Putative self-defence
At the start of the trial, it appeared Pistorius would argue "putative self-defence". He cannot use
the basic self-defence principle because there was no actual threat to his life. Putative self-
defence means the accused genuinely believed their life was under threat and used "reasonable
means" to protect themselves. Defence lawyer Barry Roux has sought to show that Pistorius was
vulnerable due to his disability and had previously fallen victim to violent crime. Pistorius told
the court he was "extremely fearful, overcome with a sense of terror and vulnerability" in the
moments before he fired the gun. But one piece of evidence that might damage this defence is
Pistorius's written gun competency test, taken in 2012 so he could obtain a licence. The athlete
explains, in his own handwriting, when a gun owner is allowed to use lethal force against an
intruder. "Attack must be against you. Must be unlawful. Must be against person," he wrote.
"Know your target, and what lies beyond."
Private versus putative private defence – what is the difference?
Private defence is a defence excluding unlawfulness, which is judged objectively and
‘putative’ or ‘supposed’ private defence, relates to the mental state of the accused.
Where the accused raises the defence of private defence, the judicial inquiry
commences with an examination of the unlawfulness or the lawfulness of the accused’s
conduct. If the conduct is lawful, then an acquittal results. If the conduct is unlawful,
then the inquiry might not end there. Provided a foundation is laid for the ‘putative’
private defence, then the court proceeds to examine whether the accused genuinely,
albeit mistakenly, believed that he or she was acting in lawful private defence (where
the charge requires intention to be proved) or whether this belief was also held on
reasonable grounds (where negligence is sufficient for liability). The use of force in
private defence is justified if it was reasonably necessary to repel an unlawful invasion
of person, property or other legal interest, and the test of whether an accused had
acted justifiably is an objective one. Putative private defence on the other hand could
be raised successfully to show lack of intention where an accused had acted
defensively in the honest but erroneous belief that his life or property was in danger.
In S v De Oliveira 1993 (2) SACR 59 (A), the appellate division held that the difference
between private defence and putative private defence was significant: A person who
acted in private defence acted lawfully, provided his account satisfied the requirements
laid down for such defence and did not exceed its limits. In putative private defence it
was not lawfulness which was in issue, but culpability. If an accused honestly believed
his or her life or property to be in danger but objectively viewed were not, the
defensive steps he or she took could not constitute private defence. If in those
circumstances he or she killed someone his or her conduct was unlawful. His or her
erroneous belief that his or her life or property was in danger may well exclude dolus,
in which case liability for the persons death based on intention will also be excluded, at
worst for him or her, he or she could then be convicted of culpable homicide. The
appellant was convicted of murder and two counts of attempted murder. The
appellant’s wife had alerted the appellant to the fact that there were unknown men
outside the house. The appellant took his firearm and fired six shots towards the
driveway. One shot hit a long standing employee of the appellant injuring him and
another shot hit one of the employee’s friends killing him. The appellants defence was
putative self-defence. The appellant did not testify in his defence. It was held that in the
instant case where the appellant had not testified as to his state of mind at the time of
the shooting, whether he had an honest belief that he was entitled to act as he did had
to be determined with regard to such other evidence as reflected on his state of mind,
and inferential reasoning. It was further held that there was no indication that any
attack on the house or its occupants was imminent and the appellant was in a state of
comparative safety; in these circumstances it was inconceivable that a reasonable man
could have believed that he was entitled to fire at or in the direction of the persons
outside in defence of his life or property.
