Torts and Damages Case digests 2.23.

22

Barredo v Garcia (Torts)

BARREDO V GARCIA G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942 FAUSTO

B A R R E D O , p e t i t i o n e r, v s . S E V E R I N O G A R C I A a n d T I M O T E A
ALMARIO, respondents.

FACTS:
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between
Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head- on collision between
a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by
Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-
year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later.
A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS (CRIMINAL CASE):

1. CFI- Rizal – Fontanilla was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court
in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil
action be reserved.
2. CA: affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case.
Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7,
1939, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto
Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro
Fontanilla.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS (CIVIL CASE):

1. CFI – Manila: Fausto Barredo is liable in damages for the death of Faustino
Garcia caused by negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by
Barredo in the amount of 2,000.
2. CA: reduced the damages to 1,000.

ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo,
thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil
Code as an employer of Pedro thus making him primarily and directly,
responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro
Fontanilla

RULING:
Yes.
The responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but
not because of the same, but because of the cuasi- delito, that is to say, the
Torts and Damages Case digests 2.23.22

imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the

establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of the persons enumerated
in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices)
causes any damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc.
have committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It
is this fault that is condemned by the law.

One is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his
own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable
for the acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise to
the responsibility.

ELCANO vs. HILL

FACTS:

The defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, killed
the son of the plaintiffs (Sps. Elcano). A complaint was then filed by the said
plaintiffs before the Court of First Instance of QC for recovery of damages against
the defendants Reginald and his father-defendant, Marvin, with whom he was
living and getting subsistence. The CFI of QC dismissed the complaint upon the
motion to dismiss of the defendants. When Reginald was criminally prosecuted,
the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal,
because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."

The motion to dismiss was based on the following grounds:

1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107,
which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;

2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-
adjudicata;

3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because
he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by
marriage.

The said motion was initially denied by the trial court, but the order of dismissal
was then issued upon the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants.

Hence, this appeal was filed by the plaintiffs.

ISSUE/S:

1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in
the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
Torts and Damages Case digests 2.23.22

2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code be applied
against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the
occurrence complained of Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistence from his father, was already legally married?

HELD:

1. NO. The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action
against him.

Article 2177 of the new code provides:Responsibility for fault or negligence

under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. A separate
civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages
on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other
words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111,
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi- delict
only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed
by the accused.

2. YES. The Supreme Court is in the opinion that the conclusion of defendant-
appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld. While
it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child
(Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the
marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article
399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person... He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian." Under Article 2180, "(T)he
obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." [According to
Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to
supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to
Torts and Damages Case digests 2.23.22

third persons. On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing
that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued
without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry
with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to
judicial litigation.] In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald,
although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at
the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still
subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch
as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of
Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

!
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered
to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.

Heirs of Dulay vs CA

FACTS:

On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty.

Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at
the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay. Herein petitioner Maria
Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in
behalf of her minor children, filed on February 8, 1989 an action for damages
against Benigno Torzuela and herein private respondents Safeguard
Investigation and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard
Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of defendant Torzuela.
Respondent SUPERGUARD alleged that a complaint for damages based on
negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by
petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to
quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the
private respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature
considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine
qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability.

ISSUE: WON 2176 refers only to negligent acts and not intentional acts.
Torts and Damages Case digests 2.23.22

RULING:

Yes. It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the
prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a
compliance with the requirement of express reservation (Yakult Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what the petitioners
opted to do in this case. However, the private respondents opposed the civil
action on the ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a quasi-
delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. What is in dispute
therefore is the nature of the petitioner's cause of action. The nature of a cause
of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the
cause of action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose of an
action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the
party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint
itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. (De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis
Society, 112 SCRA 243 [1982]).

An examination of the complaint in the present case would show that the
plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking their right to recover damages against
the private respondents for their vicarious responsibility for the injurycaused by
Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as stated in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code
provides: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting
the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from
negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts
committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.

Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

TAYAG vs ALCANTARA
FACTS: Heirs of Tayag, Sr. filed with the Court of First Instance of Tarlac
presided over by Judge Alcantara, a complaint for damages against the private
respondents Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Romeo Villa. They alleged that
while Tayag Sr. was riding on a bicycle along MacArthur Highway, he was
bumped and hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus driven by Romeo Villa. As a result, he
sustained injuries which caused his instantaneous death. The bus was in a faster
and greater speed than what was reasonable and proper and in a gray negligent,
Torts and Damages Case digests 2.23.22

careless, reckless and imprudent manner, without due regards to injuries to

persons and damage to properties and in violation of traffic rules and regulations;
The private respondents filed a motion to suspend the trial on the ground that the
criminal case against the driver of the bus Romeo Villa was still pending in said
court, and that Section 3, Rule Ill of the Revised Rules of Court enjoins the
suspension of the civil action until the criminal action is terminated. The
respondent Judge granted the motion and suspended the civil case.
The respondent Judge rendered a decision in Criminal Case, acquitting the
accused Romeo Villa of the crime of homicide on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
Thereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the
ground that the petitioners have no cause of action against them the driver of the
bus having been acquitted in the criminal action. The petitioners opposed the
motions alleging that their cause of action is not based on crime but on quasi-
delict.
Respondent Judge issued an order dismissing the complaint in Civil Case.
The petitioners moved to reconsider; however, the same was denied by
respondent Judge.
Petitioners interposed a Petition for Certiorari to SC, claiming that the respondent
Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and for with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the disputed order, and that there is no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except thru the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case serve to
automatically dismiss the civil case for damages based on quasi delict.
the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and/or with
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Civil Case.
HELD: Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from
the act or commission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.
All the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely:
(1) an act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private
respondent;
(2) damage caused by the said act or commission;
(3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or commission; and
Torts and Damages Case digests 2.23.22

(4) no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties

The petitioners' cause of action is based on a quasi delict. As such, the acquittal
of the driver is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case for damages based on
quasi-delict. Judge Alcantra acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in dismissing Civil Case.
The order of dismissal is hereby set aside.
The case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs
against the private respondents.
Garcia v Florido
FACTS: German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, his
wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of the hospital,
hired and boarded a PU car owned and operated by Marcelino Inesin, and
driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City
to Zamboanga City for the purpose of attending a conference.
While the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at
21 km, it collided with an oncoming passenger bus owned and operated by
the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by Pedro Tumala. Garcia et al.
sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical
treatment and hospitalization
Garcia et al. filed an action for damages against both drivers and their
owners for driving in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in
gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the
passengers aboard the PU car
RTC: Dismissed the case because it is not quasi-delict because there is a
violation of law or traffic rules or regulations for excessive speeding
ISSUE: Whether or not Garcia et al. can still file a civil action for quasi-
delict despite having a criminal action.
HELD: YES. Decision appealed reversed and set aside, and the court a
quo is directed to proceed with the trial of the case.
• Essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194
of the New Civil Code are present, namely:
a) act or omission of the private respondents
b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the
operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by Pedro Tumala resulting in the
collision of the bus with the passenger car
c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by as a result of the
collision
Torts and Damages Case digests 2.23.22

d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or

prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents
e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the
parties
• Violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to
observe for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which
failure resulted in the injury on petitioners.
• Petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief
of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said
criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said
accused.

• It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for
damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press
recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to
recover them in the present civil case.
• Petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one
where reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason
that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the
reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar
him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the
case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of
dismissal.

