Protection: Headquarters Department of The Army
Protection: Headquarters Department of The Army
PROTECTION
SEPTEMBER 2009
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: This manual is approved for
public release; distribution is unlimited.
HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
This publication is available at
Army Knowledge Online (www.us.army.mil) and
General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine
Digital Library at (www.train.army.mil).
FM 3-37
Protection
Contents
Page
PREFACE ...............................................................................................................................iv
Chapter 1 PRESERVING THE FORCE .............................................................................. 1-1
Protection Role ................................................................................................... 1-1
Operational Environment .................................................................................... 1-3
Threats and Hazards .......................................................................................... 1-3
Combat Power .................................................................................................... 1-5
Forms of Protection ............................................................................................ 1-6
Principles of Protection ....................................................................................... 1-7
Warfighting Functions ......................................................................................... 1-9
Protection Warfighting Function ......................................................................... 1-9
Composite Risk Management .......................................................................... 1-11
Chapter 2 PROTECTION WARFIGHTING FUNCTION ..................................................... 2-1
Protection Tasks and Systems ........................................................................... 2-1
Air and Missile Defense ...................................................................................... 2-1
Personnel Recovery ........................................................................................... 2-3
Information Protection ........................................................................................ 2-4
Fratricide Avoidance ........................................................................................... 2-6
Operational Area Security .................................................................................. 2-7
Antiterrorism ....................................................................................................... 2-9
Survivability ...................................................................................................... 2-12
Force Health Protection .................................................................................... 2-13
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations ........................... 2-15
Safety................................................................................................................ 2-17
Operations Security .......................................................................................... 2-18
Explosive Ordnance Disposal .......................................................................... 2-18
Chapter 3 PROTECTION IN FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS ....................................... 3-1
Full Spectrum Operations ................................................................................... 3-1
Operational Design ............................................................................................. 3-3
Security Operations ............................................................................................ 3-4
Figures
Figure 1-1. Protection as an element of combat power ......................................................... 1-2
Figure 1-2. Security environment ........................................................................................... 1-4
Figure 1-3. METT-TC and hazard assessment factors.......................................................... 1-5
Figure 1-4. Elements of combat power .................................................................................. 1-6
Figure 1-5. Forms of protection .............................................................................................. 1-6
Figure 1-6. Principles of protection ........................................................................................ 1-8
Figure 1-7. Warfighting functions ........................................................................................... 1-9
Figure 1-8. CRM process ..................................................................................................... 1-12
Figure 3-1. Full spectrum operations ..................................................................................... 3-1
Figure 3-2. Screen security operation .................................................................................... 3-4
Figure 3-3. Guard security operation ..................................................................................... 3-5
Figure 3-4. Cover security operation...................................................................................... 3-8
Figure 3-5. Movement corridor operation............................................................................. 3-11
Figure 3-6. Whole-government, integrated approach to stability operations ....................... 3-12
Figure 3-7. Stability operations framework .......................................................................... 3-12
Figure 3-8. Controlling freedom of movement for protection .............................................. 3-13
Figure 4-1. Operations process ............................................................................................. 4-1
Figure 4-2. Continuing activities and integrating processes .................................................. 4-2
Tables
Table 1-1. Protection tasks and corresponding significant activities .................................... 1-10
Table 1-2. Army risk assessment matrix .............................................................................. 1-12
Table 3-1. Elements of full spectrum operations .................................................................... 3-3
Table 4-1. Expanded operations process with supporting topics ........................................... 4-5
Table 4-2. CRM process....................................................................................................... 4-10
Table 5-1. Sample protection working group activities ........................................................... 5-8
Table 5-2. Sample protection working group for vulnerability assessment ............................ 5-9
Table A-1. Protection synchronization for deployment ...........................................................A-3
Table A-2. Examples of transportation protective services ....................................................A-7
This manual affirms the composite risk management (CRM) process as the overarching process for integrating
protection into Army operations and depicts a broad methodology for determining protection priorities from
which specific decision support tools can nest. FM 3-37 provides guidance on how the protection cell within the
division, corps, and Army headquarters is formed for protection planning, preparation, execution, and
continuous assessment.
Note. It is Department of the Army (DA) policy to develop and employ all measures that prevent
attacks and minimize risks from hazards to Soldiers, civilians, their Families, infrastructures, and
information to achieve mission assurance. To adapt to an evolving environment and to achieve a
broad, coherent, and comprehensive approach to protection, the Army applies an all-hazards
approach to protection. This approach focuses on protecting personnel, physical assets, and
information from traditional, irregular, disruptive, and catastrophic threats, including criminal
activity and naturally occurring disasters. The Army will prepare to recover quickly if prevention
and protection efforts fail.
Commanders should be aware that homeland defense and civil support operations in the continental United
States (CONUS) are governed by a distinct set of laws and policies regarding the employment of forces, types
of operations, and use of force. These laws and policies must be factored into determining the appropriate use of
protection principles and tasks and systems for an operation in CONUS.
This manual follows joint doctrine and introduces several ideas to provide a context for understanding
protection within the military art and science of operations to achieve its purpose of preserving the force—
personnel (combatant and noncombatant), physical assets, and information. FM 3-37 strives for a broad
application of some universal concepts regarding protection and also integrates lessons learned from five years
of combat operations.
This manual is organized as follows:
• Chapter 1, Preserving the Force.
• Chapter 2, Protection Warfighting Function.
• Chapter 3, Protection in Full Spectrum Operations.
• Chapter 4, Protection Integration in Army Operations.
• Chapter 5, Protection Cells.
• Appendix A, Protection in Force Projection Operations.
• Appendix B, Combat Identification.
• Appendix C, Protection of Military Bases.
• Appendix D, Operations Security.
Definitions for which FM 3-37 is the proponent publication (the authority) are in boldfaced text and have an
asterisk in the glossary. These terms and their definitions will be incorporated into the next revision of FM 1-02.
For other definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the
definition.
This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/the Army National Guard of
the United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.
The proponent for this publication is the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Send
comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms)
directly to Commanding General, U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center, ATTN: ATZT-TDD, 320 MANSCEN
Loop, Suite 270, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 64573-8929. Submit an electronic DA Form 2028 or comments
and recommendations in the DA Form 2028 format by e-mail to <leon.mdottdddoc@conus.army.mil>.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.
PROTECTION ROLE
1-1. Military activities and operations are intrinsically hazardous. Commanders and leaders conducting
full spectrum operations must assume prudent risks every day based on the significance of the mission, the
exigency of the operation, and opportunity. In warfare, this reality defines a sacred trust that must exist
between leaders and Soldiers regarding mission accomplishment and protection. A commander’s inherent
duty to protect the force should not lead to risk aversion or inhibit the freedom of action necessary for
maintaining initiative and momentum or achieving decisive results during operations. Leaders balance
these competing responsibilities and make risk decisions based on experience, ethical and analytical
reasoning, and their knowledge of the unit and the situation and through intuitive judgment. It is through
protection that commanders and leaders preserve combat power and reduce the risk of loss, damage, or
injury to their formations.
1-2. Protection is the preservation of the effectiveness of mission-related military and nonmilitary
personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or
outside the boundaries of a given operational area.
1-3. Protection is an element of combat power and a warfighting function. As a contributor to overall
combat power, protection represents relative potential; as a warfighting function, protection refers to twelve
specific tasks and systems that are explained in chapter 2. It is easy to confuse these two constructs while
conceptualizing, visualizing, or describing protection means and capabilities. Commanders reference
protection as an element of combat power when they understand and visualize all possible activities,
actions, and effects available for protection. Some of these actions or effects may be achieved through the
combined integration of the other five elements of combat power (movement and maneuver, intelligence,
fires, sustainment, and command and control [C2]), focused by leadership and information and resulting in
an increasingly effective and efficient concept of protection. (See figure 1-1, page 1-2.)
Protection as an
Element of Combat
Power
Protection
Overall protection
Warfighting
potential is achieved
Function
through the combined
The protection integration of the
warfighting elements of combat
function power (protection,
employs the movement and
twelve specific maneuver,
tasks and intelligence, fires,
systems of sustainment, and C2),
protection. focused by leadership
and information.
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1-9. The nature and outcome of military operations are shaped within a complex framework of
environmental factors. The operational environment (OE) is defined as a composite of the conditions,
circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the
commander. (Joint Publication [JP] 3-0) (See FM 3-0 for more information.) Commanders and leaders
charged with providing or ensuring protection must begin with a thorough understanding of the OE, the
risks and opportunities resident there, and the ways and means available for preserving combat power
through protection. Army doctrine recognizes eight operational variables (political, military, economic,
social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time [PMESII-PT]) that can provide a
foundation for a broad assessment and understanding of the OE. These operational variables can be further
translated for use at the tactical level to support military operations, plans, missions, and orders through the
six Army mission variables (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, and civil considerations [METT-TC]). Using the METT-TC factors, leaders examine the
environment as it relates to their mission and begin the process of identifying threats and hazards.
THREATS
1-11. Threats are nation states, organizations, people, groups, conditions, or natural phenomena able to
damage or destroy life, vital resources, or institutions. (See FM 3-0 for more information.) Commanders
focus on threats to military operations that are generally coercive activities or information deliberately
conducted or implemented by an adaptable enemy or a willful threat. Army doctrine describes threats
through a range of four major categories or challenges—irregular, catastrophic, traditional, and disruptive.
(See FM 3-0 for more information.) These categories can be used to begin threat identification and
analysis; enhance situational understanding; and support plans, operations, and orders. (See figure 1-2, page
1-4.) Both threats and hazards have the potential to decrease combat power and the operational
effectiveness of the force. For this reason, their overall assessment and mitigation is accomplished through
the CRM process and applied throughout the operations process. Commanders develop risk reduction
measures and controls and threat mitigation strategies for all phases of military operations and activities.
LIKELIHOOD
IRREGULAR CATASTROPHIC
Guerilla Forces Hostile Nations and Rogue States
VULNERABILITY
• Protracts the struggle
• Relies on sanctuaries • Seeks to match WMD and delivery
capabilities
• Employs close combat
• Requires strategic deterrence
Radical Fundamentalists
TRADITIONAL DISRUPTIVE
Uniformed Military Forces Other Adversaries
Regional Adversaries
HAZARDS
1-12. Hazard is a condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death to personnel; damage to or
loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation. (JP 3-33) (See FM 5-19 for more information.)
Army risk management doctrine provides six categories (activity, disrupters, terrain and weather, people,
time available, and legal factors) to further focus METT-TC analysis for hazard identification. (See figure
1-3.) Accidental hazards are usually predictable and preventable and can be reduced through effective risk
management efforts. Commanders differentiate hazards from threats and develop focused protection
strategies and priorities that match protection capabilities with the corresponding threat or hazard while
synchronizing those efforts in space and time. However, hazards can be enabled by the tempo or friction or
by the complacency that sometimes develops during extended military operations.
COM
MBAT PO
OWER
1--13. Combat power
p is the total means off destructive, constructive,
c a informationn capabilities that a
and
m
military unit or formation cann apply at a giiven time. Arm my forces geneerate combat powerp by convverting
pootential into efffective action. (FM 3-0) (Seee FM 3-0 for more
m informatioon.) Combat poower is generaated by
transforming po otential into efffective action that is accom
mplished as leaaders use inforrmation to orgganize,
inntegrate, and fo ocus specific movement
m andd maneuver, inttelligence, firees, sustainmentt, C2, and prottection
caapabilities to form combineed arms operrations. (See figure f 1-4, paage 1-6.) Com mbined arms is the
syynchronized an nd simultaneouus application of the elemennts of combat power p to achieeve an effect greater
g
thhan if each elemment were usedd separately or sequentially. (FM
( 3-0)
1--14. Combat power
p b exactly quanntified, and its measure leadss to relative com
cannot be mbat power annalysis
annd assessmentts at best. Tacctical informattion systems and a controls measure
m and monitor
m the reelative
coombat power potential
p throuugh establishedd running estimmates and meaasures of effecctiveness (MOEs) or
m
measures of perrformance (MO OPs) to providee the context for
fo power accum mulation and expenditure.
e Leaders
innterpret and usee the informatiion to provide the
t purpose, diirection, and motivation
m that is necessary too focus
thhe operation annd accomplish thet mission.
1--15. As an elemment of combaat power, proteection represennts potential that reflects the totality of prottective
m
means in a given situation. Protection
P poteential is not absolute
a and, therefore,
t has a latent qualitty that
deepends on leaddership, missioon prioritizationn, and resourcee allocation ass its catalyst. Mission
M prioritiization
iss simply tangibble commoditiees and time. Protection
P poteential can be maximized
m by integrating
i thee other
fivve elements of
o combat pow wer with leadeership and infformation to reinforce
r proteection or to acchieve
coomplementary protective efffects. The goaal of protectionn integration at the tactical level is to balance
prrotection potenntial with the freedom of action
a throughoout the duratioon of militaryy operations. This
T is
acccomplished by b incrementaally integratingg reinforcing or complementary protection capabilities into
opperations until all significant vulnerabilitiess have been mitigated or elimminated.
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2 FM 3-37 1-5
Chapter 1
FORM
MS OF PRO
OTECTIO
ON
1-16. Protection can n take many forms. Militarry operations recognize fivve broad form ms of protectioon
(deterrrence, prevention, active seccurity, passive defense, and mitigation) too help organizee the protectioon
elemennt of combat power.
p (See figure
fi 1-5.) Thhese forms of protection suppport battle command and thhe
leaderr’s visualization to provide a context withhin which all protection
p actiivities can be understood annd
furtherr described. Thhey are nonseqquential, reflecct the continuoous nature of protection,
p andd may serve as a
methood to conceptu ualize protectioon capabilities for conductinng operations. Some militaryy activities maay
supporrt more than one form of prootection at a tim me in an overllapping manner, reflecting thhe dual nature of
o
protecction as an elemment of combaat power and as a a warfightinng function. Unlike
U maneuver, the forms of
o
protecction may oriennt on the terrainn, the protectedd asset, and/or the enemy.
F
Figure 1-5. Fo
orms of prote
ection
DETERRENCE
1-17. The posture of an individual, formation, or structure can have a deterrent effect on threat
decisionmaking and result in protection. The presence of well-trained, equipped, disciplined troops can
often deter confrontation or conflict and protect the success of an operation or organization. Well-armed
vehicles and fortifications may also deter enemy action and provide some level of protection for occupants
and inhabitants. Random AT measures help deter terrorist attacks by disrupting routine patterns and
presenting the appearance of greater security.
PREVENTION
1-18. Prevention involves the ability to neutralize, forestall, or reduce the likelihood of an imminent attack
before it occurs; it can be achieved through deliberate action or as an effect. When linked to effective
action, information sharing can increase situational awareness and increase protection. AT, OPSEC, and
information security programs rely on situational awareness and individual protective measures to reduce
the likelihood of an accident or attack. Alert and warning systems can reduce the effectiveness of an attack
or environmental event. Prevention does not typically represent an offensive, preemptive capability, but
may employ other measures (information engagement, civil and public affairs, preventive medicine).
ACTIVE SECURITY
1-19. Dynamic activities with the organic ability to detect, interdict, avert, disrupt, neutralize, or destroy
threats and hazards while maintaining the freedom of action can provide protection to the overall operation
or force. Aggressive patrolling, route security, or local security measures in the vicinity of critical assets
and bases provide protection. Some air missile defense assets represent active security measures.
PASSIVE DEFENSE
1-20. Protection can be achieved from survivability positions, fortifications, and physical barriers that are
designed to protect forces and material from identified threats and hazards. Some level of protection can
also be derived from the geographic positioning of a formation or critical asset; this may often be the most
expedient method of providing protection for some assets or resources. Bases, base clusters, tactical
command posts, refuel-on-the-move positions, forward logistics elements, and detainee holding areas are
all positioned after considering the protection potential of a particular location. The proximity to threats and
hazards, exploitable terrain and water features, and infrastructures can contribute to combat power potential
by influencing the protection potential of a specific area. The use of camouflage or smoke provides
protection through passive means.
MITIGATION
1-21. Mitigation is the activities and efforts that—
z Have the ability to minimize the effects or manage the consequence of attacks and designated
emergencies on personnel, physical assets, or information.
z Preserve the potential, capacity, or utility of a force or capability.
z Have a protective quality.
CBRN decontamination and PR, AT, and consequence management efforts may provide protection through
mitigation and enable the restoration of essential capabilities.
PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION
1-22. The five principles of protection—full-dimension, integrated, layered, redundant, and enduring—
represent or summarize the characteristics of successful protection integration and practice. These
principles provide military professionals with a context for implementing protection efforts, developing
protection strategies, and allocating resources. They are not a checklist and may not apply the same way in
every situation. (See figure 1-6, page 1-8.)
Fig
gure 1-6. Prin
nciples of pro
otection
FULL-DIMENSION
I
1-23. Protection is not
n a linear acctivity—it is a continuing annd enduring activity.
a Protecction efforts annd
activitties must conssider and accoount for threatts and hazardss in all directtions, at all timmes, and in alla
enviroonments. Protecction planning, coordination,, and implemenntation from hoome camp or station to an areea
of opeerations (AO) occur
o anywherre Soldiers or national
n interessts are located. (See appendixx A.) Situationnal
awarenness supports this
t principle and
a leads to an informed proteection response.
INTEGRA
ATED
1-24. Protection is integrated withh all other acttivities, system ms, efforts, and capabilities associated witth
militarry operations to
t provide strenngth and structture to the oveerall protectionn effort. Integraation must occuur
verticaally and horiizontally in all a phases of the operationns process. Protection
P inteegration shoulld
compllement other warfighting
w funnctions withouut significantlyy inhibiting thhe potential off combat poweer.
Protecction is typicallly integrated thhrough variouss forcing functtions such as working
w groupss, meetings, annd
boardss. (See chapter 5 for further innformation.)
LAYERED
D
1-25. Protection cap pabilities shoulld be arranged using a layereed approach to provide strenggth and depth to t
the ovverall protection
n system. Layeering also reduuces the destruuctive effect off a threat or hazzard through thhe
dissipaation of energyy or the culminnation of forcee and may provvide time to focus identificatiion, assessmennt,
o response effforts and actioons. Exclusion areas, barrierss, sally ports, passwords, annd
target acquisition, or
identitty badges are examples of layering tacticcs, techniquess, and proceduures (TTP) annd resources for fo
protecction.
REDUNDANT
1-26. Redundancy ensures
e that specific activities, systems, effforts, and capaabilities criticall for the success
of thee overall proteection effort have a seconndary or auxiliary effort off equal or greeater capabilityy.
Redunndant capabilities are not meerely duplicativve; they emphasize the overlapping of cappabilities so thhat
there are
a no seams in i the protectivve posture. Reddundancy mayy not be achievved in all proteection measurees,
makinng it necessary to identify thee critical pointt of failure or the critical path associated with
w each majoor
protecction activity, system,
s effort, and capability to ensure that redundancy is applied. Proteection efforts arre
often redundant and d overlapping anywhere vulnnerability, weaakness, or faillure is identifiied or expected.
Powerr generation sy ystems, water purification
p syystems, and pattrol distribution patterns are often resourceed
for reddundancy.
