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LIMITATION ACT, 1963

Section 7 - Disability of one of several persons

1. Corresponding section of Act No. 9 of 1908

7. Disability of one of several plaintiffs or applicants.—

Where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the
execution of decree, is, under any such disability, and discharge can be given without the
concurrence of such person, time will run against them all; but, where no such discharge can be
given, time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such
discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the disability has ceased.

Illustrations

(a) A incurs a debt to a firm of which B, C and D are partners. B is insane and C is minor. D can
give a discharge of the debt without the concurrence of B, and C. Time runs against B, C and D.

(b) A incurs a debt to a firm of which E, F and G are partners. £ and F are insane, and G is a
minor. Time will not run against any of them until either Eor F becomes sane, or G attains
majority."

2. Applicability of the section

This section applies only to those cases where the act of the adult joint owner or decree-holder is
perse a valid discharge.1 Section 7 contemplates the existence in two or more persons of a joint
right and a joint causes of action in support of a single suit. But where the causes of action for the
two sons were different, section 7 did not apply.2

A 'Marumakkathayan' joint family consisted of two sole surviving minor members. On 9-6-1943
when the plaintiffs were minors, their father purporting to act as their guardian, and their maternal
grandparents sold the properties in favour of defendant No. 1 who in turn gifted that property to
defendants 5 and 6, one of the minors attains majority becoming manager of family and is capable
of giving discharge without concurrence of other on 1-2-1951. The suit for possession beyond three
years from such date was held barred by limitation.3

Section 7 extends the period of limitation to some cases then where there is a joint decree in favour
of persons who are under any such disability as is mentioned in section 6. Section 7 contemplates a
legal capacity to give discharge without the concurrence of the person under a disability. For instance
a partner or a karta of a Hindu joint family has power to realise the whole of the decretal debt
without the consent of the other decree-holders. But, a guardian of a minor cannot, without the
permission of the Court realise monies payable to a minor decree-holder under a decree of Court, by
reason of the provisions of Order XXXII, Rule 6, C.P.C.4

3. Whether applicable to proceedings under the Uttar Pradesh Zamlndarl Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950

In the case of Deshrajv. Deputy Director of Consolidation5 a Division Bench of the Allahabad High
Court has held that on a reading of section 41 of Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950, with section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 it is clear that Limitation Act
would apply to the suits under section 209 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act. On the same reasoning the provisions of section 7 of the Limitation Act will also be
applicable to proceedings under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.6

4. Whether applicable to void transactions

Section 7 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is not applicable to void transactions. It applies only where a
transaction is voidable and it can be set aside by resorting to remedy by way of suit. The rights,
were held to be barred, for example,7 on account of the application of the theory of "discharge",
where the rights, which were necessary to be avoided by a suit, i.e., the transactions in question
were not void, but voidable, and an action within the period of limitation was necessary to be
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brought by the person to whom the right of relief was available and against whom also the period of
limitation had started to run. Where, however, the transaction is void ab initio, it is not necessary
that a suit to set aside such a transaction is to be filed within any prescribed limitation.8

An application for compensation, filed by the minors after the period of limitation, as specified in
section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1963 (section 166 of new Motor Vehicles Act), cannot be said
to be barred by limitation.9

The right of a junior member of an //torn tarwad to question unauthorised alienations of//torn or
tarward property is an individual and personal right of his, and he is not competent to grant a
discharge within the meaning of section 7 and therefore, his suit in exercise of his individual and
personal right to question an alienation made by the 'karnavan', within three years of his attaining
majority is within time, and is not barred by limitation. However, the position will be different and he
may be stultified from pursuing the matter afresh if he had been party to the litigation, in which the
alienation was questioned but was approved.10

5. Principles

The principle underlying section 7 is that when one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a
suit is under any disability and if there is any other member, who can give a valid discharge without
the concurrence of the person under disability, the time will begin to run from the date when that
member competent to give a discharge can institute a suit.11

