)) WARSI —_—EDITOR John Jordan is «former teacher of languages who has also written for defence magasines, including Novy Invematonal, Defence al Jan's Defence Weekly. He is the author of ewo major books on the postwar Soviet Navy, and was responsible for the sections on France, the Netherlands and Belgium in ‘Conways All the Word's Fighting Ships 1947-95. He has been associated with Warship since its beginnings, and in recent years has contributed a series of articles on the French Marine "Nationale of the interwar and postwar periods. He took over the Edlcorship at the end of 2004. MAIN CONTRIBUTORS Ita always boen the policy of Warship to publish the work of| the worlds finest warship historians, Consequently, the contributions to this volume are by established and recognized experts, David K Brown spent the whole of iis working life as a member ofthe Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, reiing 3s Deputy Chief Naval Architect in 1988, He is currently President of the World Ship Society. He has contributed 10 Warship ever since its launch, and is the author af many books, Including (with George Moore) Rebuldng the Royal Navy Enrico Cernuschi and Vincent O'Hara have collaborated on | a number of projects. Ceenuschi has written over 150 articles ‘0n maritime subjects and is co-author ofthe definitive Le nav dda quera italime 1940-1945. O'Hara's work has recently appeared in several publications, He is the author of The ‘German Fleet at War 1939-1945, Keith MeBiride has written twmerous atticles for maritime periodicals including Warship Word, Warsiptemational and The Marines Mor, as wells eing a regular contebutar to Weaship Iain McCallum worked for the British Council in various parts ‘of che world before retming to England to pursue his research, in military and naval history. In addition ta a number of articles, he has published Bload Brothers, a double biography of the inventors Hiram and Hudson Maxie. Stephen McLaughlin isa librarian at the San Francisco Public Library. Besides being a regular contributor to Warship, he is the author of Russian and Soviet Baedeshis an co-author with R.D. Layman of The Hid Warship. He is errenaly working ‘0m a hock about Russian ironclad and coast defence ships. ‘George Moore has contributed numerous articles to Warship ‘on British warship building. programmes from the 1930s ‘onwards. He i co-author (with David K Brown) of Rebuilding the Royal Naty. Conrad Waters is a barrister by taining but a banker by proftsion. The author of a number of articles on modem naval history, he is public relations officer for the group attempting t0 retum the Second Woeld War sloop HMS Whinbrel to the UK. £30.00 RRP.WARSHIP 2005WARSHIP 2005 Founding Editor: Antony Preston Editor: John Jordan Assistant Editor: Stephen Dent CONWAY MARITIME PRESSFrontispiece: ‘The ex- Yugoslavian leader Dubrovnik, in alien service as Prema, underway in che Aegean in August 1942.The long-bareled 40/56 guns were also ordered forthe destroyer Split, which isthe subject of EEnmco Cemasch and Vincent P O'Hara’ amticle inthis edition of Warship. (Aldo Fraccarol collection) © Conway Maritime Press 2005 Fins published in Great Britain in 2005 by Conway Maritime Press sn vornt ot Choa books Gr le The Chrysalis Building, Bramley Road, London. WI0 6SP ‘www.conaymaritime.com, All ghs reserved. No part ofthis publeation may be rpreuced, stored in a ercval system, of uansmied in any fem ot by any ‘means, electoni, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the poe ermision ofthe publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data ‘A eecond of distil available on request fom the British Library. ISBN 1844860035 Consay editorial: John Jona, Stenhen Dene and Stuart Robertson Design: Stephen Dent Printed and bound in Singapore by Kyodo.CONTENTS Publisher's Introduction: Antony Preston (1938-2004) Editorial FEATURE ARTICLES The Riddle of the Shells, 1914-18: Duquesne and Tourville: The First French Treaty Cruisers by John Jordan Aboard Orél at Tsushima by Stephen McLaughlin Lord Nelson and Agamemnon by Keith McBride Steam Torpedo Boats of the Royal Navy by D K Broun The Star-Crossed Split: the Troubled Story of an Unlucky Flagship by Enrico Cemuschi and Vincent O'Hara jisappointment in the North Sea by Iain McCallum From Daring to Devonshire by George Moore The ‘Escorteurs Rapides’ Chateaurenaule and Guichen by John Jordan The Underside of Warship Design: A Preliminary History of Pumping and Drainage Part 1: The Pre-Dreadnought Era by Stephen McLaughlin REVIEW SECTION Navies In Review 2004 Warship Notes Reviews Warship Gallery Index 25 38 66 B 97 ui 136ANTONY PRESTON {as with enormous sorrow, and just as this 27 volume of Warship was going to press, that the Conway Maritime eam leamed of the death ofthe anna’ founding Editor and constant champion Antony Preston (1938-2004), Iewas sly reminiscent of those occasions when Antony would attive in the office as the final proof was about to be passed, enthusing about the latest news despatch from the Swedish Navy, or ‘with an illustration of a new missile system for last-minute inclusion in ‘Navies in Review’. The Admical’, as Antony was known to many inthe naval community, passed away on Christmas Day after a long illness that severely limited his output over the lst two years, which in itself must have frus- trated such a prolific writer, revered historian and skilful commentator It was an hon to work with Antony over the pase nine years in his roles as both Warship's Editor and consultant to the Conway list. We will miss his unbridled enthusiasm, his almost legendary stories and mischievous sense of humour. Most ofall we are deprived ofthe knowledge that the man had buile up, both for his specialist subjects, namely the Victorian and contemporary navies, but also his ability to say, or write, something appropriate and considered fon most topics of naval and military history (One of the last conversations I had with Antony was when he telephoned to endorse fly and applaud the appointment of John Jordan as his suecessor as Editor to the annual. Jobin hhas a great determination (© continue the traditions and values that the annual represents and has already browghe in ‘new ideas. We had all hoped that Antony would be able t0| continue his involvement as Editor Emeritus and i¢ was a commission that he was looking forwan! to undertaking. Regrettably, this was not 10 be. ‘A memorial service is planned for the summer. There are also plans to sec up an annual prize for naval writing in Ancony’s honour. The evocative and fitting tributes that follow have been provided by a small selection of his many Warship colleagues. They certainly give you an idea of this great man who will be sadly missed. John