Punic Wars

The Punic Wars were a series of wars (taking place

Punic Wars
between 264 and 146  BC) that were fought between
the Roman Republic and Ancient Carthage.

The First Punic War broke out on the island of Sicily in

264  BC. It was regarded as "the longest and most
severely contested war in history" by the Ancient
Greek historian Polybius.[1] The fighting, which
consisted predominantly of naval warfare, largely took
place on the waters of the Mediterranean surrounding
Sicily. The conflict began because Rome's imperial
ambitions had been interfering with Carthage's
ownership claims of the island of Sicily. Carthage was
the dominant power of the western Mediterranean at
the time, and had an extensive maritime empire; An animated display showing the territory
meanwhile, Rome was a rapidly expanding state that controlled by Rome and Carthage during the
had a powerful army but a weak navy. The conflict period of the Punic Wars and the territorial
lasted for 23 years and caused substantial materiel and changes during them

human losses on both sides; the Carthaginians were    Carthaginian possessions

ultimately defeated by the Romans. By the terms of the    Roman possessions
peace treaty, Carthage paid large war reparations to
Rome and Sicily fell to Roman control—thus becoming Date 264 BC – 146 BC
the first Roman province. The action of taking control Location Western Mediterranean region
of Sicily had further entrenched Rome's position as a Result Roman victory, destruction of
superpower in the Mediterranean and the world as a
Carthage
whole. The end of the war also sparked a significant,
but unsuccessful, mutiny within the Carthaginian Belligerents
Empire referred to as the Mercenary War. The First Rome Carthage
Punic War officially came to an end in 241 BC.

The Second Punic War began in 218 BC and witnessed Hannibal's crossing of the Alps and invasion of
mainland Italy. This expedition enjoyed considerable early success, notably in the large victories of the
Lake Trasimene and Cannae (in  217 and  216 BC). There was also extensive fighting in Iberia (modern
Spain and Portugal); on Sicily; on Sardinia; and in North Africa. The successful Roman invasion of the
Carthaginian homeland in Africa in 204 BC led to Hannibal's recall from Italy. He was defeated by Scipio
Africanus in the Battle of Zama in 202 BC and Carthage sued for peace. A treaty was agreed in 201  BC
which stripped Carthage of its overseas territories, and some of their African ones; imposed a large
indemnity, to be paid over 50 years; severely restricted the size of its armed forces; and prohibited Carthage
from waging war without Rome's express permission. Carthage therefore became a secondary power in
Rome's sphere of influence.

Rome contrived a justification to declare war on Carthage again in 149 BC in the Third Punic War. This
conflict was fought entirely on Carthage's territories in what is now Tunisia and largely centred around the
Siege of Carthage. In 146 BC the Romans stormed the city of Carthage, sacked it, slaughtered most of its
population and completely demolished it. The previously Carthaginian territories were taken over as the
Roman province of Africa. The ruins of the city lie 16 kilometres (10  mi) east of modern Tunis on the
North African coast.

Contents
Primary sources
Background and origin
Opposing forces
Armies
Navies
First Punic War, 264–241 BC
Course
Interbellum, 241–218 BC
Mercenary War
Carthaginian expansion in Iberia
Second Punic War, 218–201 BC
Italy
Iberia
Africa
Interbellum, 201–149 BC
Third Punic War, 149–146 BC
Siege of Carthage
Aftermath
Notes, citations and sources
Notes
Citations
Sources

Primary sources
The main source for almost every aspect of the Punic Wars[note 1] is the historian
Polybius (c. 200 – c. 118 BC), a Greek sent to Rome in 167 BC as a hostage.[3] His
works include a now-largely lost manual on military tactics,[4] but he is now known
for The Histories, written sometime after 146 BC.[5][6] Polybius's work is considered
broadly objective and largely neutral as between Carthaginian and Roman points of
view.[7][8] Polybius was an analytical historian and wherever possible personally
interviewed participants, from both sides, in the events he wrote about.[9][10][11] He
accompanied the Roman general Scipio Aemilianus during his campaign in North
Africa which resulted in the Roman victory in the Third Punic War.[12]

The accuracy of Polybius's account has been much debated over the past 150 years, Polybius
but the modern consensus is to accept it largely at face value, and the details of the war
in modern sources are largely based on interpretations of Polybius's account.[3][13][14]
The modern historian Andrew Curry sees Polybius as being "fairly reliable";[15] while Craige Champion
describes him as "a remarkably well-informed, industrious, and insightful historian".[16]

Other, later, ancient histories of the war exist, although often in fragmentary or summary form.[17] Modern
historians usually take into account the writings of various Roman annalists, some contemporary; the
Sicilian Greek Diodorus Siculus; the later Roman historians, Livy (who relied heavily on Polybius[18]),
Plutarch, Appian (whose account of the Third Punic War is especially valuable[19]) and Dio Cassius.[20]
The classicist Adrian Goldsworthy states "Polybius' account is usually to be preferred when it differs with
any of our other accounts".[note 2][10] Other sources include coins, inscriptions, archaeological evidence
and empirical evidence from reconstructions such as the trireme Olympias.[21]

Background and origin

The Roman Republic had been aggressively expanding in the
southern Italian mainland for a century before the First Punic
War.[22] It had conquered peninsular Italy south of the Arno
River by 272  BC, when the Greek cities of southern Italy
(Magna Graecia) submitted after the conclusion of the Pyrrhic
War.[23] During this period of Roman expansion Carthage,
with its capital in what is now Tunisia, had come to dominate
southern Spain, much of the coastal regions of North Africa,
The approximate extent of territory the Balearic Islands, Corsica, Sardinia, and the western half of
controlled by Rome and Carthage
Sicily.[24]
immediately before the start of the First
Punic War.