The disability contemplated by section 7 is the disability on account of the minority, insanity, or
idiocy of the person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree
during the relevant period. Even if a petition filed by the judgment-debtor under section 16 of the
Debt Relief Act has the effect of staying the execution of the decree, the resultant disability of the
decree-holder cannot be said to be a disability falling under section 7 of the Limitation Act.12 Section
7 only supplements section 6. It lays down conditions under which disability of one of the joint
plaintiff or applicants shall or shall not entitle any one of them to exemption to which the former, if
he were the sole plaintiff or applicant, would be entitled.13 Section 7 would not operate as a bar if
the elder brother was not manager of the family during the relevant period.14 The section applies to
proceedings under U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act.15 It also applies to Fatal Accidents
Act, 1855.16

6. Scope and effect

The right of the Hindu father or manager is not sacrosanct to the extent of holding him capable of
continuing to be such even after it is found that he is either incompetent or incapable or that he, in
fact, voluntarily relinquishes his responsibilities. Where it is found on the facts that the father is no
longer the managing member and the next senior adult member was, in fact, in management, the
failure of such next senior adult member to set aside the alienation within three years of his attaining
majority operates as a bar against the other junior members of the family.17

A suit by one of two presumptive reversioners for declaration that alleged adoption by Hindu widow
was not true and valid, was filed within 3 years of plaintiffs attaining majority though beyond period
prescribed by Article 57 of Limitation Act. The non-filing of suit by other presumptive reversioners
who had already attained majority cannot come under the word 'discharge' as used in section 7.18

7. Right under the section - Whether personal

Where the decree is one for redemption and plaintiffs are joint decree-holders, the decree has to be
executed and the mortgage redeemed as a whole. It follows therefore that without the concurrence
of the minor plaintiff, the other plaintiffs cannot give a valid discharge and that time for the
execution of the decree cannot run as against any of them during the continuance of the minority of
the minor plaintiff. Section 7 does not confer exclusive personal right in favour of the person under
disability. The section does not warrant the construction that the benefit accruing from the
suspension of the period of limitation is a purely personal benefit available only to the original parties
and not to others who acquire their rights. So long as the decree is kept alive by virtue of section 7,
there is no reason to restrict the right to execute the decree in favour of the original decree-holders
alone. Such right must be equally available to their assignees or transferees also. The right which is
alive and capable of enforcement by the decree-holders themselves cannot be said to be barred or

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extinguished immediately on transfer of the same to a third party. Thus, the auction purchaser of the
rights of the decree-holders under the decree for redemption can enforce the rights within such time
as was available to the original plaintiffs decree-holders.19

8. "Where one of several persons"

In the case of a Hindu joint family a suit to set aside an alienation filed by the younger of two
brothers within three years of his attaining majority would be barred by limitation if the elder
brother, who was the manager and an adult, had failed to sue within three years of his attaining
majority.20 Where an alienation is set aside by the decree of the trial court and only one of the
alienees appeals, the others, being added as respondents, the appellate court in allowing the appeal
and dismissing the suit as bared by time can grant relief in respect of the non-appealing alienees
also.

Where on the death of a party to an action, the right persons are brought on record as legal
representatives and one of them dies, the estate continues to be sufficiently represented for the
purpose of that litigation by the remaining representatives and the suit does not abate if no
representative of the deceased L.R. are brought on record.21

Under sections 7 and 8, Limitation Act read with Article 60 a suit brought by two or more brothers of
an undivided Hindu family to set aside an alienation by their guardian, more than three years after
the elder brother attained majority, is barred by limitation not only as regards the share of the elder
brother but also in respect of the younger's, though the latter attained majority within three years
prior to the suit.22

Where a minor challenges the alienation of his property by de facto guardian as being without
authority or legal necessity, the suit for recovery of possession of the property has to be instituted
within a period of 3 years from the date when the minor attains majority and suit filed after the
expiry of 3 years has to be dismissed as time-barred.2 The extended period of 3 years under
sections 6, 7, 8 of the Indian Limitation Act, in no case can go beyond the period of 3 years from the
date of cessation of the disability. The person in possession of the property would get his possession
or title as the case may be, perfected upon the extinguishment of the right to file a suit in relation to
the property.23