Lee, Publisher [met Antony Preston in 1973, on my first visit t0 the [National Maritime Museum and its Draught Room, then the place where plans and Ships’ Covers could be consulted. “Then and later he impressed me with the wealth of naval historical lore he had accumulated, so litle of which ended up in print, and so much of which helped explain 20° century history. "The Museum, where Antony served what amounted to his apprenticeship, was far more than national, Because the Royal Navy hal so long been the mest powerful in the world, it had necessarily gathered information on all the world’s navies. Victories in two World Wars had brought it rnot only German records but also the records the Germans themselves had seized in Europe. Thus Antony had devel- ‘oped the sort of broad view which served him so well as a naval journalist, and which illuminates his last book, The Worlds Worst Warships, which is actually about why diferent navies spproach somewhat similar problems in such diferent ways, Deep exposure to the Covers, moreover, taught Antony far more than mose journalists ever learn about the realities, as opposed ro the hopes, of warship design and construction, However, what I remember best of Antony is his wonderfil stock of stories which certainly illuminated for me the nature and the past of British and European society, anc which were so memorable for their wit and joy. He was fond, for example, ‘of explaining chat as an English Catholic he could see Britain from a slightly different point of view, not least because his family had been banned from the country for several hundred years due to an earlier act of reason. Norman Friedman 1 as serving in a farflung comer of che empire in 1975 when a letter arrived from Antony Preston, already a distin guished naval historian. He was completing for publication the English-language edition of Jenuschuta, Jung and Mickel’s Die Japanischen Kriegsschiffe 1869-1945 and had heard on the grapevine that | ad glas-plate negative ofthe Japanese corvette Hiei completing in 1877 at Pennar, Pembroke Dock I did not have the plate with me but a print was duly provided and published. That was the beginning ofa friendship with a teat warship historian and writer. We served together on several committees and meetings usually ended with Antony engaging me in vigorous discussion about the merits of some Victorian gunboat whose reputation he sought to re-establish ‘Telephone calls from Antony were never short; ideas and aneedtes tumbled out with successive ‘and did [tell you.” fr ‘and have you heard..?, ensuring that plans for the remainder of the evening could be abandoned. [¢ comes a3 surprise to note how many books Antony vvrote, None was finer than Send a Gumboat! which he wrote with John Major Ancony inscribed my copy '.avho shares with me a deep affec tion for the Victorian Navy’, The Victorian Navy was indeed his spiritual home and he might have written much more, Ancony Preston was a good man. and all who beneficed from his fellowship and profound knowledge of warships mourn his passing and honour his memory. Lawnence Phillips While Antony was still working at the Maritime Museum in the early “608 a group used to meet in Greenwich under his leadership to tall about the history of ships with Antony, David Lyon, Trevor Lenton, Jim Colledge and others acca- sionally such as George Osbon. Our main concer was the {general opinion that the 19" century Admiralty was opposed to technical change, largely based on Briggs’ misleading book. We vowed to change this view and I think we have done so between us. From this period comes an often quoted remark of Antony's, chat ‘the Crimean Wat was the last old fashioned war for the Army and the first modern war for the Navy’. We also objected to the name ‘Crimean War for one fought by the Navy mainly in the Baltic, but we have yet o win that one. His Send a Guenboat! was one ofthe frst hooks to suggest that che Navy did quite well off the Crimea. Antony has an unusual skill in weiting ‘popular’ books which were simple but still accurate, Of course he will be bese remembered as the first editor of Warship as a quarterly Pm sure I was not the only one who was persuaded to write by Antony, David K Brown,EDITORIAL ike all of us at Conway I was greatly saddened by the ‘death of Antony Preston, He was a big man in every sense ofthe word, generous, immensely knowledgeable and akove al a great enthusiast: Our elationship began in 1977 when he was Eltor of Navy Imemainal I had written a lewer to the magasine which was critical of an article published about the Soviet carirferuiser Kiew, and was pleased enough ro sce may Letter, together with crude “irawing of my own analysis of the weapons systems, in print Twas surprised a week late to receive alter inviting me to write whatever T wanted on the Soviet Navy. My own “second career’ as a Soviet Navy analyst began there, and when Antony moved on frst to Defence magaine, then to Jane's Defence Weekly, he made @ point of commissioning feom me two series f articles, ane on Soviet surface ships, the exer on Soviet submarines, both of which resulted in books Dring the 1980s Antony and were in regular contact, anc 1 remember accompanying him on visis to the MoD in ‘Whitehall, and to the Novosti Press Agency ~ a visit which also took in an excellent Thai restaurant in South, Kensington. He loaned me books of is for my research, and visited my house on the south coast on a number of occasions Hee loved to cock a snook at what he saw as The xtablshment, and one of the dhngs that [know he liked bout my writing was that I brought a different perspective to things I wrote about, which Ithink he ascribed to my being 2 teacher in a state comprehensive and a Guarda reader. (I shall always remember the chuckle wich which he inteolaced ‘me tan arms dealer ata reeption in. a Porstnouth hotel and then moved on, leaving ust it!) ‘Warship was fst publshed under Antony's editorship as a «quarter in January 1977, and my own fist contribution was to Warship No3, published in July that yeat. fer an intial flue of articles there was then a gop of some ten years before Tagain became a ceguar contributor, by which time the fcus cof my interests had shifted from the postwar Soviet Navy to the French Marine Nationale. However, even when I was contebuting litle I remnined a subscriber, an there i fall set of quterlies and annus on my bookshelves (mest of which I paid for!