A of Act disclosed
that right to recover immediate possession of premises accrued to certain
persons if requisite conditions were satisfied - Government's policy statement
stated that intention was only to require Government servants to vacate
premises allotted to them by Government, if they had their own houses in area
- However, Appellant-officer had retired before notice was served on
Respondent-tenant - Thus, Appellant was not entitled to relief - Appeal allowed.

Ratio Decidendi:
"No action shall lie against parties, unless proper notice is duly served upon
them."

JUDGMENT

P.S. Kailasam, J.

1. This appeal is by special leave by the landlord against the judgment of the
High Court of Delhi whereby it allowed a revision of the respondent-tenant and
set aside the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller, Delhi, rejecting the
application of the respondent seeking permission to contest the proceedings for eviction
filed by the appellants under Section 14(A)(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

2. The appellant, Shri B.N. Muttoo, Inspector General of Police, leased the
property No. F-9, East of Kailash, New Delhi, to the respondent from 15th
September, 1972 at a monthly rent of Rs. 2,200/- exclusive of electricity and
water charges. The lease was for the use of the premises for residential and/or
professional purposes only and not for commercial purposes. The lease
agreement was renewed from time to time and the respondent became a monthly
tenant under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. On 18th July, 1974 the landlord filed
a petition for eviction of the respondent on the grounds of his user, subletting
and bona fide requirement. The petition was registered as Suit No. 182 of 1974 and
is still pending.

3. The first appellant, B.N. Muttoo, retired as Inspector General of Police on 30th
November, 1975. While in office he was occupying premises bearing No. C-
II/77 Moti Bagh I, New Delhi, allotted to him by the Government.

On 9th September, 1975 the Government took a decision that Government

servants who own houses in the locality should vacate the Government
accommodation allotted to them within 3 months from 1st October, 1975.

On 9th December, 1975 a notice was served on the first appellant by the
Deputy Director (Admn.) stating that the Government by its Office Memorandum No.
12031(1)/74-Pol.II dated 9th September, 1975 required all Government officials who
own houses in Delhi and New Delhi and have also been allotted Government residence to
vacate the Government residence before the stipulated date failing which penal rate of
licence of market rate shall be charged besides necessary action to evict him from the
Government residence.

On the same day the appellant filed the present suit for eviction of the
respondent.

On 16th January, 1976 the respondent applied for leave to defend. On 10th
March, 1976 the Rent Controller refused leave and decreed the suit filed by the
landlord.

A revision petition was filed by the respondent before the High Court which allowed
the revision and set aside the order of the Rent Controller and remanded the
proceedings to the Rent Controller for disposal according to law. Against the order of
the High Court allowing the revision by the respondent the present appeal has
been preferred to this Court by the landlord.

4. The question that arises in this appeal is whether the Rent Controller war right in
refusing leave to the respondent to defend the eviction petition filed by the
landlord.

5. In order to appreciate the point that arises for consideration it is necessary to refer to
the relevant provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

Delhi Rent Control Act (Act 59 of 1958) came into force on 31st December,
1958. By Chapter III the right of the landlord to evict the tenant was restricted.

Section 14 prohibited any order or decree for recovery of possession of any of

the premises being made by any court in favour of a landlord except under
certain circumstances. The landlord was required to make an application to the
Controller for recovery of the possession on one of the grounds mentioned in
Sub-clauses (a) to (1) in Section 14(1). The provisions of Section 14(1)(e) which
are relevant may be referred to:

14. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other

law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any
premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the
landlord against a tenant;

Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the

prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the
premises on one or more of the following grounds, namely:

(a) X X X

(b) X X X

(c) X X X

(d) X X X

(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required
bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself
or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the
owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises
are held and that the landlord or such person has no other
reasonably suitable residential accommodation;
Explanation.-For the purposes of this clause "premises let for residential
purposes" include any premises which having been let for use as a residence are,
without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other
purposes;

6. By the Delhi Rent Control Act (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 24 of 1975),

1975 the Delhi Rent Control Act was amended. The Ordinance was eventually
replaced by the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act No. 18 of 1976.