Section 8 is a proviso to section 6 or 7. A combined effect of sections 6 and 8 read with the third
column of the appropriate article would be that a person under disability may sue after cessation of
disability within the same period as would otherwise be allowed from the time specified therefor in
the third column of the schedule. But such extended period would not be beyond 3 years from the
date of the cessation of the disability.24

9. "Discharge" - Meaning of

The word 'discharge' in section 7 refers to discharge of any liability, pecuniary or otherwise. Where a
person is wrongfully in possession of property he is liable to vacate possession in favour of the true
owner. This is also covered by section 7 and if possession is delivered by such person to the manager
of a joint Hindu family, it is a discharge of that liability qua the entire joint family. The same principle
should apply in the case of execution of partition decree by delivery of possession over immovable
property.

The only exception to the power of the manager of a joint Hindu family to give a discharge on behalf
of the members of the family is contained in Order 32 Rule 6, C.P.C.

Where there is no question of the receipt of money or other movable property but it is a case of
taking possession over immovable property and the case is not governed by the provisions of Order
32, Rule 6, the original power of the manager to acton behalf of the entire joint family remains intact
so far as taking possession over immovable property in execution of the decree is concerned.25 The
mere non filing of suits cannot come under the word 'discharge.'26

The provisions of section 7 are not limited to suits or decrees on monetary claims only. Nor is there
any reason to think that the word 'discharge' can refer only to debts, "Discharge" means to free form
liability. The liability may be in respect of monetary claims, like debts; it may be in respect of
possession of property; it may be in respect of taking some order as regards property; it may be in
respect of many other matters. Except in the case to declaratory decrees or decrees of a similar

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nature, the decree in favour of one person against another requires the person against whom the
decree is made, liable to do something or to refrain from doing something. This liability is in a sense
a debt which the party is in law bound to discharge.27 Where the karta had sold with a condition for
reconveyance, the only joint family property, a house, but had continued to reside as a tenant
therein and it was he against whom the suit for arrears of rent was filed and the karta failed to file
the suit within limitation for enforcement of clause for re-conveyance, all other members of the
family including the minors, would be debarred from filing the suit for re-conveyance as the
limitation, in such a case, would be deemed to have started running against all the members from
the date of sale.28

The manager of a joint Hindu family has the power to give discharge fora debt due to the joint Hindu
family, and a person, who can give a valid discharge of the liability under a negotiable instrument, is
entitled to sue, and, therefore, a suit by such a person is not non-maintainable on the ground that
the other coparcener of the joint Hindu family has not been impleaded in the suit either as a co-
plaintiff or as a defendant or that such a coparcener has been impleaded after the expiry of the
period of limitation.29

Under section 7 of the Limitation Act, the capacity or incapacity to give a discharge is intended to
relate to legal capacity or incapacity. If there is any physical circumstance which the law takes into
consideration as involving legal incapacity, then certainly it is contemplated under this section for
instance lunacy, minority or some such thing. These are well-recognised legal incapacities which
disable a person from entering into a contract-agreement or any transaction. Thus, when the karta of
a joint Hindu family who was a partner of a firm dies leaving behind him surviving his father and his
minor son as coparceners, the father can give a valid discharge and agree to final settlement of
accounts of the partnership. Even, therefore, assuming that the said father entered into an
agreement postponing the accounting, it will not have effect of derogating from his legal capacity to
give valid discharge. If he does so he does it at his own risk and the running of time cannot stop
against the minor son for that reason alone.30 Under the Hindu law karta of a Hindu joint family
represents all the members of the family and has the power and duty to take action which binds the
family in connection with all matters of management of the family property. Clearly, therefore, when
in respect of a transaction of property possession has to be received by the several members of the
family, it is the karta's duty and power to take possession on behalf of the entire family, including
himself, the members of the family who are suijuris as well as those who are not.31 In a Full Bench
decision, reported in Indira Pillai v. Kesavan Channa,32 the Kerala High Court held that the several
members of a joint family are joint owners of the family property and their title in a suit in respect
thereof is a joint title and not several. They are undoubtedly persons jointly entitled to institute a
suit in respect of the property within the meaning of section 7.

