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EXECUTIVE SESSION

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

INTERVIEW OF: MARY MCCORD

Wednesday, November 1, 2017

Washington, O.C.

The interview in the above matter was held in Room HVC-304, the Capitol,

commencing at 11:12 a.m.

Present: Representatives Conaway, Gowdy, Stefanik, Schiff, Himes,

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Carson, Speier, Quigley, Swalwell, and Heck.
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Appearances:

For the PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE:

For MARY MCCORD:

RAPHAEL ADAM PROBER, ESQ.

MARTINE CICCONI, ESQ.

AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP

ROBERT S. STRAUSS BUILDING

1333 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVENUE, N.W.

WASHINGTON DC 20036-1564

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Good morning. This is a transcribed interview of Mary

McCord.

Thank you for speaking to us today.

For the record, I am- senior counsel at the House Permanent

Select Committee on Intelligence for the majority. There are also various

Members and staff present who will introduce themselves a1s the proceedings go

on. But before we begin, I wanted to state a few things for the record.

The questioning will be conducted by Members and staff present. During

the course of this interview Members and staff may ask questions during their

allotted time period. Some questions may seem bas_ic, but that is because we

need to clearly establish facts and understand the situation. Please do not

assume we know any facts you have previously disclosed as part of any other

investigation or review.

This interview will be conducted at the Top Secret/SCI level.

During the course of this interview we will take any breaks that you desire.

We ask that you give complete and fulsome.replies to questions based on

your best recollections. If a question is unclear or you're uncertain in your

response, please let us know. And if you do not know the answer to a question or

simply cannot remember, just say so.

You're entitled to have counsel present for this inter.iiew, and I see that

you've brought them. At this time, if counsel can make thHir appearances for the

record.

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MR. PROBER: Raphael Prober, from Akin Gump.
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MS. CICCONI: Martine Cicconi from Akin Gump.

Thank you.
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The interview will be transcribed. There is a reporter making a record of

these proceedings so we can easily consult a written compilation of your answers.

Because the reporter cannot record gestures, we ask that you answer verbally. If

you forget to do this, you might be reminded to do so. You may also be asked to

spell certain terms or unusual phrases.

Consistent with the committee's rules of procedure, you and your counsel,

upon request, will have a reasonable opportunity to inspect the transcript of this

interview in order to determine whether your answers were correctly transcribed.

The transcript will remain in the committee's custody. The committee also

reserves the right to request your return for additional questions should the need

arise.

The processes for the interview is as follows. The majority will be given 45

minutes to ask questions and the minority will be given 45 minutes to ask

questions. Immediately thereafter, we will take a 5-minute break, should you

desire, after which time the majority will be given 15 minutes to ask questions and

the minority will be given 15 minutes to ask questions. These 15-minute rounds

will continue until each side has exhausted its questioning.

The timing for these rounds will be adhered to by all sides, with no

extensions being granted. And time will be kept for each portion of the interview

with warnings given at the 5- and 1-minute mark respectively.

To ensure confidentiality, we ask that you do not discusses the interview

with anyone other than your attorneys. And you are reminded that it is unlawful to

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deliberately provide false information to Members of Congress or staff. And
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lastly, the record will reflect that you're appearing voluntarily for this interview,
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which will be under oath.

Ms. McCord, if you could raise your right hand to be sworn.

[Witness sworn.]

Thank you.

And just a reminder, when speaking, please make sure the microphone is

on with the green light so that the reporter can transcribe it.

Over to you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. CONAWAY: Thank you for being here this morning.

MR. GOWDY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you on behalf of all of us

for being here this morning.

My name is Trey Gowdy, I'm from South Carolina. Tom Rooney is

from - oh, sorry.

MR. ROONEY: I think he wanted to say something.

MR. PROBER: We can go when you are through.

MR. GOWDY: No. Heavens, no. You go now. You're being paid more

by the hour than I am, you go.

MR. PROBER: Thanks very much. I just wanted 'to run through a couple

of housekeeping things before we get started.

As everyone knows, and as I've communicated to staff on both sides, Ms.

McCord's happy to be here and to answer the questions. I just want to make sure

that we're all being mindful of her role as a lawyer and the attendant obligations

there as we are having the conversation. I don't envision any issues arising, but I

wanted to make sure to flag that to the extent anything comes up in that regard.

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And then also, of course, open matters and any sensitivity around that,
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should any issues arise, I just wanted to flag that as we're getting going.
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I also wanted to mention, consistent with the committee's rules and my

conversations with staff on both sides, it's certainly our understanding and

expectation that this will remain confidential. But I would just ask that to the

extent any piece of this does not remain confidential, and, again, it's our hope and

expectation that it will, that the NOA that we and Ms. McCord signed this morning

does not present an issue with regard to nonclassified information if there's a

belief that less than the entire context is being provided.

And, Ms. McCord, I know there are no documents that you're intending to

use today. This is obviously based on recollection, some events going back

roughly a year ago or more.

Ms. McCord has spoken with the Special Counsel and also with the Senate

and is relying on her memory here. But I just want to make clear that there are a

lot of dates involved and she doesn't have the benefit of her files or her notes as

we're getting going.

And the last piece is, I wanted to mention that we let the Department know

that she would be coming in and doing this interview.

MR. GOWDY: Very well.

MR. PROBER: Thank you.

MR. GOWDY: Ms. McCord, the committee is looking at four things, four

areas of jurisdiction. What did Russia do with respect to the 2016 election cycle?

With whom, if anyone, did they do it? What was the U.S. Government's

response? And the fourth tranche for purposes of today would be the issue of

maskings and unmaskings, and then the dissemination of classified information.

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So our questions will focus on the first couple of those prongs.
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But before we get into that, 2015, 2016, what was your title, what was your
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role and responsibilities at the Department?

MS. MCCORD: So I came over to the National Security Division at the

Department from the U.S. Attorney's Office in D.C. in the spring of 2014, as the

Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General. That was a career position. And I

remained career throughout my tenure at the National Security Division.

So in 2015 and 2016 until October, I was the Principal Deputy. In October

of 2016, when John Carlin, then the Assistant Attorney General, departed the

government, I became the Acting Assistant Attorney General, but still held my title

as Principal Deputy.

So in the role both as Principal Deputy and as an Acting Assistant Attorney

General, I had responsibility, of course, when John was there, with John,

Mr. Carlin, for supervising the 350-plus attorneys and staff in the division, and that

covered areas of counterterrorism prosecutions, counter-espionage and export

control prosecutions, national security cyber prosecutions, the Office of

Intelligence, which is where all of the work in front of the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Court is done, and also the law and policy shop, which is a group of

lawyers that did policy work, to include proposed legislation, working with folks on

Capitol Hill on testimony and other things on national security-related issues,

authorities -- intelligence authorities.

And also those were the lawyers who helped prepare me and Mr. Carlin,

the Deputy Attorney General, and the Attorney General for National Security

Council meetings on issues of national security across a wide spectrum.

