1

INTRODUCTION TO THEODICY

This section will deal with the following:

I. Theoretical Introduction.
II. Historical Introduction.
III. Notion of Theodicy or Rational Theology.
IV. Division of Theodicy.

I. Theoretical Introduction.
( theological problem )

Beings that are contained within the limits of our experiences –be they actual or
possible-, are either rational (men) or infrarational (the world); their sum total can simply be said
world, which is then taken to mean as the universality (sum total) of the theings that are
contained in experience.

Hence springs the problem:

Does the world have a sufficient explanation of itself or does it have this explanation
from and by another being, which then would be the supreme cause of the world?
Such a being which is supposed as the cause of the world, is commonly called God and
therefore its problem is called theological problem (Theos = God, logos= science).
The theological problem is a great problem of theoretical philosophy; for philosophy is a
science of all things through the supreme causes, that is, it does not only deal with this or that
class of things, but with the reality as such; for this or that things constitutes a partial or relative
reality, in as much as in the multiplicity of things each one thing implies a relation to the other;
but reality as such constitutes the total reality, in which a certain absolute is possessed, which
may offer an absolute or radical explanation –that is ultimate- of the world; therefore we can say
that Philosophy is the science of the absolute or is universal wisdom =philosophy is especially
metaphysics as a science that explains all things through highest causes). Hence the theological
problem can be stated thus:

Is the Absolute, the sum total itself of the things of experience or is it something outside
and above experience? Or in other words still:

Is the absolute immanent in the things or does it transcends them?

Gnoseology teaches and holds that our knowledge has a transcendent value insofar as
human knowledge is referred essentially to being which is not posited but presupposed by it; and
this is gnoseological transcendence. Ontology considers being in common inasmuch as the
notion of being transcend all notions; also it considers the transcendent properties and principles
having transcendent value: hence Ontology possesses a certain transcendence in relation to the
empiricity itself of things; but this transcendence is in line with the consideration of things which
are considered as being: therefore it is metaphysico-logical or considerative transcendence of
things.

It must be considered therefore whether the things could be transcended in themselves

insofar as besides themselves there could be another being; and this is transcendence which is
simply metaphysical), in which shines the greatest sapiential value of metaphysics.
From what has been said, it is clear that the theological problem can be stated in two
ways:
Inasmuch as –positing the existence of the world- it is queried of its Cause that can or could
explain it.
Inasmuch as it is asked: of what nature is the Absolute that is dealt with greatly in Philosophy.
In the former God is considered as Cause, and thus in the study of the causes (which
pertains to Ontology), the supreme Cause is considered; in the second way God is considered
in Himself as an absolute being in whom is the full philosophical consideration.
The first way is according to the mind of Aristotle, in whose doctrine God is considered
relationally to the world; the second way is according to the mind of Plato and the platonic
School, in whose doctrine God is considered directly in himself.
We, from the inspiration both Aristotelian and platonic philosophy and of our Christian
philosophy, consider together the theological problem as a problem of the cause of the world and
of the absolute being.

The Science of God is the most noble part of metaphysics; and more: it is
Metaphysics taken in its strictest sense, insofar as through it all beings are transcended and
through it the Absolute being is affirmed.

II. Historical Introduction.

Omitting all those that were taught in the pre-christian religions, the first who spoke
rationally and philosophically among the Greeks were Xenophanes and Anaxagoras: the former
spoke too obscurely about God: the latter posited Nous (mind) as the ordering power of the
world: however, God-of whom Xenophanes speaks,-and Mind, of which Anaxagoras speaks,
would seem rather to be something immanent to the things themselves (pantheism =+ theos, a
doctrine identifying God and world).

After these pre-socratic men Plato and Aristotle treated more clearly and truly about God:
Plato admitted above the sensible world ideas or intelligible world, so that among these ideas the
Good is eminent, but he also admits a certain “orderer” artifex of the world; the doctrine of Plato
is very noble, but he did not speak expressly enough of God as a most perfect being.

2
 Aristotle holds with Plato that the material cause of the world is eternal and unproduced;
however, in order to explain the movement or mutation of the things, he admits a supraworld
cause of movement or Immobile Motor, which or who moves finally, that is by attracting, the
things of the world; but his Immobile Motor does not create things, dos not perceive them or
provides for them consequently.
Among the old philosophers are the Stoics, among whom eminently stands Seneca, who
beautifully writes about God, but in a pantheistic way conceives him like the rest of the Greek
Stoics (Zeno, Chrysippus). After the Christian era we have the neoplatonics (Plotinus) who
conceived God as One, from whom everything flows through emanation like rivulets from a
fountain (emanatism emanatistic pantheism).
By Christian revelation, contained in the Old and New Testament, God is conceived as
Being (“Qui est”, Ex.III:14), creator of all things, who knows all and provides for all things.
From here the Holy Fathers of Christian Teachings speak more clearly and nobly about God like
St. Augustine as one of them. In the Middle Ages God is the central object of philosophical
inquiries so that everything could be –would be clarified by God, through God and to God;
eminent among these philosophers are St. Bonaventure, who uses the intuitive or mystical
method, and St. Thomas who prefers the strictly rational method. Tractates on God according to
St. Thomas’ presentation –called Thomistic Treatise- can be said to be complete, so that few
things could be added for today’s studies.

Then from the XVI to the XVIII century the theological problem aside from the
scholastic philosophy has been treated in most diverse ways. Many admitted the existence of
God as distinct from the world (Descartes, Bacon, Locke, Malebranche, Leibniz, Berkeley, Vico,
Reid etc.), but they used different methods: R. Descartes proceeds from the idea of an Infinite;
Bacon and Locke from the world; Leibniz from the idea especially of God and necessary truths
that require divine intellect; Berkeley from the necessity of admitting other cause of perceptions
(=ideas) in us; Vico from the facts of history; Malebranche defends the immediate vision of God;
Reid holds the certitude of God from instinct.
Others (Hobbes, Bayle, hume, Lamettrie, D’Holbach etc.) deny the existence of God
(Atheism); others (Spinoza) held that God is the same substance of the world (pantheism); still
others held the existence of God but denied his providence as related to the world.
From the XVIII century on to our times we have the following: Kant denied that God can
be demonstrated by the human reason, because according to him our science is absolutely limited
to experience; but he conceded that the existence of God is a “postulate of the practical reason”,
that is, required by the practical life of man (sort of agnosticism).
After Kant, we have the absolute idealism that holds the Absolute as the sum total itself
of all the things of the world (immanentism, idealistic pantheism); then Materialism that teaches
that nothing can be obtained aside from matter (materialistic atheism); then, Positivism that holds
nothing can be known beyond experience (positivistic agnosticism).
Among those who admit God, some deny the capacity of human reason to demonstrate
his existence: traditionalists hold that the existence of God could only be held from the tradition
of the primitive revelation; sentimentalists, voluntarists, pragmatists, and modernists admit God
as the object which is required by the sentiments or by the good will or by action or by a certain
obscure subsconsciousness of man. Other, as the ontologists (Gioberti and –in some way-

3
Rosmini), attribute too much to reason, because they say that it has the capacity of intuiting God
or at least something divine.
Now-a-days the theological problem has a great consideration because there are many
atheistic and pantheistic doctrines that are being circulated and defended in different circles, such
as idealism, materialism, positivism, pragmatism etc., which deny the transcendence of the
Absolute Being and hence they teach immanentism. Existentialism is either atheistic (Heidegger,
Sartre) or theistic (Lavelle, Marcel, Barth, Scestov etc.); but even theistic existentialism is
irrationalistic inasmuch as it rejects the value of investigation or inquisition and rational proof.
Among those who admit God (spiritualists, Christians, Catholics) there exists a great
variety of methods in arriving at God: many reject the traditional method of the scholastic
philosophy which they call too intellectual like Blondel and his followers; many idealists
converted to Catholicism, especially in Italy, preferred the process, in admitting the existence of
God, that starts from the “Ego” or “I” and from its condition. The Scholastics however, although
as Catholics they greatly hold divine revelation and as men respected greatly the subjective
inclinations and feelings and exigencies, firmly hold that the theological problem must be
resolved through strict rational method that proves God’s existence and explains in some way
His nature.

III. Notion of Theodicy or Rational Theology.

The philosophical science that solves the theological problem by means of reason is
called Rational Theology; this is also called Natural Theology, because it makes use of the
natural light of reason and not the supernatural light of revelation. This is also called Theodicy,
which was first used by Leibniz to defend the providence of God against the objection posited by
Bayle: the term used by Leibniz indicated only the defense or justification of God (Oeos +
dikadzw = defense or justice or justification of God); after this, however, it was used to indicate
the whole tractate on God by means of the natural light of human reason.

Theodicy then or Rational Theology can be defined as: the Metaphysics of God (or the
rational science about God).
The material object of this part of philosophy is God; the formal object “qoud” is God as
the first cause and the ultimate end of all things, not God as the Father and Redeemer (such a
consideration of God pertains to revealed or sacred Theology); the formal object “qou” is the
most immaterial being in the third degree of abstraction or of the greatest intelligibility.
From the preceding objects we can deduce the distinction and importance of Rational
Theology in relation to all sciences and to all the other parts of philosophy.

4
 Due to the material object of Rational Theology it is distinguished from the other parts of
philosophy that ideal with the created things; and by its formal object “qoud” and “qou” it is
distinguished from Sacred Theology, which considers God as Author of the supernatural order
by means of the supernatural light of revelation.

The method of rational Theology is analytico-synthetic and in this way it is most

generally proposed: from the world to God and from God to the world, so that the world may be
better known as the sum total of the things created by God and governed by Him, according to
the following schema:

Nature of God
Ascension: *aaaaaaaaaaaa Descent:
from creatures from God to
to God creatures

aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

IV. Division of Rational Theology.

The theological problem can be loosened in three great questions as it could be dedeuced
from the preceding schema:
1. Does God exist?
2. What is the nature of God
3. What is the causality of God towards the world?

Hence we have three Chapters:

Chapter I. On the existence of God (against atheism)
Chapter II. On the nature of God (against agnosticism and pantheism)
Chapter III. On the causality of God towards the world (against panteism and deism)

Here then is the schema of the entire Rational Theology:

The necessity of demonstrating the existence of
God.
The essence of The possibility of demonstrating the exist of God
God: from world.
Demonstration of the existence of God from the

5
 world.
Metaphysical essence of God.
Physical essence of God.
Unicity of God..
RATIONAL The nature of Super-intellect of God.
THEOLOGY God:
Super-will of God.
Super-power of God.
Causality of Creation of the world by God.
God in relation
to the world
Concursus of God for the operation of the creatures.
Providence of God.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

A strictly rational certitude concerning the existence of God can be possessed in this life
in two ways:
1) by prescinding from the world or from beings contained in experience, so that the
affirmation of the existence of God could be had without any need of demonstration; or
2) by proceeding from the world and ascending to God through demonstration.
In the first case we have immediate certitude (=no mediation of a demonstration is needed)
and its manner would then be intuitive: hence its method is immediate or intuitionism. In the
second case we have a mediate certitude, that is a certitude obtained by means of or through the
mediation of a demonstration starting from beings of this world: this is dialectic (discursive)
method.
Immediatism (=immediate method) or intuitionism rejects demonstration whatsoever of
the existence of God from the world; but this differs from atheism holds that existence of God
can in no way be known and hence God does not exist; while immediatism holds that the
existence of God –which they admit- cannot be demonstrated from the world, because this
existence is known immediately.

Here, then, are the questions that must be solved:

1. Is the existence of God proved by the world’s existence?
2. Is the existence of God demonstrable by the world’s existence?
3. By what means is the existence of God demonstrated?

We have therefore three articles:

Art. I. The necessity of demonstrating the existence of God from the existence of the world.
Art. II. The possibility of demonstrating the existence of God from the world.

6
Art. III. The demonstration of the existence of God from the existing world.

Article I.

The Necessity of demonstrating God’s existence from the world

The intuitionistic method rejects strict demonstration or ascending mediation from the
world to God. However, we distinguish under this common denomination three kinds of
intuitionistic methods:

1. God exists because by our intellect we directly perceive –intuit- Him (intellectual
intuitionism, intuitionism, ontologism).
2. God exists because life itself (our feelings, actions, subconsciousness, our needs, the
cravings of the heart etc.) makes Him present to/in us (vitalistic intuitionism, which
irrationally approaches the problems of life and affirms the primacy of tendencies over
mere theoricity)
3. God exists because His existence clearly shows itself to us in the idea itself of Him
(rationalistic or aprioristicintuitionism).

Let us consider these singly:

I. Ontologistic Intuitionism is defended by Malebranche and Gioberti: they hold that the
intellect of man has for its proper or proportionate object God himself immediately
present –be it in His essence (Malebranche) or in His attribute as Creator (Gioberti).
For them –and for those who teach a certain intuitionism of God- the proposition
“God exists” is per se (in itself) known or immediately evident and therefore, it does
not need any demonstrative mediation: we have to remember that a proposition per se
known in the aristotelico-scholastic terminology is a proposition in which the
agreement of the predicate with the subject is necessary and independent from
experience.

II. Sentimentalistic Intuitionism id defended by those who hold the primacy of feelings
as a cognitive faculty over intellect (Jacobi, Schleiermacher, modernists…); and
pragmatic intuitionism is taught by the pragmatists and in various degrees by the
irrationalists.

III. Rationalistic or aprioristic Intuitionism is defended by those who infer immediately

God’s existence from the idea of God. Their argument is called from simultaneous,
because together with the idea of God that one has, immediately the existence of God
is deduced; this is also termed a priori argument because it affirms that God exists
independently of any consideration of the things; this type is commonly called
ontological argument.

The following are the salient historical forms of ontological argument:

7
 1) St. Anselm’s form: By the term God we understand that greater than which cannot be
thought of; but greater is that which is found in the intellect and in the thing than that
which is found in the intellect alone; therefore God is in the intellect at the same time as it
is in the thing,… that is, God exists.
In some way this argument of St. Anselm was accepted by St. Bonaventure and by Scotus.

2) The form of Descartes: “I have a clear and distinct idea of the Infinite as including and
containing all perfections. But existence is a perfection. Therefore God exists.”
This Cartesian argument is based on the rationalistic principle of his philosophy: We can
attribute to something that which appears to us in its clear and distinct idea: and this principle
springs from the rationalistic metaphysics of Descartes, according to whom the reality present to
the intellect is the idea from which is deduced from the extra-soul thing, that which we clearly
and distinctly perceive or intuit.

3) Leibnizian form. Leibniz objects to the Cartesian form by insisting on the possibility of
the idea of God first. His form is: God, insofar as a necessary being, is possible. But if
God did not exist, he would not be impossible, for he would exist through effection, i.e,
through production, and effection is unthinkable for a necessary being (for then God
would become impossible). Therefore God exist.

As could be seen, the ontological argument does not engage itself in explaining the origin of
the idea of God, which is in us, but rather it concludes from this idea in some way possessed, the
existence of God: it does proceeds through identity between the ideal order and the real order or
domain, that is, it is based on the principle of identity: it is called that transit from the ideal order
to the real order, i.e, from God as thought of to God as existing.
In the history of Philosophy the strongest adversaries of this ontological argument are St.
Thomas and Emm. Kant.

Against this intuitionistic method we have.

Thesis I.

The existence of God.

1. Is not an object of intellectual intuition.
2. Nor an object of vital intuition through feeling and action.
3. Nor it is proven by the ontological argument.

Proof of the thesis.

Part I. (God’s existence is not the object of intellectual intuition).

Arg. I. (Directly). The object of intellectual intuition ought to be proportionate or the proper
object of the human intellect. But the proper object of the human intellect is the intelligible in the
sensible. Therefore the existence of God is not the object of intellectual intuition (cfr.
Psychology, n. 60ss,).

8
 Arg. II. (Indirectly). If God were the object of intellectual intuition in the present life,
revelation would be rendered inutile, and, -still more-, mystery would be impossible. But to
affirm this is absurd. Therefore Ontologism ought to logically conclude or lead into rationalistic
naturalism or to the negation of revelation of the supernatural order.

Arg. III. The proposition “God exists” (=God is existing) is certainly per se known, because
the predicate “existing” is form the reason and essence (=from the concept as something
necessarily belonging to it) of the object “God”, but this is insofar as God is concerned: qou ad
se, and not qou as nos, i.e, as far as we are and our knowledge are concerned: we are knowers, no
doubt, but although in God his essence is the same as his existence, yet we in the present life do
not know or perceive this identity in an immediate manner.