The Amending Act continued the provisions of the Ordinance but extended the
summary procedure which was applicable to Section 14(1)(e) to evictions on the
ground set out in Section 14A of the Act. The Amending Act came into aforesaid on
February 9, 1976 but by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 1 it was deemed to have
come into force on 1st December, 1975 i.e. on the date on which the Ordinance
came into force. Section 14A conferred a right to recover immediate possession
of premises to certain persons. The amended Section 14A(1) reads:

(1) Where a landlord who, being a person in occupation of any

residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government or any
local authority is required, by, or
in pursuance of, any general or special order made by that Government or
authority,
to vacate such residential accommodation, or in default, to incur certain
obligations,
on the ground that he owns, in the Union territory of Delhi a residential
accommodation either in his own name or in the name of his wife or
dependent child, there
shall accrue, on and from the date of such order, to such landlord,
notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other
law for the time being in force or in any contract (whether express or
implied), custom or usage to the contrary,
a right to recover immediately possession of any premises let out by him:

7. This section confers on a landlord who owns a residential accommodation in

his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child in the Union territory of
Delhi and was in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central
Government or any local authority and is required by any general or special order made
by the Government or the authority to vacate such residential accommodation or in
default to incur certain obligations on the ground that he owns a residential
accommodation in Delhi either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent
child, a right shall accrue to such landlord to recover immediate possession of any
premises let out by him. Apart from conferring rights under Section 14A a
summary procedure for trial of applications made under Section 14(1)(e)
and Section 14A is provided under Sections 25A, 25B and 25C. Section 25A
provides that the provisions of Chapter IIIA which contains Sections 25A, 25B and 25C
and any rule made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent
therewith contained elsewhere in this Act or any other law for the time being in force.
The special procedure for disposal of application for eviction under Section
14(1)(e) and Section 14A is prescribed by Section 25B. The procedure
envisaged is that when an application under Section 14(1)(e) or Section 14A is
filed by the landlord the Controller shall issue summons in the prescribed form.

Sub-section (4) to Section 25B restricts the right of the tenant to defend by
providing that the tenant shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the
premises unless he files an affidavit stating the grounds on which he seeks to
contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from the Controller. In
default of his appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave, the
statement made by the landlord in the application for eviction shall be deemed to be
admitted by the tenant and the applicant shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the
ground aforesaid. Sub-section (5) to Section 25B states the conditions under which the
Controller shall give leave to the tenant to contest the application. It requires that the
affidavit filed by the tenant should disclose such facts as would disentitle the landlord
from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground
specified in Clause (e) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14, or under Section
14A. When once the leave is granted to the tenant to contest the application the
Controller shall commence hearing of the application as early as practicable.

8. The introduction of Section 14A became necessary as the Government took a

decision on 9th September, 1975 that the Government servants who own
houses in the Union territory of Delhi shall be required to vacate Government
accommodation allotted to them within 3 months from 1st October, 1975.

If they fail to vacate the accommodation they were to be charged licence fee at market
rates. The Government servants who were owing houses in the Union territory
of Delhi could not get possession of their residential accommodation. It became
necessary to confer on them the right to recover immediate possession of their
premises and also to prescribe an expeditious procedure for achieving the
object. According to the procedure specified in Section 25B it was made incumbent on
the tenant to apply for and obtain leave to contest the application for eviction.

9. Coming to the facts of the case the Government took the decision to require the
Government officers who have been allotted premises by the Government and who own
their own houses in the area specified to vacate the premises allotted by the
Government within 3 months from 1st October, 1975. Notice of such intention was
conveyed to the landlord on 9th December, 1975.

In the meantime on 30th November, 1975 the officer retired from service. Thus
on the date on which notice was served on him he had already retired.

The petition for eviction was also filed on 9th December, 1975 after the officer
retired.