ENDURIN
NG
1-27. Protection hass an enduring quality
q that diffferentiates it frrom defense annd specific secuurity operationns.
Whereeas a tactical fo
orce defends onnly until it cann resume the offfense and a foormation providdes security inn a
manneer that maintaiins freedom off action, proteection has a peersistent characcter that servees one dominannt
puurpose—the prreservation of the protected asset or capabbility. The endduring characteer of protectionn may
afffect freedom of
o action and reesource allocattion.
WARFIGHTIING FUNC
CTIONS
1--28. Protection See figure 1-7.)) A warfightingg function is a group
n is one of the six warfighting functions. (S
off tasks and systems (people, organizations,
o information, and
a processes), united by a coommon purposse, that
coommanders usse to accompllish missions and training objectives. (F FM 3-0) Comm manders underrstand,
viisualize, descriibe, and directt operations inn terms of the warfighting fuunctions as theey represent taangible
taasks that becomme plans, orderrs, and missionns. Commanders integrate thee warfighting functions
f to geenerate
coombat power and a achieve itss full destructivve, disruptive, informationall, or constructiive potential thhrough
coombined arms. Combined arrms use inform mation and thee capabilities of each warfigghting functionn in a
coomplementary and/or reinforrcing relationshhip with other warfighting fuunctions. Proteection is not a linear
fuunction; it is a continuing acctivity that cann be sequentiallly planned buut its executionn and assessmeent are
coontinual.
PRO
OTECTIO
ON WARF
FIGHTING
G FUNCT
TION
1--29. The prottection warfighhting function is the related tasks and systtems that preseerve the force so the
coommander can n apply maxiimum combat power. (FM 3-0) Preservinng the force includes prottecting
peersonnel (com
mbatants and noncombatants)
n ), physical asssets, and inforrmation of thee United Statees and
m
multinational military
m and civilian partnners. The prrotection warffighting functtion facilitatees the
coommander’s ab bility to mainttain force inteegrity and com mbat power. Prrotection deterrmines the deggree to
w
which potential threats can dissrupt operationns and counters or mitigates thhose threats.
1--30. Whereas protection as an a element of combat powerr represents prrotection potenntial with an innfinite
chharacter, the prrotection warfiighting functioon serves to foccus protection efforts on tweelve specific taasks or
syystems:
z AMD D.
z PR.
z Informmation protecttion.
z Fratriicide avoidance.
z Operational area security.
z AT.
z Surviivability.
z FHP.
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2 FM 3-37 1-9
Chapter 1
z CBRN operations.
z Safety.
z OPSEC.
z EOD.
1-31. At a minimum, commanders consider the fundamentals of each task during military operations to
ensure the timely integration of proper protection efforts that are necessary in time and space to preserve the
force while supporting decisive, shaping, or sustaining operations. (See table 1-1.) (See chapter 2 for more
information on these tasks and systems.)
guidelines enable air defense artillery forces to successfully accomplish combat missions and support
overall force objectives. (See FM 44-100 for more information.)
Note. See appendix B for more information on AMD and airspace management.
PERSONNEL RECOVERY
2-11. PR is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and
reintegration of isolated personnel. (JP 3-50) PR is the overarching term for operations that focuses on
recovering isolated or missing personnel before becoming detained or captured and extracting those
detained or captured personnel through coordinated and well-planned operations.
2-12. PR operations occur within a complex framework of environmental factors that shape their nature
and affect their outcomes. Commanders must understand the OE and the impact of PMESII-PT to ensure
that PR is incorporated into and supports each mission. This includes the characteristics of the particular
OE to each mission and how aspects of the environment become essential elements in shaping the way
Army forces conduct operations. Threats to isolated Soldiers will vary significantly across the spectrum of
conflict.
2-13. PR is not a separate mission; it is incorporated into planning for all missions. PR guidance must
synchronize the actions of commanders and staffs, recovery forces, and isolated individuals. In order to
synchronize the actions of all three, commanders develop PR guidance based on command capabilities to
conduct recovery operations. By knowing what actions they have dictated to potential isolated Soldiers,
commanders develop situational understanding and provide guidance to their staffs and recovery forces to
synchronize their actions with those of isolated Soldiers.
2-14. Commanders must integrate PR throughout the full spectrum of operations. This requires
understanding the complex, dynamic relationships among friendly forces, enemies, and the environment
(including the populace). This understanding helps commanders visualize and describe their intent for PR
and develop focused planning guidance. As commanders develop PR guidance for subordinate units, they
must ensure that subordinates have adequate combat power for PR. Commanders must also provide
resources and define command relationships with the requisite flexibility to plan and execute PR
operations.
2-15. Commanders provide PR planning guidance within their initial intent statement. PR planning
guidance conveys the essence of the commander’s visualization with respect to incorporating PR into
mission planning. PR guidance provides a framework for how the unit and subordinates will synchronize
the actions of isolated personnel and the recovery force. Effective PR planning guidance accounts for the
OE and the continuum of operations. PR guidance is addressed in the synchronization of each warfighting
function. It broadly describes how the commander intends to employ combat power to accomplish PR
execution tasks within the higher commander’s intent.
company level, and issued to Soldiers as mission-specific ISG. Samples of information to be incorporated
into ISG are—
z Definition of “isolation.” ISG should clearly tell the Soldier under what circumstances he
should execute the ISG.
z Where to go. ISG must consider numerous factors, such as the scheme of maneuver (for the
directed mission), friendly situation, enemy situation, preestablished and higher C2 measures,
and battlefield control measures. Rally points may be designated in the higher order or
established in the unit order. Rally points may be established specifically for the PR purpose or
may be generic rally points that can serve several purposes. The “where to go” aspect may be
accomplished by directing Soldiers to move in a general direction until they reach a “lateral”
rally point, such as a road or river.
z What to do. ISG should describe actions that isolated Soldiers take, from initiating the ISG to
arriving at the designated location, including actions en route to the location. The ISG should
define actions (friendly and hostile) or the lack of actions that facilitate changes from the
primary location and may provide alternate, contingency, and emergency locations. Security
considerations that may have a bearing on friendly and hostile actions should also be addressed.
z Signals. This guidance can pertain to individual actions from the initiation of the ISG through
the linkup with a recovery force. It covers equipment that has been issued to the Soldier and
incorporates other data from paragraph 5 (Command and Control) of the unit order. It can
include procedures for linking up with a recovery force and specific instructions on using a
challenge and password, radios and beacons, and visual signals to overhead platforms.
2-19. Civil efforts to recover personnel or isolated persons may include sanctioned or unsanctioned
intervention by intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), influential
persons, or private citizens. Sometimes, civil organizations act independently without the knowledge of the
U.S. military or government.
2-20. Diplomatic and civil PR options can be requested or can be imposed upon the senior defense
representative and are most common when the isolated person has been captured or detained. (See JP 3-50
for more information.)
2-21. The ability of the Army to meet PR responsibilities hinges on leaders at every level preparing for the
recovery of isolated, missing, detained, or captured personnel. Leaders must integrate PR into ongoing
planning, preparation, and execution activities and consider many options for successful execution.
Reintegration must be planned, giving the operator knowledge that he and his family will be taken care of
during the entire PR process.
INFORMATION PROTECTION
2-22. Information protection is active or passive measures that protect and defend friendly information and
information systems to ensure timely, accurate, and relevant friendly information. It denies enemies,
adversaries, and others the opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systems for their
own purposes. (FM 3-0) When pursuing their objectives, adversaries attempt to keep commanders from
exercising effective C2 and, therefore, often target key decision makers and C2 information systems.
Information systems are typically vulnerable along the following primary attack vectors:
z Unauthorized access.
z Malicious software.
z Electromagnetic deception.
z Electronic attack.
z Physical destruction.
z Propaganda.
2-23. Protecting information is an enduring requirement that occurs in all environments. Information
protection is accomplished with a full range of protective means. Passive information protection measures
are those technical and nontechnical measures that are inherent to everyday operations and directly impact
users. They are designed to conceal information from, and deny information to, the threat; protect
information from unauthorized modification; and protect information from unauthorized destruction.
Measures include, but are not limited to, the implementation of access controls, application security,
physical security, security education, communications security, and network security. Passive measures are
readily standardized in unit policies and procedures.
2-24. Although carefully designated and implemented, passive protection measures reduce risk; they do
not provide total protection. In order to enhance the Army’s ability to safeguard information and
information systems against increased threats, vulnerabilities, and attacks, protection in a dynamic network
environment requires an active operational component at all echelons. Active processes consist of proactive
measures that enable an organization to protect against, and counteract the dynamic nature of, a threat by
using known TTPs to detect friendly vulnerabilities before the adversary. Additionally, active processes
enable a unit to react decisively during an incident and recover quickly after an incident.
2-25. External and internal information perimeter protection prevents unknown or unauthorized users or
data from entering a network. External efforts include communications security, router filtering, access
control lists, and security guards. Where necessary, units physically isolate or place barriers between
protected and unprotected networks. Internal perimeter protection consists of firewalls and router filters to
serve as barriers between echelons or functional communities.
exploitation and attack. To be successful, electronic protection must minimize the enemy’s ability to
conduct electronic warfare support and electronic attack operations against friendly forces.
Information Assurance
2-33. Information assurance consists of measures that protect and defend information and information
systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This
includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and
reaction capabilities. (JP 3-13) These attributes consist of—
z Availability—timely, reliable access to information and services by authorized users. (Available
information systems operate when needed.)
z Integrity—protection from unauthorized change including destruction.
z Authentication—certainty of user or receiver identification and authorization to receive specific
categories of information.
z Confidentiality—protection from unauthorized disclosure.
z Nonrepudiation—proof of message receipt and sender identification so that neither can deny
having processed the information.
2-34. Information assurance, along with CND, demonstrates a layered approach through defense in depth
that protects DOD systems against exploitation, degradation, and the denial of service. It does this by
employing vigorous protection, detection, reaction, and restoration capabilities. This incorporation allows
effective defensive measures or the timely restoration of degraded networks and information systems.
Information assurance defense in depth protects all networks, including their information systems,
computers, radios, infrastructure implementation, gateways, routers, and switches. (See FM 3-36 and
FM 6-20.10 for more information.)
FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE
2-35. Fratricide is the unintentional killing of friendly personnel by friendly firepower. The
destructive power and range of modern weapons, coupled with the high intensity and rapid tempo of
combat, increase the potential for fratricide. Tactical maneuvers, terrain, and weather conditions may also
increase the danger of fratricide.
2-36. Fratricide is accidental and is usually the end product of an error by a leader and/or Soldier. Accurate
information about locations and activities of friendly and hostile forces and an aggressive airspace
management plan help commanders avoid fratricide. Liaison officers increase situational understanding and
enhance interoperability. Leaders and Soldiers must know the range and blast characteristics of their
weapon systems and munitions to prevent ricochet, penetration, and other unintended effects.
2-37. Commanders and leaders are responsible for preventing fratricide. They must lower the probability
of fratricide without discouraging boldness and audacity. Good leadership that results in positive weapons
control, control of troop movements, and disciplined operational procedures contributes to achieving this
goal. Situational understanding and friendly personnel and combat identification methods also help.
Eliminating fratricide increases Soldier willingness to act boldly with the confidence that misdirected
friendly fires will not kill them. Additionally, more host nation contractors, day laborers, and NGO
personnel who support Army operations face the same risks as U.S. forces. Since these personnel work and
often live in and among U.S. forces, commanders must include them in protection and combat
identification plans. This may significantly increase the protection responsibility of commanders.
2-38. Commanders protect the fighting spirit of Soldiers through effective leadership and morale. Incidents
of fratricide can degrade unit effectiveness and combat power potential. The loss of confidence, hesitation,
oversupervision, and excessive caution are just some of the negative reactions that can afflict leaders and
Soldiers following a fratricide incident.
2-39. Fratricide avoidance is normally accomplished through a protection strategy that emphasizes
prevention, centered on two fundamental areas—situational awareness and target identification. Fratricide
may also be more prevalent during joint and coalition operations when communications and
interoperability challenges are not fully resolved.
z Situational awareness. Situational awareness is the immediate knowledge of the conditions of
the operation, constrained geographically and in time. (FM 3-0) It includes the real-time,
accurate knowledge of one’s own location and orientation and the locations, activities, and
intentions of other friendly, enemy, neutral, or noncombatant elements in the AO, sector, zone,
or immediate vicinity.
z Target identification. Target identification is the accurate and timely characterization of a
detected object on the battlefield as friend, neutral, enemy, or unknown. (FM 3-20.15) Unknown
objects should not be engaged; rather, the target identification process continues until positive
identification has been made. An exception to this is a weapons-free zone where units can fire at
anything that is not positively identified as friendly.
2-40. The potential for fratricide may increase with the fluid nature of the noncontiguous battlefield and
the changing disposition of attacking and defending forces. The presence of noncombatants in the AO
further complicates operations. Simplicity and clarity are often more important than a complex, detailed
plan when developing fratricide avoidance methods. (See appendix B for more information.)
during some phases of an operation. However, area security operations take advantage of the local security
measures performed by all units, regardless of their location in the AO.
2-43. Commanders at all levels apportion combat power and dedicate assets to protection tasks and
systems based on an analysis of the OE, the likelihood of threat action, and the relative value of friendly
resources and populations. Although all resources have value, the mission variables of METT-TC make
some resources, assets, or locations more significant to successful mission accomplishment from enemy
and friendly perspectives. Commanders rely on the CRM process and other specific assessment methods to
facilitate decisionmaking, issue guidance, and allocate resources. Criticality, vulnerability, and
recuperability are some of the most significant considerations in determining protection priorities that
become the subject of commander guidance and the focus of area security operations. Area security
operations often focus on the following assets and activities:
z Base and base cluster defense. Base defense is the local military measures, both normal and
emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a
base to ensure that the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to U.S. forces. (JP 1-02) A
division or corps may be required to protect multiple forward operating bases (FOBs). Units may
be assigned base defense operations on a permanent or rotating basis, depending on the mission
variables.
z Critical asset security. Critical asset security is the protection and security of personnel and
physical assets and/or information analyzed and deemed essential to the operation and
success of the mission and the required resources for protection. This designation generally
comes as a result of a deliberate assessment or as a directed mission.
z C2 node protection. Command posts and operations centers are often protected through area
security techniques that involve the employment of an array of protection and security assets in a
layered, integrated, and redundant manner. This can often keep hostile threats at a distance by
maximizing the standoff distance from explosive effects while keeping the protected asset
outside the range of enemy direct-fire weapons and observation.
z HRP security. HRP are personnel who, by their grade, assignment, symbolic value, or relative
isolation, are likely to be attractive or accessible terrorist targets. (JP 3-07.2) Special precautions
are taken to ensure the safety and security of these individuals and their family members. When
units identify a significant risk to selected personnel, the local commander normally organizes
security details from internal resources. However, under certain circumstances, designated
personnel may require protective service details by specially trained units.
z Physical security. Physical security consists of that part of security concerned with physical
measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment,
installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage,
damage, and theft. (JP 6-0) (See FM 3-19.30 for more information.) Physical security measures
as they pertain to AT identify physical vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks of bases, personnel, and
materiel and take actions to reduce or eliminate those vulnerabilities. Survivability operations
and general engineering support may be required to emplace compensatory measures for
identified vulnerabilities. The physical security system builds on the premise that baseline
security and the preparedness posture are based on the local threat, site-specific vulnerabilities,
identified critical assets, and available resources.
z Response force operations. Response force operations expediently reinforce a unit’s organic
protection capabilities or complement that protection with maneuver capabilities based on the
threat. Response force operations include the planning for defeat of Level I and Level II threats
and the shaping of Level III threats until a designated combined arms, tactical combat force
(TCF) arrives for decisive operations. (Threat levels are discussed in appendix C.) Response
force operations use a mobile force with appropriate fire support (usually designated by the area
commander) to deal with Level II threats in the AO. (See FM 3-19.1 for more information.)
z Lines of communications security. The security and protection of lines of communications and
supply routes are critical to military operations since most support traffic moves along these
routes. The security of supply routes and lines of communication (rail, pipeline, highway, and
waterway) presents one of the greatest security problems in an AO. Route security operations are
defensive in nature and are terrain-oriented. A route security force may prevent an enemy force
ANTITERRORISM
2-44. AT is the Army’s defensive program to protect against terrorism. Army AT focuses on risk
management, planning (including the AT plan), training, exercises, resource generation, comprehensive
program review, and the conduct of random AT measures. AT planning coordinates specific AT security
requirements with the efforts of other security enhancement programs, such as intelligence support to AT,
law enforcement, physical security, and others. Effective AT programs synchronize intelligence, CRM, and
existing security programs to provide a holistic approach to defend against terrorist threats. Units at each
echelon typically have at least one qualified AT officer assigned. (See DODI 2006.16 and Army Regulation
[AR] 525-13 for more information.)
Note. Units at each echelon should have at least one assigned Level II AT officer.
z Establish terrorist threat and incident response planning. Commanders and agency and
activity heads develop reactive plans. These plans prescribe appropriate actions for reporting
terrorist threat information, responding to terrorist threats and attacks, and reporting terrorist
incidents.
z Conduct exercises and evaluate and assess AT plans. Commanders institute an exercise
program that develops, refines, and tests AT response procedures to terrorist threats and
incidents. This exercise program ensures that AT is an integral part of exercise planning.
Note. A complete list of site-specific AT security measures linked to each particular FPCON is
generally contained in the installation, facility, or base AT plan.
2-48. Successful AT activities involve the overlapping of several protection tasks and systems. Incident
response clarifies procedures for C2 and the actions of responders. These actions include determining the
full nature and scope of the incident, containing damage, and reporting information to higher headquarters.
These measures can contribute to deterring attacks if potential adversaries recognize that U.S. forces are
vigilant and ready to respond to an incident. Incident response measures include emergency response,
disaster planning, and preparedness to recover from a terrorist attack.
2-49. Perimeter security requires a combination of physical security measures, such as protective obstacles,
physical barriers, fencing, protective lighting, and electronic security systems. Security personnel
continuously observe and assess measures, access control, entry control points, and guard towers.
Survivability operations help enable perimeter security by emplacing physical barriers, building
survivability positions, and hardening sites.
SURVIVABILITY
2-50. Survivability includes all aspects of protecting personnel, weapons, and supplies while
simultaneously deceiving the enemy. Survivability tactics include building a good defense; employing
frequent movement; using concealment, deception, and camouflage; and constructing fighting and
protective positions for both individuals and equipment. (JP 3-34)
2-51. Survivability operations are the development and construction of protective positions (such as earth
berms, dug-in positions, overhead protection, and countersurveillance means) to reduce the effectiveness of
enemy weapon systems. (FM 3-34) It also includes other mitigation TTP, such as fire prevention and
firefighting. (See FM 5-415 for more information.) Survivability and survivability operations combine
technology and methods that afford the maximum protection to Army forces. Survivability operations
range from employing camouflage, concealment, and deception (including the supporting task of battlefield
obscuration) to hardening facilities, C2 nodes, and critical infrastructure.