- So alsough Ian now playing forthe team, as i€ were, I have ako sto on on the terraces, and I have ‘experienced the elation (roundebreaking articles, regular acces to the top names in naval history) and the occasional feustracions (a follow-up promised but not delivered) of every ‘Worship readet ‘When Warship began, Antony's vision was of a journal which would provide a forum for people who could write about the design, development snd service history of combat ships in away chat woul inform, enlighten and enthuse the reader ship. The scope was tobe “international unlimited by period, rationality, oF ship type’ (1 quote from the back cover of ‘Wership No.1). Throughout Warship’ lietie thse ims have not only heen consistently achieved, but have often en surpassed. Whereas the emphasis in dhe easly issues was prima sly on information (and the birth of Warship certainly released wealth of new material on the ‘twainstream warships ofthe First/Second World War periods) there has heen a steady shift in recent years towards the investigation of less familiar warships and technical developments, and the publication of | articles which aim to provoke 2s well as co enlighten. Since becoming established Warship has hecome more ‘democratic? inthe sense thac rather than the editorial eam commissioning. articles, iis increasingly the case that we are appreached by writers who are offering their material for publication. The role of Editor then becomes primarily one of ensuring that the articles we publish are of the quality that readers expect, and that there is a good balance in ters of topic, period! and ‘nationality. We hope that we have achieved this with Warship 2005, andl it will certainly continue to be our primary focus for the future, thereby ensuring that we remain true to Antony's ‘This year’s annual sees the conclusion of lain MeCallum’s trilogy The Ride of the Shells, an investigation of the prob- lems which resulted in the notoriously poor performance of British armour-piercing shell atthe Battle of Jutland. A fas nating story emerges, edolent with intrigue and personal antagonisms. The British do love an inquest (always to be preferred to getting it right in the fist place!), and the post Jutland investigation conducted by the Projectile Committee tothe filling and fusing of heavy naval projectiles’ is most certainly a classic. The Committee undertook its delibera- tions amid accusations from both the Jellicoe and Beatty factions that the Grand Fleet was having to fight with one hhand tied behind its hack because of defective shell, counter: aceusations from some inside the Admiralty that Jellicoe was simply making excuses for his own timid performance at Jutland and Beatty for the poor shooting of his battlecruiser, fand a determined rearguard action by the Department of | Naval Ordnance. The chairman of the Committee, Vice- Adial Farquhar, appears not to have enjoyed the full conf dence of the main protagonists, and submitted a final report ‘which aimed to keep everybody happy andl satisfied nobody (Butler Report, anyone!) From the same period, and also concerned with the effects cof projectiles on armour, we have Stephen McLaughlin's dramatic account ofthe Battle of Taushima seen through the eyes of the young Russian naval constructor Vladimir Kostenko, who served in the battleship Orel, Kostenko ‘embarked on the ship during her work-up in 1904 and subse- ‘quently accompanied her on the Baltic Squadron's fatal expe- dlition to the Far East, during which time he devised measures to improve stability and to prepare the ship for combat. During the course ofthe battle Kescenko logged the hits made by the vatious projectiles on the ship, and supervised damage control procedures. This is an absorbing personal account of the battle into which the author has merged other important sources in onder to resolve anomalies and create an accurate picture of whar took place aboard the One. This article is ‘complemented by the frst of a two-part feature on underwater damage conteo in battleships; the first pare deals with the pre «dreadnought era while the second, to be published in Warship 2006, wil focus on developments after 1906, HMS Lord Nelson and her sister Agamemnon, which were begun only days before Tashima, are the subject of an articleWARSHIP 2005 by Keith McBride, They were the Royal Navy's last pre- Greadinought bactleships, and although laid down some months before Dreadnought herself, they were launched after hace and completion was delayed because of the priority accorded to getting the revolutionary new ship into service at the earliest posible date, They were advanced ships for theit dy, and their powerful 9.2in secondary batteries would have enabled them to fight in the line with contemporary Dreadinoughts, but eriple-expansion turbines, capable of a maximum speed of 18.5 knots, would relegate them to second-line service during the First World War. In his review oof the protracted and sometimes heated discussions which artended the design process Keith MeBride considers the Impact made by the new DNC Philip Watts, who had acquired a reputation for packing a quart into a pint pot in his ‘export’ designs The nineteenth century is represented by David K Brown's absorbing article on the development of steam torpedo boats in the Royal Navy. Following successful trials with early Whitehead torpedoes during the late 1860s and eaely 1870s the Navy committed itself ro a programme of boats capable cof launching one or more torpedoes from deck-mounted tubes, and by 1886 had no fewer than 210 torpedo boats in service. Daviel Brown is keen to emphasize thar the late Victorian Navy was not the conservative force that some writers have portrayed, but was on the contrary keen to be in the forefront of all new technotogical developments. He paints a fascinating picture of life aboard these small, frail craft, which would eventually be superseded in Royal Navy service by the larger, more seaworthy "torpedo-boat destroyer’ ‘The Eclitor continues his series of articles on the interwar Marine Nationale with a study of the early Treaty eruisers Duquesne and Toure, Despite the almost coral lack of protec tion in these ships, the French constructors still experienced considerable difficulyy in keeping displacement within the 10,000-ton Washington Treaty limit, and it must certainly have been a source of pusslement for the Marine Nationale that che Fealian counterparts of the Trent class managed to ‘combine identical firepower with even greater speed, and stil ‘have sufficient weight available for an armoured citadel with 75min sides and a 50mm deck (but this is another story!) Accurate and reliable information on the early French Treaty cruisers has until recently not been easy to come by, and the slficulties experienced when attempting 10 research the follow-on aricle on the Sufren-Duplix, to be published in Warship 2006, are the subject of one of this years ‘Warship Nowe. Some 15 years after the Duguesnes were laid down, a modern destroyer was begun for the