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POLITICAL LAW
Last Minute Tips

LOCUS STANDI

Distinguish between legal standing and real party in interest?

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not
by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence, the question in
standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the real party who
would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"
(Kilosbayan v. Morato, 246 SCRA 540, 562)

Exceptions to the rule on legal standing?

1. When a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for
the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution (Legaspi v. CSC, 150 SCRA 530);
2. When a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of
public funds.
BUT EVEN A TAXPAYER'S SUIT, THE COURT IS NOT DEVOID OF DISCRETION AS
WHETHER OR NOT IT SHOULD BE ENTERTAINED OR THAT IT ENJOYS AN OPEN DISCRETION
TO ENTERTAIN THE SAME OR NOT.
3. When the transcendental importance to the public of the case demands that it be settled
promptly and definitely brushing aside technicalities of procedure (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.
232 SCRA 110)

EMINENT DOMAIN
Does the principle of res judicata bar subsequent proceedings for the expropriation of the
same property?
NO. The principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings,
cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent
domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and
unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like
police power, can "reach every form of property which the State might need for public use."
Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of property,
remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity; and they
have the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest requires it." Thus,
the State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone of
previous non-compliance with any legal requirement.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

The 13th Congress passed a law. One of its provisions states: “this law shall be irrepealable”. Is
the provision valid?
NO. The power of present and future legislature must remain plenary. When one legislature
attempts to pass an irrepealable law, to that extent it attempts to limit the power of future legislatures.
The power of any legislature can be limited only by the Constitution.

What measures are not subject to referendum until after 90 days after effectivity?
Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically vested in
Congress by the Constitution cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity.
(Section 10 (b), RA 6735).

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Is the legitimacy of the Arroyo Administration a political question?

NO. Unlike the Aquino administration, the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration is not a political
question. The Supreme Court, in the case of Joseph E. Estrada vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R.
No. 146738, March 2, 2001, held in this wise: “Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a
Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano vs. President Corazon Aquino, et. al. and related cases to
support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent
Arroyo, ergo, they present political question. A more cerebral reading of the cases will show that they
are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the government of former President Aquino was the
result of a successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. It is a familiar learning
that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial
scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the
government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath she took at the EDSA shrine
is the oath under the 1987 Constitution. Indeed she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of
the presidency under the authority of the 1987 constitution.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II is
clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to
petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the Presidency. EDSA I is extra-
constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of
judicial review, but EDSA II is intra-constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused
and the succession of the Vice-President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented
political question; EDSA II involves legal questions.

What is meant by doctrine of incorporation and transformation?

a) The doctrine of incorporation postulates that the generally accepted principles of international law
are automatically incorporated in the municipal law of each state upon its admission to the family of
nations. Thus, international law rules are adopted and incorporated as part of a state’s municipal law, by
a general provision or clause usually in its Constitution.
We adhere to the doctrine of incorporation as provided in Art. II, Sec 2,of the constitution he “The
Philippines xxxxxx adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations”.

b) Under the doctrine of transformation, on the other hand, requires such principles of international
law to be enacted as statutes or otherwise converted into municipal law before they can be considered
binding on the state.

Now in another country, MJ, a very close friend of the President, committed a crime in the
Philippines covered by an extradition treaty between the Philippines and the state of refuge.
a. Briefly discuss the procedure of extradition.
b. If there is no extradition treaty between the state of refuge and the state seeking the fugitive’s
return, how may the latter acquire jurisdiction over him? Explain.

a. A request for extradition is first presented through diplomatic channels to the state of refuge. This
request will be accompanied by the necessary papers relative to the identity of the person sought and the
crime he is alleged to have committed or of which he has already been convicted.
Upon receipt of this request, the state of refuge will conduct a judicial investigation to ascertain if
the crime is covered by the extradition treaty and if there is a prima facie case against the fugitive
according to its own laws. If there is, a warrant of surrender will be drawn and the fugitive will be
delivered to the demanding state.
b. The state may still secure his surrender, but not as a matter of right. In the interest of international
comity or courtesy, the state of refuge may accede to the former’s request and surrender the fugitive to it.

Cite some provisions in the 1987 Constitution which have embodied the policy of people
empowerment.
a. Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution which grants the people power to directly make laws through
initiative and referendum;

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b. Article XIII, Section 15, which provides that the State shall respect the role of independent people’
organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their
legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means;
c. Article XIII, Section 16, which provides that the right of the people and their organizations to effective
and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not
be abridged. The state shall by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation
mechanisms.

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

What is the Regalian Doctrine?

The Regalian doctrine was the foundation for the Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory
that all lands were held from the crown. As adopted in a republican system, it means that ownership is
vested in the State. Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides that, “All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests
or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.” Hence, any
person claiming ownership of a portion of the public domain must be able to show title from the state
according to any of the recognized modes of acquisition of title.

Give the nationalized areas of investments as provided in the Constitution?

They are:
a. Public Utilities - Section 11, Article XII
b. Education – Section 4(2), Article XIV
c. Advertising – Section 11(2), Article XVI

Regarding public utilities, what is reserved only to Filipino citizens or to corporations at least 60%
of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens?
What is reserved is only the operation of the public utilities. Aliens are allowed to own rte
equipment of public utilities. The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately
from the ownership of the facilities thereof. One can own said facilities without operating them as a public
utility, or conversely, one may operate a public utility without owning the facilities used to serve the public.
The devotion of property to serve the public may be done by the owner or by the person in control thereof
who may not necessarily be the owner thereof. (Tatad vs. Garcia, 243 SCRA 436)
What are the exceptions to the rule that private land may be owned only by Filipino citizens?
a. Those owned by foreigners by hereditary succession – meaning public lands acquired through
intestate succession or by operation of law
b. Former natural-born Filipino citizens

What are the kinds and sizes of private land which former natural-born citizens of the Philippines
are allowed to acquire?
Under RA 8179, former natural-born citizens of the Philippines are allowed to be transferees of
private lands, urban or rural, with the following maximum sizes: five thousand (5,000) s.q.m. for urban
land, and three (3) hectares for rural land. The purpose allowed are for business or other purposes.

What is the duration allowed by law for the lease of private lands by foreign investors?
Under RA 7652, lease of private lands by foreign investors is allowed, but no lease contract shall be
for a period exceeding 50 years, renewable once for a period of not more than 25 years. The leased area
shall be used solely for the purpose of investment.

What is the “Filipino First Policy”?

In the case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, GR No. 122156, February 3, 1997, the Supreme Court
said that it pertains to section 10 par. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 constitution which provides that “in the grant
of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos”.

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A corporation, 60% of its capital stock is owned by Filipinos and the other 40% to foreigners,
proposes to publish a weekly magazine for general circulation that will feature the lifestyles of the
rich and famous. May this be done? Cite the constitutional provision on this point?
NO. The corporation cannot publish a weekly magazine since it will be engaged in the operation of a
mass medium and is not wholly owned by Philippine citizens. Section 11(1) of Article XVI of the 1987
Constitution provides: “The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations, cooperatives or associations, wholly-owned and managed by such
citizens.

BILL OF RIGHTS

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES/ PRIVACY OF COMMUNCATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE

In People vs Marti the SC held that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is not
meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals, it is tasked only against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.

Warrantless Arrests
1. The person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is
attempting to commit an offense
2. The peace officer has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances indicating that the person to be arrested has committed a crime
- The present rules removed the requirement that a crime must have been in fact committed. The
indubitable existence of a crime is not anymore required.
3. The person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

X was arrested for and charged with robbery. X posted bail in order to be released temporarily.
During trial and before entering his plea, X raised objections regarding the legality of his arrest for
robbery. The prosecution, however, claims that the posting of the bail bond by X was tantamount
to an effective waiver of the latter’s right to question the legality of the arrest.
(a) Did the posting of the bail bond by X amount to a waiver of the right to question the legality
of his arrest?
(b) Was there a waiver of the right to question the legality of the arrest if the same was made
after entering a plea.