In S v Naidoo 1997 (1) SACR 62 (T) the accused was charged with the murder of his
father after he mistakenly believed that he was about to be burgled and discharged his
firearm killing his father. He had been the victim of previous burglary attempts at his
home. The accused raised the defence of putative self-defence. The court accepted that
the accused did not have any intention to kill his father. The accused conceded that he
foresaw as a distinct possibility that whoever was outside the door would be killed by
his shot, that he had sufficient intention to kill in the form of dolus eventualis to sustain
a conviction for murder. The court held that in order to sustain the conviction the state
had to prove that there was a perception on the part of the accused that he acted
unlawfully at the time. The state argued that the accused could not escape conviction
on the ground of putative self-defence. It was held that if a person believed that he was
under attack and the force which he applied to resist the putative attack was
reasonable and necessary to ward off the attack, then he did not have the necessary
knowledge of wrongfulness, which would constitute the dolus necessary to sustain a
conviction for murder, but he could be convicted of culpable homicide. Regarding the
factual question as to whether the state had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
the accused did not believe that he was entitled to shoot in the manner in which he did,
it was held that objectively, a reasonable man in the position of the accused would not
have fired the fatal shot aimed in the direction which he did. Taking the accused
circumstances it was accepted that the accused believed that the force he used was
commensurate with the perceived threat, and reasonably necessary to ward it off. Held
that the accused in firing the shot did not have the necessary knowledge of
wrongfulness to sustain a conviction of murder, but that he had acted negligently in the
circumstances as perceived by him and was therefore guilty of culpable homicide.
In S v Sataardien 1998 (1) SACR 637 (C) the accused was charged with murder. He raised
the defence of putative self-defence. The deceased assaulted the accused and,
thereafter, threatened to kill him and the accused under the impression that the
deceased was reaching for his firearm, drew his own firearm and shot in the direction
of the deceased’s hand. This shot was fatal.
The Western Cape Division, Cape Town held that: ‘One had to regard the accused’s
state of mind subjectively and the court had to place itself, as far as possible, in the
position of the accused at the time of the events’.
The court further held that insofar as culpable homicide was the negligent cause of
death, an objective reasonableness test applied in such a case: Did the accused
reasonably believe that he was in a situation that warranted private defence, and was
the act of retortion performed by him reasonable under the circumstances? In
determining these questions the court had to avoid being an ‘armchair critic’. It was
held that the accused had honestly believed that his life was in danger and accordingly
had not had the intention to kill the deceased and further that the accused had acted
reasonably under the circumstances and had thus also not caused the death of the
deceased in a negligent manner.
In S v Dougherty 2003 (4) SA 229 (W), the Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg held
that if an accused person honestly but erroneously believed that his or her conduct in
killing another was justified then dolus was excluded. The court further held that the
legal position could be understood with greater clarity once one accepted that the Latin
word ‘dolus’ did not mean simply ‘intention’ but meant ‘evil intent’ or something
analogous thereto. The state of mind relevant to a determination of dolus must not, of
course be confused with motive. The court held that the test for justification, although
objective (and even taking into account the qualifications, in particular the subjective
situation in which an accused person finds himself or herself) had to be a high one. The
appellant had shot and killed the deceased and injured another in circumstances
where he had been afraid for his life. Objectively viewed, it had not been necessary for
the appellant to have inflicted the injuries in question in order to protect his life. He
acted unreasonably in shooting at the deceased as he had done. The deceased was
unarmed at the time and clad only in shorts. While the court should not adopt an
‘armchair view’ the objective test was measured against the standard of a reasonable
person. A reasonable person in the situation in which the appellant had found himself
would not have fired the volley of shots, but would have aimed a non-fatal shot or
shots to bring his suspected attackers down and would have aimed with an intention to
kill only if it had become clear that he, the appellant, had not shot to kill he would
probably have been killed himself. It was held that the appellant should have been
found guilty only of culpable homicide.
The SCA has spoken
In S v Joshua 2003 (1) SACR 1 (SCA) the court held that the appellant who had been
convicted of several counts of murder and attempted murder, had shot at certain of
the deceased and the complainant in one of the attempted murder charges, while they
did not objectively pose a threat to him, but while he thought he was in danger of an
imminent attack from them. It was held that at worst for the appellant he should have
been convicted of culpable homicide on the murder counts. He had believed
erroneously that he was still in danger of being attacked by them and that he
accordingly had been entitled to retaliate, when in fact they were turning or had turned
sideways, probably in an endeavour to escape. His erroneous belief that his life had
been in danger excluded dolus.