2-52. Survivability operations frequently enable other protection tasks and systems, including AMD,
operational area security, AT, and CBRN operations. Survivability operations also provide support to the
movement and maneuver warfighting function by conducting mobility and countermobility operations.
2-53. Commanders may call on engineers to support the protection efforts of combat or sustainment units.
Engineers can mass their skills and equipment to develop defensive positions into fortifications or
strongpoints and improve existing defensive positions. Within a missile threat environment, engineers
provide field fortification support to harden key assets against missile attacks. They also provide
survivability applications to host nation facilities and U.S.-operated facilities. These applications can
include entry control points, guard towers, and other means of hardening. Engineers provide protective
measures against terrorists that threaten U.S. forces or national interests. (See FM 5-103 for more
information.)
2-54. While survivability operations are traditionally recognized as an engineer task, units at all echelons
have an inherent responsibility to improve their positions, whether a fighting position, bunker, or FOB.
Survivability consists of four areas that are designed to focus efforts toward mitigating friendly losses to
hostile actions or environments:
z Mobility. Survivability of friendly forces is much more likely when they are moving or when
they possess the ability to reposition quickly. Maintaining freedom of movement and
repositioning often increases survivability. Static units must maintain the capability to move on
short notice.
z Situational understanding. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and
judgment to relevant information to determine the relationship among the mission variables to
facilitate decisionmaking. (FM 3-0) It requires the ability to identify, process, and comprehend
the critical elements of information about what occurs inside a commander’s AO. Having
accurate situational understanding provides the baseline for hazard assessments.
Note. The situational understanding of terrain, through proper terrain analysis, is important to
survivability and the development of survivability positions, minimizing the requirements to
adjust terrain and leading to the efficient use of survivability assets.
z Hardening. Hardening is the act of using natural or man-made materials to protect personnel,
equipment, or facilities. Hardening measures protect resources from blast, direct and indirect
fire, heat, radiation, or electronic warfare. Hardening is accomplished by using barriers, walls,
shields, berms, or other types of physical protection. It is intended to defeat or negate the effects
of an attack and includes fighting positions, protective positions, armored vehicles, Soldiers, and
information systems.
z Camouflage, concealment, and deception. Camouflage, concealment, and deception use
materials and techniques to hide, blend, disguise, decoy, or disrupt the appearance of military
targets and their backgrounds to prevent visual and electronic detection of friendly forces.
Camouflage, concealment, and deception help prevent an enemy from detecting or identifying
Medical Surveillance
2-61. Medical surveillance is the ongoing, systematic collection, analysis, and interpretation of data
derived from instances of medical care or medical evaluation, and the reporting of population-based
information for characterizing and countering threats to a population’s health, well-being, and performance.
(JP 4-02) Medical surveillance is essential to planning, implementing, and evaluating public health
practices. It closely integrates with the timely dissemination of data as required by higher authority. This
program provides the commander a trend analysis that is vital to hazard assessment for operations in an
AO.
VETERINARY SERVICES
2-63. The focus of veterinary services is food and animals. It covers food safety and defense and the
quality assurance of food during all stages of procurement, storage, and distribution; veterinary medical
care for military working dogs; and veterinary preventive medicine. Veterinary personnel are trained to
perform surveillance inspections of operational rations; and they examine and inspect food, ice, and bottled
water sources for contamination. In the event of CBRN contamination, these personnel can determine
whether packaged food sources are consumable. Veterinary personnel inspect all service-owned
subsistence received, stored, issued, sold, or shipped from or to military installations (including those items
received from depots and supply points). (See AR 40-656 for more information.)
2-64. Veterinary personnel provide complete care for military working dogs, limited care for other DOD
and government-owned animals when time and resources permit, and limited care to indigenous animals as
directed. The veterinary preventive medicine mission includes prevention and control programs to protect
Soldiers from food-borne diseases. It establishes animal disease prevention and control programs to protect
Soldiers and their families, contractors, and other personnel from zoonotic diseases. Veterinary personnel
evaluate zoonotic disease data collected in the AO and advise preventive medicine elements and higher
headquarters on potential hazards to humans. They also investigate unexplained animal deaths, including
livestock and wildlife. (See FM 4-02.18 for more information.)
prolonged stress. Mental health sections identify Soldiers with combat and operational stress reactions and
those who need rest and restoration in or near their unit area for rapid return to duty. These programs aim to
maximize the return-to-duty rate of Soldiers who are temporarily impaired, have a behavior health
diagnosis, or have stress-related conditions. Preventing posttraumatic stress disorders is an important
objective for all Army leaders. (See FM 4-02.51 for more information.)
PREVENTIVE DENTISTRY
2-67. Military preventive dentistry incorporates primary, secondary, and tertiary preventive measures taken
to reduce or eliminate oral conditions that decrease Soldier fitness to perform the mission and cause
absence from duty. Dental care measures for Soldiers are described under preventive dentistry and known
as the Dental Combat Effectiveness Program. Before operational deployment, preventive dentistry
measures include the Basic Combat Training/Advanced Individual Training Dental Program (a program to
treat Class 3 dental patients), the Soldier Readiness Program (described in AR 600-8-101), and the
preventive dentistry programs described in AR 40-35. (See FM 4-02.19 for more information.)
2-68. Deployed Soldiers are at higher risks of developing oral diseases, probably due to inadequate oral
hygiene and altered nutritional intake. Nearly all oral disease is preventable with the use of good personal
health habits (proper diet and nutrition, oral hygiene, and substance abuse). Effective oral disease
prevention methods are simple, inexpensive, and readily available. During deployment, commanders must
ensure that primary preventive services are implemented and monitored to improve the dental readiness of
Soldiers in support of military operations. Leaders ensure that drinking water supplied to Soldiers is
optimally fluoridated, when possible, and provide oral health information in the AO at every opportunity.
Leaders ensure that Soldiers are aware of healthful stress reduction habits and techniques and that they
know the importance of avoiding harmful oral habits, such as tobacco use and improper diet. Soldiers
should have access to oral hygiene devices and have the opportunity to practice good oral hygiene. Soldiers
receive dental floss, toothbrushes, and fluoridated toothpaste in the Ration Supplement, Sundries Pack,
Type I. Local Post Exchanges also carry oral hygiene supplies.
SAFETY
2-77. Safety has a full spectrum mission. Operational conditions often impose significant hazards to
Soldiers through the increased probability of an accidental event. In extreme OEs, these hazards raise the
risk level as equipment and personnel are taxed. Leaders must know their Soldiers and trained crews, and
operators must know the capabilities and limitations of their platforms and systems. To maintain a
continuous operational tempo, commanders must know how to employ and sustain personnel and
equipment. When planning operations, commanders—
z Consider human endurance limits and environmental conditions.
z Balance the possible benefits of sustained, high-tempo operations with the level of risk.
z Accept no unnecessary risks.
z Conduct high-risk operations only when the potential gain or benefit outweighs the potential
loss.
2-78. Integrating safety into the operations process through the protection warfighting function and the
CRM process provides an opportunity to identify and assess hazards to the force and develop risk reduction
measures. (See FM 5-19 for more information.) The responsibility for safety starts with the commander and
continues through the chain of command to individuals. Safety works best when all leaders and Soldiers
receive training to recognize hazards and implement controls to reduce or mitigate risks in their daily
operations. (See AR 385-10 for more information.)
2-79. Commanders at all levels normally have a safety officer assigned to their personal or special staff.
The safety officer—
z Assists commanders in evaluating and maintaining awareness of safety-related issues, while
facilitating safety integration.
z Maintains a close, day-to-day working relationship with the protection cell.
z Is a member of many forcing functions and forums, including the protection working group.
z Travels throughout the AO.
z Observes safety-related issues.
z Provides technical assistance to leaders and planners as they develop and execute safety
programs, plans, orders, and SOPs.
OPERATIONS SECURITY
2-80. OPSEC is the process of identifying essential elements of friendly information and subsequently
analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions
that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators hostile intelligence systems
might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful
to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the
vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. (FM 3-13) (See AR 530-1 for more
information.)
2-81. OPSEC applies to all operations across the spectrum of conflict. All units conduct OPSEC to
preserve essential secrecy. Commanders establish routine OPSEC measures in unit SOPs. The OPSEC
officer coordinates additional OPSEC measures with the G-2; assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3); and
other staff and command elements. The OPSEC officer develops measures during the military
decisionmaking process (MDMP). The G-2 assists the OPSEC process by comparing friendly OPSEC
indicators with enemy intelligence collection capabilities. The chief of protection, OPSEC officer, and
protection cell staff integrate OPSEC into all operations. (See appendix D for more information.)
Note. EOD provides technical assistance for the salvage, demolition, neutralization, or other
disposition of government-owned shipments in transit.
Note. A priority of Army mortuary affairs is immediate recovery and clearance of deceased
persons. The presence of UXO found on, embedded in, or in the vicinity of deceased persons
adversely impacts the recovery of deceased U.S. or coalition personnel. Therefore, Army
planners should involve EOD in the planning stages for the recovery and processing of deceased
personnel.
FUL
LL SPECT
TRUM OP
PERATIO
ONS
3--1. Full specttrum operationns is the Armyy’s operationall concept of coombining offennsive, defensivve, and
sttability or civill support operaations simultanneously as partt of an interdeppendent joint force
f to seize, retain,
annd exploit the initiative,
i acceepting prudent risk to create opportunity.
o Thhey employ syynchronized acttion—
leethal and nonllethal—proporrtional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding u of all
vaariables of thee OE. Missionn command thhat conveys inntent and an appreciation
a o all aspects of the
of
siituation guidess the adaptive use of Army forces.f (FM 3--0) Ultimately,, full spectrum
m operations crreate a
saafe and secure environment where w the stabbilization and restoration
r of peaceful
p proceesses can prevaail and
enndure. (See figure 3-1.)
30
0 September 2009
2 FM 3-37 3-1
Chapter 3
3-2. Full spectrum operations require continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and
stability or civil support tasks:
z Outside the continental United States (OCONUS). Operations conducted OCONUS and in its
territories simultaneously combine three elements—offense, defense, and stability. Commanders
balance the right mix of constructive and destructive capabilities along with lethal and nonlethal
actions to create dilemmas for opponents. Stability operations are characterized by nonlethal
actions, but the ability to engage potential threats with lethal force remains a viable deterrent.
z CONUS. Operations in CONUS and in its territories require the element of civil support or a
combination of offensive and defensive elements, depending on the nature of the mission. Civil
support operations are characterized by nonlethal support actions. The use of offensive and
defensive elements in CONUS is limited to very specific circumstances associated with
homeland defense or self-defense by installations and personnel from hostile or life-threatening
attacks. Offensive and defensive elements may only be used in accordance with U.S. law and
DOD policy.
3-3. The Army can perform many tasks simultaneously, but not necessarily with equal emphasis or
effectiveness. Commanders and leaders must be flexible and adaptive as they seek opportunities to seize,
retain, and exploit the initiative. Leaders must have enhanced situational understanding in simultaneous full
spectrum operations due to the diversity of threats, the proximity to civilians, and the impact of information
during operations. The fluid, dynamic, and changing nature of operations may require the surge of certain
capabilities, such as protection, to effectively link decisive operations to shaping or stabilizing activities in
the AO. In other operations, the threat may be less discernible, unlikely to mass, and immune to the center
of gravity analysis, which requires a constant and continuous protection effort or presence.
3-4. Full spectrum operations are also characterized by initiative, simultaneity, and synchronization.
Operational and individual initiative involves intrinsic risk and opportunity, and significant opportunities
do not typically last long. Full spectrum operations must be capable of simultaneity (enabled through the
exercise of mission command) in order to act on opportunity. Mission command requires mutual trust and
full knowledge of the operational concept and demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise
disciplined, aggressive, and independent initiative to accomplish the mission within the commander’s
intent.
3-5. Commanders must accept risk to exploit time-sensitive opportunities by acting before adversaries
discover vulnerabilities, take evasive or defensive action, and implement countermeasures. Commanders
and leaders can continue to act on operational and individual initiative if they make better risk decisions
faster than the enemy, ultimately breaking the enemy’s will and morale through relentless pressure.
Commanders can leverage technological advancements or processes that improve endurance and protection
capabilities to increase the probability of mission accomplishment. Advanced information technologies
increase commanders’ situational awareness, and the improved awareness enables commanders to make
better risk decisions faster than the enemy.
3-6. Accurate assessment is essential for effective decisionmaking and the apportionment of combat
power to protection tasks. Commanders fulfill protection requirements by applying or deriving reinforcing
or complementing protection capabilities from forces in primary, supporting, or economy-of-force roles or
from the OE itself. This is accomplished by identifying all protection capabilities available to the
commander and then proportionately synchronizing them within the concept of operations and with all
other full spectrum activities. Protection can be derived as a by-product or a complementary result of some
combat operations (such as security operations), or it can be deliberately applied as commanders integrate
and synchronize tasks and systems that comprise the protection warfighting function.
3-7. Full spectrum operations are normally translated into action through the development and
arrangement of primary and subordinate tasks that ultimately become missions. (See table 3-1.)
OPERATIONAL DESIGN
3-8. Commanders and leaders use all aspects of military art and science to protect the force. At the
operational level, leaders consider protection as they implement the elements of operations design to
reinforce and complement protection. As they understand and visualize the OE, commanders develop broad
concepts to effectively employ land power. Through the operational art, they define problems and
challenges, formulate and refine designs, and link them through METT-TC variables to tangible and
achievable objectives at the tactical level. Protection can often be derived from the effect or outcome of an
operational approach that makes effective use of time, terrain, tides, or tempo. Ports, lodgment and staging
areas, airfields, and drop zones are often decisive points that are selected or shaped for their ability to offer
some level of protection to the force, mission, or center of gravity. Sanctuaries and safe havens are selected
for their ability to provide protection, defense, or egress that is necessary to preserve the force or
population. The elements of combat power can be sequenced in a reinforcing and complementary manner
that provides protection for offensive action through preparatory activities, preemption, or diversion. Joint
capabilities can also help set conditions that reduce risk and increase protection.
3-9. At the tactical level, AOs are often designated and assigned based on factors in the OE and unit
capability. Unit boundaries, fire control restrictions, and graphic control measures help create zones of
action, engagement areas, and kill zones for friendly forces that help commanders reduce the likelihood of
fratricide or accidental damage. Rules of engagement (ROE), warning systems, and weapons control status
protect the force and populations through the controlled application of lethal and nonlethal action. To this
end, commanders are often given additional authority or C2, such as tactical control, to ensure the
synchronization (necessary for rapid response, defense, and protection) of all elements operating in or near
the AO.
SECUR
RITY OPE
ERATION
NS
3-10. One of the most
m common methods
m of prroviding protecction for grouund combat forces during fuull
spectruum operations is through seccurity operationns. The ultimatte goal of securrity operations is to protect thhe
force from surprise and reduce the unknown in any situation.. Doctrine recoognizes five foorms of securitty
operattions in the millitary art:
z Screen.
z Guard.
z Cover.
z Area secu
urity.
z Local secu urity.
3-11. Commanders use u all five forrms of securityy to protect the force during offensive
o operaations; althoughh,
screenn, guard, and cover are typpically associaated with com mbat formationns specificallyy organized for fo
combiined arms man neuver. For thiis reason, screen, guard, andd cover are alsso aligned withh the movemennt
and maneuver
m warfighting functionn while area security is alignned with the prrotection warffighting functioon
for tacctical task appo
ortionment.
3-12. Screen, guard,, and cover operations reflecct increasing leevels of combaat power that caan be applied to
t
protecct an asset or force
f from a directed threat and are typicaally conducted by combat unnits designed forfo
combiined arms man neuver. The priimary purposee of a screen operation
o (see figure
f 3-2) is to
t provide earlly
warninng, thereby preeventing surpriise. Guard andd cover operatiions (see figuree 3-3) involve combined armms
units in
i combat, fig ghting to gain time with difffering levels of
o capability annd autonomy for independennt
actionn.
Figu
ure 3-2. Scree
en security operation
o
t formation, asset, or locattion they are prrotecting and do
3-13. Area security operations usuually focus on the d
not noormally focus on the enemyy force. Area security operrations take addvantage of thhe various local
securitty measures being
b performeed by all unitss in the AO. Local
L securityy measures aree inherent to all
a
operattions and inclu
ude active andd passive meassures taken aggainst enemy actions.
a Local security allowws
commmanders to provvide immediatee, responsive seecurity to the foorce.
OFFE
ENSE
3--14. Offensive operations aree combat operations conductted to defeat annd destroy eneemy forces andd seize
teerrain, resourcees, and populaation centers. They impose the commander’s will on thhe enemy. (FM M 3-0)
Suurprise, concen ntration, tempoo, and audacityy characterize the offense. Movement
M and maneuver dom minate
T application of protection capabilities
duuring offensivee operations. The c to offensive operrations is challeenging
beecause of the dynamic natuure of offense action and thhe need for boold initiative that t depends ono the
w
willingness to accept
a risk. Prrotection can be
b derived thrrough audacityy or surprise or o by increasinng the
teempo of offenssive operations. On the offensse, leaders must balance the need for cautioon with the pootential
siignificance thaat opportunity offers
o and musst weight theirr decision in faavor of initiativve and action. Army
foorces conduct offensive
o operaations for seveeral purposes, such
s as destroyying or disruptting an enemy force,
seeizing key terraain, or creatingg a secure enviironment for stability operatiions. At the opperational level, they
deefeat enemy forces
f that thhreaten importtant areas or governments. Primary offeensive tasks innclude
m
movement to co
ontact, attack, exploitation,
e annd pursuit. (Seee FM 3-0 for more
m informatioon.)
3--15. Seizing, retaining,
r andd exploiting innitiative and opportunity
o arre the essencees of the offeensive.
A
Activities that do
d not directly contribute to that goal often become suppoorting, secondaary, or nested efforts.
e
Inn offensive opeerations, protecction must be applied
a carefullly and selectivvely to ensure that it does noot have
a debilitating effect
e on a coommander’s freedom
fr of acction. This is accomplished through prottection
inntegration and synchronizatioon. Protection efforts are inttegrated with other o combat power
p elemennts and
syynchronized sim multaneously oro sequentiallyy where and whenw significannt hazards and threats are proojected
inn the offensivee plan. This iss typically a function
fu of thee protection ceell and the G-33 at echelons above
brrigade, and it is
i achieved thrrough a host of o formal and informal
i proceesses at brigadee and below. During
D
offfensive operattions, typical points
p of vulneerability includde flanks, criticcal C2 nodes annd capabilitiess, lines
off communicatiions, sustainmeent areas, fratrricidal events, unstable popuulations, and accidents.
a Prottection
inntegration is disscussed in chappter 4.
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2 FM 3-37 3-5
Chapter 3
3-24. The following vignette shows how a commander carefully balances threat and vulnerability to decide
on acceptable risk and complete the mission according to the higher commander’s intent.
