IV UPES NATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY COMPETITION, 2018

TC-24

BEFORE THE HON’BLE COURT OF PRINICIPAL SESSIONS JUDGE, NEHRADUN

STATE OF UTTARAKHAND- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - PROSECUTION

v.

SHAURYA SINGH & AVANTIKA RANA- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -DEFENCE

FOR OFFENCES CHARGED UNDER:

SECTION 302 & 120B r/w SECTION 34 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860.

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE PRINCIPLE SESSIONS JUDGE

MEMORANDUM ON THE BEHALF OF PROSECUTION

-Table of Contents- Page |i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................. iii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................................................... v

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION...................................................................................... viii

STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................................... ix

STATEMENT OF CHARGES .................................................................................................. x

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS .............................................................................................. xi

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ................................................................................................... 1

I THE ACCUSED 1 & ACCUSED 2 ARE GUILTY OF MURDER UNDER

SECTION 302 OF I.P.C. ......................................................................................................... 1

I-A. THE INTENTION OF CAUSING SUCH BODILY INJURY ......................................... 2

i. Requisite Skill was there to use a drug .................................................. 2

ii. Ulterior Motive was to kill ..................................................................... 3

iii. Nature of Injuries Inflicted were sufficient enough to cause death ....... 3

I-B. OFFENDER KNOWS THAT THE ACT IS LIKELY TO CAUSE DEATH. ..................... 5

i. Motive of the Accused ............................................................................ 5

ii. Deceased died due to its administration ................................................ 6

iii. Accused has poison in his possession .................................................... 6

iv. Accused had the opportunity to administer the poison .......................... 7

I-C. PERSON TO WHOM THE HARM IS CAUSED ......................................................... 7

II THE ACCUSED 1 AND ACCUSED 2 HAVE COMMITTED CRIMINAL

CONSPIRACY IN FURTHERANCE OF COMMON INTENTION................................. 8

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II-A THERE WAS COMMON INTENTION BETWEEN THE TWO ACCUSED. ................. 8

i. There was common intention in the sense of prior meeting of minds or

pre-meditated plan between the two. ................................................................. 9

ii. The person in order to be held liable, he should have participated in

the act in the furtherance of the common intention ........................................... 9

II-B THERE WAS CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY BETWEEN THE ACCUSED. ................... 10

i. That there must be an agreement between the persons who are alleged
to conspire. ....................................................................................................... 11

ii. That the agreement should be for doing of an illegal act. ................... 12

[III] ACCUSED 1 IS LIABLE FOR GIVING FALSE INFORMATION .................... 12

PRAYER ..................................................................................................................................xii

MEMORANDUM ON THE BEHALF OF PROSECUTION

-List of Abbreviations- P a g e | iii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION EXPANSION

& AND

¶ PARAGRAPH

A ACCUSED

A.I.R. ALL INDIA REPORTER

A.L.T. ANDHRA LAW TIMES

A.P. ANDHRA PRADESH

Anr. ANOTHER

B.B.C.J. BIHAR BAR COUNCIL JOURNAL

Cal. CALCUTTA

Cr.P.C. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE

Cri.L.J. CRIMINAL LAW JOURNAL

D.L.T. DELHI LAW T IMES

D.W. DEFENCE W ITNESS

ed. EDITION

G.L.R. GUJARAT L AW REVIEW

Hon’ble HONOURABLE

I.P.C. INDIAN PENAL CODE

MEMORANDUM ON THE BEHALF OF PROSECUTION

-List of Abbreviations- P a g e | iv

Ker. KERALA

M.P. MADHYA PRADESH

No. NUMBER

Ors. OTHERS

p. PAGE

P.W. PROSECUTION W ITNESS

r/w READ W ITH

S.C. SUPREME COURT

S.C.C. SUPREME COURT CASES

Sec. SECTION

U.P. UTTAR PRADESH

v. VERSUS

MEMORANDUM ON THE BEHALF OF PROSECUTION

-Index of Authorities- Page |v

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

TABLE OF CASES

S. No Cases p. ¶

1. A.G. Bhagwat v. U.T. Chandigarh, 1989 Cri.L.J. 214. 3 10

2. Balu & Ors. v. State (U.T. of Pondicherry), 2016 Cri.L.J. 176. 9 31

3. Bhagguram & Ors. v. State of M.P., (1986) Cri.L.J. 206. 13 42

4. Bhupinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1988) 3 S.C.C. 513. 3, 5 11, 19

Chandrakant Murgyappa Umrani v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R.

5. 8 28
1999 S.C. 1557.

