Plantiff’s Fault, contributory negligence (Reduction of damages due to contributory negligence.

NELEN LAMBERT, assisted by her husband, GLENROY ALOYSUIS

LAMBERT, petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF RAY CASTILLON, Represented by MARILOU T. CASTILLON and SERGIO
LABANG, respondents
FACTS:
1. The case started when Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother Joel Castillon at
Tambo, Iligan City and borrowed his motorcycle. He then invited his friend, Sergio
Labang, to roam around Iligan City. Ray drove the motorcycle with Sergio as the
backrider.2

2. After eating supper at Hona’s Restaurant and imbibing a bottle of beer, they
traversed the highway towards Tambo at a high speed. Upon reaching Brgy. Sto.
Rosario, they figured in an accident with a Tamaraw jeepney, owned by petitioner
Nelen Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot, which was traveling on the same
direction but made a sudden left turn. The incident resulted in the instantaneous
death of Ray and injuries to Sergio.

3. Respondents, the heirs of Ray Castillon, thus filed an action for damages with prayer
for preliminary attachment against the petitioner Nelen Lambert. The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case at the RTC of Iligan City.

4. The complaint was subsequently amended to include the claim by Joel Castillon for
the damages caused to the motorcycle.

5. after a full-blown trial, the court a quo rendered a decision in favor of herein private
respondents but reduced petitioner’s liability by 20% in view of the contributory
negligence of Ray.

6.  Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants,
directing the latter, jointly and severally, to pay the former the following:

1. The sum of SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE THOUSAND AND NINETY-ONE

(P633,091) PESOS, representing loss of support, death indemnity, funeral and
related expenses, moral damages and attorney’s fees and

2. Costs of the suit.

For lack of merit, defendants’ counterclaim is dismissed.

On the claim of Joel Castillon, the evidence shows that he is not the real owner of the
motorcycle. He is not the real party in interest. Accordingly, his complaint is
dismissed.

On the third-party complaint, the third-party defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation

is ordered to pay the sum of P16,500.00 directly to the plaintiffs. This sum, if paid,
should be deducted from the amount adjudged in par. 1 above.
 7. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.7 Hence the present petition,
based on the following arguments:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error of law and grave abuse
of discretion when it did not apply the ruling of this Honorable Court in the case of
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court and
Casiano Pascua, Et. Al., [189 SCRA 168, August 30, 1990], as reiterated recently in
the case of Edna A. Raynera vs. Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla [306 SCRA 102,
April 21, 1999], in which this Honorable Court enunciated that drivers of vehicles
"who bump the rear of another vehicle" are presumed to be the cause of the
accident.”

2. The erroneous conclusion of the Honorable Trial Court as affirmed by the

Honorable Court of Appeals that the act of tailgating, at high speed, constitutes
contributory negligence only, is contrary to the rulings of this Honorable Court in the
case of Sanitary Steam Laundry, INC. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals [300
SCRA 20, December 10, 1998] and the case of Edna A. Raynera vs. Freddie Hiceta
and Jimmy Orpilla [306 SCRA 102, April 21, 1999].

3. The Honorable Court of Appeals grossly erred in its conclusion that petitioner’s
driver was negligent, without taking into consideration the presumptions enunciated
by this Honorable Court in the case of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. The Honorable
Intermediate Appellate Court and Casiano Pascua, Et. Al., [189 SCRA 168, August
30, 1990], and the case of Edna A. Raynera vs. Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy
Orpilla [306 SCRA 102, April 21, 1999].

4. As an alternative relief, petitioner most respectfully assigns as error the Honorable

Trial Court’s computation as to the loss of earning capacity of Ray Castillon. Such
computation is contrary to the formula enunciated by this Honorable Court in the
case of Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals [31 SCRA 511
(1970)].

5. The Honorable Trial Court’s award of moral damages is contrary to the

pronunciation of this Honorable Court in the case of Ace Haulers Corporation vs. The
Honorable Court of Appeals and Abiva [338 SCRA 572, August 23, 2000], wherein
the award of moral damages was disallowed absent any evidence of bad faith
or ill-motive.

8. Petitioner insists that the negligence of Ray Castillon was the proximate cause of his
unfortunate death and therefore she is not liable for damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reduction of damages due to contributory negligence is valid?
Whether or not Ray Castillon negligence was the proximate cause of his
unfortunate death.
RULING:
1. The court states that:  “No cogent reason exists for disturbing the following findings of
the trial court, which the Court of Appeals affirmed:”
2. And That: “To the mind of the court, this is exactly what happened. When Reynaldo
Gamot was approaching the side road, he slightly veered to the right for his
allowance. Ray Castillon, who was following closely behind, instinctively veered to
the left but it was also the moment when Reynaldo Gamot sharply turned to the left
towards the side road. At this juncture both were moving obliquely to the
left.l^vvphi1.net Thus the motorcycle sliced into the side of the jeepney throwing the
driver forward so that his forehead hit the angle bar on the left front door of the
jeepney even as the motorcycle shot forward and the jeepney veered back to the
right and sped away.”

