1. Ernesto M. De Guzman vs. Hon. Abelardo Subido, G.R. No. L-31683, January 31, 1983, 205 Phil.

373
Facts:
Ricardo Mendoza was accused of the crime of assault upon a
person in authority when, being a student of one Illuminada
Tinio, she attacked and lay hands upon her person by slapping
the latter on one of her cheeks while she was engaged in the
performance of her duties as a teacher and while she was
within the premises of the high school building exercising the
functions inherent in such capacity.

Issue:
Whether or not a teacher is a person in authority

Held:
No. A teacher is not a person in authority on the ground that he
does not possess the necessary requisite thereof prescribed by
law. In applying the provisions of the preceding and other
articles of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction,
whether as an individual or as a member of some court or
governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be
deemed a person in authority. The word “authority” has been
given a restricted meaning, so as to include only persons who
perform some of the functions of the Government of the
Philippine Islands and who according to the aforesaid article,
are directly vested with jurisdiction. By “directly vested
jurisdiction” is meant “the power or authority to govern and
execute the laws, particularly the authority vested in the judges
to administer justice, that is, to try civil or criminal cases or both,
and to render judgment thereon in accordance with the law”;
 and “authority” as well as “directly vested jurisdiction” are two
things which should be conferred by law.

2. Elvira Yu Oh vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125297, June 6, 2003, 451 Phil. 380

Facts:
The complainant Solid Gold International Traders, Inc sued petitioner for
issuing check of a closed account. RTC ruled in favor of the complainant.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that she did not receive
any notice of dishonor. The RTC denied the motion. Petitioner appealed to
the CA only to suffer the same decision as the RTC. She when to the SC
alleging the issue below:

Issue:
Whether the Notice of Dishonor in BP 22 is indispensable for the case to
prosper

Held:
Yes, In cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, it is necessary that the prosecution
prove that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor. Since service of
notice is an issue, the person alleging that the notice was served must prove
the fact of service. Basic also is the doctrine that in criminal cases, the
quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Hence, for cases of B.P. Blg. 22 there should be clear proof of notice. Indeed,
this requirement cannot be taken lightly because Section 2 provides for an
opportunity for the drawer to effect full payment of the amount appearing
on the check, within five banking days from notice of dishonor. The absence
of said notice therefore deprives an accused of an opportunity to preclude
criminal prosecution. In other words, procedural due process demands that
a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. In the case at bar,
appellant has a right to demand – and the basic postulate of fairness
requires – that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her
to afford her to opportunity to aver prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.
The Solicitor General contends that notice of dishonor is dispensable in this
case considering that the cause of the dishonor of the checks was “Account
Closed” and therefore, petitioner already knew that the checks will bounce
anyway. This argument has no merit. The Court has decided numerous
cases where checks were dishonored for the reason, “Account Closed” and
we have explicitly held in said cases that “it is essential for the maker or
drawer to be notified of the dishonor of her check, so she could pay the
value thereof or make arrangements for its payment within the period
prescribed by law” and omission or neglect on the part of the prosecution to
prove that the accused received such notice of dishonor is fatal to its cause.

7. Benjamin ("KOKOY") T. Romualdez vs. Hon. Simeon V. Marcelo and Presidential Commission on Good
Government, G.R. Nos. 165510-33, July 28, 2006, 529 Phil. 90

Facts:
Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No.
3019 for failure to file his Statements of Assets and Liabilities for
the period 1967-1985 during his tenure as Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and for the period 1963-1966
during his tenure as Technical Assistant in the Department of
Foreign Affairs. However, the petitioner contended that his
criminal liability was extinguish by way of prescription.
Respondents alleged that the prescription was interrupted due to
the absences of the petitioner for being abroad.

Issue:
Whether the prescription period of an offense of a special law
may be interrupted by the absence of the accused for being
outside the criminal jurisdiction of our court through Suppletory
application of Art 10. of the RPC.
Held:
No, if there is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent,
Article 10 of the RPC applies suppletorily, Thus, the Court has
applied suppletorily various provisions of the RPC to resolve cases
where the special laws are silent on the matters in issue.
The silence of RA No. 3019 on the question of whether or not the
absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents or tolls the
running of the prescriptive period is more apparent than real.
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall
begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment. The running of the prescriptive
period shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide that the absence
of the accused from the Philippines prevents the running of the
prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that can be gathered
from the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No.
3326, did not consider the absence of the accused from the
Philippines as a hindrance to the running of the prescriptive
period. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

7. Evangeline Ladonga vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. NO. 141066, February 17, 2005, 492 Phil. 60

Facts:
Accused was charged with her husband violation of BP 22 for
issuing checks on closed account. RTC found her husband guilty
and the accused as co-conspirator of the said crime. Accused
appeal to the CA contending that BP 22 has no provision on
conspiracy. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC stating that as the
BP 22 do not prohibit the application of RPC in suppletory,
Conspiracy to commit violation of BP 22 is valid. Hence this case

Issue:
Whether the RPC is suppletory to BP 22.

Held:
Yes, B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory
application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of
contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the
RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be
applied suppletorily.

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. –

Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under
special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter
should specially provide the contrary.

The first clause should be understood to mean only that the

special penal laws are controlling with regard to offenses therein
specifically punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule
of statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail over
general ones. Lex specialis derogant generali. In fact, the clause
can be considered as a superfluity, and could have been
eliminated altogether. The second clause contains the soul of the
article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in
the provision that the “code shall be supplementary” to special
laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary.

8. Miriam Armi Jao Yu vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 134172, September 20, 2004, 481 Phil. 780

Facts:
On March 25, 1991, petitioner was charged with 19 counts of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Regional Trial
Court. Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty.
After hearing, the trial court rendered a Decision finding her guilty
of the charges and imposing upon her with fines and to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of the fine and
to pay the costs of suit. Accused appealed the decision in the
Court of Appeals who affirmed in toto the trial court’s Decision.
Hence this case.

Issue:
Whether the accused found guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 221 be made to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case he
fails to pay the fines imposed by the trial court for such violations?

Held:
Yes, The imposition of subsidiary imprisonment is expressly
provided under Articles 38 and 39 of the Revised Penal Code. The
SC also hold that the above provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment can be applied suppletorily to Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 pursuant to Article 10 of the same Code.
Indeed, the absence of an express provision on subsidiary
imprisonment in Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 does not and cannot
preclude its imposition in cases involving its violations.

It bears stressing that on February 14, 2001, we issued

Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 clarifying the imposition of
imprisonment for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and
subsidiary imprisonment upon the accused found guilty but is
unable to pay the fine he is sentenced to pay. In clarifying the
imposition of subsidiary imprisonment, the Circular states that if
the accused is unable to pay the fine imposed by the trial court,
“there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal
Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.”