CINCO vs CANONOY
FACTS: Cinco filed a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City for the
recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident because of the fault or
negligence of Hilot involving his automobile and Hilot's jeepney. After such, a
criminal case was filed against the driver arising from the same accident. At the
pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the
civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111,
Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever
stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered;
Judge Canonoy of City Court of Mandaue City ordered the suspension of the civil
case. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof was denied and he elevated
Torts and Damages Case digests 2.23.22

the matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Cebu with the allegation
that the City Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the
civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence.
CFI dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the following grounds:
a.) that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in
suspending the civil action inasmuch as damage to property is not one of the
instances when an independent civil action is proper
b.) that petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the law,
which is to submit his claim for damages in the criminal case
c.) that the resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and, therefore, certiorari is
improper; d.) that the Petition is defective inasmuch as what petitioner actually
desires is a Writ of mandamus.
Cinco filed a Petition for Review in SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to
property during the pendency of the criminal action.
HELD: The City Court erred in reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court. The civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 is that
arising from the criminal offense and not the civil action based on quasi-delict
Art. 31 is more appropriate in this case.
Art. 31.When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently
of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict.
Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the Decision of the
City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, suspending the civil action based on a quasi-
delict until after the criminal case is finally terminated.
The Decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu is hereby set aside.
City Court of Mandaue City is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of Civil
Case No. 189.

CANGCO vs Mnl Railroad

On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC).
He was an employee of the latter and he was given a pass so that he could ride
the train for free. When he was nearing his destination at about 7pm, he arose
Torts and Damages Case digests 2.23.22

from his seat even though the train was not at full stop. When he was about to
alight from the train (which was still slightly moving) he accidentally stepped on a
sack of watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact that it was dim. This
caused him to lose his balance at the door and he fell and his arm was crushed
by the train and he suffered other serious injuries. He was dragged a few meters
more as the train slowed down.

It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks
of watermelons. MRC raised as a defense the fact that Cangco was also
negligent as he failed to exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did
not wait for it to stop.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.

HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice
and a lot of people are doing so every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor
and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while
the train was still moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person.
He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were there as there were no
appropriate warnings and the place was dimly lit. The Court also elucidated on the
distinction between the liability of employers under Article 2180 and their liability for
breach of contract [of carriage]:
Torts and Damages Case digests 2.23.22

Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar

FACTS: Jesmariane Reyes was walking along the west-bound lane of

Sampaguita St., United Paranaque subdivision, Paranaque city. A Mitsubishi
L-300 van was travelling along the eastbound lane opposite Reyes. To avoid an
incoming vehicle, the van swerved left and hit Reyes. Alex Espinosa, a witness,
went to her aid and loaded her in the back of the van. Espinosa told the driver of
the van, Jimmy Bautista, to bring Reyes to the hospital. Instead, Bautista left the
van parked inside a nearby subdivision with Reyes still in the van. Thereafter, an
unidentified civilian came to help and drove Reyes to the hospital. The registered
owner of the van was Caravan, which is a corporation engaged in the business of
organizing travel and tours. Bautista was Caravan’s employee assigned to drive
the van as a service driver. Caravan shouldered the hospitalization expenses of
Reyes, but Reyes died 2 days after the accident.

Respondent Ermilinda Abejar, Reyes’ paternal aunt and who raised Reyes since
she was 9 years old, filed in RTC a complaint for damages against Bautista as
Caravan’s employee and Caravan as the registered owner. Bautista was dropped
as defendant since summons could not be served upon him. RTC ruled that
Bautista was grossly negligent in driving the vehicle. Hence this petition. Caravan
argues that Abejar is not a real-party-in-interest for she does not exercise legal or
substitute parental authority, nor is she judicially appointed as guardian of Reyes,
or her only living relative. Abejar is also not the executor or administrator of the
estate of Reyes. According to Caravan, only the victim herself or her hairs can
enforce an action based on culpa aquilana such as Abejar’s action for damages.
Caravan also excuses itself from liability on the premise that it exercised
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees.

ISSUES: 1. Whether Abehar is a real party-in-interest to file this suit.