(a) No. There was no waiver of the right to question the legality of the arrest. Under Rule 114 sec. 26
of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure an application for or admission to bail shall not bar the
accused from challenging the validity of his arrest provided he raises them before entering his plea.
This abandons the old ruling the SC in People vs Dural where it was held that the illegality of the
arrest is cured when the accused files a petition for bail. As it stands now, the rule is that the
application for or admission to bail does not cure the illegality of the arrest.
(b) Yes. X will then be estopped from questioning the illegality of his arrest when he voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the
trial. Under the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure when the accused enters his plea he waives the
right to question the legality of his arrest.

Warrantless Searches

Stop and Frisk

Police officers were patrolling Quiapo, Manila when they spotted X who was acting suspiciously.
The policemen approached X but when the former introduced themselves as policemen X tried to
flee but was unsuccessful in doing so. His bag was checked by the policemen and in it they saw
unlicensed firearms and ammunition. X was charged with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. X, however, maintains that the evidence were illegally seized from him and hence
not admissible as evidence. Rule on the legality of the seizure of the ammunition and firearm.

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The search and seizure of the firearms and ammunition was perfectly legal and as such they are
admissible as evidence against X. The search and seizure maybe justified as akin to a “stop and frisk”
situation. When X acted suspiciously and attempted to flee, there was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag. To require a search warrant would be useless and too late (
Posadas vs Court of Appeals 188 SCRA 288).
In Manalili vs CA(October 7, 1997) citing the US case of Terry vs Ohio, the Supreme Court
defined “stop and frisk” as the vernacular designation of the right of the police officer to stop a citizen on
the street, interrogate him and pat him for weapons whenever he observes unusual conduct which leads
him to conclude that criminal activity maybe afoot.

Plain View

Some police operatives, acting under a lawfully issued warrant for the purpose of searching for
firearms in the house of X located at No. 10 Shaw Boulevard, Pasig, Metro Manila, found, instead
of firearms, ten kilograms of cocaine.
1. May the said police operatives lawfully seize the cocaine? Explain your answer.
2. May X successfully challenge the legality of the search on the ground that the peace officers
did not inform him about his right to remain silent and his right to counsel? Explain your
answer.
3. Suppose the peace officers were able to find unlicensed firearms in the house in adjacent lot,
that is, No. 12 Shaw Boulevard, which is also owned by X. May they lawfully seize the said
unlicensed firearms? Explain your answer.

1.Yes. The police operatives may lawfully seize the cocaine, because it is an item whose possession is
prohibited by law. It was in plain view and it was only inadvertently discovered in the course of a lawful
search. The possession of the cocaine is prohibited by Section 8 of the Dangerous Drugs Act. As held
in Magoncia vs. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770, an article whose possession is prohibited bv law may be seized
without the need of any search warrant if it was discovered during a lawful search. The additional
requirement laid down in Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 that the discovery of the article must
have been made inadvertently was also satisfied in this case.

2.No. X cannot successfully challenge the legality of the search simply because the peace officers did not
inform him about his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution Provides: “Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably his own choice”.

“As held in People vs. Dy, 158 SCRA 111, for this provision to apply, a suspect must be under
investigation. There was no investigation involved in this case.”

3. The unlicensed firearms stored at 12 Shaw Boulevard may lawfully be seized since their possession is
illegal. As held in Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770, when an individual possesses contraband
(unlicensed firearms belong to this category), he is committing a crime and he can be arrested without a
warrant and the contraband can be seized.

EXCLUSIONARY RULE
On the basis of a search warrant issued by a court, unlicensed firearms were seized from the
residence of A. Consequently, A was charged with illegal possession of firearms and thereafter,
the trial court found him guilty as charged. On appeal, A argued that the firearms were
inadmissible in evidence because of the invalidity of the search warrant, since there was no
written deposition showing that the judge examined the witnesses under oath. Can A question the
validity of the search warrant for the first time on appeal?
No. Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution provides that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The
Rules on Criminal Procedure further requires that such examination must be put into writing and under
oath.
In the case of Pastrano vs. CA, the SC held that although failure to comply with these requirements
is a ground for quashing a search warrant, the accused did not move to quash the search warrant before
the trial court. Neither did he object to the presentation of the evidence obtained as being the product of
an illegal search. Objections to the legality of the search warrant and to the admissibility of the evidence
obtained thereby were deemed waived when said issues were not raised during the trial of the case.

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Is AO No. 308 entitled “Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System”

violative of the right to privacy?
YES. It impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’ protected zone of privacy.
A.O. 308 also violates the right to privacy expressly recognized in Sec. 3(1) of the Bill of Rights.
The broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. 308, if implemented, will put our people’s rights
to privacy in clear and present danger. The heart of A.O. 308 lies in Sec. 4 which provides for a
Population Reference Number (PRN) as a common reference number to establish a linkage among
concern agencies through the use of “Biometrics Technology” and “Computer Application Designs”. The
indefiniteness of A.O. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve information
for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN. The ability of a sophisticated
data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier on an individual and transmit it over a
national network is one of the most graphic threats of the computer revolution. (Ople vs. Torres, et al.,
G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998)

What are the rules on wiretapping?

Under RA 4200, it is unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. It is also unlawful for any person to
knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record or any such other record or copies thereof, of
any communication or spoken word or to replay the same for any other person or persons or to
communicate the contents thereof either verbally or in writing or to furnish transcriptions thereof to any
other persons.
Exempted from RA 4200 are peace officers, who are authorized by written order by the court, to
execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in cases involving the crimes of : a) treason; b)
espionage; c) provoking war and disloyalty in case o f war; d) piracy, mutiny in the high seas; e) rebellion,
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion; f) sedition, conspiracy to commit
sedition, inciting to sedition; g) kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code and h) violations of
Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against national security.

Navarro v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999)

To back up his story, the witness produced and presented to the court a tape recording of the
exchange between the accused and the victim which the witness was able to take without the accused’s
knowledge. The trial court admitted as evidence the said tape recording despite the Anti-Wire Tapping
Act after Jimmy authenticated it.
HELD: RA 4200 or the Anti-Wire Tapping Act prohibits the over hearing, intercepting or
recording of private communications. The exchange between the accused and the victim in this case was
not private. It was done in the police station in the presence of other persons including some policemen
and the desk officer. Since the conversation or communication was not private, its tape recording was not
prohibited.

Does the right of a husband to privacy of communication and correspondence apply against wife?
Yes. The husband is entitled to invoke the right against his wife. Any evidence obtained by the
wife in violation of the right of the husband to privacy of communication and correspondence is
inadmissible against the latter. (Zulueta vs. CA, G.R. No. 107383)

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

1. Movie censorship – subject to greater degree of regulation; greater degree of evil

-- however, powers of MTRCB is merely “regulatory” in nature

2. Press & TV/Radio – covers every form of publication; covers even radio and television as instruments
of mass communication
-- may be abridged only when substantial danger exists

Test of Validity of Government Interference

a. Clear and Present Danger Rule
b. Dangerous Tendency Rule

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c. Balancing of Interest Rule

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Non-establishment Clause
a) reinforces policy on separation of Church and State
b) the State cannot set up a church
c) the State cannot pass laws which aid one or all religions
d) the State should not prefer one religion over another
e) the State cannot participate in the ecclesiastical affairs of any religious organization and vice
versa
“ecclesiastical affair” is one that involves the relationship between the church and its members
and relates to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation.