In Coetzee v Fourie and Another 2004 (6) SA 485 (SCA) the first respondent and his father,
the second respondent, proceeded against the appellant for damages allegedly
suffered as a result of a shooting. It was held that the appellant had shot the first
respondent believing his life to be in danger, but that none of the facts taken alone or
cumulatively necessarily indicated that the appellant had been in danger of an
imminent attack. If the appellant had felt threatened the circumstances required at
least a warning to be given by the appellant that he felt under threat before he was
justified in shooting the first respondent. A firearm was a potentially lethal weapon,
which should be discharged in the direction of a person only as a last resort. The
appellant was found to be negligent in the circumstances.
In short, the law of private defence is
summarised by a full bench of Orissa High
court in the case of State of Orissa v.
Rabindra Nath [19]:
It is the responsibility of the State to defend a person’s body and
property. In the same way, it is the duty of every person to take
shelter under the machinery of the state. But in case such aid is not
available, he has the right of private defence.
Whether or not a person was allowed to use his right of private defence
without the recourse of public authorities depends upon the nature of
threat of imminent danger. The right of private defence of property
commences when a reasonable apprehension of danger to the property
commences.
After the actual danger has commenced, the question of applying for
protection of the public authorities does not arise.
The law does not expect a person to run away for protection under
public authorities when someone attacks on a person in possession of
the property. The moment reasonable apprehension of imminent
danger to the property commences, the right of private defence is
available to the individual. There is no duty on the accused to run for
protection of public authorities.
When a person in possession is attacked by trespassers, he has the
whole right to drive away the aggressors by application of force. When
the person who is in physical possession of the property is
dispossessed by the trespasser, he is entitled in exercise of the right of
private defence to drive away such intruder provided that the
trespasser has not obtained settled possession over the property.
If the accused although has the physical possession of the property but
at the time of attack, if he is not present at the spot, is entitled to
exercise his right to force aggressor to not to enter into the property or
to turn away the aggressor when he comes to know that the trespasser
is getting into possession of his property or is attempting to do so.
If there is an imminent danger to the property and the person in
possession incurs sufficient injury, he is entitled to defend the act of
aggressor without asking for the aid of the state.
When there is no serious loss to the property or no urgency for driving
away from the trespasser, the person must recourse to state aid and
not exercise any offence under the shelter of private defence. Where
such person exercising the right is present on the property at the time
trespass is attempted, he would ordinarily have the right of private
defence as soon as his possession over the property is actually
threatened. There can be an exception to the rule of seeking state aid
in case where the aggressor tries to take advantage of the temporary
absence of the person who has the settled possession of the property
and attempts to trespass to the property.
Just because the location of police station was not away from the crime
scene, it does not mean that a person cannot exercise his right of
private defence. This can be taken into account if it is proved that
could have been timely and effective. The effectiveness of the police
help depends on the possibility that timely information to the police
and obtaining timely assistance from the police was possible and
effective.
In dealing with cases of private defence, a distinction must be made
between enforcing a right and maintaining the right.
If the aggressor was only preparing for the attack, this does not mean
that the other person has no right of private defence. It must,
however, be proved that there was no time to take recourse of public
authorities.
When can a person exercise his right of private defence against
the body to cause death? (Section 100)
1. 100 authorises a person to take away life in exercise of his right of
private defence against body. The basic idea behind Section 100 was
that no innocent person should be punished. If a person has committed
an offence in order to protect his or someone else’s person or property
instead of running away from the spot; the law gives him the right to
defend the concerned person or property [20].
It is the duty of the court to check if the action of the accused is protected
under the exceptions of Section 100 or not, even though the accused has not
taken a plea. It is not necessary that the accused has obtained any injury or
not. Mere reasonable apprehension would be sufficient for the exercise of right
of private defence [21].