HELD: We deny the petition. 1. YES. Abehar’s capacity to file a complaint stems
from her having exercised substitute parental authority over Reyes. Under the
Article 216 of the Family Code, in default of parents or a judicially appointed
guardian, the following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority over
the child in the order indicated xxx (3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-
Torts and Damages Case digests 2.23.22

one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified. Also, Art. 233 of FC states that “the
person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over
the person of the child as the parents.” Reyes’ parents and paternal grandparents
are deceased. The whereabouts of her maternal grandparents are unknown, and
she has no record that she has any siblings. Abehar took custody of Reyes when
she was a child and assumed the role of her parents, and thus exercised
substitute parental authority over her. As Reyes’ custodian, Abehar exercised the
statutorily recognized rights and duties of a parent. Thus, Abehar’s right to
proceed against Caravan is based on two grounds: first, Abehar suffered the
same anguish that a natural parent would have felt upon loss of one’s child;
second, Abehar is capacitated to do what Reyes’ parents would have been
capacitated to do.

Even if Reyes was already 18 years old when she died. While parental authority
terminates upon emancipation, Abehar continued to support and care for Reyes.
Except for the legal technicality of Reyes’ emancipation, her relationship with
Abehar remained the same. The anguish caused to Abehar was no different
because of the emancipation. In The Receiver for North Negros v. Ybanez, we
ruled that Art. 1902 of the old Civil Code (now Art. 2176) is broad enough to
accommodate even plaintiffs who are not relatives of the deceased. The article
does not limit or specify the active subjects, much less the relation that must exist
between the victim of the culpa aquiliana and the person who may recover
damages, thus warranting the inference that, in principle, ANYBODY who suffers
any damage from culpa aquiliana, whether a relative or not of the victim, may
recover damages from the person responsible therefor.
Torts and Damages Case digests 2.23.22

Geluz vs. CA

FACTS:

Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in
1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her
present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her
pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself
aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became
pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her
pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the
defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became
pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the
latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo
and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife.
Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of
fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of
Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know
of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.

ISSUE:
Whether the husband can claim damages for the death of the unborn fetus.

RULING:

No. The fetus was not yet born and thus does not have civil personality.
According to Article 40 of the Civil Code, birth determines personality. In this
case, the fetus does not yet possess a personality to speak of because it was
aborted in uterus. The child should be born before the parents can seek any
recovery for damages. Action for pecuniary damages on account of personal
injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured. There could be no action for
such damages that can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child for the injuries
it received because it lacked juridical personality. The damages which the
parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to moral damages, in this
case, for the act of the appellant Geluz to perform the abortion. However, moral
damages cannot also be recovered because the wife willingly sought the
abortion, and the husband did not further investigate on the causes of the
abortion. Furthermore, the husband did not seem to have taken interest in the
administrative and criminal cases against the appellant, but was more concerned
in obtaining from the doctor a large money payment.
Torts and Damages Case digests 2.23.22

Air France vs Carrascoso

Facts: Carrascoso bought a first-class ticket from Philippine Air Lines, agent of
Air France. From Hongkong to Saigon and Saigon to Bangkok, Carrascoso only
received firstclass accommodations from Air France after Carrascoso protested
and argued with Air France’s employees. From Bangkok to Teheran and/or
Casablanca, Carrascoso was ‘compelled’ to give up first-class accommodations
to a ‘white man’ whose better right to the same had not been established either
then or in Court. Carrascoso was already seated at the time. Air France’s own
witness testified that, based on the “O.K.” marks on Carrascoso’s ticket, there
was space for Carrascoso. Lower court and CA ruled in favor of Carrascoso.

Issue: W/N Carrasco is entitled to damages arising from tort - YES

Holding:

The act that breaks the contract may also be a tort. In this case, when Air France
breached its contract of carriage, it also became liable for a tortious act which
gave rise to payment of damages in favor of Carrasco.