Part II. (God’s existence is not an object of vital intuition through feeling and action).

Arg. I. Good will, feeling, action, life, etc. are important in disposing human reason to the
study of God: often they are occasion or motive of that study or desire to know; often also they
show the most firm adhesion to God; that is, they are more or less best subjective means
(psychological, personal, individual) of one’s disposition or adhesion. However, they don’t fully
satisfy the exigencies of the objective, certain knowledge which is required that the existence of
God be admitted by all.
This is so since through sentiment or action -abstracting from a strictly rational inquisition or
investigation- no other thing is obtained but a certain peace or rest of the tendencies which vary
according to the subjects, places, times and circumstances. And whatever is too variable cannot
have the value of objective certitude for all, always, everywhere and in whatever circumstances.

Arg. II. The method of vital intuition leads to immanentistic relativism or symbolism: that is,
God would be reduced to a certain fiction or to a certain name or term that is used for rhetorical
exercises of those who exalt the “value” or values of life, but take away intelligibility from life
and intellectuality from themselves (of life and reality of man).

Part III. (The existence of God is not proven by ontological argument).

If the existence of a thing is not previously evident, the leap from the ideal order to the
real is illegitimate, because then there would be a sophism from genus to genus. For in any
reasoning there is the rule: latius hos quam in praemissa conclusion non vult: that is, the
conclusion should never be wider in scope than the premises. Hence, if the major and minor of
reasoning are in the ideal level, the conclusion should also stay in the same order or level;
therefore the ontological argument is rather “a process or transit from the God thought of us
infinite to the God thought of as existing” and not to the God actually or de facto existing.

Article II.

9
The Possibility of proving the existence of God from the world.

The demonstration of the existence of God from the world is called “a posteriori”
demonstration or demonstration from beings of experience.
The possibility of this demonstration must be proven, because from the exclusion of the
intuistic method the possibility of the “a posteriori” demonstration cannot be inferred “ipso
facto”: for an atheist could reject any certitude about God –be it immediate are mediate certitude;
and excluding the immediate certitude, what remains is the mediate certitude, the value of which
or probative strength must an ought to be vindicated.

The possibility of the “a posteriori” demonstration is denied on account of various

reasons:
1) The Fedeists and traditionalist deny the possibility of demonstrating “a posteriori” God
existence because they deny the capacity of human reason and they only admit faith or
tradition as the criterion or medium of certitude about God.
2) Empiricists (the more rigid, like hume) and the positivist deny this possibility, because
they do not admit the possibility of knowing anything outside of the experience of the
phenomenon: theoretical agnosticism.
3) Kant denies the theoretical demonstrability or certitude about God because according to
him human knowledge does not show anything except the phenomenical reality through
construction by “a priori” forms.
4) All those who deny the transcendence of knowledge (like the idealist of whatever kind)
or its objectivity (like the phenomenalists) also deny the possibility of a posteriori
demonstration.

Against these, we have.

Thesis II.

1. The existence of God can be demonstrated by an “a posteriori” demonstration.

2. –what is more-, is ought to be thus proven.

Proof of thesis.

Part I (Existence of God can be proven by “a prosteriori” demonstation).

This part of thesis is proven by showing the possibility, the value and the mode or manner of
the “a proteriori” demonstration.

I. The possibility of “a prosteriori” demonstration is clear through those things we

already studied from the other tractates in philosophy.
1) Human knowledge has transcendent value; and this is direct opposition to absolute
idealism or idealistic immanentism (cfr. Gnoseology, n. 247-253)
2) Human knowledge has objective value: this is against phenominism (idem, n. 256-281)

10
 3) Human knowledge has theoretically absolute value: this is against relativism (idem,
n.236-242)
4) Human cognition possesses transcendental notions (being, cause, end) consequently
principles (of contradiction, of sufficient reason, of causuality, finality) having
ontological, analytical and transcendental value: this is against emperism, positivism and
Kantianism (vide ontology n. 354-356; 427-434; 436-438).
Human cognition shows or presents the world –at least within the limits of experience- as the
sum total of beings in process or in its state of becoming; and this is seen from the objectivity of
the sensitive and intellective knowledge.
Hence; admitting the certainty or the existence of thing in fieri “and admitting the
principles that imply the undeniable relation between the being in process or movement and the
being on which it depends, “a posteriori” demonstration is possible.
This possibility is natural to man because the proper object of the human intellect is
intelligible in and from the sensible. But the adequate object of the intellect of human is being in
all its latitude; hence it is a natural journey of the human mind to proceed from sensible things to
God; sensible things are considered as beings, and therefore the rise from experience to
metempricity becomes possible.

II. The value or the apodictical efficacy of the “a prosteriori” demonstrations certainly
comes from the value of the principles, under whose pressure sensible things are
considered. Certainly things are contingent; however, if they are considered under the
light of the metaphysical principles, they appear as necessarily dependent on a
Supreme Cause. The necessary nexus or connection between being “in feiri” or
becoming and cause shows the apodictical efficacy of “a prosteriori” demonstration.

III. The mode of demonstration is done in three moments:

1. The beginning of demonstration is taken from sensible things; but to prove the thesis
“God exists”, it behoves to have some concept about God’ for now this common nominal
concept –and this is also philosophical- suffices: by name “God” is understood the
Supreme Being.
2. The process of demonstration is made by two premises:
a) The prior premise indicates either a fact or a character of sensible things;
b) The prosteriori premise, meanwhile, is compose of two propositions, one of which is the
principles of causality expressed in various forms, and the other one affirms the
impossibility of a process and infinitum, that is, it excludes the possibility of not
terminating the process; the process is essentially metaphysical, for facts and things of
experience are considered as beings.

3. The end or terminus of demonstration is the thesis itself: “God exists” expressed in
different manners according to the diversity of fact that is assumed in the major premises.

Part II (The existence of God ought to be demonstrated by “a posteriori” argument or

demonstration).
This part of the thesis is rather against fideism and traditionalism.

11
 Arg. I. Existence and nature of sensible thing are sufficiently perceive by the human reason
and therefore ought to be sufficiently explained by the same reason. Now, if a prosteriori
demonstration were not possible, there would be no sufficient rational explanation of the sensible
things. Therefore a prosteriori demonstration ought to be possible.

Minor is clear from this that prescinding from revelation, the intuitionistic method is
insufficient to produce or give proof of the certitude about God’s existence.

Arg. II. “Ad hominem” against the adversaries can be established from the fountains of
revelations:
1) St. Paul expressly teaches: “Since the creation of the world, invisible realities, God’s
eternal power and divinity have become visible, recognize through the things he has
made” (Rom. 1:20).
2) The Church teaches that the existence of God “can certainly be known by natural light of
reason” (Vat. Council I, Denz. N. 1805).
3) St. Pius X teaches that the existence of God can be known not only generically, but can
be demonstrated (Motu proprio Sacrorum antistitum, 1910).Thus, the founts of revelation
proclaim the faith should be preceed by reason demonstration the existence of God.

Article III.

The a prosteriori demonstration of God’s existence.

The arguments used to prove the existence of God are classified by the Scholastics in
different ways: some distinguish the metaphysical and physical arguments; others present
cosmological and psychological etc. arguments… St Thomas in his works and especially in his
Summa Theologiae (I, 2, 3) and Contra Gentiles (I, 13; 15) proposes the five ways, which –we
can say- really constitute the synthetic exposition of all arguments which the traditional
philosophy of the Greeks and of the Holy Fathers of the Church commonly used; in thomistic
exposition, however, there is clarity and a clear reduction to the essential elements.
We will expose and used with commentary the five ways of St Thomas as apodictical
arguments commonly admitted and used by the Scholastics; however, other arguments will also
be adduced, the value of which is disputed among the Scholastics.

Hence, we have.

Thesis III.

GOD EXISTS

Proof of the Thesis.

12
 I. Apodictical Arguments.

I. The way of the movement (the first and more obvious way).
“it is a certain and clear to the sense perception that some things are moved in this world.
“Everything however that is moved is moved by another.
“Now this cannot (is not allowable, is not possible to) proceed in infinitum (=unto infinity,
without end).
“Therefore it is necessary to arrive at something that is the first mover that is not moved
by another (Immobile or Immovable Motor).

Commentary.
The major premise. In this first way “movement” is not taken to mean in the physical
sense as locomotion or local movement only, but in the metaphysical sense: for any mutation or
change from potency to act; but mutation can be substantial or accidental; accidental mutation is
either of place or of quantity (increase or decrease) or of quality (alteration).
The formula “it is certain and apparent to the senses” is the same as saying “it is certain
because it appears to the senses”, that is, it is clear from experience in which the senses and
intellect play an important role; in other words: mutation of the change of things is an
experiential datum or fact, from which St Thomas starts off his way.
To the first part of the minor premise. This is the principle of causality according to the
Aristotelian formula; however, while Aristotle speaks of finalistic motion (or attraction), St
Thomas speaks of efficient motion.
After the position of the principle of causality St Thomas shows its demonstrations
through the reduction of the principle of in potency, and what is moving is in act; if anything
would and could move itself, it would be at the same time in act and in potency according to the
same aspect, that is, it would be and not be in potency: and this is contradictory.
(Put in another way: “If I am here and want to go to there I must first have the capacity –
then next I must actually go. The first is called by Aristotle potency or potentiality; the second,
act or actualization of perfection…
Not only when I travel from place to place, but also any time something moves or
changes in any way, the same set of conditions must exist, namely: first the capacity or potency
for the move or change; second, the fulfilment or act…
We notice, too, that whenever there is a rise from potency to act, new, higher perfection
or being appears. Before, there was only a possibility or capacity of potency –afterwards, there is
an improvement- there is new being or higher being, as a result” (Fr. William G. Most, is there
God? Chapter 4, p.13).

To the second part of the monor premise. The process unto infinity (=to continye along a
long chain of beings that move and are moved) is an impossibility or is repugnant; for, if there
motion, which is carried out from experience, has no explanation. Process to infinity skips
explanation: (As long as we have beings that need help to get from potency to act, the problem
still remains. It is only when we come to a being that does not need help that we get an answer.
In other words, beings that cannot supply their own perfection cannot really explain things. For
that we need a being that needs nothing else. That being is the end in the series or long chain of
beings).

13
 As to the conclusion. Immovable Motor (kinoun akineton) must here be understood as act
that operates the train of the physical things from potency to act (= it moves others, so it is
motor), but itself does not rise from potency (=Immovable), for it does not have potency or
capacity to be reduced to act: hence it is Pure Act.

II. The Way of Efficiency or the Way of the effects or subordination of the efficient
causes.

“We find that in sensible things there is order of efficient causes.

“It is not possible that something be the efficient cause itself.
“But it is not possible, in a series of efficient causes, to proceed in infinitum.
“Therefore it is necessary to put a certain efficient first Cause: whom we call God.”

Commentary.
This way differs from the first: the first way considers sensible things inasmuch as they are
subject to change or mutation, while this considers then insofar as they operate or insofar as they
are efficient causes: or, in the first way there is a quasi mechanical metaphysics, while in the
second way what we have is a quasi dynamic metaphysics.

Major: that fact that is asserted in the major premise is the order or series of efficient causes
interdependent on one another; there exists a connection between the efficient causes, so that the
efficiency of one is subordinated to the efficiency of the other; for example, the efficiency of a
tree bearing depends on the efficiency of the soil, the rain, the sun, etc.

To the first part of the minor. This first is the principle of causality under the form of
efficiency; the form of St. Thomas’ “nothing is an efficient cause of itself” is equivalent to the
following formula: “every efficient cause that depends in effecting something, does not explain
it’s own efficiency by itself”, and briefly: “whatever is made, when and while it effects, is made
by another in it’s efficiency.”

To the second part of the minor. It is the same as in the first way.

To the conclusion. By the conclusion of the second way God is offered to us as the first
cause, the root fountain of all efficiency in the things of our experience. “and the first cause is
pure act, with no potency or potentiality mixed in, and therefore needs nothing else: that is why it
is first in the series of causes caused by it and dependent on it.”

III. The way of Contingency

“We find that in things some are possible to exist and not to exist.
“But it is impossible for all that are existing to be such… unless there something necessary in
the things.
“Now it is not possible to proceed in infinitum in the chain of necessary things that possess a
cause of its necessity.
“Therefore it is necessary to posit something that is per se necessary: and this we call God.”

14
 Commentary.
This way is distinguished from the preceding one because, while the way of efficiency
looks at things inasmuch as they are efficient, the Way of contingency looks at things in their
entity or structure of being: They are and they have the capacity not to be, and many others are
not (existing) and they have the capacity to be (existing). The contingency of things (=they
happen to be) can be seen from their origin (or generation) and corruption (=destructions); that
is, the sign of contingency is generation and corruption.

To the major: the major is equivalent to the following proposition: certain contingent
things exist within the ambit of experience.

To the first part of the minor. Not of that are or exist can be contingent; for those that are
contingent proceed from non-being to being (from non esse ad esse), and hence St Thomas says:
“for sometime they are not”; thus, if all things were to be contingent, “sometime –order was a
time that- nothing was in the sensible things”; and consequently, since they could not rise by
themselves from non-being to being, “also now there would be nothing”; but since now we know
that contingent things are today existing, then not all things are contingent, but that there must
exist a necessary being.
As it becomes clear, this part of the minor is the same principle of causality under the
formula: contingent being requires a necessary being.

To the second part of the minor. If the necessary beings (=incorruptible, celestial bodies)
have the necessity from themselves, then one has not to proceed to look for some other being that
would give their existence; but if they do not have the necessity from themselves (=if they have
somewhere the cause of necessity of their existence), then they must depend on another to
account or their actual existence.

To the conclusion. In this conclusions God is offered to us as a being per se (by itself)
necessary, that is, as a being having from and by itself its necessity of being.

IV. The Way of the Degree of beings.

“We find in that things something more or less good, more or less true and noble…
“But more or less are said of different things according as they approximate diversely
something that is the greatest.
“Therefore there is something that is most true, and best, and most noble and
consequently it is the greatest, supreme being.
“But what is greatly said as such in a certain genus, is the cause of all that are of that
genus or kind.
“Therefore there exists something that is the cost of the existence (esse) of goodness and
of whatever perfection that can be found in all things. And this we call God.”

Commentary.
This Way is distinguished from the preceding ones, because this way does not consider
beings in mutation or change proper or in efficiency or it is entity, but in their relation insofar as
there exists a hierarchy or gradation in the possession of perfections.

15
 To the Major. It is the clear that the gradation or gradation of the major or minor
perfection is in the transcendental perfections (entity, unity, truth, goodness) are quasi
transcendental perfections (life, nobility, to understand, to want, to know, etc.); the material
perfections (heat, color, odor, etc. are not considered, nor the categorial perfections (substances,
accident, animality, humanity), for these do not admit of “more or less” in perfection.

Hence then is the major: there exists in things gradation of truth, unity, goodness, entity,
etc.

As to the first part of the minor. The measure of greater or lesser cannot be understood
unless in its relation to the greatest, because more or less is said inasmuch as there is more less
appropinquation to the greatest. Here is the principle: a being through participation asks for a
being essence; thus a more or less perfect thing asks for the most perfect being.

To the first conclusion. This coincides with Plato’s ideas of suprasensible beings that are
most perfect; and since in our thomistic philosophy the good, the true… are convertible with
being, therefore that which is most one, most true, the best… coincides with that which is
supremely or in the greatest degree being (which we could call: the beingest, the most real being,
essentially being).

To the second minor. The argument that is concluded by the preceding proposition
reaches to the most perfect and is of merely platonic character, as it considers the states of beings
in gradation. But St Thomas wishes to put also a causal connection or a dynamic between the
participating beings and the imparticipated, and therefore arrives in argument, at the most perfect
being as casing the participating beings, by adding another minor: the most perfect is the cause
of the participating beings.

This causality of the most perfect being is the first of all an exemplar causality, then it is
also efficient and causality, for graduated perfections –and consequently limited- are not and
cannot be from themselves (a se): for perfection which is from itself is not limited (since an act is
limited through potency, not by itself) ; hence it is caused by another, and so we say that the
most perfect being is the cause of those that participate that perfection.

The fourth way then is the synthesis of Platonism and aristotelism: Platonism is found in
affirming that the existence of the greatest being is deduced from the existence of the beings that
have hierarchical perfection; aristotelism is found in affirming the causal relationship between
the participating beings and the unparticipated being.