Yugoslav Navy. It would ‘bea further 19 years before she finally entered service, during which time the basic design was little modified; she was therefore already obsolete even before she entered service. Enrico Cemuschi and Vincent O'Hara have traced the «chequered history ofthe Spl from conception ro completion, The article illustrates the problems of building complex svarsips in small countries with a narrow military-industrial base: a8 originally designed the ship would have had a main armament made in Czechoslovakia, French fire control ‘stems, AA guns from Sweden, and Yarrow turbines made in Britain. Most of these items were never delivered because of | the outbreak of war and the incomplete hull was captured by the Italians while still on the cocks, Completion of the ship postwar then assumed a national symbolic dimension, in the same way that the French Navy fel compelled by public ‘opinion to complete the batleship Jean Bar. The postwar period is represented by George. Moore's anicle From Daring to Devonshire’. After his study of the postwar frigates ofthe Type 41, Type 61 and Type 12 clases, the author tums his atention tothe destroyer designs of the same period. The Daring was the last destroyer buil for the Royal Navy eo be armed exclusively with guns for flet air defence, and the ‘County'type destroyer the fist to he quipped with surface-to-air missiles. The unusual design of | the Seaslug misile, with its wrap-around boosters, meant that ithod a much greater impact on the overall layout ofthe ship than contemporary US Navy missiles of che Tartar/Terier series. This makes the development of what was in other respects a very suecessul warship design all the more ered itable This year's Navies in Review section has been compiled by Conrad Waters, and as usual is complemented by Warship Noes, reviews and photogallery. A number of readers have ‘been in contact about the photo ofthe beaches! submarine in last year's Galery, and although we don't yer feel we can tel the whole story we ate fail certain that we can identify this particular boat (see Warship Notes). In a new depareure, our customary reviews of the major naval books of the year are complemented by reviews of two important websites with a ‘warshipfnaval history focus, and we intend this to become 2 regular feature of future issues. Many of our readers now use the Intemet for research, and whilst naval websites constitute an invaluable resource they vary widely in quality, being ‘written by enthusiasts for other enthusiast, often witha lack of editorial ‘quality contol, For this years review we have selected the well-established Kaigun (IJN) and Regia Marina (lalian Navy) websites, andl we shal be reviewing others in Warship 2006, Over the past two years we have been endeavouring t0 ‘open up the ‘Review’ section ofthe annual tothe readership for example, our invitation to readers to send in thei own views on Antony Preston's selection in his hook The World’ Worst Warships. A number took up the gauntlet and responded, but not as many as we had hoped. Lean only eit erate that we would ike as many people to hecome involved with Warship as possible, and we particularly weleome any contributions readers feel able to make to Warship Notes and to the photogallery. We also encourage readers to write t us to let us know which features they have enjoyed and what ‘they might like to see in future isues John JordanTHE RIDDLE OF THE SHELLS, 1914-18 Part Three: Disappointment in the North Sea In the concluding part of his trilogy, Tain MeCallum looks at how the Battle of Jutland focused the Royal Navy's attention on the performance of its armour-piercing shell, the inter-personal and inter-departmental antagonisms which all but derailed an objective inquiry, and the remedial measures subsequently undertaken to restore the offensive capa- bilities of the Grand Fleet N ‘o naval action in history has caused mote contro. versy than Jutland os, as the Germans call it, the tattle of the Skagerrak. None since Trafalgar had been so long and cagerly awaited, and expectations were high. For a few hours on 31 May 1916 the Royal Navy under Jellicoe was offered a golden opportunity to capitalise on the huge scale of national investment in. warship construction before the war and to demonstrate the power of its great guns. Unlike their military counterparts, the naval commanders had hitherto been reluctant fo commit their main forces unless sure of some initial advantage ‘Perhaps one explanation of the difference,’ writes Basil Liddell Hart unkindly, ‘was chat the Admials exercised their command in the forefront of the battle and the Generals from headquarters far in reat.” However that may be, when at last the German High Sea fleet came out in force, the opportunity was missed, Despite a two to one superiority in ships and weight of broadside, the Grand Fleet gor the worst of the exchanges, losing 14 ships (111,000 tons) as against eleven of the High Sea fleet (62,000 tons). A crucial difference was chat whereas five British ships, including the battle cruisers Queen Mary, Invincible and Indefatigable, blew up under fie, only one German ship suffered a like fate, a fact which also accounts for the high casualties on the British side: 6,945 as against the German 3,058.1 The story of Jutland has been many times told and need noc be repeated here. In terms of strategy the honours lay with the British, who retained control of the seas, but the Royal Navy could find litele consolation for British batdcerusers in action at Judd. This snapshot, chough not of partculaty high quality, gives a good impression ofthe condi- tions inthe early phases ofthe bale. (CPL)WARSHIP 2005 its failure co achieve a decisive victory and thereby pethaps to shorten the war. The possible consequences of such a vietory have been much debated, recent opinion tending to the view that they would not have been as momentous a8 earlier commentators were inclined to believe. Nevertheless at the time no one was in any doubt that a splendid chance had gone a-begging, The frustra- tion of David Beatty, commander of the battle cruiser fleet, was expressed ina letter to Lond Fisher: ‘Would that ve had been able to make job of it... To be so near and yet so far was worm and gallwood after che hammering we huad given them and the losses we had sustained... They suffered more than we did.” ‘Apart from controversy over the taetical handling of the Fleet, which became the subject of a long-running dispute between the Jellicoe and Beatty camps, the post Jutland inquests cenired on technical factors believed to be responsible forthe disappointing outcome of the battle, In his despatch to the Admiralty, Jellicoe referred to the light disadvantage during