6. Daya Nand v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 2008 S.C. 1823. 4, 6 13, 21

7. Esher Singh v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2004 (4) A.L.T. 28. 11 35

8. Hardeo Singh v. State of Bihar & Ors., 2000 Cri.L.J. 2978. 12 38

9. Ibra Akanda v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1944 Cal. 339. 10 32

10. In re Thangaraju, 1981 Mad. L.W. (Cri.). 2 5

Jaikrishnadas Manohardas Desai & Anr. v. State of Bombay,

11. 10 34
A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 889.

12. K.S. Narayan v. S. Gopinathan, 1982 Cri.L.J. 1611. 11 36

13. Kaul Ram Brahma v. State of Assam, 1977 Cri.L.J. 98. 2 8

14. Keher Singh v. State (Delhi Admin.), A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1883. 3, 12 11, 39

MEMORANDUM ON THE BEHALF OF PROSECUTION

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15. Krishan Pal Singh v. State of U.P, 1993 A.W.C. 1691 (All.). 2 5

16. Md. Asir Ali v. State of Assam, 2009 (3) G.L.T. 817. 9 29

17. Nagina Sharma & Ors. v. State of Bihar, 1991 Cri.L.J. 1195. 8 26

18. Narendra Nama Das v. State of Tripura, 2009 (1) G.L.R. 856. 8 26

19. Naseem Ahmed v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 691. 7 24

Noor Mohd. Yusuf Momin v. State of Maharashtra, (1970) 1

20. 9 31
S.C.C. 696.

21. Prakash Gandhi v. State of Gujarat, 1992 Cri.L.J. 462. 4 15

22. Ramesh Kumar v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 945. 4 16

23. Ramesh Singh v. State of A.P, 2004 Cri.L.J. 3354. 9 31

24. Ramesh v. State, 1979 Cri.L.J. 727. 3 12

25. Regina v. Williams, (1986) 84 Cr. App. R 299, C.A. 5 20

26. Rewaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1978 Cri.L.J. 858. 5 19

27. Sanjeev Nanda v. State,160 (2009) D.L.T. 775. 5 17

28. Sarju Sonar v. Emperor, 11 Cri.L.J. 438. 13 44

29. Shanmughan v. State of Kerala, (2012) 2 S.C.C. 788. 4 14

30. Sharad Birdichand v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1622. 5, 7 19, 24

31. Sheo Govind Bin v. State of Bihar, 1985 B.B.C.J. 632. 8 26

32. State (N.C.T. of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 3820. 11 37

33. State of A.P. v. R. Punnayya, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 45. 2, 5 7, 18

34. State of U.P. v. Iftikhar Khan, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 863. 10 34

MEMORANDUM ON THE BEHALF OF PROSECUTION

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35. State v. Raja Parida, 1972 Cri.L.J. 193 (Ori.). 2 5

36. Surinder Pal v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1723. 14 44

ONLINE DATABASES

• Manupatra (www.manupatra.com).

• SCC Online (www.scconline.in).

• JSTOR (www.jstor.org).

STATUTES

• Indian Penal Code, 1860.

• Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

• The Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

• The Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.

BOOKS REFFERED

• D. ORMEROD, SMITH AND HOGAN’S CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 2009).

• HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND 44 (4th ed. 1987).

• HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND 429 (2nd ed. 1933).

• RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE 936 (31st ed.2006).

JOURNALS

• American Society of Health System Pharmacists, AHFS Drug Information, 2009.

Bethesda, MD. (2009).

• Emergency Medicine Myths: Epinephrine in Cardiac Arrest, 52 THE JOURNAL OF

EMERGENCY MEDICINE 809, 809-814 (2017).

MEMORANDUM ON THE BEHALF OF PROSECUTION

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Prosecution, most humbly and respectfully, submits that this Hon’ble Court has the

requisite territorial and subject matter jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate this matter

under Section 1771 r/w Section 262 and Section 2093 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973.

1
Section 177: Ordinary place of inquiry and trial

‘Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it
was committed’.

2
Section 26: Courts by which offences are triable. Subject to the other provisions of this Code,

(a) any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), may be tried by,

(i) the High Court, or

(ii) the Court of Session, or
(iii) any other Court by which such offence is shown in the First Schedule to be triable;

(b) any offence under any other law shall, when any Court is mentioned in this behalf in such law, be
tried by such Court and when no Court is so mentioned, may be tried by-

(i) the High Court, or

(ii) any other Court by which such offence is shown in the First Schedule to be triable.