11. People of the Philippines vs. Bulu Chowdury, G.R. No. 129577-80, February 15, 2000, 382 Phil. 459

Facts:
Complainants testified that they applied with Craftrade for employment as
factory worker in South Korea. They were interviewed by Chowdury. During
the interview, Chowdury told them that they would be working in a factory
in Korea. He required them to submit her passport, NBI clearance, ID
pictures, medical certificate and birth certificate. They were also obliged to
attend a seminar on overseas employment. After they submitted all the
documentary requirements, Chowdury required them to pay placement fee.
They made the payment to Ong. Chowdury assured them that they would
be able to leave on the first week of September but it proved to be an empty
promise. They were not able to leave despite several follow-ups. Thus, they
went to the POEA where they discovered that Craftrade’s license had already
expired. They tried to withdraw their money from Craftrade to no avail. They
filed a complaint for illegal recruitment against Chowdury upon advice of
POEA’s legal counsel.
For his defense, Chowdury testified that he worked as interviewer at
Craftrade from 1990 until 1994. His primary duty was to interview job
applicants for abroad. As a mere employee, he only followed the instructions
given by his superiors, Mr. Emmanuel Geslani, the agency’s President and
General Manager, and Mr. Utkal Chowdury, the agency’s Managing Director.
Chowdury admitted that he interviewed private complainants on different
dates. Their office secretary handed him their bio-data and thereafter he led
them to his room where he conducted the interviews. During the interviews,
he had with him a form containing the qualifications for the job and he filled
out this form based on the applicant’s responses to his questions. He then
submitted them to Mr. Utkal Chowdury who in turn evaluated his findings.
He never received money from the applicants. He resigned from Craftrade
on November 12, 1994.
The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale. Hence this case.

Issue:
whether accused-appellant knowingly and intentionally participated in the
commission of the crime charged.

Held:
No, Evidence shows that accused-appellant interviewed private
complainants in the months of June, August and September in 1994 at
Craftrade’s office. At that time, he was employed as interviewer of Craftrade
which was then operating under a temporary authority given by the POEA
pending renewal of its license. The temporary license included the authority
to recruit workers.30 He was convicted based on the fact that he was not
registered with the POEA as employee of Craftrade. Neither was he, in his
personal capacity, licensed to recruit overseas workers. Section 10 Rule II
Book II of the Rules and Regulation Governing Overseas Employment (1991)
requires that every change, termination or appointment of officers,
representatives and personnel of licensed agencies be registered with the
POEA. Agents or representatives appointed by a licensed recruitment
agency whose appointments are not previously approved by the POEA are
considered “non-licensee” or “non-holder of authority” and therefore not
authorized to engage in recruitment activity.
Upon examination of the records, however, we find that the prosecution
failed to prove that accused-appellant was aware of Craftrade’s failure to
register his name with the POEA and that he actively engaged in recruitment
despite this knowledge. The obligation to register its personnel with the
POEA belongs to the officers of the agency. A mere employee of the agency
cannot be expected to know the legal requirements for its operation. The
evidence at hand shows that accused-appellant carried out his duties as
interviewer of Craftrade believing that the agency was duly licensed by the
POEA and he, in turn, was duly authorized by his agency to deal with the
applicants in its behalf. Accused-appellant in fact confined his actions to his
job description. He merely interviewed the applicants and informed them of
the requirements for deployment but he never received money from them.
Their payments were received by the agency’s cashier, Josephine Ong.
Furthermore, he performed his tasks under the supervision of its president
and managing director. Hence, we hold that the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellant’s conscious and active
participation in the commission of the crime of illegal recruitment. His
conviction, therefore, is without basis.

27. People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Orilla, G.R. Nos. 148939-40, February 13, 2004, 467 Phil. 25

Facts:
In September 12, 1996 at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, 15-year-old
Remilyn Orilla was sound asleep inside one of the rooms of their house
when she was suddenly awakened by a heavy weight pressing on her body
and found her brother, Joseph Orilla on top of her. Remilyn Orilla noticed
that she was naked from waist down. Joseph Orilla continuously pinned
down Remilyn Orilla’s body with his own. She struggled to free herself from
appellant but her efforts proved futile. Appellant held both hands of Remilyn
Orilla with one hand holding a knife with his other hand. He then forced
Remilyn’s legs apart and inserted his penis into her vagina. Remilyn felt pain.
She also felt some warm matter enter her vagina. Appellant remained on
top of Remilyn Orilla and, after a few minutes, she again felt the same
substance enter her vagina. Joseph Orilla was charged with two (2) counts of
Rape, both Information is identical and reads:
xxx the above-accused, by means of force or intimidation, armed with a
knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with REMILYN R. ORILLA, younger sister of accused, against her
will and consent. xxx

The trial court found Joseph Orilla guilty of only one (1) crime of QUALIFIED
RAPE and imposed on him the death penalty because while appellant
ejaculated twice in Remilyn’s vagina, the first and second ejaculations
occurred during one single body connection. However, instead of dismissing
the second case, the trial court considered it as a qualifying circumstance for
the purpose of imposing the death penalty.

Issue:
Whether the Regional Trial Court gravely erred when it imposed the death
penalty based on the following grounds:
1) Relationship;
2) Minority;
3) Use of deadly weapon; and
4) Second ejaculation

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

Relationship – Article 14 does not include relationship as an aggravating

circumstance. Relationship is an alternative circumstance under Article 15 of
the Revised Penal Code. The list of aggravating circumstances in Article 14 of
the Revised Penal Code is thus exclusive. Based on a strict interpretation,
alternative circumstances are thus not aggravating circumstances per se.
The Revised Penal Code is silent as to when relationship is mitigating and
when it is aggravating. Jurisprudence considers relationship as an
aggravating circumstance in crimes against chastity. However, rape is no
longer a crime against chastity for it is now classified as a crime against
persons. The determination of whether an alternative circumstance is
aggravating or not to warrant the death penalty cannot be left on a case-by-
case basis. The law must declare unequivocally an attendant circumstance
as qualifying to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. The
Constitution expressly provides that the death penalty may only be imposed
for crimes defined as heinous by Congress. Any attendant circumstance that
qualifies a crime as heinous must be expressly so prescribed by Congress.

Minority – Amended Information did not allege Remilyn’s minor age. The
prosecution’s failure to allege specifically Remilyn’s minor age prevents the
transformation of the crime to its qualified form. Since the Amended
Information failed to inform appellant that the prosecution was accusing
him of qualified rape, the court can convict appellant only for simple rape
and the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua and not death. The information
must allege every element of the offense to enable the accused to prepare
properly for his defense. The law assumes that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense

Use of Deadly Weapon – When the accused commits rape with the use of a
deadly weapon, the penalty is not death but the range of two indivisible
penalties of reclusion perpetua to death.

