1. G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967 ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC.

,
HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA,
respondent-appellant. VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.

Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760 with the following
provisions questioned for its violation of due process: refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest
or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in open view; prohibiting admission o less
than 18 years old; usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively
(tax issue also); making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and cancellation of
license for subsequent violation.

The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari.

Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the constitution?

Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals.
There is no violation o constitutional due process for being reasonable and the ordinance is enjoys the
presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. .As such a limitation cannot be
viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such
premises could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. Taxation may be made to
implement a police power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon the local
legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed and injunction lifted.

2. Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho GR L-29646 10 November 1978

Facts: Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or
participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent,
temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying
the permit fee of P50.00.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila violates the due process of law and
equal protection rule of the Constitution.

Held: Yes.The ordinance violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may
withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines
to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit
aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of
law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process
and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

3. Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro

4. . Nunez vs Averia GR No. L-38415 June 28, 1974

(refer to recit)
5. Republic vs Rosemoor Mining & Development Corp GR No. 149927

FACTS: Dr. Lourdes S. Pascual, Dr. Pedro De la Concha, Alejandro De La Concha, and Rufo De Guzman,
after having been granted permission to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato,
San Miguel, Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high quality and in commercial
quantities in Mount Mabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato mountain range. Having succeeded in
discovering saidmarble deposits, the petitioners applied with the Bureau of Mines, now Mines and
Geosciences Bureau, for the issuance of the corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits. After
compliance with numerous required conditions, License No. 33 was issued to them. After respondent
Ernesto R. Maceda was appointed Minister of the DENR, petitioners’ License No.33 was cancelled by him
through his letter to Rosemoor Mining and Dev’t Corp.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was due process of law in the revocation of the mining license?

HELD: There was due process of law in the revocation of the mining license since respondents’ license
may be revoked or rescinded by executive action when the national interest so requires, because it is not
a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.

6. Libanan vs Sandiganbayan GR No. 112386 June 14, 1994

7. Kwong Sing vs City of Manila GR No. 15972 October 11, 1920

8. People vs Herida GR No. 127158 March 5, 2001

FACTS: RTC rendered judgment finding appellant Herida guilty of Murder of HERLITO DELARA by then
and there mauling and stabbing him with the use of knives and bolos, hitting him on the different parts
of the body, thereby inflicting upon Delara serious and mortal stab wounds which were the direct cause
of his death while Nonito Jamilla Jr was acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

Hence, this petition. appellant avers that the trial court judge exhibited bias or prejudice against him.

Appellant points out that over 70% of the testimonies of the prosecution's material witnesses were
elicited by the judge, while the cross-examination of the defense witnesses was to a large extent
conducted by the judge himself He submits that under these circumstances, his right to a fair and
impartial trial was violated.

ISSUE: Whether Herida's contitutional right to fair and impartial trial was violated.

Held: No. Records show that the trial court did intensively question the witnesses. 43% of the total
questions asked of prosecution eye witness Tomas Baniquid came from the judge. However, the judge
also intensively questioned witnesses of the defense. When appellant Herida took the stand,
approximately 43% of the questions were asked by the judge. This intensive questioning, however, is
necessary. Judges have as much interest as counsel inthe orderly and expeditious presentation of
evidence and have the duty to ask questions thatwould elicit the facts on the issues involved, clarify
ambiguous remarks by witnesses, and address the points that are overlooked by counsel. The judge’s
behavior under this circumstance cannot be considered biased or prejudiced.

9. Cruz vs CSC GR No. 144464, November 22, 2001

Facts: In 1994, the Civil Service Commission discovered that pettioner Zenaida Paitim (municipal
treasurer of Norzagaray, Bulacan) took the non-professional examination for Gilda Cruz, after the latter
had previously failed in the said examination 3 times. The CSC found after a fact-finding investigation that
a prima facie case exists against Paitim and Cruz. A “Formal Charge” for dishonesty, grave misconduct,
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The petitioners, in their answer, entered a
general denial of the formal charge. The petitioners declared that they were electing a formal
investigation on the matter. The petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that if the
investigation will continue, they will be deprived of their right to due process because the CSC was the
complainant, the prosecutor, and the judge, all at the same time.

In 1995, Dulce J. Cochon issued an investigation report and recommendation finding the petitioners
guilty of "Dishonesty" and ordering their dismissal from the government service. The report was
forwarded to the CSC for its consideration, and likewise found the petitioners guilty and ordered the
same to be dismissed from government service. Petitioners maintain that the CSC did not have original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative case. Allegedly, in accordance with Sec. 47(1), Chapter
7, Subtitle A, Title 1, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC is vested with appellate jurisdiction
only in all administrative cases where the penalty imposed is removal or dismissal from the office and
where the complaint was filed by a private citizen against the government employee.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s right to due process was violated when the CSC acted as an
investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge all at the same time.

Ruling: No. Petitioners' invocation of the law is misplaced. The provision is applicable to instances where
administrative cases are bled against erring employees in connection with their duties and functions of
the office. This is, however, not the scenario contemplated in the case at bar. It must be noted that the
acts complained of arose from a cheating caused by the petitioners in the Civil Service (Sub professional)
examination. The examinations were under the direct control and supervision of the Civil Service
Commission. The culprits are government employees over whom the Civil Service Commission
undeniably has jurisdiction. Thus, after the petitioners were duly investigated and ascertained whether
they were indeed guilty of dishonesty, the penalty meted was dismissal from the office. Section 28, Rule
XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations explicitly provides that the CSC can rightfully take
cognizance over any irregularities or anomalies connected to the examinations.

10. Tejano vs Ombudsman GR No. 159190 June 30, 2005

Issue: where Ombudsman Desierto committed grave abuse of discretion?

Held: Yes, attributes partiality on the part of Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the
reinvestigation of the instant case despite the fact that he earlier participated in the initial preliminary
investigation of the same when he was a Special Prosecutor by concurring in the recommendation for
the filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan. Having participated in the initial preliminary
investigation of the instant case and having recommended the filing of appropriate information, it
behooved Ombudsman Desierto to recuse himself from participating in the review of the same during
the reinvestigation. He should have delegated the review to his Deputies.

11. Sarmiento vs Raon GR No. 131482, July 3, 2002

Facts:

Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving sister and spouse,
respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the
properties left by the deceased was her one-half share in a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite, registered
under the name of co-owners Lido Beach Corporation and Filomena Bernardo. On January 25, 1996,
respondents instituted against petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for ejectment alleging that
during the lifetime of Filomena Bernardo, she leased her share in the property to petitioner for a period
of five years counted from 1986; that the said lease expired and was not extended thereafter; and that
petitioner refused to vacate the property despite demands therefor. Summons was served on Roberto
Samartino, brother of petitioner. At the time of service of summons at petitioner’s house, he was not at
home as he was then confined at the National Bureau of Investigation Treatment and Rehabilitation
Center (NBI-TRC), Tagaytay City since January 19, 1996, where he was undergoing treatment and
rehabilitation for drug dependency. Thus, on February 2, 1996, a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared
before the trial court with a certification that petitioner will be unable to comply with the directive to
answer the complaint within the reglementary period, inasmuch as it will take six months for him to
complete the rehabilitation program and before he can be recommended for discharge by the
Rehabilitation Committee.
Issue:

Whether or not the right of petitioner to due process is violated.

Ruling:

Yes. The trial court’s failure to give petitioner a reasonable opportunity to file his answer violated his
right to due process. There being no valid substituted service of summons, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. It should be emphasized that the service of summons is not
only required to give the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also to afford the latter
an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him. Thus, compliance with the rules regarding
the service of summons is as much an issue of due process as of jurisdiction. The essence of due process
is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of his defense. It is elementary that before a person can be deprived of his property, he should
first be informed of the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is premised.