3. The testimonies of the witnesses Frias, Opada, Labang and Sumile show that he did
not stop even for a second, or less before making the left turn. On the contrary, he
slightly veered to the right immediately followed by the abrupt and sudden turn to the
left in order to enter the side road. It is apparent that Reynaldo Gamot did not keep a
lookout for vehicles or persons following him before proceeding to turn left. He failed
to take into account the possibility that others may be following him. He did not
employ the necessary precaution to see to it that the road was clear.

4. The court, “Clearly see, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without first
establishing his right of way, was the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed
the life of Ray and injured Sergio. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.11 The
cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Reynaldo for, as the trial
court correctly held, without that left turn executed with no precaution, the mishap in
all probability would not have happened.

5. The Court in this case agree with the trial court that Ray was likewise guilty of
contributory negligence as defined under Article 2179 of the Civil Code, we find it
equitable to increase the ratio of apportionment of damages on account of the
victim’s negligence.

6. Under the Article 2179 reads as follows:

When the plaintiff’s negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury,
he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care,
the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded.

The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly

responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but
must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be
held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence.15 The
determination of the mitigation of the defendant’s liability varies depending on the
circumstances of each case. The Court had sustained a mitigation of 50% in Rakes
v. AG & P;16 20% in Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court17 and LBC Air Cargo, Inc. v. Court of Appeals;18 and 40% in Bank of the
Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals19 and Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of
Appeals.20 1awphi1.nét
 7. In the case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the mishap: (1)
was driving the motorcycle at a high speed; (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw
jeepney; (3) has imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a
protective helmet.21 These circumstances, although not constituting the
proximate cause of his demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same
result. The contribution of these circumstances are all considered and
determined in terms of percentages of the total cause. 

8. Hence, pursuant to Rakes v. AG & P, the heirs of Ray Castillon shall recover
damages only up to 50% of the award. In other words, 50% of the damage shall be
borne by the private respondents; the remaining 50% shall be paid by the petitioner.

9. Anent the award of loss of earning capacity, we agree with the petitioner that the trial
court erred in the computation of the net earnings.

10. In considering the earning capacity of the victim as an element of damages, the
following factors are considered in determining the compensable amount of lost
earnings: (1) the number of years for which the victim would otherwise have lived;
and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased. Jurisprudence
provides that the first factor, i.e., life expectancy, is computed by applying the formula
(2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or
the Actuarial Combined Experience Table of Mortality. As to the second factor, it is
computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e.,
the total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or
income and less living and other incidental expenses. The net earning is ordinarily
computed at fifty percent (50%) of the gross earnings. Thus, the formula used by this
Court in computing loss of earning capacity is: Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 –
age at time of death) x (gross annual income – reasonable and necessary living
expenses)].

11. NET = LIFE EXPECTANCY x GROSS - LIVING

EARNING [2/3 (80-age at the time ANNUAL EXPENSES
CAPACITY (X) of death)] INCOME (GAI) (50% of GAI)
-50% x
X = [2/3 (80-35)] x [P31,876.00
P31,876.00]
X = [2/3 (45)] x [P31,876.00 - P15,938.00]
X = 30 x 15,938.00  
X = P478,140.00    

We sustain the awards of P33,215.00 as funeral and burial expenses being supported with
receipts;24 P50,000.00 as death indemnity; and P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, the
award of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees must be deleted for lack of basis.

The indemnity for death caused by a quasi-delict used to be pegged at P3,000.00,25 based

on Article 2206 of the Civil Code, which reads:

ART. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at
least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances.
In addition:
 (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased,
and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every
case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity
at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article
291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent’s inheritance by the law of
testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the
death, for a period of not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the
court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of
the deceased.