Second Ejaculation – It is not the number of times that appellant ejaculated

but the penetration or touching that determines the consummation of the
sexual act. Thus, appellant committed only one count of rape. Second
ejaculation is not also of one of the qualifying circumstances of Rape.
Therefore, it has no basis in law.

Proper Penalty – To determine the proper penalty, we apply Article 63 of the

Revised Penal Code. Article 63 states that the greater penalty, which is
death, will be applied when in the commission of rape there is present one
aggravating circumstance. The Supreme Court held that the aggravating
circumstance that is sufficient to warrant the imposition of the graver
penalty of death must be that specifically enumerated in Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code. Since it is only relationship that is alleged and proven in
this case, and it is not an aggravating circumstance per se, the proper
penalty is the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua.
29.People of the Philippines vs.Luzviminda S. Valdez, G.R. Nos. 216007-09, December 08, 2015, 774 Phil.
723

Facts:
Among the subjects of the cases were the reimbursements of
expenses of private respondent Luzviminda S. Valdez (Valdez), a
former mayor of Bacolod City, particularly: cash slips were
altered/falsified to enable Valdez to claim/receive reimbursement
from the Government the total amount of P279,150.00 instead of
only P4,843.25; thus, an aggregate overclaim of P274,306.75.

The Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO),

Office of the Ombudsman – Visayas received the joint affidavit,
which was thereafter resolved adverse to Valdez. Consequently,
Valdez was charged with eight cases four of which (SB-14-CRM-
0317 to 0320) were for Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act
No. 3019, while the remaining half (SB-14-CRM-0321 to 0324) were
for the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification… of Official/Public Documents under Articles 217 and
171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). All
the cases were raffled before public respondent.

Since the Ombudsman recommended “no bail” in SB-14-CRM-

0321, 0322, and 0324, Valdez, who is still at-large, caused the filing
of a Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix the
Amount of Bail. She argued that the three cases are bailable as a
matter of right because no aggravating or modifying
circumstance was alleged; the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence shall be taken from the medium period that ranged
from 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years; and applying
Article 48 of the RPC, the imposable penalty is 20 years, which is
the maximum of the medium period.
Petitioner countered in its Comment/Opposition that the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is inapplicable as the attending
circumstances are immaterial because the charge constituting the
complex crime have the corresponding penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Since the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua,
bail is discretionary. Instead of a motion to fix bail, a summary
hearing to determine if the evidence of guilt is strong is,
therefore, necessary conformably with Section 13, Article III of the
1987 Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules. Without
filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter
before the SC.

Issue:
Whether an accused indicted for the complex crime of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public
Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is
entitled to bail as a matter of right

Held:
Yes. Mañalac, Jr. v. People already resolved that an accused
charged with Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents where the amount involved exceeds
P22,000.00 is not entitled to bail as a matter of right because it
has an actual imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua. In
Mañalac, Jr., the defendants argued that they should be allowed
to post bail since reclusion perpetua is not the prescribed penalty
for the offense but merely describes the penalty actually imposed
on account of the fraud involved. It was also posited that Article
48 of the RPC applies “only after the accused has been convicted
in a full-blown trial such that the court is mandated to impose the
penalty of the most serious crime,” and that the reason for the
imposition of the penalty of the most serious offense is “only for
the purpose of… determining the correct penalty upon the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.”

This Court, through the Third Division, however, denied the

petition and resolved in the affirmative the issue of whether the
constitutional right to bail of an accused is restricted in cases
whose imposable penalty ranges from reclusion temporal
maximum to reclusion perpetua. To recall, the amounts involved
in Pantaleon, Jr. were manifestly in excess of P22,000.00. We
opined that the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and that the ISL is inapplicable since it is an
indivisible penalty. The rulings in Pantaleon, Jr. and analogous
cases are in keeping with the provisions of the RPC. Specifically,
Article 48 of which states that in complex crimes, “the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied
in its maximum period.” Thus, in Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents, the prescribed penalties
for malversation and falsification should be taken into account.
Under the RPC, the penalty for malversation of public funds or
property if the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 shall be
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua,
aside from perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to
the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of
the property embezzled. On the other hand, the penalty of prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000.00 shall be imposed for
falsification committed by a public officer.

Considering that malversation is the more serious offense, the

imposable penalty for Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents if the amount involved
exceeds P22,000.00 is reclusion perpetua, it being the maximum
period of the prescribed penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to… reclusion perpetua. For purposes of bail
application, however, the ruling in Mañalac, Jr. should be revisited
on the ground that Pantaleon, Jr. was disposed in the context of a
judgment of conviction rendered by the lower court and affirmed
on appeal by this Court.

The appropriate rule is to grant bail as a matter of right to an

accused who is charged with a complex crime of Malversation of
Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
involving an… amount that exceeds P22,000.00.

The pivotal question is: How should We construe the term

“punishable” under the provisions above-quoted? In Our mind,
the term “punishable” should refer to prescribed, not imposable,
penalty. The October 10, 2014 Resolution of public respondent is
spot on had it not confused imposable penalty with prescribed
penalty. Nonetheless, reading through the text of the assailed
Resolution reveals that the anti-graft court actually meant
prescribed penalty whenever it referred to imposable penalty.
Therefore, in essence, the ruling is correct.

If the complex crime of Malversation thru Falsification shall be

imposed in its maximum period, there is no doubt that, in case of
conviction, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. The
cases, however, are still at their inception. Criminal proceedings
are yet to ensue. This is not the proper time, therefore, to call for
the application of the penalty contemplated under Article 48 by
imposing the same in its maximum period. For purposes of
determining whether a person can be admitted to bail as a matter
of right, it is the imposable penalty prescribed by law for the crime
charged which should be considered and, not the penalty to be
actually imposed.

30. People of the Philippines vs. Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr., G.R. No. 140756, April 04, 2003,448 Phil. 749

Facts:
The accused, with force, violence and intimidation, robbed a passenger bus
routed to Pampanga. When the accused approached and about to rob the
deceased victim, the discovered that the said victim was a member of the
Philippine National Police. The accused then informed the victim that they
will kill him for being a police. The victim plead for his life. The accused
disregarded the plea and shoot the victim multiple times. After the robbery,
the accused were arrested a a criminal cae was filed against them for the
crime of Robbery with Homicide.

Issue:
Whether Treachery in a crime of Robbery with Homicide should be treated
as a qualified aggravating circumstance.

Held:
No, Treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with
homicide although said crime is classified as a crime against property and a
single and indivisible crime. Treachery is not a qualifying circumstance
because “homicide” is used in its broadest and most generic sense.

Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither does it

constitute a crime specially punishable by law nor is it included by the law in
defining the crime of robbery with homicide and prescribing the penalty
therefor. Treachery is likewise not inherent in the crime of robbery with
homicide. Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance in robbery with homicide for the imposition of the proper
penalty for the crime.
32. People of the Philippinesvs. Felipe Mirandilla, Je., G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011, 670 Phil. 397

Facts:
AAA was kidnapped by Felipe Mirandilla, Jr. and three others on or on about
midnight of December 2, 2000 or early morning of December 3, 2000 in
Barangay San Francico, Legazpi City. Mirandilla held AAA in detention for
thirty-nine (39) days in separate cells situated in the city. He carnally abused
her while holding a gun and/or a knife for twenty-seven (27) times,
employing force and intimidation. At least once, Mirandilla put his penis in
AAA’s mouth against her will while employing intimidation, threats, and
force.

AAA was able to escape one afternoon. She was able to reach the house of
one Evelyn Guevarra who brought her to the police station on January 11,
2001. Guevarra bathed AAA and the police gave AAA food. When the police
presented to her pictures of suspected criminals, she recognized Mirandilla’s
face.

The following morning, accompanied by the police, AAA submitted herself to

Dr. Sarah Vasquez, Legazpi City’s Health Officer for medical examination. It
was found that she had hymenal lacerations in different positions of her
hymen, indicative of sexual intercourse, and that she had contracted
gonorrhea.

Mirandilla was charged before the RTC of Legazpi City with kidnapping with
rape, four counts of rape, and rape through sexual assault. Mirandilla
denied the charges against him. He insisted that he and AAA were live-in
partners and that their sexual encounters were consensual. The RTC
convicted him of the offenses charged.

The CA affirmed with modification the RTC ruling convicting Mirandilla. It

found him guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape
(instead of kidnapping as ruled by the RTC), four counts of rape, and one
count of rape by sexual assault. Mirandilla appealed.

Issue:
Whether or not Mirandilla was properly convicted of the special complex
crime of kidnapping with rape, four counts of rape, and one count of rape by
sexual assault

Held:
No. Mirandilla is guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal
detention with rape.

AAA was able to prove each element of rape committed under Article 266-A,
par. 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, that (1) Mirandilla had carnal knowledge
of her, (2) through force, threat, or intimidation. She was also able to prove
each element of rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code: (1) Mirandilla inserted his penis into her mouth, (2)
through force, threat, or intimidation.

Likewise, kidnapping and serious illegal detention is provided for under

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code which states that any private individual
who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any manner deprive him of his
liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death if the
kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

However, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special
complex crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one
kidnapping with rape. This is because these composite acts are regarded as
a single indivisible offense as RA 7659 punishes these acts with only one
single penalty.

36. People of the Philippinesvs. Conrado R. Laog, G.R. No. 178321, October 05, 2011, 674 Phil. 444

Facts:
Appellant Conrado Laog was charged with murder before the RTC
of Malolos Bulacan and a crime of rape of AAA. When arraigned,
appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The two cases were
thereafter tried jointly because they arose from the same incident.

AAA testified that at around 6 PM of June 6, 2000, she and her

friend, Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, were walking along the rice
paddies on their way to apply for work at a canteen near the
National Highway in Sampaloc, San Rafel, Bulacan. Suddenly,
appellant, who was holding an ice pick and a lead pipee, waylaid
them and forcibly brought them to a grassy area at the back of a
concrete wall. Thereafter, appellant struck AAA in the head with
the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and to fall down. When
Jennifer saw this, she cried out for help but appellant also hit her
on the head with the lead pipe, knocking her down. Appellant
stabbed Jennifer several times with the ice pick and covered her
body with thick grass. Appellant then turned to AAA wherein he
hit her in the head and stabbed her on the face. While AAA was in
such defenseless position, appellant pulled down her jogging
pants, removed her panty, and pulled her blouse and bra. He then
went on top of her, sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into
her vagina. After raping AAA, appellant also covered her with
grass. At that point, AAA passed out.

When AAA regained consciousness she crawled until she reached

her uncle’s farm at daybreak on June 8, 2000. When she saw him,
she waved at him for help. Her uncle, BBB, and a certain Nano
then brought her to Carpa Hospital where she stayed for more
than 3 weeks.
During cross-examination, AAA explained that she did not try to
run away when appellant accosted them because she trusted
appellant who was her uncle by affinity.

Appellant died the charges against him. He testified that he was at

home cooking dinner around the time the crimes were
committed.

The trial court found appellant guilty of the 2 crimes. He was

sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for the
murder of Jennifer and Reclusion Perpetua for the rape he
committed to AAA.

Appellant contends that the trial court and CA erred in

appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength. He argues that for abuse of superior strength to be
appreciated in the killing og Jennifer, the physical attributes of
both the accused and the victim should have been shown in order
to determine whether the accused had the capacity to overcome
the victim physically or whether the victim was substantially weak
and unable to put up a defense.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in its decision finding the
appellant guilty of the 2 separate crimes of Murder and Rape.

Held:
Yes, While we concur with the trial court’s conclusion that
appellant indeed was the one who raped AAA and killed Jennifer,
we find that appellant should not have been convicted of the
separate crimes of murder and rape. The facts alleged and proven
clearly show that the crime committed by appellant is rape with
homicide, a special complex crime provided under Article 266-B,
paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code.

A special complex crime, or more properly, a composite crime, has

its own definition and special penalty in the RPC. In one case,
Justice Regalado explained that composite crimes are “neither of
the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes
in Article 48 of the RPC, since they do not consist of a single act
giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies nor do they
involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another.

Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended, provides only a single

penalty for the composite acts of rape and the killing committed
by reason or on the occasion of rape. “When by reason or on the
occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death.”

Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove

both the rape of AAA and the killing of Jennifer both perpetrated
by appellant, he is liable for rape with homicide under the above
provision. There is no doubt that appellant killed Jennifer to
prevent her from aiding AAA or calling for help once she is able to
run away, and also to silence her completely so she may not
witness the rape of AAA, the original intent of the appellant.

The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of

rape with homicide were consummated, and it is immaterial that
the person killed in this case is someone other than the woman
victim of the rape. In the special complex crime of rape with
homicide, the term “homicide” is to be understood in its generic
sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed
by reason or on occasion or the rape. Hence, even if any or all of
the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and
evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly
established by the prosecution, the same would not qualify the
killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant is still
rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the
aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a
generic aggravating circumstance only.