MR. GOWDY: From time to time at least some folks in the media and

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even of us that aren't experts like you are will draw a distinction between
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counterintelligence investigations and terrorism or criminal investigations. Is that
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a distinction that you draw? And if so, is there a difference in the way that you

would investigate or manage those categories of cases?

MS. MCCORD: There is a distinction. A criminal investigation is one

where usually from the beginning there is -- reason to beleive, the crime's been

committed. And so from the beginning of the investigation the goal is to

determine whether there is a sufficient quantum of evidence to charge someone

with a criminal offense.

A counterintelligence investigation -- and usually the goal in a criminal

investigation is to get from that starting point to a decision about whether the

evidence is there and, you know, as expeditiously as possible, consistent with the

rule of law.

In a counterintelligence investigation, many of these are not with an eye

toward any types of criminal charges whatsoever. It's in order to obtain

intelligence collection and to determine -- and this might be counterintelligence

investigations regarding potential intelligence officers here in the United States or

elsewhere who are trying to obtain information across a variety of different issues

to share with their own -- with their own governments.

And so, these are oftentimes -- most times, I would say -- not with any kind

of intent or objective of reaching a criminal charge. And so, these might remain

open for years.

MR. GOWDY: Did you have a role or did the Department have a role, if

you know, in investigating the intrusion into the DNC server whenever that may

have taken place?

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MS. MCCORD: Yes. So it was primarily through the Federal Bureau of
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Investigation, which, of course, is part of the Department. And they were involved
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in that from a very, you know, early stage.

MR. GOWDY: Would you have also been involved in that?

MS. MCCORD: So I was briefed on that from time to time. I can't recall

the first briefing. And then of course that issue also became an issue that was of

concern to the entire, you know, National Security Council and the National

Security Council staff.

And so in addition to the FBl's investigative role in that matter, there was

also, you know, interest across the National Security Council in what did happen

and what should the government's response be, what should the U.S. response

be.

MR. GOWDY: Would that have fallen more in the counterintelligence or

the criminal side of the ledger or both?

MS. MCCORD: So the FBI would have been looking at it for both,

counterintelligence purposes and to try to determine if we could attribute the

intrusion to any individual that could be potentially charged. So they were, you

know, focused on both of these things.

In terms of the National Security Council and, you know, the different

members and different departments, their work wouldn't have been focused on,

you know, a criminal investigation, it was focused on determining who was

responsible and then how should the U.S. respond to them.

MR. GOWDY: Would Bureau agents ever come to you for advice or

counsel about how to access evidence or whether or not you had enough probable

cause to access evidence?

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MS. MCCORD: I guess I would need some clarification on what you mean
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MR. GOWDY: Search warrant.

MS. MCCORD: Well, obviously they --1 shouldn't say obviously. The Bureau

would come to a prosecutor for a search warrant. And so if it is a national

security matter that is reporting up through the National Security Division, they

would typically be working with not only a lawyer either in counterterrorism

section or our counterintelligence and export control section -- we have attorneys

in both -- but also usually with an assistant United States attorney at one of the

U.S. Attorney's Offices in the country that would have, you know, jurisdiction over

the event.

And that's because a process like a search warrant, we would -- we at the

National Security Division -- would need to be using -- have an open case and

take that to a judge and we would work with an assistant U.S. attorney.

MR. GOWDY: Confusion is probably too strong a word, but there is a lack

of clarity, at least on some of our behalfs, of whether or not the U.S. Government

had access to the DNC server during the pendency of this investigation. Do you

know whether or not they did and whether or not any U.S. Government entity

sought access to the server?

MS. MCCORD: I do not know the answer to whether the Bureau or other

U.S. Government entity had access to the server. What I'm aware of with regard

to the Bureau's investigation is that from an early point in time they reached out to

officials at the DNC to make them aware of intrusions that had taken place and

they did that over a series of different contexts, without getting a lot

of -- cooperation is maybe too strong of a word -- but without getting -- making a

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lot of progress in terms of attention to the issue.
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• MR. GOWDY: Well, every now and again law enforcement agencies will
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ask for access to what they perceive to be evidence. And then when they ask

and don't like the answer, they'll resort to a legal process to access it. Do you

know whether or not they saw the search warrant, discussed one with you, or did

they just ask for it?

MS. MCCORD: For --

MR. GOWDY: To the server.

MS. MCCORD: For access to the server? They did not discuss that with

me.

MR. GOWDY: With respect to whether it's Mr. Podesta's email or whether

it's the DNC server, for those of us that were homicide prosecutors and not other,

more thoughtful, smart stuff, is it a crime to access someone's server and to

intrude in someone's server? Are there potential crimes that would have been

committed in connection with that?

MS. MCCORD: There are computer crimes that involve unauthorized

access to, you know, servers, computers, other types of cyber.

MR. GOWDY: What are the elements of those offenses? Do you recall

what --

MS. MCCORD: I don't have the statute book in front of me.

MR. GOWDY: Would that be true for both an email account and a server?

Would they both be --

MS. MCCORD: I believe both are those that could be the subject of

unauthorized access that could give rise to potential charges.

MR GOWDY: All right. So if you've answered this, I apologize, but I want

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to ask it again. Were there open criminal investigations with respect to the breach
of the email or the server?
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MS. MCCORD: At what point in time are you --

MR. GOWDY: At any point in time.

MS. MCCORD: So there were -- the FBI from the time I think it first

learned of the breach into the server began trying to ascertain who had -- who was

responsible for that intrusion. And that - I can't recall exactly when I became

aware of that, and I don't recall us being specific as to which bucket the FBI had

put that in, counterintelligence versus criminal at the beginning.

But I will say that certainly it was always our hope and objective -- when I

say our, I mean at the National Security Division, working with the Deputy

Assistant Attorney General who was responsible for our cyber investigations -- it

was certainly always the hope that it would get to a point of confidence in who in

particular was responsible for that.

MR. GOWDY: In 2015 or 2016, at any point while you were there, do you

recall either counterintelligence or criminal investigations into either of the major

political candidates and/or their campaigns?

MS. MCCORD: There -- no.

MR. GOWDY: Do you recall either counterintelligence or criminal

investigations into anyone, whether formally or informally connected with either of

the two major political candidates' campaigns.

MS. MCCORD: Yes.

MR. GOWDY: What can you tell us about that?

MS. MCCORD: So beginning in -- although I was not aware of this at the

time -- but beginning in the summer of 2016 is when the FBI began investigating

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some individuals who had been affiliated with the Trump campaign as
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counterintelligence investigations, not criminal investigations. And that proceeded
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throughout the fall and, of course, after the election and into this year, as you're

• aware.

At some point, and I don't know, you would have to talk to the Bureau about

how they keep track of their own records and the way they open different

investigations. They can open as a Cl or counterintelligence investigation, open

as a criminal investigation, and they can sometimes merge these. And I can't tell

you when these would have been merged. I can say that by early 2017, I would

say, is when there were more discussions about potential criminal, you know,

looking at this as criminal investigations in addition to counterintelligence

investigations.

MR. GOWDY: I think if I wrote it down right, you said individuals. Do you

recall any of the names of people, either formerly or informally, connected with the

Trump campaign?

MS. MCCORD: Yes.

MR. GOWDY: And you said these would have been Cl investigations at

the time, not necessarily criminal.

MS. MCCORD: So the way it was explained to me by the Bureau was that

MR. GOWDY: Before we get to those individuals, who with the FBI would

you have -- who would have briefed you, who would you have worked -- which

agent would you have worked most closely with?

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MS. MCCORD: So recall, I was the -- by the time we were receiving any
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briefings on this -- this aspect, the Cl aspect, as opposed to the cyber aspect of
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this -- I was the Acting Assistant Attorney General. So I was not the one dealing

on a day-to-day basis with the Bureau. So I -- my counterparts at the Bureau

often were either Andy McCabe or on cyber or Cl matters Bill Priestap -- not cyber,

but on Cl matters Bill Priestap. On the counterintelligence side it would have

been Carl Ghattas -- I mean on the counterterrorism side it would have been Carl

Ghattas.

The briefings -- we began to have more regular -- well, regular briefings on

the Cl investigations at the beginning of this calendar year, in January, and had

really sort of our first soup-to-nuts kind of briefing either the first Friday or the

second Friday in January. I just can't recall anymore which it was. And we

would have these weekly or biweekly, up really until about the time I departed.

And those were usually done not by Mr. McCabe, but by Mr. Priestap and

agents and supervisory agents and I think the deputy AD, or maybe it was the AD,

I'm not sure, Pete Strzock -- Pete Strzock. And then sometimes there would be

someone from the FBl's general counsel present at the briefings.

MR. GOWDY: Would those have

been opened as separate matters or one matter?

MS. MCCORD: You'd really need to talk to the Bureau about that. -

MR. GOWDY: In what way?

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MS. MCCORD: Well, certainly by early January there was the potential
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with respect to Michael Flynn to have potentially violated a criminal statute in light
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of his conversations with the Russian Ambassador Kislyak in late December and

that was discussed with the Bureau.

No one was putting their fingers on any particular criminal

statutes with respect to sort of collusion at that point. It was still an investigation

into exactly what contacts there had been and how high up these went and what

that might, you know, what that might look at.

So I can't, you know, I can't pinpoint a particular time, you know, reflecting

back on it when any decision was made this is now criminal versus this is

now -- this is still Cl.

MR. GOWDY: What's the difference to you between the word collusion

and conspiracy?

MS. MCCORD: Well, collusion is a word that's been used out in the public

to refer to this investigation. It's, of course, not a crime itself. Conspiracy is a

crime. I don't know what the elements of collusion are because it's not a crime,

but I think people use it in a way that sounds very much like conspiracy.

MR. GOWDY: When you use it, is that how -- we used to used the word

conspiracy. Is collusion tantamount to conspiracy, is it a synonym, are there

distinctions?

MS. MCCORD: I can't answer that because I can't tell you what everyone

who's used that word in the last year is thinking when they use the word. I can tell

you from a -

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MR. GOWDY: How about you, when you use it?
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MS. MCCORD: From a criminal investigative perspective, I would use the
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word conspiracy.

MR. GOWDY: All right. For purposes of you and I, to the extent I can

remember I'm going to use the word conspiracy instead of collusion. Although I'm

going to have to backtrack because you used the word collusion.

Investigating collusion, between whom and to do what?

MS. MCCORD: So as you recall, we discussed that this was opened as a

counterintelligence investigation initially. So I think that's part of that, and, frankly,

just what's been in the media is why a lot of people have sort of shorthanded this

to refer to Russian collusion.

And for counterintelligence purposes, when the objective is not necessarily

to lead to criminal charges, words like that could be used in that community to

determine whether there was what would be commonly referred to as collusion, I

think.

And so a lot of, I think, what the Bureau was looking at when it first opened

was to determine, you know, what efforts, if any, were made to anyone associated

with the Trump campaign to collude with, conspire with those within the Russian

administration to influence the election. And so that's the kind of context I think

that I'm using that term.

When we talk about conspiracy, we're talking -- to me, when I talk about

conspiracy, I'm talking about is there evidence of a conspiracy that could lead to

criminal charges.

And just to go back to, I don't know if this is to correct or clarify an earlier

response, in terms of the timing, when the first -- in the course of our briefings on

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these matters early in 2017, when it became clear that there could be some
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potential criminal culpability or at least worth investigating and criminal tools like
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subpoenas were going to be used, then, of course, you need to open a criminal

investigation because you have to have a grand jury open in order to issue a

subpoena.

MR. GOWDY: There are four pivot points, probably more than four, but

four that I wrote down. The reason that I started with the intrusion into the DNC

server and Podesta's email is that's a pretty clear point for which there could have

been conspiracy or collusion.

MS. MCCORD: Uh-huh.

MR. GOWDY: There's the dissemination of whatever would have been

gathered from that intrusion.

MS. MCCORD: Uh-huh.

MR. GOWDY: And then I guess there's everything else. And I think you

used the phrase influence the election.

MS. MCCORD: Uh-huh.

MR. GOWDY: Was there an investigation, evidence -- which is a word I

like, other people like the word intelligence - of any member of the Trump

campaign conspiring with the hackers of the DNC server and the Podesta email?

MS. MCCORD: At the time I left, that's something that was still under

investigation.

MR. GOWDY: It was still under investigation whether or not the Trump

campaign assisted in the actual intrusion?

MS. MCCORD: Well, I mean I guess you could put it that way. What

I -- what I -- the way I think of it is, it was an active investigation into attributing the

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responsible party for the intrusion and making attribution to the responsible party
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for the dissemination of that information through the Guccifer 2.0 persona.
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MR. GOWDY: But you'd agree those are two separate pivot points.

There is the intrusion - and I could have had nothing to do with the intrusion, but

taken full advantage of the fact that somebody else committed a crime.

MS. MCCORD: That's true.

MR. GOWDY: All right. So with those two separate pivot points, and I

think you testified that the matter was still under investigation when you left, what

evidence, regardless of source, regardless of credibility, believability, existed that

any member of the Trump campaign conspired with anyone else to intrude into

either the DNC server or the Podesta email?

MS. MCCORD: I can't recall if there was information -- any information or

evidence at the time I left about conspiring to take part in the actual intrusion.

MR. GOWDY: How about the dissemination of information gathered

during the intrusion?

MS. MCCORD: I can't refer you to any evidence of that as well.

MR. GOWDY: All right. So there's the -- we'll call it a crime, the crime of

the intrusion.

MS. MCCORD: Uh-huh.

MR. GOWDY: Would it be a crime to disseminate information gathered as

a result of someone else's crime?

MS. MCCORD: It depends. It depends. And maybe you've tried to

embed this in your question. But it depends on what that person who is doing the

disseminating, what their knowledge is about and any wittingness or, I guess,

complicity in the actual intrusion. But I think you've tried to bake into your

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question that there wouldn't be any. And I guess knowledge of whether
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information -- you know, I'm taking it out of the context that we've been talking
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about, just in a more generic context -- and knowledge about whether that

information is classified or not.

If you think about a traditional sort of leak case, for example, and if you

have just someone who is the recipient of leaked information that didn't do

anything to elicit a leak of that information, there's a different question about

publishing it. That's a very different question than complicity for leaking it. So it

is a little bit similar, a little bit analogous.

MR. GOWDY: I've been gone so long, I don't remember the answer to this

question, but can you be guilty of a conspiracy when the act took place before the

conspiracy was formed?

MS. MCCORD: Not for the conspiracy to commit that act.

MR. GOWDY: Is misprison of a felony a possible charge if you after the

fact knew about a crime taking place and failed to report it or does that require you

having a duty to report it?

MS. MCCORD: I don't - I'm not competent to answer that question right

now--

MR. GOWDY: I'm not either. I'm just trying to figure out what potential

criminality could exist if Mr. Conaway hacked into Mr. Rooney's email and I had

nothing to do with it, but I thought, this is some interesting stuff, I'm going to

participate in the dissemination of it. I'm just trying to figure out what the range of

possible criminal conduct could be for that. Can you think of anything?

MS. MCCORD: I'm not -- I'm just not prepared today to tell you

every -- every possible crime that there could be, because it's so factually specific.

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If what you're -- never mind.
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Well, I'm actually not trying to make it complicated.
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"Influencing the election" is kind of the phrase that we hear a lot. Is that a crime?

Is working with a foreign government to influence an election a crime?

MS. MCCORD: There could be different crimes that come from that.

MR. GOWDY: And that's what I'm getting at. What could they be?

MS. MCCORD: Well, again, I would go back to what complicity there

might have been in the obtaining of the information, what sources might have

been used, wire sources or others to convey the information, whether it was done

fraudulently based on who you claim to have been in conveying the information or

what the source of that information is. So I think there's a variety of things to be

looked at.

MR. GOWDY: Do all of those assume some complicity in the underlying

act?

MS. MCCORD: No. I don't believe they would have to assume

complicity. If by underlying act you mean the intrusion --

MR. GOWDY: Access, yeah.

MS. MCCORD: -- then no. But as you do know, because I know you were also

were a Federal prosecutor, all criminal offenses do require knowledge and most

require an intent except for strict liability crimes.

MR. GOWDY: All right. Walk us through the application process for a

FISA warrant.

MS. MCCORD: So I should just clarify, I will do that, but I will also -- I want

to make sure that you all are aware that because I was a career DOJ employee,

even when I was the Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security, I did

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not have the authority by statute to sign FISA applications, because I was not
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Presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed. So although I was the head of
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the National Security Division for 6 months, I did not sign FISAs. Those did have

to go to someone who was Presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed and

statutorily given the responsibility and authority to sign those.

But typically when the FBI had information that it had put together into an

application to seek a FISA, it would work with attorneys in the Office of Intelligence

at the National Security Division to make sure -- who would go through the FISA

application and work with the agents to determine whether it was sufficient and

had necessary probable cause and met the other necessary criteria under the

FISA statute.

Sometimes they would be turned away, if those requisite standards couldn't

be met. Other times modifications might be made. Sometimes it was a process

that would go on for weeks or even months to, you know, put together the entire

FISA application.

Once the attorney in the Office of Intelligence was satisfied that the

application met the statutory requirements, that would be approved by various

supervisors within the Office of Intelligence, to include the Deputy Assistant

Attorney General for the Office of Intelligence. And then it would go to whomever

the signer was going to be.

So when John Carlin was still the AAG, he would sign, unless he was out of

town and unavailable, in which case it would go up to the Deputy Attorney

General. And if that person was unavailable, it would go to the Attorney General.

MR. GOWDY:

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MS. MCCORD:
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MS. MCCORD: There were not.

MR. GOWDY: Do you recall if there were any FISA applications with

respect to Carter Page?

MS. MCCORD: There was.

MR. GOWDY: How many?

MS. MCCORD: Just -- well, there was an application that was approved in

the fall of 2016. And then it was reapproved after 90 days. It was extended in, I

believe, January of 2017.

MR. GOWDY: Is there both a formal and an informal declination or

rejection policy with the court? Will they allow you to present something

informally and the judge advise you whether or not you have enough? Or is it all

a formal application with a formal acceptance or rejection?

MS. MCCORD: There are times that I know we've sent over read copies

so that the staff can start to get familiar with the read copy. And staff would

advise our attorneys if they thought there might be any issues that would cause

concern before a formal application went over.

But I don't know of any process where the actual judge, the court would,

you know, informally say this is not going to cut it, resubmit it. There were -- like I

said, sometimes there would be dialogue at the staff level.

MR. GOWDY: Were there any --

[Discussion off the record.]

-
MR. GOWDY: Do you know whether there were any rejections for any of
 -
the applications with connection to Carter Page?
24

MS. MCCORD: There were not.

MR. GOWDY: What --

MS. MCCORD: At least I'm not aware of any. I don't believe there were.

MR. GOWDY: And this application, the standard approval for having it

approved is what, probable cause?

MS. MCCORD: Yes.

MR. GOWDY: And that would manifest itself in what, an affidavit?

MS. MCCORD: Yes.

MR. GOWDY: Signed by whom?

MS. MCCORD: By whichever agent, Bureau agent.

MR. GOWDY: By a Bureau agent.

MS. MCCORD: Yes.

MR. GOWDY: Do recall which Bureau agent signed the FISA applications

in Carter Page's case?

MS. MCCORD: I don't.

MR. GOWDY: Were you part of the drafting of any part of that application?

MS. MCCORD: Not the drafting, no.

MR. GOWDY: Reviewing it?

MS. MCCORD: I saw one of the earlier versions that then went through a

number of edits and clarifications and, you know, questions that DOJ had of the

Bureau, information, you know, for additional information and additional

clarification. I don't believe I ever read -- I know that I never read the final version

that went for approval. I did see an earlier version.

-
MR. GOWDY: To the extent you can recall, what was the probable cause
 -
in support of the application, Carter page's case.
25

MS. MCCORD: So I am -- this is over a year ago, and I cannot recall with

any great specificity. I do know that it relied on information from Mr. Steele,

Christopher Steele, I do recall

that was an issue that we discussed, that some of the -- you know, to make it very

clear to the court that for

Mr. Steele had had a relationship with the

Bureau and they had found him to be credible in the past.

There was also other information that was included in that affidavit, which I

don't have good recall on, but it was not solely Mr. Steele's information or the

information

MR. GOWDY: Can you recall what percentage of the affidavit was related

to Mr. Steele and what was related to the stuff you cannot recall? I'm not asking

you to recall something you can't recall. Just from a percentage standpoint, was it

one or two sentences provided by Mr. Steele or 50 percent of the application.

MS. MCCORD: It wasn't one or two sentences, but I can't put a

percentage on it.

MR. GOWDY: Who in the Bureau told you that Mr. Steele had proven to

be a reliable informant in the past?

MS. MCCORD: This, I believe, was in the affidavit. I also - I also had

had conversations with at least one or -- sometimes it's hard for me to remember

whether a conversation was directly with someone at the Bureau or whether it's

something I learned from someone else at NSD that they had talked to the Bureau

about.
 -
But I do believe at one point I had a conversation -- I believe with Andy
26

McCabe -- about the fact that Christopher Steele had been -- was, of course, a

but had been a previous FBI source and someone they'd found to

be credible.

MR. GOWDY: Do you recall if the Bureau let you know whether Mr. Steele

was acting in his capacity as a Bureau informant or, I don't know, hypothetically

working for a private entity when he gathered the information?

MS. MCCORD: So I learned at some point -- and I can't recall exactly

when I learned it. In other words, I don't know if I learned this before the Carter

Page affidavit or whether I learned it after.

But I learned that Mr. Steele had originally -- had come to the Bureau with

information that he had gathered originally because he had been contracted

by -- to do opposition research -- contracted by a Republican source to do

opposition research -- I believe this to have been during the primaries -- on Mr.

Trump.

And that later, after it became clear that Mr. Trump was going to be the

candidate for the Republicans, that that -- I don't know if it was the same contract

was taken over -- but his work continued, now being paid by a Democratic source.

And that at some point Mr. Steele came to the Bureau, because he had had a

previous relationship with the Bureau, and reported to the Bureau some of the

information that he had learned through these other -- through these paid work

that he was doing.

I believe I knew that before the Carter Page affidavit or at the time at least

of the Carter Page FISA affidavit. What I didn't know is that that had anything to

-
do with a dossier. I hadn't seen a dossier. In fact didn't read the dossier until
 -
January of 2017 when Buzz Feed published it.
27

But I did know that he had come voluntarily to the Bureau with information

that he had obtained through his work that he was being paid for, first by

Republicans, then by Democrats, as opposition research that he thought the

Bureau would be interested in.

MR. GOWDY: I think it was twice you said came to the FBI. Who told you

that Mr. Steele came to the FBI?

MS. MCCORD: I believe I learned that from Mr. McCabe and also through

Stu Evans, the Deputy MG for the Office of Intelligence, who would have learned

it from someone else in the Bureau. It's possible it was not Mr. McCabe. I have

a recollection of a phone call with him about it.

And came is just sort of my word. I don't know whether -- I mean, to the

extent that suggests physically walked up, I'm not opining on or recalling, or I'm

not sure I ever knew exactly how it was communicated, whether it was an in-

person physical visit, whether it was a phone call, or something else.

MR. GOWDY: Do you think it would make a difference in your deliberative

process if a previously reliable informant had come to the FBI as opposed to the

information being provided by another political party doing opposition research?

They strike me as two kind of different analyses.

MS. MCCORD: I mean, certainly in my entire career as a prosecutor up

until last May, the source of every piece of evidence I've ever sought to rely on, it

was important to me where it came from and whether there was potential -- you

know, how credible it was.

And I would factor everything in that I would expect a court to factor in, and

-
that would include: Is it coming from a source that might be biased? Is it coming
 -
from a source with whom I have a previous relationship and have established
28

reliability before? And all the other facts and circumstances that one would use to

assess the reliability of the information.

MR. GOWDY: If that analysis would be true for sources, would it also be

true for subsources?

MS. MCCORD: Yes.

MR. GOWDY: Were you able to vet, corroborate, contradict any of the

information provided by Mr. Steele

MS. MCCORD: You're asking me personally?

MR. GOWDY: Yes, ma'am.

MS. MCCORD: That was not - I personally am not an investigator and

wasn't an investigatory agent, so I personally did not corroborate information

through other investigations.

MR. GOWDY: From time to time in the old days we would ask law

enforcement officers: How do you know that? How did you come into contact

with that information? Do you recall asking the FBI: How do you know?

MS. MCCORD: Certainly that was done. Now, recall the conversations

are usually going on -- what I know about this is coming to me through those who

are responsible for the day-to-day back and forth with the agents. And Stu and I

certainly -- Stu Evans certainly talked about questions we had on, you know, the

application and questions to go back to the Bureau with. I was not the one doing

that.

So when you asked me before did I corroborate, I took that as me

personally, Mary McCord, and I did not go and try to do my own investigation and

-
corroborate. These are questions that certainly we were discussing with the
 -
Bureau to obtain as much corroboration as possible, recognizing fully that for
29

The Bureau continued -- and the standard for that, of course, was probable

cause -- the Bureau continued and was continuing up until the point that I left in

May to try to corroborate of Mr. Steele's-

MR. GOWDY: If I wrote it down correctly, there was an initial application

with Carter Page and then there was one re-up and then a second re-up?

MS. MCCORD: Not before I left, there was just one, because it would

have been after 90 days. And so there was just one.

MR. GOWDY: Again, refresh my recollection, you left when?

MS. MCCORD: I left May 12th.

MR. GOWDY: And these applications --

MS. MCCORD: Actually, you know, now that I sit down and think about it,

there would have been probably another 90 days passed. I just don't know.

just can't recall whether there was a second re-up. There might have been.

MR. GOWDY: Do you know when the first application was made or

approved?

MS. MCCORD: I don't. I remember it being fall, and I can tell you it was

not at all when the press reported this. The press, I believe, was reporting a FISA

on Mr. Page, like, in the summer, which was not the case at all. I think it was

October or November, but I just don't recall specifically.

MR. GOWDY: And these applications are good for 90 days?

-
MS. MCCORD: Yes.
 -
MR. GOWDY: So if it were -- even it were November, there would be one
30

re-up before you left in May and maybe a second before you left in May.

MS. MCCORD: That's right. So I could be wrong, I could just not be

recalling the second. I believe, though, that the first re-up, I believe Deputy

Attorney General, then Acting Attorney General Yates was still in the office, which

would suggest that it would have been before January 30th, but would have had --

MR. GOWDY: Does there have to be fresh probable cause for a re-up, or

what is the standard by which a judge, a court determines whether to reauthorize?

MS. MCCORD: The court would be looking to whether there was

still -- there wouldn't have to be fresh probable cause.

Strictly speaking, there wouldn't have to be for a judge

to reauthorize it, but I do recall that there was some of that in this particular case,

MR. GOWDY: All right. I'm running short of time. No application for

, yes for Page.

MR. GOWDY: All right. I think I have only got a couple of minutes and I'm

sure I have got colleagues who want to ask you something.

There is about a minute left.

MR. ROONEY: Thanks, Mr. Gowdy, for that, yielding. I'll wait until after

the minority goes. So I yield.

. MR. SCHIFF: Thank you, Ms. McCord, for being here, and thank you for

your service to the country.