the early tages of the action and to ‘the indifferent armour protection of our batle cruisers’ alo to the high standard of the German gunnery and the face that‘... theie ships are stil able fie with great accu racy when they have received severe punishment’ But the first question that arose was why so many British ships had been lost following massive internal explosions. At first the answer seemed obvious, On 3 June Beatty sent an. urgent telegram to Jellicoe: ‘Present arrangement of flash. doors are (sic) ineffective when turret armour is pene trated. Flash from shell may reach cordite in main cages, and handing rooms... Almost certain that magnzines of three lost battle cruisers exploded from such a. caus, Maurice Hankey, Cabinet Secretary, noted in his diary “We have discovered the reason why our ships blew up — vie. defective arrangements for preventing the effect of a shell bursting in the turret from reaching the magatine. Subsequently other deficiencies were highlighted in the course of inquities instituted by the Admiralty, and each of the parties involved looked to defend their comer. Bearty conceded that in the heat of battle precautions ray have been relaxed to achieve a higher rate of fte, and he drew attention to the relatively weak armour protec tion of the battle cruisers and the safety tisk presented by Iyedite filled nose-fuzed projectiles, He also requested a formal investigation into the cause of explosions in British warships. The director of naval construction, Tennyson d'Eyncourt, denied that the fault lay with the design of the ships or an insufficient thickness of armout. He lent his support co the flash theory, arguing that the German propellant charges, contained in brass cylinders instead of silk bags, were not only safer but had been better handled, so reducing the risk of fires being trans- mitted to the magazines. He too pointed the finger of blame ar the careless manner in which cordite hal been. exposed during the action, that is ‘the system of supply which we unfortunately practised’. As to che British projectiles, the Department of Naval Ordnance confirmed that it was proposed to replace Iyddite by TNT in common HE shell equipped with the No. 45 fuze and a ‘sealing device’ to increase safety. ‘At the same time Beatty and his flag-captain, Ernle 10 Chatfield, turned their attention to another disquieting aspect of the butte, namely why the British heavy projec tiles, despite being much heavier than those of the Germans, appeared not to have inflicted anything like proportionate damage. On 14 July Beatty wrote to the Admiralty drawing attention to the failure of German, ships to blow up under fre as, at Jutkand, had his three battle cruisers. By contrast he instanced che German cruiser Bhicher at the Dogger Bank, which, ‘when lying ‘over practically on her beam ends was repeatedly hit by heavy shell, some of which entering through her unpro tected bottom must have penetrated to and burst in or near her magazines’, and yet did noe blow up. Captain EC. Dreyer of the Iron Duke, Jellicoe’ flagship, acked to these concerns when he declared that the British armour piercing shells had failed to do what was expected of them, and had mostly broken up on the enemy's armour plate. Tn the light of past experience this ean have come as no ‘great surprise. The Fleet’ Manual of Gunnery for 1915, states plainly enough that: ‘These shell seldom penetrate even medium armour unbroken if striking obliquely, and in the case of the APC filled HE fic. lyddite} this marked tendency to break up lessens materially the chance of obtaining the detonation of these shell actually clear of, and behind, armour...’ Now forthe fist rime pressure grew for action to remedy what ad hitherto been regarded as an unfortunate but unavoidable limitation. As Dreyer was later to note in his memoirs ‘Te was obvious to us after Jutland chat there must be something very wrong with our ‘APC shell 12-inch and above... If our actual hits with far Tanger shell had pierced thicker armour and burst with proportionately greater explosive effect, it seemed probable that some half dozen or more German capital ships would have been sunk.? The implications of this were worrying to say the least, and a small number of gunnery officers led by Dreyer began to agitate for an investigation into the filling and fusing of heavy naval projectiles. Experience trad revealed that in engagements fought at long range only very few of these could be expected to find their mark it was therefore all the more essential that when they did they should achieve the maximum effect and, in a much, used phrase, penetrate to the vitals of the opposing ship. EC. Dreyer had long been regarded as one of the Navy leading gunnery experts. Before the war he had been appointed gunnery officer, Home Fleet, before joining the Department of Naval Ondnance as assistant to Jellicoe. Here he was concerned with all aspects of ‘ordnance and methods of fre control, collaborating with Percy Scoct and Reginald Bacon and developing with the help of is brother Cape. J. T. Dreyer RA a range finding ‘computer known to the Fleet as the Dreyer Table, He was a regular visitor to Vickers’ and Armstrong’ works, where he inspected hydraulic mountings and supervised newly installed guns. His strictures about the fai the armour-piercing shell had therefore to be taken seri- ‘ously. Four days after Jurland a committee was appointed under his presidency ‘to inquite into and report on the ‘gunnery information derived from or confirmed by the action of 31st May,.', and this in turn led to the setting up of a committee to investigate the whole position with, regard to heavy naval shell‘THE RIDDLE OF THE SHELLS, 1914-18 (On board HIMS Prince of Wales in 1911. Jelicoe, commanding the Adantc Feet, with Captain Ronald Hopwood on his ighe and the young F, C. Dreyer, Flag Commander, on his left. (Photo courtesy of Admiral Sit Desmond Dreyer, GCB, KBE, DSC) Preside over by Vice-Admiral R. B. Farquhar, the Projectile Committee started work in August, embarking om a series of rials of APC and CPC shell. For this assign- ‘ment Farquhar was not pethaps the ideal choice. A former chief inspector of naval ordnance, he did not take kindly to the suggestion thar the British shell was faulty Together with others at the Admiralty, he believed thac at Jutland i had acquitted itself at least as well as the German shell, and that Dreyer was exaggerating its alleged defects. There was little urgency about the Committees proceedings, and its findings tended co reflect the view ofits president. A final report was not to appear until March 1917, when the preamble regeetted that the trials had taken'so long due to ‘the extremely heavy work, owing to the war, devolving on the expet mental establishment at Shoeburyness. But even before the Projectile Committee had started its deliberations, gunnery officers drawing conclusions from the experience of battle were emphasising the need for improved shells and fuses. Three weeks after Jutland, and with the destruction of the battle cruisers in. mind, Dreyer wrote to Jellicoe: ‘When we introduce an AP shell filles! HE (nor Iyddte) with delay aetion fare I should like to see their [ie. the German] fuze copied as a start, and tried in AP trotyl [TNT] filled shell. We have many people engaged in trying to make out that out AP shell filled Iyddite, which burst half way through the plate, ace just as good 'as the German shell filled with troryl with delay action fuze, which burst their shell well inside our ships. It seems a pity not to be willing to learn.’ Jellicoe, well aware of long-held reservations about Iyddice as a bursting charge, urged on the Admiralty, with the backing of Beatty and Chatfield, that the Ordnance Committ press ahead with eests of AP shell filled with TNT and g an adaptation of che German delay action fuze. Rumours were already circulating on both sides about the indifferent performance of British shell. On 10 July Admiral Hipper, commander of the German battle cruiser squadeon, noted in.a report headed Lessons ofthe Skagerrak Batele that the enemy’s heavy projectiles had inflicted relatively little damage because of “ineffective bursting ‘charges’, which he aseribed to faulty fuzes. The Germans may well have preferred to conceal their awareness of this situation, but comment was unavoidable. According to Arthue Mardet: ‘The decisive impetus for doing some. thing about the shell seems to have derived from a luncheon party in the Lion [Beatty’ flagship] some time in ‘August. One of the guests, a Swedish naval officer who hhad been Naval Attache in Berlin, told Chatfield chat German naval officers considered that che British navalable’ ~ that the heavy shell had not pene cir armour but had broken to pieces on it. had wh,’ Chatfield cords, ‘and pretended to take the marter, but I was hardly able t0 self till the guests had gone." The next day (6 Beatty wrote to Jellicoe: *...1 am_very much, he starement of the Swedish gentleman and I ery much like to know what you think about it his concern was shared, for there followed a wonled letter from Beatty to the Admiralty or the Ordnance Committee to carry out thor- ests of heavy shell against armour at varying angles ick. When these trials were held, they revealed that probable battle conditions of obliquity the APC equently failed to carry their charge through .a 2-inch, te. They were, in Chatfield’s words, ‘quite hopeless fe Was now a growing divergence of opinion een Beatty and the Fleet's gunnery officers on the ine hand, and officials responsible for procurement at the Admiralty and the Department of Naval Ordnance on the other. On account of his rapid promotion and flamboyant litesoyle, Beatty was not generally popular with colleagues at the Admiralty, of whom he had earlier written to MPshtiche dor Shem Lage stom Vaglaihe ib-om gn f Brivsh 15-inch armour piercing shell, with black pou comparison. According to Campbell, Seyi ust behind the armour plating. Jellicoe: ‘..they are an astounding collection and really ‘do not seem to know what they are talking about" Beatty hhad blamed incompetence in Whitehall for the loss of ‘Cradock at Coronel, and he complained constantly about the lack of communication between the Admiralty and ‘the Sea’. For their part officials at the Admiralty suspected that Beatty and his colleagues were using the shells issue as a excuse for the poor shooting of the battle cruiser fleet at Jutland, The indifferent record ofthe bactle cruisers in this regard was a matter of common knowledge, Beatty himnself having bemoaned the fact that his ships were suffering from lack of practice because owing to the submarine threat they had been limited to small bore shooting within the confines of the anchorage at Rosyth in the Firth of Forth. The Projectile Committee having been set up, there- fore, the Admiralty declined to tke any further aetion until its report had been received. But Beatty refused t0 allow the matter to be shelved in this way. In November he returned to the charge, pointing out that during the war: ‘Fourteen German ships have been sunk by gunfire alone and none of them have blown up. Nine British ships Ihave been sunk by gunfire, of which six blew up. Ie is diff- aan a5) (MS, Syl! uler filling, on board Seyelits after the bate, with a German as struck by no fewer than eight 15in shells, most of which broke up 12euenot to conclude that the Germans have the advantage ‘over us in either fuzes, explosives or ship construction.” He urged that the explosives experts of the armament firms should be consulted, for: ‘The opinions of Naval Officers, whose experience suggests expedients, only result in tempting to find a cure, but leave the cause unknown.” At the Admiralty most senior officers preferred 10 accept the flash theory, which put the onus on the ships for mishandling the cordite propellant, than to face up to the implications of shortcomings in armour protection or projectiles. Tennyson 'Eyncoure repeated his view that while both British and German ships had been exten: sively damaged, the Germans had escaped blowing up because they had devoted greater care to the safe handling of their propellant charges. Concerning the British prac- tice, a former director of naval ordnance, Frederick Tudor, rinuted: “There is little doubt in my mind that in the great anxiety to attain a rapid rate of fire, the ordinary precautions for safety of cordite cartridges have been grad- ally relaxed, until a lst the test of the enemy's shells has proved the danger of what was being done..." Aecondingly the Admiralty’ reply laid stress on ‘the undoubted improper exposure of condite during this action’, where- ‘upon Beatty and Jellicoe took umbrage at what they inter- preted as an implied censure. After an_ acrimonious exchange of correspondence oil was poured on the tro bled waters, an Admiralty minute conceding that: ‘The explanation may be with the delay action of the German fuzes, bu this is not certain. In December 1916 there was a marked change in att tuxles when, following Jellicoe’s appointment as fist sea lord, Beatty succeeded him as commander-in-chief, Grand Fleet. At once a higher priority was accorded to the problem posed by the shells. Beatty wrote to Jellicoe: “The latest Ordnance Committee report is very disturbing and alarming and will need very energetic steps to be taken to remedy the existing deficiencies in the projec: tiles, otherwise we are at a grave disadvantage