A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any
other contractual relation… it generates a relation attended with a public duty.
Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier’s employees, naturally, could give ground
for an action for damages… Petitioner insists the first-class ticket was no
guarantee to first-class accommodations, as the same “would depend upon the
availability of first class seats.” First, Air France could not have the “indiscretion
to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all”. Second, Air France’s own
witness, Rafael Altonaga said that the “O.K.” mark in Carrascoso’s ticket meant
that space is confirmed. Passengers do not merely contract for transportation,
but have a right to expect kindness, respect, courtesy, and due consideration
from the carrier’s employees. The act of petitioner’s employee in forcing
respondent to vacate constituted the breach of the contract, attended with
evident bad faith. Therefore the contention of petitioner that there was no bad
faith fails: though bad faith was not alleged expressly, it may be implied from the
airline’s actions. As employer, petitioner airline was held liable. Ruling: CA
decision affirmed.
Torts and Damages Case digests 2.23.22

REYES vs PEOPLE

The defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is a domestic corporation

engaged in the business of transporting beer products for the San Miguel
Corporation (SMC for Short) from the latter's San Fernando, Pampanga plant to
its various sales outlets in Luzon. Among its fleets of vehicles for hire is the white
truck trailer described above driven by Romeo Dunca y Tumol, a duly licensed
driver. Aside from the Corporation's memorandum to all its drivers and helpers to
physically inspect their vehicles before each trip, the SMC's Traffic Investigator-
Inspector certified the roadworthiness of this White Truck trailer prior to June 20,
1989. In addition to a professional driver's license, it also conducts a rigid
examination of all driver applicants before they are hired.

In the early morning of June 20, 1989, the White Truck driven by Dunca left
Tuguegarao, Cagayan bound to San Fernando, Pampanga loaded with 2,000
cases of empty beer "Grande" bottles. Seated at the front right seat beside him
was Ferdinand Domingo, his truck helper ("pahinante" in Pilipino). At around 4:00
o'clock that same morning while the truck was descending at a slight downgrade
along the national road at Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a damaged
portion of the road covering the full width of the truck's right lane going south and
about six meters in length. These made the surface of the road uneven because
the potholes were about five to six inches deep.

The left lane parallel to this damaged portion is smooth. As narrated by

Ferdinand Domingo, before approaching the potholes, he and Dunca saw the
Nissan with its headlights on coming from the opposite direction. They used to
evade this damaged road by taking the left lance but at that particular moment,
because of the incoming vehicle, they had to run over it. This caused the truck to
bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of the wheels and the truck swerved to the left
invading the lane of the Nissan. As a result, Dunca's vehicle rammed the
incoming Nissan dragging it to the left shoulder of the road and climbed a ridge
above said shoulder where it finally stopped.. The Nissan was severely
damaged, and its two passengers, namely: Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy,
Jr. died instantly from external and internal hemorrhage and multiple fractures.

ISSUES

1. Whether the Court may award damages to the offended parties in the criminal
case despite the filing of a civil action against the employer of the truck driver;
and in amounts exceeding that alleged in the information for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property
Torts and Damages Case digests 2.23.22

RULING: No. With regard to the second issue, the award of damages in the
criminal case was improper because the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action
against the employer. As enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong, "civil indemnity is not
part of the penalty for the crime committed." The only issue brought before the
trial court in the criminal action is whether accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is
guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. The
action for recovery of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by the
separate civil action filed against the petitioner as employer of the accused truck-
driver. In this case, accused-driver jumped bail pending his appeal from his
conviction.

Thus, the judgment convicting the accused became final and executory, but only
insofar as the penalty in the criminal action is concerned. The damages awarded
in the criminal action was invalid because of its effective waiver. The
pronouncement was void because the action for recovery of the civil liability
arising from the crime has been waived in said criminal action. As a final note, we
reiterate that "the policy against double recovery requires that only one action be
maintained for the same act or omission whether the action is brought against
the employee or against his employer. The injured party must choose which of
the available causes of action for damages he will bring.