To the second conclusion. The conclusion of this way shows as God as being
unparticipated causing other participating beings, i.e. beings that are diversely graduated in
perfection.

V. The Way of Order

16
 “We see that certain things that lack knowledge, namely, the natural bodies, operate for
an end or a purpose .
“But those lack knowledge , do not tend towards an end unless directed by one that is
knowing and intelligent.
“Therefore a certain intelligent being from whom all things that are naturally ordered
proceed, exists, and this we call God”.

Commentary.
The Fifth Way is distinguished from the preceding ones because it considers things in their
relationship, not insofar as entitative degrees of perfection are concerned (as the 4th way ), but
insofar as the operations are concerned that are regulated by an end or a purpose. This argument
is also called physical, because it proceeds from nature that operates according to an end; thus it
is also called teleological (telos = end).

The Major Premise. This takes note that the things of nature function towards an end or
operate because of an end, that is, with order. This is clear from the “a priori” principle of
finality, but , most especially this is seen from the scientific study of astronomy, chemistry,
biology and psychology.
Finality can be considered intrinsically or extrinsically, intrinsic finality is directed
towards the operations of the things in themselves; while extrinsic finality considers the
operations of the things according to the connection that exists between them. St. Thomas notes
in the Major premise explicitly the intrinsic finality, however, the argument can be completed by
considering both finality from which springs the order. Order is defined by St. Augustine as “The
disposition (arrangement ) rendering the even and uneven things their proper places” (Decivit,
Dei, XIX, 13). These even and uneven things are different things, according to the pythagoric
terminology; the disposition that gives each thing it proper places requires a common end
towards which all things are harmoniously ordered.

The minor. This is the principle of causality under the formula: every effect requires a
proportionate cause. For order requires an intelligent being to be understood or known or to be
produced, for order embraces the following:
a) Elements to be ordered;
b) An end towards which they are to be directed;
c) Relations and laws according to which the elements are ordered towards an end.
These three –but especially the last two- need an intelligence because an end as an end,
relations and laws pertain to the conceptual order and consequently it is supersensible.

The conclusion. The conclusion explicitly must end with a certain orderer even if it be finite
as the intelligent cause of the order; but from the analysis of order and finality it is argued clearly
that the cause should be infinite. For the order is the highest and in it are contained also men who
are endow with intellect and freedom, from whom such an order cannot flow or come; therefore
what is required is a cause most highly intelligent; besides, intrinsic finality is so intimate to the
entity of things that the cause of finality must also be the cause of the entity; for the cause of
entity, as it will be seen below, ought to be a creating power and therefore infinite.
Therefore the giver of order (ordinator) of things is an infinite being or supreme: God.

Note: The five Ways of St. Thomas can be presented synthetically in one argument:
17
 Things are mutable, that are dependently efficient causes, contingent, gradated in
perfection, ordained in operations towards an end.
But these mutable….things required a cause.
Therefore there exists a Being that is Pure Act, First Cause, Necessary Being, Most
perfect Being, Most highly intelligent. And this we call God.

II. Confirmatory Arguments

Now we will consider certain arguments as confirmatory which usually are added to the
five Ways of St. Thomas. Some are simply confirmatory insofar as they confirm the certitude
acquired through the apodictic arguments; others, however, are -according to our opinion-
apodictical arguments; but since there is controversy as to their demonstrative value, we propose
them as at least confirmatory.

1. The argument based on eternal truths.

This argument proceeds from the possible or intelligible essences (or ideas and necessary
enuntiables). This is called by different names: ideological argument (Descogs), argument from
the possible (shaaf), from the foundation of the possibles (De Raeymaeker), from absolute
necessity of truth.
Here now is the syllogism:

There are truths (=objects and enuntiables of the intellect) that are necessary, immutable
and universal (in other words: they are eternal at least in a negative sense).
But these kind of truths require an intellect.
But again such an intellect cannot be the human intellect nor any created intellect.
Therefore there exists a supreme Intellect or supreme Intelligent Being.

As can be seen, this argument is the same as that which is based on the basis of the
possibles (cfr. Ont,. n. 387); only here what is considered is the existence of God and not the
ontological foundation of truth.

2. The Eudaemonological Argument.

This argument proves the existence of God from the innate desire for happiness in man (eu +
daomonia). Here is its form:

In man is a fundamental desire for happiness, which cannot but be fulfilled or satisfied.
But the fulfillment of this desire be had by means of objects that, although good, are
imperfect.
Therefore, there exists a perfect Good that is the object of the human happiness: God.

The major premise of the argument expresses an undeniable fact for all men (cfr. History of
Religions).

In the minor premise it is stated that the desire cannot be satisfied through imperfect goods.
The reason is: man can tend and in fact tends towards imperfect goods; however, since he
18
possesses the concept of good as such 9good without limit), he cannot be satisfied with imperfect
goods, because these goods do not adequate the good as such.

The conclusion, taking into consideration the insufficiency of the imperfect goods, infers the
existence of a perfect good, which perfectly satisfies the desire of man.

Those who retain the strength of the argument reduce it to the 4th way of St. Thomas ,
because they see in it the process from imperfect goods to the perfect good; but Manser and Gred
do not accept this reduction, because the cause that is properly dealt with in the argument is the
final cause and do not the efficient cause nor the exemplar cause.

St. Augustine extolled this argument (see his: “Lord, you have made us for Yourself… and our
hearts are restless until they rest in you.”). Also Kant holds this view, but he denies the true
demonstrative value of this argument and he proposes it as a more postulate of the practical
reason.

III. Deontological argument.

This argument proceeds from consciousness of the obligation or moral law (deon = duty
or obligation). Here is its formula:

There is in man a moral law with its absolute imperative: good must be done, evil must
be avoided.
But any law requires a lawgiver.
And this lawgiver is not immanent in the world, that is, it cannot be a single person nor a
political society or State.
Therefore, there must exist a Lawgiver that transcends the world: and this we call God.

The major premise states a fact that is admitted by all; this is called by Kant himself “the
Fact of reason”.
The first minor is evident.
The second minor is proved by the following:
This legislator cannot be a single person (=individual man), for otherwise it (he or she)
would be the superior and subject at the same time, and hence can free himself from the same
law established by him…; and in this case law would lose its meaning of law (=for then it would
really not be a law if it does not bind);
The legislator cannot be a political society, because society itself, if it wanted to
legitimately command, ought to base its right to command on moral law: we know that moral
law does not presupposes a State, but rather it is the State that presupposes moral law from which
it takes its legitimacy.
For those who admit the moral law, this argument is apodictical.

IV. Ethnological argument.

This starts off from the consensus of mankind or of peoples (ethnos = people), who for
basic truths of fundamental importance (as the existence of God) is a sufficient criterion of truth
or certitude. Here is its formulation;
All peoples admit –at least morality- the existence of certain supreme being, whatever
would be his nature.
19
 Now, the consensus of mankind in elementary truths necessary for life is a criterion of
truth and certitude.
Therefore a supreme being exists: God.

The major is clear. The minor would not demonstrate anything if the consensus of
mankind would spring from prejudices or from fraud committed by Heads of the People or priest
or from or ignorance or from fear or social pressure or force.
However, it can in no way be proved that humankind –or account of those reasons in
such different places and times could posit quasi unanimously a consensus in only one truth; for
1) Prejudices are varied for every people; they are from avarices;
2) Fraud could not be so universal (time and place);
3) Ignorance explains nothing, since most learned men admit of the existence of
God;
4) Fear does not suffice, for even the strong fearlessly admit the existence of God;
and always God is not considered as a tyrant, but as a good and provident
legislator;
5) Social pressure or force (this theory is defended by the French Sociological
School: Durkheim and Ley-Bruhi) proves nothing, since it could not produce
interior certitude. The modern tyrants (and atheistic communists) could in no way
succeed in uprooting this faith from the heart of the people they rule or oppress.

V. Arguments of lesser import:

1) From the origin of human soul. The human soul, or account of its spirituality,
cannot take its origin except by and through creation (vide: Psychology) ; this is
reduced to the 2nd and 3rd ways.
2) From the origin of life. Living things cannot come out through spontaneous
generation (vide: Cosmology, 297) therefore it asks for creation.
3) From miracles. We observe facts which are beyond and over the order of nature;
therefore, no natural being can effect them; therefore, a Transcendent Cause is
needed to explain them. This argument is also called Thaumatological (thauma =
event), and this is similar to the second way.
4) From entropy degradation of energy0. The sum total of energies posses from the
actual state (or movement or transitus from the present state) to the potential
movement or of heat (cfr. Thermodynamics; and Cosmology, 201). Now if the
world would have no origin, then the actual energy would have been exhausted
already. Therefore the world had originated from a certain Supreme Being.
This argument (also called entropological) coincides with the 2nd and 3rd ways.
5) From mystical experiences. Mystics do bear witness to a special communion with
the divinity and bear testimony is certainly worth of trust. Therefore God exists.
(this argument was very special for Bergson, and coincides with the Ethnological
argument).

Judgment about this second kind of arguments.

20
 Argument I, II, III (from the eternal truths, from the innate desire for happiness, from
consciousness of moral law) seem to be apodictical, whatever reduction many would propose to
the 4th way of St. Thomas.
The fourth argument (from the consensus found in mankind) has a lesser apodicticity
than the others: but it serves best to acquire certitude about the existence of God a s a general
confirmation of the other arguments.
The arguments under I, II, III Participate in the apodicticity of the ways, in which they
coincides; the argument of the 4th is rather a confirmation from sciences; the argument from the
5th is a special and the best case of confirmation from the consensus of mankind.

Scholion I.

Kantian Critique (crisis)

In this critica rationis purae (transcendental dialectic) Kant, in order to prove the
impossibility of the methapysics about God (Theologia rationalist), subjects the arguments
adduced to demonstrate the existence of God to a crisis or critique.
Before he institutes his critique, he reduces all arguments to three according to the three
principles.
1) From the principle of identity he posits the ontological argument which implies
dogmatically the identity between the ideal order and the real order.
2) From the principle of the Causality. He places the Cosmological argument, i.e. the
argument that proves the existence of God from the world, which is considered as
effect (so this argument is equivalent to the 1st and 2nd of St. Thomas)
3) From the principle of finality he posits the physico- theological argument or the
way of order

And after putting all this classifications he rejects the aforementioned arguments. Before
reputing the Kantian Critique, we note that the argument called physico-theological (the way of
order) is not based on the principle of finality, but on the principle of Causality, as also all the
other arguments: even the 5th way proceeds from the experience of the order of the world…
Let us see what we can say against and about the Kantian Critique.

I. The Kant rejects the ontological argument because in it there is a big jump in the
ideal order to the real order: this is illegitimate or illogical.
We surely go with this Kantian Critique; but prior to this Kantian position, St.
Thomas has already strongly rejected such argument.

II. Cosmological argument.

1) Kant exposes this argument to prove the existence of the most real being (God) in this
way: If

21
anything exists, there must also exist a being absolutely necessary. Now, something must also
exists (at least I exist). Therefore there exists a being absolutely necessary. But now, a being that
is absolutely necessary is most real. Therefore a most real being exists.
Kant’s argument is a polysyllogism, i.e. consisting of two parts: the first part is an a
prosteriori argument and concludes to a being absolutely necessary; the other part is an priori
argument like the ontological argument, because from the concept of being absolutely necessary
it deduces the existence of a being most real. Therefore there is a fallacy or sophism in this
argument.
The ontological argument intends to prove the existence of God from the concept of God
itself; while in the cosmological argument such existence is sufficiently proven when we arrive
at the being absolutely necessary, although afterwards the other attributes of God are inferred
from the concept of such a being.

2) Kant insists by saying that the ontological argument is always present I the cosmological
argument, and he proceeds this way: If the following proposition is true: -that a being
absolutely necessary is most perfect, its converse must also be true, at least “de facto”,
i.e. that a most perfect being is a being absolutely necessary or necessarily exists; in this
argument, from the concept of a most perfect being is inferred its necessary existence,
and hence we have the process of the oritological argument.

3) Kant still insists that the principle of causality does not prove the existence of God
because it has no worth beyond experience; but our response is taken from those things
that we learned from and about the transcendental value of the principle of Causality in
Ont., n.434;

4) For Kant to accept a process in infinitum is not absurd or repugnant.

Our answer is: that process to infinity may not be repugnant as long as we admit a series of
infinite causes, and only to place this series of infinite causes as a sufficient explanation of
causality; but then, even if we admit this infinite series which for us is impossible its causality
still remains to be explained. We always have to have the First Cause to explain the other
causes...

5) Kant further holds that a being that is absolutely necessary, inasmuch as it is not caused,
contradicts the principle of causality; for according to him this principle states; whatever
exists has a cause.
The answer to this is taken from the true metaphysical concept of the principle of causality. If
the principle is understood in its physico-deterministic sense, that can be stated as: “whatever
exists has an antecedent cause”, then this is true for the physical phenomena; and in this sense all
phenomena have a rigid connection with one another, in such a way that one is a cause of
another which in turn is caused by another still... But in the metaphysical sense this principle
runs thus: “Whatever is made or produced is produced or made by another (quidquid fit ab alio
fit), without limiting or modifying this “by another”, which is the cause; this “other” then can be
caused (as happens in physical determinism) or uncaused (as it is applied in or to the
transphysical and supreme being): in our case, the existence of God places God as the
transphysical uncaused cause, because otherwise there would be no sufficient explanation of the
efficience of the wordly causes.

22
 6) Kant concludes his Critique by saying that the concept of a necessary being is so elevated
above experience that it becomes impossible.
Our answer is based on the concept which we actually have about God as we will see
afterwards.

III. Physico-theological argument.

1) Kant says that the physico-theological argument is an argument by analogy which
proceeds like this: as a watch asks for a maker, so also the order of the world requires
someone responsible for its order. But, Kant continues, an argument by analogy is only a
probable argument. Therefore from the order of the world the existence of God is not
proved demonstratively.
Our answer is: when certain authors adduce the analogy of the watch (and of other things
that require an artifex) they are using certain example for clearer exposition of the argument;
but the argument from order, considered in itself, is not based on analogy: order as such
always requires an orderer or ordinator: and this is the strength of the argument, and it is
apodictic; analogy is used only as an intuitive aid or tool to help the mind of the unlearned.

2) Kant continues saying that the physico-theological argument leads to the ordinator, and
not to the creator; therefore not to God.
Our answer is that finality is so intrinsic and essential to the entity of things that he who
has given the finality must be also given the entity of things or must have created them.

3) Kant also insists and says that since order is finite, the ordinator can be finite. Therefore
the argument does not lead to God.
Our response: is that although the way of order may lead to the orderer proximately and
directly, however, since the ordinator is also the creator; indirectly the orderer is found to be
infinite.
In other words: the way of order by itself leads to the ordering power; however, if the
concept of the orderer is subjected to an analysis, the orderer as discovered by an a prosteriori
demonstration, ought to be the creator and therefore infinite.

Scholion II.

ATHEISM

Atheism is a state of mind or a doctrine that denies the existence of God (a + theism).
Atheists can be practical or theoretical:
Practical atheists are those who, although in doctrine admit the existence of God, in real life
are living or acting as though for them. God does not exist; the theoretical atheists are those who
in doctrine do not admit of the existence of God.

23
 Theoretical Atheists are either negatives or positive:
Negative atheists do not have any concept about God or simply they deny that God exists;
while positive atheists do have a concept of God by deny however or place the existence of God
in doubt.

Practical atheists visibly do exist, as could be gleaned from the daily life of individuals and
of people in general; this sort of atheism is rather a product of a depraved will, that despises and
rejects the moral law as imposed by God and neglects the duties of religion.

As to theoretical atheism the following can be said:

1) Negative atheism can be held or given, but not for a long time, especially in the present
state of human culture; even in the primitive peoples certain idea about God is held and
revered at least in adult life.
2) Positive atheism can be and in fact is given, as can be seen in the history of Philosophy;
atheists are materialists of old, like Democritus, Lucretius, and the modern materialists
who oppose true religion and admit religion of science (scientism) as E. Haeckel… and
propagate religion of the state as in the case of communist countries.
It can be disputed whether positive atheism is culpable or not. Concerning this question we
say the following : better than we do God knows whether individual atheists profess atheism in
good faith or not bad faith; certainly not all are atheists for a strictly theoretical motives , rather
on the whole many do profess atheism from practical motives influenced by a weak or weakened
or wounded and stained will.
Atheism is a great evil for science or life be it individual or social; the certitude about the
existence of God is opposed to vices ; hence bad will is opposed to the inquisition about God and
on the other hand, negation and denial of God increases bad faith. Hence on the whole positive
atheists are likely culpable.