Beginning in 480 BC, Carthage had fought a series of inconclusive

wars against the Greek city states of Sicily, led by Syracuse.[25] By
264 BC Carthage was the dominant external power on the island,
and Carthage and Rome were the preeminent powers in the
western Mediterranean.[26] Relationships were good and the two
Play media
states had several times declared their mutual friendship via formal
Reconsruction of Carthage, in Latin
alliances: in 509  BC, 348  BC and around 279  BC. There were
with English subtitles
strong commercial links. During the Pyrrhic War of 280–275 BC,
against a king of Epirus who alternately fought Rome in Italy and
Carthage on Sicily, Carthage provided materiel to the Romans and
on at least one occasion used its navy to ferry a Roman force.[27][28] According to the classicist Richard
Miles, Rome's expansionary attitude after southern Italy came under its control combined with Carthage's
proprietary approach to Sicily caused the two powers to stumble into war more by accident than design.[29]
The immediate cause of the war was the issue of control of the independent Sicilian city state of Messana
(modern Messina).[30] In 264 BC Carthage and Rome went to war, starting the First Punic War.[31]

Opposing forces

Armies

Most male Roman citizens were eligible for military service and would serve as infantry, with a better-off
minority providing a cavalry component. Traditionally, when at war the Romans would raise two legions,
each of 4,200 infantry[note 3] and 300 cavalry. Approximately 1,200 of the infantry, poorer or younger men
unable to afford the armour and equipment of a standard legionary, served as
javelin-armed skirmishers, known as velites. They carried several javelins,
which would be thrown from a distance, a short sword, and a 90-centimetre
(3  ft) shield.[34] The balance were equipped as heavy infantry, with body
armour, a large shield and short thrusting swords. They were divided into three
ranks, of which the front rank also carried two javelins, while the second and
third ranks had a thrusting spear instead. Both legionary sub-units and
individual legionaries fought in relatively open order. It was the long-standing
Roman procedure to elect two men each year, known as consuls, as senior
magistrates, who at time of war would each lead an army. An army was
usually formed by combining a Roman legion with a similarly sized and Detail from the
equipped legion provided by their Latin allies; allied legions usually had a Ahenobarbus relief
larger attached complement of cavalry than Roman ones.[35][36] showing two Roman foot-
soldiers from the second
Carthaginian citizens only served in their army if there was a direct threat to century BC
the city.[37] When they did they fought as well-armoured heavy infantry armed
with long thrusting spears, although they were notoriously ill-trained and ill-
disciplined. In most circumstances Carthage recruited foreigners to make up its army. Many were from
North Africa which provided several types of fighters including: close-order infantry equipped with large
shields, helmets, short swords and long thrusting spears; javelin-armed light infantry skirmishers; close-
order shock cavalry carrying spears; and light cavalry skirmishers who threw javelins from a distance and
avoided close combat.[38][39] Both Iberia and Gaul provided large numbers of experienced infantry  –
unarmoured troops who would charge ferociously, but had a reputation for breaking off if a combat was
protracted[40][41] – and unarmoured close-order cavalry[42] referred to by Livy as "steady", meaning that
they were accustomed to sustained hand-to-hand combat rather than hit and run tactics. The close-order
Libyan infantry and the citizen-militia would fight in a tightly packed formation known as a phalanx.[39]
On occasion some of the infantry would wear captured Roman armour, especially among Hannibal's
troops.[43] Slingers were frequently recruited from the Balearic Islands.[42][44] The Carthaginians also
employed war elephants; North Africa had indigenous African forest elephants at the time.[note 4][41][46]

Garrison duty and land blockades were the most common operations.[47][48] When armies were
campaigning, surprise attacks, ambushes and stratagems were common.[39][49] More formal battles were
usually preceded by the two armies camping two–twelve kilometres (1–71 ⁄2 miles) apart for days or weeks;
sometimes forming up in battle order each day. If either commander felt at a disadvantage, they might
march off without engaging. In such circumstances it was difficult to force a battle if the other commander
was unwilling to fight.[50][51] Forming up in battle order was a complicated and premeditated affair, which
took several hours. Infantry were usually positioned in the centre of the battle line, with light infantry
skirmishers to their front and cavalry on each flank.[52] Many battles were decided when one side's infantry
force was attacked in the flank or rear and they were partially or wholly enveloped.[39][53]

Navies

Quinqueremes, meaning "five-oarsmen",[54] provided the workhorses of the Roman and Carthaginian
fleets throughout the Punic Wars.[55] So ubiquitous was the type that Polybius uses it as a shorthand for
"warship" in general.[56] A quinquereme carried a crew of 300: 280 oarsmen and 20 deck crew and
officers.[57] It would also normally carry a complement of 40 marines;[58] if battle was thought to be
imminent this would be increased to as many as 120.[59][60] In 260 BC Romans set out to construct a fleet
and used a shipwrecked Carthaginian quinquereme as a blueprint for their own.[61]
As novice shipwrights, the Romans built copies that were heavier than the
Carthaginian vessels, and so slower and less manoeuvrable.[62] Getting the
oarsmen to row as a unit, let alone to execute more complex battle
manoeuvres, required long and arduous training.[63] At least half of the
oarsmen would need to have had some experience if the ship was to be
handled effectively.[64] As a result, the Romans were initially at a
disadvantage against the more experienced Carthaginians. To counter this,
the Romans introduced the corvus, a bridge 1.2 metres (4 feet) wide and 11 The corvus, the Roman ship
metres (36 feet) long, with a heavy spike on the underside, which was boarding device
designed to pierce and anchor into an enemy ship's deck.[59] This allowed
Roman legionaries acting as marines to board enemy ships and capture
them, rather than employing the previously traditional tactic of ramming.[65]