12. Bautista vs CA GR No. 157219 May 28, 2004

Facts:

On August 12, 1999, petitioners Natividad E. Bautista, Clemente E. Bautista and Socorro L. Angeles filed a
complaint against respondent Manila Papermills, International, Inc. for quieting of title. This complaint
was later amended to implead respondents Adelfa Properties, Inc. and the spouses Rodolfo and Nelly
Javellana. fter several delays spanning more than two years, the case was finally set for trial. However,
on May 2, 2002, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Postponement to cancel the hearing on the
ground that Atty. Michael Macaraeg, the lawyer assigned to the case was in the United States attending
to an important matter. The trial court denied petitioners motion for postponement and considered
them as having waived the presentation of their evidence.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a violation to due process.

Ruling:

No, due process is not violated. Petitioners’ contention that they were denied due process is not well-
taken. Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so,
he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is
accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without
violating the constitutional guarantee.

13. Ynot vs IAC GR No. 74457 March 20, 1987

Facts:

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo
when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the
violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive
order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was
sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the
decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.

Issue:

Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Ruling:

The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626
in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court
said that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the
inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they
can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the
carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition,
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due
process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon
the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.

14. Mariveles Shipyard vs CA GR No. 144134 November 11, 2003

FACTS: Petitioner submits that respondent Court of Appeals (CA) erred in its decisions in the previous
cases where the petitioner was involved. The latter contend that, among other issues, CA gravely erred
in its affirmation on the National Labor Relations Commission‘s (NLRC) decision that the petitioner
together with ‘Longest Force’, a security agency, are jointly and severally liable for the payment of back
wages and overtime pay to private respondents. The petitioner invokes that it has already paid all the
necessary compensation to the private respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should be held jointly and severally liable, together with ‘Longest
Force’ in the payment of back wages to the private respondents as affirmed by respondent CA?
HELD: Yes.

REASONING: Under Article 106, par. 2 of the Labor Code, ‘in the event that the contractor or
subcontractor fails to pay wages of his employees…the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with
his contractor or subcontractor xxx’. Also, in Article 107 of the same Code, the law states that ‘…the
preceding Article shall likewise apply to person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being
an employer, contracts with an independent contractor…’. Pursuant to the mentioned provisions of the
Labor Code, the Court said that, in this case, the petitioner as an indirect employer, shall truly be liable
jointly and severally with ‘Longest Force’ in paying backwages and overtime pay to the private
respondents. Moreover, the Court emphasized that ‘Labor standard are enacted by the legislature to
alleviate the plight of workers whose wages barely meet the spiraling costs of their basic needs. Labor
laws are considered written in every contract. Stipulations in violation thereof are considered null‘.
Therefore, the petitioner should be held jointly and severally liable, together with ‘Longest Force’ to the
private respondents as earlier decided by NLRC, as affirmed by the CA.

15. Roxas vs Vasquez GR No. 114944 June 21, 2001

Fact: Manuel C. Roxas was the Chairman, while Ahmed S. Nacpil was a Member, of the Bids and Awards
Committee of the PC-INP who invited bids for the supply of sixty-five units of fire trucks. The COA
subsequently discovered that while the disbursement voucher indicated the bid price has discrepancy.
DILG Secretary filed a complaint with the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No.
3019 against the accused. On review, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of
the complaints against the petitioner. However, the Special Prosecutor made a sudden turnabout as
regards to the petitioner and ordered their inclusion as accused in a Criminal Case. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration. The Review Committee of the Office of the Special Prosecutor
recommended that the Motion for Reconsideration be granted and that the charge against the movants
be dismissed. However, Deputy Special Prosecutor disapproved the recommendation. Thus, Petitioner
filed with this Court the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to annul the orders of the
Ombudsman directing their inclusion as accused in Criminal Case.

Issue: Whether the petitioners were deprived of due process when the Special Prosecutor reinstated the
complaint against them without their knowledge?

Held: Yes, the court find that the case at falls under one of the recognized exceptions to this rule, more
specifically, the constitutional rights of the accused are impaired and the charges are manifestly false. In
cases where the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor were unable to agree on whether or not
probable cause exists, we may interfere with the findings and conclusions. The petitioners were deprived
of due process when the Special Prosecutor reinstated the complaint against them without their
knowledge. Due process of law requires that every litigant must be given an opportunity to be heard. He
has the right to be present and defend himself in person at every stage of the proceedings. For all intents
and purposes, therefore, petitioners were no longer parties in the criminal action. Evidently, the Office of
the Special Prosecutor thought so too. It did not give petitioners notice of the reinvestigation, which
would have enabled them to participate in the proceedings. But when it later found probable cause
against petitioners, it should have first given them notice and afforded them an opportunity to be heard
before ordering their inclusion in Criminal Case

16. Villaruel vs Fernando GR No. 136726, September 24, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioner Villaruel, issued a memorandum addressed to the respondents detailing them to the Office of
DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal. After the lapse of 90 days, petitioner failed and refused to
reinstate respondents to their mother unit. Without acting on respondents’ request for reconsideration,
petitioner issued a memorandum on addressed to Abarca placing him under “preventive suspension” for
90 days without pay pending investigation for alleged grave misconduct.

Respondents requested Secretary Garcia to lift the detail order and to order their return to their mother
unit since more than 90 days had already lapsed. Respondents alsosought the intervention of the
Ombudsman in their case. As a result, the Ombudsman inquired from Secretary Garcia the action taken
on respondents’ request for reconsideration of the detail order. Secretary Garcia replied to the
Ombudsman that he had issued a memorandum directing petitioner to recall respondents to their
mother unit. Despite repeated demands by respondents, petitioner failed and refused to reinstate
respondents to their mother unit.

Respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus and Damages with Prayer for a Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction. the trial court granted respondents’ prayer for a preliminary mandatory injunction. The trial
court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering petitioner to comply with the order of
Secretary Garcia directing petitioner to recall respondents to their mother unit until further orders by
the trial court. For petitioner’s continued failure to comply with the writ of preliminary injunction,
respondents moved to cite petitioner in contempt. Respondents also moved to declare petitioner in
default for not filing an answer within the period prescribed in the trial court’s order.

HELD:

Petitioner not denied of due process. Due process, in essence, is simply an opportunity to be heard[19]
and this opportunity was not denied petitioner. Throughout the proceedings in the trial court as well as
in the Court of Appeals, petitioner had the opportunity to present his side but he failed to do so. Clearly,
petitioner’s former counsel, the OSG, was negligent. This negligence, however, binds petitioner. The trial
and appellate courts correctly ruled that the negligence of the OSG could not relieve petitioner of the
effects such negligence[20] and prevent the decision of the trial court from becoming final and
executory.

As a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. Only when the application of the
general rule would result in serious injustice should an exception thereto be called for. “

In the present case, there was no proof that petitioner suffered serious injustice to exempt him from the
general rule that the negligence of the counsel binds the client.
Petitioner did not even attempt to refute the respondents’ allegations in the petition for mandamus and
damages.

17. Tropical Homes vs NHA GR No. L-48672

Facts:

Petitioner executed a special power of attorney which expressly authorized its counsel -

To appear for and in its behalf in the above-entitled civil case in all circumstances where its appearance
is required and to bind it in all said instances.

Petitioner's counsel presented said power of attorney during the scheduled pre-trial. After reading the
same, respondent judge then and there dictated in open court an order declaring petitioner in default
for failure to appear at the pre-trial since the power of attorney the petitioner had executed in favor of
its counsel did not satisfy the requirements of Sec. 1, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court in that no mention is
made therein of the attorney's authority to bind his client during the pre-trial, and ordering the plaintiff
therein to present its evidence ex parte.

Issue:

Was the power of attorney executed by the petitioner sufficient?

Held:

Yes.

Although the power of attorney in question does not specifically mention the authority of petitioner's
counsel to appear and bind the petitioner at the pre-trial conference, the terms of said power of
attorney are comprehensive enough as to include the authority to appear for the petitioner at the pre-
trial conference.