Chapter II

THE NATURE OF GOD

Prenotes on the concept of God

1) A concept of God is possible to us.

From the five ways of St. Thomas God is shown to us a Pure Act, First Cause, a per se
Necessary Being, Supreme Being , Order of all things, Thus we know that God exists, but at the
same time we know in some way also “quid sit ”what he is; but insofar as we can we must more
intimately inquire into the nature of God.

Nature in philosophy is the same as essence considered as the principle of operation; hence
consideration of God’s nature entails also the consideration of God’s essence and operations.

24
 Now, can we have some concept about God? The answer is affirmative, because God is
certainly and at least a being; but a being in tits whole latitude is the adequate object of the
human intellect; therefore, a certain concept of God is possible to us.

II. Our concept of God is a proper concept taken from the common concepts.
Still it is asked: What kind of concept can have about God?
Certainly not a proper concept ,Because proper concept is had about or of things that are
contained withing the ambit of the proper object for the human intellect: This proper concept
(intuitive or quidditative idea) is possessed when a certain thing is directly perceived in itself or
in another of the same nature: God however is not the proper object of the human above and
beyond experience.

It is neither a common concept; For common concept is had when a thing is known in the
notes that agree with it and with others of the same kind: The concept of man insofar as animal is
a common concept, that is an obscure and confuse idea; Thus the concept of white insofar as
color is a common concept; In like manner, if we would know God only as being, His concept
would also be common.
About God we know that he is Act, Being, Cause, the First, the order, Immovable, Supreme
etc.: these however can be said as common to God and to the other things if they are taken
singly; things can be first or greatest in certain group or kind, can be act, being, order etc.;
however, if common notes are united or joined to form certain unique or single concept ,then the
concept is proper of God; that is, what would be had is a proper concept from common notes,
inasmuch as a collection of proper notes applicable to God alone.

It is clear that proper concept from the common is an analogous concept (abstractive idea;
but not abstract one), insofar as concept that we form for ourselves from the empirical things
metaphysically considered, are attributed to God not according to identity, but through analogy
(through approximation).
God is therefore cognoscible or intelligible to us; hence absolute agnosticism is fals .
However, God is not visible (not intuible) either through the senses or through the intellect
(intellectual intuition of God is excluded by the doctrines about the proper object of the human
intellect).
Besides, although He is cognoscible (foe He is a being and is contained with the ambit of the
adequate object of the intellect), God is incomprehensible to the human intellect: for to
comprehend is the same as to know something exhaustively (whole and entirely) or as it is
cognoscible. But God, as he is infinite, cannot be known exhaustively by a finite intellect, be it
the intellect of the angles or of men; therefore he is incomprehensible. In heaven the angles and
the blessed have an intuitive vision of God through the light of glory, but in now we can they
comprehend God.
Being incomprehensible by the human intellect, God is also innefable, that is, there is no
name that can worthily and adequately indicate to us his nature.

III. Our concept of God is obtained in three ways.

It is further asked: How is an analogous concept acquired?

25
 By progressing from empirical things. Empirical things are considered by us metaphysically,
that is, as beings, and not as, for example, as bodies, as form, as matter; from the characteristics
of things metaphysically considered we have the concept of God by means of the triple method
of way:
1) By way of causality; empirical things have perfections that can be called
transcendental; entity, unity, truth, goodness, wisdom, activity etc.; God is the
cause of the empirical things; therefore, by way of causality, the perfections
of empirical things are proven to be present in God eminently.
2) By way of remotion: empirical things imperfectly possess –the perfections;
therefore they have imperfections: finiteness, composition, mutability,
temporeity, multiplicity, measurement by space and time etc.; imperfections
are removed or denied in the concept of God, who is said then to in finite, in-
composite (simple), in-mutable, in-temporal (eternal) and in-mense (not
measured).
3) By way of eminence or by excess or excellence: empirical things possess
perfections, which however are subjected to limitations: limited science,
goodness, power etc.; these limitations are taken away and the perfections are
attributed to God in an eminent way; God then is said to be supper-knowing, -
good, -powerful etc.

Therefore God has the transcendental perfections of creatures or of the beings caused by him
(by way of causality), but without the imperfections (by way of remotion) and in a more eminent
way (by way of eminence). Hence our concept about God is negative-positive concept: as to the
thing it is in itself positive, but as to the manner it is partly negative and partly positive.

IV. Our concept of God is composed of his attributes (Perfections).

The perfections, which we attribute to God in order to have an analogous concept of him, are
called attributes; and an attribute can be described as: a perfection that constitutes the essence
and operations of God, according to our human way of conceiving God.
Note the phrase; according to our human way of conceiving God, for in God, as we will
discuss later, all things are one through absolute identity and simplicity; but the human reason, in
order to perceived something about God, conceives him by using many concepts; thus our
concept of God is certainly true, but only it is analogous and imperfect.

God’s attributes can be divided in many ways;

1) Absolute and relative: the first ones are attributes that describe God in himself
(infinity, simplicity etc.); relative attributes are those that consider God in
relation to the empirical things (creator, conserver, provident).
2) Absolute attributes are divided into negative and positive attributes; the first are
attributes that are obtained through remotion and the latter through the way of
eminence.
The negative attributes indicate to us rather the essence of God and therefore are called
essential attributes, so that they are absolutely incommunicable to creatures. The positive
attributes show us rather the operations of God and therefore they are called operative attributes,
so that they are, in some way and imperfectly only communicable with creatures.

26
 This chapter then on the nature of God consist of two sections:
Section I. On the essential attributes of God.

Section II. On the operative attributes of God.

Section I.

The essential attributes of God.

We ask the following questions in this section:

1. In what does Deity consist or what is the fundamental attributes of God? This is the
question on the metaphysical essence of God.
2. What are the determinations of the divine perfection? This is the questions of God’s
physical essence.
3. Is there only one (unicus) God or many gods must be admitted? This is the question of
the unicity of God.

Hence we have three articles:

Art. I. The metaphysical essence of God.
Art. II. The physical essence of God.
Art. III. The unicity of God.

Article I

The metaphysical essence of God.

I. Notion and position of the question.

The essence of a thing can be considered physically or metaphysically.
Physical essence of a thing is its essence considered insofar as it exists and is composed of
those perfections which belong to the thing; metaphysical essence is that by which the thing is
first constituted in itself, through by which it is distinguished from the others and which is the
root of all that are conceived of a thing (cfr. Ontology, n. 377 of J. di Napoli).
Let us take for example man: his physical essence is that he is a rational animal, free, moral,
religious, social, progressive, endowed with speech, risible etc.; inasmuch as he is a rational
animal, man is constituted in himself, distinguished from the other things and possesses the root
of all the properties: he is then free, moral, religious etc. because he a rational animal.
It is clear then that the metaphysical essence in things is that by which a thing is defined and
therefore it is constituted through the proximate genus and specific difference, which together
constitute a species. In order words: metaphysical essence is the note strictly constitutive of a
certain thing; and the physical essence includes the species and those things that are proper to it
and which flow from the species, such as for man his freedom, morality,religiosity etc. that from
his rationality; or in another way: the physical essence is the sum total of the constitutive
(metaphysical essence) and consecutive notes.

27
 Metaphysical essence then is a fundamental, radical, primary, central attributes of a thing;
this is also called the metaphysical constitutive of a thing.
Applying now to God the concepts of metaphysical and physical essence, of course always in
accordance to our way of thinking (and therefore in an analogical way), we want to know what is
his fundamental attributes that may show us the essence of the Deity, that would distinguish God
from other things, and that this attributes is the root of all divine attributes.
Therefore: that attribute could only be understood as the metaphysical essence of God of it
be:
1) Substantive, that is it is not something added to the essence of God, but something
to which others are added or inhering.
2) Distinctive, that is it distinguishes God from the other beings, without any
possibility of confusing God with the others;
3) Radical, that is, it has to be the root or spring of all the other attributes of God, so
that in the concept of God there be no insulation of simple collection of attributes,
rather every other attributes is derived from this one.

II. Doctrines,
As to the essence of God the following doctrines are proposed:
1) Occam and the nominalists place the essence of the Deity in the aggregation or cumulus
of all perfections; in other words, according to the nominalists the Godhead is constituted
from actual infinity. This doctrine flows from gnoseological nominalism, which holds
that universal is nothing but a collection.
2) Scotus and the scotists, as they hold that being is a nation logically univocal, find no
other thing in God that would distinguish him from the other beings except his infinity:
God is being infinites; however for the scotist actual infinity the actual possession of all
perfections) is the physical essence of God, while the metaphysical essence of God is the
radical infinity or the right to or exigency of all the perfections.

3) The thomists place the physical essence in the collection or sum total of all perfections;
as to the metaphysical essence, they are divided into:
a) Old thomists (Jhon of St. Thomas, Gonet, Salmanicenses hold that the metaphysical
essence of God is constituted by the actual super intellectuality or that to understand itself
is most actual and subsistent, by which God knows himself; that is: Deity is constituted
by actual super intellectuality.
b) other thomists (Ferre, Godoy) hold that metaphysical essence of God is constituted by the
radical super intellectuality of God.
c) the thomists of the XIX century place the metaphysical essence of God in aseity, that is
from himself-ness, or in this that God is a being from himself, and not from another being.
4) More recent thomists almost commonly hold that the metaphysical essence of God consist
in that God is His being subsistent in himself, “ipsum suum esse subsistens.”
The last doctrine is the one we also hold and for its understanding certain things must be
noted.

The doctrine, according to which the Deity is constituted by this that God is his being
subsistent in himself, means the following: God’s existence (to be or esse) is not received in his
essence as an act in potency, but it subsists in itself; namely, it is an act not received in potency-

28
essence and not-receptive of other acts: nor is it received in potency nor is it potency in relation
to other acts, the essence of God does not have “to be” or existence, but is existence: hence the
essence of God is the existence (esse) itself as subsistent: existential essence and essential
existence. Thus being participially taken or “to be” is an essential predicate of God alone: other
beings (finite or created things, creatures) are having “to be” or existence, and they are not their
existence or “to be”.
So then we state:

Thesis IV.

The metaphysical essence of God (Deity or Godhead) is constituted through this

God is his subsistent existence –“to be“-itself.

Proof of the Thesis

Arg. I. (Indirectly from refutation of other doctrines).

The metaphysical essence of God must be understood as something substantive,

distinctive and radical. But that which is posited by other doctrines is not something substantive,
distinctive and radical. Therefore that which is posited or proposed by other doctrines is not the
metaphysical essence of God.
Minor is proven by parts:
1) Actual infinity or collection of perfections constitutes the physical essence of
God or his facto essence; it rather indicates the fact of infinity than something
radical of it, which is the root of the fact.
2) Radical infinity or right is something that possesses itself rather adjectively
not substantively, because right or exigency supposes subject or being that has
right. However this radical infinity can be accepted as a universal character of
all the divine perfections, because all the perfections of God are infinite.
3) Radical or actual intellectuality is in like manner possessing itself adjectively
because it also supposes a being that has intellectuality. But, if God is
conceived as a being as operating or living, actual intellectuality is his proper
character, for intellectuality is the supreme degree of life and immanence.
4) Aseity is rather conceived as something negative, which supposes something
positive; for, why is God from himself and not from another? Yes, because he
is existence itself: he does not have, but is existence (to be); hence he does not
receive existence.

Arg. II. (Directly).

The which is understood as substantive, distinctive and radical in God constitutes his
metaphysical essence. But subsistent existence (esse) itself is understood as something
substantive, distinctive and radical in God. Therefore the subsistent existence itself constitutes
the metaphysical essence of God.

Proof of the minor. The subsistent existence itself is understood as

29
 1) Something substantive; for it is not understood as something coming on or
springing from or having itself subjectively;
2) As something distinctive; for through this God is distinguished from things
which are not their existence, but have or receive their existence;
3) As something radical; for from this that God is understood as subsistent
existence itself all attributes are easily inferred through analysis.

Note this. The argument is confirmed by revelation in the Old Testament, in which (Ex.
III, 14) God says of himself; “I am who I am”; this name God for himself when he sent Moses to
the people: “He who sent me”
Here are the attributes; simplicity (in-composition), infinity, in-multibility, in-mensity,
eternity (in-temporeity); thus the essence of God conceived as that which is his subsistent esse or
being itself, and hence having all the perfections without any composition (simpilicity) and in the
greatest degree (infinity), so that it could in no way be changed or moved (immutability) as to
space (immensity) and as to time (eternity).
Let as examine these attributes singly:

I. Simplicity.
Simplicity is the attribute that indicates in God the absolute negation of whatever
composition. This simplicity can be threefold according to the threefold composition.
1) Physical simplicity is the negation of physical composition, which is
constituted by essential (matter and form) or quantitative parts.
2) Metaphysical simplicity is the negation of metaphysical composition, which is
had from metaphysical entities: potency and act, essence and existence (esse),
substance and accident, nature and suppositum.
3) Logical simplicity is a negation of a logical composition that is from
proximate genus and specific difference, from whose composition springs or
comes the definition.

II. Infinity
Infinity is the attributes that indicates in God the possession of all perfections without
limits: an infinite being is a most perfect being and hence most perfectly good: for being is good
insofar as it is perfect, and it is perfect inasmuch as it is in act.
As the concept of infinite is had from experience through the negation of any limitations, it
must be shown how the perfections of the creatures are found in God. And to solve this question
perfections are distinguished in the following ways:

1) Simple perfections are those that in their concept include no imperfection whatsoever: to
be (esse), to live, to understand, to want, to loved; of these it is said that it is better to
have them not to have them.
2) Mixed perfections that are perfections which in to reason out etc.; in one word: mixed
perfections implied potency be it in matter or outside matter.

From these we say:

30
 1) No perfections is predicate of God and of creatures univocally, because nothing is
univocal between being whose essence is his subsistent esse and the being which happens
to be.
2) All perfections of the creatures are predicated of God eminently or in the highest degree.
3) Simple perfections are attribute to God formally and eminently, that is, in conformity
with their concept but in the highest degree.
4) Mixed perfections are attributed to God virtually and eminently, that is insofar as in God
there is something (his perfection) that is equivalent to the perfections of the creatures
and insofar as God can create them or cause them through his eminent power… but
always in an eminent manner; thus it is said that God contains virtually the reasoning
power or matter inasmuch as God is capable of giving both the reasoning power and
matter.

III. Immutability.
Imutability is an attribute that indicates in God are radical negation of whatever kind of
mutation or change; we say “radical negation”, because in God is excluded not only a de facto
change (immutation), but also de jure and radically any changed is excluded: God is not only not
changed, but he cannot be changed (immutability).

Mutation or change, as we know, is the rise from a certain to another. There are many kinds
of mutation which can be considered in relation to God:
1) Intrinsic and Extrinsic mutation: the first is true change of thing in itself as, for example,
generation, corruption, calefaction, etc.; the latter is rather a change of denomination
insofar as the changed is another thing, from which different denominations come; what
has been always said: anyone changes his position near the column, he alone is changed
and not the column; the column however, is diversely denominated and it is said to be
previously at the right side and afterwards at the left side of the person. On account of the
change of the individual a change is also attributed to the column, but here what is rather
dealt with is extrinsic changed or mere denomination.
2) Intrinsic mutation is either physical or moral: physical changed is mutation in the
constitution itself of a thing or in the decrease of the will.
3) Physical change can be proper or improper: 1) proper change is that in which there is a
new form from a certain subject (substantial changes, as generation and corruption, and
accidental changes): in proper change is that in which there is subject receiving the new
form creation, in which there is annihilation, in which there is a change into non-subject
or into the nothingness of subject, are in proper changed or changes that are improper
called.

IV. Immensity.
Immensity is an attribute indicating in God a negation of limitation by space; limitation
or measurement can be either circumscription or definition, so that thing be in a place
circumscriptively or definitively.
Immensity can be considered virtually or actually; virtually it is an absolute attribute of
God, which namely is considered in God without supposing the actual existence of the world;
actually it is the relative attribute of God, insofar the existence of the spatial world is supposed,

31
to and in which God is present. Virtual immensity is usually or simply called immensity while
actual immensity is termed omnipresence or ubiquity.
In short: immensity is the omnipresence to and in the spatial possible world, ubiquity is
omnipresence in the spatial actual world; hence God is not measured (immense) also to a non-
existing. God is a space not circumscriptively nor definitely, but simply in determination insofar
as there is no limit in his presence; hence it is also said usually that God in the world
“repletively” containing, as it were, and filling all things but not contained by things.