DEFENSE
E
3-25. Defensive opeerations are combat
c operattions conducteed to defeat an a enemy attaack, gain tim me,
econom mize forces, and develop conditions favvorable for offensive
o or stability
s operattions. (FM 3-00)
Successful defensivee operations are often charactterized by prepparation, securiity, disruption,, massed effectts,
and fleexibility. Commanders may also a choose to defend for othher purposes, to include retaiining key terraiin
or prootecting the po opulace, criticaal assets, and infrastructure.. There are thhree tasks assoociated with thhe
defensse—area defen nse, mobile deffense, and retroograde movemeent. While areaa and mobile defense
d basicallly
describbe typical defeensive patterns involving commbat, retrograde movement geenerally involvves an organizeed
movem ment away from m the enemy too preserve the force.
f
3-26. In a mobile deefense, the deffender withhollds a large porttion of availabble forces for use
u as a strikinng
force in
i a counterattack. Mobile deefenses requiree enough depthh to let enemy forces advancee into a positioon
that exxposes them too counterattackk. The defense separates attacking forces frrom their suppport and disruppts
the ennemy’s C2. As A enemy forcces extend theemselves in thhe defended arrea and lose momentumm annd
organiization, the deffender surprises and overwheelms them withh a powerful coounterattack.
3-27. A mobile deffense normallyy integrates elements
e of offfense, defensse, and delay while focusinng
combiined arms man neuver on the destruction off enemy forcess. Most of thee force forms a striking forcce,
while the rest of thhe force defendds in depth annd exposes thee enemy to coounterattack. An A area defensse
concenntrates on denyying enemy access to a particcular area of teerrain, restrictinng their freedoom of maneuveer,
and drrawing them innto kill zones and
a engagemennt areas where they can be deefeated in detaiil from mutuallly
supporrting positions.
Figu
ure 3-4. Cove
er security operation
3-37. Preventable accidents can thwart mission success during combat operations. Leaders must continue
to assess the environment and routine activities for the evidence of hazards that can lead to the preventable
loss of combat power through accidents and events. Personnel rest and recovery plans, leader experience,
and skill levels are safety considerations that influence risk management decisions during combat
operations.
STABILITY
3-38. Stability operations is an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and
activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to
maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services,
emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0) Stability operations aim to
stabilize the environment enough that the host nation can begin to resolve the root causes of conflict and
failure of the state. When a host nation or other agency cannot provide the basic functions of government,
military forces may be introduced to establish or restore basic civil functions and protect them until the host
nation or a civil authority is capable of providing these services for the local populace. Stability operations
are often more important to the lasting success of military operations than traditional combat operations
because they enable the introduction of other instruments of national power to an OE, creating a stable
foundation for the transfer of activities to civilian or host nation control.
3-39. Stability operations are conducted within the context of full spectrum operations (see figure 3-1, page
3-1). Offensive operations continue, but are generally characterized as episodic activities against specific or
focused targets, individuals, or groups. Offensive operations may include limited major operations against
former warring parties or raids and deliberate cordon-and-search operations throughout the OE. Defensive
operations may be conducted to protect facilities, enclaves, sanctuaries, or groups or to gain time for
response forces to take decisive action.
3-40. Military forces must quickly seize and retain the initiative in stability operations to gain control of
civil mechanisms of power and the environment and to prevent local conditions from destabilizing or
deteriorating. Acting boldly can prevent organized resistance from developing, while creating opportunities
for actions necessary to reduce suffering, strengthen institutions, and begin the transition to civil authority.
Bold initiatives during stability operations involve risk. The close proximity to civilians with immediate
access to global information conduits can magnify the consequences of inaction, accidents, collateral
damage, and casualties. Leaders must carefully balance lethal and nonlethal actions during stability
operations. Overcautious prevention activities or procedures limit the freedom of action just as unrestrained
action can result in provocation tactics by adversaries.
3-41. Fragile states suffer from institutional weaknesses that threaten the survival of their central
government. (See FM 3-07 for more information.) Stability operation strategies are developed to achieve
conflict resolution by enhancing host nation legitimacy, civil institution development through capacity-
building activities, and progress toward justice and the rule of law. They support and reflect overarching
national security, defense, and military strategies and policies eventually articulated within the framework
of the campaign plan at the operational level. At this level, stability operation strategies often require the
integration of operational and tactical tasks along the lines of effort that lead to the following end state
conditions:
z Safe and secure environment.
z Established rule of law.
z Social well-being.
z Stable government.
z Sustainable economy.
3-42. Protection of the force during stability operations is essential for success at all levels of operations,
from tactical to strategic. Like offensive and defensive operations, stability operations can derive some
protection from the concept of operations alone, but the most sustainable protection success for the force is
achieved by integrating the protection tasks and systems that comprise the protection warfighting function.
Loss, damage, injuries, and casualties can influence the will of participating populations to sustain
opperations. Thee enduring natture of stabilitty operations may require a protection sttrategy that is more
reesource-intensiive and prescribbed than typicaal security operrations.
3--43. Stability operations reqquire commandders to balance protection needs n between military forcees and
ciivil population ns. Because U.S.
U forces andd the local poopulation frequuently interactt, planning forr their
prrotection is immportant and diifficult. Enemies attack to weaken
w U.S. ressolve and prom mote their indiividual
aggendas. Such enemies,
e who may be nearlyy indistinguishhable from nonncombatants, viewv U.S. forcees and
faacilities as prim
me targets. An additional plannning considerration during stability
s operatiions is to proteect the
foorce while usin ng the minimum m force consisttent with the approved
a ROE.. The escalation of force TTP P must
allso be rehearseed and flexible enough to chaange with the local
l threat connditions. Collaateral damage caused
c
byy military op perations can negatively im mpact the misssion and suppport enemy provocation tactics. t
C
Conversely, oveerly restrictive ROE can limiit the commandder’s freedom of action and ability to proteect the
foorce.
3--44. Stability operations
o andd irregular warffare often involve conflict beetween nonstatee actors who possess
p
limmited conventtional forces. For
F this reasonn, some Armyy functional caapabilities are often retaskedd from
thheir primary fuunction to condduct or reinforrce protection efforts such as
a fratricide avvoidance, operaational
seecurity, and ATT based on ME ETT-TC.
3--45. Adversariies often blendd in with the local populacee during stabillity operations and are difficcult to
iddentify, making g heightened levels of awarreness the norrm. Civil areas typically conntain structureed and
prrepared routes, roadways, annd avenues thaat can canalizee traffic. Contrrol measures (such
( as establlishing
traffic patterns)) could alleviaate traffic concerns, but maay also exposee vulnerabilitiees that enemiees and
addversaries willl exploit. This can lead too predictable friendly
f movement patterns that can easily be
teemplated by th
he enemy. Com mmanders mayy gradually appply protection to t protect movvement, or theyy may
esstablish a moveement corridorr. (See figure 3-5.)
Fig
gure 3-5. Mo
ovement corrridor operatio
on
3--46. Informatioon engagemennt is an essentiial activity durring stability operations
o andd is a key prottection
ennabler. Commaanders and Solldiers engage the t local popullation to informm friendly audiences and infl
fluence
neeutral audiencces, enemies, and adversarries. This cann include meeasures such as improving local
innformation proograms, improvving populace and infrastruccture security, defeating IED D bomb-makinng and
ng efforts, andd defeating innsurgent or teerrorist recruittment efforts. Civil affairs (CA)
exxpertise-fundin
orrganizations heelp develop foormal and infoormal relationsships. Leaders and Soldiers conduct inform mation
enngagement task ks to facilitatee the delivery of friendly meessages and thhemes (matcheed by actions ono the
grround) to key leaders
l and poppulation groups.
3--47. The closee proximity of civilians and Soldiers can alsoa promote FHP
F issues (succh as communnicable
diisease) through
h close contactt with local civvilians, detaineees, or local fooods. Stability operations aree often
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2 FM 3-37 3-11
Chapter 3
Fa
ailed F
Failing Recov
vering
Vio
olent conflict Normalizzation
Fosterring
Sustainability
Trans
sformation
Initial
Response
R
3-51. Protection strategies for stability operations often begin by determining where the current situation is
best described along the fragile-state spectrum or continuum and then applying protection capabilities to
the most significant military and civilian vulnerabilities. Primary stability operation tasks reflect a host of
subtasks within the continuum of operations and throughout the five stability sectors. Protection measures
are applied during vulnerability assessments focused on the primary stability operation tasks.
3-54. The protection of key personnel and facilities may be an essential task anywhere in the stability
operations fragile-state spectrum or stability operations framework where there is a directed threat. Key
civil leaders may require protective services, sound AT and OPSEC procedures that are included in PR
plans and battle drills, and police and physical security reinforcement. Facilities that have national, cultural,
religious, or military significance may need dedicated security to reduce civil tension. Police stations,
armories, and hospitals may require immediate protection during heightened awareness. Records and
documentation for verifying identity and authority, deviant behavior, key governmental actions, and other
important historical events and information may need to be protected from destruction and misuse.
Explosives, mines, UXO, or CBRN hazards may exist in the OE at the cessation of hostilities or may be
introduced deliberately or accidentally. These threats and hazards may require an integrated EOD,
demining, or foreign consequence management response.
ESTABLISH CIVIL CONTROL
3-55. Transformation occurs in the stability operations framework as civil security is achieved and certain
risks are reduced, making other stability operation tasks possible. Civil control regulates behavior in an AO
and builds the foundation for order, justice, and the rule of law. There is a host of enforcement mechanisms
in a given society to maintain normalcy and civil behavior, including law enforcement officials, local
political and civic leaders, educators, clergy, and others who reflect and maintain local law, customs,
norms, and values. Most civil societies follow some form of predictable social activity cycle that often
includes seasonal, ethnic, religious, or cultural events such as holidays, school or academic periods, or days
of specific observance. The chief of protection examines the significance of each event for potential
hazards, risks, and opportunities and applies the requisite protection capability. For example, religious
holidays or pilgrimages may increase the number of third-country nationals entering the host nation while a
patriotic event could lead to the massing of civilians at key governmental locations. The end of the
academic school period may increase the number of adolescents in the streets of certain regions.
3-56. Military forces may be initially engaged in conducting policing and penal operations to prevent
criminal activity or to reduce crime-conducive conditions in a particular area. These activities protect
communities from criminal predators who can have a chilling effect on populations and destabilize specific
areas. In these operations, military forces must be proficient in the escalation of force before resorting to
lethal action within the ROE. Nonlethal TTP and technologies provide commanders with the ability to
demonstrate a measured force response which can contribute to the protection of the force and the civil
populace. The presence of well-trained, equipped, and disciplined troops with lethal or violent capability
can often be sufficient to deter violence, confrontation, or conflict during a stability operation. Law
enforcement activities transition from military personnel to civilian police who are supplied by the host
nation or as part of a third-country or international policing effort. Police training, development, and
mentoring may continue until normalization is achieved. Commanders may authorize, develop, and train
civilian volunteers to augment civil control efforts or to serve as a police auxiliary.
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES
3-57. Areas that have been neglected or damaged as a result of conflict may require the protection of
essential infrastructure. Power generation, water treatment, medical, and transportation facilities and
systems may require protection from pilferage, sabotage, or neglect which may be accomplished through
physical security, survivability, or area security TTP. Broadcast news, journalists, media outlets, and other
information venues often adhere to a predictable media or news cycle. The chief of protection works with
public affairs personnel to restore local media outlets and to anticipate the impact of negative or sensational
broadcast media or other information releases to the force or in the OE. Information engagement also
involves significant leader and Soldier engagement with the local population as a means for informing the
public while also gathering information on the environment.
3-58. By integrating military and host nation police forces early, commanders get police or street level
information on local criminal elements, including organized crime. Through combined police operations,
commanders help establish a safe and secure environment for U.S. forces, host nation forces, and civilians.
Such multinational operations also improve the perception of host nation government legitimacy. When no
insurgent or terrorist threat exists, integrating protection actions may be limited to safety and FHP
activities.
SUPPORT GOVERNANCE
3-59. When conditions in a failed or failing state become extreme and prevent the host nation government
from conducting civic functions, military forces must be capable of providing support to governance and
civic functions while acting as a transitional military authority according to the international law or
mandate. (See FM 3-07 for more information.) In this capacity, military forces may be required to protect
the integrity of specific governmental processes. Elections normally follow a predictable cycle of activity
that can be examined for the evidence of corruption, election fraud, organized criminal involvement, or
threat interference. Election events, voting sites, and ballots require protection and safe access to ensure the
legitimacy of election results. International election monitors or support personnel may also require some
level of personnel protection.
CIVIL SUPPORT
3-61. DOD civil support operations are divided into the three broad categories of domestic emergencies,
support of designated law enforcement agencies, and other support activities (JP 3-28). This includes
responds during disasters and declared emergencies, support or restoration of public health and services and
civil order, support during national special security events, and periodic planned support of other activities.
Army forces conduct civil support operations exclusive of the elements of offense and defense. (See FM 3-
0 for more information.)
3-62. When support for domestic emergencies is provided under the auspices of the national response
framework, it is called defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). The national response framework is the
Department of Homeland Security guide to how the nation conducts an all-hazards response. It is built
upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to align key roles and responsibilities across
the nation. Federal, state, tribal, and local governments; nongovernmental organizations; and the private
sector use the National Incident Management System to execute response to incidents. The National
Incident Management System provides a consistent nationwide template that allows public and private
sectors to work together to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of
incidents, regardless of their cause, size, location, or complexity. Unless otherwise directed by the
President, the U.S. military conducts DSCA operations in support of other federal agencies that are
coordinating the federal response. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is typically the
primary federal agency for requesting and coordinating DOD support.
3-63. The commitment of DOD resources for DSCA operations requires approval by the Secretary of
Defense or direction from the President. In most instances, DOD provides DSCA in response to a request
for assistance from another federal agency when local, tribal, state, and federal resources are fully
committed or when a DOD-unique capability is required. All requests for assistances are evaluated by
DOD to determine whether they meet the criteria for supportability (legality, lethality, risk, cost,
appropriateness, and impact on readiness). Once the request for assistance is approved, DOD issues a
mission assignment that specifies exactly what type and how much support is authorized. In some
imminently serious situations, local commanders may unilaterally initiate an immediate response to save
lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. However, Secretary of Defense approval
or Presidential directive is still required for the commitment of potentially lethal capabilities or direct law
enforcement support, including interdicting vehicles; conducting searches and seizures; making arrests or
apprehensions; and performing surveillance, investigation or undercover work, security patrols, and
crowd/traffic control.
3-64. Federal military units directed to support a DSCA mission may be under the operational control of a
defense coordinating officer, U.S. Army North, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), or U.S.
Pacific Command depending on the situation. Requested support can include such capabilities as medical,
aviation, communications, damage assessment, transportation, logistics, debris clearing, aerial firefighting,
and CBRN consequence management response. According to the Posse Comitatus Act, members of the
U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps (including state national guard forces called into federal
service) are prohibited from exercising nominally state law enforcement, police, or peace officer powers
that maintain law and order on nonfederal property (states and their counties and municipal divisions)
within the United States. There are some exceptions in which the Posse Comitatus Act does not apply;
these include national guard units under state authority and Title 10 troops under the order of the President
of the United States pursuant to the Insurrection Act.
3-65. The commitment of DOD resources for other civil support operations (such as support to designated
law enforcement agencies, support during national special security events, and periodic planned support of
other activities) requires approval according to national laws and DOD policies.
3-66. FHP capabilities may support the preservation of life within the framework of the National Disaster
Medical System (NDMS). The NDMS combines federal and nonfederal medical resources into a unified
medical response system for incidents involving public health and medical emergencies. Under the
auspices of the Department of Health and Human Services, the NDMS facilitates the deployment of various
medical response teams to an event area. The Army response to this effort may include the formation of a
medical task force or the deployment of specialized expertise. The Army medical response to disasters is
typically provided through special medical augmentation response teams organized by the U.S. Army
Medical Command and its subordinate commands, on a task-organized basis, from various worldwide
assets. Larger events might require a functional task force, such as a medical task force to conduct medical
evacuation, triage, treatment, and public health and medical surveillance.
3-67. DOD may have to augment civil air space management assets and capabilities when their
effectiveness has been so significantly degraded that the probability of a catastrophic aviation event is
probable. The air component command to the USNORTHCOM has the primary capabilities to provide
support to civil aviation, while deconflicting the complexities of operations involving air assets from
multiple organizations.
3-68. Soldiers engaged in civil support operations may face threats from criminals, disease, the weather, or
TIM. The tasks of safety, FHP (preventive medicine), AT, and CBRN defense are critical considerations
for protecting deployed personnel and assets. An accurate, on-going assessment of risk is vital in
determining whether and how the deployed commander will provide DSCA.
3-69. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01B establishes fundamental policies
and procedures governing the actions taken by U.S. commanders and their forces during all DOD civil
support and routine military department functions occurring within U.S. territory and territorial seas.
During DSCA operations, the Secretary of Defense retains the authority to set the arming level for Title 10
forces. When DOD forces under DOD control operate in coordination with other federal agencies, the
applicable rules for the use of force will be coordinated with on-scene federal agency personnel. Standing
rules for the use of force also apply to homeland defense missions occurring within U.S. territories.
Commanders at all levels are responsible for training their personnel to understand and properly utilize the
standing rules for the use of force.
OPE
ERATION
NS PROCE
ESS
4--1. While each operation differs
d in desiign and circum
mstances, all operations
o folllow a general cycle
knnown as the “operations
“ proocess.” This process
p consistts of the majoor C2 activitiees performed during
d
opperations—plaanning, preparation, execution, and contiinuous assessm ment. (See figgure 4-1.) Dooctrine
deescribes this frramework by each operationss process activiity; however, planning,
p prepaaring, executinng, and
asssessing occur sequentially orr simultaneoussly.
Figure 4-1
1. Operations
s process
4--2. During pllanning, comm manders use the MDMP to anaalyze the missiion while translating organizaational
caapabilities in teerms of the waarfighting functions for integration and exppression in a pllan or order. Various
V
acctivities and prrocesses are ussed during preeparation and execution
e for synchronization
s n and are monnitored
annd evaluated du uring a processs of continual assessment
a thaat facilitates deccisionmaking.
4--3. Througho out the operaations processs, commanderrs accomplish the missionn by using several s
m
mechanisms to facilitate the integration
i andd synchronizatiion of tasks annd functions. Battle
B rhythm is one
keey control meaasure that helpss manage the deliberate
d integgration of functions and activvities. Army dooctrine
allso illustrates several continuuing activities and processes that are usedd for functionnal integration in the
opperations proceess. For exampple, terrain mannagement is a continuing acttivity that reliees on the intelliigence
prreparation of thet battlefield (IPB) processs for its integrration and synnchronization. These activitiees and
prrocesses occurr during all opperations and mustm be synchhronized with each
e other andd integrated innto the
30
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2 FM 3-37 4-1
Chapter 4
overall operation. (See figure 4-2.) This is often accomplished through the use of cross-functional teams,
working groups, and boards.
Integrating Processes
• IPB
• Targeting
• ISR synchronization
• CRM.
• Knowledge management
Continuing Activities
• ISR
• Security operations
• Protection
• Liaison and coordination
• Terrain management
• Information management
• Airspace C2
Figure 4-3.