3
Section 209. Commitment of case to Court of Session when offence is triable exclusively by it- When
in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused appears or is brought before the
Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of
Session, he shall

(a) commit the case to the Court of Session;

(b) subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody during, and
until the conclusion of, the trial;
(c) send to that Court the record of the case and the documents and articles, if any, which are to be
produced in evidence;
(d) Notify the Public Prosecutor of the commitment of the case to the Court of Session.’

MEMORANDUM ON THE BEHALF OF PROSECUTION

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Mr. Shaurya Singh (hereinafter referred to as Accused 1) is the husband of Mrs. Aastha

Singh (hereinafter referred to as deceased). Accused 1 had an extra-marital affair with

Ms. Avantika Rana (hereinafter referred to as Accused 2). Accused 1 had married the

deceased due to parental pressure. After the death of his parents, Accused 1 wanted to

marry Accused 2 and so wanted divorce from the deceased. Due to this, the marriage

between Accused 1 and deceased was strained.

2. On 01.11.2017, Accused 1 and Accused 2 decided to finally end the marriage so that

Accused 1 could marry Accused 2. They both went to Accused 1’s house where the

deceased was present. Accused 1 and Accused 2 both entered into a fight with deceased

for the divorce.

3. At 7:30 PM, on the same day, body of deceased is recovered and is first seen by Accused

1. Accused 1 calls the neighbour (the informant P.W.1) on the pretext that her wife (the

deceased) has committed suicide. On coming to home, it was found that the deceased

body was lying on the floor, there were injuries on the forehead and syringe and bottle of

a medicine was lying beside deceased.

4. Due to some suspicion of the death, the neighbour Pooja Mishra (P.W.1) called the police

and lodged the FIR.

MEMORANDUM ON THE BEHALF OF PROSECUTION

-Statement of Charges- Page |x

STATEMENT OF CHARGES

CHARGE 1

Accused 1 and Accused 2 have been charged under Section 302 (Punishment of Murder) and

120B (Punishment of Criminal Conspiracy) read with Section 34 (Common Intention) of

Indian Penal Code, 1860.

CHARGE 2

Accused 1 has been separately charged under Section 203 (False Information) of Indian Penal

Code, 1860.

MEMORANDUM ON THE BEHALF OF PROSECUTION

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

WHETHER ACCUSED 1 AND ACCUSED 2 ARE GUILTY OF MURDER.

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Accused 1 and Accused 2 are guilty

of Murder as they have committed an act of killing Aastha Singh by administering her Lethal

dosage of Epinephrine and causing fatal injuries on her head thereby accomplishing the Actus

Reus. Both the accused had intention as well as motive to kill deceased as the Accused 1 had

extra marital affair with Accused 2 and wanted to marry Accused 2 and considered deceased

as a barrier and thereby having Mens Rea.

WHETHER ACCUSED 1 AND ACCUSED 2 HAVE COMMITTED CRIMINAL

CONSPIRACY IN FURTHERANCE OF COMMON INTENTION.

It is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble Court that both the Accused had both common

intention and pre-mediated plan to murder the deceased to accomplish the same they

procured the liquid Epinephrine, a drug that was to be avoided by the deceased. As Accused 1

and Accused 2 had an illicit relationship with each other and in order to marry each other

they conspired in furtherance of common intention to kill the deceased.

WHETHER ACCUSED 1 IS LIABLE FOR GIVING FALSE INFORMATION

It is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble Court that Accused 1 is liable for giving False

information about the crime to Investigating Officer and P.W.1. Accused 1 made the offence

of murder to appear as suicide when he knew that it was false and murder has been

committed. He gave this false information to P.W.1. Also, the Accused 1 fabricated false

suicide note to the investigating officer which he knew was not written by the deceased.

MEMORANDUM ON THE BEHALF OF PROSECUTION

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

[I] THE ACCUSED 1 & ACCUSED 2 ARE GUILTY OF MURDER UNDER

SECTION 302 OF I.P.C.

1. It is humbly submitted that Accused 1 and Accused 2 are guilty of committing murder

of the deceased. Accused 1 and Accused 2 have committed this offence against

deceased who is the wife of Accused 1, in order to marry each other. The chain of

circumstances, post mortem report4 and Statements of Witnesses prove the same

beyond reasonable doubt.

2. The Section 302 of I.P.C. prescribes the punishment of murder. So, it is pertinent to

refer to Section 300 of I.P.C. which highlights the Ingredients of murder.

3. The Section 300, I.P.C. states that

“A person is guilty of committing murder if he intentionally causes

the death of a person or causes such bodily injury as he knows, is

likely to cause death of that person or causes such bodily injury,

which in the ordinary course of nature results into death or

commits an act so dangerous that it must, in all probability cause

death of that person.”5

4. Here, the present act of Accused 1 and Accused 2 is murder under clause 2 of Section

300 which states, a person is guilty of murder if he causes death of the person with

the intention of causing such bodily injury (I-A) as the offender knows to be likely to

cause death (I-B) of a person to whom the harm is caused (I-C). The Prosecution

4
Exhibit No. 4, Post Mortem p. 16.

5
Section 300, The Indian Penal Code, 1860, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

MEMORANDUM ON THE BEHALF OF PROSECUTION

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contends that all the ingredients of the crime aforementioned are established in the

instant matter.

5. Section 300(2) applies to cases where the offender knows that injury was likely to

cause death.6 Knowledge of the accused is relevant under Section 300, Clause (2).7

I-A. THERE WAS AN INTENTION OF CAUSING SUCH BODILY INJURY.

6. To constitute murder there must be malice aforethought, express or implied. 8 In the

present case both Accused 1 and Accused 2 have ‘guilty mind’.

7. In a case where the assailant causes death by the fist blow intentionally given

knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged lever, enlarged spleen or

diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that Particular person as a

result of the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may

be.9

i. Requisite Skill was there to use a drug.

8. Accused 1 is the husband of the deceased knew about the medical condition of

deceased. Accused 2 is a cardiologist and therefore, had the requisite skill to use a

drug as lethal weapon by injecting it at the strategic part in right amount to cause

death of deceased by drug over-dose. The ‘intention to kill’ can be inferred the nature

of injuries caused to the victim, 10 including injuries in the skull (cause of death) and

heart failure due to overdose of Epinephrine (cause of death), Humerus fracture, A-C

Joint dislocation which corresponds to Physical Trauma. Epinephrine, the drug which

6
Krishan Pal Singh v. State of U.P, 1993 A.W.C. 1691 (All.) ¶ 12; see also State v. Raja Parida, 1972
Cri.L.J. 193 (Ori.) ¶ 14.

7
In re Thangaraju, 1981 Mad. L.W. (Cri) ¶ 22.

8
HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND 429 (2nd ed. 1933).

9
State of A.P. v. R. Punnayya, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 45 ¶ 16.

10
Kaul Ram Brahma v. State of Assam, 1977 Cri.L.J. 98 ¶ 10.

MEMORANDUM ON THE BEHALF OF PROSECUTION

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caused the death is,11 a prescribed drug12 of which there is no prescription found.

ii. Ulterior Motive was to kill.

9. It can also be inferred from the fact that Accused 1 had an extra-marital affair with

Accused 2 and desperately wanted to get a divorce so that they could marry each

other. There is clear motive to get rid of the deceased. The deceased was not agreeing

to the divorce so they both went to Accused 1 place ‘to settle the situation one final

time’.13

iii. Nature of Injuries inflicted were sufficient enough to cause death.

10. An injury “sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death” essentially

means that the death will be the most probable result of the injury having regard to the

ordinary course of nature. The word ‘likely’ means ‘probably’, and can easily be

distinguished from ‘possibly’.14

11. It is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that in the case of Keher Singh v. State

(Delhi Administration),15 it was laid by the court that the post mortem is very

important where the cause death is to be established and the matter is of controversy.

Also, the post mortem report is a valuable piece of information and does not require

any other formal proof. 16 The Post mortem report here states the cause of death to be

the Injuries on the Skull, also, there is Humerus Fracture, A-C Joint dislocation, etc.

12. When there are repeated blows or attempts at taking a person’s life, there can be said

to have existed an intention on the part of the inflictor to kill the other person.17 The

11
Exhibit No. 4, Post Mortem Report, p. 19.

12
Schedule H, The Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, No. 23, Acts of Parliament, 1940 (India).

13
Proposition, Witness Statements, p. 13.

14
A.G. Bhagwat v. U.T. Chandigarh, 1989 Cri.L.J. 214 ¶ 17.

15
A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1883 ¶ 42.

16
Bhupinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1988) 3 S.C.C. 513 ¶ 13.

17
Ramesh v. State, 1979 Cri.L.J. 727 ¶ 28.
MEMORANDUM ON THE BEHALF OF PROSECUTION
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grave nature of injuries caused to the deceased implies that they could not be self-

inflicted. Both the Accused went to the place of Accused 1 on 01.11.2017 with the

intention of killing the deceased to accomplish their motive. 18

13. Moreover, in the absence of any circumstances to show that injury was caused

accidentally or unintentionally, it is presumed that there was intention to cause the