V. Eternity.
Eternity is attribute indicating that in God there could be no succession whatsoever: a
negation of before and after. This is also called duration (permanence in being or existence)
without beginning, without end and without succession; most famous is the definition given by
Boethius; interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possession (directly: a possession in which is
perfect and at the same time entire [without any succession] of an interminable life [=which
cannot have a beginning (terminus a quo) nor an end (terminus ad quem).
The following is.

Thesis V.

God is
1. Absolutely simple,
2. Infinite in all perfections,
3. Immutable,
4. Immense,
5. Eternal.

Proof of the thesis.

Part I. (God is absolutely simple).

The subsistent being itself is absolutely simple.
But God is subsistent being itself.
Therefore God is absolutely simple.
Minor is clear from the preceding thesis. The major is proven according to the varied species
of simplicity:
1) The subsistent being itself includes metaphysical composition from act and potency, from
essence and existence… hence it is excludes composition.
a) Of substance and accident, because accidents is referred to substance as act to
potency:
b) Of nature and suppositum, because suppositum completes nature adding to it its
individuation, subsistence (suppositality) and accidents (in creatures); thus that
by which God is God (Deity, Divine Nature) is identified with that by which God
is “this God” Deity, God and this God are really and truly one and the same.

32
 2) The subsistent Being Itself excludes physical composition from form and matter, because
form is referred to matter as act to potency; hence God is not a body and has no
quantitative parts; he is not the form or soul of the world; thus immediately pantheism is
excluded.

3) The subsistence Being Itself also excludes logical composition from proximate genus and
specific difference for in the logical order specific difference is referred to proximate
genus as act to potency.

Note well: Certainly the notion of being is transcendental, and in like manner the notion of
subsistence also: they transcend every genus and every difference; and God is Subsistent Being
Itself; therefore He has no genus nor difference.

Part II (God is infinite in all perfections).

A subsistent Being Itself is infinite. But God is the Subsistent Being Itself. Therefore God is
infinite.
The minor is obvious. The major is also evident, because, as we already know, an act is
limited through potency; hence the Pure Act is pure Perfection without limitation. St. Thomas
this to say: “from this therefore that God is existence itself subsisting by itself, it is fitting
that He contains in himself all perfection of existence (S.T., I, 4, 1, ad 3).
Furthermore, esse or existence as such, implies no limitation; it finds itself limited as it is
received in an essence, which is distinguished from it as potency is distinguished from act; pure
act is esse or existence and hence unlimited.
Together with infinity God possesses goodness, because the concept of goodness coincides
with the concept of perfection.

Part III (God is immutable)

Arg. I. A subsistent being itself is immutable. But God is the Subsistent Being Itself.
Therefore God is immutable.

The minor is obvious. The major is clear from this that a subsistent Being Itself excludes any
potency and hence any intrinsic mutation be it physical or moral: it does not begin to be, it does
not cease, is not corrupted, is not annihilation, is not created, does not change volitions.
It does not only exclude a de facto mutation, but also a radical or in radice mutation, because
potency is the root of mutability and mutation; and as there can be no potency in God, so there
could not be any root of mutability in Him.
Only extrinsic or denominative mutation can be attributed to God, because this mutation is a
mutation of a mere demonstration, not a mutation of the thing: from this that the other things are
changed by God, different denominative are attributed to God, too.

Arg. II. An infinite being is immutable. But God is an infinite being. Therefore God is
immutable.
The major is obvious since that which possesses all perfections cannot be changed, either by
acquiring or losing perfections.

33
 Part IV (God is immense)
Arg. I. A subsistent Being itself is immense. Now God is the subsistent Being Itself.
Therefore God is immense.
The major is clear from this that a measured being is limited by space is in potency to have a
presence from place to place either circumscriptively or definitively: but a subsistent being itself
can in no way be limited in space be it possible or real.

Arg. II. An infinite being is immense. Therefore God is immense.

The antecedent is clear from that an infinite being excludes all limitations; therefore it also
excludes the limitation of place.

Arg. III. An immutable being is immense. Therefore God is immense.

The antecedent is obvious from this that limitation from place or space implies mutability.

Take note. Here immensity is proven as an absolute attribute of God, that is, as an attribute
of God who is considered in himself; ubiquity or omnipresence ought to be proven after the
consideration of the divine operation, since this itself is founded on the causality of God; God is
present to all because he is at work in all. However from this that God is the universal Mover or
Motor, the First Cause and Orderer, his ubiquity is implicity affirmed.

Part V (God is eternal)

Arg. I. The subsistent being itself is eternal. Therefore God is eternal.

The antecedent is proven from this that a Subsistent Being does not begin nor cease to be nor
has it any succession, because it is an Act received and not receptive, i.e. an Act that is tor
received cannot begin nor cease to exist; and an Act that is irreceptive does not have succession.

Arg. II. God is infinite, immutable, immense. Therefore He is eternal.

The consequence is clear from this that a being that is subject to time is limited, mutable,
measured in space in which it has succession.
The eternity of God is no other than His immutability in time or “qouad tempus”, insofar as
time is considered: hence it is not only that God is eternal, but due to His greatest simplicity, God
is His eternity.
God’s eternity, which is positive eternity or absolute permance in being as absolute
<<now>>, must be distinguished from negative aternity of the metaphysical essences or ideas or
universal and necessary truths, which is rather a logical state that prescinds from time. Positive
eternity or eternity of the immutable Being has a full ontological value and supposes the negative
eternity of the divine intellect, which is the fount and the place of all possible (thinkable) things.

34
 Scholion I.

The distinction of God’s attributes.

Among the attributes of God there can be no real distinction; this is due to the absolute
simplicity of God: everything in God is reduced to Existence, to which nothing is added or can
be added.
Between the essence and existence of God then there is only a distinction of the
reasoning reason which is rather a nominal distinction.
Between the attribute there is a distinction of the reasoned out reason or virtual
distinction, but loosely precisive or, as others say, virtual minor distinction: the reason is because
divine attributes are many concepts that imply one another as implicit and explicit: once one is
posited the others are posited implicitly, so that nothing may be required except the analysis to
render explicit that which is implicit.

Scholion II.

The relation between eternity and time.

Eternity, as we know it, is absolute now; since however our concepts are directly taken
from sensible things, things that are subjected to time, there is always an image of a certain
indefinite succession mixed to the concept of eternity; but this image is not a true eternity,
although it may participate the intermination of eternity. On account of this we speak of eternal
essenses –because the prescind from time-, of eternal City –since it perdures in time-, of an
eternal fire, of eternal punishment, of eternal affection etc.
Eternity, as it does not have before and after, cannot coextend with time: however
because eternity is duration it coexists with time, in such a way that the past and the future of
time are present to eternity. Thus Christ himself says of himself in the Gospel: “Before Abraham
was, I am” (Jn. 8:58).
Hence eternity is something uniquely intelligible, not imaginable; the coexistence of
eternity and time (insofar as eternity contains and has the time present to it in its absolute
presentiality) does not imply identity. Imagination can be aided in understanding the coexistence
of eternity and time by the help of a circle: all the points of a circle (A,B,C,D…) that succeed
each other, are respectively past and future; the unmoved center, which is joined through
equidistant and equal radii the peripheral points of the circumference, is eternity:

Article III.

The Unicity of God

Being simple, God is certainly one; we immediately add however that he is unicus, the
only one, so that there could be no other God besides himself.

35
 Against the uniqueness or unicity of God there are two oppositions: the opposition of
those, who admit a plurality of God’s or many highest and supreme principles (opposition by
excess) and opposition of those, who exaggerate the unicity of God by identifying Him with the
world, (opposition by defect).

I. Excess is present in dualism and polytheism:

1) Dualism can be considered strictly in a philosophical manner and more expressly in a
theological way:
a) Philosophic Dualism holds the existence of two eternal principles, that are
God and eternal manner; this is the common doctrine among the Greeks of old
(even in Plato and especially in Aristotle, among the stoics) and the gnostics
in the second century after Christ.
b) Theological dualism holds two highest principles: amongst two good
principles and a most evil principles; this is the doctrine of the manichaelism
of the Persian manete (III century after Christ); this teaches that the two
highest principles are in constant opposition with each other in as much as the
highest good principles is the cost of all good and the highest evil principle is
the cost of whatever evil there could be. Manichaelism invaded northern
Africa and has been defended by a certain sect (like a Church with her
Bishops and with the communion of the members), in which for sometime St.
Augustine was counted among its adherence and defenders. Afterwards
Augustine left the sect and wrote many works against the manichaelism.
2) Polytheism is a quasi doctrine of the people in the olden days and of the forest
dwellers of are times. Polytheism has many forms; Demonolatry (cult of the
geniuses), zoolatry (cult of animals), antropolatry, sabaeism (cult of the stars or
astrolatry), feticism (cult of rivers, of the earth, of the idols) etc.

Many discussions have been going on among the lettered people as to origin of polytheism
and as to what is first monotheism or polytheism; recent ethnologists commonly hold that
monotheism is prior to polytheism.

II. Defect in Pantheism

Pantheism (pan + theos = all God) is a doctrine of those who deny that true real distinction of
God from the world. It used to be called monism also (monos = alone), although one can teach
monism without being a pantheist when one tries to reduce everything to unity without thinking
of God (ex. g. the philosophy of Parmenides is monistic but not pantheistic, insofar Parmenides
does not speak of God).
De facto, however, since, monism does not distinguished the absolute from the world,
monism is always pantheism.
Kinds of Pantheism in the history of philosophy:
1. Static pantheism holds the world is constituted by God who is the formal principle of
the world or its whole substance:
a) Stoicism holds that God is the constituted principle of the world or that it is
sole and form of the eternal matter.

36
 b) Spinozism holds that God is the only substance of the world; God is the
essence of the world (=God or Nature) and the world is the intrinsic
manifestation of God; hence God is the selfsame naturans (constituting) while
the world is natura naturata (constituted).According to Spinoza there are many
attributes of God but we only know of thwo, namely, extension and cogitation
all things of the world are modi or modes by which the cosmico-divine
substance is determined and purified according to these two attributes: ex .g.
bodies are modi of extension, souls are modi of cogitation.
2. Dynamic Pantheism holds that the world is an emanation or evolution of God:
a) Emanatistic Pantheism holds that the world is emanated from God or has its origin
from God through communication of substance:as a rivulet coming from a spring , a
son from the father , a web from aracne ,so the world emanates from the substance
itself of God .This doctrine is found in Brahmanism, neoplatonism
(Plotinus,Porohyrios ,Proclus),perhaps in Sctous Erigena (IX century after
Christ ),almost certainly in Jordan Bruno.
b) Evolutionistic Pantheism holds that the world is an evolution of God: such is the
doctrine of absolute idealism (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and their followers );and thus
also, at least in his first books , is Bergson’s position: among the old philosophers
strongly figures Heraclitus.
Omitting the treatise an polytheism which is not a philosophic doctrine, we have against
dualism and pantheism the following:

Thesis VI.

1. There is but one God.

2. Who is distinct from the world.

Proof of the thesis.

Part I. (There is only one God

A. Directly in itself.

Arg. I. The subsistent being itself is unique (i.e. there could be no other than it).
But
God is the subsistent being itself. Therefore there can be no other God.
The major is clear from this that the very subsistent existence itself excludes the
composition of essence and existence :existence is purified or multiplied if it is received in
essence distinct from itself, insofar as distinct essences render distinct existence that is received
in them: if existence is the very essence of a certain thing, then there would be no plurification of
it: the principle is always the same: act is limited and purified through potency or potentiality;
hence, as form is plurified or individuated through matter signed with quantity, in like manner
existence is plurified through essence.

37
 Arg. II.A simple being is unique. But God is absolutely simple. Therefore there is one
God (unique).
The major is obvious from this that absolute simplicity excludes any composition from
suppositum and nature; hence in God that by which God is God (divine nature or Deity) is the
same as that by which God is this God (a divine individual); hence, as an individual is
incommunicable and unique, so also is nature; God is unique because this God is unique (i.e.
incommunicably singular).

Arg. III. An infinite being is unique (there cannot be but one infinite being). But
God is infinite. Therefore God is unique (there is but one God).
The major is clear from this that, if there would be many infinite beings, one should be
distinguished from another by this that one would have something that the other would not have;
and then they would not be infinite anymore.

Arg. IV. An immutable being is unique. And God is immutable. Therefore there is
but one God (unique).
The major is seen from this that if there were many gods, one would be in potency to the
perfection of the other and hence that god would undergo a change; but an immutable being
excludes any kind of change.

B. Indirectly by refuting dualism.

Arg. I. Philosophical qualism is proved false for, if God were to depend on matter in His
operation. He would not be Pure Act and Subsistent Being.
Arg. II. Manichaean dualism is false because it is absurd, enept, useless and pernicious:
1) Absurd. For evil is the privation of God, i.e. a non-being; hence the highest Evil
would be the highest non-being; and a highest non-being in no way can be cause because,
otherwise, it would be a being as cause and non-being as evil; thus there would be a
contradiction in the concept of the Highest Evil.
2) Inept, in order to explain evil in the world. For the two principles are either equal or
unequal in virtue or in active capacity; if the good principle is superior, then there would
be no evil in the world; and if the principle of evil is superior, then there would be no
good in the world; if they are equal, they would be destroying one another in the effects,
because they are essentially at odds with each other within the same ends of the world.
3) Inutile to explain evil, because evil is caused by the good per accidens, or indirectly, that
is, by a being on account of the defect either of the agent or of the subject on which the
agent is operating (Ont., n. 353).
4) Pernicious, because, if evil is attributed to a principle very highly evil, then the freedom
of man is destroyed, and so also which imputabilty, merit and demerit, prize and
punishment.

Part II (God is distinct from the world).

38
 Pantheism is already refuted from all that up to now have been said about the existence and
essence of God; however the importance of the question and the presence of the pantheism
during our times in materialism and idealism urge that some special treatment be given to it.

I. Pantheism contradicts the first metaphysical principles:

1) It contradicts the principle of contradiction:
a) If God is the form of the world or constitutes the world, the world would be become an
absolute being; and this contradicts the characteristics of contingence and mutability that
are found in the world.
b) If the world is an emanation of God, it would then have the attributes of God; and this
also contradicts the characteristics of the world; if the parts or components of the world
are finite and contingent; besides, emanation, as it is q communication of substance,
requires a divisible substance; and this contradicts the divine simplicity.
c) If the world is an evolution of God, then God is imperfect and mutable, because what
evolves is an imperfect being; but, God is infinite and immutable.

2) It contradicts the principle of causality:

a) It cannot be denied that there is becoming in the world; therefore if God is constituting
the world, the becoming of things will have no cause that would truly explain it.
b) If God evolves into the world, his evolution remains unexplained; for evolution in
mutation, and mutation requires a cause outside itself.

3) It contradicts the principle of finality:

a) If the world is a necessary emanation of God, then there is no explanation of why a
supreme Being would emanate itself into imperfect beings even into matter which
according to the neoplatonics is essentially evil.
b) If the world is an evolution of God, so much so that becoming be its essence, then there is
no way of understanding what could be the end of this evolution: for evolution entails
essentially as tendency towards an end or implies an absolute relatively or relationship
towards something that renders it intelligible: an evolution without end or finality is
intrinsically contradictory, because it would be evolution and at the same time non-
evolution.

Section II.

THE OPERATIVE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD

By way of remotion we know the attributes of God, attributes that are conceived by human
mind as essential; by way of eminence we know the attributes of God, which are conceived by
the human mind as operative. For God is conceived –and He ought to be conceived as a living
being; for the greatest degree of life is intellectual life that comprises the intellect and will to
which is joined power.

39
 Thus we have three articles:
Art. I. The super intellect of God.
Art. II. The super will of God.
Art. III. The super-power of God.

Art. I.

The superintellect of God.

That God intelligent is seen clear from the way of orders; on the other side his infinity
requires that in him be found all perfections of the creatures, among which is intellectuality;
besides, the degree of intellectuality follows the degree of immateriality (cfr. Psych.. n. 88); as
God is most simple, he is in the highest degree of immateriality, and therefore he is in the highest
degree of intellectuality . hence the intellect of God is Super intellect.