All warships were equipped with rams, a triple set of 60-centimetre-wide (2 ft) bronze blades weighing up
to 270 kilograms (600 lb) positioned at the waterline. In the century prior to the Punic Wars, boarding had
become increasingly common and ramming had declined, as the larger and heavier vessels adopted in this
period lacked the speed and manoeuvrability necessary to ram, while their sturdier construction reduced the
ram's effect even in case of a successful attack. The Roman adaptation of the corvus was a continuation of
this trend and compensated for their initial disadvantage in ship-manoeuvring skills. The added weight in
the prow compromised both the ship's manoeuvrability and its seaworthiness, and in rough sea conditions
the corvus became useless; part way through the First Punic War the Romans ceased using it.[65][66][67]

First Punic War, 264–241 BC

Course

Much of the First Punic War was fought on, or in the waters near,
Sicily.[68] Away from the coasts its hilly and rugged terrain made
manoeuvring large forces difficult and favoured the defence over
the offence. Land operations were largely confined to raids, sieges
Sicily, the main theatre of the First and interdiction; in 23 years of war on Sicily there were only two
Punic War full-scale pitched battles.[69]

Sicily, 264–257 BC

The war began with the Romans gaining a foothold on Sicily at Messana (modern Messina).[70] The
Romans then pressed Syracuse, the only significant independent power on the island, into allying with
them[71] and laid siege to Carthage's main base at Akragas on the south coast.[72] A Carthaginian army of
50,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and 60 elephants attempted to lift the siege in 262  BC, but was heavily
defeated at the Battle of Akragas. That night the Carthaginian garrison escaped and the Romans seized the
city and its inhabitants, selling 25,000 of them into slavery.[73]

After this the land war on Sicily reached a stalemate as the Carthaginians focused on defending their well-
fortified towns and cities; these were mostly on the coast and so could be supplied and reinforced without
the Romans being able to use their superior army to interfere.[74][75] The focus of the war shifted to the sea,
where the Romans had little experience; on the few occasions they had previously felt the need for a naval
presence they had usually relied on small squadrons provided by their Latin or Greek allies.[72][76][77] The
Romans built a navy to challenge Carthage's,[78] and using the corvus inflicted a major defeat at the Battle
of Mylae in 260 BC.[79][80][81] A Carthaginian base on Corsica was seized, but an attack on Sardinia was
repulsed; the base on Corsica the Romans had seized was then lost.[82] In 258 BC a Roman fleet heavily
defeated a smaller Carthaginian fleet at the Battle of Sulci off the western coast of Sardinia.[80]

Africa, 256–255 BC

Taking advantage of their naval victories the Romans launched an invasion of North Africa in 256 BC,[83]
which the Carthaginians intercepted at the Battle of Cape Ecnomus off the south coast of Sicily. The
Carthaginians were again beaten;[84] this was possibly the largest naval battle in history by the number of
combatants involved.[85][86][87] The invasion initially went well and in 255 BC the Carthaginians sued for
peace; the proposed terms were so harsh they fought on.[88] At the Battle of Tunis in spring 255  BC a
combined force of infantry, cavalry and war elephants under the command of the Spartan mercenary
Xanthippus crushed the Romans.[89] The Romans sent a fleet to evacuate their survivors and the
Carthaginians opposed it at the Battle of Cape Hermaeum (modern Cape Bon); the Carthaginians were
again heavily defeated.[90] The Roman fleet, in turn, was devastated by a storm while returning to Italy,
losing most of its ships and more than 100,000 men.[91][92][93]

Sicily, 255–241 BC

The war continued, with neither side able to gain a decisive advantage.[94] The
Carthaginians attacked and recaptured Akragas in 255 BC, but not believing they
could hold the city, they razed and abandoned it.[95][96] The Romans rapidly
rebuilt their fleet, adding 220 new ships, and captured Panormus (modern
Palermo) in 254 BC.[97] The next year they lost another 150 ships to a storm.[98]
On Sicily the Romans avoided battle in 252 and 251 BC, according to Polybius
because they feared the war elephants which the Carthaginians had shipped to the
island.[99][100] In 250  BC the Carthaginians advanced on Panormus, but in a
battle outside the walls the Romans drove off the Carthaginian elephants with Roman statuette of a
javelin fire. The elephants routed through the Carthaginian infantry, who were war elephant
then charged by the Roman infantry to complete their defeat.[100][101] recovered from
Herculaneum
Slowly the Romans had occupied most of Sicily; in 250 BC they besieged the last
two Carthaginian strongholds – Lilybaeum and Drepana in the extreme west.[102]
Repeated attempts to storm Lilybaeum's strong walls failed, as did attempts to block access to its harbour,
and the Romans settled down to a siege which was to last nine years.[103][104] They launched a surprise
attack on the Carthaginian fleet, but were defeated at the Battle of Drepana; Carthage's greatest naval
victory of the war.[105] Carthage turned to the maritime offensive, inflicting another heavy naval defeat at
the Battle of Phintias and all but swept the Romans from the sea.[106] It was to be seven years before Rome
again attempted to field a substantial fleet, while Carthage put most of its ships into reserve to save money
and free up manpower.[107][108]

Roman victory, 243–241 BC

After more than 20 years of war, both states were financially and demographically exhausted.[109]
Evidence of Carthage's financial situation includes their request for a 2,000 talent loan[note 5][note 6] from
Ptolemaic Egypt, which was refused.[112] Rome was also close to bankruptcy and the number of adult
male citizens, who provided the manpower for the navy and the legions, had declined by 17 per cent since
the start of the war.[113] Goldsworthy describes Roman manpower losses as "appalling".[114]
The Romans rebuilt their fleet again in 243 BC[115] after the Senate approached Rome's wealthiest citizens
for loans to finance the construction of one ship each, repayable from the reparations to be imposed on
Carthage once the war was won.[115] This new fleet effectively blockaded the Carthaginian garrisons.[111]
Carthage assembled a fleet which attempted to relieve them, but it was destroyed at the battle of the
Aegates Islands in 241  BC,[116][117] forcing the cut-off Carthaginian troops on Sicily to negotiate for
peace.[111][118]