Once more, the Court admonishes trial judges against issuing precipitate orders of default as these have
the effect of denying a litigant the chance to be heard, and in order to prevent needless litigations in the
appellate courts where time is needed for more important or complicated cases. While there are
instances when a party may be properly defaulted, these should be the exception rather than the rule,
and should be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal or inordinate neglect to comply with the
orders of the court. Absent such a showing, a party must be given every reasonable opportunity to
present his side and to refute the evidence of the adverse party in deference to due process of law.

18. Benedicto vs CA GR No. 125359, September 4, 2001

FACTS: In 1991 to 1992, petitioners, together with former First Lady Imelda Marcos, werecharged with
twenty-five informations at the RTC for dollar salting violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960. The
complaints alleged that petitioners maintained foreign exchange abroad without prior authorization
from and failed toreport earnings or receipts to the CB. Meanwhile, CB Circular No. 1318 revised the
rules governing non-trade foreignexchange transactions and Circular No. 1353 deleted the requirement
of prior Central Bank approval for foreign exchange-funded expenditures obtained from the banking
system. Both circulars contained a saving clause exempting from its coverage pending criminal actions
involving violations of Circular No. 960 and Circular No. 1318.

ISSUE: Whether or not the repeal of CB 960 by Circular 1353 extinguish criminal liability of petitioners?

HELD: No. Generally, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving a courtof its authority
to punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior toits repeal. This is because an unqualified
repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of rendering legal what had been previously declared as
illegal,such that the offense no longer exists and it is as if the person who committed it never did so.
Inclusion of a saving clause in the repealing statute that provides that therepeal shall have no effect on
pending actions.2. repealing act reenacts the former statute and punishes the act previously
penalizedunder the old law. In such instance, the act committed before the reenactment continuesto be
an offense in the statute books and pending cases are not affected regardlessof whether the new
penalty to be imposed is more favorable to the accused.

19. Ang Tibay vs CIR GR No. L-46496 February 27, 1940

Facts:

There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union,
Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather material
claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically
discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is
desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau
of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. That
National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or
employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the
NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to
the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU.
But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.

Issue:

Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.

Held:

To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the

CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically
stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No.
103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated
judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere
receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is
essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and
deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant,
the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic
law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises
judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes
between employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any
question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or
affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and
tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them,
subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.

As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to
point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules
of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such
manner as it may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity
of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can in
justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There cardinal primary
rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's

cause and submit evidence in support thereof;
The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
The decision must have something to support itself;
The evidence must be substantial;
The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing;
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected;
The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely

attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is
hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded
to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such
evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with
the requirements set forth. So ordered.

20. Namil vs Comelec GR No. 150540 October 28, 2003

Facts:
On May 20, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang,
Sultan Kudarat proclaimed the petitioners as winning candidates for
their Sangguniang Bayan. The following day, herein private respondents
were proclaimed winners as well. Private respondents claimed that
they should be recognized as the winners, and not the petitioners.
Upon receipt of such letter, the Commissioner-in-charge for Region XII
asked the Law Department, the Regional Election Registrar and the
Provincial Elections Supervisor to submit their reports on the matter.
All of them found the second proclamation valid. Hence, the COMELEC
issued a Resolution ordering the immediate installation of the private
respondents as the newly elected members of the Sangguniang Bayan,
even though petitioners herein have already taken their oath and have
assumed office. Petitioners contend that such Resolution is null and
void because they were not accorded due notice and hearing, hence
constituting a violation of the due process principle.

Issue:

Whether or Not due the COMELEC has the power to suspend a proclamation
or the effects thereof without notice and hearing.

Held:

No. The COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a

proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice
and hearing. The proclamation on May 20, 2001 enjoys the presumption
of regularity and validity since no contest or protest was even filed
assailing the same. The petitioners cannot be removed from office
without due process of law. Due process in quasi-judicial proceedings
before the COMELEC requires due notice and hearing. Furthermore, the
proclamation of a winning candidate cannot be annulled if he has not
been notified of any motion to set aside his proclamation. Hence, as
ruled in Fariñas vs. COMELEC, Reyes vs. COMELEC and Gallardo vs.
COMELEC, the COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a
proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice
and hearing.

c. Equal protection
Cases:
1. Philippine Association of Service Importer vs Drilon GR No. 81958 June 30, 1988
Facts:

Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged

principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of
overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of
Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the
Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household
Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males
and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only
to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in
violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of
the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the
Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may
be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE
submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the
police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent
have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists
bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism
providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and
protection of the Filipino workers.

Issue:

Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged

Department Order No. 1.

Held:

SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid

classification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a
class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class
was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to
female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before
the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of
rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided
that:

Such classification rests on substantial distinctions

That they are germane to the purpose of the law
They are not confined to existing conditions
They apply equally to al members of the same class

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial

distinctions.

Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence
of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the
right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the
requirements of “public safety” as may be provided by law. Deployment
ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power.
Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the
contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise
of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making
powers.

2. Himagan vs People GR No. 113811, October 7, 1994

FACTS:
Himagan was a policeman charged with murder and attempted murder before the RTC. In the course
thereof, the trial court issued an Order suspending him until the termination of the case on the basis of
Section 47, R.A. 6975 (Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), to wit: Sec. 47.
Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. — Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient
in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law
is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office
until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within
ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.

Himagan filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension, relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil
Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. The RTC denied the same.

Himagan went to the SC via petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of respondent
Judge and to command him to lift petitioner’s preventive suspension.

Contentions of Himagan: (1) while the first sentence of Sec. 47 provides that the accused who is charged
with grave felonies where the penalty imposed is six years and one day shall be suspended from office
“until the case is terminated”, the second sentence of the same section mandates that the case, which
shall be subject to continuous trial, shall be terminated within 90 days from the arraignment of the
accused; (2) an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law
and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

Sec. 42 of PD 807 (Civil Service Decree), which limits the maximum period of suspension to ninety (90)
days, provides: Sec. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. — When
the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally
decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of
the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in
the service; Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or
petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 47 of R.A. 6975 violates Himagan’s constitutional right to equal protection of the
laws.

RULING:
No. First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP
charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the
termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case.

The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90)
days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of
each other.

The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time frame within which the trial
should be finished. Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the
suspension of accused be lifted? The answer is certainly no.

While the law uses the mandatory word “shall” before the phrase “be terminated within ninety (90)
days”, there is nothing in R.A. 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be
lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period.

Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be
subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or
civil liability.

If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a
speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court
refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus,
or secure his liberty by habeas corpus. Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807.

A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of preventive suspension in
pending administrative investigation, not in criminal cases, as here. What is more, Section 42 expressly
limits the period of preventive suspension to ninety (90) days. Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which states that
“The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules shall apply to all personnel of the Department” simply
means that the provisions of the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations are
applicable to members of the Philippine National Police insofar as the provisions, rules and regulations
are not inconsistent with R.A. 6975.

Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which limits the preventive suspension to ninety (90)
days cannot apply to members of the PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 provides differently, that is, the
suspension where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years shall continue until the case is
terminated. x x x x The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of
persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive
suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to
harass or intimidate witnesses against them. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious
offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are
obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused
is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of
R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the
laws. x x x x A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative
purpose such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded

3. Almonte vs Vasquez GR No. 95367 May 23, 1995

Facts:
This is a case wherein respondent Ombudsman, requires petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as
chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988" and all
evidence such as vouchers from enforcing his orders.
Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and
Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection
with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled
positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an
employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies
furnished several government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman.