37. Jaime J. Araza vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 247429, September 08, 2020
Facts:
Complainant testified that she and Accused were married on October 5, 1989 at Malate Catholic
Church. She had no marital issues with Accused until he went to Zamboanga City for their
networking business. Accused was formerly working as an Overseas Filipino Worker but
decided to stop in 1993 to join complainant in her business.

One day, she received a text message informing her that her accused-husband is having an affair
with their best friend. At first, she did not believe them. However, that information brought
complainant to Zamboanga to see for her herself whether it was true. Indeed she was able to
confirm that her husband was living with another woman.

She instituted a complaint against the accused and his alleged mistress for Concubinage at the
Philippine National Police. The case was subsequently amicably settled after the parties executed
an Agreement whereby accused and mistress committed themselves never to see each other
again.

After the case was settled accused lived with complainant. However, it was only for a short time.
Without saying a word, accused left complainant. She was looking for the accused and out of
desperation, she sought the help of the NBI to search for him. To her surprise, the accused had
returned to live with his mistress again.

The complainant went emotionally depressed and anxious She was suffering from insomnia and
asthma. Allegedly, she is still hurting and crying. She is took anti-depressant and sleeping pills to
cope with her severe emotional and psychological turmoil brought about by the accused marital
infidelity and having children with his mistress.

A case was filed against the accused for Violence Against Women and their Children on
Psychological Violence caused by his infidelity. RTC found accused guilty of the said offense.
Accused appeal the case to the CA to which it affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in ruling that Araza committed psychological violence upon his wife AAA
by committing marital infidelity, which caused AAA to suffer emotional anguish and mental
suffering.

Held:
Yes, Psychological violence is an indispensable element of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No.
9262. Equally essential is the element of emotional anguish and mental suffering, which are
personal to the complainant. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator,
while emotional anguish or mental suffering are the effects caused to or the damage sustained by
the offended party. The law does not require proof that the victim became psychologically ill due
to the psychological violence done by her abuser. Rather, the law only requires emotional
anguish and mental suffering to be proven. To establish emotional anguish or mental suffering,
jurisprudence only requires that the testimony of the victim to be presented in court, as such
experiences are personal to this party.

In order to establish psychological violence, proof of the commission of any of the acts
enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar of such acts, is necessary.

The prosecution has established Araza’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt by proving that he
committed psychological violence upon his wife by committing marital infidelity. AAA’s
testimony was strong and credible. She was able to confirm that Araza was living with another
woman. Marital infidelity, which is a form of psychological violence, is the proximate cause of
AAA’s emotional anguish and mental suffering, to the point that even her health condition was
adversely affected.

38. People of the Philippinesvs. Wilfredo Layug, Et., Al.,G.R. No. 223679, September 27, 2017, 818 Phil.
1021

39. Bert V. Pascua vs. People of the PhilippinesG.R. No. 250578, September 07, 2020

40. People of the Philippinesvs. Eduardo Prieto, G.R. No. L-399, January 29, 1948, 80 Phil. 138
41. People of the Philippinesvs. Amado V. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-6025, May 30, 1964, 120 Phil. 191

Fact:
The information filed against defendants Hernandez and others in
Criminal Case No. 15481 alleged that on or about March 15, 1945,
and for some time before the said date and continuously
thereafter, until the present time, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and the place which they had chosen as the nerve
center of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating and
cooperating with each other, as well as with the thirty-one (31)
defendants charged in Criminal Cases of the Court of First
Instance of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and also with others
whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown, the said
accused and their other co-conspirators, being then high ranking
officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with the
Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), which is now actively
engaged in an armed rebellion against the Government of the
Philippines thru act theretofore committed and planned to be
further committed in Manila and other places in the Philippines.
That during the period of time and under the same circumstances
herein-above indicated the said accused in the above-entitled
case, conspiring among themselves and with several others as
aforesaid, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously organized,
established, led and/or maintained the Congress of Labor
Organizations (CLO), formerly known as the Committee on Labor
Organizations (CLO), with central offices in Manila and chapters
and affiliated or associated labor unions and other “mass
organizations” in different places in the Philippines, as an active
agency, organ, and instrumentality of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (P.K.P.) and as such agency, organ, and
instrumentality, to fully cooperate in, and synchronize its activities
– as the CLO thus organized, established, led and/or maintained
by the herein accused and their co-conspirators, has in fact fully
cooperated in and synchronized its activities with the activities of
the “Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan” (H.M.B.) and other organs,
agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (P.K.P.), to thereby assure, facilitate, and effect the
complete and permanent success of the above-mentioned armed
rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.

Issue:
Whether the Defendant-Appellant is guilty of the crimes in
relation to Rebellion for being a member or sympathizer of the
Communist Party of the Philippines.

Held:
No, The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and
principle is not to be considered as a criminal act of conspiracy
unless transformed or converted into an advocacy of action. In
the very nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or principle is
insufficient unless the communist advocates action, immediate
and positive, the actual agreement to start an uprising or
rebellion or an agreement forged to use force and violence in an
uprising of the working class to overthrow constituted authority
and seize the reins of Government itself. Unless action is actually
advocated or intended or contemplated, the Communist is a mere
theorist, merely holding belief in the supremacy of the proletariat
a Communist does not yet advocate the seizing of the reins of
Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is not yet actually
considered as engaging in the criminal field subject to
punishment. Only when the Communist advocates action and
actual uprising, war or otherwise, does he become guilty of
conspiracy to commit rebellion. The most important activity of the
appellant Hernandez appears to be the propagation of
improvement of conditions of labor through his organization, the
CLO. While the CLO of which he is the founder and active
president, has communistic tendencies, its activity refers to the
strengthening of the unity and cooperation between labor
elements and preparing them for struggle; they are not yet
indoctrinated in the need of an actual war with or against
Capitalism. The appellant was a politician and a labor leader and it
is not unreasonable to suspect that his labor activities especially in
connection with the CLO and other trade unions, were impelled
and fostered by the desire to secure the labor vote to support his
political ambitions. It is doubtful whether his desire to foster the
labor union of which he was the head was impelled by an actual
desire to advance the cause of Communism, not merely to
advance his political aspirations. Insofar as the appellant’s alleged
activities as a Communist are concerned, the court have not
found, nor has any particular act on his part been pointed to the
court, which would indicate that he had advocated action or the
use of force in securing the ends of Communism. True it is, he had
friends among the leaders of the Communist Party, and especially
the heads of the rebellion, but this notwithstanding, evidence is
wanting to show that he ever attended their meetings, or
collaborated and conspired with said leaders in planning and
encouraging the acts of rebellion, or advancing the cause thereof.
Insofar as the furnishing of the mimeograph machine and clothes
is concerned, it appears that he acted merely as an intermediary,
who passed said machine and clothes on to others. It does not
appear that he himself furnished funds or material help of his
own to the members of the rebellion or to the forces of the
rebellion in the field. The Court find that there is no concrete
evidence proving beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant
actually participated in the rebellion or in any act of conspiracy to
commit or foster the cause of the rebellion. The court absolves
the appellant from the crime charged as the mere fact of his
giving and rendering speeches favoring Communism would not
make him guilty of conspiracy because there was no evidence that
the hearers of his speeches of propaganda then and there agreed
to rise up in arms for the purpose of obtaining the overthrow of
the democratic government as envisaged by the principles of
Communism.