However, the amount has been gradually increased through the years. At present, prevailing
jurisprudence fixes the amount at P50,000.00.26

Paragraph 3 of the same provision also serves as the basis for the award of moral damages
in quasi-delict. The reason for the grant of moral damages has been explained, thus:

… the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The
intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity
of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the
offender.27

While it is true that there can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of human
life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by a precise mathematical
calculation,28 we hold that the trial court’s award of moral damages of P50,000.00 for the
death of Ray Castillon is in accord with the prevailing jurisprudence.29

With respect to attorney’s fees, it is well settled that the same should not be awarded in the
absence of stipulation except under the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code. The trial court did not indicate the basis for its award. As we have held in Rizal Surety
and Insurance Company v. Court of Appeals:30

"Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows attorney’s fess to be awarded by a court when its
claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest
by reason of an unjustified act or omission of the party from whom it is
sought.l^vvphi1.net While judicial discretion is here extant, an award thereof demands,
nevertheless, a factual, legal or equitable justification.1a\^/phi1.net The matter cannot and
should not be left to speculation and conjecture (Mirasol vs. De la Cruz, 84 SCRA 337;
Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 619).

In the case at bench, the records do not show enough basis for sustaining the award for
attorney’s fees and to adjudge its payment by petitioner…"

Likewise, this Court held in Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals that:

"In Abrogar v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 67970, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA
57] the Court had occasion to state that ‘[t]he reason for the award of attorney’s fees must
be stated in the text of the court’s decision, otherwise, if it is stated only in the dispositive
portion of the decision, the same must be disallowed on appeal.’ …1awphi1.nét

12. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the net
earnings is computed at 50% of the gross annual income to conform with the
prevailing jurisprudence, and the FURTHER MODIFICATION that petitioner NELEN
LAMBERT is ordered to pay the heirs of Ray Castillon only 50% of the damages
herein awarded, except attorney’s fees which is DELETED for lack of basis.
The Last Clear Chance Doctrine (other example of the last clear chance doctrine)
ROGELIO ENGADA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Former Fourteenth Division, Manila, and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
FACTS:
1. In this case, Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney bound
for Iloilo City. On board was Sheila Seyan, the registered owner of the
Tamaraw. While traversing the road along Barangay Acquit, Barotac Nuevo,
the Tamaraw passengers allegedly saw from the opposite direction a
speeding Isuzu pick-up, driven by petitioner Rogelio Engada. 

2. The pick-up had just negotiated a hilly gradient on the highway. When it was
just a few meters away from the Tamaraw, the Isuzu pick-up’s right signal
light flashed, at the same time, it swerved to its left, encroaching upon the
lane of the Tamaraw and headed towards a head-on collision course with it. 

3. Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up. Iran swerved to his left but the
pick-up also swerved to its right. Thus, the pick-up collided with the Tamaraw,
hitting the latter at its right front passenger side. The impact caused the head
and chassis of the Tamaraw to separate from its body. Seyan was thrown out
of the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. The pick-up stopped diagonally
astride the center of the road.

4. Seyan and Iran were brought to Barotac Nuevo Medicare Hospital.

5. After which, A criminal complaint for damage to property through reckless

imprudence with serious physical injuries was filed with the Municipal Trial
Court of Barotac Nuevo against petitioner Rogelio Engada and Edwin
Iran.5 Probable cause was found against petitioner, while the complaint
against Iran was dismissed.6
6. Consequently, an Information was filed against petitioner charging him with
serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless
imprudence, 

7. After trial, the court rendered on August 25, 1994 a decision, disposing as
follows:

8. WHEREFORE, the Court, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Simple Imprudence resulting [in] physical injuries and damage to property
defined and penalized in Article 263, paragraph 4 and in relation with Article
365, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences the accused
Rogelio Engada to suffer imprisonment of ONE (1) MONTH and ONE (1) DAY
of arresto mayor.
 9. Accused is further ordered to pay complainant Mrs. Sheila Seyan the amount
of ₱51,000.00 for the total destruction of the Toyota Tamaraw Jeepney and
₱110,000.00 for indemnification of hospital and medical expenses, and to pay
the cost of the suit.

10. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On May 31, 1999, the CA
dismissed the appeal and affirmed with modification the trial court’s decision,
thus:

11. WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the

appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with modification as to the penalty
imposed upon the accused who is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto mayor.

12. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.

13. For, Petitioner claims innocence and seeks acquittal.
14. He contends that in this case we should relax the rule that only legal
questions can be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. According to him, the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts, and
erred in its conclusion as to the proximate cause of the collision. He insists
that the Court of Appeals erred when it found him negligent for occupying the
lane of the Tamaraw jeepney, and then failing to return to his original lane at
the safest and earliest opportunity.
15. Petitioner further contends that the CA failed to consider that he already
relayed his intention to go back to his lane by flashing the pick-up’s right
signal light. He submits that at that moment Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw,
had no more reason to swerve to his left. Had Iran not swerved to the left,
according to petitioner, the collision would have been avoided. It was Iran who
was clearly negligent, says petitioner. Citing our ruling in McKee v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,11 petitioner avers that although his act of
occupying the Tamaraw’s lane was the initial act in the chain of events, Iran’s
swerving to the left after petitioner flashed his right turn signal, constituted a
sufficient intervening event, which proximately caused the eventual injuries
and damages to private complainant.