Exceptions to Non-establishment Clause

a) Exemption from taxation of properties actually, directly and exclusively used for religious purposes
[Art. VI, sec. 28(3)]
b) Exemption from citizenship requirement in ownership of educational institutions established by
religious groups and mission boards [Art. XIV, sec. 4(2)]
c) Optional religious instruction in public elementary and high schools, as requested by the parents [Art.
XIV, sec. 3(3)]
d) Appropriation allowed in favor of ecclesiastics employed in the armed forces, in a penal institution, or
in a government-owned orphanage or leprosarium [Art. VI, sec. 29(2)]
e) State can interfere with purely secular affairs of the Church, such as labor disputes between the
church (as employer) and its employee, which has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith,
worship or doctrine of the church (Austria vs. NLRC)

LIBERTY OF ABODE

Aspects:
a. Freedom to choose and change one’s place of abode
b. Freedom to travel both within the country and outside
Police power as a limitation (with due process)
a. impaired upon lawful order of the court
b. impaired in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as provided by law

“hamletting” – involuntary herding of people into one place secured by the military is illegal

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

Full public disclosure by the State

a) embraces all official records
b) limited to citizens only but without prejudice to right of aliens to have access to records of cases
where they are litigants
c) does not grant a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like (limited to access to official records)
Limitations
a) limited to matters of public concern
b) limited to State’s transactions involving public interest
c) records involving State security (military, diplomatic, and other similar classified matters) or
those confidential in character
d) subject to such other limitations provided by law

Custodial investigation:
any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.

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The investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on
a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of
interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements (Escobedo v. Illinois).
Under the 1987 Constitution, the rights are available if a person is in custody, even, if he is not
yet a suspect, or if the person is a suspect, even if he is not yet in custody.
Under Section 2 of R.A. 7438, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an
"invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have
committed.

The rights of a person under custodial investigation are not available under the following
instances:
1. Admissions made in an administrative investigation conducted by officials of the PAL do not
come under Section 12, III (People v. Judge Ayson (175 SCRA 216 [1989]);
2. Section 12 does not apply when confession or admission is made to a private individual
(Kimpo vs. Sandiganbayan, 232 SCRA 53 [1994]);
3. Section 12 does not apply to a person undergoing audit because an audit examiner is not a
law enforcement officer (Navallo vs. Sandiganbayan, 234 SCRA 175 [1994]);
4. Section 12 does not apply to a situation where a person presents himself to the police and in
the process makes his admissions (People vs. Taylaran, 108 SCRA 373 [1981])
5. Section 12 does not apply to a situation where in a meeting with the mayor, which the person
voluntarily and spontaneously requested, the person confessed to the mayor without being interrogated
by the latter, or to confessions made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any
other investigating officer. (People vs. Andan, 269 SCRA 95 [1997])

Is the disqualification provided in Section 40 “(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political
cases here or abroad” violative of the right to be presumed innocent?
The disqualification in question does not, in reality, involve the issue of presumption of innocence.
Elsewise stated, one is not disqualified because he is presumed guilty by the filing of an information or
criminal complaint against him. He is disqualified because he is a "fugitive from justice," i.e., he was
not brought within the jurisdiction of the court because he had successfully evaded arrest; or if he
was brought within the jurisdiction of the court and was tried and convicted, he has successfully
evaded service of sentence because he had jumped bail or escaped. The disqualification then is
based on his flight from justice. In the face of the settled doctrine that flight is an indication of guilt, it
may even be truly said that it is not the challenged disqualifying provision which overcomes the
presumption of innocence but rather the disqualified person himself who has proven his guilt. (Marquez,
Jr. v. Comelec (243 SCRA 538 [April 18, 1995])

What are the requisites of trial in absentia?

a. The accused has already been arraigned
b. He has been duly notified of the trial
c. His failure to appear is unjustified. (people vs. Salas)

Can the right to be present at one’s trial be waived?

YES.

Notwithstanding waiver, can there be an instance wherein the accused can be required to appear?
YES, for purposes of identification.

Is there any instance wherein even for purposes of identification, the accused may not be required
to appear.
The Constitution now unqualifiedly permits trial in absentia even of capital offenses, provided
that after arraignment he may be compelled to appear for the purpose of identification by the
witnesses of the prosecution, or provided he unqualifiedly admits in open court after his
arraignment that he is the person named as the defendant in the case on trial. Reason for requiring
the presence of the accused, despite his waiver, is, if allowed to be absent in all the stages of the
proceedings without giving the People's witnesses the opportunity to identify him in court, he may in his
defense say that he was never identified the person charged in the information and, therefore, is entitled
to an acquittal. People vs. Presiding Judge

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What are the instances where the presence of the accused is mandatory?
1. During arraignment;
2. During trial, for identification;
3. During promulgation of sentence, unless for a light offense wherein the accused may appear
by counsel or a representative.

What is the effect if accused fails to appear during promulgation of judgment?

Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure should be modified to read that if
upon promulgation of the judgment, the accused fails to appear without justifiable cause, despite due
notice to him, his bondsmen or counsel, he is thereby considered to have waived his right to appeal.
However, if within the fifteen (15) day period of appeal he voluntarily surrenders to the court or is
otherwise arrested, then he may avail of the right to appeal within said period of appeal. People vs.
Mapalao (197 SCRA 79 [1991])

Can judgment be promulgated even when accused had jumped bail?

One who jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason for his non-appearance during the trial.
Accordingly, after the trial in absentia, the court can render judgment in the case and promulgation
can be made by simple recording the judgment in the criminal docket with a copy thereof served
upon his counsel, provided that the notice requiring him to be present at the promulgation of
judgment is served through his bondsmen or warden and counsel.
People vs. Valeriano and Acabal (226 SCRA 694 [1993])

When is the writ of habeas corpus available?

1. When a person is subjected to physical restraint;
2. When a person is subjected to moral restraint (Caun ca vs. Salazar)
3. To a prisoner convicted by a court without jurisdiction or where his sentence has become invalid.

May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal
bliss?
NO. Marital rights, including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the
extraordinary writ of habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention. It is issued when one is deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercising legal
custody over another person. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. No
court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be
enforced by compulsion of writ of habeas corpus. Such is a matter beyond judicial authority and us best
left to the man and woman’s free choice. (Erlinda Ilusorio vs Binder)

Transactional Immunity:
Art. XIII, Section 18 (8) - Immunity which may be granted by the Commission on Human Rights
to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, which makes
the witness immune from criminal prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates.

Use and Fruit Immunity:

Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants "use immunity"; and the
other, which grants what is known as "transactional immunity." The distinction between the two is as
follows: "Use immunity" prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner
in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. On the other hand, "transactional
immunity" grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled
testimony relates. Galman vs. Pamaran ( 138 SCRA 274 [1985])

People vs. Esparas (260 SCRA 539 [1996])

The automatic review by the Supreme Court of decisions imposing the death penalty is
something which neither the court nor the accused could waive or evade.

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The review of death penalty by the Supreme Court remains automatic and does not depend on
the whims of the death convict. It continues to be mandatory, and leaves this Court without any option.
There is more wisdom in our existing jurisprudence mandating our review of all death penalty
cases, regardless of the wish of the convict and regardless of the will of the court. Nothing less than life
is at stake and any court decision authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as
possible. We must strive to realize this objective, however elusive it may be, and our efforts must not
depend on whether appellant has withdrawn his appeal or has escaped.

People vs. Nitafan (April 6, 1992)

BP 115 (Trust Receipts Law) is not violative of this provision on non-imprisonment of debt,
because the law does not seek to enforce a loan but to punish dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the
handling of money or goods to the prejudice of another. Violation of trust receipt agreement is
punishable as estafa which is not an offense against property, but against public order.

RIGHT TO BAIL

Who have constitutional right to bail?

All persons actually detained, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties.

When is there no constitutional right to bail?

When the following conditions concur:
(1) the accused is charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua;
(2) the evidence against him is strong. (Magno vs. Abbas)
. Moreover, after conviction for any offense, bail is discretionary while the case is on appeal.

When is bail a matter of right?

All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as prescribed by law or rule:
a. before or after conviction by the MTC’s; and
b. Before conviction of the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. (Rule 114, sec. 4)

When is bail a matter of discretion?

Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion, perpetua, or life
imprisonment, the court on application, may admit the accused on bail. The court, in its discretion, may
allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty after the same bail bond during the period to appeal
subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than 20 years,
the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) that the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteracion;
(b) that the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence,
or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) that the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;
(d) that the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or
(e) that there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit the
crime.

Does lethal injection constitute cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment under Section 19, Article
III of the 1987 constitution?

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NO. It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment. In the oft-cited case of Harden v. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. at 747, citing In
Ex Parte Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436. this Court held that "[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture
or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in
the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by
lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not.

In a criminal prosecution, is there a denial of the right of the accused to counsel if the court
appointed counsel is not of his own choice?
Even if we were to extend the application of the concept of "preference in the choice of counsel"
to an accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot partake of a discretion
so absolute and arbitrary as would make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the
predilection of the accused. As held by this Court in the case of People vs. Barasina (229 SCRA 250):
"Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution
does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation
is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from
handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial
investigation, will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct
the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or
another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been
contemplated by the framers of the charter"
Applying this principle enunciated by the Court, we may likewise say that the accused's discretion
in a criminal prosecution with respect to his choice of counsel is not so much as to grant him a plenary
prerogative which would preclude other equally competent and independent counsels from representing
him. Otherwise, the pace of a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused to the detriment
of the eventual resolution of the case. (Amion vs. Chiongson, 301 SCRA 614)

Acquittal vs. Dismissal

Paulin vs. Gimenez - Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted
because the evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt, but dismissal
does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty.
Dismissal terminate the proceedings, either because the court is not a court of competent
jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form or substance.

When will dismissal give rise to double jeopardy?

1. Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the
prosecution has rested; or based on insufficiency of evidence (people vs. City Court of Silay); and
2. Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his
right to speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute (Esmena vs. Pogoy).

When can the People or the prosecution appeal?

1. When the accused has waived or is estopped from invoking his right against double jeopardy;
2. When the prosecution is denied due process of law;
3. When the dismissal or acquittal is made with grave abuse of discretion.

When is the accused deemed to have waived or is estopped from invoking double jeopardy?
1.The dismissal is induced by the accused or his counsel; and
2. such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal.

(People vs. Salico)

CITIZENSHIP

How may a Filipino citizen who has lost his citizenship reacquire Philippine citizenship?
A Filipino citizen who has lost his citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship:

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1) by naturalization;
2) by repatriation; and
3) by direct act of Congress. (Sec. 2, CA No. 63)

Who may avail of repatriation?

Repatriation may be availed of by those who lost their citizenship due to:
1) desertion of the armed forces;
2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3) service in the Armed Forces of the USA at any other time;
4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5) political and economic necesstiy

What is the procedure in repatriation?

Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned
resides or last resided. (Angat v. Republic, 314 SCRA 438 [September 14, 1999])

Mr. Cruz, a natural-born Filipino, became a naturalized American, in connection with his service in
the US Marine Corps. Later, Mr. Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under R.A. No. 2630. Can Mr. Cruz still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship?
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be resorted to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural born Filipino.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same
in the Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan in accordance with law, Mr. Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a
Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original
status before he lost his Philippine citizenship. (Bengzon III vs. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, 7 May 2001).

Dinstinguish between dual citizenship (Sec 40 (d), Local Gov’t Code) and dual allegiance (Sec. 5,
Article IV, Constitution).
Dual citizenship – as a result of concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states,
a person is simultaneously considered a national of the said states. Ex. – a person whose parents are
citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person possesses dual citizenship ipso facto and without any voluntary on his
part.
Dual allegiance – a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to 2 or more
states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition. Ex. – A
Filipino Chinese, who is already a Filipino citizen but who by his acts, may be said to be bound by second
allegiance, either to Beijing or Taiwan.
The Supreme Court said that the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with the dual
citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even
after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160, Sec. 40 (d) and in RA 7854,
Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. (Mercado vs. Manzano & Comelec, 307 SCRA 630
[May 26, 1999])

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

What are the non-legislative powers of the Congress?

The non-legislative powers of the Congress are:
1. Power to declare the existence of state of war (Sec. 23(1), Art. VI);
2. Power to canvass presidential/vice-presidential elections (Sec. 4(3), Art. VII);
3. Power to call for special election for President and Vice-President (Sec. 10, Article VII);
4. Power to decide who shall discharge the powers and duties of the office of the President

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(Sec. 11, Art. VII);

5. Power to revoke/extend the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus (Sec. 18, Art. VII);
6. Power of concurrence to treaties/international agreements (Sec. 21, Art. VII);
7. Power of impeachment (Sec. 3, Art. XI);
8. Power to amend/revise the Constitution (Sec. 1, Art. XVII).

May the membership in the House of Reps. be increased by special law?

Membership may be increased even by special law and not necessarily by a general
reapportionment law after a census as required in par. 4 of section 5 because:
1. of the phrase "unless otherwise fixed by law."
2. The Constitution did not prohibit Congress from increasing its members by passing a special
law, other than a general reapportionment law;
3. Not to allow increase by special law will result to inequitable (Mariano, Jr. v. Comelec (242
SCRA 211)

May a political party participate in the party-list system of representation?

Yes. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides that members of the House of
Representatives may “be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.”
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be
registered under the party-list system.
But in the recent case of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Comelec, G.R. No.
147589, 26 June 2001, the Supreme Court said:
While even major political parties are expressly allowed by the Constitution to participate in
the party-list system, . . . . . . they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the
marginalized and the underrepresented.

How are party list representatives elected?

The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes: Provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats (Sec. 11 (b) of RA 7941).

What is the effect if an elected party-list representatives changes his political party or sectoral
affiliation?
An elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral representation
during his term of office shall forfeit his seat; provided that if he changes his political party or sectoral
affiliation within 6 mos. before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list
representative under his new party or organization.

What are the rules on legislative districting?

1. apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio (Sec. 5(1);
2. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory (Sec. 5(3));
3. Each city with a population of at least 250,000, or each province, shall have at least one
representative (Sec. 5(3));
4. Within 3 years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment
of legislative districts based on the standards provided in the section (Sec. 5(4)).

May a Senator accept a treaty negotiator position and can a taxpayer question the same?
Yes. A Senator may accept a treaty negotiator position as it is considered an extension of the
legislative position or is in aid of legislative duties. A legislator who serves as treaty negotiator under the

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President of the Philippines continues to sit in Congress, where he can better work for the approval of the
treaty and the passage of the needed implementing legislation.
No. A taxpayer cannot question such acceptance for lack of the standing requirement for bringing
taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392, 403 (1980), to wit:
1. that tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional
protections against abuses of legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or
2. that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent (see Pascual vs. Secretary of
Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960], or
3. that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither does petitioner
seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. (Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966] ), citing
Philippine Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965] ).

A Senator accepts a Cabinet position during his 2nd term. Can he run again for the Senate?
No. By accepting a Cabinet position, a Senator would be deemed to have voluntarily resigned as
a Member of the Senate. No Senator shall serve for more than 2 consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected (Sec. 4, Article VI).

Can the Sandiganbayan order the preventive suspension of a Member of the House of Reps. being
prosecuted criminally for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
Yes, the Supreme Court in Paredes v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 118364, January 28, 1997)
said that the accused cannot validly argue that only his peers in the House of Reps. can suspend him
because "the power granted to Congress under the Constitution to suspend its own members appears to
be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in R.A. No. 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on the petitioner for
misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives." (Paredes v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No.
118364, January 28, 1997)

COMPARE the Paredes case with ----- Maceda v. Vasquez:

In the Maceda case, the Supreme Court said that in the absence of any administrative action
taken against the judge by the Supreme Court with regard to his certificate of service, the investigation
being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of power.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court personnel arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the
Supreme Court for determination whether said judge or court personnel had acted within the scope of his
administrative duties.

Does the Court have jurisdiction to settle the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader?
NO. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House
Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of
Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary." To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of
the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court. (Santiago vs. Guingona, Jr. (298
SCRA 765; November 18, 1998)

Journals v. extraneous evidence, which will prevail?

Because journals are official records of the Congress, the journals prevail.

Journals v. Enrolled bill, which will prevail?

Enrolled bill prevails except on matters expressly required to be entered in the journals.

Matters mandated by the Constitution to be entered in the journal:

1. Yeas and nays on 3rd and final reading of a bill (Sec. 26(2), Art. VI);
2. Veto message of the President (Sec. 27(1), Art. VI);

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3. Yeas and nays on the erpassing of a bill vetoed by the President (Sec. 27(1), Art. VI);
4. Yeas and nays on any question at the request of 1/5 of members present (Sec. 16(4), Art. VI)

What is the effect of change in party affiliation on membership in the Electoral Tribunals and the
Commission on Appointments?
Members of the Electoral Tribunals, as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are
entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our
Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). But in the case of Bondoc vs. Pineda, membership in
the House Electoral Tribunal may be terminated for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's
congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he
represents in the tribunal, or formal affiliation with another political party.
On the other hand, if by reason of the affiliation of certain members of the House of Reps with
another political party, the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House is materially
changed, the House is clothed with authority to declare vacant the necessary number of seats in the
Commission on Appointments held by members of said House belonging to the political party adversely
affected by the change and then fill said vacancies in conformity with the Constitution (Daza vs.
Singson).

What is the extent of the power of Congress to conduct legislative investigations?

The Houses of Congress or any of their committees may conduct investigations or inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in
or affected such inquiries shall be respected. (Sec. 21, Article VI, Constitution).
However, as held in Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (203 SCRA 767), the exercise
of the power to conduct investigation is not absolute or unlimited.
1. It is allowed only when it is “in aid of legislation.” Hence, when the investigation involves a
speech of a legislation which contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation, but only called to a
possible violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, then, the investigation is not valid;
2. The legislative investigation is also not allowed if there is already a pending case before a
court involving the issue, or the issue has been pre-empted by the court. That would pose the possibility
of conflicting judgments.
3. The legislative investigation must also not violate a person’s rights under the Bill of Rights
such as the right against self-incrimination.

Meaning of in aid of legislation:

It is not necessary that every question propounded to the witness must be material to a proposed
legislation. The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the
inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation.

Can Congress or any of its committees conducting investigation cite for contempt witnesses who
refuse to testify or to answer questions?
Yes. The Congress may cite for contempt such witnesses if the investigation is being conducted
in aid of legislation (Arnault vs. Nazareno). The Congress may not cite for contempt such witnesses if
the investigation is not in aid of legislation, or if there is a pending case in court involving the same subject
matter and parties (Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee)

Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance (235 SCRA 630 [1994])

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, § 26(2) qualified the two stated conditions before a bill can become
a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form
and distributed three days before it is finally approved.

May a veto of a bill be recalled or reconsidered by the President?

Yes, for as long as the President has not yet communicated his veto of the bill to the House
where it originated and the recall or reconsideration is made within 30 days from the receipt of the bill by
the President.

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What is meant by a legislative veto?

A legislative veto is a means whereby the legislature can block or modify administrative action
taken under a statute. It is a form of legislative control in the implementation of particular executive
action. The form may either be negative, i.e., requiring disapproval of the executive action, or affirmative,
i.e., requiring approval of the executive action.

Private Respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution, which conducts various

programs and activities that are beneficial to the public, especially the young people, pursuant to
its religious, educational and charitable objectives. In 1980, private respondent earned, among
others, an income of P676,829.80 from leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop owners,
like restaurants and canteen operators, and P44,259.00 from parking fees collected from non-
members. Is the income of private respondent from rentals of small shops and parking fees
exempt from taxation."
What is exempted is not the institution itself . . .; those exempted from real estate taxes are lands,
buildings and improvements actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational
purposes. The tax exemption covers property taxes only. Indeed, the income tax exemption claimed by
private respondent finds no basis in Article VI, Section 28, par. 3 of the Constitution.
Private respondent also invokes Article XIV, Section 4, par. 3 of the Charter, claiming that the
YMCA "is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution whose revenues and assets are used actually,
directly and exclusively for educational purposes so it is exempt from taxes on its properties and income."
We reiterate that private respondent is exempt from the payment of property tax, but not income tax on
the rentals from its property. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CA (298 SCRA 83; October 14,
1998)

What are the constitutional limitations on the power of appropriation?

The constitutional limitations on the power of appropriation are:
1. The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the
operation of the Government as specified in the budget;
2. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law;
3. No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation therein;
4. The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for
approving appropriations for other departments or agencies;
5. A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be
supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposed therein;
6. Prohibition against any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

Has the president the power to veto a provision in an appropriation bill?

Gonzales v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452) --
The 1935 Constitution gave the President the power to veto a provision of an appropriation bill
(Sec. 11(2), Art. VI).
Notwithstanding the elimination in Art. VI, Section 27(2) of the 1987 Constitution of any reference
to the veto of a provision, the extent of the President's veto power as previously defined by the 1935
Constitution has not changed. This is because the eliminated provision merely pronounces the basic
principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto.
Petitioners contend that the President may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill.
1. This contention disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be
the subject of a separate veto;
2. This contention overlooks the constitutional mandate that any provision in the general
appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and shall be limited in
its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
3. Even assuming that provisions are beyond the executive veto power, we are of the opinion that
Sec. 55 (FY 1989) and Section 16 (FY 1990) are not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term:
3.1. The vetoed provisions do not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriations. They apply
generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress;
3.2. The disapproved or reduced items do not even appear on the face of the bill;

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3.3. The vetoed provisions are more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of
augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation.
Consequently, Sections 55 and 16 are INappropriate provisions that should be treated as items
for the purpose of the veto power of the President.