Benjamin ("KOKOY") T. Romualdez vs. Hon. Simeon V. Marcelo and Presidential Commission on Good
Government, G.R. Nos. 165510-33, July 28, 2006, 529 Phil. 90

7. Evangeline Ladonga vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. NO. 141066, February 17, 2005, 492 Phil. 60

Facts:
Accused was charged with her husband violation of BP 22 for issuing checks
on closed account. RTC found her husband guilty and the accused as co-
conspirator of the said crime. Accused appeal to the CA contending that BP
22 has no provision on conspiracy. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
stating that as the BP 22 do not prohibit the application of RPC in
suppletory, Conspiracy to commit violation of BP 22 is valid. Hence this case

Issue:
Whether the RPC is suppletory to BP 22.

Held:
Yes, B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of
the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P.
Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are
necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses
which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not
subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to
such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.

The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal
laws are controlling with regard to offenses therein specifically punished.
Said clause only restates the elemental rule of statutory construction that
special legal provisions prevail over general ones. Lex specialis derogant
generali. In fact, the clause can be considered as a superfluity, and could
have been eliminated altogether. The second clause contains the soul of the
article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the
provision that the “code shall be supplementary” to special laws, unless the
latter should specifically provide the contrary.

8. Miriam Armi Jao Yu vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 134172, September 20, 2004, 481 Phil. 780

9. The United States vs. Fred C. Bruhez, Et., Al., G.R. No. 9268, November 04, 1914, 28 Phil. 305

10. People of the Philippines vs. Li Wai Cheung, G.R. Nos. 90440-42, October 13, 1992, 289 Phil. 105

11. People of the Philippines vs. Bulu Chowdury, G.R. No. 129577-80, February 15, 2000, 382 Phil. 459

Facts:
Complainants testified that they applied with Craftrade for
employment as factory worker in South Korea. They were
interviewed by Chowdury. During the interview, Chowdury told
them that they would be working in a factory in Korea. He
required them to submit her passport, NBI clearance, ID pictures,
medical certificate and birth certificate. They were also obliged to
attend a seminar on overseas employment. After they submitted
all the documentary requirements, Chowdury required them to
pay placement fee. They made the payment to Ong. Chowdury
assured them that they would be able to leave on the first week of
September but it proved to be an empty promise. They were not
able to leave despite several follow-ups. Thus, they went to the
POEA where they discovered that Craftrade’s license had already
expired. They tried to withdraw their money from Craftrade to no
avail. They filed a complaint for illegal recruitment against
Chowdury upon advice of POEA’s legal counsel.

For his defense, Chowdury testified that he worked as interviewer

at Craftrade from 1990 until 1994. His primary duty was to
interview job applicants for abroad. As a mere employee, he only
followed the instructions given by his superiors, Mr. Emmanuel
Geslani, the agency’s President and General Manager, and Mr.
Utkal Chowdury, the agency’s Managing Director. Chowdury
admitted that he interviewed private complainants on different
dates. Their office secretary handed him their bio-data and
thereafter he led them to his room where he conducted the
interviews. During the interviews, he had with him a form
containing the qualifications for the job and he filled out this form
based on the applicant’s responses to his questions. He then
submitted them to Mr. Utkal Chowdury who in turn evaluated his
findings. He never received money from the applicants. He
resigned from Craftrade on November 12, 1994.
The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale. Hence this case.

Issue:
whether accused-appellant knowingly and intentionally
participated in the commission of the crime charged.

Held:
No, Evidence shows that accused-appellant interviewed private
complainants in the months of June, August and September in
1994 at Craftrade’s office. At that time, he was employed as
interviewer of Craftrade which was then operating under a
temporary authority given by the POEA pending renewal of its
license. The temporary license included the authority to recruit
workers.30 He was convicted based on the fact that he was not
registered with the POEA as employee of Craftrade. Neither was
he, in his personal capacity, licensed to recruit overseas workers.
Section 10 Rule II Book II of the Rules and Regulation Governing
Overseas Employment (1991) requires that every change,
termination or appointment of officers, representatives and
personnel of licensed agencies be registered with the POEA.
Agents or representatives appointed by a licensed recruitment
agency whose appointments are not previously approved by the
POEA are considered “non-licensee” or “non-holder of authority”
and therefore not authorized to engage in recruitment activity.

Upon examination of the records, however, we find that the

prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant was aware of
Craftrade’s failure to register his name with the POEA and that he
actively engaged in recruitment despite this knowledge. The
obligation to register its personnel with the POEA belongs to the
officers of the agency. A mere employee of the agency cannot be
expected to know the legal requirements for its operation. The
evidence at hand shows that accused-appellant carried out his
duties as interviewer of Craftrade believing that the agency was
duly licensed by the POEA and he, in turn, was duly authorized by
his agency to deal with the applicants in its behalf. Accused-
appellant in fact confined his actions to his job description. He
merely interviewed the applicants and informed them of the
requirements for deployment but he never received money from
them. Their payments were received by the agency’s cashier,
Josephine Ong. Furthermore, he performed his tasks under the
supervision of its president and managing director. Hence, we
hold that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt accused-appellant’s conscious and active participation in
the commission of the crime of illegal recruitment. His conviction,
therefore, is without basis.