-
I just have a few follow-up questions and then some questions on a
somewhat different topic.
- 31

I think Director Corney had testified in open session that the DNC had

offered essentially the forensic blueprint of their seNer done by one of the private

reputable cybersecurity firms and that was sufficient for what the Bureau's needs

were. Do you have any reason to believe that wasn't accurate?

MS. MCCORD: No, I don't.

MR. SCHIFF: Do you know whether the FBI, in fact, even asked for the

seNer or whether what they were being offered was sufficient?

MS. MCCORD: I don't.

MR. SCHIFF: In terms of the potential offenses that may be involved when

a foreign government inteNenes in our election and the crime of conspiracy, the

crime of conspiracy may be related to conspiring to violate certain election laws in

that context, is that one of the forms that a conspiracy might take?

MS. MCCORD: Right. I mean conspiracy on its own has to be tied to

some other crime, a conspiracy to commit some type of a crime. So

that's -- that's one possibility.

MR. SCHIFF: So if a foreign government making expenditures during a

Presidential campaign violated U.S. election laws, a conspiracy to work with a

foreign government in the provision of that assistance would be a crime as well?

MS. MCCORD: That's right.

MR. SCHIFF: In the circumstances here, whether the campaign was

involved in the actual break in of the Democratic Party computers wouldn't

preclude it from criminal liability if after the fact it entered into a conspiracy with

Russians to make use of the illegally obtained information on Hillary Clinton.

-
MS. MCCORD: That's correct -- that could be correct, depending on the
facts.
- 32

MR. SCHIFF: And depending on the facts, if the Russians offered

assistance to the campaign in the form of stolen emails and the campaign

accepted that assistance and the Russians took certain actions to follow through

on that agreement, that could constitute the crime of conspiring to violate the

campaign election laws.

MS. MCCORD: I think it probably could.

MR. SCHIFF: A number of us sat down with Bill Priestap yesterday. Did

you work with Bill during your time at DOJ?

MS. MCCORD: I did.

MR. SCHIFF: And what was his position?

MS. MCCORD: So he was the assistant director over counterintelligence.

MR. SCHIFF: And was he intimately involved in the preparation of the

FISA pertaining to Carter Page?

MS. MCCORD: I believe so. I did not have a lot of discussions with Bill

Priestap at that time about that, but logically he's the one who would have

been -- he was the one in charge of counterintelligence at the time and I'm sure he

had great visibility into that.

MR. SCHIFF: And if he had contemporaneous access to the FISA

applications and a chance to review them, would his recollection be more fresh

than your own about what would be in the FISA application?

MS. MCCORD: Absolutely.

MR. SCHIFF: If it was his view that a substantial part of the FISA

application, indeed more than half of the FlSA application was based on sources

-
not involving Mr. Steele, would you have any reason to believe that that was
 incorrect?
- 33

MS. MCCORD: No.

MR. SCHIFF: Do you know whether information concerning

MS. MCCORD: It may have been. I just don't fully recall.

MR. SCHIFF: I want to ask you about your involvement in the investigation

vis-a-vis Mr. Flynn, General Flynn.

•
But in terms of concerns about contacts that might --

MR. QUIGLEY: Excuse me, could I ask if the gentleman will yield just to

clarify?

MR. SCHIFF: Yes.

MR. QUIGLEY: If the question be, do you mean the general election?

assume that's obvious, but I want to make sure.

MS. MCCORD: Yes.

 MR. QUIGLEY: Okay. Sorry.
- 34

MS. MCCORD: I believe the piece either came out on the 7th or the 8th.

I don't recall exactly. But that's separate from the concerns about his contacts

with -- potentially improper contacts with the Russians.

I first became aware of contacts he had with Ambassador Kislyak in early

January when Mr. McCabe called me. It was -- I don't remember the exact date,

it was that first week -

 35

MS. MCCORD: That's correct.

MR. SCHIFF:

MR. SCHIFF:

MS. MCCORD:

- MR. SCHIFF: And as people were scrutinizing within the Bureau_

before it was presented to the President, it came to the attention of Mr. McCabe

MS. MCCORD: That's correct.

MR. SCHIFF: And so there was a delay in completing -

MS. MCCORD: That's correct.

MR. SCHIFF: And then what happened?

MS. MCCORD: So the first conversation was relatively short because

-
 -
MR. SCHIFF: Can I just ask you, I'm sorry, before you get into that. The
36

MS. MCCORD: That's correct.

MR. SCHIFF: What does that mean in terms of what the President was

getting in the interim? That the first- was held off, did it

subsequently -- was it subsequently amended that day to include information that

might explain it?

MS. MCCORD: It was not. It was pulled back and it was not

provided -- at least to the extent I am aware, nothing was then provided to the

-
President that day on,

-
MR. SCHIFF:
- 37

-
[12:13 p.m.]
- 38

MS. MCCORD: I asked Mr. McCabe for -- and, of course, by this point, it's

January. General Flynn has been announced that he will be the incoming

national security adviser, and so I asked Mr. McCabe

MR. SCHIFF: Do you know what date that would have been?

MS. MCCORD: I don't know what date it would have been. It's early

January, within the first 2 weeks of January. I think probably within the first

week -- probably within like the first 10 days of January.

The next morning I -- that night, I didn't try to contact the Deputy Attorney

General, Sally Yates, because it was in the evening, and I knew I couldn't speak

to her. I don't think she was there in the office anymore. And this is not

information I could convey over an unclassified cell phone, and I wanted to talk to

her in person about it, so I thought I would do that the next morning.

The next morning, I was able to talk to the Deputy Attorney General, Sally

Yates. I conveyed to her what Andy had conveyed, plus by then, of course, I had

and shared those with her. She then asked that we request the
which I did, and which ultimately were

provided.

MR SCHIFF: What happened after that in terms of the concerns about

General Flynn?

-
MS. MCCORD: So on January 13, which was a Friday, was one of our
 39

Obviously, we knew about Carter Page because there had been a FISA.

But I had never gotten sort of a full briefing on these counterintelligence

investigations and what happened since then.

MR. SCHIFF: And this was a full briefing you were getting from the

Bureau?

MS. MCCORD: That's right. So it was - Bill Priesatep came over, Pete

Strzok, and then, I believe, Trisha Anderson from the general counsel's office,

and maybe one other person with general counsel.

And they wanted to outline for a few of us in the Department, a very small

circle from the Deputy Attorney General's Office, and then my office, sort of like

the status of the investigation and what they had done so far.

And the Friday morning of January 13, much to our surprise -- and I didn't

even know this. I hadn't seen this come out. But on January 12, in the evening,

online, David Ignatius had published a piece that indicated that there had been

calls between Ambassador Kislyak and General Flynn about this. But the

substance was not in these -- was not in this newspaper article.

We were all pretty shocked. So I learned of that during the briefing when

somebody said that -- have you seen the David Ignatius article? And I had not

seen it, and that was then made available. And we were all pretty shocked that

this would already be in the press.