The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition:

(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically vested in
Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity.
(Sec. 10, RA 6735)

VOTING in Congress:
1. To elect the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Reps., -- majority vote of all its
respective members (Section 16 (1), Article VI);
2. To punish its members for disorderly behavior, suspend or expel its members -- two-thirds of
all its Members (Section 16(3) Article VI);
3. To declare the existence of a state of war -- two-thirds of both Houses in joint session, voting
separately (Sec. 23(1), Article VI);
4. To override a veto made by the President, two-thirds of all the Members of each House
(Section 27 (1), Article VI);
5. To grant tax exemption -- majority of all the Members of the Congress (Section 28 (4), Article
VI);
6. To choose among two or more candidates for President who shall have an equal and highest
number of votes -- majority of all the Members of the Congress (Section 4, Article VII);
7. To determine whether the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office --
two thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately (Section 11, Article VII);
8. To revoke a proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus -- majority of all its voting JOINTLY (Section 18, Article VII);
9. TO concur to an amnesty granted by the President -- majority of all the Members of the
Congress (Section 19, Article VII);
10. To concur to a treaty or international agreement -- two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate
(Section 21, Article VII).
11. To affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment, or override its contrary
resolution - one -third of all the Members of the House of Reps. (Section 3(3) Article XI);
12. To convict a person in an impeachment case -- two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate
(Section 3 (6), Article XI);
13. To approve a proposal to amend or revise the Constitution -- three-fourths of all its Members
(Section 1 (1), Article XVII);
14. To call a constitutional convention -- two-thirds of all its Members, or by a majority vote of all
its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention (Section 3, Article XVII)

Distinguish between contractual tax exemptions and tax exemptions granted under franchises.
Contractual tax exemptions, in the real sense of the term and where the non-impairment clause of
the Constitution can rightly be invoked, are those agreed to by the taxing authority in contracts, such as
those contained in government bonds or debentures, lawfully entered into by them under enabling laws in
which the government, acting in its private capacity, sheds its cloak of authority and waives its
governmental immunity. Truly, tax exemptions of this kind may not be revoked without impairing the
obligations of contracts. These contractual tax exemptions, however, are not to be confused with tax
exemptions granted under franchises. A franchise partakes the nature of a grant which is beyond
the purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Indeed, Article XII, Section 11, of the
1987 Constitution, like its precursor provisions in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, is explicit that no
franchise for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except under the condition that such privilege
shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress as and when the common good so
requires.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Is the President immune from suit?

Yes, the Supreme Court has affirmed time and again the doctrine of the President’s immunity
from suit. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the

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exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being
the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time,
also demands undivided attention. The Supreme Court, however, in Carillo vs. Marcos, said that
although the President as such may not be sued, enjoying as he does immunity from suit, the validity of
his acts can be tested by an action against the other executive officials.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may
be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf Thus, an
accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as
a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege.
Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the
court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person. Soliven v.
Makasiar (167 SCRA 393 [November 14, 1988])

Supreme Court as Presidential Electoral Tribunal: The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or
Vice- President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

Classify appointments:
Permanent or temporary: Permanent appointments are those extended to persons possessing
the requisite eligibility and are thus protected by the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.
Temporary appointments are given to persons without such eligibility, revocable at will and without the
necessity of just cause or a valid investigation; made on the understanding that the appointing power has
not yet decided on a permanent appointee and that the temporary appointee may be replaced at any time
a permanent choice is made.
Regular or ad interim: A regular appointment is one that requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments and is made by the President while Congress is in session, takes effect
only after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and once approved, continues until the end
of the term of the appointee. An ad interim appointment is one made by the President while Congress is
not in session, takes effect immediately, but ceases to be valid if disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or if not confirmed upon the next adjournment of Congress. In the latter case, the ad
interim appointment is deemed “by-passed” through inaction and deemed disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments. The ad interim appointment is intended to prevent a hiatus in the
discharge of official duties.

What are the limitations on the power of appointment?

1. Appointment by an acting President shall remain effective unless revoked by the elected
President within 90 days from assumption of office (Sec. 14, VII);
2. 2 months immediately before the next presidential election and up to the end of the term, a
President or acting President shall not make appointments except temporary appointments to executive
positions.
3. Congress may prescribe qualifications.

May the President, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article
VII of the Constitution, be required to fill vacancies in the judiciary in view of Sections 4(1) and 9
of Article VIII. A corollary question is whether he can make appointments to the judiciary during
the period of the ban in the interest of public service.
The Court’s view is that during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution:
“(t)wo months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” -- the
President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Section
4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the
time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. It is noteworthy that the
prohibition on appointments comes into effect only once every six (6) years.
Section 15, Article VII is directed against two (2) types of appointments: (1) those made for
buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made
within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared
election offenses in the Omnibus Election Code. x x x The second type of appointments prohibited by
Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-called “midnight” appointments.

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The exception allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly
restricts the appointing power of the President during the period of the ban. (In re: Appointments dated
March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Villarta as RTC Judges (298
SCRA 408; November 9, 1998)

What are the limitations on the power of the President to declare martial law?
The limitations are:
1. Limited to 2 grounds: invasion or rebellion, when public safety requires it;
2. The duration of such proclamation shall not exceed 60 days;
3. Within 48 hrs. after such proclamation, the President shall personally or in writing report his
action to Congress;
4. The Congress may then, by majority vote of all the members voting jointly, revoke his action;
5. Such revocation may not be set aside by the President;
6. The Supreme Court has authority to inquire into the sufficiency of the factual basis for such
action;
7. Martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution; nor supplant the functioning of
the civil courts or legislative assemblies; nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function; nor automatically suspend the privilege of
the writ.

What are the limitations on the power of the President to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus?
The limitations are:
1. Limited to 2 grounds: invasion or rebellion, when public safety requires it;
2. The duration of such proclamation shall not exceed 60 days;
3. Within 48 hrs. after such proclamation, the President shall personally or in writing report his action
to Congress;
4. The Congress may then, by majority vote of all the members voting jointly, revoke his action;
5. Such revocation may not be set aside by the President;
6. The Supreme Court has authority to inquire into the sufficiency of the factual basis for such
action;
7. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons facing
charges of rebellion or for offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion;
8. Any person arrested for such offenses must be judicially charged therewith within 3 days,
otherwise, he shall be released.

Distinguish between absolute pardon and conditional pardon.

An absolute pardon is one extended without any strings attached, whereas a conditional pardon
is one under which the convict is required to comply with certain requirements.
In absolute pardon, the pardonee has no option at all and must accept the pardon whether he
likes it or not, while in conditional pardon, the offender has the right to reject it since he may feel that the
condition imposed is more onerous than the penalty sought to be remitted.

May an accused be granted pardon during the pendency of his appeal from conviction by the trial
court?
No. The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present
Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency
of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor, if one is made, should not be
acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn.
Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government concerned must require proof from the
accused that he has not appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal Such proof
may be in the form of a certification issued by the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the
release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of
an appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively liable. (People v. Salle, Jr., 250 SCRA
581, 592 (1996), People vs. Maquilan (294 SCRA 633; August 27, 1998)

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT:

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Expanded meaning of judicial power:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

Meaning of Judicial Review:

The power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts in light of their
conformity with the Constitution. This is not an assertion of superiority by the courts over the
departments, but merely an expression of the supremacy of the Constitution. The power is inherent in the
Judicial Department, by virtue of the doctrine of separation of power.

What is the effect on political questions of the expanded meaning of judicial power?
Even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within the Court’s powers of review
under the expanded meaning of judicial power conferred upon it by Article VIII, Sec. 1, of the Constitution,
which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Daza vs.
Singson)

Congress enacts a law providing that: "No court shall issue any restraining order or injunction
against the Asset Privatization Trust in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of
assets transferred to it." Is this provision an infringement of judicial power as defined in Section
1, Article VIII of the Constitution?
Judicial power is "not unqualified." It may be regulated and defined by the Constitution (Sec. 2,
VIII) and by law. In this case, Proclamation 50-A is the law that provides that judicial power may not be
exercised in the form of an injunction against the acts of the APT in pursuance of its mandate Mantruste
Systems, Inc. v. CA (179 SCRA 136 [1989]).

What cases must be heard en banc?

1. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law;
2. Cases involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations;
3. Cases heard by a division when the required majority in the division is not obtained;
4. Cases where the Supreme Court modifies or reverses a doctrine or principle of law previously laid
down either en banc or in division;
5. Administrative cases to dismiss or discipline a judge of a lower court (Sec. 11, VIII);
6. Election contest for President or VP (last par., Sec. 4, VII).