4 Battle co
ommand
4--5. Command ders understandd and broadly visualize
v proteection considerrations and oppportunities in reelation
too the mission and
a the OE in terms of the forms f of protection. They diiscern hazards that are preveentable
annd divide threaats into those thhat may be detterred and thosse that may reqquire the appliication of secuurity or
deefensive measu ures to achievve protection. Commanders provide guidaance on risk toolerance, CCIR R, and
assset or capabiliity criticality too help focus thee staff and subbordinate leaderrship.
4--6. A commaander’s tolerannce for risk may m vary with the nature of the threat, operational theme, t
ennvironmental conditions,
c or external factorrs. Leaders alw ways protect all
a military perrsonnel. All military
m
reesources have value,
v but all military
m assets are not linkedd to mission acccomplishment in the same manner
m
orr at the same time.
t As the coompetition for protection asssets increases, commanders must m provide a clear
inntent and guidaance on where,, when, and hoow much risk they t are willinng to assume orr tolerate. The CRM
prrocess providees a context forfo risk assessm ment to suppoort decisionmaaking. Decisionn support tools and
syystems may bee helpful withinn the assessmennt process to help
h commandeers differentiatte between impportant
asssets and missiion-critical asseets.
4--7. The operations staff asssists the com mmander in inttegrating proteection with thhe other warfighting
fuunctions througghout the operaations process. At division annd higher levelss, the protectioon cell—
z Focuses effort in the MDMP to prroduce a plan or o order.
z Deveelops protectionn strategies to effectively usee resources in support of a protection
p conccept of
operaations.
z Contrributes to IPB and situationall understandingg.
z Identtifies vulnerabiilities, hazards,, and gaps in innformation.
z Particcipates in the taargeting process and the ISR R synchronizatioon process.
z Coordinates with various
v working groups to further synchhronize protecction with the other
warfiighting functions according too the commandder’s intent andd concept of opperations.
4--8. As a conttinuing activityy, protection innformation andd considerationns are typicallyy integrated innto the
opperations process by the opeerations officerr using the CRRM integratingg process. (Seee FM 5-19 forr more
innformation.) The protection cell uses the CRM processs to identify, evaluate,
e and monitor threatts and
haazards as they emerge, while conducting thee functional tasks and monitooring the system ms that compriise the
30
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2 FM 3-37 4-3
Chapter 4
protecction warfightin
ng function. When
W leaders employ
e the CRRM process to integrate key protection taskks
and syystems, they also
a participatee in the varioous integrating processes and working grooups during thhe
conduuct of operation
ns.
4-9. The CRM process provides a uniform wayy of assigning a risk value to an activity by determining thhe
probabbility of a hazzardous event occurring andd the severityy or outcome in relation to the mission or o
personnnel. It providdes a context for identifyingg and assessinng threats andd hazards and is a source of o
inform
mation for man ny other processses. The CRM M process inform
ms and alerts commanders
c too conditions annd
activitties that may neegatively affecct the mission and
a require an adjustment deccision.
PROTECT
TION CELL
4-10. Successfully integrating the protection funnction into opeerations beginss with fixing reesponsibility for fo
the maany disparate protection
p taskss and systems. At division levvel and higher, this is typicallly done througgh
a desiignated protection cell and the chief of protection.
p At brigade and below, this may m occur morre
inform
mally with thee designation of a protectioon coordinatorr from amongg the brigade staff or as an a
integraating staff funcction assigned to a senior leadder. Once funcctional and cooordinating respoonsibilities havve
been delineated
d am
mong organizattional staff meembers, protecction tasks andd systems aree integrated annd
synchrronized in th he operations process throuugh boards, working w groupps, and meetiings like otheer
warfigghting function ns. Protection cells
c are furtherr discussed in chapter
c 5.
PROTECT
TION AND MODULARITY
Y
4-11. Brigade comb bat teams (BCT Ts), functionall brigades, andd support brigades perform protection taskks
and fuunctions direccted by higherr headquarterss. Brigades inncorporate theiir efforts into an establisheed
protecction frameworrk developed by b the staff at higher headquuarters. Amongg the Army’s modular m suppoort
brigaddes, the MEB presents
p a new capability thatt is ideally suitted to perform protection taskks and functionns
for a division, corpss, or multinatiional force. Thhe MEB can be b task-organized as neededd to provide thhe
protecction requirements needed at a division andd corps levelss. At these levvels, the proteection cell maay
recommmend the task k organization of units whosse primary misssion is protecction. Task orgganization is thhe
tempoorary reorganizzation of thee force by ussing commannd and supporrt relationshipps, including a
recommmended task organization
o foor the MEB andd other functioonal units as reequired. MEBss are designed to t
C2 thee following uniits that providee protection andd other supporrt to the force:
z Engineer.
z Military police.
p
z CBRN.
z CA.
z Air defense artillery.
z EOD.
z TCF.
When protection req quirements exceed the capabiilities of the MEB,
M the protecction cell can iddentify the neeed
for a functional
f brigaade headquarteers. (See figuree 4-4.)
4-12. The protection cell translates protection guidance and capabilities and the results of analysis into
protection strategies using various decision support and analytical tools and the principles of protection.
The use of protection principles in developing protection strategies provides coherence to the many diverse
and overlapping protection activities and forms existing or occurring in the OE. Commanders at all levels
allocate resources to support protection strategies based on an accurate and continual assessment of threats
and hazards over time, but remain flexible enough to respond to variances and opportunities and to make
adjustments.
4-14. While each protection task and system has its own operational consideration, each must be
synchronized within a coherent protection strategy or concept to ensure synergistic protection efforts. For
example, AMD without survivability is much less effective. Area security without AT, OPSEC, and
physical security is also less effective. To ensure this synergy, the protection cell develops protection
strategies around which MOP and MOE can be established. In this way, the success or failure of each
individual protection effort can be monitored and evaluated.
CONTINUOUS ASSESSMENT
4-15. Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation, particularly the
enemy, and progress of an operation. (FM 3-0) Commanders typically base assessments on their situational
understanding, which is generally a composite of several informational sources and intuition. Staff
members normally develop running estimates that illustrate the significant aspects of a particular activity or
function over time. These estimates are used by commanders to maintain situational awareness and direct
adjustments. Significant changes or variances among or within running estimates can signal a threat or an
opportunity, alerting commanders to take action.
4-16. Assessing protection is an essential, continuing activity that occurs throughout the operations
process. While a failure in protection is typically easy to detect, the successful application of protection
may be difficult to assess and quantify. For example, although prevention and deterrence may consume
significant resources that are easy to quantify, the absence of accidents or threat actions does not
necessarily mean that the plan is working or that leaders are managing risk well. This makes the measured
assessment of deliberate protection activities essential to determining the effectiveness of the plan, task
organization, or operational concept.
4-17. Deliberate assessment is enabled by monitoring and evaluating criteria derived from the tasks and
systems that comprise the protection warfighting function. Criteria used to monitor and evaluate the
situation or operation may be represented as MOP or MOE. These measures are discrete, relevant, and
responsive benchmarks that are useful in all operations. They may contain the CCIR and EEFI and may
generate information requirements. MOP and MOE can be significant decision support tools and may drive
transition periods, resource allocations, and other critical decisions.
Measure of Performance
4-18. A MOP helps determine whether a commander has applied enough, correct resources to an operation.
A MOP is a criterion used to assess friendly actions and that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP
3-0) This measure is friendly force-oriented. It measures task accomplishment; and in its simplest form, it
answers whether a task was performed successfully. FM 7-15 provides a table with MOPs that can be used
to develop standards for each task. Some specific MOPs may be altered for their relevance to the local
situation or they may be omitted; however, all changes to established MOPs should be disseminated
vertically and horizontally among headquarters and participants in an operation or activity.
Measure of Effectiveness
4-19. A MOE is useful in determining success and deciding whether a commander must maintain, adjust,
or reallocate resources. An MOE is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or OE
that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an
effect. (JP 3-0) It is oriented to mission accomplishment, focuses on the results or consequences of an
action, and is used to assess changes in the OE. This is more often a subjective assessment as it tends to
measure long-term results. As a result, an MOE may consist of a series of indicators that are used to judge
success or failure.
4-20. Significant changes in some environmental conditions are subtle and only occur over a long period of
time, yet protection activities must be continual. The enduring nature of protection could cause
complacency or inattentiveness, requiring leaders to stay focused on determining, monitoring, and
evaluating accurate protection indicators and warnings that maintain situational understanding and alert
them to risk.
4-21. Commanders monitor MOEs and evaluate variances and change indicators for cause and effect to
forecast failure or identify a critical point of failure in an activity or operation. Based on this type of
assessment, resources can be reassigned to mitigate the overall risk to the mission or to support or reinforce
specific local security efforts. The goal is to anticipate the need for action before failure occurs, rather than
react to an unplanned loss. Thorough staff planning in the MDMP allows commanders to accelerate
decisionmaking by preplanning responses to anticipated events through the use of battle drills, branches,
and sequels. War-gaming critical events also allows commanders to focus their CCIR and the supporting
information collection effort. Information developed during this process can be used to develop EEFI and
indicators or warnings that relate to the development of protection priorities.
4-22. If an action appears to be failing in its desired effect, the result may be attributed to—
z Personnel or equipment system failure.
z Insufficient resource allocation at vulnerable points.
z Variance in anticipated threat combat power ratio, resulting in an increased risk equation.
z Ineffective supporting efforts, leading to a cumulative failure of more critical elements.
4-23. Assessment identifies the magnitude and significance of variances in performance or conditions from
those that were expected through prior forecasting to determine if an adjustment decision is needed.
Commanders monitor the ongoing operation to determine if it is progressing satisfactorily according to the
current plan, including fragmentary orders that have modified it. The staff assesses the situation in relation
to established protection criteria. This assessment ensures that facts and assumptions remain valid and also
identifies new facts and assumptions. Assessment decreases reaction time by anticipating future
requirements and linking them to current plans.
4-29. Assessment permits the commander to shape protection measures and provides valuable information
for refining future protection activities. Commanders stay alert to transitions in operations. Significant
changes in the situation and environment often affect vulnerabilities to the force; such changes may require
adjustments to CALs and DALs.
4-30. Commanders and units remain flexible while conducting protection operations. When the situation
changes significantly, the protection plan must be adapted so that resources and opportunities are not
wasted. Commanders should not hesitate to modify the protection plan if it fails to adequately protect
critical assets.
4-31. The most important question when assessing the effectiveness of applied protection capabilities is
whether the allocation of resources and combat power to protection tasks remain valid. The staff compares
expectations to actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of the plan, and they recommend
appropriate adjustments. They answer the following questions:
z Was the plan successful?
z Were the assets protected?
z Were Soldiers accidentally killed or injured?
z Were the correct assets defended?
z Did protection equipment or TTP fail?
z What actions must be taken to restore critical capabilities or mitigate damage?
z Is it necessary to reallocate assets because of enemy actions?
z What protection assets are available for reinforcement?
z What activities can be combined to produce a complementary protective effect?
z What additional protection capabilities are needed?
z What current protection capabilities are not needed?
4-32. Commanders must prepare for success and failure when planning to mitigate the risk to the mission
and force. A significant change in the situation may represent successful mission accomplishment.
However, commanders can become vulnerable or complacent immediately after mission accomplishment
due to fatigue or exuberance arising from victory. As the chance of human error increases, an unprepared
force becomes vulnerable to enemy counterattacks or surprise attacks.
4-33. Since many protection information requirements are long-term and overlap staff functions, the
protection cell often develops a means of quantifying progress and normal activities. In planning, the staff
develops specific information requirements oriented on protection. These requirements may be represented
as CCIR and used to focus collection efforts or as change indicators to alert or measure variances in
baseline assumptions detailed in the protection concept of operation. Protection effectiveness, progress, and
success can be expressed in many ways—including the reaction time of response forces; duration of
specific, uninterrupted military capabilities; statistics on Soldiers returned to duty; and many others.
4-34. The criteria used to evaluate the degree of mission success can be expressed as—
z MOP to determine how well protection tasks achieved the intended purpose.
z MOE to evaluate the overall effectiveness of protection plans and assumptions.
PLANNING
4-35. Planning is the first step toward effective protection. Commanders consider the most likely threats
and decide which personnel, physical assets, and information to protect. They set protection priorities for
each phase or critical event of an operation. The MDMP or troop-leading procedures provide a deliberate
process and context to develop and examine information for use in the various continuing activities and
integrating processes that comprise the operations process. Effective protection strategies and risk decisions
are developed based on information that flows from mission analysis, allowing a thorough understanding of
the situation, mission, and environment. Mission analysis typically occurs during planning, and the CRM
process provides a context to identify and analyze threats and hazards before their integration in preparation
and execution. (See table 4-2, page 4-10.)
4-36. During mission analysis, functional proponents in the protection cell develop running estimates of
their specific protection task and system that are used to monitor and evaluate protection efforts throughout
the operations process. These estimates can be used to develop variances and their change indicators from
which MOP and MOE may be further developed.
Planning Guidance
4-37. Planners receive guidance as commanders describe their visualization of the operational concept and
intent. This guidance generally focuses on COA development by identifying decisive and supporting
efforts, massing effects, and stating priorities. Effective planning guidance provides a broad perspective of
the commander’s visualization with the latitude to explore additional options. Command guidance is often
issued using the warfighting functions as criterion. A commander’s initial protection guidance may
include—
z Protection priorities.
z Work priorities for survivability assets.
z AMD positioning guidance.
z Specific terrain and weather factors.
z Intelligence focus and limitations for security efforts.
z Areas or events where risk is acceptable.
z Protected targets and areas.
z Vehicle and equipment safety or security constraints.
z PR C2.
z FPCON status.
z FHP measures.
z MOPP guidance.
z Environmental guidance.
z INFOCON.
z UXO guidance.
z OPSEC risk tolerance.
z ROE, standing rules for the use of force, and rules of interaction.
z Escalation of force and nonlethal weapons guidance.
4-38. Commanders typically determine their own CCIR, but may select some from staff nominations. Staff
sections recommend the most important priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and friendly force
information requirements for the commander to designate as CCIR.
4-45. The staff may also conduct a specific analysis to assess threat capability or the vulnerability and
criticality of an asset to assist commanders in determining protection priorities or task organization
decisions. This type of analysis is often required when the nature of the operation is enduring or requires a
continuous, dedicated protection effort or when the potential loss of the protected asset has significant
consequences.
Soldiers. For nonmission activities, troops include Soldiers, their dependents, civilian workers,
and others, whether or not they are connected to the activity. Some examples of other-than-
mission hazards include sexual assault, domestic violence, substance abuse, sexually transmitted
diseases, and other behavioral or medical conditions.
z Time available. Insufficient time for mission preparation often forces commanders to accept
greater risk when planning, preparing, and executing plans and orders associated with mission
planning. To avoid or mitigate the risks associated with inadequate time for planning, leaders
should allow subordinates two-thirds of the available planning time as a control measure. For
nonmission activities, insufficient time is a matter of haste rather than availability. This
especially applies during holiday periods when the zeal of young Soldiers to get home may lead
them to depart duty stations without sufficient rest.
z Civil considerations. This variable expands the consideration of hazards to include those that a
tactical mission may pose to the civilian populace and noncombatants in the AO. The objective
is to reduce collateral damage to civilians and noncombatants. Hazards are also created by the
presence of a large civilian population and their efforts to conduct day-to-day living during the
course of a mission. Dense civilian traffic may present hazards to convoys and maneuver
schemes. Such diverse elements as insurgents, riots, and criminal activity must also be assessed.
For nonmission activities, the term addresses those legal, regulatory, or policy considerations
that may impact a desired activity or limit a COA.
Criticality Assessment
4-48. A criticality assessment identifies key assets that are required to accomplish a mission. It addresses
the impact of temporary or permanent loss of key assets or unit ability to conduct a mission. It examines
costs of recovery and reconstitution, including time, expense, capability, and infrastructure support. The
staff gauges how quickly a lost capability can be replaced before giving an accurate status to the
commander. The general sequence for a criticality assessment is—
z List the key assets and capabilities.
z Determine if critical functions or combat power can be substantially duplicated with other
elements of the command or an external resource.
z Determine the time required to substantially duplicate key assets and capabilities in the event of
temporary or permanent loss.
z Set priorities for response to threats toward personnel, physical assets, and information.
4-49. The protection cell staff continuously updates the criticality assessment during the operations
process. As the staff develops or modifies a friendly COA, ISR efforts confirm or deny information
requirements. As the mission or threat changes, initial criticality assessments may also change, increasing
or decreasing the subsequent force vulnerability. The protection cell monitors and evaluates these changes
and begins coordination among the staff to implement modifications to the protection concept or
recommends new protection priorities. PIR, running estimates, MOPs, and MOEs, are continually updated
and adjusted to reflect the current and anticipated risks associated with the OE.
Vulnerability Assessment
4-50. A vulnerability assessment is a DOD, command, or unit level evaluation (assessment) to determine
the vulnerability of a terrorist attack against an installation, unit, exercise, port, ship, residence, facility, or
other site. (JP 3-07.2) It identifies areas of improvement to withstand, mitigate, or deter acts of violence or
terrorism. The staff addresses the questions of “who” or “what” is vulnerable and “how” it is vulnerable.
The vulnerability assessment identifies physical characteristics or procedures that render critical assets,
areas, infrastructures, or special events vulnerable to known or potential threats and hazards. The
assessment provides a basis for developing controls to eliminate or mitigate vulnerabilities. Vulnerability is
the component of risk over which the commander has the most control and greatest influence. The general
sequence of a vulnerability assessment is—
z List assets and capabilities and the threats against them.
z Determine common criteria for assessing vulnerabilities.
z Evaluate the assets and capabilities for their vulnerability.
4-51. Vulnerability evaluation criteria may include the degree to which an asset may be disrupted, quantity
available (if replacement is required due to loss), dispersion (geographic proximity), and key physical
characteristics as required.
4-52. DOD has created several decision support tools to perform criticality assessments in support of the
vulnerability assessment process (including mission, symbolism, history, accessibility, recognizability,
population, and proximity [MSHARPP] and criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect,
and recognizability [CARVER]). Protection cells can use any of these tools.
Protection Priorities
4-53. Although all military assets are important and all resources have value, the capabilities they represent
share no inherent equality in their contribution to decisive operations or overall mission accomplishment.
Determining and directing protection priorities may be the most important decisions that commanders make
and staffs support. There are seldom sufficient resources to simultaneously provide all assets the same level
of protection. For this reason, commanders use CRM to identify increasingly risky activities and events,
while other decision support tools assist in prioritizing protection resources.
4-54. Most prioritization methodologies assist in differentiating what is important from what is urgent. In
protection planning, the challenge is to differentiate between critical assets and important assets and further
determine what protection is possible with available protection capabilities. Event-driven operations may
be short in duration, enabling a formidable protection posture for a short time; condition-driven operations
may be open-ended and long-term, requiring an enduring and sustainable protection strategy. In either
situation, commanders must provide guidance on prioritizing protection capabilities and categorizing
important assets.
4-55. Initial protection planning requires various assessments to support protection prioritization; namely,
threat, vulnerability, and criticality assessments. These assessments are used to determine which assets can
be protected given no constraints (critical assets) and which assets can be protected with available resources
(defended assets). Commanders make decisions on acceptable risks and provide guidance to the staff so
that they can employ protection capabilities based on the CAL and DAL. All forms of protection are
utilized and employed during preparation and continue through execution to reduce friendly vulnerability.