May be erased: [The letter reads in pertinent parts: that the EIIB has a syndicate headed by the Chief of
Budget Division who is manipulating funds and also the brain of the so called "ghost agents" or the
"Emergency Intelligence Agents" (EIA); that when the agency had salary differential last Oct '88 all
money for the whole plantilla were released and from that alone, Millions were saved and converted to
ghost agents of EIA; Almost all EIIB agents collects payroll from the big time smuggler syndicate monthly
and brokers every week for them not to be apprehended.]

In his comment on the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied all the allegations written on the
anonymous letter. Petitioners move to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum but was
denied.

Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted with the claim of privilege of an agency of the
government on the ground that "knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services Funds
and its plantilla . . . will necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies,
and tactics and the whole of its being" and this could "destroy the EIIB."

Issue:
Whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services and salary
vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are classified without violating their equal
protection of laws.

Held:
YES. At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state
secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters and in addition, privilege to withhold the
identity of persons who furnish information of violation of laws. In the case at bar, there is no claim that
military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel
of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information
regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic
sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets
it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar
excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations.

The Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled by fictitious
persons and that the allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal purposes. The plantilla and
other personnel records are relevant to his investigation as the designated “protectors of the people” of
the Constitution.

Nor is there violation of petitioners' right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that
"in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified
complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings before the
Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, there can
be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it
is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the
Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people which keep them from
complaining against official wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the
Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government
because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence,
can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them. On the other hand complainants are more
often than not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers.

Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would violate petitioners' right
against self-incrimination. It is enough to state that the documents required to be produced in this case
are public records and those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are government officials in
whose possession or custody the documents are. Moreover, if, as petitioners claim the disbursement by
the EII of funds for personal service has already been cleared by the COA, there is no reason why they
should object to the examination of the documents by respondent Ombudsman.

4. Telecommunication and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines vs COMELEC GR. No. 132922 April 21,
1998
Facts:

Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the

Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and
television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal
standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able
to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a
result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand,
had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge.
Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the
Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.

Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which
provides:
“Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time
to be known as the “Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and
impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all
radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all
radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to
provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of
campaign.”

Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires

COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines with
payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by
COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out
radio and television stations to provide free air time.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million

pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992
presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands
to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year.
Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and
television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to
require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust
taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost
P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and,
in this year’s elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of
COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime
time daily for such.

Issue:

Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television
broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws.

Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of

property without due process of law and without just compensation.

Held:

Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether

radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government.
Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals
who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and
television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not
own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast
signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to
use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be
burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public
service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and
supervising radio and television stations, the state spends
considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television
stations to provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines
which require payment of just compensation for the print space they
may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast
industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the
case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide
free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry
gets.

As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no

private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air
time to the COMELEC.

5. Philippine Judges Association vs Prado GR No. 105371, November 11, 1993

Facts:
The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to
implement Section 35 of RA 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege
from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration Commission
and with certain other government offices. It is alleged that RA 7354
is discriminatory becasue while withdrawing the franking privilege
from judiciary, it retains the same for the President & Vice-President
of the Philippines, Senator & members of the House of Representatives,
COMELEC, National Census & Statistics Office and the general public.
The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the
law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal
protection clause.

Issue:

Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

Held:

The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due

process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of
justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate
clause in Article III Section 1 of the Constitution to provide for
amore specific guarantee against any form of undue favoritism or
hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection
clause. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. What the clause requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared unconstitutional.
Circular No. 92-28 is set aside insofar

d. Searches and seizures

Cases:
1. Lopez vs Commissioner of Customs GR No. L-27968 December 3, 1975

FACTS:
Sometime in 1964, the petitioner and Reparations Commission entered into a conditional contract,
subject to the condition that the title to and ownership of the vessel shall remain with the Commission
until full payment. Later on, petitioner entered into a contract with one Tomas Velasco, authorizing the
latter to supervise and manage the M/V JOLO LEMA. The vessel however was however apprehended,
searched and then seized by the Collector of Customs. A Seizure Identification proceeding was instituted
against said vessel for smuggling into the Philippines 1,408 sacks of Indonesian copra and 86 sacks of
Indonesian coffee beans, in violation of Section 2530 (a) and (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines. This appeal taken by Lopez directly to the Supreme Court, upon the ground that only
questions of law would be taken up therein.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to interfere with the Seizure
Identification proceeding No. 25/66 pending before the Commissioner of Customs, on account of the
Indonesian agricultural products smuggles into the Philippines through the use of M/V JOLO LEMA

Ruling:
Lopez maintains that whatever powers the Commissioner of Customs had, prior thereto, over seizure
identification proceedings had been transferred to the Philippine Fisheries Commission. The Supreme
Court said that this pretense is manifestly devoid of merit. Said section 5 of Republic Act No. 3512
merely transfers to the Philippine Fisheries Commission the powers, functions and duties of the Bureau
of Customs, the Philippine Navy and the Philippine Constabulary over fishing vessels and fishery matters.
Such transfer should be construed in the light of section 1 of said Republic Act No. 3512, reading.
It is clear that the powers transferred to the Philippine Fisheries Commission by Republic Act No. 3512
are limited to those relating to the "development, improvement, management and conservation of our
fishery resources." All other matters, such as those concerning smuggling, particularly of agricultural
products, into the Philippines, are absolutely foreign to the object and purpose of said Act and could not
have been and were not transferred to the aforementioned Commission. Seizure Identification
proceeding No. 25/66 for the smuggling of Indonesian agricultural products into the Philippines is
certainly beyond the jurisdiction of the Philippine Fisheries Commission.

2. Salazar vs Achacoso GR No. 81510 March 14, 1990

Facts:

Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA,
charged petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty.
Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram directing him to appear
to the POEA regarding the complaint against him. On the same day,
after knowing that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment
agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a
Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there
will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or
intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it
having verified that petitioner has— (1) No valid license or authority
from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy
workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts
prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to
Article 38 of the same code. A team was then tasked to implement the
said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong
policemen, went to petitioner’s residence. They served the order to a
certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated
assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for
the return of the seized properties, because she was not given prior
notice and hearing. The said Order violated due process. She also
alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the
properties were confiscated against her will and were done with
unreasonable force and intimidation.
Issue:

Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or

the Secretary of Labor) can validly issue warrants of search and
seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code

Held:

Under the new Constitution, “. . . no search warrant or warrant of

arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized”. Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of
seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on Article
38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, “We reiterate that the
Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or
arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial
process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the
Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect… The power of
the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is,
obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made
to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution,
it is the sole domain of the courts.” Furthermore, the search and
seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant. The court held
that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify
specifically the things to be seized.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the

Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The
respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of
the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.

3. Harvey vs Santiago GR No. 82544, June 28, 1988

Facts:

This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following:

American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch
Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna
respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders
to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended
petitioners at their residences. The “Operation Report” read that
Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman
was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout
in the “after Mission Report” read that two children of ages 14 and 16
has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for
sometime now.
Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo
negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in
scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters
and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also
found.

Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were

apprehended 17 February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of
the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for
self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged
not for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to
face deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings
were instituted against aliens for being undesirable aliens under
Sec.69 of Revised Administrative Code.

Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for

violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised
Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III
commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but
was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988
Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court
heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain
petitioners pending determination of existence of probable cause.

Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID

agents.

Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to

petitioners.

Held:

While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it

violates the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the
physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The
arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after
close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause
justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense.
The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore
the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules on
Criminal Procedure).

The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant
of arrest is not an absolute rule. There are at least three
exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.)
Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In
view of the foregoing, the search done was incidental to the arrest.

The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of

any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from
questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and
the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made
their detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas corpus
will not be granted when confinement is or has become legal, although
such confinement was illegal at the beginning.

The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration

are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Section
37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a
ground for deportation against them. Deportation proceedings are
administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a
preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in
accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. What is essential is that
there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be
arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with
assistance of a counsel if desired.

Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done
under the authority of the sovereign power. It a police measure
against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country
is found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the
people.

4. Asian Surety vs Herrera GR No. L-25232 December 20, 1973

Facts:
Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent Judge Jose Herrera of the City Court
of Manila, and to command respondents to return immediately the documents, papers, receipts and
records alleged to have been illegally seized thereunder by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) led by respondent Celso Zoleta, Jr.
On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta,
Jr. supported by the deposition of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in connection
with an undocketed criminal case for estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against the
Asian Surety and Insurance Co., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, with principal office at Room 200 Republic Supermarket Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila.
Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Anti-graft Division of the NBI
entered the premises of the Republic Supermarket Building and served the search warrant upon Atty.
Alidio of the insurance company, in the presence of Mr. William Li Yao, president and chairman of the
board of directors of the insurance firm. After the search they seized and carried away two (2) carloads
of documents, papers and receipts.
Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant is void.

Ruling:
Yes. In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct offenses of : (1)
estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud, in contravention of the explicit command
of Section 3, Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: "no search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense."

5. Soliven vs Makasiar GR No. 82585 November 14, 1988

Facts:

In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1)

whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations
for libel were filed against them although the finding of the
existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the
Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2)
whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when
respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first
issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the
resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City
Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by
the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President,
through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration
was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these
developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the
administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual
support.

Issue:

Whether or Not petitioners were denied due process when informations

for libel were filed against them although the finding of the
existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the
Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President.

Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when

respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause

Held:

With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due

process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact
that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion
to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute
the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does
not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his
counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed
completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an

interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of
warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and
the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to
issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by
law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the
Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause
for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate
interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal

responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is
not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he
finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly

laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal
complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases
filed before their courts. It has not been shown that respondent judge
has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the
issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be
sustained. The petitions fail to establish that public respondents,
through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to
amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and
prohibition prayed for cannot issue.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or

lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court
Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and
83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the
Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in
the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.

6. Lim vs Felix GR No. 94054-57 February 19, 1991

FACTS: On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the
Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman
Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro,
and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort
of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot
wound. An investigation of the incident then followed.
Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator filed an
amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing Vicente Lim, Sr. et al of the crime
of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order concluding that a probable
cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused..
On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate
informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail.
On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for
change of venue w/c was authorized, from the RTC of Masbate to the RTCt of Makati to avoid
miscarriage of justice. The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S.
Felix.
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and
manifestations, among others was an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of
the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the
best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal determination of the existence of a probable
cause or prima facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the
mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall
have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause.
Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issued
warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein.

ISSUE : Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the
prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.

HELD: NO. The Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires “x x x
probable cause to be personally determined by the Judge x x x”, not by any other officer or person.
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the
investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The
determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been
satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed
by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest
against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal
determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as
mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had
nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners’ motion for the
transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and recommendation of the
respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.

7. Mata vs Bayona GR No. 50720, March 26, 1984

FACTS:

l Petitioner is accused under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306 "AN ACT GRANTING THE PHILIPPINE JAI-
ALAI AND AMUSEMENT CORPORATION A FRANCHISE TO OPERATE, CONSTRUCT AND MAINTAIN A
FRONTON FOR BASQUE PELOTA AND SIMILAR GAMES OF SKILL IN THE GREATER MANILA AREA".
l The information against herein petitioner alleged that he offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai
game by "selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai
Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned."
l During the hearing of the case, the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the
issuance of the warrant is missing from the records of the case.
l This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the
articles seized
l The court dismissed his motion stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and
examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence
Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP and the court made a certification that the documents were
not attached immediately and that there’s nowhere in the rules which specify when these documents
are to be attached to the records.
l Petitioner’s MR was also denied
l Hence, this petition praying, among others, that this Court declare the search warrant to be invalid and
all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any
proceedings on the matter.

ISSUE:

WON the search warrant is valid.

HELD:

NO. The search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to
the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person
giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

8. Columbia Pictures vs Judge Flores GR No. 78631 June 29, 1993

I. THE FACTS

As a consequence of a complaint filed by the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., NBI agents
conducted surveillance operations on certain video establishments, among them respondent FGT Video
Network, Inc. (FGT), for “unauthorized sale, rental, reproduction and/or disposition of copyrighted film,"
a violation of PD 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law). After an NBI agent was able to have copyrighted
motion pictures “Cleopatra” (owned by 20th Century Fox) and “The Ten Commandments” (owned by
Paramount) reproduced in video format in FGT, the NBI applied for and was able to obtain from the
respondent judge the subject Search Warrant No. 45 which reads:

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

GREETINGS:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the Undersigned after examining under oath NBI Senior Agent Lauro C.
Reyes and his witnesses Mr. Danilo Manalang and Ms. Rebecca Benitez-Cruz, that there is a probable
cause to believe that Violation of Section 56 P.D. No. 49 as amended by P.D. No. 1988 (otherwise known
as the Decree on Protection of Intellectual Property) has been committed and that there are good and
sufficient reasons to believe that FGT Video Network, Inc., Manuel Mendoza, Alfredo C. Ongyanco, Eric
Apolonio, Susan Yang and Eduardo Yotoko are responsible and have in control/possession at No. 4
Epifanio de los Santos corner Connecticut, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila (per attached sketch and
list of MPAA member Company Titles) the following properties to wit:

(a) Pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films the titles of which are mentioned in the
attached list;
(b) Posters, advertising leaflets, flyers, brochures, invoices, lists of titles being reproduced or retaped,
journals, ledgers, jon (sic) order slips, delivery slips and books of accounts bearing and/or mentioning the
pirated films with titles (as per attached list), or otherwise used in the reproduction/retaping business of
the defendants;
(c) Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment and
other machines and paraphernalia or materials used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease,
distribution, or possession for purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public exhibition of the
above-mentioned pirated video tapes which they are keeping and concealing in the premises above-
described, which should be seized and brought to the Undersigned.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day between 8:00 A.M. to
5:00 P.M. of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-
enumerated personal properties, and bring said properties to the undersigned immediately upon
implementation to be dealt with as the law directs.
In the course of the implementation of the search warrant in the premises of FGT, the NBI agents found
and seized various video tapes of copyrighted films owned and exclusively distributed by petitioners.
Also seized were machines and equipment, television sets, paraphernalia, materials, accessories,
rewinders, tape head cleaners, statements of order, return slips, video prints, flyers, production orders,
and posters.

FGT moved for the release of the seized television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head
cleaners, accessories, equipment and other machines or paraphernalia seized by virtue of the subject
warrant. It argued that as a licensed video reproducer, it had the right possess the seized reproduction
equipment, which are not illegal per se, but are rather exclusively used and intended to be used for
reproduction and not in the “sale, lease, distribution or possession for purposes of sale, lease
distribution, circulation or public exhibition of pirated video tapes.”

Finding that FGT was a registered and duly licensed distributor and in certain instances and under special
instructions and conditions reproducer of videograms and that, therefore, its right to possess and use
the seized equipment had been placed in serious doubt, the lower court ordered the return of the
“television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment and
other machines or paraphernalia” to FGT.

II. THE ISSUE

Did the respondent judge act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering
the immediate return of some of the items seized by virtue of the search warrant?

III. THE RULING

[The High Tribunal DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the order of the respondent Judge Flores.]

NO, the respondent judge DID NOT act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
ordering the immediate return of some of the items seized by virtue of the search warrant.