The object of the science of God is twofold: primary and secondary.

The primary object is that which is known by God before everything, by its own reason,
and in which the other things are known.
The secondary object is that which is known by reason of the primary object.
In order to understand the nature of the divine science according to our human way of
thinking, we have:

Thesis VII.

1. God understands and comprehends Himself as primary object;

2. He comprehends all the other things as secondary object,
3. So that the science of God is the most perfect science.

Proof of the thesis.

Part I (God understands and comprehends Himself as the primary object).

I. God understands Himself.

In order that God understand Himself, it is required that God possesses an intellect that he is
intelligible and that His essence be present to His intellect. But now all these are so.
Therefore God understands Himself. For certainly.
1) There is super intellect in God being an infinite Being;
2) Also there is intelligibility for God is in the highest degree of immateriality; still more,
we say with Plato: the more existing is something, the more intelligible is that a
something; and God is the greatest being, therefore He is most intelligible;
3) There also is the presence of God’s essence in the intellect of God for there exists an
identity between essence and intellect on account of the simplicity of God.

II. God comprehends Himself.

40
 To comprehend is the same as to know something exhaustively (i.e. insofar as it is
cognoscible, so that there is a perfect adequation between the thing known and the knowing
subject. But in God there is not only adequation but perfect identity between the object known
and the subject knowing: for He Himself is only one God. Therefore God comprehends Himself.

III. God Himself is the primary object of the science of God.

The primary object of a science is that which is known on account of itself and before
everything else. But now, God, due to the identity of the intellect and the intelligible in Himself,
knows and ought to know Himself on account of Himself and before every other thing. Therefore
God Himself is the primary object of the science of God.
Aristotle expressed this most succinctly saying that God is nohsis the nohsews (the thought
of thought, absolute autoconscience, supreme Immanence of knowing and of the known). The
error of Aristotle consisted in this that he denied in God the knowledge of mutable things due to
the false presupposition that God would be changed with the things if He would know them;
rightly would he have said it if the mutable things were the primary object of the science wof
God.

Part II (God comprehends the other things as secondary object)

I. God comprehends the other things aside from Himself.

The other things are either possible (=thinkable) or real; but God comprehends both, for
1) Comprehends the possible things because the possible are nothing but modes of
participability of the divine essence ad extra (with outside direction) (cfr. Ontol., n 387
and also Notes); now, God comprehends divine essence; therefore He comprehends the
modes of His participability or the possible things;
2) He comprehends the real things, because real things are themselves possible which due to
the will and power of God are drawn into existence; therefore since He comprehends
Himself in His essence and will and power, God comprehends all real things.
These other real things other from God are whatever they may be: singular things, the
greatest and the smallest, the past and the future, necessary and free, also futurables or
conditioned futures.

II. God comprehends the other things as secondary subject.

The possibles are certainly known by God in Himself and through Himself, because there is
nothing outside Him: for they are ideas of God –many ideas, or just one Idea of many.

He also knows the real things in Himself and through Himself because otherwise the science
of God would depend on things if He would know them outside Himself. In this way is avoided
the difficulty in which Aristotle belabored about the diving knowledge of mutable things.
The principle of the amplitude of divine science about real things is best stated by St.
Thomas: “To such is extended the science of God, inasmuch as His causality is extended” (S. T.,
I, 14,11) but now, the causality of God is extended to all things beside Himself; therefore also
His science extends itself to all things inasmuch as all are under His causality; hence all the other
things are known by God by knowing Himself, that is, as secondary object.

Part III (The science of God is most perfect

41
 I. By reason of the object.
The science of God is infinite, because God knows all things (extensive infinity) and most
perfectly (intensive infinity); Therefore God knows all things by proper knowledge, not only by
common knowledge.
G. Galilei, because of his mathematism , by which all are reduced to geometric beings,
posited only the extensive difference between the science of God and that of man, of intensive
difference: according to him God knows more than we do, but better.

II. By reason of the subject.

The science of God is substantial or simplest because ii is not an act or habit added to essence
(as it happens in us), but it is identified with essence: For good: to understand is the same as to
be or exist.

III. By reason of means.

The science of God is most intuitive or absolutely immediate, i.e. not discursive nor
indicative because reasoning and judgment are signs of imperfection; nor does God know
through impressed species, for everything is naked and open to intuiting: the science God is one
Supreme Intuiting.

IV. By reason of the term known.

The science of God is independent of things because He knows them in Himself; it is most
efficacious because God’s science is not caused by things, but is the cause of all things;
hence God’s knowledge or science is INFALLIBLE.

Corollary on the truth of God.

As truth is defined as the adequation of the intellect and the intelligible object, in God is truth
because God’s intellect is perfectly adequated, or rather it is identified with the essence of the
intelligible.

In God there exists formal truth, either metaphysical (the adequation of the thing to the
intellect) or logical (the adequation of the intellect to the thing) or moral (adequation of
expression to the intellect): the reason is because in God there exists the unity of essence and
intellect, the unity of intellect and will.
The truth of God is the highest truth ,because the adequation is the highest identity.
The truth of God is the first truth, because it is the first adequation.
From the truth of God proceeds all truth, and without, the truth of God there could be no
truth once God is denied, then seal and the end of all truth.
God, however, does not possess truth but he is through essence his internal truth itself.

42
 Art. II.
the superwill of God.

That there is a well in God this is obvious from the fact that in him is an intellect :every
intellective being possesses a will: besides God possesses all the perfections of the creatures
among which is the will . The will follows the intellect: hence as there is superintellect in God,
so in him is also superwill.

Therefore in God, as there is the power to will, is love from whom, according to our way of
thinking, flow all the affects and all the virtues of God .
The object of the will is twofold, like the object of the intellect: primary and secondary.
There is a special difficulty in the question about the will of God from to headings:
1) From the relationship of the divine will to evil;
2) From the concordance of the divine freedom with the divine immutability.

On the superwill of God is

Thesis VIII.

1. God loves himself as primary and necessary object;

2. Loves the other things freely as a secondary object;
3. So that the love of God is the most perfect of love.

Proof of the thesis.

Part I (God loves himself as primary and necessary object).

I. God loves himself.

For God to love or to desire himself there must be a will in him, he must be good and there
must be a connection between his will and himself. But these three are found in him, for;

1) As we already studied, there is a will in God;

2) He is good for he is the highest and supreme being;
3) There is nexus called love, because loving and the loved are identified in absolute
simplicity of the divine essence.

I. God loves or desires himself as a primary object.

A primary object is that which is loved for itself and on account of which the others are
loved. But now, God loves himself for himself for he is the highest good and hence supremely
lovable or amiable. Therefore God loves himself as the primary object of love.

II. Go loves or desires himself necessarily.

A will, whatever it be, necessarily desires a good that is such on every angle or that is an
absolute good, so that the most appetible must be most greatly desired.
But God is such a good or is most appetible good.

43
 Therefore God must greatly be desired by himself, scil. God loves or desires himself
necessarily.

Part II (God desires other things aside from himself freely as the secondary object).

I. God desires other things aside from himself.

God loves whatever is good.
But other things aside from God are beings, and therefore good.
Therefore God desires or loves other things aside from himself.

II. God loves other things aside from himself as a secondary object.
God loves other things aside from himself as a secondary object if he loves them in himself
and for himself.
But God, as the highest good, ought to love other things in himself and for himself, as he
understands the other things in himself.
Therefore God loves other things aside from himself as a secondary object.

III. God desires other things aside from himself freely.

A will, whatever it may be, desires freely that which is not good as such from all angles.
Now, other things aside from God are not good as such from all angles: for they are limited
goods, appetible but not to be desired absolutely.
Therefore, God desires other things aside from himself freely.

Part III (The love of God is most perfect).

I. The love of God is substantial.

For the love of God is not in God as an accident or passion as in creatures; as God does not
possess truth as he is Truth, so God does not possess love, as that he is LOVE, the highest and
first LOVE, Superamor: “God is love” (I John IV: 16).

II. The love of God is immutable.

Since the love of God is identified with his immutable essence.

III. God’s love is most benevolent.

Because the love of God grants, it does not acquire or receive from other beings aside from
God; it loves other things because these thing are good; but they are good because God makes
them so; hence God loves those which and because they are from himself.

IV. God’s love is most free.

For the love of God has an end the communication only of his goodness; also, if he makes
something, God love always himself as to be communicated to other things.

44
 Scholion I.

The affection of God.

Love must certainly be attributed to God, still more: God is his love; as to the other
affections, those can be attributed to him that consider the concupiscible part: hated, desire, joy,
flight; an axception is sadness, for God cannot be a subject to evil and consequently to pain;
affections or feelings that are of the irascible level cannot be attributed to God, because nothing
is arduous to God; hence to God cannot be given hope, despair, fear, audacity, anger; when we
speak of God’s anger or sadness we speak metaphorically inasmuch as from the action of God
there is caused effects that are had from the anger and sadness of creatures. All this attribution of
affections is to be taken not univocally but analogically through analogy of proportionality, and
in anger and sadness metaphorically: God is related to his volitive acts which are generically
affective as the creature is related to his own.

Scholion II.
The Virtues of God.

Virtues that do not contain any idea of imperfection can be attributed to God analogically
and eminently:

1) Justice is in God; not, however, in the sense that he is obligated towards creatures, but in
so far as he deals with equality; commutative and distributive justice can be attributed to
him, but not legal justice, because he is not obligated towards some superior nor is he
restricted to a certain community.
2) Mercy or compassion is found in God, but only in as far as he exercises this towards us,
and not as though he suffers something in himself.
3) Liberality is in God, both most formally and most eminently.
In God there can be no temperance, but there is wisdom and in some way fortitude.
Note. Christ is not only God but also a man; hence he possesses in his affections and
virtues all the properties of the divinity and humanity; as God, he is Love; as Man, he wanted
to experience and did experience the passions and most especially the passion or feeling of
love, the most expressive organ of which and symbol is his most sacred heart.

Scholion III.
The holiness of God.

God’s sanctity is his justice itself insofar as he hates evil.

From here we have a question:
What is the will of God towards evil?

I. God does not nor can he desire evil directly (as an end in itself). This is evident, for
evil as evil cannot be an end or cannot attract the will for any subject desiring; this is
for all kinds of agents or subject doing.

45
 II. God can desire physical evil indirectly (accidentally, as a means). For physical evil
(such as sickness, pain, death, tempest, earthquakes etc.) which is ordained as a
means to a greater good by the fact that it deprives is at least relatively good (in
relation to the greater good towards which it is ordained). But now, God can will
physical evil indirectly; ex.g. sickness deprives health, therefore it is physical evil;
but sickness can be ordained as a means to sanctity, which is a greater good than
health which is deprived by sickness; therefore God can will sickness as a means, i.e.
indirectly.
III. God cannot will moral evil or sin indirectly. For God can only will any evil if that evil
is ordained or can be ordained to a greater good as that which is deprived by it. But
moral evil cannot be ordained to a greater good as that which it deprives: for it
deprives a moral law and therefore a lawgiver, who is God. Therefore God cannot
will –not even indirectly- a moral evil.
IV. God can permit or not to impede moral evil, because he can have reasons or motives
of not impeding it, especially in order to leave to man the full freedom of determining
himself and of meriting.

Scholion IV.
The concordance of freedom and the immutability of God.

Things other than himself God wills freely; but freedom or liberty supposes that one willing
may will or may not will or desire an object; therefore liberty indicates certain contingency or
muatiation or change.
How is liberty of God reconciled with his immutability?
This is a most difficult question evidently and it has two tendencies in the solution:
1) Scotus and the scotists put in God free determinations, with which God desires other
things than himself; such determinations are distinguished from the divine essence
through a formal distinction and these determinations were always found in God;
therefore, according to the scotists, still the simplicity and immutability of God are saved,
although there be these free determinations.
2) The thomists reject such free determinations, because these determinations are opposed to
the divine simplicity and immutabilty:
a) To the divine simplicity : because, if these determinations are something, they are added
to the divine essence and imply composition;
b) To the divine immutability: because, although de facto these determinations be eternal in
God, de lure they can be not in God (for these are free); so that would be safeguarded is
the immutation of God, not his radical immutability.
To the positive solution of the question Thomists consider the will of God in two ways:
1) Subjectively (intrinsically, in the act of willing) and
2) Terminatively (extrinsically, in the effect which flows from the act of volition).
Subjectively considered, the will of God is the pure act itself, necessary and immutable,
that constitutes the essence of God; terminatively considered, the will of God is free inasmuch as
the terminus or free and contingent effect corresponds to the one and necessary act, on account
of his infinity.

46
 In other words (and inasmuch the explanation is possible to the finite human mind) this
can be said: the active indifference (=autodetermination, liberty or freedom) in creature is in the
faculty which contingently posits an act to which the effect contingently corresponds (=to which
a contingent effect corresponds=); active indifference in God is only in the effect that
contingently answers to the necessary act of divine volition; and it contingently responds because
the divine necessary act, which is infinite, is capable of determining an effect contingently.
In short: the freedom of creature is a contingency of an act; freedom of God is a
contingency of an effect flowing from a necessary act.

Scholion V.
Classification of divine will.

The classification of the divine will is not made according as what the will is in itself,
because in God the will is one and most simple act, which is identified with the divine essence.
Classification is made only in our way of considering the divine will from the effect of the will
itself:

I. Antecedent and consequent will.

Antecedent will is the will of God insofar as it is considered antecedently to the prevision of
an act of the creature.
Consequent will is the will of God inasmuch as it is considered consequent to the prevision
of the act of the creature, Ex. g. by the antecedent will God wills all men to be saved; but by his
consequent will he saves only those who did good works.

II. Efficacious and inefficacious will.

Efficacious will is the will of God insofar as it is considered as de fact connected with the effect.
Inefficacious will is the will of God inasmuch as it is considered not connected with the effect.
Ex. g. in reference to the damned, the salvific will of God is inefficacious.

III. Absolute and conditioned will.

Absolute will is the will of God considered independently from conditions. While conditioned
will is the will of God considered as dependent on condition.

IV. The will of pleasure and the will of sign.

The will of pleasure is the will of God considered in itself and is called Divine Pleasure. The
will of sign are signs by which the will of divine pleasure are manifested. Ex.gr. a testament is a
sign of the will and however it is called 7will, so that the testator is called to express his will
through a testament. The signs of the divine will are precept, prohibition, promise, counsel and
operation.

47
 Article III.

The superpower of God.

I. Notion.
Power, as applied to God, is taken not as passive power or capacity to receive (potency), but
as an active power or capacity to do, not, however, as a mere capacity, because in God there is
no potential status in relation to the act; divine power is an act which is considered as capable of
action.
God’s power can be said as the principle of effection ad extra, that is, with an outward
direction. We say “of effection ad extra”, because nothing can be made or produced in God
himself; hence the power of God looks at those things only that are outside God.
God’s power is really the same as the intellect and will of God inasmuch as the intellect is
considered as the principle that directs effection, and the will as commanding, and power as
executing.

II. Division.
The power of God can be considered under two respect: absolute power and ordained power:
1) Absolute power is the same power of God considered prescinding from the other divine
attributes, as wisdom, goodness, justice; in other words: it is the power considered by
abstracting from the decrees of the will.
2) Ordained or ordered power is the power of God considered according to the decrees of
the will or in union with his attributes.
Ex. g. by absolute power God can destroy the human soul; but by the ordained power,
considering the attributes of wisdom and goodness and justice, God will not destroy it.

III. Infinity.
The power of God, being identical with divine essence, is infinite, that is, superpower or
Omnipotence.
Here is the fundamental principle about God’s omnipotence: God can make all that is
intrinsically possible or that which does not involved contradiction; hence God can make all
possible things, not however, at the same time, for possible things (=modes of participability of
the divine essence ad extra) are infinite.
The infinity therefore of the divine power is not to be understood in the sense that God can
make infinite, for something infinite cannot be made; rather it ought to be understood in this
sense that God could do or make other things besides those that he already made or makes.

General Corollary on the Nature of God.