PREPARATION
4-56. Preparation consists of activities by the unit before execution to improve ability to conduct the
operation, including, but not limited to, the following: plan refinement; rehearsals; reconnaissance,
coordination, inspection, and movement. (FM 3-0)
4-57. Preparation includes increased application and/or emphasis on active and passive protection
measures. During preparation, the protection cell may conduct or coordinate the following activities:
z Revising and refining the plan.
z Emplacing systems to detect threats to the CAL.
z Directing OPSEC measures.
z Designating quick-reaction forces or TCFs and troop movements.
z Preparing and improving survivability positions.
z Liaising and coordinating with adjacent and protected units.
z Determining indicators and warnings for ISR operations.
z Rehearsing.
z Training with defended assets.
z Confirming subordinate back briefs.
z Implementing vulnerability reduction measures.
4-58. During preparation, the protection cell ensures that the controls or risk reduction measures developed
during planning have been implemented and are reflected in plans, SOPs, and running estimates, even as
the threat assessment is continuously updated. New threats and hazards are identified or anticipated based
on newly assessed threat capabilities or changes in environmental conditions as compared with known
friendly vulnerabilities and weaknesses. Commanders use after-action reviews and war games to identify
changes to the threat. The protection cell and working group maintain a list of prioritized threats, adverse
conditions, and hazard causes. The challenge is to find the root cause or nature of a threat or hazard so that
the most effective protection solution can be implemented and disseminated.
4-59. As the staff monitors and evaluates the performance or effectiveness of friendly COA,
reconnaissance collects information that may confirm or deny forecasted threat COAs. As the threat
changes, risk to the force changes. Some changes may require a different protection posture or the
implementation or cessation of specific protection measures and activities. The protection cell analyzes
changes or variances that may require modifications to protection priorities and obtains guidance when
necessary. Threat assessment is a dynamic and continually changing process. Chiefs of protection and
planners stay alert for changing indicators and warnings in the OE that would signal new or fluctuating
threats and hazards.
4-60. Complete intelligence for a specific threat assessment is seldom available. Changes in the situation
often dictate adjustments or changes to the plan when they exceed variance thresholds established in
planning. During preparation, the staff continues to monitor and evaluate the overall situation because
variable threat assessment information may generate new PIR, while changes in asset criticality could lead
to new friendly force information requirements. Updated critical information requirements could be
required based on changes to asset vulnerability and criticality when conjoined with the threat assessment.
4-61. Commanders exercising battle command direct and lead throughout the entire operations process as
they provide supervision in concert with the CRM process. Commanders’ actions during preparation may
also include—
z Reconciling the threat assessment with personal judgment and experience.
z Providing guidance on risk tolerance and making risk decisions.
z Emphasizing protection tasks and systems during rehearsals.
z Minimizing unnecessary interference with subunits to allow maximum preparatory time.
z Circulating throughout the environment to observe precombat inspections.
z Directing control measures to reduce risks associated with preparatory movement.
z Expediting the procurement and availability of resources needed for protection implementation.
z Requesting higher headquarters support to reinforce logistical preparations and replenishment.
4-62. Depending on the situation and the threat, some protection tasks may be conducted for short or long
durations, covering the course of several missions or an entire operation. The staff coordinates the
commander’s protection priorities with vulnerability mitigation measures and clearly communicates them
to—
z Superior, subordinate, and adjacent units.
z Civilian agencies and personnel that are part of the force or may be impacted by the task or
control.
4-63. Subordinate leaders also conduct CRM and provide supervision to ensure that Soldiers understand
their responsibilities to and the significance of protection measures, tasks, and systems. This is normally
accomplished during mission preparation through training, rehearsals, task organization, and resource
allocation. Rehearsals, especially those using opposing force personnel, can provide a measure of
protection plan effectiveness. (See FM 3-0 for more information.)
EXECUTION
4-66. Execution is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and
using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions. (FM 3-0)
4-67. Commanders exercising battle command decide, direct, and provide leadership to organizations and
Soldiers during execution. As operations develop and progress, the commander interprets information that
flows from C2 systems for indicators and warnings that signal the need for execution or adjustment
decisions. Commanders may direct and redirect the way combat power is applied or preserved and may
adjust the tempo of operations through synchronization. The continuous and enduring character of
protection activities makes the continuity of protection actions and activities essential during execution.
Commanders implement control measures and allocate resources that are sufficient to ensure protection
continuity and restoration.
4-68. The protection cell monitors and evaluates several critical ongoing functions associated with
execution for operational actions or changes that impact protection cell proponents. Some of these
functions include—
z Ensuring that the protection focus supports the decisive operation.
z Reviewing and adjusting the CCIR derived from protection tasks and systems.
z Reviewing changes to graphic control measures and boundaries for the increased risk of
fratricide.
z Evaluating the effectiveness of C2 battle tracking for constraints on PR.
z Monitoring the employment of security forces for gaps in protection or unintended patterns.
z Evaluating the effectiveness of liaison personnel for protection activities.
z Evaluating movement coordination and control to protect critical paths.
z Monitoring adjacent unit coordination procedures for terrain management vulnerabilities.
z Monitoring readiness rates of response forces involved in fixed-site protection.
z Monitoring FHP.
4-69. Staff members are also particularly alert for reports and events that meet CCIR. Once a threat to a
critical or defended asset is detected by monitoring and evaluating running estimates and MOEs for
indicators and warnings, the protection cell alerts the unit responsible for protecting the asset or
recommends additional protective action. Unit commanders respond to their assessment of the threat or
deliberate warning and then execute contingency or response plans. For example, if a threat force attacks an
asset, the commander applies combat power to defeat it. Commanders are alerted by CCIR if the capability
of the threat force reflects a variance that exceeds anticipated and projected combat power ratios. They may
respond to the increased risk by rendering an execution or adjustment decision to commit additional assets
in the form of response forces or fires that are necessary to defeat or neutralize the threat.
4-70. Events frequently occur that prompt commanders to reevaluate assessed threat and vulnerability,
usually due to a significant change in the situation. Examples include a change in mission, loss of a critical
asset, newly discovered enemy capability, environmental change, political or civil event, or change in the
ROE. Commanders must stay as sensitive to the risk calculus as they are to changes in readiness rates or
available manpower in terms of immediate combat power. When commanders adjust or change their risk
calculation, the process begins anew. The staff compares the new friendly situation to the known enemy
situation, develops controls, recommends priorities and DPs, and then implements the decisions. The
protection cell determines—
z Where protection assets can best help mission accomplishment with acceptable risk.
z If protection assets should be committed to the mission immediately or be held in reserve.
z If assets should be moved due to a change in the DAL.
z Whether the commander needs to request assistance and, if so, for what purpose.
4-71. There may be a change in the ROE or political, civil, or environmental situation. These unanticipated
changes may not require immediate action. However, commanders must consider how changes relate to the
mission as they mitigate the vulnerability to civilians and the environment. They must—
z Determine if immediate actions will minimize damage.
z Decide whether actions will affect mission accomplishment.
z Determine if the staff balance requires protective actions.
z Ensure overall mission accomplishment.
ASSESSMENT DURING EXECUTION
4-72. Upon publication of the OPORD, the protection cell and protection working group monitor the
situation so that protection tasks approved by the commander are executed according to plan.
4-73. The protection cell monitors and evaluates the progress of current operations to validate assumptions
made in planning and to continually update changes to the situation. The protection cell and protection
working group continually meet to monitor threats to the CAL and DAL, and they recommend changes to
the protection plan as required. They monitor the conduct of operations, looking for variances from the
OPORD that affect their areas of expertise. When variances exceed a threshold value developed or directed
in planning, the protection cell may recommend an adjustment decision to counter an unforecasted threat or
hazard or to mitigate a developing vulnerability. They also track the status of protection assets and evaluate
the effectiveness of the protection systems as they are employed. Additionally, the protection cell and
protection working group monitor actions of other staff sections by periodically reviewing plans, orders,
and risk assessments to determine if those areas require a change in protection priorities, posture, or
resource allocation.
LESSONS LEARNED
4-74. The way organizations and Soldiers learn from mistakes is key in protecting the force. Although the
evaluation process occurs throughout the operations process, it also occurs as part of the after-action review
and assessment following the mission. Leaders at all levels ensure that Soldiers and equipment are combat-
ready. Leaders demonstrate their responsibility to sound stewardship practices and risk management
principles required to ensure the minimal losses of resources and military assets due to hostile, nonhostile,
or environmental threats. Key lessons learned are immediately applied and shared with other commands.
Commanders develop systems to ensure the rapid dissemination of approved lessons learned and TTP
proven to save lives or protect equipment and information. The protection cells at each command echelon
evaluate the integration of lessons learned and constantly coordinate protection lessons with other staff
elements within and between the levels of command.
engineer coordinator, provost marshal, or CBRN officer may be designated as a protection coordinator to
support integration. Chiefs of protection and protection coordinators participate in various forums to
facilitate the continuous integration of protection tasks and systems in the operations process. This typically
occurs through protection working groups in a theater of operations and in force protection working groups
and executive forums as part of the installation force protection program.
5-4. The protection working group is led by the chief of protection and normally consists of—
z AMD officer.
z AT officer.
z CBRN officer.
z Engineer officer.
z EOD officer.
z OPSEC officer.
z Provost marshal.
z Intelligence representative.
z PR officer.
z G-6 representative.
z Public affairs officer.
z Staff judge advocate.
Note. Depending on the OE or type of operation, the commander may add G-7; assistant chief of
staff, civil affairs operations (G-9); surgeon; and safety; information engagement; medical; and
CA staff officers.
5-5. At the division level, subordinate units normally provide a liaison officer to the working group
meetings. The protection cells in division, corps, and Army headquarters integrate protection functions into
the operations process.
5-6. The protection working group—
z Helps the commander establish protection priorities by developing the CAL and DAL.
z Provides a forum for evaluating assumptions made in protection planning and for recommending
adjustments to protection efforts.
z May help deconflict protection responsibilities, recommend C2 relationships necessary for
specific protection efforts, facilitate adjacent unit coordination, or allocate protection resources.
z Considers various time horizons from the current organizational battle rhythm through future
operations.
5-7. While there are subtle differences, each is organized along similar lines and can perform similar
functions. The division and corps differ in that the corps is more likely to be a joint or multinational
headquarters, and it often has a larger AO. All protection cells, especially at the theater level, have unique
characteristics with different organizations, coordinators, sections, and abilities, depending on the mission
they are conducting.
5-8. The protection cell helps develop a concept of protection tailored to the type of operation the unit is
conducting. Figure 5-1 shows an MEB supporting a division with three BCTs and one aviation brigade. A
mission analysis for the operation determined requirements that could be best satisfied by one or more
MEBs. Based on the mission variables, the protection working group in the division main command post
recommended the mix of capabilities needed for the MEB. Here, the MEB is focused on completing
specific protection tasks and providing support to maneuver units. The MEB typically adjusts command
and support relationships accordingly. The protection cell may make recommendations to the division on
the task organization of protection assets or the type of C2 relationship needed to reduce high risks. This
example depicts the employment of an MEB for protection tasks; however, in operations without an MEB,
the protection cell may recommend protection strategies from reinforcing and complementary capabilities
found in other formations for use in primary and economy-of-force roles.
COMPOSITION
5-9. The protection cell membership does not require representatives from every functional element of
protection. However, these members provide a dedicated staff that is able to coordinate with other
appropriate coordinating, personal, and special staff elements. Primary members of the protection cell
typically include the chief of protection, AMD officer, PR officer, OPSEC officer, provost marshal, CBRN
officer, EOD officer, engineer officer, and AT officer.
CHIEF OF PROTECTION
5-10. The chief of protection may be designated by tables of organization and equipment or by the unit
commander. He is the principal advisor to the commander on all matters relating to the protection
warfighting function. A chief of protection—
z Plans and coordinates protection functions and missions.
z Advises the commander on where to allocate and employ protection capabilities.
z Chairs protection working group meetings, coordinates input, and makes recommendations to
the commander regarding CALs and DALs.
z Manages the writing of the protection annex and provides input to plans, orders, branches, and
sequels.
z Synchronizes with other staff cells, nodes, and functional groups.
z Provides guidance on the execution of protection tasks and systems.
z Continually monitors and assesses the overall protection effort.
PROVOST MARSHAL
5-14. The provost marshal plans military police support for operations and provides advice on military
police capabilities. He—
z Makes recommendations on developing and allocating military police resources that protect
CALs and DALs.
z Synchronizes military police operations and law enforcement guidance between main and
tactical command posts and among subordinate, adjacent, and higher units.
z Provides military police and physical security planning expertise, including—
Area security.
Police engagement.
Internment/resettlement and detainee operations.
Area damage control.
Consequence management operations.
Base defense operations.
Response force operations.
Critical site and asset security.
C2 node protection.
Straggler and displaced-civilian control.
Law enforcement.
Criminal investigations.
ENGINEER OFFICER
5-18. The engineer officer identifies requirements and prioritizes engineer capabilities and assets. He—
z Identifies current and future operations that require force packaging to meet operational
requirements.
z Identifies and synchronizes requirements for the mobility of friendly forces.
z Identifies requirements for safeguarding bases.
z Advises on the aspects of survivability as defined in chapter 2.
z Facilitates the sustainment of friendly forces.
z Identifies general engineering operations.
z Synchronizes with the CBRN officer to apply battlefield obscuration and decontamination
support as appropriate.
z Provides reachback to the Army Corps of Engineers.
z Contributes to a clear understanding of the physical environment.
z Provides support to noncombatants, other nations, and civilian authorities and agencies.
ANTITERRORISM OFFICER
5-19. The AT officer—
z Establishes an AT program.
z Collects, analyzes, and disseminates threat information.
z Assesses and reduces critical vulnerabilities (conducts AT assessments).
z Increases AT awareness in Soldiers, civilians, and family members.
z Maintains defense according to the FPCON.
z Establishes civil/military partnerships for terrorist incident crises.
z Conducts terrorism threat/incident response planning.
z Conducts exercises and evaluates/assesses AT plans.
organizations that are not forward deployed. (JP 3-30) Theater command posts can exploit resources,
capabilities, and expertise while physically located outside the theater or in a joint operations area. They
also coordinate unified actions and oversee protection for the theater within the combatant commander’s
area of responsibility.
5-25. Figure 5-2 shows the operational protection directorate at the theater level, which is where corps or
other task-organized units normally receive protection guidance from higher headquarters. Similar to the
cells at corps and division, the operational protection directorate requires expertise from other staff sections
to synthesize the information required to oversee the entire protection function.
5-30. Commanders incorporate daily, weekly, or monthly protection working group meetings into the unit
battle rhythm as needed. The meetings have the same purpose, regardless of the echelon. Protection
functions at different echelons of command differ mostly in the size of the AO and the number of available
protection capabilities. The protection working group—
z Determines likely threats and hazards from updated enemy tactics, the environment, and
accidents.
z Determines vulnerabilities as assessed by the vulnerability assessment team.
z Establishes and recommends protection priorities, such as the CAL.
z Provides recommendations for the CAL and DAL.
z Reviews and coordinates unit protection measures.
z Recommends FPCONs and random AT measures.
z Determines required resources and makes recommendations for funding and equipment fielding.
z Provides input and recommendations on protection-related training.
z Makes recommendations to commanders on protection issues that require a decision.
z Performs tasks required for a force protection working group and a threat protection working
group according to Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 2000.16.
z Accesses assets and infrastructure that are designated as critical by higher headquarters.
5-31. Table 5-1 shows a sample purpose, agenda, and composition of a protection working group with staff
inputs and outputs, and Table 5-2 shows a sample protection working group created for vulnerability
assessments.
SCHEDULE MOVEMENT
A-6. Correctly sequencing forces to deploy provides the commander with capabilities to achieve the
desired objectives. Once commanders put a strategic lift schedule into motion, it is difficult to change
without losing the transportation capacity. Protection considerations consist of front-loading appropriate
units to provide protection and security. The units draw equipment first and then support follow-on units
with staging and onward movement. These units should arrive in theater early in the deployment process to
provide better protection and movement security. Protection and security are essential to promptly move
combat forces forward.
A-7. Commanders also implement another protection consideration—proactive OPSEC measures. These
measures limit public knowledge of in-transit force movements, including U.S. military ship and aircraft
flights and intratheater movements of key personnel, equipment, and logistics.
A-8. A final protection consideration includes reviewing and, if necessary, modifying contracting
processes and transportation agreements. This consideration meets DOD protection and AT standards.
DEPLOYMENT
A-9. Table A-1 lists theater and deploying division or corps protection cell requirements for the
synchronization and execution of protection measures during deployment.
A-10. During the force projection process, four distinct and interrelated deployment phases occur. These
phases may not be sequential; they can overlap or occur simultaneously.
z Predeployment activities.
z Movement to and activities at the port of embarkation.
z Movement to the port of debarkation.
z Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSO&I).
PREDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES
A-11. During predeployment activities through the fort-to-port phase, the U.S. Army Installation
Management Command is a critical protection and force projection enabler. This command manages most
Army installations worldwide. Its garrison commanders play a critical role in successfully protecting
deploying forces as they execute force projection operations in CONUS. Installation provost marshals (with
military police) protect assets as the unit prepares to deploy. Safety, medical, and information management
personnel protect personnel and information. Division and corps protection cells coordinate closely with
the installation and garrison staff to identify which information and assets to protect and to apply
appropriate protection and security measures that are consistent with the threat analysis.
A-12. At Army installations, AT working groups work as forums to involve installation protection
personnel with federal, state, and local law enforcement officials. Together, they identify potential threats
to the installation and improve interagency communications. Before deployment, division and corps
protection cells coordinate with the installation staff to develop protective measures as required by the local
threat assessments. In addition, coordination may be required with port security personnel and the
combatant commander for protection requirements in the AO.
A-13. OPSEC and information protection are also key protection tasks during predeployment activities.
Effective OPSEC keeps adversaries from exploiting friendly deployment and staging information.
Commanders also ensure that their rear detachment commanders and family readiness groups take
appropriate OPSEC measures.
A-14. Commanders consider the AT element of protection during predeployment activities. Each deploying
unit (battalion or larger) should have at least one assigned Level II AT officer. This individual must have
completed a service-sponsored certification course. The deploying unit commander (assisted by the AT
officer) ensures that AT plans are integrated into movements through high-threat areas. Before deployment,
units assess risk by conducting threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments. Units conduct the
assessments far enough in advance of deployment to allow for the development of necessary protection
measures for deploying assets.
A-15. After the notification, commanders at all levels begin to issue planning guidance as they plan,
prepare, execute, and assess the deployment order. Unit commanders analyze the protection requirements
and determine which resources adequately protect the deploying force. Finding the proper balance between
protecting the force and rapidly projecting the force is critical. Commanders seek an appropriate balance of
protection, rapid deployment, and adequate support.
A-16. Before arriving in an area of responsibility, commanders submit protection plans through their higher
headquarters to the geographic combatant commander (this does not apply to the units deploying to the
USNORTHCOM area of responsibility). The protection measures in the deploying unit plan must match
the guidance developed by the geographic combatant commander, who coordinates and approves individual
plans.