The provisions of Order 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not debar the manager of a Hindu joint
family from giving discharge in respect of a liability to deliver properties. When in respect of a
transaction of property possession has to be received by the several members of the family, it is the
karta's duty and power to take possession on behalf of the entire family, including himself the
members of the family who are sui juris, as well as those who are not.

There is no scope for the application of either the provisions of Order 32, Rule 6 or Order 32, Rule 7
to a case where a partition decree is passed in favour of the manager and the minor members of a
joint Hindu family. For, acceptance of delivery of possession of property in terms of the decree in a
partition suit cannot be considered decree entering into any "agreement or compromise". The
managing member of the family can therefore give a discharge of the liability under the partition
decree by accepting delivery of possession on behalf of his minor sons without their consent and so
time for execution runs against the minors also under section 7 of the Limitation Act from the date of
the decree.33

The term discharge used in a section 8 of Travancore Limitation Act is not confined to the discharge
of a pecuniary liability but has a wider significance and includes release of rights in respect of
maintainable property and even the right to institute a suit.34

Order 32 Rule 7 does not govern the case, as it is not a case of a person entering into an agreement
or compromise on behalf of minor. Apart from the fact, Rule 6 will also be inapplicable to the case, it
should be remembered that the rule does not in any way affect the power of the next friend or the
guardian to receive money or other moveable property. It only prescribes the procedure to be
adopted by the next friend or guardian for receiving money or movable property. It is also manifest

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from these rules that they do not impose any restriction on the manager of the joint family who is
not appointed as the next friend or guardian to give discharge within the contemplation of section 7,
Limitation Act. Evidently these rules are attracted only to the case of a next friend or guardian. They
leave the powers of the manager who is not acting as the next friend or guardian untouched.35

There is no reason to think that the word "discharge" can refer only to debts and is wholly
inappropriate in respect of any decree for possession, whether on partition or otherwise. For, except
in the case of declaratory decree or decrees of a similar nature, the decree in favour of one person
against another requires another to do something or to refrain from doing something. This liability is
in a sense a debt which a party is in law bound to discharge. The ordinary use of the word judgment-
debtor to denote a person against whom a decree has been made makes a clear recognition of
this.36

The mother of the minor claimant cannot be elevated to the status of a manager. The power which a
joint claimant has, as a guardian of another claimant, to give a discharge on the latter's behalf is not
sufficient for the purpose of section 7. A claim which is made in an application filed under section
110A of the Motor Vehicles Act (section 166 of new Motor Vehicles Act) is an indeterminate claim
and, therefore, the mother of the minor claimant is in no position to give a valid discharge in case of
such a claim. Each one of the legal representatives has a separate cause of action and each one of
them is entitled to the separate award of compensation by reason of his or her status and by reason
of his or her relationship to the deceased.37

'Karnavan' is the accredited representative and mouthpiece of the 'tarward' and so long as he is alive
he alone can give valid discharge without the concurrence of others. The suit by him to set aside
alienation is competent.38

The guardian of plaintiffs has no doubt a right to give a discharge but this is subject only to Order 32
Rule 6 of C.P.C. viz., with the permission of Court. Such conditional right to give discharge is
insufficient for the operation of section 8 of the Limitation Act under which the discharge
contemplated is one as of right. The discharge that can be given only with the permission of the
Court is not within the section. The capacity to make an application on behalf of another person does
not necessarily imply the capacity to give a discharge on behalf of such person and the right of one
joint decree-holder to apply for execution on behalf of all, under Order 21 Rule 15 of C.P.C., is
dependent on the permission of the Court and assuming that such right implies a right to give a
discharge, the discharge given by a person must be as of right.39

10. Whether minority of one son could enlarge the period of limitation

No doubt one of the sons of the alienor was a minor on the date of the suit but his minority cannot in
any way benefit the plaintiffs who has major sons even on the date of the alienation.40

11. Who can give a valid discharge

One of several co-partners can give a valid discharge of a debt due to firm.41 A manager of a joint
Hindu family can give a valid discharge without the concurrence of the others.42