The right of private defence can save a person from guilt even if he causes the
death of another person in the following situations:
The deceased was the actual assailant,
There was a threat to life or of great bodily harm must be present,
The threat must be real and apparent as to create honest belief that
necessity exists,
There must be no other reasonable or safe mode of escape,
There must be a necessity of taking life
If the offence which is committed by the deceased and which had
occasioned the cause of the exercise of the right of private defence of
body and property falls within any of the seven categories enumerated
in Sections 100 of the penal code [22].
This Section exercises a limit on the right of private defence to the extent of
absolute necessity. It must not be more than what is necessary for defending
aggression. There must be reasonable apprehension of danger that comes from
the aggressor [23].
The question of private defence arises only when the prosecution has
established that the act of the accused is an offence [24].
Cases in which the right of private defence
can be exercised to the extent of causing
death:
Fear of death: If there is an assault and a person has a reasonable
fear that his death will cause if he will not kill that person.
Fear of grievous hurt: If there is an assault and a person has a
reasonable fear that he will be grievously hurt if he will not kill that
person.
To prove that the person was under fear of death or grievous hurt; the following
conditions need to be fulfilled:
o The accused must not have caused the fault i.e. he must not
have started the encounter first. It needs to be the victim who
should cause the fear of death or grievous hurt without fault
of the accused.
o There must be an approaching danger to life or of great bodily
harm. This danger must be so evident and real that the other
person felt the necessity to cause death.
o There must not be any other safe or reasonable way to escape
from that situation.
o There must be a necessity to do so. The act of voluntarily
causing death can be excused only when the person feels that
it is necessary to act that way [25].
Reasonable Apprehension of danger:
The right of private defence of the body extends to voluntarily causing of death
to the assailant during the assault if the victim has reasonable apprehension
that grievous hurt would otherwise be the consequence. It is this apprehension
in the mind of the victim which gives him the right of private defence to
voluntarily cause death of the assailant [26].
In considering the plea of self-defence, it is not to be considered that how many
injuries have been inflicted upon the accused. It does not matter if any injury
has been inflicted or not. What is to be considered is whether the accused had
any reasonable apprehension of grievous hurt or death to himself or not [27].
Real or apparent danger:
The apprehension of death or grievous hurt which was present in the mind of
the accused to enable him to invoke the aid of private defence is to be
ascertained objectively with reference to events and deeds at the time of the
offence and the surrounding circumstances [28].
Intention of Rape: If a person feels that the other person is
committing assault with an intention of rape; the death can be
committed for self-defence. In the case of State of orissa v.
Nirupama Panda [29], the victim entered into the house of accused
and tried to rape her. There was a scuffle between them and the
accused lady finally stabbed the man and he died. She was not held
liable because she was acting in her right of private defence.
Intention of satisfying unnatural lust: If a person is committing
assault with an intention of satisfying his unnatural lust; the other
person can exercise his right of private defence to the extent of
causing the death of that person. It has been held in the case of Indu
Kumari Pathak v. S. K. Pathak [30] that if a wife refuses to submit
to her husband for cohabitation, the husband is not expected to use
force to make the wife to sexual intercourse. The husband has no right
to cause injury to his wife in enforcing sexual intercourse and wife has
the right of private defence to retaliate the force used on her [31].
Intention of kidnapping or abduction: If a person feels that the
other person is acting with an intention of kidnapping or abducting him
or any other person, he may use his right to cause death of kidnapper.
Intention of wrongful confinement: If a person feels that the other
person is intending to wrongfully confine him or any other person and
if the person is confined, he will not be able to escape or take help of
public authorities for his release. In this case, he can exercise his right
of private defence to cause death of another person.
Act of throwing or attempt to throw acid: This provision was not
present in the original provision but observing the increasing rates of
acid attack, this condition was added after recommendations of Justice
J. S. Verma Committee [32] under which a person, in certain
circumstances may exercise his right of private defence to voluntarily
cause harm or death to the assailant.