The main contentions raised by the tenant in the petition for leave to contest
were;

(1) the landlord cannot invoke the provisions of Section 25B(5) as he was not a
Government servant on the date of the petition;

(2) the landlord had already filed a petition for eviction which was registered as
O.S. No. 182 of 1974 and was pending before the Additional Rent Controller . As
the eviction is sought on the same ground in the present petition it was submitted that
this petition could not be entertained;

(3) the premises which the respondent is occupying were let for the purpose of
residential or professional purposes and therefore the landlord is not entitled
to ask for eviction as the premises are not let for residential purposes.

10. The Rent Controller rejected all the contentions put forward by the
respondent. He held that the question as to whether the landlord was a
Government servant or not on the date when the notice was received and on
the date when he filed the petition is irrelevant so long as he satisfied the
requirements laid down in Section 14(1) of the Act.

On the second contention the Rent Controller found that the ground for
eviction under Section 14A is a new cause of action and different from
the one that was raised in the previous petitions and hence the present
petition is not barred.

On the third point the Rent Controller found that it is not necessary for an
application under Section 14(1) that the building should have been let for
residential purposes as required under Section 14(1)(c) and it is sufficient if
the landlord requires the premises for residential accommodation. The Rent
Controller held that the grounds on which leave to resist an application can be granted
are those that are specified in Section 25B(5) alone.

11. On appeal the High Court allowed the revision by the tenant mainly
on the ground that the application for eviction must fail on account of
the admitted fact that the landlord had retired from service on 30th
November, 1975 before the Ordinance came into force and was on that
account liable to vacate the premises independently of his ownership of
the premises in dispute.

12. The important question that arises for consideration is whether the
landlord who retired from service on 30th November, 1975 before the
Ordinance came into force could avail himself of the provisions of
Section 14A(1).

A reading of Section 14A discloses that a right to recover immediate

possession of premises accrues to certain persons if the requisite
conditions are satisfied. The conditions are:

(1) the landlord must be in occupation of any residential premises

allotted to him by the Central Government or any local authority;

(2) such landlord is required by a general or special order made by the

Government or authority to vacate such residential accommodation or in
default to incur certain obligations on the ground that he owns in the Union
territory of Delhi a residential accommodation either in his own name or in the
name of his wife or dependent child.

If the aforesaid conditions are satisfied a right shall accrue to such a landlord
on and from the date of such order to recover immediate possession of any
premises let out by him.

It may be noted that the section does not require that the person who is
in occupation of the premises allotted by the Government should be a
Government servant.

It is necessary that the person is required by the Government or authority to vacate

such accommodation imposing certain consequences in the event of his not vacating.
The policy decision taken by the Government on 9th September, 1975
only related to Government servants who were in occupation of
premises allotted to them by the Government.

If the Government servant had another house in the locality he was to vacate within 3
months from the 1st October, 1975. This general order no doubt relates only to
Government servants.

After the decision was taken it was realized that some provision should be made to
enable the persons in occupation of buildings allotted to them by the Government to get
possession of the houses they own but have been let to tenants. In order to enable them
to get possession of the premises let by them expditiously Section 14A(1) was enacted
and the expeditious procedure under Section 25B was made applicable.

It may also be noted that the order served on the landlord on 9th December, 1975
mentions that all Government officials who own houses in Delhi and have also been
allotted Government residence are to vacate Government accommodation. The general
circular dated 9th September, 1975 as well as the notice served on the landlord
thus support the view that the intention of the Government was to enable only
those Government servants who are in occupation of Government
accommodation and who own houses to get immediate possession, though
Section 14A does not restrict the right to recover immediate, possession to
Government servants alone.