The Treaty of Lutatius was agreed. By its terms Carthage paid 3,200 talents of silver[note 7] in reparations
and Sicily was annexed as a Roman province.[116] Henceforth Rome considered itself the leading military
power in the western Mediterranean, and increasingly the Mediterranean region as a whole. The immense
effort of repeatedly building large fleets of galleys during the war laid the foundation for Rome's maritime
dominance for 600 years.[119]

Interbellum, 241–218 BC

Mercenary War

The Mercenary, or Truceless, War began in 241 BC as

a dispute over the payment of wages owed to 20,000
foreign soldiers who had fought for Carthage on Sicily
during the First Punic War. This erupted into full-scale
mutiny under the leadership of Spendius and Matho
and 70,000 Africans from Carthage's oppressed
dependant territories flocked to join the mutineers,
bringing supplies and finance.[120][121] War-weary
Carthage fared poorly in the initial engagements,
Territory ceded to Rome by Carthage under the especially under the generalship of Hanno.[122][123]
treaty is shown in pink Hamilcar Barca, a veteran of the campaigns in Sicily,
was given joint command of the army in 240 BC, and
supreme command in 239  BC.[123] He campaigned
successfully, initially demonstrating leniency in an attempt to woo the rebels over.[124] To prevent this, in
240 BC Spendius tortured 700 Carthaginian prisoners to death, and henceforth the war was pursued with
great brutality.[125][126]

By early 237 BC, after numerous setbacks, the rebels were defeated and their cities brought back under
Carthaginian rule.[127] An expedition was prepared to reoccupy Sardinia, where mutinous soldiers had
slaughtered all Carthaginians. The Roman Senate stated they considered the preparation of this force an act
of war, and demanded Carthage cede Sardinia and Corsica, and pay an additional 1,200-talent
indemnity.[note 8][128][129] Weakened by 30 years of war, Carthage agreed rather than again enter into
conflict with Rome.[130] Polybius considered this "contrary to all justice"[128] and modern historians have
variously described the Romans' behaviour as "unprovoked aggression and treaty-breaking",[128]
"shamelessly opportunistic"[131] and an "unscrupulous act".[132] These events fuelled resentment of Rome
in Carthage, which was not reconciled to Rome's perception of its situation. This breach of the recently
signed treaty is considered by modern historians to be the single greatest cause of war with Carthage
breaking out again in 218 BC in the Second Punic War.[133][134][135]

Carthaginian expansion in Iberia

With the suppression of the rebellion, Hamilcar understood that
Carthage needed to strengthen its economic and military base if it were
to again confront Rome.[137] After the First Punic War, Carthaginian
possessions in Iberia (modern Spain and Portugal) were limited to a
handful of prosperous coastal cities in the south.[138] Hamilcar took
the army which he had led to victory in the Mercenary War to Iberia in
A Carthaginian quarter-shekel,
237  BC and carved out a quasi-monarchial, autonomous state in its
dated 237–209 BC, depicting the
south east.[139] This gave Carthage the silver mines, agricultural Punic god Melqart (who was
wealth, manpower, military facilities such as shipyards and territorial associated with
depth to stand up to future Roman demands with confidence.[140][141] Hercules/Heracles). On the
Hamilcar ruled as a viceroy and was succeeded by his son-in-law, reverse is an elephant; possibly a
Hasdrubal, in the early 220s  BC and then his son, Hannibal, in war elephant, which were linked
221  BC.[142] In 226  BC the Ebro Treaty was agreed with Rome, with the Barcids.[136]
specifying the Ebro River as the northern boundary of the
Carthaginian sphere of influence.[143] At some time during the next
six years Rome made a separate treaty with the city of Saguntum, which was situated well south of the
Ebro.[144]

Second Punic War, 218–201 BC

In 219 BC a Carthaginian army under Hannibal besieged, captured and sacked Saguntum[133][145] and in
spring 218 BC Rome declared war on Carthage.[146] There were three main military theatres in the war:
Italy, where Hannibal defeated the Roman legions repeatedly, with occasional subsidiary campaigns in
Sicily, Sardinia and Greece; Iberia, where Hasdrubal, a younger brother of Hannibal, defended the
Carthaginian colonial cities with mixed success until moving into Italy; and Africa, where the war was
decided.[147]

Italy

Hannibal crosses the Alps, 218–217 BC

In 218 BC there was some naval skirmishing in the waters around

Sicily. The Romans beat off a Carthaginian attack[148][149] and
captured the island of Malta.[150] In Cisalpine Gaul (modern
northern Italy), the major Gallic tribes attacked the Roman colonies
there, causing the Romans to flee to their previously-established
colony of Mutina (modern Modena), where they were besieged. A
Roman relief army broke through the siege, but was then ambushed
and besieged itself.[151] An army had previously been created by
the Romans to campaign in Iberia, but the Roman Senate detached The territory and allies of Rome and
one Roman and one allied legion from it to send to north Italy. Carthage immediately before the
Raising fresh troops to replace these delayed the army's departure start of the Second Punic War.
for Iberia until September.[152]