Stagee
Activity
Load
L Tran
nsport Cargoo Transport by
y
Prottection Protection Protection
n Protection
Ma
aterial by Land
L and Loaad Sea
Vesseel
Insta
allation Installa
ation: Comm mercial Comme ercial Port Port authorityy U.S. Navy U.S. Navy
DA po olice rail and carrierss readinesss U.S. Coast
Military police moving g committeee Guard
Responsibility
carrierrs
Com
mmander Unit gu
uards Surfacce aw
Local la Unit Supercargoe
es Commercial Commercial
Deployyment enforce
ement carriers carriers
and
Distrib
bution
Comm mand
Unit Superc
cargoes Unit Superca
argoes NA NA Maritime Unit
administration
n supercargoes
Note. The protection
p cell mustt assess the assetss and carriers and, in coordination witth the Surface Deplloyment and Distrib
bution Command,
provide add
ditional protection measures
m consistennt with threat and sensitive-cargo
s requuirements.
Fig
gure A-1. Pro
otection resp
ponsibilities during deplo
oyment
A-18. Deploying un nits traditionallly focus prottection efforts on their imppending oversseas operationns.
Howevver, the protecction cell stafff must frequently coordinatte with CONU US-based agenncies. Protectioon
responnsibilities for Army units deploying
d throough commerccial seaports are a divided am mong joint annd
interaggency organizzations. These organizationss include the U.S. Army Materiel Com mmand (Surfacce
Deployment Distribution Commannd, Army Conntracting Com mmand, and Arrmy Sustainm ment Commandd),
U.S. Transportation
T n Command, Military
M Sealifft Command, USNORTHCO OM, and U.S S. Army Forcees
Comm mand. Because the protection tasks that the Army may connduct outside its i installationss are limited, thhe
protecction staff workks closely withh federal, statee, and local aggencies. Togethher, they ensurre that adequaate
protecction measures exist and that they
t are execuuted during depployments throuugh strategic seaports.
A-19. Although tran nsportation orgganizations annd activities may
m provide lim mited organic protection, thhe
deployying unit comm mander plans protection
p meassures for rail annd highway movements. Thee protection celll,
in cooordination with h the Surface Deployment
D annd Distributionn Command, continually
c asssesses the asseets
and caarriers. It also provides addittional protectioon measures coonsistent with the threat andd sensitive-carggo
requirements. These measures mayy include the use u of contractt security persoonnel or unit guards
g to protect
unit assets,
a but thee commander makes the fiinal determinaation based onn security reqquirements. Thhe
protecction cell coorddinates with the installation transportation
t o
officer (CONUUS) or movemeent control team m
(OCONUS) and auth horized railroadd or commerciial truck carrierrs on guard andd escort matterrs.
A-20. The protectionn cell coordinnates with the port readinesss committee at each strategic port. Thesse
mittees provide deploying uniit commanderss with commonn coordination structures forr DOD; the U.S
comm S.
Coast Guard; and othher federal, staate, and local aggencies at the port
p level. Wheen military equuipment is beinng
movedd, the committeees act as princcipal interfacess between DOD D and other offficials at ports.
A-21. In coordination with other DOD activities and port authorities, the U.S. Transportation Command
and Surface Deployment and Distribution Command administer the DOD transportation security program.
This program provides standardized transportation security measures, constant oversight, and central
direction. In CONUS, commanders plan protection measures for units and equipment en route to the port,
while the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command coordinates security at the port.
A-22. Depending on the threat assessment, units may guard equipment while at the installation, at
railheads, or en route to ports of embarkation. Units may consider assigning supercargoes to accompany the
equipment during transit from the seaport of embarkation to the seaport of debarkation.
A-23. DOD 4500.9-R specifies governing requirements for moving sensitive military cargo. It establishes
various levels of required protection and monitoring based on risk categories. Protection and monitoring
measures range from simple seals used in shipping to continuous cargo surveillance. The regulation
establishes protection requirements for cargo and outlines the transportation protective services available to
meet them. The cargo sensitivity and means of transportation determine how the Surface Deployment and
Distribution Command protects military cargo. Table A-2 provides examples of transportation protective
services required for various types of sensitive items and equipment.
Note. See DOD Regulation 4500.9-R, part II, chapter 205 for more information.
A-24. The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command supports force projection and protection operations
by providing logistics security to prevent theft, misappropriation, and other criminal acts.
A-25. During major combat operations, the U.S. Coast Guard conducts operations in littoral regions. These
regions include port security and safety, military environmental response, maritime interdiction, coastal sea
operations, and protection in territorial waters of the United States and overseas. In addition to waterside
physical security, Coast Guard duties include—
z Regulating the shipping, handling, and pier side storage of hazardous cargo.
z Interfacing with military authorities as the senior DOD port safety agent.
z Issuing hazardous-cargo permits.
z Supervising vessel fire prevention programs.
A-33. RSO&I operations can provide enemies with numerous opportunities to inflict serious casualties.
These operations can delay the buildup of combat power by exploiting the vulnerability of units in transit
from the theater staging base to the theater assembly area.
A-34. Units undergoing RSO&I present enemies with high-value, high-payoff targets. Any damage or
destruction could result in serious delays in force closure. The advance deployment of military police units
or other forces designated for area security become extremely important targets.
DETECTION PROCESS
B-1. Combat identification is the process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects in
the OE sufficient to support an engagement decision. (JP 3-09) (See JP 3-0 for more information.) Units
achieve combat identification by applying situational awareness and target identification capabilities and by
adhering to doctrine, TTP, and approved ROE that directly support a Soldier’s engagement decision against
objects in an OE. Combat identification attempts to avoid fratricide and unnecessary collateral damage.
B-2. Proper identification provides an accurate characterization of potential targets to allow engagement
decisions with high confidence. Combat identification is not hardware-dependent; its capability combines
the following:
z Situational awareness. Situational awareness provides the immediate knowledge of operation
conditions, constrained geographically and in time.
z Target identification. Target identification provides the accurate and timely characterization of
detected personnel and objects as friendly, neutral, enemy, or unknown. It is time-sensitive and
directly supports a Soldier’s target engagement decision. Quick and accurate target identification
involves training and technology to maximize correct identification. Target identification
provides two methods to distinguish targets:
Cooperative. Cooperative target identification requires intentional collaboration by the
target.
Noncooperative. Noncooperative target identification exploits physical characteristics of
the object and requires no cooperative action or response by the target.
z Doctrine. Sound doctrine provides a source of common understanding and interoperability. This
knowledge directly contributes to Soldier ability to distinguish between friend and foe.
z TTP. TTP for combat identification provides the ability to identify a target, engage it while
maintaining awareness of unknown targets, and avoid fratricide. Inadequate TTP or failure to
rehearse them can cause hesitation, fratricide, and unnecessary collateral damage.
z ROE. ROE are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the
circumstances and limitations under which U.S. forces will initiate and/or continue combat
engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 1-02) Critical to ROE is the rapid, accurate
identification of potential targets. ROE are standardized throughout the AO to comply with
higher headquarters guidance. If too restrictive, ROE could reduce combat effectiveness and put
the force at greater risk. However, if ROE are too lax, they can lead to unnecessary collateral
damage and fratricide. The greater the Soldier’s ability to discriminate among friendly, enemy,
neutral, and unknown personnel and objects, the less restrictive ROE may become. The military
authority developing ROE R should coonsider combaat identificatioon capabilities when defininng
engagemeent criteria. Figure B-1 com mpares nonrestrrictive and resstrictive ROE and shows how
they relatee to casualties caused by enem
my or friendlyy fires.
Figure
e B-1. Relatio
onship betwe
een ROE and
d combat ide
entification
LINKA
AGE
B-3. The range at which currennt weapons are effective exceeds e the huuman ability to quickly annd
accuraately identify all
a entities in thhe AO. Not onnly are Soldiers unable to fullly exploit weaapon advantagees
due too combat identification lim mitations, but these limitatiions also incrrease potentiall fratricide annd
unnecessary collaterral damage. Enemies
E may use
u equipmentt with the sam me characteristtics as those of o
friendlly forces, or th
hey may blend into the civiliaan populace duuring operationns. To counter the enemy, U.S.
forces can maneuverr over larger arreas, in more dispersed
d formaations, and in contiguous
c andd noncontiguouus
AOs. However, thesse abilities plaace more stresss on existing fire control measures.
m Wheen these factors
combiine with multin national operatiions (whose foorces may havee different or noo combat identtification aids or
o
proceddures), leaders must remain aware
a of how combat
c identification is functiioning at all tim
mes.
B-4. Regardless off the combat identification, commanders need n to interfaace technologyy with doctrinne,
TTP, and
a ROE. Com mbat identificaation standardizzes the approach in decidingg the appropriatte level of forcce
againsst all types of taargets. It consiists of—
z Detection n—the discoveery of any phenomena (persoonnel, equipmeent, objects) thhat are potential
targets. Commanders
C caan use detection from variouss means (visuaal observation, radar detectionn,
electronicc signals measuurement).
z Location— —the determinnation (by direcction, reference point, or gridd) of where a potential
p militarry
target is lo A (ground or air).
ocated in the AO
z Identifica ation—the dettermination off the friendly, hostile, unknoown, or neutraal character of a
detected, potential targeet by its physicaal traits (size, shape,
s functionnal characteristtics).
z Classifica ation—the cattegorization of o a potential target by thee relative leveel of danger it
representss.
z Confirma ation—the rappid verification of a target in terms of the initial ideentification annd
classificattion. Soldiers and leaders coonfirm identification and claassification of the target as an a
enemy beefore engaginng. When enggagement is considered, c Sooldiers answerr the followinng
questions:
Can I engage the tarrget based on ROE?
R
Whatt are the secondd- and third-orrder effects if I engage the tarrget?
Which target should I engage first (if there are multiple targets)?
What is the best weapon system to use?
B-5. Planners and executors must remember that current cooperative target identification technology does
not identify friend or foe—it only identifies friendly or unknown. Soldiers must decide whether to engage
the target. Cooperative target identification is a tool for a final check before engagement; Soldiers should
never use it as the sole criterion for target engagement.
B-6. Combat identification capability can be enhanced before detecting a potential target. It starts before
operations, with planned fire and maneuver controls that minimize potential fratricide. Maintaining an
accurate common operational picture provides continuously updated situational awareness to commanders
and units, allowing leaders to control fires more effectively. Consequently, when Soldiers engage a target,
they increase the likelihood of engaging correct targets with fewer or no negative, second- or third-order
effects. These factors apply with surface-to-surface, air-to-surface, and surface-to-air engagements.
SURFACE TO SURFACE
B-7. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps developed combat identification capabilities to improve combat
identification. Those capabilities are partitioned into the categories of information management tools,
active and passive marking tools, and training tools:
z Information management tools. This category provides automatic locations of friendly forces,
reported enemy sightings, obstacles, and known battlefield hazards. It provides satellite
communications links to key leaders and critical platforms. There is a man-portable component
that provides one-way, location data to the common operational picture. The system is typically
composed of software and a hardware device.
z Active marking tools. Active marking tools include near-infrared programmable emitters for
vehicles and flashing beacons for dismounted troops; second- and third-generation radar;
forward-looking infrared imagers; active radio frequency identification tags that can be queried
at standoff ranges; and digital line-of-sight hazard markers.
z Passive marking tools. Passive tools include combat identification panels that provide a
contrast against a vehicle hull, cloth thermal identification panels, infrared strobe lights,
dismounted combat identification marking devices, highly reflective markers to identify
battlefield hazards and noncombat sensitive sites; individual glow tape; and infrared helmet
markers. The passive capabilities are enhanced by night vision equipment, long-range optics,
close combat optics, vehicle fire control systems, and vehicle thermal viewers.
z Training tools. Virtual and live training tools include conduct-of-fire trainers, close combat
tactical training systems, active targets, and vehicle recognition systems.
B-8. Technologies include, but are not limited to, the following:
z The Joint Combat Identification Marking System consists of combat identification panels, cloth
thermal identification panels, infrared strobe lights, dismounted combat identification marking
systems, individual glow tape, and infrared helmet markers.
z The U.S. military has many units equipped with differing combat identification capabilities.
Although commanders know the capabilities within their command, the challenge is to integrate
these capabilities across echelons to complement ROE.
AIR TO SURFACE
B-9. Air-to-surface combat identification begins after detecting an object and ends with exchanging
information between the detectors and the shooter. Major tasks in air-to-surface combat identification
include—
z Detecting objects in the AO.
z Locating object positions.
z Identifyinng the object as friendly, eneemy, neutral, or unknown. Iff unknown, perrsonnel continuue
identificattion procedurees until determiining object chharacteristics or they shift to another target if
there is no
o immediate thhreat.
z Classifyinng informationn relevant to the targeted enemy. Personnnel categorizze the target in i
relation too the level off danger it reprresents. The proximity
p of frriendly and neeutral entities in
i
relation to
o an identifiedd target may im mpact the decission to engagee due to secondd- or third-ordeer
effects, su
uch as blast or rubble damagee.
z Confirmin ng the initial iddentification annd classification of the target..
z Providing g and verifying the informatioon exchange too and from the shooter.
s
B-10. Achieving these tasks requirres a weapons platform
p that can—
z Detect, lo
ocate, and identtify the potentiial target beforee engaging it.
z Receive situational
s awaareness on thee target and the t relevant taarget area, including friendlyy,
enemy, an nd neutral entitties.
z Communiicate with a coontroller, such as an observer on the targett or a C2 nodee. The controller
quickly trransmits relevaant informationn in an easily unnderstood form mat before targeet engagementt.
z Engage thhe target.
z Assist witth target assesssment.
B-11. Air-to-surfacee attacks begin by a request frrom a ground or
o aerial observver. When an attack
a is initiateed
by a ground obserrver, friendly forces may be b close to enemy
e targets, thus requiriing clear target
identiffication. Perso
onnel mark friiendly and eneemy locations by multiple means when operating o under
dangerrously close coonditions. Aeriial and ground combatants shhould agree thaat they understtand the locatioon
me aircraft, suuch as the AC-130, can paint a
of all relevant forcess before engaggement. (See fiigure B-2.) Som
target with infrared before
b engagemment so that a ground
g observeer can verify thhe target identification.
Figure
e B-2. Multip
ple target identification
B-12. Before initiation by an aerial platform, the pilot already has situational awareness and situational
understanding of the target and surrounding target area. A pilot engages a target only after accessing all
available knowledge providers and obtaining a positive visual confirmation.
B-13. Other air-to-surface considerations include the following:
z Combat identification features that ground forces can easily identify are not always as
identifiable from an aviation platform.
z The Target Identification Panel System is a thermal, tape-marked cloth that mounts atop a
vehicle. This surface-to-air identification device has limited surface-to-surface utility.
z Terminal attack controller training and equipment fully integrates with ground forces to ensure
teamwork and understanding.
z Ground observers use a geographic designation system visible to aerial platforms.
z Communication links connect all aircraft and ground forces when maneuvering and fighting,
including during darkness and limited visibility. Ground forces can “see” each other using Blue
Force Tracker and are better able to avoid fratricide. All aircraft is not capable of interrogating a
ground target as friendly before a lethal engagement occurs. One option is to pair the aircraft
with a C2 aircraft that is equipped with Blue Force Tracker to quickly clear targets for
engagement. If an aircraft lacks a combat identification system, leaders ensure that SOPs compel
pilots to contact ground elements for aircraft clearance before engaging.
SURFACE TO AIR
B-14. Preventing enemy aerial attack is the responsibility of all joint force components. The correct
identification of airspace users protects the force from enemy air attack and the erroneous engagement of
friendly aircraft. Identification, friend or foe (IFF) is a device that emits a signal positively identifying it as
friendly. (JP 1-02) (See FM 44-100 for more information.) It is the primary means of identifying friendly or
unknown aerial platforms at an extended distance. Training must emphasize IFF procedures, manual
identification procedures when IFF is not available, and the coordination requirements and procedures for
engaging threats while protecting friendly aircraft. One technology used for IFF is the Mark XII (Mode 4),
the current air-to-air and surface-to-air identification system that consists of a transponder on aircraft and
an interrogator on air defense artillery sensors.
B-15. Army and other forces (joint, coalition, multinational) use airspace to conduct air operations, deliver
fires, conduct air defense operations, and conduct intelligence operations. AC2 is the Army’s operational
approach to integrate airspace users and maximize the effectiveness of systems, while minimizing risks to
friendly aircraft. By maintaining complete situational awareness of airspace users, AC2 enables early
identification and coordinated air defense engagements of threat aircraft to prevent aerial attacks of friendly
forces.
B-16. AC2 does not denote that any airspace contiguous to the AO or other geographical dimension of
airspace is designated “Army” airspace. Neither does it imply command of any asset that is not assigned or
under operational control to an Army commander. Under joint doctrine, airspace is not owned in the sense
that assignment of an AO confers ownership of the ground. Airspace is used by multiple components and
the joint force commander designates an airspace control authority (usually the joint force airspace control
authority) to manage airspace.
B-17. AC2 personnel can effectively integrate Army, joint, and multinational airspace users operating
within the ground commander’s AO by maintaining complete situational awareness of the airspace, and
maintaining communications with airspace users. As components of the Army Air Ground System, AC2
and AMD elements develop SOPs and annexes to facilitate AC2 and air defense operations that
consistently follow joint procedures defined in JP 3-01, JP 3-30, JP 3-52, and the theater Airspace Control
Plan:
z AMD and AC2 staff elements are organic to modular forces (brigade and higher).
z Multifunctional BCTs and support brigades (except sustainment) contain a version of an air
defense airspace management (ADAM)/brigade aviation element (BAE) that is responsible for
integrating brigade AC2, including AMD and aviation functions.
z Division and corps units contain an AC2 element in their main and tactical command posts.
z Numbered armies contain an AC2 element in their main and contingency command posts.
z The U.S. Army also has airspace managers as part of the battlefield coordination detachment, the
combined arms liaison organization to the Air Operations Center.
z Positive identification. Leaders ensure that Soldiers make positive identification before
engaging targets.
z Visual identification panels. Units mark vehicles so that other friendly units operating in the
area can identify them.
z ROE. Commanders ensure that Soldiers clearly understand the ROE.
BASE COMMANDER
C-16. A base commander—
z Integrates the protection warfighting elements to protect and secure personnel, physical assets,
and information.
z May appoint a base defense force commander to help execute base defense functions. (The base
defense force commander tasks units to provide Soldiers and materiel needed to form a base
defense force.)
z Organizes the base defense force as required by the threat assessment and the types of units
located on or near the base.
z Requests support from specialized forces (EOD, CBRN reconnaissance) if required.
PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS
C-21. Base AT protection requires the close cooperation and integration of activities, units, and planning.
Most failures to protect bases from terrorist attacks can be attributed to the failure of various organizations
to coordinate activities, share responsibilities, and disseminate intelligence information.
C-22. The same principles of defense apply to base AT protection. Considerations for access to the base
perimeter and various clusters, effective communications, control measures, and integrated barrier systems
play an important role in building necessary protection against prospective terrorist attacks.