Has the Congress the power to amend the Rules of Court?

In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96, the Supreme Court declared: “. . . . .
the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.”

In re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Villarta
as RTC Judges (298 SCRA 408 [November 9, 1998])
The Court’s view is that during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution (t)wo
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” -- the President
is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Section 4(1) and 9
of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time
frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. It is noteworthy that the prohibition
on appointments comes into effect only once every six (6) years.
Section 15, Article VII is directed against two (2) types of appointments: (1) those made for
buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made
within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared
election offenses in the Omnibus Election Code. x x x The second type of appointments prohibited by
Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-called “midnight” appointments.

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CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

What are the powers of the Civil Service Commission?

The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, it has the
following powers:
1. To establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service;
2. to strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development
programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public
accountability;
3. to promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions, classify positions, prescribe conditions
of employment except as to compensation and other monetary benefits which shall be provided by law;
4. to determine the qualifications of the candidates for appointment (but it cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the appointing authority);
5. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, it has the power to hear and decide administrative cases
instituted before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments;
6. to recall an appointment initially approved in disregard of applicable provisions of the Civil Service
law and regulations;
7. to submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs;

What are the powers of the Commission on Elections?

The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions :
1. Promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before any of its offices;
2. Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall.
3. Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
4. Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters.
5. Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities
of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
6. Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions;.
7. File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion
of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including
acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
8. Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including
limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of
election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates.
9. Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employer it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive,
order, or decision.
10. Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

What are the powers of the Commission on Audit?

The Commission on Audit shall have the following powers:
1. to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government,
or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters
2. to examine and audit all forms of government expenditures;
3. to settle government accounts;
4. to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required
therefor;

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5. promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, inexpensive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or
uses of government funds and properties; and
6. To decide administrative cases involving expenditure of public funds.

Section 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any
guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.

Section 4. The Commission shall submit to the President and the Congress, within the time fixed by
law, an annual report covering the financial condition and operation of the Government, its subdivisions,
agencies, and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and non-
governmental entities subject to its audit, and recommend measures necessary to improve their
effectiveness and efficiency. It shall submit such other reports as may be required by law.

ELECTION LAWS

Are pre-proclamation controversies allowed in elections for President, VP, Senator and
Congressman?
Pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, VP, Senator and Congressman are NOT
ALLOWED "on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation [canvassing] of Election Returns or Certificates of Canvass.
HOWEVER, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing board to -
1. CORRECT MANIFEST ERRORS in the Certificates of Canvass or Election Returns, motu propio
or upon written complaint of an interested person; and
2. Also, questions affecting the COMPOSITION or PROCEEDINGS of the Board, may be initiated
before the Board, or directly with the Comelec.

WHAT is the EFFECT of filing a certificate of candidacy?

1. ANY person holding a public APPOINTIVE office or position, including active members of the
AFP, and officers and employees of the government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered IPSO FACTO RESIGNED from his office upon the FILING of his Certificate of Candidacy
[Section 66, OEC; Sec. 4 (a), Comelec Res. No. 3253/3253-A];
2. ANY ELECTIVE national or local official, running for any office OTHER THAN the one he is
holding in a permanent capacity, shall be deemed RESIGNED only upon the start of the campaign
period corresponding to the position for which he is running [Comelec Res. No. 3253/3253-A].

MAY a candidate be SUBSTITUTED?

ONLY an OFFICIAL CANDIDATE of a registered Political Party who dies, withdraws, or is
disqualified may be substituted.

WHAT are GROUNDS for Substitution?

1. Death of the official candidate;
2. Withdrawal of the official candidate;
2. Disqualification for any cause of the official candidate.
[Section 77, OEC; Sec. 11, Comelec Res. No. 2977}

WHAT is the PROCEDURE in SUBSTITUTION of Candidate?

The PROCEDUE is as follows;
1. The SUBSTITUTE candidate, nominated by the Political Party concerned, may FILE his
Certificate of Candidacy as herein provided for the office affected NOT LATER THAN MID-DAY of the day
of the election;
2. IF the death or disqualification occur between the day before election and mid-day of election
day, the Certificate of Candidacy may be filed with ANY BEI in the political subdivision where he is a
candidate, OR in the case of candidates for Senator, with the Law Department of the Comelec
[Section 77, OEC; Sec. 12, Comelec Res. No. 3253].

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May an INDEPENDENT candidate who dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause be
SUBSTITUTED?
NO. Only a candidate officially nominated by a political party may be substituted. No substitution
shall be allowed for an independent candidate. [Sec. 13, Comelec Res. No. 3253-A].

MAY a person who has WITHDRAWN as a candidate for a position SUBSTITUTE for any other
position?
NO. A person who has withdrawn his candidacy for a position shall NOT BE ELIGIBLE as
SUBSTITUTE for any other position [Sec. 13, Comelec Res. No. 3253];

Nuisance Candidate. The COMELEC may, motu propio, or upon verified petition of an interested party,
refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that the said certificate was
filed:
1. to put the election process in mockery or disrepute;
2. to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates; or
3. by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide
intention to run for the office for which the certificate has been filed, and thus prevent a faithful
determination of the true will of the electorate.

What are the grounds for disqualification of a candidate?

Under Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code:
1. ANY CANDIDATE who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision
of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having:
1.1. given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters or public officials performing electoral functions;
1.2. committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
1.3. spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;
1.4. solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96,
97 and 104;
1.5. violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-
paragraph 6;
2. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country, unless said
person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance
with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
3. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or offense punishable
by 1 year or more
4. Those removed from office as a result of an Administrative case
5. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the republic
6. Fugitives from justice in criminal and non-political cases here and abroad
7. Insane or feeble minded persons

Under the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160)
The following persons are disqualified from running for any ELECTIVE LOCAL POSITION:
1. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one [1] year or more imprisonment, within two [2] years after serving sentence;
2. Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
3. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
4. Those with dual citizenship;
5. Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
6. Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad
and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
7. The insane or feeble-minded.

“Fugitive From Justice”-- includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment, but
likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.

Rodriguez v. COMELEC
-- Rodriguez cannot be considered a “fugitive from justice”, because his arrival in the Philippines
from the US preceded the filing the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court and the
issuance of the arrest warrant by the same foreign court, by almost 5 months.

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WHAT are the EFFECTS of Disqualification:

Any candidate, who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified, SHALL NOT BE
VOTED FOR, and the VOTES cast for him SHALL NOT BE COUNTED.
If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and received the winning number of votes in such election, the court or the
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may, during the pendency thereof, order the SUSPENSION of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong [Sec. 6. R. A. 6646; Sec. 17, Comelec Resolution
No. 3253].

Amelita C. Villarosa ran for the office of Representative of the lone district of Occidental Mindoro
in the 11 May 1998 elections. In her Certificate of Candidacy, she placed as her nickname “JTV”,
which is actually the nickname of her husband, former Congressman Jose T. Villarosa. The issue
is – whether or not the “JTV” votes should be counted in favor of Candidate Amelita C. Villarosa.
The use of nickname is allowed under Section 13 of Rule 211 if: 1) the nickname and appellation
of affection and friendship is accompanied by the first name or surname of the candidate; and 2) the
nickname, even if not accompanied by the name or surname of the candidate, is the one by which the
candidate is generally or popularly known in the locality.
In the instant case, the “JTV” votes are not accompanied by the first name or surname of
candidate Villarosa and “JTV” is not a nickname by which candidate Villarosa was generally and popularly
known in the lone legislative district of Occidental Mindoro. The HRET was therefore correct in NOT
COUNTING the “JTV” votes in favor of candidate Vilarosa. (Villarosa vs. HRET)

ELECTION CONTESTS
A. Jurisdiction over Election Contests
1. Original and Exclusive
a) President/Vice-President, Supreme Court; b) Senator, Senate Electoral Tribunal;
c) Representatives, HR Electoral Tribunal; d) Regional/Provincial/City, COMELEC;
e) Municipal, RTC; and e) Barangay, Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Court
2. Appellate Jurisdiction
From decisions of the RTC and Municipal/City Courts, appeal shall be made exclusively to the
Comelec, whose decision shall be final, executory and unappealable.