Meanwhile, Hannibal assembled a Carthaginian army in New Carthage (modern Cartagena) and led it
northwards along the Iberian coast in May or June. It entered Gaul and took an inland route, to avoid the
Roman allies to the south.[153] At the Battle of Rhone Crossing, Hannibal defeated a force of local
Allobroges which sought to bar his way.[154] A Roman fleet carrying the Iberian-bound army landed at
Rome's ally Massalia (modern Marseille) at the mouth of the Rhone,[155] but Hannibal evaded the Romans
and they continued to Iberia.[156][157] The Carthaginians reached the foot of the Alps by late autumn[153]
and crossed them, surmounting the difficulties of climate, terrain[153] and the guerrilla tactics of the native
tribes. Hannibal arrived with 20,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and an unknown number of elephants – the
survivors of the 37 with which he left Iberia[71][158]  – in what is now Piedmont, northern Italy. The
Romans were still in their winter quarters. His surprise entry into the Italian peninsula led to the cancellation
of Rome's planned campaign for the year: an invasion of Africa.[159]

Roman defeats, 218–217 BC

Hannibal captured the chief city of the hostile Taurini (in the area of
modern Turin) and his army routed the cavalry and light infantry of the
Romans at the Battle of Ticinus in late November.[160] As a result, most of
the Gallic tribes declared for the Carthaginian cause, and Hannibal's army
grew to more than 40,000 men.[161] A large Roman army was lured into
combat by Hannibal at the Battle of the Trebia, encircled and
destroyed.[162] Only 10,000 Romans out of 42,000 were able to cut their
way to safety. Gauls now joined Hannibal's army in large numbers,
bringing it up to 60,000 men.[161] The Romans stationed an army at
Arretium and one on the Adriatic coast to block Hannibal's advance into
central Italy.[163]
Hannibal

In early spring 217  BC, the Carthaginians crossed the Apennines

unopposed, taking a difficult but unguarded route.[164] Hannibal attempted
without success to draw the main Roman army under Gaius Flaminius into a pitched battle by devastating
the area they had been sent to protect.[165] Hannibal then cut off the Roman army from Rome, which
provoked Flaminius into a hasty pursuit without proper reconnaissance.[166] Hannibal set an ambush[166]
and in the Battle of Lake Trasimene completely defeated the Roman army, killing 15,000 Romans,[167]
including Flaminius,[166] and taking 15,000 prisoner. A cavalry force of 4,000 from the other Roman army
were also engaged and wiped out.[167] The prisoners were badly treated if they were Romans, but released
if they were from one of Rome's Latin allies.[168] Hannibal hoped some of these allies could be persuaded
to defect, and marched south in the hope of winning over Roman allies among the ethnic Greek and Italic
city states.[163][169]

The Romans, panicked by these heavy defeats, appointed Quintus Fabius Maximus as dictator.[170] Fabius
introduced the Fabian strategy of avoiding open battle with his opponent, but constantly skirmishing with
small detachments of the enemy. This was not popular among the soldiers, the Roman public or the Roman
elite, since he avoided battle while Italy was being devastated by the enemy.[163] Hannibal marched
through the richest and most fertile provinces of Italy, hoping the devastation would draw Fabius into battle,
but Fabius refused.[171]

Cannae, 216 BC

At the elections of 216 BC Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus were elected as consuls;
both were more aggressive-minded than Fabius.[172] The Roman Senate authorised the raising of a force of
86,000 men, the largest in Roman history to that point.[172] Paullus and Varro marched southward to
confront Hannibal, who accepted battle on the open plain near Cannae. In the Battle of Cannae the Roman
legions forced their way through Hannibal's deliberately weak centre, but Libyan heavy infantry on the
wings swung around their advance, menacing their flanks.[173] Hasdrubal led Carthaginian cavalry on the
left wing and routed the Roman cavalry opposite, then swept around the rear of the Romans to attack the
cavalry on the other wing. He then charged into the legions from behind.[173] As a result, the Roman
infantry was surrounded with no means of escape.[173] At least 67,500 Romans were killed or
captured.[173]

Within a few weeks of Cannae a Roman army of 25,000 was ambushed by Boii Gauls at the Battle of Silva
Litana and annihilated.[174]

Roman allies defect, 216–205 BC

Little has survived of Polybius's account of Hannibal's army in Italy after Cannae. Livy gives a fuller
record, but according to Goldsworthy "his reliability is often suspect", especially with regard to his
descriptions of battles;[note 9] nevertheless his is the best surviving source for this part of the war.[176][177]
Several of the city states in southern Italy allied themselves with Hannibal, or were captured when pro-
Carthaginian factions betrayed their defences. These included the large city of Capua and the major port
city of Tarentum (modern Taranto). Two of the major Samnite tribes also joined the Carthaginian cause. By
214 BC the bulk of southern Italy had turned against Rome.[178][179]

However, the majority of Rome's allies remained loyal, including many in southern Italy.[180] All except
the smallest towns were too well fortified for Hannibal to take by assault, and blockade could be a long-
drawn-out affair, or if the target was a port, impossible.[181] Carthage's new allies felt little sense of
community with Carthage, or even with each other.[180] The new allies increased the number of fixed
points which Hannibal's army was expected to defend from Roman retribution, but provided relatively few
fresh troops to assist him in doing so.[182] Such Italian forces as were raised resisted operating away from
their home cities and performed badly when they did.[183]

When the port city of Locri defected to Carthage in the summer of

215 BC it was immediately used to reinforce the Carthaginian forces in
Italy with soldiers, supplies and war elephants.[184] It was the only time
during the war that Carthage reinforced Hannibal.[185] A second force,
under Hannibal's youngest brother Mago, was meant to land in Italy in
215 BC but was diverted to Iberia after the Carthaginian defeat in Iberia
at the Battle of Dertosa.[184][186]

Meanwhile, the Romans took drastic steps to raise new legions:

enrolling slaves, criminals and those who did not meet the usual
Hannibal's allies in southern property qualification.[183] By early 215 BC they were fielding at least
Italy c. 213 BC, shown in light 12 legions; by 214  BC, 18; and by 213  BC, 22. By 212  BC the full
blue complement of the legions deployed would have been in excess of
100,000 men, plus, as always, a similar number of allied troops. The
majority were deployed in southern Italy in field armies of
approximately 20,000 men each. This was insufficient to challenge Hannibal's army in open battle, but
sufficient to force him to concentrate his forces and to hamper his movements.[187]