inflicted injury.19

14. Where there were various injuries on deceased, the medical expert held that these

injuries could not be caused in the case of suicidal poison or due fall on a hard

substance, and the case was of forcible administration of poison. The court held that

prosecution has rightly proved murder.20

15. Similarly, in a case where the cause of death was due to administering Potassium

Cyanide (poison), the Post Mortem Report indicated Lacerations, Abrasions, bruises,

the court held that the nature of injuries is not such that can be caused by fall or self-

infliction, hence the Prosecution case was called to be well supported and conviction

was sustained.21

16. In another case of death caused by Cyanide poisoning, the circumstances of the case,

the possibility of suicide was ruled out since there were external injuries on the

body.22 In the present matter, the injuries23 such as fracture, joint-dislocation, bruises

on face and forearm, injuries on skull are indicative of the fact that these are

intentionally inflicted by Accused 1 and Accused 2 on deceased to ensure the death of

the deceased and are not suicidal.

18
Proposition, Facts established before the Court of Law, p. 38.

19
Daya Nand v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 2008 S.C. 1823 ¶ 17.

20
Shanmughan v. State of Kerala, 2012 2 S.C.C. 788 ¶ 12.

21
Prakashkumar Jayanti Lal Gandhi v. State of Gujarat, 1992 Cri.L.J. 462 ¶ 27.

22
Ramesh Kumar v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 945 ¶ 6.
23
Exhibit No. 4, Post mortem Report, p. 16-18.

MEMORANDUM ON THE BEHALF OF PROSECUTION

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I-B. OFFENDER KNOWS THAT THE ACT IS LIKELY TO CAUSE DEATH.

17. 'Knowledge' has been defined to mean information and skills acquired through

experience or education. 24 When the knowledge of particular consequence is backed

by will to cause such consequence, intention is said to have formed. 25

18. Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender’s knowledge

of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim is sufficient

to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. 26

19. Where it is proved by the medical evidence that the injury was fatal and sufficient to

cause death and the death was direct result of attack, the accused could be imputed

with the knowledge of the death. The conviction of accused under Section 302 was

proper.27 The Supreme Court has held that there are four conditions that are needed to

be proved for the conviction of Accused in the case of administration of the toxic

substance.28

i. Motive of the Accused

20. Motive may be relevant to proof and the prosecution may prove the motive for a

crime if it helps them to establish their case, as a matter of circumstantial evidence. 29

In present case, the motive is clearly established. The Accused 1 and Accused 2 were

engaged in illicit relationship with each other. They wanted to ‘get rid of the

deceased’ to marry each other as she was a “barrier”. 30

24
Sanjeev Nanda v. State, 160 (2009) D.L.T. 775 ¶ 224.

25
D ORMEROD, SMITH AND HOGAN’S CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 2009).

26
State of A.P. v. R. Punnayya, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 45 ¶ 15.

27
Rewaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1978 Cri.L.J. 858 ¶ 9.

28
Sharad Birdichand v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1622 ¶ 164; see also Bhupinder Singh v.
State of Punjab, (1988) 3 S.C.C. 513 ¶ 22.
29
Regina v. Williams, (1986) 84 Cr. App. R 299, CA.

30
Proposition, Witness Statement, p. 12; see also Proposition, Investigation Report, p. 36.

MEMORANDUM ON THE BEHALF OF PROSECUTION

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ii. Deceased died due to administration of the poison.

21. In the absence of any circumstance to show that injury was caused accidentally or

unintentionally, it is presumed that there was intention to cause the inflicted injury.31

A doctor’s opinion is considered as an expert’s opinion32, and does not require any

formal proof. In this case, Accused 1 and Accused 2 went to the deceased house and

had a fight. The presence of liquid epinephrine in the body of the deceased is clearly

stated in the Forensic report. The drug Epinephrine can be lethal if taken in large

quantity.33

22. It is contended that the death by liquid epinephrine is caused by both the Accused.

The Medical Report of deceased explicitly laid down that deceased must not consume

epinephrine as it can cause anxiety and stress, which was a condition known to

Accused 1, his husband. Accused 2 is a cardiologist and has knowledge about the

over-dosage of epinephrine drug being lethal. Moreover, Accused 2 even has the

requisite skill to administer the drug in the vulnerable organ.

iii. Accused had poison in his possession.

23. It is pertinent to note that the epinephrine drug was not prescribed to deceased and the

Medical Report of deceased stated that it is not to be taken by deceased 34 for avoiding

stress and anxiety. In addition to this, this drug is a prescribed drug and cannot be

procured by anyone without prescription and there was no prescription found. 35

Therefore, the procurement is not done by the deceased. Heart specialist uses

epinephrine, high-dose epinephrine is harmful and is not recommended. Epinephrine

31
Daya Nand v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 2008 S.C. 1823 ¶ 17.

32
Section 45, The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1872 (India).

33
BETHESDA, M.D., American Society of Health System Pharmacists, A.H.F.S. Drug Information,
2009.t
34
Exhibit No. 12, Medical Report of Accused, p. 28.

35
Exhibit No. 15, Investigation Report, p. 36.

MEMORANDUM ON THE BEHALF OF PROSECUTION

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may improve return of spontaneous circulation, but does not improve survival to

discharge or neurologic outcome. 36 Accused 2 is a cardiologist, therefore, has access

to these medicines and thus the procurement of epinephrine for killing deceased was

done by Accused 2.

iv. Accused had the opportunity to administer the poison.

24. The circumstantial evidence in the present case has determined the link of causation

which proves that the act was committed by the person so accused.37 On 01.11.2017,

the Accused 1 and Accused 2 went to the house of deceased,38 the deceased was alone

at home, both the accused entered into an argument with the deceased for the divorce.

The same proves that Accused had reasonable time and opportunity to administer the

drug at a place where it would have maximum effect.

I-C. PERSON TO WHOM THE HARM IS CAUSED.

25. It is to be noted that, epinephrine was not prescribed to deceased. In the Medical

Report of the deceased, it was expressly mentioned that this drug was not to be taken

by the deceased39 for avoiding stress and anxiety, and implies that it was intentionally

used by both the accused to cause the death of the deceased. Aforementioned para 22

and 23 clarifies that deceased neither procured nor administered this drug. The

administration of particularly this drug is indicative of the fact that it was injected to

deceased as it assured the death of deceased in every circumstance.

26. Also, the drug has been injected intravenously40 where it has a maximum effect, a

36
Emergency Medicine Myths: Epinephrine in Cardiac Arrest, 52 THE JOURNAL OF EMERGENCY
MEDICINE 809, 812 (2017).

37
Naseem Ahmed v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 691 ¶ 10; see also Sharad Birdhichand State
of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1622 ¶ 150.

38
Proposition, List of Established Facts before the Hon’ble Court, p. 38.
39
Exhibit no. 12, Medical Report of Accused, p. 28.

40
Exhibit No. 4, Post Mortem Report, p. 18.

MEMORANDUM ON THE BEHALF OF PROSECUTION

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characteristic which is known to every cardiologist. The Post Mortem Report is an

extremely relevant and important document in cases brought under Sec. 302 of the

Indian Penal Code41 and the forensic report can also be relied upon to prove facts. 42

[II] THE ACCUSED 1 AND ACCUSED 2 HAVE COMMITTED CRIMINAL

CONSPIRACY IN FURTHERANCE OF COMMON INTENTION.

27. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Accused 1 and Accused 2 in

furtherance of the common intention [II-A] had committed criminal conspiracy to kill

Mrs. Aastha Singh. [II-B]

II-A THERE WAS COMMON INTENTION BETWEEN THE TWO ACCUSED.

28. Section 34 of the I.P.C. states that,

“When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of

the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that

act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.” 43

29. Before a person can be held liable under the provisions of this section, there is need to

establish the ingredients, that are,

A. There was a common intention in the sense of prior meeting of minds or pre-

mediated plan between the two;

B. The person in order to be held liable, he should have participated in the Act in the

furtherance of the common intention.

If common intention and participation are both present, this section would be

applicable.44

41
Sheo Govind Bin v. State of Bihar, 1985 B.B.C.J. 632 ¶¶ 14-17; see also Nagina Sharma & Ors. v. The
State of Bihar, 1991 Cri.L.J. 1195 ¶ 27.

42
Narendra Nama Das v. State of Tripura, 2009 (1) G.L.R. 856 ¶ 5.
43
Section 34, The Indian Penal Code, 1860, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

44
Chandrakant Murgyappa Umrani v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 1557 ¶ 1.

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i. There was common intention in the sense of prior meeting of minds or

pre-meditated plan between the two.

30. Common Intention means that when two or more persons intentionally do an act

jointly, it is same as if each of them had done it individually.45

31. In the present case, Accused 1 and Accused 2 had a clear intention to get rid of the

deceased Mrs. Aastha Singh as she was the only barrier between Accused 1 and

Accused 2, as stated by Accused 2.46 Also, both Accused 1 and Accused 2 wanted to

get married and deceased was not ready to give divorce to Accused 1, because of

which they had regular fights.

32. In such cases, the totality of circumstances must be taken into consideration in

arriving at the conclusion whether the accused had the common intention to commit

an offence of which they could be convicted. 47 As on 01.11.2017, A-1 and A-2

decided to settle the situation for one final time as stated by Accused 2,48 and hence

both Accused 1 and Accused 2 tried to kill the deceased by injecting the epinephrine.

In order to make it appear as a suicide, they even fabricated a false suicide note. It can

be concluded considering the circumstances in the present case that there was

presence of common intention between Accused 1 and Accused 2.

ii. The person in order to be held liable, he should have participated in

the act in the furtherance of the common intention

33. The expression “in furtherance of common intention of all” in Section 34 I.P.C., for

45
Md. Asir Ali v. State of Assam, 2009 (3) G.L.T. 817 ¶ 51.

46
Proposition, Witness Statement, p. 12.

47
Noor Mohammad Mohd. Yusuf Momin v. State of Maharashtra, (1970) 1 S.C.C. 696 ¶ 8; see also
Ramesh Singh v. State of A.P, 2004 Cri.L.J. 3354 ¶¶ 11-12; Balu and Ors. v. State (U.T. of
Pondicherry), 2016 Cri.L.J. 176 ¶ 12.

48
Proposition, Witness Statements, p. 13.

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the application of this section does not require, all participants in the joint act must

either have the common intention of committing the same offence or the common

intension of producing the same result by the joint act. It is enough if all of them

intend that the joint act be performed. 49

34. On 01.11.2017, Accused 1 and Accused 2 came to Accused 1 house50 on the pretext

of asking for the divorce, to which the deceased denied and therefore Accused 1 and

Accused 2 got into an argument with the deceased, wherein they tried to kill the

deceased by injecting liquid epinephrine in her body.

35. To which she opposed, then Accused 1 and Accused 2 got furious and started

violence which is also heard by P.W.151 and because of which deceased got severely

injured and then they successfully inject epinephrine and because of which she died of

drug overdose and injuries on the head.

36. Accused 2 was a heart specialist and knew about the Aastha’s condition through

Accused 1 and therefore was capable of pre-judging the condition which could have

taken place after injecting epinephrine. Also, the injection was injected directly in the

peri-cardial sac, in order to ensure that quick dead, which can only be done by a heart

specialist. It is enough if it is established that the criminal act has been done by one of

the accused in the furtherance of common intention. 52

II-B THERE WAS CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY BETWEEN THE ACCUSED.

• Section 120B: Criminal Conspiracy

37. It is pertinent to note that the punishment for committing criminal conspiracy is

mentioned in Section 120B, I.P.C. whereas in order to show conviction under this

49
Ibra Akanda v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1944 Cal. 339 ¶ 45.

50
Proposition, List of established Facts before the Hon’ble Court, p. 38.
51
Exhibit 3, Witness Statements, p. 6.

52
State of U.P. v. Iftikhar Khan, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 863 ¶ 31; see also Jaikrishnadas Manohardas Desai and
Anr. v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 889 ¶ 9.

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-Arguments Advanced- P a g e | 11

charge, it is important to refer to the ingredients of Sec. 120A, I.P.C.

• Section 120A: Definition of Criminal Conspiracy

When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done, an

illegal act, or an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an

agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy.53

Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an

offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act

besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such

agreement in pursuance thereof.54

38. The essential ingredient of proving criminal conspiracy is to show agreement between

two or more persons who were alleged to conspire, itself amounts to offence. 55 Before

a person can be held liable under the provisions of this section, there is need to

establish the ingredients of this section.

i. That there must be an agreement between the persons who are alleged

to conspire.

39. In order to convict the respondent’s guilty circumstantial evidence must be relied

upon.56 An agreement made between two or more accused persons wherein, they

become committed to co-operate for the definite accomplishment of the objective by

embodied means of the agreement, or by any means.

40. There was an agreement between Accused 1 and Accused 2 as per which they wanted

to get rid of the deceased by killing her, for which Accused 2 made a prior

arrangement of liquid Epinephrine. Accused 2 was a heart specialist and it was easy

53
Esher Singh v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2004 (4) A.L.T. 28; see also HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND
44 (4th ed. 1987).

54
Section 120A, The Indian Penal Code, 1860, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
55
K.S. Narayan v. S. Gopinathan,1982 Cri.L.J. 1611 ¶ 7.

56
State (N.C.T. of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 3820 ¶ 12.

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-Arguments Advanced- P a g e | 12

for her to procure the medicines without prescription, which was not possible

otherwise as it is a prescription drug i.e. it can only be attained, through a prescription

from a qualified medical practitioner.57 Moreover, Accused 1 and Accused 2 had

beforehand arranged a note from the diary of the deceased which they later used as a

suicide note. Thus, clearly establishing there was clear agreement between Accused 1

and Accused 2 for committing such a crime. Some connecting link or connecting

factor is enough for framing a charge. 58

ii. That the agreement should be for doing of an illegal act.

41. The evidence as to transmission of thoughts, sharing the unlawful design, may be

sufficient to prove the commission of Criminal conspiracy. 59 The act to get rid of the

deceased by killing her by severely injuring her and then injecting epinephrine in the

pericardial sac in order to ensure quick death, which could have only been done by a

qualified doctor or a heart specialist, Accused 2 in this case, is a cardiologist. And

thus, act committed was illegal.

[III] ACCUSED 1 IS LIABLE FOR GIVING FALSE INFORMATION.

42. The Accused 1 is liable for the offence of giving false information respecting an

offence committed.

43. Section 203 of I.P.C., states that,

“Whoever knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has

been committed, gives any information respecting that offence

which he knows or believes to be false, shall be punished with

imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to

57
Schedule H, The Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, No. 23, Acts of Parliament, 1940 (India).
58
Hardeo Singh v. State of Bihar & Ors., 2000 Cri.L.J. 2978 ¶ 10.

59
Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1883 ¶ 272.

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-Arguments Advanced- P a g e | 13

two years, or with fine, or with both”. 60

44. The essential ingredients to secure a conviction under Section 203 I.P.C. as laid by the

Court are as follows:

1. That an offence was committed;

2. That the accused knew or had the reason to believe that such Offence has been

committed;

3. That he gave the information with respect to that offence;

4. That the information so given was false;

5. That when he gave such information he knew or believed it to be false. 61

45. In the present case, (1) the offence of Murder was committed; (2) the Accused 1 knew

that murder was committed; (3) Accused 1 informed62 P.W.1 Pooja Mishra that

deceased has committed suicide. Also, Accused 1 pointed out false suicide note to

police officer;63 (4) the information given by accused regarding the offence and the

letter was false; (5) Accused 1 knew that deceased had not committed suicide, also,

suicide note which was pointed out by the Accused 1 was deliberately produced with

malicious intention, to make the Murder appear as Suicide.

46. Hence, all the ingredients as laid down in this section are fulfilled thereby making

Accused 1 liable under this section. To attract this Section 203, ‘information given’

must be ‘Voluntary Information’.64 In the case of Sarju Sonar v. Emperor,65 it was

held by the court that the word ‘information’ in the collocation of words ‘gives any

60
Section 203, The Indian Penal Code, 1860, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

61
Bhagguram and Ors. v. State of MP, (1986) Cri.L.J. 206 ¶ 24.

62
Exhibit No. 1, First Information Report, p. 4.

63
Exhibit No. 15, Investigating Report, p. 34.
64
Sarju Sonar v. Emperor, 11 Cri.L.J. 438; see also Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code 936
(31st ed.2006).

65
Ibid.

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-Arguments Advanced- P a g e | 14

information’ means the information volunteered by person. Such information can be

given to private persons as well as public servants. 66

47. Here, in the instant case, at 7:45 pm on 01.11.2017, the Accused 1 ‘voluntarily’ called

P.W.1 Pooja Mishra (private person) to inform that her wife, the deceased had

committed suicide.67 When the police came to the crime scene, the Accused 1

voluntarily pointed out to the ‘suicide note’68 on the table which indicates

‘voluntariness’ of the behalf of the accused. As, all the ingredients of this section are

proved, Section 203 applies and makes Accused 1 guilty for giving False Information.

66
Surinder Pal v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1723 ¶ 34.
67
Exhibit No. 1, First Information Report, p. 4.

68
Exhibit No. 15, Investigation Report, p. 34.

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-Prayer- P a g e | xii

PRAYER

Wherefore, in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the

prosecution humbly prays and implores before this Hon’ble Court of Session that:

1. Convict Shaurya Singh, Avantika Rana for the offence of Murder, Criminal

Conspiracy read with Common Intention under Sections 302, 120B r/w Section 34 of

the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

2. Convict Shaurya Singh for the offence of Giving false information respecting an

offence committed under Section 203 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

3. Impose appropriate punishment available under law.

AND/OR

Pass any other order it may deem fit, in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.

All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.

Date: sd/- _________________________

Place: Nehradun (COUNSELS FOR PROSECUTION)

MEMORANDUM ON THE BEHALF OF PROSECUTION