12. People of the Philippines vs. Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011, 669 Phil. 461

13. People of the Philippines vs. Martin Y. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 304 Phil. 725

14. People of the Philippines vs. Luisito D. Bustinera, G. R. No. 148233, June 08, 2004, 475 PHIL 190

15. The United States vs. Andres Pablo, G.R. No. L-11676, October 17, 1916, 35 Phil. 94

16. People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Simeon N. Ferrer, Et., Al., G.R. No. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972,
150-C Phil. 551

17. Roman C. Tuason vs. Register of Deeds, Caloocan City, Et., Al., G.R. No. 70484, January 29, 1988, 241
Phil. 650

18. Paul Joseph Weight vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113213, August 15, 1994, 305 Phil. 366

19. Republic of the Philippines, Represented by The Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) vs. Hon.
Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr., Et., Al., G.R. No. 174629, February 14, 2008, 569 Phil. 98

20. People of the Philippines vs. Ricky V. Hijada, Et., Al., G.R. No. 123696, March 11, 2004, 469 Phil. 284

21. The United States vs. Antonio Parrone, G.R. No. 7038, January 07, 1913, 24 Phil. 29

22. People of the Philippines vs. Yolanda P. Santos, G.R. No. 237982, October 14, 2020

23. People of the Philippines vs. Salvador Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019

24. Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Et., Al. vs. The Secretary of Justice, Et., Al., G.R. No. 203335, February 18,
2014, 727 Phil. 28

25. Rujjeric Z. Palaganas vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. NO. 165483, September 12, 2006, 533 Phil.
169
26. People of the Philippines vs. Apolonio Apduhan, Jr., Et Al., G.R. No. L-19491, August 30, 1968, 133
Phil. 786

27. People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Orilla, G.R. Nos. 148939-40, February 13, 2004, 467 Phil. 253

Facts:
In September 12, 1996 at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, 15-
year-old Remilyn Orilla was sound asleep inside one of the rooms
of their house when she was suddenly awakened by a heavy
weight pressing on her body and found her brother, Joseph Orilla
on top of her. Remilyn Orilla noticed that she was naked from
waist down. Joseph Orilla continuously pinned down Remilyn
Orilla’s body with his own. She struggled to free herself from
appellant but her efforts proved futile. Appellant held both hands
of Remilyn Orilla with one hand holding a knife with his other
hand. He then forced Remilyn’s legs apart and inserted his penis
into her vagina. Remilyn felt pain. She also felt some warm matter
enter her vagina. Appellant remained on top of Remilyn Orilla
and, after a few minutes, she again felt the same substance enter
her vagina. Joseph Orilla was charged with two (2) counts of Rape,
both Information is identical and reads:

xxx the above-accused, by means of force or intimidation, armed

with a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with REMILYN R. ORILLA,
younger sister of accused, against her will and consent. xxx

The trial court found Joseph Orilla guilty of only one (1) crime of
QUALIFIED RAPE and imposed on him the death penalty because
while appellant ejaculated twice in Remilyn’s vagina, the first and
second ejaculations occurred during one single body connection.
However, instead of dismissing the second case, the trial court
considered it as a qualifying circumstance for the purpose of
imposing the death penalty.

Issue:
Whether the Regional Trial Court gravely erred when it imposed
the death penalty based on the following grounds:
1) Relationship;
2) Minority;
3) Use of deadly weapon; and
4) Second ejaculation

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

Relationship – Article 14 does not include relationship as an

aggravating circumstance. Relationship is an alternative
circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code. The list
of aggravating circumstances in Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code is thus exclusive. Based on a strict interpretation, alternative
circumstances are thus not aggravating circumstances per se. The
Revised Penal Code is silent as to when relationship is mitigating
and when it is aggravating. Jurisprudence considers relationship
as an aggravating circumstance in crimes against chastity.
However, rape is no longer a crime against chastity for it is now
classified as a crime against persons. The determination of
whether an alternative circumstance is aggravating or not to
warrant the death penalty cannot be left on a case-by-case basis.
The law must declare unequivocally an attendant circumstance as
qualifying to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. The
Constitution expressly provides that the death penalty may only
be imposed for crimes defined as heinous by Congress. Any
attendant circumstance that qualifies a crime as heinous must be
expressly so prescribed by Congress.

Minority – Amended Information did not allege Remilyn’s minor

age. The prosecution’s failure to allege specifically Remilyn’s
minor age prevents the transformation of the crime to its
qualified form. Since the Amended Information failed to inform
appellant that the prosecution was accusing him of qualified rape,
the court can convict appellant only for simple rape and the
proper penalty is reclusion perpetua and not death. The
information must allege every element of the offense to enable
the accused to prepare properly for his defense. The law assumes
that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense

Use of Deadly Weapon – When the accused commits rape with the
use of a deadly weapon, the penalty is not death but the range of
two indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death.

Second Ejaculation – It is not the number of times that appellant

ejaculated but the penetration or touching that determines the
consummation of the sexual act. Thus, appellant committed only
one count of rape. Second ejaculation is not also of one of the
qualifying circumstances of Rape. Therefore, it has no basis in law.

Proper Penalty – To determine the proper penalty, we apply

Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 63 states that the
greater penalty, which is death, will be applied when in the
commission of rape there is present one aggravating
circumstance. The Supreme Court held that the aggravating
circumstance that is sufficient to warrant the imposition of the
graver penalty of death must be that specifically enumerated in
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Since it is only relationship
that is alleged and proven in this case, and it is not an aggravating
circumstance per se, the proper penalty is the lower penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

28. People of the Philippines vs. Ireneo Jugueta,G.R. No. 202124, April 05, 2016, 783 Phil. 806

29.People of the Philippines vs.Luzviminda S. Valdez, G.R. Nos. 216007-09, December 08, 2015, 774 Phil.
723

30. People of the Philippines vs. Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr., G.R. No. 140756, April 04, 2003,448 Phil. 749

31. Aristotle N. Valenzuela vs. People of the Philippines,G. R. NO. 160188, June 21, 2007, 552 Phil. 381

32. People of the Philippinesvs. Felipe Mirandilla, Je., G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011, 670 Phil. 397

33. People of the Philippines Islandsvs. Silverio Daos, Et., Al., G.R. No. 40331, April 27, 1934, 60 Phil.
143

Facts:
Appellants were convicted of the complex crime of robbery with
homicide and was sentenced to death, to indemnify the heirs of
their victim Felino Dumalo. The say the trial court improperly
declared them guilty of murder, improperly imposed the death
penalty, and failed to estimate in their favor the mitigating
circumstance of having acted upon impulses so powerful as to
have produced passion and obfuscation.

Issue:
Whether the appellants committed robbery with homicide
Held:
Yes. The appellants’ act in pretending to be bona fide passengers
in the car of the deceased, when they were not so in fact, in order
not to arouse his suspicion, constitutes craft; and the fact that in
assaulting him, they did so from behind, catching him completely
unawares, he believing, as in fact he believed, that he had in his
car, not bad men who were plotting against his life, but bona fide
passengers, certainly constitutes treachery.

The appellants’ confessions also show that the liability of each of

the appellants is also the liability of all of them together, on the
ground that Dumalo’s death and the robbery committed against
him were the result of a conspiracy and a previously prepared and
conceived plan which was later carefully carried out by them, each
of them having contributed with separate acts which, although
less effective, were indispensable to the attainment of the same
end.

It is obvious that the appellants committed the crime of robbery

with homicide, clearly and conclusively proven by the prosecution.