Search Warrant No. 45 fails to satisfy the test of legality. This is more so because the Court has previously
decided a case dealing with virtually the same kind of search warrant. In 20th Century Fox vs. CA, the
Court upheld the legality of the order of the lower court lifting the search warrant issued under
circumstances similar to those obtaining in the case at bar. A striking similarity between this case and
20th Century Fox is the fact that Search Warrant No. 45, specifically paragraph (c) thereof describing the
articles to be seized, contains an almost identical description as the warrant issued in the 20th Century
Fox case, to wit:

(c) Television sets, Video Cassettes Recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipments
and other machines used or intended to be used in the unlawful reproduction, sale, rental/lease,
distribution of the above-mentioned video tapes which she is keeping and concealing in the premises
above-described.

On the propriety of the seizure of the articles above-described, the Court held in 20th Century Fox:
Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners are articles which can be found in
a video tape store engaged in the legitimate business of lending or renting out betamax tapes. In short,
these articles and appliances are generally connected with, or related to a legitimate business not
necessarily involving piracy of intellectual property or infringement of copyright laws. Hence, including
these articles without specification and/or particularity that they were really instruments in violating an
Anti-Piracy law makes the search warrant too general which could result in the confiscation of all items
found in any video store.

The language used in paragraph (c) of Search Warrant No. 45 is thus too all-embracing as to include all
the paraphernalia of FGT in the operation of its business. As the search warrant is in the nature of a
general one, it is constitutionally objectionable.

The Court concluded that the respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion in ordering the
immediate release of the enumerated items, but that he was merely correcting his own erroneous
conclusions in issuing Search Warrant No. 45. This can be gleaned from his statement that “. . . the
machines and equipment could have been used or intended to be used in the illegal reproduction of
tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films, yet, it cannot be said with moral certainty that the
machines or equipment(s) were used in violating the law by the mere fact that pirated video tapes of the
copyrighted motion pictures/films were reproduced. As already stated, FGT Video Network, Inc. is a
registered and duly licensed distributor and in certain instances and under special instructions . . .
reproducer of videograms, and as such, it has the right to keep in its possession, maintain and operate
reproduction equipment(s) and paraphernalia(s).”

9. Del Castillo vs People GR No. 185128 January 30, 2012

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Version of the Prosecution

Eden del Castillo was found in possessionof SHABUin the City of Cebu, Philippines.
On July 21, 2000, a search warrant was issued by Judge Dicdican of the RTC of Cebu City.
At about 10:30 am of July 21, 2000, a team composed a number of Policemenwent to the subject
house to implement the searchwarrant.
The police officers were accompaniedby the barangay tanods.
At the time, the appellant was with her grandmother Elena Rivaral Garcia, the registered owner of the
house, and Servando del Castillo, appellants brother, in the living room.
The raiding team divided themselves into two searching groups and they found three large plastic
packetsof white crystallinesubstanceand other paraphernalia.
Servando voluntarily surrendered five small packs of white crystalline substance.
Appellant was arrested and informed of her constitutional rights, specifically, the right to counsel.
Petallar, one of the officers, then prepared an inventory of the seized articles and appellant was made
to sign the same.
Petallar and Buazon explained that the inventory receipt was dated July 2000 although the raid was
conducted on July 31 because their office had earlier prepared the blank form.
A copy of the inventory was given to the Tanod and thereafter Appellant Servando were brought to the
Police station while the items seized were brought to the PNP Crime Lab and was confirmed to be
SHABU.
Version of the Defense
The house subjectof the search was owned by Elena, appellants grandmother, and her late husband,
Jose Garcia as evidenced by a Tax Declaration, that only Brent Lepiten, Elenas grandson was living inthe
house while appellant was living with her parents in San Vicente Village, Wireless, Mandaue City, a
distance of about five kilometresform Elenas place.
Appellant, who was in the house to visit her grandmother, was having breakfast when the door was
opened. Several men entered thehouse and instructedthem to sit down.
Two of these men carrying an envelope went upstairs and woke up Jamie Garcia. Jaime then went
downstairs and these two men without the envelope followed two minutes later.
The same two men who earlier went upstairs went up again with a tanod and when they came down,
they had with them an envelope, the contents of which were spread on the table and werelisted down.
Appellant wasthen askedto sign a paper where a listing of the contents of the envelopewas made but
she requested to contact her lawyer which was denied. She was forced to sign otherwise she would be
handcuffed.
The list of inventory was neither read to her nor did they leave a copy for her or to any of the
recepients.The RTC found her guilty

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE/S

Whether or notthe lowercourt erred in finding that the raiding team failed to issue a detailed receipt
of seized articles andto give a copy thereof to the lawful occupant in violation of the law?

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT

Yes, the court erred.
The Court found that the raiding team failed to comply with the procedures on search and seizures
provide under Sec. 11 and 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Sec. 11. Receipt for the property seized. Sec. 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to the
court.
Clearly, the detailed receipt of the inventory must be given to the lawful occupant. In this case,
however, P03 Petellar admitted that the inventory receipt was given to the barangay tanod despite the
presence of the appellant and her grandmother which is in violation of the rule.
Likewise, the police officers failedto deliver the seized items to the court which issued the search
warrant.

10. Corro vs Lising GR No. L-69899 July 15, 1985

FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Corro is publisher and editor of the Philippine Times. Respondent Judge Esteban
Lising, upon application filed by Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo of the Philippine Constabulary Criminal
Investigation Service, issued a search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of articles allegedly
used by petitioner in committing the crime of sedition.

Seized were printed copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts or drafts of articles for publication in the
Philippine Times, newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times, subversive documents, articles printed
matters, handbills, leaflets, banners, typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing machines and
tape recorders, video machines and tapes. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall warrant and to
return documents or personal properties alleging among others that the properties seized are
typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines, video machines and
tapes which are not in any way, inanimate or mute things as they are, connected with the offense of
inciting to sedition.

Respondent Judge Lising denied the motion.

Hence, this petition praying that the search warrant issued by respondent Judge Esteban M. Lising be
declared null and void that the padlocked office premises of the Philippine Times be reopened.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition stating that probable cause exists justifying the
issuance of a search warrant, the articles seized were adequately described in the search warrant, a
search was conducted in an orderly manner and the padlocking of the searched premises was with the
consent of petitioner’s wife.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.

RULING:
No. There was no sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. Probable cause as
defined in Burton vs. St. Paul, M&M. Ry. Co., is constituted by “such reasons, supported by facts and
circumstances, as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his actions, and the means taken in
prosecuting it, are legally just and proper.

Thus, an application for search warrant must state with particularly the alleged subversive materials
published or intended to be published by the petitioner publisher and editor of the Philippine Times.
Mere generalization will not suffice. The statements of private respondents Col. Castillo and Lt. Ignacio in
their affidavits are mere conclusions of law and will not satisfy the requirements of probable cause.

The language used is all embracing as to include all conceivable words and equipment of petitioner
regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature
of a general warrant which is objectionable. Prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of
the seized articles is GRANTED and all properties seized thereunder are ordered RELEASED to petitioner.
Respondent officers are ordered to RE-OPEN the padlocked office premises.

11. Umil vs Ramos GR. No. 81567 October 3, 1991

Facts:

On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes

Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential
information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man"
(NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot
wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five
(5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day
before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a
road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The
wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie
Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City
Homes, Biñan, Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name
of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification,
Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof the
CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was
positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the
2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.

Issue:

Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.

Held:

Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed
subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the
arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was
committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance therefore in connection therewith constitute
direct assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing
crimes.