If a person is in fear that other person is going to throw acid or is attempting to
throw acid and this may cause grievously hurt; He /she can exercise his/her
right of private defence to cause death of that person. The act of throwing or
attempting to throw acid is an offence under Section 326A and 326B of the
Indian Penal Code.
When can a person exercise his right of private defence against
Property to cause death? (Section 103)
This section postulates that in certain cases, when you have threat to a
property, be it yours or someone else’s or movable or immovable property, you
can exercise the right of private defence to cause death of a person.
In the case of Jagan Ram v. State, [39] the court said that whenever any
offence is committed on a property, it is immaterial that the accused is the
owner of the property or not. However, they cannot exercise this right to defend
the property of other person if that person has entered into a free fight.
This act justifies the mentioned acts when they causes reasonable apprehension
of death or grievous harm. If a person is not in possession of the property, he
cannot claim any right of private defence regarding such property. Right to
dispossess or throw out a trespasser is not available to the true owner if the
trespasser is in the lawful possession of the property at that time. [40].
If a person is appointed to guard the property of his employer, he is protected
under Section 103 if he commits homicide while defending the property from
aggressors. Similarly, a person who is appointed to guard a public property
enjoys the same right [41].
Cases in which the right of private defence
can be exercised to the extent of causing
death:
A person cannot exercise his right of private defence against the property to
cause death of any person except in the following cases:
Robbery: Robbery, as per section 390 of IPC, can be committed in
two ways. Eventually, robbery is an advanced stage of either theft or
extortion.
Theft is Robbery when at the time of committing theft, the thieves eventually:
o Causes death, hurt or wrongful restraint
o Attempts to cause death, hurt or wrongful restraint
o Causes fear of death, hurt or wrongful restraint
o Attempts to cause fear of death, hurt or wrongful restraint
Extortion is robbery when at the time of committing robbery, the person is put
in fear of instant death, hurt or wrongful confinement.
House-breaking at night: As per section 446 of IPC, if a person
commits housebreaking after sunset and before sunrise, the other
person has a right of private defence to an extent of causing the death
of the house breaker.
Mischief by fire: It is explained under section 436 of IPC. If any person
acts to cause wrongful damage to someone’s property, it comes under
mischief. Mischief by fire is considered as the most aggravated form of
mischief.
If a person commits mischief by setting fire on any building, tent or vessel
which is used for Human dwelling; another person has a right to cause death of
that person under right of private defence.
Theft, mischief or house-trespass with reasonable fear of death
or grievous hurt: If any offence of theft, mischief or house-trespass
is being committed on someone’s property, a person generally cannot
cause death of the offender. But if the person is under a reasonable
fear that if he will not cause death of that person, the result will be his
death or grievous hurt, he can cause death of the offender.
It may be noticed in the case of Kanchan v. State, [42] just because mischief
was committed by victim and his companions on the property of the accused,
the accused does not have a right to cause death. There must be reasonable
apprehension that death or grievous hurt may otherwise be the consequence.
In all the above-said situations, although the right of a person can be extended
to causing death of the aggressor, the right cannot be exercised in excess to
what is necessary.
What is the extent of private defence against property in a
situation which is not mentioned in the seven categories of
Section 103? (Section 104)
If there is any other threat to the property which is not mentioned above, the
person cannot exercise his right of private defence to cause death to any
person. However, the person can exercise his right of private defence to cause
any harm other than death to the person who is doing wrong to his property.
(Section 104)
Also, in cases where theft, mischief or trespass if it does
What does the Supreme Court says on the right of private
defence to cause death?
The Supreme Court reviewed the law relating to the right of self-defence
extending to cause death and clearly enunciated these:- [43]
1. It is not a right to take revenge. It is a right to defend.
2. It can be exercised only when the person is unable to get immediate
aid from the State machinery [44].
3. This right can be extended to protect the body and property of third
party as well.
4. It should not be an act of self-creation [45] but an act of necessity
which causes an impending danger and should not exceed than what is
legitimate and necessary[46]. One may cause such injury as may be
necessary to tackle with that danger or threat” [47].