to the Enemy in the very arm we thought we had a priority On the Projectile Committee Farquhar was replaced by Vice-Admiral Limpus and Major John Dreyer RA was broughe in to hunry the trials along, but it was not enough. Clearly more vigorous aetion was called for. Beatty’s friend and biographer WS. Chalmers recounts how ‘Chatfield came to him with the disturbing news that no anni lating wietory over the German fleet was likely until all the existing shell had been replaced by a more effective type. Beatty...thought only in terms of annihilation, but it would be necessary, literally, to pound enemy ships all clay with ‘cud shell, as had been done at Jutland, before they could be put ou of action." ‘Writing ‘Secret and Immediate’ to the Secretary of the Admiral, Graham Greene, Beatty crew attention to trial reports that APC shell for the much vaunted 13.5-inch, guns ‘will not penetrate 13-inch armour at an angle of Impact of 20 degrees or more except at ranges of about 7,000 yards or less... The disappointing results obtained by our gunfire at the Bartle of Jutland and Dogger Bank are now explained.’ Again he called for thorough tests of heavy shell, insisting that‘.the issues at stake are such as to justify fring experiments with fuzed shell at an obsolete B ‘THE RIDDLE OF THE SHELLS, 1914-18 battleship or eruiser on lines similar to the Edinburgh trials’ And he went on to declare that: “Whatever the ‘conclusion formed as tothe relative merits, or demerits, of the APC Lyddite and CPC powder, it is conclusively proved that both ate entirely unsuitable as projectiles for the Grand Fleet... The excellent guns mounted in our ships are entirely wasted ifthe projectiles supplied with them cannot even defeat a 10-inch plate at modern figbting ranges. Iris therefore of the utmost urgency that an improved type of burster using TNT or some other insensitive substance be provided for the Fleet. The satter should be pushed forward night and day until the problem is solved. This starting communication gave rise toa controversy which, while kept secret as far as possible, reverberated through the senior echelons of the service. Many at the ‘Admiralty remained sceptical of such criticism by officers ‘who were not without prejudice in the matter ofthe shell Jellicoe was under attack for what was alleged to be an excess of caution at Jutland, and his supporters were glad to identify other than tactical reasons why his efforts had ‘not been rewarded by a more satisfactory outcome. Beatty looked t© confound those who cast aspersions on the shooting of the battle cruiser fleet. Gunnery officers such ‘as Chatfield naturally inclined to the view that the shell rather than failings in gunnery had been at fault, espe cially since they believed they had scored more hits on the German ships than turned out to be the case. Above all, officers connected with the Department of Naval Ordnance resented the imputation that they had been responsible for allowing defective shell to be supplied to the Fleet. The director during the critical years feom 1912-14 was now Thisd Sea Lord and Controller of the Navy, and itwas as Rear-Admiral Sir Frederick Tudor that hhe minuted on Beatty's letter: ‘I cannot agree with the statements, arguments and conclusions in C-in-C’ leer It is generally assumed that the Germans have an AP shell specially filed with compressed TNT and fitted with a delay action faze, This is quite possible and we should rake every effort to obtain a method of filling our AP shell less sensitive than at present; but the outstanding facts are...that the greatest thickness of our armour perfo- rated by the German shells was 6 inches...and the ‘numberof blinds’ with their shell was considerable The argument that the German shells had performed no etter than the British filed ro answer the objection that the heavier British projectiles should have been that uch more effective, and Beatty persisted. Angered by ‘sher, who had spoken disparagingly of the standard of the battle cruisers'gunnery at Jutland, he protested in a letter to his wife: ‘le has since transpired that the enemy was hit by the battle cruisers a great deal more than they were hie and the reason they did not suffer immense damage was because our projectiles were not capable of penetrating the enemy's armour... Lord Fisher was the Ist La. of the Admiralty at the time that Jellicoe was the Director of Naval Orgnance, who was responsible for the production of the inefficient projectiles.” Writing to the ‘Adiraley from his flagship Iron Duke, Beatty asked to be informed of progress with investigations into the shells question, and was assured that action was being taken toWARSHIP 2005 introduce a delay action fuze and an explosive filling insensitive enough to carry through thick armour. ‘When it appeared in March 1917 the report of the Projectile Committee tried to satisfy both sides in the dispute. It recommended withdrawal of nose-fuzed common HE shell, described by Beatty as ‘useless against armoured ships, and confirmed that when striking at oblique angles of attack APC shell could not be relied upon to penetrate duc to the sensitivity of the Iyddite filling. There was, indeed, little to choose between APC and CPC shell in terms of their ability to penetrate armour, Unlike the Germans, who in about 1912 had ‘recapped all their APC. projectiles with the Firth Hadfield hollow cap’, the British manufacturers ‘may have been led to consider designs of caps with a view to normal actack only, and this may be at the expense of perforative ‘qualities under service conditions of angle attack [when] the perforatve quality of the APC almost, if not quite, disappears.” The Committee therefore proposed that further trials be carried out with the hard steel cap and a suitably insensitive HE filling, preferably pressed blocks of| TNT as used in the German projectiles. Since these required a more sophisticated fuze to detonate them, it was recommended that: “Trials should be pushed on with, all speed, with a view to perfecting a delay action fuze for use with APC shells" ‘Acrthe same time, however, the Committee pointed out that at Jurland ‘a large number of German turrets were apparently destroyed by shell fire [which] also appears to have reached their engine and boiler rooms’ Comparisons had shown that ‘in design, material and method of manufacture our shell, from the point of view of armour-perforating, are better weight for weight than German shells of corresponding calibre... The Committee hhave reason to believe that the results of hits of our APC. and CPC shells obtained in the Battles of Dogger Bank and Jutland were better chan is here fue. in Beatty's letter] implied.’ It declared that the British projectiles, even without a delay action fuze, ‘have been generally very effective... The latest German battleships and battle cruisers are heavily protected... In spite of this [they] were heavily damaged, and this result must be regarded as...a 4,000 2000 3,000 4000 $000 6,000 7,000, ange in yards 000 4 tribute to the effectiveness of British APC and CPC shells... Probably the value of armour generally in resisting attack at an angle, whether by German shells or ‘tir own, has been rathsr under-estimated. Furthermore, a detailed inspection of ships surviving the bartle revealed that: ‘No German shell has succeeded in passing through, and bursting behind, KC armour...most of the hits failed to do sufficient damage to impair the fighting efficiency of the British ships” As to the blowing up of the battle cruisers, this was put down in each case ‘to condite charges either at the gun positions ot in the hoists becoming ignited by the flash or being struck by fragments ‘of a bursting shell, and the corte flames reaching the magazine... The Committee therefore feel justified in regarding the unfortunate loss ofthese ships as not being due to any special efficiency of the German shells.” These conclusions, while vindicating the procurement policies of the Admiralty and the projectiles provided by Woolwich and the trade, did not satisfy Jellicoe, Beatty, Dreyer and Chatfield. Ithad not escaped their notice that the military authorities had long been strugeling to rectify problems with explosives and fuzes in shel supplied to the army, Dreyer’ brother John, now a Lieutenant Colonel, was well placed to provide a degree of cross-fentilisation between the rigidly segregated service establishments. A former arsistant superintendent of experiments. at the Shoeburyness gunnery ranges, he had gone with the BEF to France, where he was able to experience at first hand the inadequacies of much ofthe shell supplied to the field anillery. Since December 1915 he had been member of the Ordnance Committee set up by Lloyd Geoxge, and he was closely associated with investigations carried out by the Ministry of Munitions into British and German gun ammunition In the preamble to the Projectile Committees report, the Secretary to the Admiralty observed thar it was ‘issued for the information of the Fleet, as there is much inter esting matter contained therein, though the deductions are not entirely concurred in by their Lordships’. Clearly opinion in the Admiralty was divided, and Beatty was not to be put down. As C:in-C he earsied heavy guns himself, and he was not convinced that the British projectiles were Deserve fect of heavy ‘naval sell at normal end oblique angles of anack Ranges a which perforation of KC amon may be expected at normal anle of inpace. Taken from Admialty paper June 1908) defending the one cle big gun arma- sent for capil sips and making che pin that the ewier the projectile the seer ts peneratve power. ‘The same reasoning was oom to lead to the inerduction of 9000 the 13.5 and S-nch guns 01000 12,000FUZE. PERCUSSION, BASE , LARGE, NP16D, MARK 1V. ‘THE RIDDLE OF THE SHELLS, 1914-18 apue mesbor ee Delayed action fe developed by the Shell Committee forthe new type APC projectile, 1917. After Jutland "ic became evident that the delay inherent in No.6 fuze was not suficint. Lthe No. 16 Mark IV) was the best that could be evolved at the time. cane was therefore abproved in view ofthe urgent necessity of taking immediate action to issue delay action fies tothe Fleet”. (Admiralty “Technical History: Ammunition for Naval Guns 1920) better than German shells of comparable calibre. He continued to believe that defects in the armour piercing shell, both APC and CPC, were more serious ehan responsible officials were willing to admit, and he doubted whether the APC could be used effectively at a range sreater than 10,000 yards. In February 1917 he had renewed his attack; pointing out that pre-war gunnery exercises had been based on visible hits rather than assess- iments of damage inflicted, that ‘enemy ships must be sunk’, and that at Jutland major damage had been caused to German ships only in the later stages of the battle, when the range was short. Again he stressed the impor- tance of the projectile carying through the armour and “reaching the enemy's vitals. In March 1917 Beatty an Jellicoe resolved that only by taking firm, independent action could matters be put right, and they appointed FC. Dreyer Director of Naval Ordnance. Despite the fact thar according to his own, account he was “handicapped by having no knowledge of metallurgy and.-had never had anything to do with the design oF proof of ammunition’, Dreyer's response was at once more positive and urgent. Jellicoe had great faith in his flag-captain, whom he described as 'a gunnery officer of unrivalled attainments and one of the best captains of ships I have ever known. ‘Never, wrote Chatfield, was a better appointment made than in selecting Dreyer..2t that moment. Outstandingly able, and of great energy and pertinacity, he et to work... With support ar the highest level, the new Director of Naval Ordnance ignored the findinys of the Projectile Committee and took matters into his own hands.‘ was convinced he wrote later, ‘that four APC and also CPC shel for guns 12-inch and above ‘were quite obsolete. che APC shell were too brittle and the CPC shell could not pretend to perforate any armour except the thinnest.” A small working group designated as the Shell Committee (Army and Navy) was formed under his direction. The brackets are significant. In view of the gravity of the situation traditional service rivalries wete set aside, two of the Committee's members, Colonels Dreyer and Haynes (the latter superintendent of experi- iments at Shoeburyness), being Royal Arillery officers. Is purpose was succinctly stated: “To determine the most suitable nature of projectiles and their filling and fusing for use in the Navy for turret guns 12-inch and above. That rumours about the shortcomings of naval shell were reaching the clubs is evident from a letter written in March from Lord Rosebery to Fisher: ‘My dear Admiral =Isiterue that at the Batele of Jutland the shes were bad? Of course you won't answer, if you would rather not..” In fact Fisher declined to pass any comment, and due to the need for secrecy very few even within the service were aware of the extent of the crisis. Chatfield wrote to Dreyer: ‘Lam glad the new Committee is formed... The Fleet knows nothing at present about out Projectile limi tations..and still believe we can penetrate the enemy's belt at long range. I am getting out something mild and cautious to partially disillusion them." At about ehe same time Beatty decided that the facts, while remaining neces-