12. People vs Hindoy GR No. 132662 May 10, 2001

FACTS:
 At around 2 a.m., a woman informant came to the station and reported that acertain Bella of
Mandaluyong, would be receiving a shipment of illegal drugs thatday. On the strength of that
information, SPO4 Antiojo organized a team that would conduct a
buy-bust operation.
 At around 3 a.m., the Criminal Investigation Team, headed by Antiojo himself andguided by the woman
informant, went to said address. Two men acted as poseur-buyers, while the others served as backup.
They knocked on the door and BELLA's live-in partner Accused Hindoy opened it.
 Eugenio (police) said, "May bagong dating, kukuha kami (If theres new stuff, well getsome)", referring
to marijuana. Accused Hindoy answered, "Meron (Yes, there is)" so Eugenio gave him one P500.00 and
five P100.00 marked bills.
 After counting the money, Accused asked BELLA to get the stuff. She compliedand brought a brick of
marijuana, with an estimated weight of one kilogram, which was wrapped in newspaper.
 Accused, in turn, handed it over to Eugenio (police). That was when they identifiedthemselves as
police officers.
 After giving the prearranged signal to the backup operatives, he and Cariagaentered the house then
announced that they were going to conduct a search. Undera table, they found a bag made of abaca
containing twelve more bricks ofmarijuana. The evidence was marked then turned over to Prianes, who
transmittedthe same to the NBI for chemical analysis.
 NBI: Specimens submitted is marijuana.
 The accused where charged with two violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
 RTC: Guilty for violating Sections 4 and 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, asamended by Section 13
of Republic Act No. 7659.

RULING:
Affirmed.
1. Whether Accused Hindoy and Bella guilty of illegal sale
—
YES.
 The evidence for the prosecution fully proved beyond reasonable doubt theelements necessary to
successfully prosecute a case for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug, namely, (a) identity of the buyer
and the seller, the object,and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the things sold and the payment
therefor.
Identity of object
 After chemical analysis by an NBI forensics expert, the thirteen (13) blocks ofsuspected marijuana, with
a combined weight of 13.05 kilograms, which werefound in and seized from the residence of BELLA,
were determined to be genuinemarijuana.
Identity of sellers
The identity of ENRIQUE and BELLA as the sellers and possessors of the seizedmarijuana cannot be
doubted, for they were caught in flagrante delicto in a standardpolice buy-bust operation. Such positive
identification prevails over their feebledenial and declaration that the abaca bag which contained twelve
blocks ofmarijuana was only left to their custody by a certain Marlyn.

2.Whether Accused guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs

—
YES.

 Likewise, the trial court did not err when it convicted ENRIQUE and BELLA ofillegal possession of
prohibited drugs punishable under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6425,as amended.
InPeople v. Lacerna, possession of marijuana is absorbed in thesale thereof, except where the seller is
further apprehended in possession ofanother quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or
included in thesale and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by theseller.

 The records, indeed, reveal that aside from selling one block of marijuana to thearresting officers,
accused-appellants were also caught in possession of another12.04 kilograms of marijuana in twelve
individually wrapped blocks, hidden in a bagunder a table in their house. Their possession thereof gives
rise to a disputablepresumption under Section 3[j], Rule 131 of the Rules of Court

3. Whether the evidence was admissible

—
YES.
 It is true that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, The right of thepeople to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purposes shallbe inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." It is equally true that any evidence obtained in
violation of such right shall be inadmissible in evidence.

This right, however, is not without exceptions, as in instances of searches incidental to lawful arrests.
Under paragraph (a), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a peace officer may, without a warrant,
arrest a person when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense.
In the case at bar, upon consummation of the illicit sale, PO3 Eugenio introduced himself and SPO1
Cariaga as police officers. ENRIQUE and BELLA were apprised of their constitutional rights. Thereafter,
the officers searched the room where BELLA supposedly got the first block of marijuana. There, they
found an abaca bag under a folding table. Upon inspection, the bag yielded twelve more blocks of
compressed marijuana inside a plastic bag. The trial court, therefore, was correct in admitting all thirteen
blocks of marijuana in evidence.

13. People vs Gerente GR No. 95847-48 March 10, 1993

FACTS:

Edna Edwina Reyes testified that Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren,
started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant

She overheard the three men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. Fredo, Totoy Echigoren
and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace.

Reyes, testified that she witnessed the killing as follows: Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against
Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood
in the head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim's head.

Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente.

Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police
Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was
brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was
massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object.

Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place. There
they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana.

They were informed by Reyes, that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the
three men who killed Clarito.

The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to come
out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and
found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil.

Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and
Totoy Echigoren, are still at large.

Two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against him for
Violation of Section 8, Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, and for Murder.

The trial court convicted him of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.
ISSUES:
Was there a lawful arrest in the absence of a valid warrant?
Was there a lawful search in the absence of a valid warrant?
Was there a conspiracy to commit a crime?
HELD:

The appealed decision was affirmed.

ARREST

The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed
Blace.

They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the
instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to
bludgeon him to death.

The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her
neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers.

Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace
and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente
without a warrant.

If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two
companions did.

SEARCH and SEIZURE

The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a
valid arrest.

This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.

The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of
arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and
might attack them unless he is first disarmed.

See Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143:

...the individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be used against
the arresting officer and all unlawful articles found his person, or within his immediate control
may be seized.

CONSPIRACY
When there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one conspirator is the act of all.

The conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the
appellant and his companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked their victim
with a piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his death.

See People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588:

When there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by
improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full
faith and credit.

14. People vs Omaweng GR No. 99050, September 2, 1992

Facts:

“In the morning of September 12, 1988, Joseph Layong, a PC constable with the Mt. Province PC
Command at Bontoc, Mt. Province proceeded with other PC soldiers to Barrio Dantay, Bontoc and, per
instruction of their officer, Capt. Eugene Martin, put up a checkpoint at the junction of the roads, one
going to Sagada and the other to. They stopped and checked all vehicles that went through the
checkpoint.

At about 9:15 A.M., Layong and his teammate, Constable David Osborne Famocod (sic), saw and flagged
down a cream-colored Ford Fiera bearing Plate No. ABT-634 coming from the Bontoc Poblacion and
headed towards Baguio. The vehicle was driven by appellant and had no passengers. Layong and his
companions asked permission to inspect the vehicle and appellant acceded to the request.

When they peered into the rear of the vehicle, they saw a travelling bag which was partially covered by
the rim of a spare tire under the passenger seat on the right side of the vehicle. Layong and his
companions asked permission to see the contents of the bag. Appellant consented to the request but
told them that it only contained some clothes. When Layong opened the bag, he found that it contained
forty-one (41) plastic packets of different sizes containing pulverized substances. Layong gave a packet to
his team leader, constable David Osborne Fomocod, who, after sniffing the stuff concluded that it was
marijuana.

The PC constables, together with appellant, boarded the latter’s Ford Fiera and proceeded to the Bontoc
poblacion to report the incident to the PC The prohibited drugs were surrendered to the evidence
custodian, Sgt. Angel Pokling. Major Carlos Figueroa, a PC Forensic Chemist at Camp Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Benguet, who has conducted more than 2500 professional examinations of marijuana, shabu
and cocaine samples, conducted two chemistry examinations of the substance contained in the plastic
packets taken from appellant and found them to be positive for hashish or marijuana.

A criminal complaint was filed against the accused where the judge convicting the accused of the crime
of transporting prohibited drugs penalized under Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
Hence the appeal.

Issue:
Whether the constitutional rights of the accused against unreasonable search was violated even if he
consented the opening of the said bag.

Held:

NO. He willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his
vehicle and travelling bag. Thus, the accused waived his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of (sic) his person or
premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof, he right to be secure from unreasonable
search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.
“Since in the course of the valid search forty-one (41) packages of drugs were found, it behooved the
officers to seize the same; no warrant was necessary for such seizure. Besides, when said packages were
identified by the prosecution witnesses and later on formally offered in evidence, the accused did not
raise any objection whatsoever.

15. De Garcia vs Locsin GR No. L-45950 June 20, 1938

FACTS:

Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac, a
search warrant commanding any officer of the law to search the person, house or store of Leona Pasion
Vda. de Garcia, for "certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents and other papers relating to her
activities as usurer."

The search warrant was issued upon an affidavit given by the said Almeda "that he has and there is just
and probable cause to believe and he does believe that Leona Pasion de Garcia keeps and conceals in
her house and store, certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents, and other papers relating to her
activities as usurer, all of which is contrary to the statute in such cases made and provided."