5. Where the person is exercising the right of self-defence, it is not
possible to calculate the amount of force which he needs to exercise.
The person exercising the right does not need to prove the existence of
a right of private defence beyond reasonable doubt [48].
6. The right of private defence is recognized under the law but within
certain reasonable limits [49].
7. Even if the accused does not plead self-defence, it is open to the Court
to consider that such circumstances might exist [50].
8. The fight of self-defence commences as soon as reasonable
apprehension arises, and continues till such apprehension lasts [51].
9. There is nothing which lays down in absolute terms and in all situations
that the injuries incurred by the accused have to be explained! [52]’.
10. Once the reasonable apprehension disappears, the right of self-
defence is not available anymore [53].
11. The plea of reasonable apprehension is a question of fact which the
court finds out through certain facts and circumstances [54].
12. It is unrealistic to expect a person under assault to step by step
modulate his defence
It is well settled that once it is held that the accused had the right of private defence and
reasonably apprehended that death or grievous bodily hurt would be the consequence if
the right of private defence was not exercised, the right of private defence of property
extended under Section 103 IPC to voluntarily causing the death of the aggressor subject to
restrictions mentioned in Section 99 IPC. In this case, if the appellants acted in exercise of
their right of private defence of property, it cannot be said that they committed a criminal
act in furtherance of a common intention, because Section 96 IPC makes it abundantly clear
that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence. They
did not intend to commit any criminal act or to do anything which may be described as
unlawful. Their object was not to kill the deceased but to protect their property. It may be,
that in a given case it may be found on the basis of material on record that some of them may
have exceeded their right of private defence and for that they may be individually held
responsible. But it cannot be said that the murder was committed pursuant to a common
intention to commit such crime. In some what similar circumstances in State of Bihar vs.
Mathu Pandey and others : SCR 1970 (1) 358 this Court considered the question as to
whether the accused could be convicted under Section 302 read with either Section
149 or Section 34 IPC. It observed :- It is well settled that once it is held that the accused had
the right of private defence and reasonably apprehended that death or grievous bodily hurt
would be the consequence if the right of private defence was not exercised,
the right of private defence of property extended under Section 103 IPC to voluntarily
causing the death of the aggressor subject to restrictions mentioned in Section 99 IPC. In this
case, if the appellants acted in exercise of their right of private defence of property, it
cannot be said that they committed a criminal act in furtherance of a common intention,
because Section 96 IPC makes it abundantly clear that nothing is an offence which is done in
the exercise of the right of private defence. They did not intend to commit any criminal act
or to do anything which may be described as unlawful. Their object was not to kill the
deceased but to protect their property. It may be, that in a given case it may be found on the
basis of material on record that some of them may
have exceeded their right of private defence and for that they may be individually held
responsible. But it cannot be said that the murder was committed pursuant to a common
intention to commit such crime. In some what similar circumstances in State of Bihar vs.
Mathu Pandey and others : SCR 1970 (1) 358 this Court considered the question as to
whether the accused could be convicted under Section 302 read with either Section
149 or Section 34 IPC. It observed :-
the
Hon’ble Suprme Court in
the case of Pammi V/s
State of M.P.
100
has held
that the aggressor can’t
avail this Right of Private
Defence as entry in the
house of deceased with the
weapons, was an act of
aggressions, and the Right
of Private Defence can’t be
claimed against an act of Self
Defence.
the
Hon’ble Suprme Court in
the case of Pammi V/s
State of M.P.
100
has held
that the aggressor can’t
avail this Right of Private
Defence as entry in the
house of deceased with the
weapons, was an act of
aggressions, and the Right
of Private Defence can’t be
claimed against an act of Self
Defence.
the
Hon’ble Suprme Court in
the case of Pammi V/s
State of M.P.
100
has held
that the aggressor can’t
avail this Right of Private
Defence as entry in the
house of deceased with the
weapons, was an act of
aggressions, and the Right
of Private Defence can’t be
claimed against an act of Self
Defence.
the
Hon’ble Suprme Court in
the case of Pammi V/s
State of M.P.