For 11 years after Cannae the war surged around southern Italy as cities went over to the Carthaginians or
were taken by subterfuge, and the Romans recaptured them by siege or by suborning pro-Roman
factions.[188] Hannibal repeatedly defeated Roman armies, but wherever his main army was not active the
Romans threatened Carthaginian-supporting towns or sought battle with Carthaginian or Carthaginian-
allied detachments; frequently with success.[189] By 207 BC Hannibal had been confined to the extreme
south of Italy and many of the cities and territories which had joined the Carthaginian cause had returned to
their Roman allegiance.[190]
First Macedonian War, 214–205 BC

During 216 BC the Macedonian king, Philip V, pledged his support to Hannibal[191] – thus initiating the
First Macedonian War against Rome in 215 BC. In 211 BC, Rome contained the threat of Macedonia by
allying with the Aetolian League, an anti-Macedonian coalition of Greek city states. In 205 BC this war
ended with a negotiated peace.[192]

Sardinia, 213 BC

A rebellion in support of the Carthaginians broke out on Sardinia in 213 BC, but it was quickly put down
by the Romans.[193]

Sicily, 213–210 BC

Sicily remained firmly in Roman hands, blocking the ready

seaborne reinforcement and resupply of Hannibal from Carthage.
Hiero II, the old tyrant of Syracuse of forty-five-years standing and
a staunch Roman ally, died in 215  BC and his successor
Hieronymus was discontented with his situation. Hannibal
negotiated a treaty whereby Syracuse came over to Carthage, at the
price of making the whole of Sicily a Syracusan possession. The
Syracusan army proved no match for the Romans, and by spring
213 BC Syracuse was besieged.[194][195] The siege was marked by
Archimedes before being killed by
the ingenuity of Archimedes in inventing war machines to
the Roman soldier – copy of a
counteract the traditional siege warfare methods of the
Roman mosaic from the 2nd century
Romans.[196]

A large Carthaginian army led by Himilco was sent to relieve the

city in 213  BC.[193][197] It captured several Roman-garrisoned towns on Sicily; many Roman garrisons
were either expelled or massacred by Carthaginian partisans.[197] In the spring of 212  BC the Romans
stormed Syracuse in a surprise night assault and captured several districts of the city.[197] Meanwhile, the
Carthaginian army was crippled by plague.[197] After the Carthaginians failed to resupply the city,
Syracuse fell in the autumn of 212 BC; Archimedes was killed by a Roman soldier.[197]

Carthage sent more reinforcements to Sicily in 211 BC and went on the offensive. A fresh Roman army
attacked the main Carthaginian stronghold on the island, Agrigentum, in 210 BC and the city was betrayed
to the Romans by a discontented Carthaginian officer. The remaining Carthaginian-controlled towns then
surrendered or were taken through force or treachery[198][199] and the Sicilian grain supply to Rome and its
armies was resumed.[200]

Hasdrubal invades Italy, 207 BC

In the spring of 207  BC, Hasdrubal Barca marched across the Alps and invaded Italy with an army of
30,000 men. His aim was to join his forces with those of Hannibal, but Hannibal was unaware of his
presence. The Romans facing Hannibal in southern Italy tricked him into believing the whole Roman army
was still in camp, while a large portion marched north and reinforced the Romans facing Hasdrubal. The
combined Roman force attacked Hasdrubal at the Battle of the Metaurus and destroyed his army, killing
Hasdrubal. This battle confirmed Roman dominance in Italy.[201]
Mago invades Italy, 205–203 BC

In 205 BC, Mago landed in Genua in north-west Italy with the remnants of his Spanish army (see § Iberia
below). It soon received Gallic and Ligurian reinforcements. Mago's arrival in the north of the Italian
peninsula was followed by Hannibal's inconclusive Battle of Crotona in 204  BC in the far south of the
peninsula. Mago marched his reinforced army towards the lands of Carthage's main Gallic allies in the Po
Valley, but was checked by a large Roman army and defeated at the Battle of Insubria in 203 BC.[202]

Hannibal is recalled, 203 BC

After Publius Cornelius Scipio invaded the Carthaginian homeland in 204 BC, defeating the Carthaginians
in two major battles and winning the allegiance of the Numidian kingdoms of North Africa, Hannibal and
the remnants of his army were recalled.[203] They sailed from Croton[204] and landed at Carthage with
15,000–20,000 experienced veterans.[205] Mago was also recalled; he died of wounds on the voyage and
some of his ships were intercepted by the Romans,[205] but 12,000 of his troops reached Carthage.[206]

Iberia

Iberia 218–215 BC

The Roman fleet continued on from Massala in the autumn of 218 BC,

landing the army it was transporting in north-east Iberia, where it won
support among the local tribes.[156] A rushed Carthaginian attack in
late 218 BC was beaten off at the Battle of Cissa.[156][207] In 217 BC
40 Carthaginian and Iberian warships were beaten by 55 Roman and
Massalian vessels at the Battle of Ebro River, with 29 Carthaginian
ships lost. The Romans' lodgement between the Ebro and Pyrenees
blocked the route from Iberia to Italy and prevented the despatch of Roman controlled territory in
reinforcements from Iberia to Hannibal.[207] The Carthaginian Iberia 218–214 BC, shown in red
commander in Iberia, Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal, marched into this and pink
area in 215 BC, offered battle and was defeated at Dertosa, although
both sides suffered heavy casualties.[208]