One of several co-executors can also give a valid discharge in respect of the whole debt.43 Similarly
a release by one of several joint promises, without the knowledge or concurrence of others, will bind
the other as well.44 One of two joint decree-holders cannot ordinarily give a valid discharge without
the concurrence of the other.45 But when decree-holders are joint members of a family, the
managing member can give a valid discharge.46 Where plaintiffs are jointly interested in a cash
allowance, they can sue to recover cash arrears for 3 years only even though one of them is a minor
at the date of the suit.47 A ate facto guardian is not the lawful guardian of the property of a minor
and cannot give a valid discharge.48

12. "Person jointly entitled to institute suit"

Merely because two or more persons are permitted to join together as plaintiffs under Order I Rule 1
and institute a suit, they are not persons jointly entitled to institute a suit within the meaning of
section 7 of the Act. Section 7 applies only to cases of persons whose substantive right is joint.

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Member of 'Marummakathayam' joint family being jointly entitled to the properties of the family are
undoubtedly persons jointly entitled to institute a suit to recover the properties.49

Where the liability is based on tort, none of the persons jointly entitled to sue can give a valid
discharge without the concurrence of other, inasmuch as these persons are in the position of
tenants-in-common, and not joint tenants, each of them having a distinct interest in the substantive
right. The fact that only one suit can be filed for recovery of compensation is not conclusive of
question that a discharge can be given by one of those persons without the concurrence of the other
persons who is under disability, the discharge contemplated by section 7 of the Act is a discharge
given by a joint claimant in his own right as such joint claimant.50

In case of fatal accidents the interest of legal representatives and heirs is distinct. Each one of them
is entitled to claim separate amount of damages. One person can give discharge in respect of his
own right but he cannot discharge in respect of the right of other claimant. In the instant case since
both the children were minors, they were incapable of giving their consent to their mother and she
should not, without their consent, give discharge. Therefore, the High Court was of the opinion that
the period of limitation could not run against the minors. Admittedly they attained majority much
later. The suit was, therefore, well within time.51

Where a 'Hundi' is in favour of Karta of joint Hindu Family and his minor son, the suit on the basis of
'Hundi' is maintainable even at the instance of father alone.52

On the death of a karta of joint Hindu family who was a partner of a firm, the surviving coparceners
are entitled to the assets in the dissolved partnership representing the shares of the profits of the
deceased partner by right of survivorship. They, therefore, will be covered by the expression "person
jointly entitled to sue", used in section 7 of the Limitation Act as they will have, mutual rights in the
assets of the dissolved partnership by right of survivorship.53

In order to attract the terms of section 7, it is necessary that one of the several persons jointly
entitled to institute a suit is under a disability and a discharge can be given without the concurrence
of such person by the other person jointly entitled to institute the suit. The expression 'jointly
entitled to institute a suit' refers to case in which cause of action is vested in all persons jointly. The
indorsee for collection is only an agent, and no title or property in promissory note vests in him. The
only person in whom the property in the note stands is the minor in whose favour the promissory
note was executed. The terms of section 7 do not apply to such a case.54 Where a property is sold in
execution of decree against property for debts incurred by deceased, co-heirs cannot separately sue
for their respective shares in the property; as their right are joint in respect of cause of action based
on transactions entered during the life time of deceased.55

13. Joint Hindu Family

According to sections 7 and 8 and Article 60 of the Limitation Act a suit brought by two brothers of
an undivided Hindu family to set aside an alienation by their guardian more than three years after
the elder attained majority is barred by limitation, not only as regards the elder brother's share, but
also in respect of the younger brother's, though the latter attained his majority within three years
prior to the institution of the suit.56 Doraiswami's case is followed in a Bombay case of Bapu Tatya v.
Bala Ravjee, where a Hindu mother acting as a natural guardian of her sons sells their property
without necessity, a suit to set aside the sale was held barred by limitation under section 7, Article
60 of this Act after three years after the eldest son attained majority.57 Similarly according to
sections 6, 7, 8 and Article 109 of this Act, a suit brought by four brothers of an undivided Hindu
family to set aside an alienation by their father before two of them were born was held barred by
limitation against all, though the last brother attained majority within three years prior to institution
of the suit.58

A suit for partition was filed by sons challenging alienations but the same was not filed within 3 years
of alienations. Two sons were major, one minor and another attained majority within 3 years. The
minority of one son cannot enlarge period of limitation for major sons. The suit for claim of major
sons was held barred by limitation.59