From what we have said the following stands out:

God is a person, because he is a SUBSISTENT BEING DISTINCT IN
INTELLECTUAL NATURE; here is the short analysis:
1) Subsistent Being, because he is Being or existence itself subsistent in itself (from the
thesis on the metaphysical essence of God);

48
 2) Distinct, for he is a being distinct from and transcending the world (from the thesis
against pantheism);
3) In the intellectual nature, because he is supremely intelligent, endowed with the highest
auto consciousness (by which he comprehends himself and the other things) with the
highest freedom (as to all things aside from himself) and with the highest love (as to
Himself and other things).
The Personality of God does not contradict the mystery of the Trinity, by which we are
taught that there are three persons in God; for the philosophic concept of God, by which God is
said to be one person, is further evolved by revealed Theology through the Trinity of persons,
without the personality being denied as stated by philosophic inquisition : philosophically or
rationally speaking, God is known as incommunicable and intelligent substance (person);
theologically or supernaturally speaking, God is known intrinsically constituted not by three
substances, but by three relations (paternity, filiation, passive spiration), which are called
persons.
Contradiction between Philosophy and S. Theology would be had if the three divine persons
would also be three substances; but here there is no affirmation or negation of the same thing
about the same under the same respect.

Chapter III.

THE CAUSALITY OF GOD TOWARDS THE WORLD

The world, of which we here speak, embraces –as we know- all beings outside of God.
The relation between God and the world could be either a relation of identity or a relation
of causality. But the relation of identity has been excluded already after the refutation of
pantheism, from which God is very well presented and proven as a Person. What remains then is
the relation of causality by which God is the maker and cause in relation to the world.
In relation to the world God, as the first Cause, works the following:
1) He gives existence to creatures (creation to which is joined conservation);
2) He concurs in the operations of creatures (concursus);
3) He governs the creatures as to their existence and operations (providence).

Hence we have three articles:

Art. I. The creation of the world.
Art. II. The concursus of God as to the operations of creatures.
Art. III. The providence of God.

49
 Article I.

The Creation of the world.

I. The position of the question.

The question that must be solved is one about the origin of the world. The world certainly has
origin and therefore it does not come from itself; and this is clear from the arguments that prove
the existence of God as the First Cause; for the world is composite, mutable, finite and
contingent; besides the world is not one substance, but it consists of many substances, that are
grouped among themselves according to space, time and action; hence the unity of the world is
only an accidental unity.
If therefore the world ought to have an origin, it takes this origin not from any other but from
the First Cause, that is, God.
Therefore the question on the origin of the world from God considers only the mode and so it
goes like this:
How does the world take its origin from God? Or:
How did God give the world its origin?
In the production of the world three things must be borne in mind: a) the efficient cause; b)
the exemplar cause; and c) the final cause.

II. The efficient cause.

The origin of the world from God can be conceived –absolutely speaking- in three ways:

1) Through emanation, insofar as the world flowed from the substance itself of God as a
web from the cobweb or a rivulet from the fountain or a ray of light from the sun… This
doctrine is held by the neoplatonists (Plotinus, Porphyrius etcx.), who say that the totality
of things flow from the One through successive emanations ( Intellect, the soul of the
world, particular souls, matter which is non-being and essentially evil or bad); the
doctrines of the neoplatonists seem to gain approval from Scotus Eriugena (IX cent.) and
Jordan Bruno.
2) Through evolution, inasmuch as the world is a resultant of the evolution itself of God.
According to this doctrine the world is but a multiple manifestation (determination,
objectivization, naturalization) of God himself. To this doctrine are inclined Spinoza, the
absolute idealists (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and their followers) and certain contemporary
thinkers (perhaps Bergson).

3) Through free creation. Creation is the production of a thing from the nothingness of
itself and of the subject.
Insofar as it is a production of the thing from the nothingness of itself, creation agrees of
whatever production; for in the production something new is made present, which before did not
exist (=from the nothingness of itself or after the nothing of itself); but creation is distinguished
from other productions, because, while in the other productions there is that potential principle
(=matter, subject in which the form is received) on which the agent operates, in creation there is
no subject presupposed; hence it os also said: from the nothingness of the subject.
That which is produced in creation is a complete substance or entire substance; does non-
subsistent form, prime matter and accidents are not simpliciter created, but rather concreated, i.e

50
something complete or composed of matter and form with accidents are created; a subsistent
form (like the human soul, angel) is created, although the human soul is infused into the body.
To create then is to produced something without presupposing anything aside from the
efficient cause; to produce from nothing = to make from non-something = not to make from
something = to make by not supposing something.
The scholastic doctrine together with the revealed doctrine of the Old and New Testament,
holds that the world took its origin from God through creation.

III. The exemplar cause.

An exemplar cause is an extrinsic formal cause or an archetypal idea after whose similarity a
certain thing is produced. Exemplarity indicates the intelligence of the efficient cause insofar as
its effects imitate the preconceived ideas; the concept of imitation implies the concept of
participation, because the effect participates the essence which the cause has before his mind
while he works.
The divine exemplarism is a special note in Platonism, in St. Augustine, St. Bonaventure and
in St. Thomas, who joins at the same time the efficient cause and exemplar causality in relation
to the world.

IV. The final cause.

The final cause or end in the question on creation is the absolutely last end.
In our doctrine the end that is absolute last of creation is the extrinsic glory of God.
Glory is the taking cognizance with praise of a certain perfection or of a certain being:
understood in this way, glory is said to be formal or formally taken (= a notice with praise); but if
the perfection is considered, of which there is taking note with praise, then there is objective
glory or the object of the formal glory, since perfection is the object of this taking notice with
praise.
This glory in relation to God is either intrinsic or extrinsic:
1) Objective intrinsic glory is that divine perfection itself as existing in God; the objective
extrinsic glory is the divine perfection or goodness as communicated or participated to
creatures.
2) Formal intrinsic glory is the notice with praise with God has of his perfection; and the
extrinsic formal glory is the notice with praise which creature has of the divine perfection
as it is in God and as communicated and participated to creatures.
As can be seen, the end of creation cannot but be the intrinsic glory, be it objective or formal,
because –being infinite- God does not need creation to have glory; it suffices that He knows and
love his infinite perfection in order to have intrinsic glory; therefore the end or purpose of
creation is extrinsic glory, either objective formal.
In short: God created the world to communicate his existence or his goodness (extrinsic
objective glory) and his knowledge and his love (extrinsic formal glory).
So we have

Thesis IX.

1. The world has its origin from God through creation.

2. According to the divine exemplar ideas
3. And for the extrinsic glory of God.

51
 Proof of the thesis.

Part I (The world has its origin from God thru creation).
Arg. I. The world, absolutely speaking, could take its origin from God either through
emanation from the substance of God or through evolution of God himself or through creation by
God. But to think of creation as an emanation from the substance of God and of evolution of God
is repugnant. Therefore the world has its origin from God through creation.

Parts of the minor are proved:

I. The world cannot have origin through emanation from the substance of God, for:
1) Emanation requires identity of nature between the one emanating and the one from
whom it emanates. But between God and the world there can be no identity of nature.
Therefore emanation of the world from God is impossible.
2) Also, emanation requires that the substance from which there could emanation, be
composite, for in emanation there exists communication of substance. But the
substance of God is most sip le. Therefore emanation from the divine substance is
impossible.

II. The world cannot have origin through evolution of God.

For evolution requires mutability of the thing that is evolving. But God is entirely immutable.
Therefore evolution of God is impossible.
Therefore the idealistic concept of God (“the transcendental Ego”) is a contradictory concept:
the whole realistic metaphysics, which is based on the notion of being and on the principles that
follow being, is opposed nail and tooth to idealistic doctrine. The Absolute either is totally
transcendent and positing the world freely or it is not Absolute.

Arg. II God is the First and universal Cause, and hence the cause of all being existing
outside Himself. But the cause of all being presupposes nothing in its action. Therefore God in
causing presupposes nothing; i.e. God is causing the world through creation, as the infinite
artifex.
In short: God is being by essence, and the others aside from himself are beings by
participation.

Part II(The world is created by God according to his exemplar ideas).

Every intellective doer acts according to his ideas, by which he assimilates the proper
effect. But God is a supremely intellective doer or agent and nothing besides himself ever existed
before creation. Therefore God created the world according to the ideas existing in his intellect.
In the platonic doctrine Demiurgus ordains the matter of the world by contemplating the
subsistent ideas; but Demiurgus does not have the characters of divinity; But God, whose
existence we have already demonstrated and his nature we exposed, is the First and Infinite
Cause; hence he created by contemplating his proper ideas or his only IDEA (The World,
Logos).
God therefore is not only the efficient cause of the world, but also the exemplar cause
creating everything according to this archetypal ideas; for this, all things hierarchically created
according to their proper degree of perfection, are assimilated to God in different ways:

52
 1) Infraspiritual things, which do not have knowledge and love for they do not have intellect
and will, are assimilated or similar to God insofar as they are vestiges of God, i.e. they
only manifest the causality of God.
2) Spiritual things (pure or not pure: angels and human souls), that possess intellect and will,
are assimilated to God insofar as they are the image of God or they more clearly manifest
the nature of God or his immateriality, with which science and love are connected.

Part III (The world is created by God for his extrinsic glory).
As good and end are convertible, a being absolutely good ought to be an end absolutely
last of its action. But now, God is a being absolutely good. Therefore God or divine goodness
must not be acquired by God but rather communicated. Therefore divine goodness that is to be
communicated is the end absolutely ultimate or last of creation.
Communication however of divine goodness is a communication of being, of knowing
and of loving; but communication of divine knowledge and essence and of love is extrinsic,
objective and formal glory of God. Therefore the world is created by God for his extrinsic,
objective and formal glory.

Therefore God is the principle, exemplar and end of all things that exist: All things by
Him, according to Him and for Him.

Scholion I.
The freedom of divine creation.

God, as we know, desires other things aside from himself, because although they are
good, they do not adequate the good as such in all angle; therefore God created the world freely.
True that there was no necessity on the part of God, because God is infinite and had no
need of creatures; neither on the part of creatures was there necessity for they are contingent.
From the freedom of creation the transcendence of God was more manifest and shone
towards the world; the necessity of creating is either affirmed from the pantheistic presupposition
or it leads to pantheism; therefore emantatism is certainly a pantheistic doctrine, at least
implicity.

Scholion II.
The conservation of the world.

Conservation is the action of God (active conservation) by which created things perdure
or continue in being (passive conservation).
Active conservation can be negative or positive; negative conservation is that by which
God does not destroy created things; and positive conservation is that by which God acts that
creatures retain their own existence.
Positive conservation can be indirect or direct: indirect is that by which God removes the
obstacles that creatures may continue to exist; direct conservation is that by God acts
immediately on creatures in order that they conserve their being or existence.
The conservation that is necessary for creatures ought to be positive and direct
conservation, because creatures are essentially contingent; their first existence received

53
through creation is not a sufficient reason for them to continue in being; hence the continued
action of God in holding the creatures in existence is required; the effects of the creatures do not
need conservation on the part of the efficient creature or finite cause, because creatures do not
produce simple existence, but such existence is from the supposed existence ; for this creature, as
such, needs the conservation of God to continue being.
Thus conservation can be considered as a continued creation, not because the creature
ceases to be and is created a new, but in so far as the action of God is continued by upholding the
creatures in their existence.

Aticle II.

The concurrence or concursus of God.

I. Notions.
As we know from the thesis against the occasionalists in Ontology (n.420) creatures truly act
or do enjoy a true efficiency.
However, for the creatures’ action a divine concurrence or concursus is required which is
rightly called the influence of divine power on the actions of creatures. If this concurrence is
applied to supernatural creatures, it is called actual grace; if it is applied to natural actions, it is
termed simply as concursus or concurrence.
Now it is asked:
Of what nature is this divine concurrence?
To solve this problem let us first distinguish the different kinds of concurrence:
1) Mediate and immediate concursus;
a) Mediate concursus is that by which God remotely influences in the actions inasmuch
as he creates the creatures and conserves their nature (essence and powers or
faculties); thus, ex.g. Government mediate influences in the fight of the soldier in as
far as it shows him all the means necessary for the fight.
b) Immediate concursus is that by which God proximately influences in the actions
themselves of creature; such as, ex.g., the teacher who directs the hand of the disciple
in actual writing.
2) Immediate concursus can be physical or moral;
a) Physical concurrence is the efficient influence by which God corroborates the
physical or natural power or strengths of creatures.
b) Moral concursus is the influence exercised through persuasions, counsels, inspirations
etc.
3) Physical concursus can be previous or simultaneous;
a) Previous concursus is the influence by which God precedes or antecedes (in nature or
causality, not only in time) the action of creature insofar as he applies the powers of
creature to action; through this kind of concursus God acts on the powers of faculties
themselves of creature.
b) Simultaneous concursus, is the influence by which God simply helps the action itself
of the creature; he does not therefore precedes causally the action, but is joined to it,
and hence there is rather a confluence with than influence on the action of creature.

54
As can be clearly seen from what has been said, previous concursus is by itself determined or is
special to single action, so that it is efficacious from within (ab intrinsico) or of itself it is capable
of obtaining this or that effect; simultaneous concursus is not of itself determined, but indifferent,
so that it is determined by the determination of the creature and therefore it is efficacious from
without (or ab extrinsico).

II. General classification of doctrines on this.

The fundamental headings of the doctrines concerning the present question are the following:
1) Against the occasionalists all scholastics firmly hold that creatures do act truly, that God
concurs in their actions at least with a mediate concursus and that all actions of creatures
are under the dominion of God.
2) Against Durandus all scholastics hold that the concursus of God is immediate for all and
each of the actions of creatures.
3) Against some (as Fonseca S.I. and others) all scholastics hold that divine concursus is
physical that is, truly efficient.
4) Admitting commonly the preceding headings, the scholastics are divided in determining
the nature of divine concursus. The most well-known schools are the Dominican and the
Jesuistic.

The Dominicans hold that their doctrine was taught by St. Thomas and so they call
themselves Thomists; their adversaries however deny that their doctrine is found in St.
Thomas and proclaim that the first defender of their doctrine was the Spanish Dom. Banez
(1529-1604).
The traditional doctrine of the Jesuits, as it is opposed to the Dominican doctrine, was first
exposed in the famous work of a spanish priest Fr. Lud. Molina (1535-1606); and thus the
doctrine is called molinism.

III. The Dominican doctrine (Thomism).

According to the Dominican School, in particular of the Thomists, the concursus of God for
and in all the actions of creatures, be they necessary or free, ought to be previous, special and
efficacious ab intrinsico, i.e. from withing. Such concursus is absolutely required on two counts:
a) from the stand point of the law of causality, according to which no created being can act
without the motion of God: b) from the absolute dominion of God in and over all actions of
creatures.
Divine action therefore precedes the actions of the creature and moves the creature through a
real and true efficiency, that is, physically; on account of this the divine concurrence is called
rightly physical promotion or physical predetermination.
If there is no physical predetermination, the Thomists hold, then it is impossible for creature
to act; once physical predetermination is posited, it is impossible for the creature not to act;
however the creature always remain free under the predetermination.

IV. Molinism.
Molinism distinctly considers the necessary and free actions of the creatures.
As to the necessary actions, the Molinists teach that physical promotion is required; actions
of irrational beings are necessary, so with volitions by which a created will desires the end or the
perfect good and the perfectly known.

55
 As to the free actions they absolutely deny physical predetermination, because according to
them this kind of concursus can in no way be composed with the human liberty; therefore they
hold that divine concursus is rather confluent with the action of creature or is simultaneous,
indifferent and efficacious from without, that is by determination of the free will.

V. Our Judgment on this.

1) It is certain, and it is admitted by almost all scholastic philosophers that divine concursus
ought to be immediate and physical; and the reason is twofold:
a) Action of any creature shows a transition from potency to act; and this transition or
movement needs a motor or a cause that makes this transitus possible.
b) The universal dominion of God over the entire nature implies that God could impede the
action of creature even safeguarding the existence of creature; but this would be
impossible if God did not extend immediate and physical concurrence: for it suffices to
take away the concursus of God in order to impede any action of creature.
2) The thomists’ doctrine serves better the universal value of the principle of causality and
the absolute dependence of creature on God; thus we can say that this doctrine is
metaphysically more true insofar as it is more coherent with the metaphysical principles.
As to the safeguarding of the human freedom in the action that are premoved by God’s
concursus, we have to admit that it is has to be saved even with God’s promotion for God’s
promotion causes the being of the action and not the qualification of the acts that remains the
object of human choice and freedom.
There remains the mystery concerning the manner of composing the divine concurrence with
human liberty: it is most certain that God concurs, as it is most certain that man is free; what
remains uncertain or not so certain is the manner of composing these two truths; however it is in
no way evident that the two headings of our doctrine (divine promotion and human freedom) do
exclude each other: the incertitude about the manner of composing is not a certitude of
inconponibility; so we have here a mystery not something absurd, against what the pantheists
say.