Iberia, 214–209 BC

The Carthaginians suffered a wave of defections of local Celtiberian tribes to Rome.[156] The Roman
commanders captured Saguntum in 212 BC[208] and in 211  BC hired 20,000 Celtiberian mercenaries to
reinforce their army.[208] Observing that the three Carthaginian armies were deployed apart from each
other, the Romans split their forces.[208] This strategy resulted in the Battle of Castulo and the Battle of
Ilorca, usually combined as the Battle of the Upper Baetis.[156][208] Both battles ended in complete defeat
for the Romans, as Hasdrubal had bribed the Romans' mercenaries to desert.[156][208] The Romans
retreated to their coastal stronghold north of the Ebro, from which the Carthaginians again failed to expel
them.[156][208] Claudius Nero brought over reinforcements in 210 BC and stabilised the situation.[208]

In 210 BC Publius Cornelius Scipio,[note 10] arrived in Iberia with further Roman reinforcements.[212] In a
carefully planned assault in 209 BC, he captured Cartago Nova, the lightly-defended centre of Carthaginian
power in Iberia.[212][213] Scipio seized a vast booty of gold, silver, and siege artillery,[212][214] but released
the captured population. He also liberated the Iberian hostages who had been held there by the
Carthaginians to ensure the loyalty of their tribes.[212][214] Even so, many of them later fought against the
 Romans.[212]

Iberia, 208–207 BC

In the spring of 208  BC, Hasdrubal moved to engage Scipio at the Battle of
Baecula.[212] The Carthaginians were defeated, but Hasdrubal was able to
withdraw the majority of his army in good order. Most of his losses were among his
Iberian allies. Scipio was not able to prevent Hasdrubal from leading his depleted
army over the western passes of the Pyrenees into Gaul. In 207 BC, after recruiting
heavily in Gaul, Hasdrubal crossed the Alps into Italy in an attempt to join his
2nd century BC
marble bust, brother, Hannibal.[212][215][216]
identified as Scipio
Africanus, now in
Roman victory in Iberia, 206–205 BC
the Ny Carlsberg
Glyptotek.[209][210] In 206  BC, at the Battle of Ilipa, Scipio with 48,000 men, half Italian and half
Iberian, defeated a Carthaginian army of 54,500 men and 32 elephants. This sealed
the fate of the Carthaginians in Iberia.[212][216] It was followed by the Roman
capture of Gades after the city rebelled against Carthaginian rule.[217]

Later the same year a mutiny broke out among Roman troops, which initially attracted support from Iberian
leaders, disappointed that Roman forces had remained in the peninsula after the expulsion of the
Carthaginians, but it was effectively put down by Scipio. In 205 BC a last attempt was made by Mago to
recapture New Carthage when the Roman occupiers were shaken by another mutiny and an Iberian
uprising, but he was repulsed. Mago left Iberia for northern Italy with his remaining forces.[214] In 203 BC
Carthage succeeded in recruiting at least 4,000 mercenaries from Iberia, despite Rome's nominal
control.[218]

Africa

In 213  BC Syphax, a powerful Numidian king in North Africa,[208] declared for Rome. In response,
Roman advisers were sent to train his soldiers[208] and he waged war against the Carthaginian ally
Gala.[208] In 206 BC the Carthaginians ended this drain on their resources by dividing several Numidian
kingdoms with him. One of those disinherited was the Numidian prince Masinissa, who was thus driven
into the arms of Rome.[219]

Scipio's invasion of Africa, 204–201 BC

In 205 BC Publius Scipio was given command of the legions in Sicily and allowed to enrol volunteers for
his plan to end the war by an invasion of Africa.[220] After landing in Africa in 204 BC, he was joined by
Masinissa and a force of Numidian cavalry.[221] Scipio gave battle to and destroyed two large Carthaginian
armies.[203] After the second of these Syphax was pursued and taken prisoner by Masinissa at the Battle of
Cirta; Masinissa then seized most of Syphax's kingdom with Roman help.[222]

Rome and Carthage entered into peace negotiations, and Carthage recalled Hannibal from Italy.[223] The
Roman Senate ratified a draft treaty, but due to mistrust and a surge in confidence when Hannibal arrived
from Italy Carthage repudiated it.[224] Hannibal was placed in command of another army, formed from his
veterans from Italy and newly raised troops from Africa, but with few cavalry.[225] The decisive Battle of
Zama followed in October 202 BC.[226] Unlike most battles of the Second Punic War, the Romans had
superiority in cavalry and the Carthaginians in infantry.[225] Hannibal attempted to use 80 elephants to
break into the Roman infantry formation, but the Romans countered them effectively and they routed back
through the Carthaginian ranks.[227] The Roman and allied Numidian cavalry drove the Carthaginian
cavalry from the field. The two sides' infantry fought inconclusively until the Roman cavalry returned and
attacked his rear. The Carthaginian formation collapsed; Hannibal was one of the few to escape the
field.[226]

The peace treaty imposed on the Carthaginians stripped them of all of their overseas territories, and some of
their African ones. An indemnity of 10,000 silver talents[note 11] was to be paid over 50 years. Hostages
were taken. Carthage was forbidden to possess war elephants and its fleet was restricted to 10 warships. It
was prohibited from waging war outside Africa, and in Africa only with Rome's express permission. Many
senior Carthaginians wanted to reject it, but Hannibal spoke strongly in its favour and it was accepted in
spring 201 BC.[228] Henceforth it was clear that Carthage was politically subordinate to Rome.[229] Scipio
was awarded a triumph and received the agnomen "Africanus".[230]