Where the elder brother did not challenge the alienation made by ate facto guardian within 3 years
from the date when he attained majority, suit by the younger brother for declaration of title and
possession instituted within 3 years of attaining majority was held barred by time.60 Where a minor
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filed suit for setting aside sale executed by his mother within a period of three years on attaining
majority, there was nothing to show that the plaintiff's elder brother was in management of the joint
family property, the suit could not be dismissed on the        mere ground that the plaintiff's elder
brother ought to have filed suit within a period of three years of his attaining majority.61

14. "Time will run against them all."

Where at the time when the right to apply for delivery of possession accrued, the decree-holder was
alive, the time will begin to run from that date and the subsequent disability of the legal
representatives of the decree-holder will not prevent the running of time.62

15. Fraud

Where there are more than one claimants entitled to set aside a revenue sale on the ground of
fraud, the mere fact that one of the claimants is a minor, cannot save the limitation bar, if the adult
claimant or claimants had knowledge of the fraud more than six months prior to the institution of the
suit.63

16. 'Karnavan' of Malabar 'Tarward'

'Karnavan' is the accredited representative and mouth piece of the Tarward' and so long as he is
alive, he alone can give valid discharge without the concurrence of others.64

In case of alienation by 'Karnavan' of 'illom' property, suit by junior members was filed within three
years of his attaining majority. Even if failure of senior member to sue in time, the suit is not barred
unless senior members was managing member.65

The right to bring an action to set aside an improper alienation made by a 'Karnavan' is a right of the
Tarward' and if competent adult members allowed the alienation logo unchallenged for over 12 years
the Tarward's' right to sue becomes thereby barred. It is not necessary at all for purpose of
applicability of section 7 to 'Marumakathayam' families, for the adult member, who could have filed
suit within time and failed to do so, to be the manager of the family during the relevant period.66

The right of suit available to junior members of a joint family to set aside alienation made by the
Manager or 'karnavan' is governed by the first part of section 8, Travancore Limitation Act, and when
any of them is under no disability to institute such a suit, the period of limitation will run against all
the member of the joint family.67 The 'Karnavan' of 'Marumakkathayam Tarwad' has a birth right to
be the manager and representative of the Tarward' for all purposes. Nor is it correct to say that there
must be some property in existence for a Tarward' to come into being and the senior member
thereof to be styled a 'Karnavan' and manager.68

__________________________

1. Sashan v. Rajagopala, 13 Mad 236; Govindram v. 7af/a, 20 Bom 383; Zam/r v. Sundar, 22 All 199 (FB); Mulchand v. Kesari, 12
Bom LR 682.

2. Kandasami v. Irusappa, 41 Mad 102.

3. AIR 1969 Ker 163.

4. AIR 1982 AP 247.

5. 1970 All WR (HC) 16.

6. AIR 1976 All 500.

7. AIR 1965 Ori 54; AIR 1961 SC 1074: (1961) 3 SCR 875.

8. AIR 1974 Pat 91.

9. 1971 ACJ 203.

10. AIR 1964 Ker 8; AIR 1958 Ker 228: AIR 1959 Ker 406: AIR 1960 Ker 46.

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11. AIR 1973 Ker 192.

12. AIR 1954 Trav-Co 237: 8 DLR TC 64.

13. AIR 1965 Mad 541.

14. AIR 1963 Ori 133.

15. AIR 1976 All 510.

16. AIR 1976 All 118.

17. 76 Mad LW 199: (1965) Mad LJ 81.

18. AIR 1959 Ori 179: ILR 1959 Cut 122.

19. AIR 1952 Trav-Co 33: 6 DLR TC 421.

20. AIR 1957 AP 434: 1956 Andh WR 5650.

21. 1960 Nag LJ (Notes) 61.

22. ILR 36 Bom 94: AIR 1922 Bom 319: AIR 1921 Bom 289; AIR 1929 Bom 13: 25 Mad LJ 405; AIR 1937 Pat 435 (FB); AIR 1950
Trav-Co 57 (FB).