Corollary
The divine science of the free future things.

I. Position of the question.

With the question on divine concurrence is joined the question on the divine science of the
free future things.
The objects of divine science cab be either possible things or actual things; but actual things,
considered in relation to our way of knowing in time, are usually called Future beings, that are
divided into necessary or free beings (=actions of free beings); free future actions can be absolute
or conditioned: absolute free future actions are events which de facto are posited sometime by
the will; conditioned future actions (also called futuribles) are events that will never be, but they
would have been or would be, once certain hypothesis is posited; ex.g., if Jesus would have
announced his Gospel among the Spaniards, the Spaniards would have been immediately
converted and become Christians.
Now we ask; how does God know the objects of his science?

56
 1) As to the possible actions (possibilia) all scholastics hold that God knows them by
knowing his own essence; for possible is a mode of participability from without of the
divine essence.
2) As to the necessary actual actions or events all scholastics hold that God knows them by
knowing the decrees of his will, by which their existence has been statuted.
3) As to the free future events be they absolute or conditioned (futuribles) there is a division
of doctrine as there as concerning the divine concursus.

II. The Thomists’ view.

As divine concursus is predetermining and proceeds from the decrees of God’s will, then all
the free actions of creatures, be this actions absolute or conditioned, are known by God through
the knowledge of his decrees; hence it is said that God knows the free futures in is
predetermining decrees: God knows the absolute future in his absolute decrees of conurring;
futuribles are known by God in his subjectively absolute decrees and objectively conditioned
decrees.
In this regard the science of God, although most simple in itself, is divided into: science of
simple intelligence and science of vision.
Science of simple intelligence is the science by which God knows the possible events; while
science of vision is the science by which God knows actual events or happenings, be they
necessary on free.

III. Molinists’ view.

As they hold that the divine concursus is simultaneous, for them then God cannot know the
free futures in his predetermining decrees. Besides, absolute free future events before being
realized can be considered as conditioned future events; if we say; a free creature does this, what
is had is absolute free future event; but before it may act, the following judgment can be had
about it: free creature, if it were found in such conditions, would do this (conditioned free
future).
Thus the science of God ought to be divided into three:
a) The science of simple intelligence, for the possible events;
b) The science of vision, for the absolute free futures;
c) The middle science for the futuribles –and this is the middle ground between the
possibles and the absolute futures.
This famous middle science of the molinists is commonly defined as: the science by which
God knows the futuribles independently of whatever predetermining decree.
As could be seen, this definition in which all molinists agree, is merely negative: it says what
middle science is not, not what it is. As to positive explanation there is great difference among
the molinists:
1) Molina, Bellarminus and others hold that God knows the futuribles in the
supercomprehension of the secondary causes: God supercomprehends all things and
hence he knows what a creature would do having these or those circumstances been
posited.
2) Vasquez holds that God knows the futuribles in themselves or in their condioned entity.
3) Card, Mazzella holds that God knows the futuribles in their truth, insofar as between two
contradictory futuribles (ex. gr. Peter, placed in these circumstances, would commit sin or
not) one ought to be true from the law of contradictory propositions.

57
 4) Billot, Remer, Boyer, hold that God knows the futuribles by comprehending his own
essence.

IV. What to say?

Both doctrine on the divine science concerning the future events is connected with the
respective doctrine on divine concursus: whoever defends promotion or predetermining
concurrence defends also the science of vision in the predetermining decrees of God to save the
universal dominion of God, his universal causality and the absolute independence of divine
science (omitting the reasons of theological order concerning the question of grace); and he who
defends simultaneous concursus defends middle science to safeguard human liberty.
Again: THIS IS A QUESTION THAT ENJOYS NO UNITY AND UNIFORMITY AMO
NG CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS! There is a mystery behind this most difficult
question on the divine science concerning the future events as the same is said about the divine
concursus in our actions and in the events of life and the world.
It is however most certain that God knows all future events; but the way or manner how
HE KNOWS THEM, this will always be for us inexplicably not obvious.

Article III.

The providence of God.

Providence can be considered according to its ordinary nature and according to the
exception in the natural laws or miracle; hence:
I. The Providence of God in common.
II. The Miracle.

I. The Providence in common.

I. Notion.
Providence can be defined as: the order of things conceived in the divine mind towards
an end and mandated in the creatures for execution.
Providence, therefore, presupposes many elements, that are:
a) The conception of order or the reason of order, which is formally an act of the divine
intellect; often Providence is strictly taken in this sense, i.e. as a mere conception of the
divine order without inclusion of the execution, which is termed governance; the
conception however of the intellect exacts in God the will of the end (=the extrinsic glory
of God) and the act of the executing power.
b) The execution of order, which is in creatures and is called rather governance. Providence
(in he strict sense0 and governance are indicated by the one name <<Taking Care>> or
“Cura” in latin: providence is an eternal element –being an act of the divine intellect-, but
governance is a temporal element or at least it takes time into consideration.

58
 c) Means, that are
1) The laws, according to which creatures are governed,
2) Conservation and
3) Concursus, by which creatures are aided in attaining the end assigned to them.

II. Division.
Providence is said to be common if it is considered in relation to creatures; special, if it os
considered in relation to rational creatures. For we know that the proximate end of the creation of
the infrarational things is man, who is supposed to use them for the attainment of his ultimate
end.
Providence is natural if the end and means do not go beyond the exigencies and strengths of
the creatures; and it is supernatural if the end and the means to go beyond and above the those
exigencies and strength.
Prescinding from the elevation of man to the supernatural state by grace, the end and means
would be natural of man, that is, there would be a state of pure nature; historically, however, or
de facto or in reality, providence in favor of man has been always supernatural, because from the
beginning man was created in the supernatural state and with preternatureal gifts. But if we look
at not only mankind but all and each individual man, then we would have natural providence,
with end and exigencies and strength not exceeding the nature of man.

III. Question and doctrines.

It is asked: Is there in God providence or ordination of things to the end of the glory of God (and
of the human happiness)?
The difficulty of the question comes from the presence of evil in the world: hence there are
many responses to this question: absolute optimism, fatalism, absolute pressimism, deism
(moderate pessimism), moderate optimism… about which we say:

1) Absolute optimism is defended by Spinoza and Leibniz: it as a doctrine that holds that the
actual world is the best and is ruled in the best manner either because it is identified with
the divine substance (Spinoza) or because God could not create a better world than the
present, otherwise he would not have the sufficient reason for creating. According to
Leibniz there are three kinds of evil in the world: metaphysical or the limitation itself and
contingence of creature; physical, as death, sickness, pain etc.; moral, as sin;
metaphysical evil is contained in the concept itself of creature, which is essentially finite;
physical and moral evil flow from the metaphysical evil at yet they do not impede the
world to be the best of all possible worlds.
2) Absolute Pessimism teaches that the world is essentially evil and is led to evil; thus say
Schophenhauer and D. Hartmann: the first teaches that the world is essentially constituted
by a blind will of existing, which implies therefore a permanence of a continuous
endeavor and of the consequent pain; the second teaches that the constitutive of all things
is the Unconscious; and the solution then of evils could be had annihilation that must be
obtained for man through art and radical abnegation.
3) Fatalism teaches that all things are subject to fate or blind and ineluctable necessity, and
not to a certain ordering intellect: this is a common doctrine among Greek and Roman
philosophers, especially among the Stoics.

59
 4) Deism (XVII-XVIII cent.) admits the existence of God, but denies or limits the
providence of God. Absolute Deists deny providence, because they say that it cannot be
reconciled, because of the existence of evil in the world, which justice, goodness and
sanctity of God: so say Bayle (against whom Leibniz wrote Theodicy), Voltaire (who
turns Leibniz optimism into decision), Diderot, D’Alembert and others in the XVIII
century. The moderate Deists admit universal laws in God, but they deny that God
directly or immediately takes care of each and individual things: this is a common
doctrine among a catholic philosophers in Europe in XVIII and XIX cent.: Kant,
Pestalozzi, Cousin etc. Deism then denies the possibility of miracle, rejects prayers,
because this is useless and injurious to God, and especially revelation in the supernatural
order; according to the Deists religion ought to be only natural and ordained by pure
natural reason with the exclusion of the incarnation of the Word, redemption, grace,
sacraments, priesthood and Church (this is laicism, naturalism, liberal Protestantism etc.)
5) Moderate Optimism is a doctrine of all those who admit the providence of God and
therefore hold that the world is only relatively perfect, not absolutely. And this our
doctrine, by which we defend the existence (against pessimism and fatalism) and
universality (against deism) of Divine Providence.
And so we have

Thesis X.

1. Divine Providence exists which is

2. Universal,
3. And so pessimism is false.

Thesis to prove.
Part I (Divine Providence exists).
Arg. I. (a priori) All intellective agent or doer orders its effects to an end and has reason or
plan or conception of this ordination. But God is most highly intellective agent. Therefore God
has reason or plan in ordering all things to an end; and this is called Providence.

Arg. II. (a posteriori). There is in the world, which is caused by God, a most constant and
progressive order under physical and moral respect, although it may be subject to some
imperfections. But order requires conception in the intellect of the creator. Therefore there exists
divine conception of the order of the world, that is, Providence.

Part II. (Divine Providence is universal).

Arg. I. The reason for this is because divine wisdom and causality extend themselves to all
and every single thing. In other words nothing escapes the loving tender care of God the supreme
Author of creator.

Arg. II. If divine Providence does not extend itself to all things, this would be because either
God does not know or will or he does not provide for all things. But the first hypothesis is false,
for God is omniscient or all-knowing; also the second hypothesis is false, because God wills

60
efficaciously the end of his extrinsic glory, on account of which he created everything; and the
third hypothesis yis also false because God is omnipotent..

Part III. (Pessimism is false).

The falsity of pessimism is sufficiently proved from the refutation of their arguments, which
flow from the presence of evil in the world. We know the will of God towards evil (see above,
on the Sanctity of God); now the question of evil must be considered in relation to divine
ordination of the world.

The following are the principles for the solution of the arguments to the adversaries:
1) All being is good; therefore evil, as the privation of good, supposes the good and it does
not exist except per accidens or accidentally.
2) The world is perfect, but only relatively, not absolutely/ The world would be absolutely
perfect if there would be no other world more perfect that this actual world; but this
contradicts the freedom and omnipotence of God; the world is relatively perfect, because
it responds to the divine idea about the world and it suffices for demonstrating the divine
attributes.
3) All creature, as such, is finite sand hence subject to limitations. This limitation is called
by Leibniz metaphysical evil, but strictly speaking it is not evil, because any creature is
not deprived of a perfection which is due: creature, as creature, is essentially subject to
limitation, from which springs the possibility of evil.
4) God is fully free in the ordering or ordination of the world and hence also in the
distribution of goods; this springs from the absolute freedom by which God wills all other
things aside from himself.
5) The laws of divine Providence are most universal and hence are understood by us with
difficulty in every single case; and this comes from the absolute simplicity and
transcendence of God, so much so that what we obtain through may laws is reached by
God through few and highest laws.
6) In the execution of the order God uses secondary causes, be they irrational or specially
rational; this is due to the existence of efficiency in the things (against the occasionalists),
although God concurs immediately and physically in the actions of creatures.
7) As to the present life, the original sin must be considered in order to explain the (de facto
or real) evils of human life; original sin is admitted as probable by a purely philosophic
mind, but Christian revelation shows us the certitude of this.
8) The present life is not the main or only human life, but there will be an everlasting life
after death. Philosophically speaking, never-ending life of the soul is most certain,
whether the soul attains happiness or not; theologically speaking, the resurrection of the
bodies is also most certain together with the intuitive vision of God for the saints and the
punishment of hell for the damned. Thus, where natural philosophic reason is insufficient
in the question of evil, Theology will come to our help.

II. On the Miracle.

I. Notion.

61
 A Miracle (from mirari or to admire) is the suspension of the laws of nature and is defined as:
the work of God suspending the laws of nature or it is an unusual event or happening or
fact divinely performed.
Two things are required for a miracle:
1) That it be unusual; this does not mean that it be done rarely, but that it is not in
accordance with the course of nature;
2) That it be divinely performed, that is, it is effected by God as the principle cause;
creature can be the instrumental or at least impetrative cause, but not as the
principal cause of miracle, for creature is not the author of nature.
For a miracle it is not required that it be done and completed in an instant or slowly, that
it be sensible or insensible, that it be done against nature or not; however, if a miracle is to serve
as a demonstrative sign about the value and strength of religion or of the sanctity of a certain
person, then it has to be sensible or cognoscible through experience.

II. Division.
Miracle is divided into three usually:
1) Above nature is that miracle that absolutely cannot be done by nature; ex.gr. the form of
the glorious body, transubstantiation are miracles above and beyond nature (=they are
miracles of the first order) and are wont to be called miracles quoad substance or as to
substance.
2) Against nature is that miracle that is contrary to the disposition of a certain nature; ex.g.
coexistence of bodies in the same place, the confinement of the children in the ardently
burning furnace of Babylon, walking over the water etc. are miracles against nature
(=miracles of the second order) and are usually called miracles quoad subjectum or as to
the subject (i.e, the subject or body which is heavy, by its nature does not walk over
water).
3) Preternatural miracle is that which in itself is factible by nature, but not in that way in
which it is made through miracle; ex.g. great knowledge is acquired in an instant by one
who has not studied, instantaneous cure etc. are preternatural miracles (=of the third
order) and they are called also miracles quoad modum or as to the manner.

III. Questions.
About miracles the following are asked:
1. Is miracle possible? (question on the possibility of miracle).
2. Is miracle recognizable as miracle? (question on the discernibility of miracle).

The question on the discernibility of miracle is divided into two:

1. Is miracle cognoscible as historical fact or as existing really in history?
2. Is miracle cognoscible as miracle or as a fact distinct from the works of the demons or
natural works (question on the philosophical discernibility of miracle).
All the proposed questions are of great importance, because rationalists –those who deny
everything that pertains to the supernatural order- either take away the possibility of miracle
on, if they admit the possibility, deny its discernibility; as Christian religion has, as a sign of
its divinity, the miraculous fact, negation then of miracle leads to the negation of Christian
religion; often the rationalists, from the presupposed negation of miracles, deny that
miraculous facts can pertain to history: ita, ex.g., concerning the resurrection of Christ, the

62
 rationalists deny the historical fact, because a miracle according to them cannot be an
historical fact; consequently the rationalistic critique against the veracity of the Gospels is
founded on the presupposed negation concerning the possibility of miracle.

So we have

Thesis XI.

1. Miracle is possible
2. And is discernible.

Thesis to prove.
Part I (Miracle is possible).
Miracle is possible if there is no repugnance on both parts.
God and creatures. But there is no repugnance on both parts.
Therefore miracle is possible.

Minor is proved by parts:

1) On the part of God there is no repugnance, for God is the Lord of all, and he
freely created all things and can freely act in the operations of creatures; God’s
efficiency is had either by taking away his concursus (by doing negatively) or by
adding strength and power to creatures (by doing positively).
2) On the part of creatures there is no repugnance, because creatures and their
operations are contingents; the necessity of physical laws is physical, i.e.
hypothetical, and not metaphysical or absolute; and by miracle nature is not taken
away from the things, but its operation only is suspended.

Part II. (Miracle is discernible).

1) It is discernible as an historical fact, as any other historical facts; it is historically
cognoscible that a men born blind before now sees after the miracle; it is enough
to apply the method of critical history to all facts that are referred to as miracles
by the narrators (this is studied in Historiology).
2) It is discernible as non-demoniacal fact, if the following are considered; the
visible author (lives a holy life or not?), the object (good or bad?), the manner
(worthy or unworthy?), and the end (good or bad?). All these circumstances all
together taken most certainly demonstrate often that miraculous facts are not
made by the devil.
3) It is discernible as a non-natural fact, because although we may not know what
nature could do or make (as is shown by the continuous progress of so many
inventions), nevertheless we well know what nature may not be able to do or
make: nature never will instantly multiply bread, resurrect or raise the death to
life, will never be able to give or cause an instantaneous healing of organic
sicknesses (=illnesses that affect the organs themselves, and not only the functions
of the organs), and the lame etc.

MORE ARE STUDIED IN THEOLOGICAL TRACTATES.

63