In these circumstances, the conclusions arrived at by the High Court that a

Government servant who had retired before the date on which he had filed the
application is not entitled to the benefits of Section 14(1) is understandable.
This view was expressed by this Court in Nihal Chand v. Kalyan Chand Jain
MANU/SC/0359/1977 : [1978]2SCR183 wherein it was observed: "There appears to be
some force in the view taken by the High Court that the provision of Section 14A(1) was
not intended for Government servant who have retired from Government service or who
have been transferred outside Delhi-." But this Court did not decide the issue because on
the facts of the case it was of the view that the landlord was entitled to invoke the
provisions of Section 14A(1) notwithstanding the fact that he had retired from
Government service with effect from 30th November, 1975. In that case the notice was
served on the appellant-landlord on 30th September, 1975 which was before the date of
retirement which was on 31st November, 1975. On the ground that the right to evict the
tenant accrued to the landlord when he was in service it was held that he was entitled to
the rights conferred under Section 14A. In this case the notice was served on 9th
December, 1975 and the officer had retired on 30th November, 1975. On the
reasoning in the above case the appellant will not be entitled to the relief. The
question therefore squarely arises in this case as to whether a Government
servant who retired before the notice was served on him' requiring to quit the
Government accommodation is entitled to the benefit of Section 14A(1).

13. It is not clear as to why the right to recover immediate possession is not
confined to Government servants alone under Section 14A.

It is clear that according to Government's policy statement the intention was

only to require the Government servants to vacate the premises allotted to them by
the Government if they had their own houses in the area.

It cannot be said that it was by inadvertance that the Legislature mentioned

persons instead of Government servants and made the section applicable to
persons other than Government servants. It is stated at the Bar that Government
accommodation is provided not only to Government servants but also to Members of
Parliament and other non-officials who occupy important positions in public life. The
Court will not be justified in presuming that when the legislature used the word
"persons" it meant only Government servants.

The rule as to construction of the statutes is well-known and has been clearly
laid down. Craies on Statute Law (6th Ed. p. 66) relying on Tasmania v.
Commonwealth [1904] 1 C.L.R. 329 has stated the rule as follows:

The cardinal rule for the constructions of Acts of Parliament is that they should be
construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves.

14. The Court has to determine the intention as expressed by the words used.

If the words of statutes are themselves precise and unambiguous then no more
can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural
sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the
lawgiver.

Taking into account the object of the Act there could be no difficulty in giving
the plain meaning to the word "person" as not being confined to Government
servants for it is seen that accommodation has been provided by the
Government not only to Government servants but to others also.

In the circumstances, the Court cannot help giving the plain and unambiguous meaning
to the section. It may be that the retired Government servants as well as others who are
in occupation of Government accommodation may become entitled to a special
advantage, but the purpose of the legislation being to enable the Government to get
possession of accommodation provided by them by enabling the allottee to get
immediate possession of the residential accommodation owned but let by them, the
Court will not be justified in giving a meaning which the words used will not
warrant. On this question therefore we find ourselves unable to concur with the
view taken by the High Court.

15. The next question that arises is whether the rights conferred under Section
14A(1) are available to premises that had been let for residential as well as
professional purposes.

It is admitted that the premises were let for residential as well as professional
purposes.

Section 14(1)(e) requires that in order to avail the provisions of Section 14(1)
(e) the premises should be "let for use as a residence".

It has been held that when premises are let for residential as well as
commercial or for residential and professional purposes the provisions of
Section 14(1)(e) will not apply.