But NOTE: Decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof.

Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Fidel Valdez Ramos

--- It was held that the election protest filed by Santiago against Pres. Ramos was rendered moot and
academic by the election of Santiago as a Senator in the May 1995 elections and her assumption of office
as such on June 30, 1995. In assuming the office of Senator, the protestant has effectively abandoned or
withdrawn this protest, or at the very least, in the language of Moraleja v. Relova, abandoned her as
“determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of
the electorate”. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would be serve public interest as it would dissipate
the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential election, thereby enhancing the all too
crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.

Distinctions between Quo Warranto in elective and in appointive office.

1.In an elective office: the issue is eligibility of the officer-elect;
- the court or tribunal cannot declare the protestant (or the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes) as having been elected.
2. In an appointive office: the issue is the legality of the appointment;
- the court determines who of the parties has legal title to the office.

Execution pending appeal

The trial court may grant a motion for execution pending appeal, because the mere filing of an
appeal does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over a case and to resolve pending incidents. In
Gutierrez v. Comelec, it was held that the RTC may grant a motion for execution pending appeal provided

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that there are valid and special reasons therefor. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the fact that
only a short period is left of the term of office is a good ground for execution pending appeal.
However, the rule must be strictly construed against the movant, and only when the reason is of
such urgency will such execution pending appeal be allowed. Not every invocation of public interest with
particular reference to the will of the electorate may be appreciated as a good reason (Camlian v.
Comelec).

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

What are the rules on the requirements for the publication of laws and implementing rules and
regulations?
In Tanada vs. Tuvera (136SCRA 27), the Supreme Court said that administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also
to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning
the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

What is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or preliminary resort?

This doctrine simply calls for the determination of administrative questions, which are ordinarily
questions of facts, by administrative agencies rather by the courts of justice.
The Supreme Court in Industrial Enterprises vs. CA explained that it may occur that the court
has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case concurrently with an administrative agency.
However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of fact are
involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceedings before a remedy will be
supplied by the courts.

What is meant by exhaustion of administrative remedies?

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, an administrative decision must first
be appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of
justice for review. This is required in order to decide the matter by itself correctly and prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the Courts.

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

Powers and Duties

The duties of the public officer may be discretionary or ministerial:
A. Discretionary if the officer is allowed to determine how and when it is to be performed and to decide
this matter one way or the other and be right either way.
B. Ministerial when the law exacting its discharge prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion of
its performance with such certainty that nothing is left for judgment or discretion.

Prohibition
A. Partisan Political Activity
“No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or
partisan political campaign”.
- Means active support for or affiliation with the cause of a political party or candidate.
- Exempt from this prohibition are those holding political offices, but it shall be unlawful for them to solicit
contributions from their subordinates or subject them to any of the acts involving subordinates prohibited
by the Election Code.
B. Nepotism
- Nepotism or favoritism toward relatives by the appointing authority is prohibited. The prohibition covers
all appointments, including designations, in the national city and municipal governments, or in branch or
instrumentality thereof, including GOCC with original charters.
C. Additional or Double Compensation

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- No elective or appointive public officer of employee shall receive additional, double, indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any
present, emolument, office or title of any kind from any foreign government. Pensions or gratuities shall
not be considered as additional, double or indirect compensation.

Liability
Three-Fold Liability Rule
- The wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal or administrative liability
- An action for each can proceed independently of the others. Dismissal of the criminal action does not
foreclose the institution of an administrative action.
- Relief from criminal liability does not carry with it relief from administrative liability.

Liability of Ministerial Officers

- Non-feasance: neglect or refusal to perform an act which is the officer’s legal obligation to perform
- Misfeasance: failure to use that degree of care, skill and diligence required in the performance of
official duty
- Malfeasance: the doing, through ignorance, inattention or malice, of an act which he had no legal right
to perform

Termination of official relations

1. Expiration of the term or tenure; 2. Resignation; 3. Recall; 4. Removal; 5.Abandonment;
6. Acceptance of an incompatible office; 7. Abolition of office; 8. Prescription and Others

Elements of Resignation
1. there must be an intent to resign;
2. the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment
Note: the validity of resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be
oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be
given effect. (Joseph E. Estrada vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 146738, March 2, 2001)

Has President Estrada Resigned?

In the case of Joseph Estrada vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, the Supreme Court held that President
Estrada indeed resigned from office in this wise:
(1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the
reservation about its legality;
(2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of presidency, for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process of our nation; He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any
kind of inability and he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears;
(3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was
referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President;
(4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same
service of our country. Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
President which he has given up; and
(5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.

Is there a need for notice and hearing in the promulgation of a general regulation by an
administrative body?
No. There is no constitutional requirement for a hearing. Where the rule is procedural or where
the rules are, in effect, merely legal opinions, there is no notice required. Neither is notice required in the
preparation of substantive rules where the class to be affected is large and the questions to be resolved
involve the use of discretion committed to the rule-making body.
HOWEVER, an administrative rule in the nature of subordinate legislation is designed to implement a law
by providing its details, and before it is adopted there must be a hearing. When an administrative rule
substantially adds to or increases the burden of those concerned, an administrative agency must accord
those directly affected a chance to be heard before its issuance.

RES JUDICATA
Does the principle of res judicata apply to decisions and orders of administrative agencies?
Yes. Administrative decisions and orders have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of
the final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.

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What are the exceptions to the applicability of the doctrine?

The doctrine does not apply in administrative adjudication relative to citizenship. Neither is it
applicable in labor relations proceedings.

TERM LIMITATION OF LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFICIAL:

A was duly elected and served 2 consecutive terms as mayor prior to the May 1995 elections. In
the May 1995 elections, A ran for mayor and was again proclaimed winner but was later declared
the loser in an election protest decided in 1997. In the May 1998 elections, A again filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor but his opponent filed a petition to disqualify him on the ground
that he had served 3 consecutive terms in the same post. Can A run again for Mayor in the May
1998 elections?
Yes. Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concern
has been elected for 3 consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2) that he has fully
served 3 consecutive terms. The 2 requisites for the application of the of the 3-term rule are absent.
First, A cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections; and
Second, A did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of
office. To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected
to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. (Lonzanida vs.
COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602)

Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the death of the incumbent. Six
months before the next election, he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for
mayor in the next election?
Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and subsequently
resigned from office before the full term expired, he has not actually served three full terms in all for the
purpose of applying the term limit. Under Art. X, §8, voluntary renunciation of the office is not considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one "for which he was
elected." Since A is only completing the service of the term for which the deceased and not he was
elected, A cannot be considered to have completed one term. His resignation constitutes an interruption
of the full term. (Borja, Jr., vs. COMELEC, (295 SCRA 157; September 3, 1998)

Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a
total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next election?
Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively. The mayor is entitled to run for
reelection because the two conditions for the application of the disqualification provisions have not
concurred, namely, that the local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times and that he
has fully served three consecutive terms. The local official has been elected three consecutive times, but
he has not fully served three consecutive terms. (Borja, Jr., vs. COMELEC, (295 SCRA 157;
September 3, 1998)

U.I.O.G.D.

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