Interbellum, 201–149 BC
At the end of the war, Masinissa emerged as by far the most powerful ruler among the Numidians.[231]
Over the following 48 years he repeatedly took advantage of Carthage's inability to protect its possessions.
Whenever Carthage petitioned Rome for redress, or permission to take military action, Rome backed its
ally, Masinissa, and refused.[232] Masinissa's seizures of and raids into Carthaginian territory became
increasingly flagrant. In 151  BC Carthage raised a large army, the treaty notwithstanding, and
counterattacked the Numidians. The campaign ended in disaster for the Carthaginians and their army
surrendered.[233] Carthage had paid off its indemnity and was prospering economically, but was no military
threat to Rome.[234][235] Elements in the Roman Senate had long wished to destroy Carthage, and with the
breach of the treaty as a casus belli, war was declared in 149 BC.[233]

Third Punic War, 149–146 BC

In 149 BC a Roman army of approximately 50,000 men, jointly commanded by both consuls, landed near
Utica, 35 kilometres (22 mi) north of Carthage.[236] Rome demanded that if war were to be avoided, the
Carthaginians must hand over all of their armaments. Vast amounts of materiel were delivered, including
200,000 sets of armour, 2,000 catapults and a large number of warships.[237] This done, the Romans
demanded the Carthaginians burn their city and relocate at least 16 kilometres (10  mi) from the sea; the
Carthaginians broke off negotiations and set to recreating their armoury.[238]

Siege of Carthage

As well as manning the walls of Carthage, the Carthaginians formed a field army under Hasdrubal, which
was based 25 kilometres (16 mi) to the south.[240][241] The Roman army moved to lay siege to Carthage,
but its walls were so strong and its citizen-militia so determined it was unable to make any impact, while the
Carthaginians struck back effectively. Their army raided the Roman lines of communication,[241] and in
148 BC Carthaginian fire ships destroyed many Roman vessels. The main Roman camp was in a swamp,
which caused an outbreak of disease during the summer.[242] The Romans moved their camp, and their
ships, further away  – so they were now more blockading than closely besieging the city.[243] The war
dragged on into 147 BC.[241]

In early 147  BC Scipio Aemilianus, an adopted grandson of Scipio Africanus who had distinguished
himself during the previous two years' fighting, was elected consul and took control of the war.[233][244]
The Carthaginians continued to resist vigorously: they constructed warships and during the summer twice
gave battle to the Roman fleet, losing both times.[244] The Romans launched an
assault on the walls; after confused fighting they broke into the city, but lost in the
dark, withdrew. Hasdrubal and his army retreated into the city to reinforce the
garrison.[245] Hasdrubal had Roman prisoners tortured to death on the walls, in view
of the Roman army. He was reinforcing the will to resist in the Carthaginian citizens;
from this point there could be no possibility of negotiations. Some members of the
city council denounced his actions and Hasdrubal had them too put to death and took
control of the city.[244][246] With no Carthaginian army in the field those cities which
had remained loyal went over to the Romans or were captured.[247]
The "Hellenistic
Scipio moved back to a close blockade of the city, and built a mole which cut off Prince",
supply from the sea.[248] In the spring of 146  BC the Roman army managed to tentatively
secure a foothold on the fortifications near the harbour.[249][250] When the main identified as
assault began it quickly captured the city's main square, where the legions camped Scipio
overnight.[251] The next morning the Romans systematically worked their way Aemilianus[239]
through the residential part of the city, killing everyone they encountered and firing
the buildings behind them.[249] At times the Romans progressed from rooftop to
rooftop, to prevent missiles being hurled down on them.[251] It took six days to clear the city of resistance,
and on the last day Scipio agreed to accept prisoners. The last holdouts, including Roman deserters in
Carthaginian service, fought on from the Temple of Eshmoun and burnt it down around themselves when
all hope was gone.[252] There were 50,000 Carthaginian prisoners, a small proportion of the pre-war
population, who were sold into slavery.[253] There is a tradition that Roman forces then sowed the city with
salt, but this has been shown to have been a 19th-century invention.[254][255]

Aftermath
The remaining Carthaginian territories were annexed by Rome and
reconstituted to become the Roman province of Africa with Utica as its
capital.[256] The province became a major source of grain and other
foodstuffs.[257] Numerous large Punic cities, such as those in Mauretania,
were taken over by the Romans,[258] although they were permitted to
retain their Punic system of government.[259] A century later, the site of
Part of the ruins of Carthage Carthage was rebuilt as a Roman city by Julius Caesar, and would
become one of the main cities of Roman Africa by the time of the
Empire.[260][261] Rome still exists as the capital of Italy;[262] the ruins of
Carthage lie 24 kilometres (15 mi) east of Tunis on the North African coast.[263][264]

Notes, citations and sources

Notes
1. The term Punic comes from the Latin word Punicus (or Poenicus), meaning "Carthaginian",
and is a reference to the Carthaginians' Phoenician ancestry.[2]
2. Sources other than Polybius are discussed by Bernard Mineo in "Principal Literary Sources
for the Punic Wars (apart from Polybius)".[20]
3. This could be increased to 5,000 in some circumstances,[32] or, rarely, even more.[33]
4. These elephants were typically about 2.5-metre-high (8 ft) at the shoulder, and should not be
confused with the larger African bush elephant.[45]
 5. 2,000 talents was approximately 52,000 kilograms (51 long tons) of silver.[110]
6. Several different "talents" are known from antiquity. The ones referred to in this article are all
Euboic (or Euboeic) talents, of approximately 26 kilograms (57 lb).[110][111]
7. 3,200 talents was approximately 82,000 kg (81 long tons).[110]
8. 1,200 talents was approximately 30,000 kg (30 long tons) of silver.[110]
9. The historian Philip Sabin refers to Livy's "military ignorance".[175]
10. Publius Scipio was the bereaved son of the previous Roman co-commander in Iberia, also
named Publius Scipio, and the nephew of the other co-commander, Gnaeus Scipio.[211]
11. 10,000 talents was approximately 269,000 kg (265 long tons) of silver.[110]

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