-
At any rate, we had our briefing. And then I believe that night -- because
 -
this made the press -- I believe Sean Spicer might have been asked about it that

night, and indicated that there were no -- there was no discussion of sanctions.
40

But more concerning for our purposes was that on Sunday, the 15th, Vice

President-elect Pence went on Face the Nation and was asked about these

conversations, and specifically said -- although I'm paraphrasing here, I don't have

it in front of me -- that he had discussed this with General Flynn, and General

Flynn had assured him that the conversations were not about the expulsion of

diplomats or the Russian sanctions.

MR. SCHIFF: And when -- what decision was made on the basis of that,

and who made the decision to brief the White House?

MS. MCCORD: So we began discussing this within DOJ, and several of

us felt strongly that we should brief someone in the White House, let someone

know that this statement that the Vice President-elect had made was not true.
 41

We also had concerns that the incoming National Security Advisor

appeared to have lied to the incoming Vice President that we thought someone in

the White House should be aware of.

Ultimately, the decision was made by Deputy Attorney General Yates to

advise the White House. And we determined, after some discussion, that the

best point of entry -- because we didn't have established relationships with people

over there yet. It was -- they hadn't taken office yet -- was the incoming -- White

House counsel, Don McGahn.

MR. SCHIFF: And do you know before you would go over to meet with

Don McGahn whether anyone else at the Bureau or Justice Department had

informed the White House of the Flynn conversations?

MS. MCCORD: I believe Director Corney had advised, I don't know exactly

who, a very small group, perhaps just the President.

MR. SCHIFF: And what's the basis of your belief that the Director had

informed the President?

MS. MCCORD: So when I - after I learned the information in more

specific detail from Mr. McCabe, and did not try to reach Ms. Yates that night,

decided to wait until the next morning, unbeknownst to me, she was summoned to

the White House for a meeting the next morning.

And in a pull-aside after that - I believe to discuss the Intelligence

Community report, which by then had just come out. And there was an

unclassified report, there was a classified report, and then there was an even

-
higher level of classification of that report.
 -
And so she'd been summoned over to a meeting of the National Security
42

Council to discuss that. And there was a pull-aside -- I learned when I then went

to talk to her after she got back from that meeting that there had been a pull-aside

after that with Director Corney and the President where they had alluded to this

And, of course, Ms. Yates was in the unfortunate position of not knowing

what they were alluding to because I hadn't briefed her yet. So that was my fault.

I was very apologetic that I hadn't had an opportunity to tell her before she was in

that pull-aside meeting.

MR. SCHIFF: And that pull-aside was Sally Yates, Director Corney, and

the President?

MS. MCCORD: That's who I recall her saying was there. It's possible

there was somebody else. I mean, I wasn't there.

MR. SCHIFF: And the general thrust of what you were informed is that

they informed the President, to some degree,

MS. MCCORD: So the way I took it from Ms. Yates is that Director Corney

had already informed the President about it. And the President and Director

Corney were then referring to it, which is why she was a little bit in the dark

because she hadn't been informed of it yet. So she was gleaning from the

conversation what may have happened, and then I was able to fill it in for her.

MR. SCHIFF: And do you know what date that was?

MS. MCCORD: I don't have the date.

MR. SCHIFF: Do you know whether that took place before the Ignatius

-
column?
 -
MS. MCCORD: Yes, it did take place before the Ignatius column.
43

MR. SCHIFF: So the President was informed

that General Flynn had talked with Kislyak about sanctions before it appeared in

the press?

MS. MCCORD: That's right.

MR. SCHIFF: So at least in theory, the leak of that information could have

come from the White House?

MS. MCCORD: At least in theory.

MR. SCHIFF: Go further, if you would. After you did discuss it with Sally

Yates then what was the next step in terms of notifying the White House more

formally?

MS. MCCORD: So when we then began -- so at this point in time, this is

still President Obama in the White House. And so we then began discussing -- it

was not until after incoming Vice President-elect Pence went on Face the Nation

that we discussed advising the incoming White House. And --

MR. SCHIFF: Oh, okay. Thank you, that's a helpful clarification. So the

President you're talking about is President Obama at this point?

MS. MCCORD: Yes. Yes.

MR. SCHIFF: Okay. Thank you.

MS. MCCORD: The David Ignatius article was on the 13th. That

pull-aside was before that, right after I learned the information. And it was clear

that from -- I shouldn't say clear because I wasn't in the room, but based on what I

heard from Deputy Attorney General Yates, it seemed like Director Corney had

advised President Obama of something.

-
I don't know the extent because she didn't fully understand what they were
 -
referring to because I hadn't briefed her yet. And when I briefed her on what I had
44

learned from Deputy Director McCabe, then it made sense to her that that must

have been what they were referring to.

But I don't know -- I can't tell you the extent of what Director Corney briefed

to the President, because I wasn't there and also because Deputy Attorney

General Yates also didn't know exactly what had been briefed, if that makes

sense.

MR. SCHIFF: Yeah.

MR. PROBER: Just to put a point on that, and I know this is clear from the

discussion, but this was Ms. McCord's recollection and perception of the

conversation with Ms. Yates --

MS. MCCORD: Right.

MR. PROBER: -- of her recollection and perception --

MS. MCCORD: Yeah.

MR. PROBER: -- so multiple levels of potential ambiguity.

MR. SCHIFF: And so tell us when then the notification was made to the

incoming administration.

MS. MCCORD: So after Vice President-elect Pence did his interview on

Face the Nation that's when we began discussing trying to figure out a point of

contact in the incoming administration to convey this to.

We were not really able to accomplish that before the inauguration. So the

week after the inauguration, Ms. Yates made the decision that we would go and

brief Don McGahn. And so she reached out to ask him if he would take an

appointment. and on Thursday the -- is it the 26th? -- the Thursday after the

-
inauguration, we went to Mr. McGahn's office and did a briefing that is
 -
substantially what Ms. Yates has testified about previously.
45

MR. SCHIFF: And was Mr. McGahn the only one present from the

White House for the briefing?

MS. MCCORD: No. There was Mr. McGahn and James Burnham, who I

was introduced to for the first time that morning or afternoon. I think it was

morning.

MR. SCHIFF: What was his position?

MS. MCCORD: He was in the White House counsel's office. I don't remember

what his title was. I mean, he is an attorney, but I don't recall -- I think deputy

White House counsel. So it was Mr. McGahn, Mr. Burnham, myself, and Ms.

Yates.

MR. SCHIFF: And what was White House counsel's reaction when you informed

them of the conversations Flynn had had with the Russian ambassador?

MS. MCCORD: I think he seemed very surprised. They both seemed

very surprised. They -- you know, it was not a long conversation, I'd say about

15 minutes. Ms. Yates did the talking. I interjected maybe once to clarify

something, and I can't even recall at this point what it was.