C-23. Contracting is often part of base defense. Base defense responsibilities should include necessary
checks on contracts. Whether the contract involves products (food, water, construction) or personnel
(contracted guards, workers) it should be vetted through a system which ensures that AT considerations are
taken into account.
ACCESS CONTROL
C-24. Thorough base protection includes identification checks of all personnel entering bases in high-threat
areas. The proper vetting of host nation support and contract personnel enhances security. Incorporating
random AT measures into the access control plan varies the level of detail required for access. This keeps
the guard force alert and keeps the enemy off balance. Additional identification measures (biometrics,
metal detectors, X-ray devices) are critical to effective access control.
PERIMETER DEFENSE
C-25. An effective and alert base defense force best deters Level I and Level II threats. Adequate standoff
distances from buildings and other structures outside the perimeter greatly enhance perimeter defense. An
accurate threat assessment, combined with defense in depth, helps determine the standoff distance required.
The staff EOD or engineer can help determine the appropriate standoff distances to protect against blasts
from IEDs. Random patrols inside and outside the perimeter (as part of the base random AT measures and
direct-fire positions on key access points and critical locations) also enhance security. In addition, some
strategies randomly use countersurveillance teams to defeat enemy surveillance.
deploys physical barriers in depth beginning with the perimeter fence line. It also clears fields of fire and
uses barriers and other entry control measures to control pedestrian and vehicle egress from and ingress to
the base. The base defense force uses barriers to protect critical assets and infrastructures inside the base.
CONTROL MEASURES
C-28. Control measures in base defense operations resemble those used in other defense operations. The
area commander establishes base boundaries in coordination with the base or base cluster commander.
Area, base, and base cluster commanders coordinate base boundaries and establish phase lines, contact
points, objectives, and checkpoints that are necessary to control base clusters. The base boundary is not
necessarily the base perimeter. Rather, it is established on the mission variables, specifically balancing the
need of the base defense forces to control key terrain with their ability to accomplish the mission. The base
boundary may or may not be contiguous to other base AOs. Commanders may further subdivide the unit’s
assigned area into subordinate AOs, bases, and base clusters and assign maneuver forces to assembly areas
and battle positions. They establish fire support coordination measures to permit or restrict fires in and
around the base. (See FM 3-09.32 for more information.) No-fire areas may be required to protect civilians;
prevent the disruption of sustaining operations; or protect combat outposts, observation posts, and patrols
from friendly fire. Commanders coordinate all established control graphics with host nation organizations
to minimize interference, misunderstandings, and collateral damage. The base defense force commander (in
coordination with the base commander) designates the base perimeter, target reference points, and sectors
of fire to organizations located at the base.
Note. See United Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-010-01, UFC 4-010-02, UFC 4-022-01, FM 5-103,
and GTA 90-01-010, Joint Contingency Operations Base Force Protection Handbook for more
information.
SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
C-41. The proper storage of arms and ammunition critically affects mission accomplishment and the safety
of deployed Soldiers. Even in high-threat areas, where renewed combat operations can happen, base
protection requires properly stored arms and ammunition.
C-42. A significant loss of combat power resulted from the Camp Doha explosion shown in the following
vignette. This incident nearly destroyed an entire squadron and sharply reduced the regiment’s overall
combat power. Logisticians estimated total losses at more $40 million.
C-46. From the base security perspective, commanders carefully consider using local or third-country
national employees. In some operational situations, using such personnel creates significant risks. The
theater subordinate Army force planners and their contract oversight organizations assess the security risk
of using local or third-country national personnel instead of U.S. contractors and military support
capabilities. This assessment includes an analysis of security risks versus the negative strategic impact of
not employing these personnel. Based on joint force and component commander decisions, base
commanders conduct a local vulnerability assessment as it relates to using local or third-country national
personnel. Answer the following questions when considering the use of local or third-country national
employees to support base operations:
z Will contractor personnel reside on or off base? If they live off base, what base access control
measures are required?
z How will access be controlled to specific areas within the base?
z Is there a vetting and badging process in place? If so, who will enforce it and how will it be
enforced?
z Will contractor personnel be physically screened or searched in order to enter the base?
z Will armed escorts be required? If so, who will do this and how will it be resourced?
z Are special technologies (metal detectors, X-ray machines) needed and available?
C-47. Area, base, and supported unit commanders provide individual protection support. Sometimes, they
provide security to contractors as determined by the Army force commander. To perform such tasks
properly, area and base commanders maintain requisite visibility over supporting contingency contractors
in their AOs.
D-1. OPSEC is how commanders manage risks to information. All units conduct (plan, prepare, execute,
and continually assess) OPSEC to preserve essential secrecy. OPSEC is vital to the success of operations.
Information that friendly forces take for granted is often what adversaries need to obtain defeat. Practicing
effective OPSEC, however routine, denies adversaries information and protects friendly forces.
D-2. Everyone must practice OPSEC and understand the cost of OPSEC compromises. It covers a range
of activities, from avoiding predictable patterns of behavior to camouflaging equipment. Good OPSEC
involves communicating why OPSEC is important and what Soldiers are supposed to accomplish.
Understanding why they do something and what their actions are supposed to accomplish allows Soldiers
to perform tasks more effectively. Successful OPSEC requires Soldiers to take deliberate and
knowledgeable actions. (See AR 530-1 for more information.)
D-4. Commanders practice OPSEC to protect information. OPSEC planning produces a set of coordinated
OPSEC measures and tasks that Soldiers and units perform to protect the force. OPSEC measures are
methods and means to gain and maintain essential secrecy about EEFI. Throughout the MDMP, the
protection cell treats OPSEC measures as protection tasks. During orders production, planners incorporate
OPSEC measures as protection tasks and tasks to subordinate units.
(intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets) and intent to collect data from friendly vulnerabilities
and is able to determine EEFI. The most likely situation stems from how the enemy used its assets during
past operations. The G-2, G-3, and OPSEC officer analyze threat characteristics as part of IPB. Enemy
intentions and collection capabilities are identified by asking the following questions:
z Who are the adversaries?
z Who has the intent and capabilities to act against the planned operation?
z What are probable enemy objectives?
z What are likely enemy actions against friendly operations?
z What information do adversaries already know?
z What collection capabilities do adversaries possess or have access to by financial arrangement,
shared ideologies, or coordinated coalitions or alliances?
z Which OPSEC indicators can be faked to deceive adversaries?
Friendly Vulnerabilities
D-13. The final element of hazard identification is to determine OPSEC vulnerabilities of an operation or
activity. It has two parts—identify OPSEC indicators and identify OPSEC vulnerabilities.
z OPSEC indicator. An OPSEC indicator is a friendly detectable action or open-source
information that an enemy can interpret or piece together to derive EEFI. The G-2, G-3, and
OPSEC officer examine all aspects and phases of the operation to find OPSEC indicators. Then,
they compare them with the enemy targeting cycle and collection capabilities, considering these
questions:
What OPSEC indicators will friendly forces create during the operation?
What OPSEC indicators can the enemy actually collect?
What OPSEC indicators will the enemy be able to use to the disadvantage of friendly
forces?
D-34. The OPSEC estimate contains up-to-date, OPSEC-related information; and the OPSEC officer
updates it continuously throughout the operation. In a time-constrained environment, a current OPSEC
estimate may be the only readily available source of OPSEC-related information. The OPSEC estimate
contains—
z Probable threat picture of friendly forces.
z Threat collection capabilities.
z Current EEFI.
z OPSEC indicators.
z OPSEC measures in effect.
z Contemplated OPSEC measures.
VA vulnerability assessment
WFF warfighting function
WMD weapons of mass destruction
SECTION II – TERMS
*base camp
An evolving military facility that supports the military operations of a deployed unit and provides the
necessary support and services for sustained operations.
*critical asset list
A prioritized list of assets that should be protected; it is normally identified by the phase of an
operation and approved by the commander.
*critical asset security
The protection and security of personnel and physical assets and/or information analyzed and deemed
essential to the operation and success of the mission and the required resources for protection.
*defended asset list
A listing of those assets from the critical asset list, prioritized by the commander, to be defended with
the resources available.
*fratricide
The unintentional killing of friendly personnel by friendly firepower.
*operational area security
A form of active security operations conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and
actions within an area of operations.
*operations security measures
Methods and means to gain and maintain essential secrecy about essential elements of friendly
information.
*protection
(Army) The preservation of the effectiveness of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel,
equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the
boundaries of a given operational area.
protection
(Joint) 1. Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and
nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within
or outside the boundaries of a given operational area. 2. In space usage, active and passive defensive
measures to ensure that United States and friendly space systems perform as designed by seeking to
overcome an adversary’s attempts to negate them and to minimize damage if negation is attempted. (JP
3-11)
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
AR 40-35. Dental Readiness and Community Oral Health Protection. 2 August 2004.
AR 40-656. Veterinary Surveillance Inspection of Subsistence. 28 August 2006.
AR 385-10. Army Safety Program. 23 August 2007.
AR 600-8-101. Personnel Processing (In-, Out-, Soldier Readiness, Mobilization, and Deployment
Processing). 18 July 2003.
DA Pamphlet 385-10. Army Safety Program. 23 May 2008.
FM 1-02. Operational Terms and Graphics. 21 September 2004.
FM 2-0. Intelligence. 17 May 2004.
FM 3-0. Operations. 27 February 2008.
FM 3-07. Stability Operations. 6 October 2008.
FM 3-09.32. (JFIRE) Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Application of
Firepower. 20 December 2007.
FM 3-11. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Defense Operations. 10 March 2003.
FM 3-11.3. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
and Nuclear Contamination Avoidance. 2 February 2006.
FM 3-11.4. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
(NBC) Protection. 2 June 2003.
FM 3-11.5. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
and Nuclear Decontamination. 4 April 2006.
FM 3-11.21. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management Operations. 1 April 2008.
FM 3-11.34. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Installation CBRN Defense.
6 November 2007.
FM 3-13. Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 28 November
2003.
FM 3-19.1. Military Police Operations. 22 March 2001.
FM 3-19.30. Physical Security. 8 January 2001.
FM 3-20.15. Tank Platoon. 22 February 2007.
FM 3-34. Engineer Operations. 2 April 2009.
FM 3-34.2. Combined-Arms Breaching Operations. 31 August 2000.
FM 3-36. Electronic Warfare in Operations. 25 February 2009.
FM 3-50.1. Army Personnel Recovery. 10 August 2005.
FM 3-90. Tactics. 4 July 2001.
FM 3-90.31. Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Operations. 26 February 2009.
FM 3-100.21. Contractors on the Battlefield. 3 January 2003.
FM 4-01.45. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations.
5 January 2009.
FM 4-02.7. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Health Service Support in a
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environment. 15 July 2009.
FM 4-02.17. Preventive Medicine Services. 28 August 2000.
FM 4-02.18. Veterinary Services Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 30 December 2004.
FM 4-02.19. Dental Service Support in a Theater of Operations. 1 March 2001.
FM 4-02.51. Combat and Operational Stress Control. 6 July 2006.
FM 5-19. Composite Risk Management. 21 August 2006.
FM 5-103. Survivability. 10 June 1985.
FM 5-415. Fire-Fighting Operations. 9 February 1999.
FM 6-20-10. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process. 8 May 1996.
FM 7-15. The Army Universal Task List. 27 February 2009.
FM 44-100. U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations. 15 June 2000.
FMI 3-35. Army Deployment and Redeployment. 15 June 2007.
FMI 3-90.10. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosives Operational
Headquarters. 24 January 2008.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Title 5, United States Code, Section 552.
Title 5, United States Code, Section 552a.
Title 10, United States Code.
Title 10, United States Code. Section 331-335.
Title 28, United States Code, Section 1385.
Title 32, United States Code.
DOCUMENTS NEEDED
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication. DA forms are available on the
Army Publishing Directorate Web site (www.apd.army.mil). DD forms are available on the OSD web site
(www.dtc.mil/whs/directives/infomgt/forms/formsprogram.htm).
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These sources contain relevant supplemental information.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
AR 75-15. (O)Policy for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. 22 February 2005.
AR 525-13. (O)Antiterrorism. 11 September 2008.
AR 530-1. (O)Operations Security (OPSEC). 19 April 2007.
FM 1. The Army. 14 June 2005.
FM 3-05.40. Civil Affairs Operations. 29 September 2006.
FM 3-34.170. Engineer Reconnaissance. 25 March 2008.
FM 3-52. Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone. 1 August 2002.
FM 3-100.4. Environmental Considerations in Military Operations. 15 June 2000.
FM 4-02. Force Health Protection in a Global Environment. 13 February 2003.
FM 4-30.51. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Procedures. 13 July 2006.
FM 5-0. Army Planning and Orders Production. 20 January 2005.
FM 6-0. Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 11 August 2003.
FMI 2-01.301. Specific Tactics, techniques, and Procedures and Applications for Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield. 31 March 2009.
FMI 3-01.50. Air Defense and Airspace Management Cell Operations. 27 February 2007.
FMI 5-0.1. The Operations Process. 31 March 2006.
STRATCOM Directive 527-1. Operations, Planning, and Command and Control: Department of
Defense (DOD) Information Operations Condition (INFOCON) System Procedures.
27 January 2006.
TC 1-400. Brigade Aviation Element Handbook. 27 April 2006.
DOD 3020.45-V2. Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP): DCIP Remediation Planning.
28 October 2008.
DODI 2000.16. DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards. 2 October 2006.
DODI 3020.45. Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) Management. 21 April 2008.
GTA 90-01-010. (O)Joint Contingency Operations Base (JCOB) Force Protection Handbook. October
2007.
JP 3-07.2. (O)Antiterrorism. 14 April 2006.
JP 3-13.3. Operations Security. 29 June 2006.
UFC 4-010-01. DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings. 8 October 2003.
UFC 4-010-02. DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standoff Distances for Buildings. 8 October 2003.
UFC 4-022-01. Security Engineering: Entry Control Facilities/Access Control Points. 25 May 2005.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Darley, William M. “Clausewitz’s Theory of War and Information Operations.” Joint Force
Quarterly. January 2006.
Hawley, John K., PhD. “PATRIOT Fratricides: The Human Dimension Lessons of Operation Iraqi
Freedom.” Air Defense Artillery. January–March 2006.
Riehn, Richard K. 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990.
Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. New York: Penguin Classics, 1982. Published in Pelican Classics,
1968. This translation published by Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd 1908. Von Krieg, published
1832.
Wong, Leonard and Gerras, Stephen. CU @ The FOB: How the Forward Operating Base is Changing
the Life of Combat Soldiers. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/>. March 2006.
Zucchino, David. Thunder Run: The Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad. New York: Atlantic
Monthly Press, 2004.
READINGS RECOMMENDED
These readings contain relevant supplemental information.
Army Directive 2008-02. Army Protection. 9 April 2008.
fratricide, iv, 1-9, 2-1, 2-6, 2-7, military decisionmaking principles of protection, 4-11
3-3, 3-6, 3-9, 3-13, A-3 process, 4-1, 4-3, 4-5, 4-6, priority intelligence, 4-15
definition, 2-6 4-9, 4-10, 4-11
protection
friendly force, 4-11 mission analysis, 4-9 definition, 1-1
full spectrum, 1-11, 2-17, 3-1, mission variables, 4-12 protection analysis, 4-11
3-2, 3-4, 3-10, 3-13, 5-1, 5-6 mission, enemy, terrain and protection capabilitites, 5-2
full spectrum operations weather, troops and support
definition, 3-1 available, time available, civil protection cell, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-
considerations, 1-3, 2-8, 2- 7, 4-9, 4-11, 4-12, 4-13, 4-
functional integration, 4-1 14, 4-15, 4-16, 4-17, 5-1, 5-
16, 3-3, 4-12
H 2, 5-3, 5-7
mission, symbolism, history, composition, 5-3
hazard, 4-3, 4-9, 4-12, 4-13, 4- accessibility, recognizability,
15, 4-16, 4-17, 5-8 population, and proximity, 4- protection coordinator, 4-4, 5-2,
definition, 1-4 14 5-6
hazard assessment, 5-1 mission-oriented protective protection directorate, 5-7
high-risk personnel posture, 4-10 protection function, 5-7
definition, 2-8 mobile security force protection plan, 4-17
definition, C-4 protection posture, 4-15
I
mobility, 2-9, 2-12, 2-18, 3-9 protection strategy, 4-1, 4-5, 5-
identification, friend or foe
movement and maneuver, 1-5, 1
definition, B-5
2-12, 3-5, 3-6, 3-9 protection warfighting function
improvised explosive device, 2-
movement corridor, 2-9, 3-11 definition, 1-9
18, 2-19, 3-11, 4-12, 5-5
multinational, 5-7 protection working group, 4-17,
indirect fire, 2-1
5-3, 5-7, 5-8
information assurance N
protective measures, 5-1
definition, 2-6 named area of interest, 2-7
provost marshal, 5-2, 5-4, 5-6
information protection
definition, 2-4 O R
infrastructure, 3-14, 4-11 occupational and
reachback, 5-5, 5-6, 5-7
environmental health
integration, 4-17 definition, 5-6
surveillance
intelligence preparation of the definition, 2-14 rear operation, 5-7
battlefield, 4-1, 4-3, 4-7, 4- offensive operations risk, 4-9, 4-10, 4-13, 4-15
12, 5-4 definition, 3-5 risk assessment, 4-12
in-theater, 5-7 operation security measures risk calculation, 4-16
J definition, D-1 risk management, 4-17
joint security operational area security, 2-1, risk reduction, 4-15
area, 5-7 2-7, 2-12, 5-4
definition, 2-7 risk tolerance, 4-3, 4-15
coordinator, 5-7
operational concept, 4-10 rules of engagement, 4-16
L definition, B-1
operational environment, 4-3,
lessons learned, 4-17 4-5, 4-6, 4-12, 4-15, 5-1 rules of engagement, 4-10
M definition, 1-3 running estimate, 4-5, 4-7, 4-
operations process, 4-1 10, 4-11, 4-13, 4-15, 4-16
main command post, 5-2, 5-4 definition, D-6
maneuver enhancement operations security, 4-5, 4-10,
brigade, 2-7, 4-4, 5-2, 5-7 4-12, 4-14 S
definition, 2-18 situational awareness, 1-7, 1-8,
measure of effectiveness, 4-6,
4-10, 4-11, 4-13, 4-15, 4-16 opposing force, 4-15 2-7, 3-2, 3-6, 3-9, 4-5
definition, 4-6 definition, 2-7
P
measure of performance, 4-6, situational understanding, 1-3,
personnel recovery, 2-1, 5-4 1-10, 2-3, 2-6, 2-12, 3-2, 4-5,
4-10, 4-11, 4-13, 4-15 definition, 2-3
definition, 4-6 4-6, 4-11, 4-15, 4-16
physical security, 4-5 definition, 2-12
medical surveillance definition, 2-8
definition, 2-14 stability, 2-7, 3-2, 3-5, 3-8, 3-
preparation, 4-14, 4-15 10, 3-11, 3-12, 3-13, 3-14, 3-
definition, 4-14 15
Official:
JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0925208
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard,and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the
initial distribution number (IDN) 110512, requirements for FM 3-37.
PIN: 085751-000