This Court in Dr. Gopal Dass Verma v. Dr. S.K. Bhardwaj and Anr., MANU/SC/0337/1961
: [1962]2SCR678 in construing Section 13(1)(e) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control
Act, 1952 held that premises let for residential purposes but used by the tenant
with the consent of the landlord incidentally for commercial professional or
other purposes cease to be premises let for a residential purpose alone and as
such the landlord would not be entitled to eject the tenant under Section 13(1)
(e) of the Act. Section 13(1)(e) allowed a decree for ejectment to be passed if the
Court is satisfied that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by
the landlord who is the owner of such premises for occupation as a residence for himself
or his family and that he has no other suitable accommodation. On the facts of the case
it was found that right from the commencement of the tenancy a substantial part of the
premises was used by respondent I for his professional purpose, and they have also
found that this has been done obviously with the consent of the landlord. The Court held
that the professional use of a substantial part of the premises with the consent of the
appellant clearly takes the case outside Section 13(1)(e). The view expressed in the
above case was reiterated by this Court in Kartar Singh v. Chaman Lal and Ors.
MANU/SC/0454/1969 : [1970]1SCR9 . On the facts it was found that the premises had
been taken for residential-cum-business or professional purposes. By the rent deed the
owner inducted as a tenant Labha Mal Arora who was practising advocate. Along with
the rent deed a letter was written by the landlord to the tenant stating that he had no
objection to the tenant having his professional office along with the residence. After the
tenant's death in 1952 the premises were used only for residence by his sons and widow
till 1957. In August, 1957 the first respondent who qualified himself as a legal
practitioner started having an office in the premises. Another son also started practising
as a lawyer in the same premises sometime later. The landlord served a notice on the
sons and widow of the deceased for requiring them to vacate the premises. The court
found two rooms were used by the original tenant as his office, one room by his clerk
and the premises had been let for residence-cum-business purposes. The plea that the
tenant was only granted a licence to use the premises for residence-cum-profession
which was personal to him and which came to an end on his death was not accepted.
The court agreed with the view expressed in Dr. Gopal Dass Verma's case (supra) that a
tenant could not be ejected under Section 13(1)(h) because the tenancy of premises let
out or used for residence and carrying on of profession could not be terminated merely
by showing that the tenant had acquired a suitable residence. The court rejected the
contention that the tenant, Labha Mal Arora, had been merely given a permission or
licence which was of a personal nature to his office. It also was unable to find that any
test of dominant intention was applied in Dr. Gopal Dass Verma's case.

16. It is not necessary for us to go into the question whether the words "let for
residential purposes" would exclude premises let predominantly for residential
purposes with a licence to use an insignificant part for professional purposes
such as lawyer's or doctor's consulting room.

The words used in Section 14A are clearly different.

Section 14A contemplates the owning by the landlord in the Union territory of
Delhi a residential accommodation. If he owns a residential accommodation he
has a right to recover immediately possession of any premises let out by him.

The emphasis is on residential accommodation. If the premises are one intended

for residential accommodation it will not make any difference if the premises are let for
residential as well as other purposes.

Even though the residential accommodation is let for professional or commercial

purposes the premises will not cease to be for residential accommodation. It is common
ground that the premises let were put up under the Delhi Development Authority's
scheme for residential purposes. The only plea was that though it was put up for
residential purposes it was let for residential as well as for professional purposes. The
requirement in Section 14(1)(e) that in order to enable the landlord to recover
possession the premises ought to have been let for residential purposes is not there in
Section 14A(1). In this view we agree with the High Court that it is not necessary
in a petition for eviction under Section 14A to satisfy that it was Jet for
residential purposes only. This view has been taken by this Court in Busching Schmitz
Private Ltd. v. P.T. Menghani and Anr. MANU/SC/0344/1977 : [1977]3SCR312 .

17. The submission that as a previous application for possession by the landlord was
pending this petition would not be permissible cannot be accepted as the grounds on
which an application for possession is filed under Section 14A(1) are different and based
on special rights conferred on the class of persons who occupied Government
accommodation.
18. The only other question that remains to be considered is the scope of the
right to contest the suit, that is on what grounds can the tenant seek leave to
resist the suit filed by the landlord under Section 14A(1).

The special procedure prescribed under Section 25B is made applicable in cases
where the landlord applies for recovery of possession on any of the grounds
specified in Clause (e) of the Proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 or under
Section 14A.

Sub-section (5) of Section 25B says that the Controller shall give leave to the
tenant to contest if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts that
would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of
possession of the premises on the grounds specified in Clause (e) of the
proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 or Section 14A.

Under Section 14(1)(e) the tenant may resist the application on the grounds specified
namely that the premises are not let for residential purposes, that they are not required
bona fide etc. So far as the facts which would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an
order under Section 14A are concerned they can only be that the landlord is not a
person in occupation of residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government
or that no general or special order has been made by the Government requiring him to
vacate such residential accommodation on the terms specified in the section. Leave to
contest an application under Section 14A(1) cannot be said to be analogous to the
provisions of grant of leave to defend as envisaged in the Civil Procedure Code. Order
XXXVII, Rule 2, Sub-rule (3) of the CPC provides that the defendant shall not appear or
defend the suit unless he obtains leave from a Judge as hereinafter provided so to
appear and defend. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of Order 37 lays down the procedure to obtain
leave. Under the provisions leave to appear and defend the suit is to be given if the
affidavit discloses such facts as would make incumbent on the holder to prove
consideration or such other facts as the court may deem sufficient to support the
application. The scope of Section 25B(5) is very restricted for leave to contest can only
be given if the facts are such as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for
recovery of possession on the ground specified in Section 14A.