16. As to petitioner’s claim that there was no evidence showing that the pick-up
was running very fast, the OSG avers that this is rebutted by the testimony of
Seyan and Iran who both testified that petitioner drove the pick-up at a fast
speed when it encroached on their lane immediately before the collision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals err in finding that the action of
petitioner, Rogelio Engada, was the proximate cause of the collision.
Whether or not Iran, had the last clear chance to avoid the collision.
RULING:
1. The court states that, “petitioner’s attempt to pin the blame on Edwin Iran, the
driver of the Tamaraw, for the vehicular collision is unfounded. Iran swerved
to the left only to avoid petitioner’s pick-up, which was already on a head to
head position going against Iran’s Tamaraw jeepney immediately before the
vehicles collided. This fact has been established by the evidence on record.
No convincing proof was adduced by petitioner that the driver of the
Tamaraw, Iran, could have avoided a head-on collision.”

2. The court, note that petitioner admitted his Isuzu pick-up intruded into the
lane of the Tamaraw jeepney. Prosecution witness Nelson Alobin, one of
those who went to the scene of the incident immediately, testified that when
he arrived at the place where the collision took place, he saw the pick-up
positioned diagonally at the center of the road.12 Its head was towards the
direction of Barotac Nuevo and the rear tires were just a few inches beyond
the center of the lane.13 Moving backwards facing Barotac Nuevo, at two arms
length away from the pick-up, Alobin also saw a tire mark, 12 inches long and
located at the left side of the center line going to the right side.1

3. The court further states that, It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his
proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary
situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and he should not
proceed if he cannot do so in safety.15 This rule is consistent with Section 41,
paragraph (a) of R.A. 4136 as amended, otherwise known as The Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides:

Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. – (a) The driver of a vehicle
shall not drive to the left side of the center line of a highway in overtaking or
passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, unless such left
side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance
ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be made in safety.

4. In the present case, there was only a distance of 30 meters from the Tamaraw
jeepney when the Isuzu pick-up abandoned its lane and swerved to the left of
the center line.16 In addition, petitioner was running at a fast clip while
traversing this lane. This was testified to by Seyan and Iran, unrebutted by
petitioner. The resulting damage to the Tamaraw jeepney, at the point where
the head and chassis were separated from the body, bolsters this conclusion
that petitioner was speeding. In our view, petitioner was negligent in several
ways, and his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. In
abandoning his lane, he did not see to it first that the opposite lane was free of
oncoming traffic and was available for a safe passage. Further, after seeing
the Tamaraw jeepney ahead, petitioner did not slow down, contrary to the rule
set in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. IAC,17 thus:
5. …[O]r if, after attempting to pass, the driver of the overtaking vehicle finds that
he cannot make the passage in safety, the latter must slacken his speed so
as to avoid the danger of a collision, even bringing his car to a stop if
necessary.

6. For failing to observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on drivers of
vehicles abandoning their lane, petitioner must be held liable.

7. Court states that , Iran could not be faulted when in his attempt to avoid the
pick-up, he swerved to his left. Petitioner’s acts had put Iran in an emergency
situation which forced him to act quickly. An individual who suddenly finds
himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger,
is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was
brought by his own negligence.

8. Petitioner tries to extricate himself from liability by invoking the doctrine of last
clear chance. He avers that between him and Iran, the latter had the last clear
chance to avoid the collision, hence Iran must be held liable.

9. Court says, The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who
has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law
solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. 19 But as already
stated on this point, no convincing evidence was adduced by petitioner
to support his invocation of the above cited doctrine. Instead, what has
been shown is the presence of an emergency and the proper application
of the emergency rule. Petitioner’s act of swerving to the Tamaraw’s
lane at a distance of 30 meters from it and driving the Isuzu pick-up at a
fast speed as it approached the Tamaraw, denied Iran time and
opportunity to ponder the situation at all. There was no clear chance to
speak of. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding petitioner
responsible for the vehicular collision and the resulting damages, including the
injuries suffered by Mrs. Sheila Seyan and the total loss of the Tamaraw
jeepney. It also did not err in imposing on petitioner the sentence of four (4)
months of arresto mayor.2
 10. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18358 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

Vicarious or imputed liability( Negligence in the hiring of employees)

Article 2180 and 2181
Merucry Drug Corp. and Ronald j. del rosario v. sps Richard huang et al. GR NO. 172122 ,
June 22, 2007
FACTS: