International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 2018, 0, 1–10
Book Review
BOOK REVIEW
Robot Ethics 2.0: From Autonomous Cars to Artificial Intelligence, by Patrick Lin,
Keith Abney and Ryan Jenkins (eds), Oxford University Press, 2017, ISBN:
(9780190652951), 432 pp, £30.00.
‘Happy are those ages when the starry sky is the map of all possible paths—ages whose paths
are illuminated by the light of the stars. Everything in such ages is new and yet familiar, full of
adventure and yet their own.’1
‘Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.’2
Robots have moved from the niche enclaves of science fiction and research labo-
ratories into everyday life. How we address the transformative and at times, disrup-
tive impact of innovations such as drones, driverless cars, assistive technologies and
social robots rightly deserves close and careful scrutiny. As robotic technologies grad-
ually become embedded into society, there has been a noticeable rise in debates
about the ethics of emerging technologies, their potential and even concerns about
the increasing mechanization of our lives and existential risks posed by artificial intel-
ligence (AI). The collection of essays in Robot Ethics 2.0: From Autonomous Cars to
Artificial Intelligence aims to examine the ethical values embedded in a range of
emerging technologies and identifies areas where particular care is warranted in re-
spect of engineering and development decisions that may impair or undermine fun-
damental ethical norms in light of actual or perceived lack of legal standards and
rules. Robot Ethics 2.0 provides an appropriate resource for study and reflection on a
range of philosophical issues that in a number of respects can be traced back to
those encountered, for example, during the enlightenment when the essence of
human life and consciousness were debated and which continue to be sharply felt
now as serious issues about sentience, consciousness and intelligence have had a re-
naissance in the age of Big Data and AI. At the core of these debates is the coming
together of hardware and software and which forms the subject matter of the
collection.
1 Georg Lukács, The Theory of the Novel (MIT Press 1971) 21.
2 Arthur C Clarke, ‘Hazards of Prophecy: The Failure of the Imagination’ in Profiles of the Future: An Inquiry
into the Limits of the Possible (Gollancz 1962) 21.
C The Author(s) (2018). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
V
For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.
1
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ijlit/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ijlit/eay011/5087802
by Bukkyo University user
on 02 September 2018
2 Book Review
Before proceeding further, it may be appropriate to highlight two caveats to this
book review. First, the review is undertaken from the perspective of a lawyer and not
as an ethicist or philosopher. The task undertaken in this review is to reflect upon
how the contributors view and approach the paradigms of complexity, trust and mor-
ality. Secondly, in view of the fact that governments and intergovernmental
organizations alike are already embarking on wide ranging consultations on the very
issues and topics covered in Robot Ethics 2.0, reflections are provided on what some
of the conclusions might imply for expectations of the role of the institution of law
in a novel environment. Even though scholars in the field of robotics and AI will
bring their specialist knowledge and expertise to bear on the topics covered in Robot
Ethics 2.0, how ‘Law’ views these developments and can or ought to respond to the
ethical imperatives will become a major feature in policymaking and governance ini-
tiatives in the future. With these two qualifications in mind, the key point made here
is that the expert analysis in Robot Ethics 2.0 rightly compels us to reassess our pre-
conceptions about ongoing and emerging ethical dilemmas. The vignettes offered by
the contributors have a broader dimension in so far as they also confront law with
some fundamental doctrinal and constitutional questions about legitimacy, account-
ability and the rule of law. Specifically, from a legal and regulatory perspective, as
standard setting norms and values gradually evolve to keep pace with innovations,
the institution of law and lawyers needs to be cognizant of the fact that emerging
technologies and AI are also giving rise to new claims, values, meanings and expecta-
tions over how information is constituted and repurposed.
Overview
Robot Ethics 2.0 builds on an earlier collected edition of essays on robot ethics pub-
lished in 2014.3 This new collection introduces an additional layer of knowledge and
understanding to the ethical landscape of robotics in two ways. First, it makes an im-
portant contribution to the growing public and scholarly debate by contextualizing
the social, ethical and normative choices at stake when robots and AI take centre
stage in society. Secondly, Robot Ethics 2.0 admirably frames the ethical dilemmas
that must be grappled with at the research and product development phase before
they are introduced to the general public. Taken together, the essays provide scholars
and those new to this field with an accessible and well-researched account of major
technological developments and innovations and should serve as a good resource for
policymaking and furthering debates about robotics and AI in the age of modernity.
The research undertaken by the contributors is impressive and complemented by an
ability to integrate what might appear as abstract concepts and ethical dilemmas with
concrete examples. The book is well structured with four main parts; it guides read-
ers through the normative foundations of moral and legal responsibility, before
exploring the relational dynamics of trust in human–robot relations and their specific
applications from ‘Love to War’, and concluding with some reflections on the
3 Patrick Lin, Keith Abney and George Bekey (eds), Robot Ethics: The Ethical and Social Implications of
Robotics (MIT Press 2012).
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ijlit/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ijlit/eay011/5087802
by Bukkyo University user
on 02 September 2018
Book Review 3
implications of emerging technologies for humanity. The 24 chapters in the collec-
tion are also preceded with a helpful summary provided by the editors, which frame
the context and highlight some key questions to be addressed by the contributions.
The only aspect that may come as a bit of a surprise with Robot Ethics 2.0 is that
Part I is principally focused on driverless cars. After all, problems of agency and the
complications introduced by information to the machine question are not foreign to
the philosophy of action and mind.4 Be that as it may, the discussion, analysis and
conclusions reached in Part I do not jar against the topics covered in the remainder
of the collection. We can now turn to some key contributions and ideas emerging
from the collection of essays.
Moral and legal responsibility
Attribution of responsibility has long been the staple of discussions on driverless
cars. Part I lays the foundation for a careful examination of the contours for responsi-
bility and provide thoughtful heuristics: the grammar of responsibility, the ‘moral un-
certainty’ behind the grand vision of autonomous technology (Bhargava and Wan
Kim), the unknown knowns of the ‘ethics of ethics settings’ (Millar), the artificiality
of creating bright lines between human and machine agency (Loh and Loh) and the
models for a precautionary principle in averting the possibility of an AI catastrophe
(Gurney). The first four chapters provide a dynamic account of how responsibility
could be conceptualized throughout the lifecycle of input and output data,
emphasizing some of the ethical tensions and ambivalence that lie beneath the
choices and values inherent in any programing task or application of models of liabil-
ity and responsibility to particular settings. It is particularly important to note that
these highly refreshing and insightful treatments of responsibility, together with con-
tributions by Zoller and White and Baum, acknowledge that any conception of au-
tonomy is unlikely to veer far from Utilitarian or Kantian conceptions of
responsibility, liability and the good life. It is probably a fair assessment that discus-
sions about attributing liability and responsibility within the context of relations con-
stituted by information seem to be less about divining the sentience of driverless
technology and may ultimately resolve into policymakers and manufacturers con-
fronting the complexity of hybrid interactions and determining how these could be
managed through design or articulation of moral obligations of various legal actors.
The unarticulated hope of many engaged in this domain of policymaking is that eco-
nomic self-interest will help allay any lingering doubts about the provenance of some
of the marketing hype relating to driverless technology.
Trust and human–robot interactions
The relentless pace of innovation in robotics suggests that robots will come to play
an important role in society and more than likely perform roles and tasks that have
been previously carried out by humans. As readers work through the chapters in Part
II, they may also wish to reflect on what it is that defines us as human beings or
4 Rodney Brooks, ‘Intelligence Without Representation’ (1991) 47 Artificial Intelligence 139; Joseph
Weizenbaum, ‘ELIZA - A Computer Program for the Study of Natural Language Communication Between
Man and Machine’ (1966) 9(1) Communications of the ACM 36.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ijlit/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ijlit/eay011/5087802
by Bukkyo University user
on 02 September 2018
4 Book Review
conversely, those features that distinguish us from machines. One specific policy
question that Part II addresses well is the elucidation of the role and significance of
trust in human–robot interactions (HRIs). As we near the end of the second decade
of this century where encounters with programmed toys, digital assistants, sensor
networks and assistive technologies are increasing and becoming commonplace, how
trust is to be facilitated is a recurring theme in HRI research. The six chapters in
Part II grapple not simply with the problems of trust and deception but also explore
how interactions between humans and robots should be negotiated through the de-
velopment of ethically sensitive designs and applications. This is an important area
for research. Without trust, many concerns about an individual’s vulnerability or ex-
posure to violations of trust are likely to erect cultural and social barriers to the adop-
tion of robots in diverse contexts and situations. Negotiating the boundaries between
likeability and trust is only one issue for HRI. The other involves overcoming the un-
canny valley. The notoriety of the uncanny valley in HRI stems from feelings of un-
easiness, anxiety or mistrust that emerge when robots resemble human feelings and
characteristics. In addition to both these issues, there is the question of what princi-
ples should guide designers of intelligent robots in promoting the good life and the
related task of operationalizing these. The contributions do not shirk from address-
ing critical questions about methodology and the role and limits of ‘user centric’
approaches to HRI applications. Four chapters emphasize the importance of HRI to
specific groups of individuals in society. Meacham and Studley, for example, argue
that the ‘internal states of the agents’ is not the only consideration. In care settings,
they suggest that HRI should not discount the critical importance of giving priority
to equally important considerations such as ‘attentiveness, competence and respon-
siveness’ (p 99). Elders pick up this theme when examining the use of assistive tech-
nologies for autistic children. The coverage and analysis of social robotics literature
and the paradox of friendships are helpful and particularly important in understand-
ing the emotional and therapeutic benefits to be derived from the use of assistive
technologies. There is much to be said about Elder’s suggestion of drawing on
Nussbaum’s and Sen’s theory of human capability and flourishing as a strategy for
averting bias (p 124). Borenstein, Howard and Wagner, by contrast, provide a sober
reminder that excessive trust or reliance placed in robots may also give rise to moral
hazards that may adversely affect individuals who may be unaware of the emotional
bonds taking place. Paediatric healthcare is used as a context for examining some of
the problems that may result from over trust. There are some important insights gen-
erated which have implications for designers as well as those commissioning their
use in settings where emotional attachments are frequently seen as having therapeut-
ic benefits and correspond with the ideal of engaging with patients as human beings
with real feelings and needs. The authors also make the point that we should not
lose sight of the importance of identifying the types of relationships and expectations
that may emerge from choices made about design, physical characteristics and func-
tionality of human like machines. If monitoring trust reposed in robots is an import-
ant area of concern, then their insights can also be used to reflect on how trust is to
be operationalized in HRI and crucially in areas where some of the risks associated
with mistrust can lead to considerable harm for humans as in the context of medical
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ijlit/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ijlit/eay011/5087802
by Bukkyo University user
on 02 September 2018
Book Review 5
surgery and hazardous environments such as nuclear energy or armed conflict. There
is a broader point worth emphasizing, namely that in addition to re-assessing the
moral hazards for human–machine interpersonal relations, attention also needs to be
given to the impact of mistrust on other human–human interactions. We get a useful
insight on what level of trust should be placed on humans in highly structured and
complex environments in the next chapter. Kirkpatrick, Hahn and Haufler’s explor-
ation of the boundaries between trust and reliance is particularly relevant as robot
technologies become infused with AI and machine learning capabilities that make
assessing risk behaviour and adaptability less than straightforward (pp 149–151).
Another problem associated with the role of humans in programming and designing
robots is that we may unconsciously imbue machines with bias, values and attributes.
The discriminatory or civil libertarian issues has been well documented. At a person-
al or subliminal level, the unintended consequences of the mimetic process and how
these can or should be counteracted is less than clear. There is no better example of
the mimetic process of anthropomorphizing human like machines than the spontan-
eous outpouring of sympathy to a hitchhiking robot, appropriately named
‘hitchBOT’, which was vandalized. The final two chapters in this part bring us back
to an important question relating to the contradictions whenever we anthropo-
morphize robots (Kate Darling) and counterintuitively the need to recognize the
value of designing robots to deceive for the greater good (Isaac and Bridewell). Both
chapters clarify the range of cultural, ethical and legal considerations that need to be
brought to the forefront in conversations about robotic functionalities, their filtering
capabilities and how robots can be used to enhance the quality of the lives of individ-
uals and society generally. It is equally important in this regard to not overlook issues
of diversity and gender when designing social robots.
Applications: from love to war
It is apparent that the technological advances in social robotics, AI and autonomous
systems are blurring the boundaries between humans and machines, and one of the
paradoxes is the unchallenged dominance of the ideology of permissionless innov-
ation and the belief in the invisible hand in guiding development. The newness of
the technology or the benefits of autonomy or automation does not invariably mean
better or desirable. The topics covered in Part III could be viewed as a reminder of
the assumptions that tend to be made when faced with new technologies and innova-
tions. One should not underestimate the serious issues and topics discussed in this
part. Chapters 13 (Cheok, Karunanayaka and Yann Zhang) and 14 (Bołtuc) consider
HRI interactions in a sexual context. The use of empirical research and references to
specific robotic applications provides some welcome and balanced analysis of the
likely impact of social robotics on cultural norms and expectations as individuals and
consumers. While we may not have too much ethical concerns about the use of
Roomba helpers or Alexa in domestic settings, is there an ethical line that is crossed
when robot sex brothels and voice recognition devices can be used for self-
gratification or emotional engagement? What troubles some in society is the com-
mercial dimension and the treatment of individuals, particularly women as objects of
sexual gratification. The use of Snapchat and Instagram as spaces for exploring sexual
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ijlit/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ijlit/eay011/5087802
by Bukkyo University user
on 02 September 2018
6 Book Review
identity and preferences may perhaps explain the anticipated growth of the robot sex
technology industry that is reputed to be worth $30 billion. The race is already
underway to build the world’s first sex robot. If the quest to gain access to emotional
or social resources to enhance our human capabilities could be seen as acceptable, al-
beit straining the boundaries of received social or cultural norms, then we cannot ex-
clude from our consideration the values and power dynamics embedded in affective
technologies. The problematizing of HRI in the emotional/sexual domain also draws
attention to the susceptibility of individuals to being manipulated, particularly when
data-driven processes become the proxy for constituting and ordering relations, pref-
erences and values often without the user’s awareness (Henschke). Even if we are
cognizant of the ethical challenges, these aspirations must be made manifest in the
design and construction of robotic applications, a point which Klincewicz spends
much time elaborating. This contribution repays careful reading as it raises some fun-
damental questions about the challenges faced in translating moral theories and
counterfactuals into engineering solutions. The broader point that seems to emerge
from each of these contributions in this part may be that engineers and philosophers
will need to better understand each other so that steps can be taken to find engineer-
ing solutions that correspond with human values and ethical norms. This is a legitim-
ate goal for identifying and developing rules to a point. There is, however, the added
dilemma of defining the ethical landscape for robotics since the normative structures
(whether Utilitarian or Kantian) are fluid and creating a hierarchy of values not en-
tirely free from their own questions of rights to be prioritized. Where does one actu-
ally start when allocating to robots the range of universal rights for robots? How do
we avoid the problem of over-or-under inclusion? Who decides and should the robot
be given a discretion? Can we program robots to behave ethically or must there be a
human in the loop? These are some of the dilemmas discussed in the earlier text5
and readers may find it helpful to consult this work alongside the present. The chap-
ter by Talbot, Jenkins and Purves is particularly noteworthy as it contributes to the
debate on how best to equip robots with ethical evaluation capabilities. One could,
as the authors suggest that machines should be programmed with a set of ethical
coordinates to guide the decision making so that they can act as consequentialists.
Even though the authors make a compelling case for this analytical shift, there seems
to be an acceptance that the policy choices to be made will depend on sector-specific
codes or principles such as those being prepared by the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers in forging a social consensus. The final chapter returns us to
subject that has been in the public and media spotlight—autonomous weapons and
the boundaries between legality and morality. Kahn is convinced that weaponizing
robots will not only lead to increasing armed conflicts but will also be morally objec-
tionable. Kahn is right in his observation of the relative lack of political enthusiasm
to withdraw from the lethal autonomous weapons arms race. The chapter provides a
useful account of how public pressure and increased visibility of the objectionable na-
ture of lethal autonomous weapons may lead to self-imposed constraints on
governments.
5 Lin and others (n 3).
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ijlit/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ijlit/eay011/5087802
by Bukkyo University user
on 02 September 2018
Book Review 7
The future of AI and robotics
The chapters in Part IV do not disappoint. LaBossiere proposes that artificial beings
should be presumed to enjoy moral status (pp 303–304). The term ‘moral status’ is
used in the sense of an expectation that any harm or abuse without adequate justifi-
cation would be regarded as wrong.6 While humans are regarded as being worthy of
moral consideration, claims that moral status should now be extended to AI has its
detractors. While discussions about the moral status of AI may have once have been
regarded simply as a philosophical debate, their practical relevance cannot be
ignored. Intelligence in the technological domain now involves machines interacting
with each other, sensors transmitting information and AI making decisions relayed in
real-time in the Internet of Things. The machine question manifests itself in calls for
AI to be entitled to an ersatz moral status (pp 303–304). DiGiovanna’s chapter
extends the rights discourse to enable artificial beings to be entitled to an identity
(not in the sense of personal identity of humans). This idea of once barely imagined
beings having artificial identities may seem to be more appropriate for science fiction
than a matter for the law. This may be short sighted. A deeper issue that emerges in
the chapter is whether we may have to eventually re-think our understanding of per-
sonhood in light of the gradual convergence of human enhancement and AI.7 If the
trajectory of technological development and epistemic uncertainties regarding per-
sonhood are unsettling, the emergence of superintelligent and unsympathetic AI is
likely to provoke considerable anxiety regarding the existential risks it poses to hu-
manity.8 It may be prudent not to underestimate John Good’s observation of what
intelligence explosion implies for society and humanity:
Thus the first ultra-intelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever
make, provided that the machine is docile enough to tell us how to keep it
under control. It is curious that this point is made so seldom outside of science
fiction. It is sometimes worthwhile to take science fiction seriously.9
Bostrom’s work10 provides the inspiration for Peterson’s chapter. How do we avert
the risks associated with superintelligent AIs? This is a challenging question as we
simply have no precedent in history to assist us in dealing with runaway superintelli-
gent machines. Petersen is not under any illusions of the complexity of the challenge
that lies ahead, but explores the possibility of a super ethical AI that may help offset
existential threats. Vallor and Bekey’s chapter maps the challenges machine learning
applications pose for various sectors in the economy and society generally. An
6 See John Basl, ‘Machines as Moral Patients We Shouldn’t Care About (Yet): The Interests and Welfare
of Current Machines’ (2014) 27 Philosophy & Technology 79; David Gunkel, ‘A Vindication of the
Rights of Machines’ (2014) 27 Philosophy & Technology 113.
7 Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (OUP 2014).
8 Stephen Hawking and others, ‘Transcendence Looks at the Implications of Artificial Intelligence—But
are We Taking AI Seriously Enough?’ The Independent (1 May 2014). https://www.independent.co.uk/
news/science/stephen-hawking-transcendence-looks-at-the-implications-of-artificial-intelligence-but-are-
we-taking-9313474.html
9 Irving John Good, ‘Speculations Concerning the First Ultraintelligent Machine’ (1966) 6 Advances in
Computers 31.
10 Bostrom (n 7).
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ijlit/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ijlit/eay011/5087802
by Bukkyo University user
on 02 September 2018
8 Book Review
emerging concern raised by the chapter is how we should view AI and think about
the knowledge produced by machines. (The General Data Protection Regulation11
addresses this issue through new transparency and accountability rules to ensure that
checks and balances are provided when humans delegate responsibilities for decision
making to machines, which may have significant legal consequences.)
Abney’s chapter provides an insight into the new information frontier for
machines—space. This chapter provides a clear and concise account of the functions
that robots can undertake in space. Indeed, many will agree with Abney that robots
and AI do not have biological or physical constraints that enable them to better ex-
plore and navigate new or difficult terrains in space, undertake critical repairs and
even set up bases in new colonies. The final chapter has the title of ‘The Unabomber
on Robots’; what makes this chapter intriguing is the fact that its author Galliott
engaged in direct correspondence with Kaczynski, and an explanatory note (p 383)
addresses the ethical dilemma he faced in deciding to initiate this communication.
His broad thesis can be framed in the form of a question that should also be central
to any philosophy of technology: what are the emerging forms of marginalization
and disenfranchisement being engendered by our technoindustrial systems? There is
a tendency to overly focus on the poster children of emerging technologies and per-
haps underestimate the way power structures marginalize communities or influence
and shape particular values and interests. Galliott’s chapter reminds that all of us
have a responsibility to ensure that we create a democratic and inclusive governance
framework.