100
has held
that the aggressor can’t
avail this Right of Private
Defence as entry in the
house of deceased with the
weapons, was an act of
aggressions, and the Right
of Private Defence can’t be
claimed against an act of Self
Defence.
the
Hon’ble Suprme Court in
the case of Pammi V/s
State of M.P.
100
has held
that the aggressor can’t
avail this Right of Private
Defence as entry in the
house of deceased with the
weapons, was an act of
aggressions, and the Right
of Private Defence can’t be
claimed against an act of Self
Defence.
the
Hon’ble Suprme Court in
the case of Pammi V/s
State of M.P.
100
has held
that the aggressor can’t
avail this Right of Private
Defence as entry in the
house of deceased with the
weapons, was an act of
aggressions, and the Right
of Private Defence can’t be
claimed against an act of Self
Defence.
the
Hon’ble Suprme Court in
the case of Pammi V/s
State of M.P.
100
has held
that the aggressor can’t
avail this Right of Private
Defence as entry in the
house of deceased with the
weapons, was an act of
aggressions, and the Right
of Private Defence can’t be
claimed against an act of Self
Defence.
the
Hon’ble Suprme Court in
the case of Pammi V/s
State of M.P.
100
has held
that the aggressor can’t
avail this Right of Private
Defence as entry in the
house of deceased with the
weapons, was an act of
aggressions, and the Right
of Private Defence can’t be
claimed against an act of Self
Defence.
the
Hon’ble Suprme Court in
the case of Pammi V/s
State of M.P.
100
has held
that the aggressor can’t
avail this Right of Private
Defence as entry in the
house of deceased with the
weapons, was an act of
aggressions, and the Right
of Private Defence can’t be
claimed against an act of Self
Defence.
the
Hon’ble Suprme Court in
the case of Pammi V/s
State of M.P.
100
has held
that the aggressor can’t
avail this Right of Private
Defence as entry in the
house of deceased with the
weapons, was an act of
aggressions, and the Right
of Private Defence can’t be
claimed against an act of Self
Defence.
the
Hon’ble Suprme Court in
the case of Pammi V/s
State of M.P.
100
has held
that the aggressor can’t
avail this Right of Private
Defence as entry in the
house of deceased with the
weapons, was an act of
aggressions, and the Right
of Private Defence can’t be
claimed against an act of Self
Defence.
the
Hon’ble Suprme Court in
the case of Pammi V/s
State of M.P.
100
has held
that the aggressor can’t
avail this Right of Private
Defence as entry in the
house of deceased with the
weapons, was an act of
aggressions, and the Right
of Private Defence can’t be
claimed against an act of Self
Defence.
the
Hon’ble Suprme Court in
the case of Pammi V/s
State of M.P.
100
has held
that the aggressor can’t
avail this Right of Private
Defence as entry in the
house of deceased with the
weapons, was an act of
aggressions, and the Right
of Private Defence can’t be
claimed against an act of Self
Defence.
the
Hon’ble Suprme Court in
the case of Pammi V/s
State of M.P.
100
has held
that the aggressor can’t
avail this Right of Private
Defence as entry in the
house of deceased with the
weapons, was an act of
aggressions, and the Right
of Private Defence can’t be
claimed against an act of Self
Defence.
the
Hon’ble Suprme Court in
the case of Pammi V/s
State of M.P.
100
has held
that the aggressor can’t
avail this Right of Private
Defence as entry in the
house of deceased with the
weapons, was an act of
aggressions, and the Right
of Private Defence can’t be
claimed against an act of Self
Defence.
the
Hon’ble Suprme Court in
the case of Pammi V/s
State of M.P.
100
has held
that the aggressor can’t
avail this Right of Private
Defence as entry in the
house of deceased with the
weapons, was an act of
aggressions, and the Right
of Private Defence can’t be
claimed against an act of Self
Defence.