On the same date, Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the Philippine Constabulary, went to the office
of Pasion de Garcia in Victoria and, after showing the search warrant to the latter's bookkeeper, Alfredo
Salas, and, without Pasion de Garcia's presence who was ill and confined at the time, proceeded with the
execution thereof. Two packages of records and a locked filing cabinet containing several papers and
documents were seized by Almeda and a receipt therefor issued by him to Salas.

The papers and documents seized were kept for a considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board
and thereafter were turned over by it to the provincial fiscal Felix Imperial, who subsequently filed, in
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, 6 separate criminal cases against Pasion de Garcia for violation
of the Anti-Usury Law. On several occasions, after seizure, Pasion de Garcia, through counsel, demanded
from the Anti-Usury Board the return of the documents seized. By motion, the legality of the search
warrant was challenged by Pasion de Garcia's counsel in the 6 criminal cases and the devolution of the
documents demanded.

By resolution, Judge Diego Locsin (CFI) denied Pasion de garcia's motion for the reason that though the
search warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the latter's part. A motion for reconsideration was
presented but was denied by order. Pasion de Garcia registered her exception.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrant is valid by reason of waiver of constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

RULING:

No. Warrant was declared null and void.

Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a search warrant
to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the
judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause,
the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter
may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized.

These requirements are complemented by the Code of Criminal Procedure, particularly with reference to
the duration of the validity of the search warrant and the obligation of the officer seizing the property to
deliver the same to the corresponding court.

Herein, the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant.
All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did not decide for
himself. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even accepting the
description of the properties to be seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt issued
is sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the law, the properties seized were not delivered to the
court which issued the warrant, as required by law. Instead, they were turned over to the provincial fiscal
and used by him in building up cases against Pasion de Garcia. Considering that at the time the warrant
was issued there was no case pending against Pasion de Garcia, the averment that the warrant was
issued primarily for exploration purposes is not without basis.

The search warrant was illegally issued by the justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac. In any event, the
failure on the part of Pasion de Garcia and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the
warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right. It is, as Judge Cooley observes, but
a submission to the authority of the law. As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any
affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an
officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful
submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration
of regard for the supremacy of the law.

16. Manalili vs CA GR No. 113447 October 9, 1997

Facts:
At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City conducted surveillance
along A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. This was done after receiving information
that drug addicts were roaming around said area.
Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen chanced upon a male person, the petitioner, in front of the
cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The petitioner had reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying
manner.

Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but the officers were able to introduce themselves and
asked him what he was holding in his hands. Petitioner resisted. Policeman Espiritu asked him if he could
see what the petitioner had in his hands. The petitioner showed his wallet and allowed the officer to
examine it. Policeman Espiritu found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and
its marijuana contents and took petitioner to headquarters to be further investigated.
The suspected marijuana was sent to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section for analysis.

Issue:
Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is unreasonable, and hence
inadmissible as evidence.

Held:
The general rule is a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant;
otherwise, such a search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Any evidence obtained
in violation of this constitutionally guaranteed right is legally inadmissible in any proceeding.

The exceptions to the rule are: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3)
seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused of their right against
unreasonable search and seizure.

In these cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause. Probable cause being at
best defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s)
or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by is in the place
to be searched.
Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a
search without a warrant.

A stop -and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a
citizenon the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapons. It has been held as one of the exceptions
to thegeneral rule against searches without warrant

In the present case, petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of the evidence illegally obtained
when he failed to raise the issue or object thereto during the trial.

The Supreme Court affirmed with modifications the assailed Decision and Resolution of the respondent
court

17. People vs Malmstedt GR No. 91107, June 19, 1991

Facts:

In an information filed against the accused- appellant Mikael

Malmstead was charged before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, for
violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines
for the third time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the
country sometime in 1982 and 1985.

In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his
arrival thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a bus to
Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days. Then in the 7 in the
morning of May 11, 1989, the accused went to Nangonogan bus stop in
Sagada.

At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989),
Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional
Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a
temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province,
for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera
Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was
prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover,
information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that
same morning that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession
prohibited drugs. The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in
coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at the
designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected
all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.

The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front
going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner
riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.

During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist.

Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked
for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused
failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it
was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be
a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the
officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown
packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped
objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a
derivative of marijuana.

Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But
before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2)
travelling bags from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of the
bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found
in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there
were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It
was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally
presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp
Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the
investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were
found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from
the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same
were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined
were hashish. a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana.
Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
ACCUSED’S DEFENSE
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For
his defense, he raised the issue of illegal search of his personal
effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM
officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were
not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian
couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian
couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were
no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next
ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would
meet each other at the Dangwa Station.

The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt
established beyond reasonable doubt.

Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him
guilty of the crime charged, accused argues that the search of his
personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search
warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered
during the illegal search are not admissible as evidence against him.

Issue:

Whether or Not the contention of the accused is valid, and therefore

the RTC ruling be reversed.

Held:

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a
lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful
arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private
person under the following circumstances.

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a

private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs

(hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he
was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his
personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing
provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest. While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not
armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal
effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case,
there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that
accused was then and there committing a crime.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. Warrantless
search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this
Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the
smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused,
10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously, 11 and attempted to
flee.

The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby

affirmed. Costs against the accused-appellant.

18. Espano vs CA GR No. 120431 April 1, 1998

FACTS:

l The accused was caught in flagrante by herein police officers selling Marijuana near Zamora and
Pandacan Streets, where they are conducting an investigation in the area reported being rampant of
drug pushing. The agents frisked the accused after he completed his transaction to a buyer and there
found with him 2 tea bags of Marijuana.
l Accused was asked by the police officers whether he has some more of the marijuana and told them he
got more at his house. They went to the accused house and found 10 more teabags of Marijuana.
l During the trial, accused denied all the allegations against him and made an alibi that he was in his
house sleeping when the police officer went to his house looking for his brother in law and instead
handcuffed him to take his part for allegedly having in his possession 10 teabags of Marijuana.
l The trial court did not believe his alibi and found him guilty of violation of Article II, Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
l Accused appealed and said that the arrest was illegally done and the search of his house is deemed a
violation of his constitutional right.
ISSUE:

WON the warrantless arrest is valid.

HELD:

YES. Petitioner’s arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule (Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of
Court ). He was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the
basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and
Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw petitioner handing over something to an alleged buyer.
After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two pieces of cellophane of marijuana. His arrest
was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence,
being the fruits of the crime.

As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioners residence, however, the same are
inadmissible in evidence.

19. People vs Aruta GR No. 120915 April 3, 1998

Facts:

On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a
certain “Aling Rosa” will be arriving from Baguio City with a large
volume of marijuana and assembled a team. The next day, at the Victory
Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming from Baguio, when
the informer pointed out who “Aling Rosa” was, the team approached her
and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello asked “aling
Rosa” about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it out to the
police. They found dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag
marked “cash katutak”.

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to

evidence alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the
items. In her testimony, the accused claimed that she had just come
from Choice theatre where she watched a movie “Balweg”. While about to
cross the road an old woman asked her for help in carrying a shoulder
bag, when she was later on arrested by the police. She has no
knowledge of the identity of the old woman and the woman was nowhere
to be found. Also, no search warrant was presented.

The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous

drugs of 1972

Issue:

Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from
the accused.

Held:
The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:

Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under

Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing
jurisprudence
Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are: (a) a
prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which
the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent, and (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search;
Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially
when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity;
Consented warrantless search;
Customs search;
Stop and Frisk;
Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied

before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.

The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely

crossing the street and was not acting suspiciously for the Narcom
agents to conclude that she was committing a crime. There was no legal
basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accused’s bag, there was
no probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested.

The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they
did not do so. The seized marijuana was illegal and inadmissible
evidence.