Conclusion
Robot Ethics 2.0 neatly captures the complexities of the design of emerging technolo-
gies and the ethical dilemmas created as a result of their integration into social envi-
ronments and particular contexts. The role of law in these debates is particularly
conspicuous by its perceived inability to keep pace with emerging technologies and
concerns. This is only part of the narrative that has now been elevated to a viral sta-
tus in light of driverless cars, social robots and threats posed malicious AI. There are
other explanations that should not be discounted. Two can be noted. First, there are
considerable difficulties in ascribing responsibility through the formulation of clear
and precise definitions of rights, duties and obligations in an environment where
technological change seems to be relentless. Legislating involves the process of
engaging with questions relating to the effectiveness, legitimacy or appropriateness
of any legal or regulatory intervention, examination of options as well as identifying
limits to extending existing category of rights, duties and harms. The second relates
to the need to re-think the dialectical relationship between law and the empirical
reality of information flows that involve hardware and software. The moral and legal
responsibilities associated with driverless cars are emblematic of the challenges in
developing ‘an interpretive community’ of rules, which enable the normative choices
11 Regulation 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data
and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation).
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ijlit/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ijlit/eay011/5087802
by Bukkyo University user
on 02 September 2018
Book Review 9
of the law of negligence, strict liability and product liability to be navigated.12 Rules
are unable to apply themselves and hence require legal actors to order their activities
and make their choices.13 The problem in creating a community for rule interpret-
ation is not limited to driverless technology, but straddles other innovations where
the intelligence explosion has enabled machines to assume human like characteristics
and attributes. Our understanding of rules and decision making has long been based
on normative frameworks and standards involving human–human interactions in so-
ciety. How do we transpose or even extend these approaches to human like and
non-biological entities like care robots or AI when it is well documented that rules in
themselves can be ambiguous, permit discretion and can be indeterminate? The
European Civil Law Rules on Robotics, well-intentioned and aspirational in its out-
look, can also be seen as a timely reminder of the need to reassess how rules function
in the age of emerging technologies, reflecting on the strategies for compliance and
contexts and the community in which rules are interpreted and applied. The quest to
calibrate ethical principles with regulatory strategies legal rules may become one of the
defining features of the interplay between the politics of science and the politics of
technology. How philosophers position themselves within the sphere of policymaking
is only part of the compelling case studies provided in Robot Ethics 2.0. It is beyond
the scope of this review to address the other major concern—the power of corporate
actors in driving innovation and how these are to be regulated. Notwithstanding the
considerable opportunities now made possible by corporate actors with global influ-
ence, their challenges for policy development and rule making are real. First, permis-
sionless innovation should never be presumed to be the default rule as it may lead to a
culture of ‘making rules up as we go along’. The fatality involving Uber’s driverless car
on 18 March 201814 raises a number of policy questions that have never been fully
addressed in public: if driverless cars are meant to reduce accidents, are there cheaper
and more efficient safety measures? Are the risks and burdens to be borne by pedes-
trians and other road users proportionate? Can driverless cars be justified in Utilitarian
or Kantian terms? Secondly, one consequence of regulatory capture in the context of
emerging technologies is that individuals will be treated as laboratory experiments
when sensors do not function as expected, or if a robot is hacked or corrupted by mal-
ware. To what extent have the general public been involved in participating in deci-
sions involving the transformation of urban spaces and critical infrastructures?
However, like Robot Ethics 2.0, it is important to end on a positive note and embrace
the potential of emerging technologies such as robots and AI. Arthur C. Clarke’s fam-
ously regarded imagination as being critical to enabling cultures to benefit from tech-
nology.15 We can include within the long list of the output of human imagination, the
horseless carriage, the Internet and AI. While science fiction may be seen as a source
12 Julia Black, Rules and Regulators (OUP 1996) 214; Robert Baldwin, ‘Why Rules Don’t Work’ (1991) 53
Modern Law Review 321.
13 Black, ibid 215–16.
14 Daisuke Wakabayashi, ‘Woman’s Death in Arizona Casts a Pall on Driverless Car Testing’ New York
Times (20 March 2018) A1.
15 Clarke (n 2) 12, 21.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ijlit/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ijlit/eay011/5087802
by Bukkyo University user
on 02 September 2018
10 Book Review
of inspiration and magical thinking, the role and evolution of the law already provide a
capacious resource for imagination and morality. If we are persistent, law could argu-
ably be regarded as a technology for barely imagined beings and provides us with a
compass of where to find them.
Joseph Savirimuthu
Senior lecturer, Liverpool Law School, University of Liverpool
E-mail: jsaviri@liverpool.ac.uk
doi:10.1093/ijlit/eay011
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ijlit/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ijlit/eay011/5087802
by Bukkyo University user
on 02 September 2018