The elements of robbery and those of homicide were conclusively

proven by the prosecution in this case which is for robbery with
homicide. The appellants’ act was the result of the plan which the
three had previously conceived in order to absolutely insure its
execution without risk to any of them. In the commission of the
crime, the aggravating circumstances of craft and treachery
should be taken into consideration.
34. People of the Philippinesvs. Domingo S. Salazar, Et., Al., G.R. No. 99355, August 11, 1997, 342 Phil.
745

35People of the Philippinesvs. Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Et., Al., G.R. Nos. 138874-75, February 03, 2004,
466 Phil. 324

36. People of the Philippinesvs. Conrado R. Laog, G.R. No. 178321, October 05, 2011, 674 Phil. 444

37. Jaime J. Araza vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 247429, September 08, 2020

Facts:
Complainant testified that she and Accused were married on
October 5, 1989 at Malate Catholic Church. She had no marital
issues with Accused until he went to Zamboanga City for their
networking business. Accused was formerly working as an
Overseas Filipino Worker but decided to stop in 1993 to join
complainant in her business.

One day, she received a text message informing her that her
accused-husband is having an affair with their best friend. At first,
she did not believe them. However, that information brought
complainant to Zamboanga to see for her herself whether it was
true. Indeed she was able to confirm that her husband was living
with another woman.

She instituted a complaint against the accused and his alleged

mistress for Concubinage at the Philippine National Police. The
case was subsequently amicably settled after the parties executed
an Agreement whereby accused and mistress committed
themselves never to see each other again.

After the case was settled accused lived with complainant.

However, it was only for a short time. Without saying a word,
accused left complainant. She was looking for the accused and out
of desperation, she sought the help of the NBI to search for him.
To her surprise, the accused had returned to live with his mistress
again.

The complainant went emotionally depressed and anxious She

was suffering from insomnia and asthma. Allegedly, she is still
hurting and crying. She is took anti-depressant and sleeping pills
to cope with her severe emotional and psychological turmoil
brought about by the accused marital infidelity and having
children with his mistress.

A case was filed against the accused for Violence Against Women
and their Children on Psychological Violence caused by his
infidelity. RTC found accused guilty of the said offense. Accused
appeal the case to the CA to which it affirmed the decision of the
RTC in toto.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in ruling that Araza committed
psychological violence upon his wife AAA by committing marital
infidelity, which caused AAA to suffer emotional anguish and
mental suffering.

Held:
Yes, Psychological violence is an indispensable element of
violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262. Equally essential is the
element of emotional anguish and mental suffering, which are
personal to the complainant. Psychological violence is the means
employed by the perpetrator, while emotional anguish or mental
suffering are the effects caused to or the damage sustained by
the offended party. The law does not require proof that the victim
became psychologically ill due to the psychological violence done
by her abuser. Rather, the law only requires emotional anguish
and mental suffering to be proven. To establish emotional
anguish or mental suffering, jurisprudence only requires that the
testimony of the victim to be presented in court, as such
experiences are personal to this party.

In order to establish psychological violence, proof of the

commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or
similar of such acts, is necessary.

The prosecution has established Araza’s guilt beyond reasonable

doubt by proving that he committed psychological violence upon
his wife by committing marital infidelity. AAA’s testimony was
strong and credible. She was able to confirm that Araza was living
with another woman. Marital infidelity, which is a form of
psychological violence, is the proximate cause of AAA’s emotional
anguish and mental suffering, to the point that even her health
condition was adversely affected.

38. People of the Philippinesvs. Wilfredo Layug, Et., Al.,G.R. No. 223679, September 27, 2017, 818 Phil.
1021

39. Bert V. Pascua vs. People of the PhilippinesG.R. No. 250578, September 07, 2020

Facts:
Perlas-Bernabe, J.: Pascua was charged with violations of Section 5 and 11 of
Article 2 of RA 9165 for selling and possessing shabu. Upon arraignment,
Pascua pleaded not guilty, however he later filed a motion to allow accused
to enter into plea bargaining agreement wherein he offered to enter into a
plea of guilty to the lesser offense. Prosecution opposed and stated that per
DOJ circular no. 027-18, the state’s consent is necessary before the accused
can plead to a lesser offense. The RTC allowed Pascua to enter into a plea of
guilty for the lesser offense however it was also stated that was ineligible for
probation for criminal case no. 18805 where he then applied for probation
for criminal case no 18806. He then moved for a reconsideration for the
pervious order that made him ineligible for probation for criminal case no.
18805 which was denied. The case was then moved to the CA wherein the
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the RTC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion.

Held:
The petition is partly granted. CA is mistaken as the said remark should be
simply regarded as a recognition and reminder of the general rule provided
in Section 24 that any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing
under this Act shall be ineligible for probation. Moreover, the CA’s view is
not supported neither by the very wording of Section 24, Article II of RA
9165 nor the provisions of the Probation Law. It likewise disregards the legal
consequences of plea bargaining. It bears stressing that it is only after the
trial court arrives at a judgment of conviction can the provisions of the
Probation Law apply. “Probation” is defined under Section 3 (a) thereof as “a
disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and sentence, is
released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision
of a probation officer.

40. People of the Philippinesvs. Eduardo Prieto, G.R. No. L-399, January 29, 1948, 80 Phil. 138

Fact:
The appellant was prosecuted in the People’s Court for treason on
7 counts. After pleading not guilty he entered a plea of guilty to
counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained the original plea to counts 4,
5, and 6. The special prosecutor introduced evidence only on
count 4, stating with reference to counts 5 and 6 that he did not
have sufficient evidence to sustain them. The defendant was
found guilty on count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3, and 7 and was
sentenced to death and to pay the fine of P20,000.

Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do

not coincide on any single detail. These witnesses evidently
referred to two different occasions.

Issues:
1. Whether the crime of Treason was sufficiently proven by the
prosecutor?
2. Whether Treason can be complexed with the crime of Murder?

Held:
1. No, This evidence does not testify the two-witness principle. The
two witnesses failed to corroborate each other not only on the
whole overt act but on any part of it.
2. In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only
be accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes
of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation.
This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a
criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even
so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes
identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a
separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to
increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
provides.
This rule would not, of course, preclude the punishment of
murder or physical injuries as such if the government should elect
to prosecute the culprit specifically for those crimes instead on
relying on them as an element of treason. it is where murder or
physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason that they can
not be regarded separately under their general denomination.

41. People of the Philippinesvs. Amado V. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-6025, May 30, 1964, 120 Phil. 191

42. People of the Philippinesvs. Amado V. Hernandez,G.R. Nos. L-6025-26, July 18, 1956, 99 Phil. 515

43. People of the Philippinesvs. Ricardo Mendoza, G.R. No. 39275, December 20, 1933,59 Phil. 163