23. Jadav Prabhatbhai Jethabhai v. Parmar Karsanbhai Dhulabhai, AIR 2001 Guj 118 (126) (FB).

24. Ballochan Karan v. Basanf Kumari Nalk, AIR 1999 SC 876 (878): (1999) 2 SCO 310; Darshan Singh v. Gurdev Singh, (1994) 6
SCO 585.

25. AIR 1955 All 186: 1954 All LJ 743.

26. AIR 1963 Ori 133.

27. Sarcla Prasad v. Lala Jamuna Prasad, 1961 Andh LT 433: 1961 All LJ 455: 1961 BLJR 570: 1961 All WR (HC) 349: (1961) 1
Ker LR 472: 1961 SCO 426: (1961) 5 SCR 875; (1962) 2 SCJ 631: (1962) 1 SCA 517: ILR (1961) 2 All 26: AIR 1961 SC 1074.

28. AIR 1980 All 52: 1979 (5) All LR 529.

29. AIR 1964 All 495.

30. AIR 1964 All 53.

31. AIR 1973 Ker 192.

32. AIR 1969 Ker 163.

33. Sarda Prasad v. La/a Jamuna Prasad, 1961 Andh LT 433: 1961 All LJ 455: 1961 BLJR 570.

34. AIR 1950 TC 57: 1950 TC LR 467.

35. (1964) 1 Andh LT 210: (1964) 1 Andh WR 277.

36. AIR 1961 SC 1074: (1961) 3 SCR 875.

37. AIR 1977 Guj 179: 1977 ACJ 44: 18 Guj LR 392 (DB).

38. ILR (1976) 2 Ker 57.

39. 1956 Ker LT 282.

40. (1985) 2 Civil LJ 455.

41. Hargobind v. Shri Krishna, 4 AWN 58.

42. Surjee v. Khwahish AH, 4 All 512; Vigneshvar v. Bapayya, 16 Mad 436; Bholamand v. Padmanund, 6 OWN 346; Harihar v.
Bholi, 6 CLJ 383; Doras/ng, 10 MLT 370. 1. Diet v. Fracer, (1897) 2 Ch 181.

43. Dict v. Fracer, (1897) 2 Ch 181.

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44. Barbara. Ramana, 20 Mad 461.

45. Venkataramaiyar, (1911) 2 MWN 307.

46. Rati Ram v. Nlndar, 41 All 435.

47. Huchrao v. Bhimrao, 20 Bom LR 166.

48. Aminabibi v. Ram Shankar, 41 All 473.

49. AIR 1961 SC 1074: (1961) 3 SCR 875; Ponnamma Pillai v. Paclmanabhan Channar, AIR 1969 Ker 163 (FB).

50. AIR 1976 All 118.

51. AIR 1983 All 27.

52. AIR 1964 All 495.

53. AIR 1964 All 53.

54. (1958) 2 Andh WR 279: 1958 Andh LT 963.

55. AIR 1953 TC450.

56. Doraisami Serumadan v. Nondsami Saluvun, 38 Mad 118; Mahableshar v. Ramchandra, 38 Bom 94.

57. Bapu Tatya v. fia/a Ravjee, 22 Bom LR 1383.

58. Ranodit Singh v. Permeshwar, 27 Bom LR 175.

59. Narayanan Ramachandna v. Arjun Bhimnao, AIR 1986 Bom 122.

60. G. Mumgan v. Marrickan, AIR 2003 Mad 129 (134): (2003) 1 MLJ 55.

61. Devendran v. Munyswant Reddiar, 2001 (2) CCC 105 (113) (Mad).

62. AIR 1954 Mad 831: (1954) 2 MLJ 89.

63. Narayan v. Damodanam, 17 Mad 189.

64. ILR (1976) 2 Ker 574.

65. AIR 1964 Ker 8 (FB).

66. 1955 Ker LT 681: ILR (1953) Trav-Co. 918: AIR 1956 Trav-Co. 78.

67. AIR 1950 Trav-Co. 57 (FB): 1950 TC LR 467.

68. AIR 1956 Trav-Co. 78: 1955 KIT 481.

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Limitation Act, 1963

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