19. The learned Counsel for the tenant submitted that the requirements of
Section 14(1)(e) should also be satisfied before the landlord could take
advantage of the procedure provided under Section 25B. The learned Counsel
drew our attention to Section 25C(1) and Section 25C(2) and submitted that the reading
of these two sub-sections would indicate that before an eviction could be ordered under
an application under Section 14A(1) the requirements of Sections 14(6) and (7) should
be satisfied. While Section 14(1) enumerates the grounds on which the landlord
can get a decree for recovery of possession against a tenant Sub-sections (2)
to (11) place certain restrictions. Sub-section (2) provides restriction as to right for
recovery of possession under Section 14(1)(e). Restriction regarding the right to recover
possession under Clause (e) is laid down in Sub-sections (6) and (7) of Section 14.
Section 14(6) states that where a landlord has acquired any premises by transfer no
application for recovery of possession shall lie under Sub-section (1) on the ground
specified in Clause (e) of the proviso thereto, unless a period of five years has elapsed
from the date of the acquisition. Sub-section (7) to Section 14 lays down that where an
order for the recovery of possession of any premises is made on the ground specified in
Clause (e) of the proviso to Sub-section (1), the landlord shall not be entitled to obtain
possession thereof before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of the
order. Section 25C makes an exception to the requirement of Section 14(6) to the effect
that where a landlord is in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the
Central Government or any local authority and who fulfils the requirements of Section
14A(1) the requirement under Section 14(6) that he would not be entitled to possession
unless a period of five years has elapsed from the date of his acquisition of the premises
is not applicable. In other words, he can straightway obtain possession without the
impediment imposed under Section 14(6). Great stress was laid by the learned Counsel
for the tenant on Section 25C(2) which provides that in the case of a landlord who,
being a person of the category specified in Sub-section (1), has obtained, on the ground
specified in Clause (e) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 or under Section
14A, an order for the eviction of a tenant from any premises, the provisions of Sub-
section (7) of Section 14 shall have effect as if for the words "six months", occurring
therein, the words "two months" were substituted. The contention was that if Section
14A(1) stood by itself and if a landlord applying under Section 14A(1) would straightway
get the possession after the tenant cannot contest the suit on the grounds specified in
Section 25B(5) there is no need for mentioning the provisions of Section 14(1)(6) and
Section 14(1)(7) and prescribing a lesser period for a prescribed period under Section
14(7). In other words, the submission was that an application for possession under
Section 14A should also satisfy the requirements of Section 14(1)(e). The provisions of
Section 25B and 25C are applicable to both applications under Section 14(1)(e) and
under Section 14A. Applications under Section 14(1)(e) are governed by Section 14(6)
and Section 14(7). By introduction of Section 25C the condition imposed in Section
14(6) is varied. The condition imposed under Section 14(6) is made not applicable to
persons who satisfy the requirements under Section 14A meaning thereby that this
restriction will be applicable only to an application under Section 14(1)(e). Section
25C(2) makes it clear that not only in the case of an application under Section 14(1)(e)
but also under Section 14A the term of six months prescribed in Section 14(7) is
reduced to two months. The reason for specifying the period of two months in the case
of Section 14A is understandable for otherwise an applicant under Section 14A would be
entitled to possession immediately. By prescribing a specific period of two months under
Section 25C(2) it is made clear that even an applicant under Section 14A would have to
satisfy the conditions laid down by Section 25C i.e. a period of two months should elapse
before the landlord is entitled to obtain possession from the date of an order for
recovery of possession. This submission also fails.

20. In the result we hold that the landlord who retired before the date on which
the notice to quit was given by the Government is also entitled to the benefits
of Section 14A and allow the appeal.

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