She let them know that we were there because we, you know, had heard

what the Vice President-elect had said on national television in response to the

questions about the conversations between General Flynn and Ambassador

And we explained the reason, because

 -
of the potential compromise as well as that it appeared that Vice
46

President-elect Pence had been given untrue information by General Flynn.

We did indicate we had no reason to believe that the Vice President-elect

was witting of that. Well, at this point, he is not the Vice President-elect anymore.

He was Vice President-elect when he made the statements, but at this point he is

the Vice President.

She also did tell Mr. McGahn that General Flynn had been interviewed by

the Bureau just earlier that week. I believe it was the day before. I believe it was

on Wednesday that he was interviewed, by my recollection. And we

also -- Mr. McGahn asked a variety of questions I can get into if you want, or not.

MR. SCHIFF: Yes, please.

MS. MCCORD: Okay. He asked how Mr. Flynn did and we - or how

General Flynn did, and we declined to answer that question. He asked if it would

be okay to ask if General Flynn was under criminal investigation, and Ms. Yates

said it would be okay to ask, but it would not be okay for us to answer that.

He asked if there were any constraints we were putting on their use of that

information.

MR. SCHIFF: So I just want to make sure, so the White House counsel

asked whether it'd be appropriate for them to inquire about whether someone in

the White House was under investigation; and Ms. Yates informed the

White House that's not an appropriate question for them to have answered?

MS. MCCORD: For us to answer. She is -- and I remember it just

because it was sort of a memorable way she stated it, was that it would be okay

for you to ask. It would not be okay for us to answer. And he did not press it at

all.
 -
MR. SCHIFF: And this would have been, if you know, prior to the
47

President's asking Director Corney, or after the President's asking Director Corney

to state publicly that he was not under investigation?

MR. GOWDY: Who is he?

MS. MCCORD: He, meaning the President, not under investigation?

MR. SCHIFF: Yeah.

MS. MCCORD: I think it's before that, but I'd have to be -- I'd have to

refresh with that date. It had to be before that. If I'm recalling correctly, that

was during -- no. I guess the President discussed it in that interview with Lester

Holt, but I'm forgetting. I'm not recalling the date.

MR. SCHIFF: I think it was discussed multiple times, I guess, between the

President and the director. But in any event, the White House counsel was

informed it would not be appropriate for you to answer that question to him, let

alone publicly.

MS. MCCORD: Yeah. I should clarify, he wasn't asking about any

criminal investigation into anyone other than Flynn. He was asking would it be

okay for me to ask if there's a -- if he's under -- he, General Flynn, was under

criminal investigation. He didn't ask more broadly.

MR. SCHIFF: Correct. But the principle, I presume, would be the same?

MS. MCCORD: The principle would be the same. I just wanted to make

sure I hadn't misled and suggested that he asked about the President, because he

had not.

MR. SCHIFF: And I'm sorry, you were going to finish what questions he

had for you.

-
MS. MCCORD: And there may have been others, but these are what I
 -
recall he asked. You know, would it -- was there any restrictions on what they
48

could do with this information, and Ms. Yates said, no, it wouldn't be right for us to

come over and bring them this and tell them that they couldn't do something with

it. We expected that they would do with it what they saw appropriate to do.

MR. SCHIFF: In terms of chronology, is this before or after the Ignatius

article?

MS. MCCORD: This is after. So the Ignatius article is on the 13th. This

is on the 25th or 26th. It's on, I think, the 26th, actually, a Thursday, now that I

think more about it. And so then we left.

And the next morning, I got a call, I'm pretty sure, from Ms. Yates herself,

direct on my line, I was at the office, saying that Mr. McGahn had called and asked

if we could come back over. He had a few clarifying questions, and she wanted

to make sure I would clear my schedule to go over.

And so I did, and went over with her again. And we went up to

Mr. McGahn's office, and it was the same four people: Mr. McGahn,

Mr. Burnham, myself, and Ms. Yates. And, you know, I didn't take notes at either

one of these meetings, and so I have tried to figure out if I'm conflating things.

I honestly don't remember the second meeting being very much different

than the first meeting. It seems like we pretty much went over -- we pretty much

repeated the same things we talked about.

I had, I mean, just personally, the sense that it was pretty surprising to him

to hear it the previous day, and he just had to process it, and just kind of wanted to

hear again and get also some verification that they really could do what they

wanted; you know, they could use the information that we provided, and we

weren't restricting it.

 -
MR. SCHIFF: Did he give you any indication on the second date that you
49

had this conversation that he had communicated the information to the President?

MS. MCCORD: He did not.

MR. SCHIFF: Did he tell you anyone else he'd shared it with at the

White House?

MS. MCCORD: He did not. In fact, I did not have the sense it had been

shared because I felt like part of the reason he asked us to come again is to clarify

that they could use the information.

MR. SCHIFF: And what would have been your next involvement with

respect to General Flynn and this issue?

MS. MCCORD: So the next involvement was -- the next day was a

Saturday, and I got an email at about 5:30 that evening. I saw it on my phone

because I was out. My sister and brother-in-law had come to town, and we were

going to see their -- my niece perform, and we were out for a very early dinner.

And my phone indicated I had an incoming email. And I looked at my.

phone, and the email said that it was from General Mike Flynn at his Executive

Office of the President email address. That is the email address.

The body of the email said that it was from John Eisenberg. It said that he

was writing to me as the deputy White House counsel for the National Security

Council. He'd been asked to follow up with me regarding matters that I'd spoken

to Don McGahn about, and he was asking if we could have a secure call the

following morning. And then he signed it John Eisenberg.

So I was confused, because the email came from General Flynn's email

address. I recall scrolling up and down several times just to make sure I was

-
correct. And I did not want to respond directly to General Flynn because it
 -
appeared that the email was not really from General Flynn.

So I contacted someone else I knew at the White House who had access to
so

email addresses because I didn't have John Eisenberg's email address on my

phone. And that-- I just asked, do you have an email address for John

Eisenberg, and the person sent me the email address.

So I then wrote back an email to John Eisenberg at John Eisenberg's email

address and said I was writing to him because I had received an email that came

from General Flynn's address but appeared to be from him, and I wanted to make

sure it hadn't been sent by mistake; and that I would be available to talk the

following morning. If it needed to be a secure call, I would need to go into the

office to take a secured call, but that I could do that if that's what he needed.

He wrote back right away from a John Eisenberg email address

that - thanking me. He said something like, Thank you for doing so, in other

words, I think he meant write directly to him, and that maybe we could start by

talking unsecure the next morning, and he'd follow my lead if there was a need for

us to go into the office to do it secure.

MR. SCHIFF: Did he ever make - clarify for you whether that prior email

had actually come from him?

MS. MCCORD: So the next morning when we actually had a phone

conversation he immediately said that he'd been in General Flynn's office working

with General Flynn the previous day, meaning Saturday, because by now this

conversation we're having is Sunday morning, and that he had left General Flynn's

office to go back to his office.

And at some point in time, his assistant had come into his office with two cell

-
phones, and that he must have -- it must have been his and General Flynn's. And
 -
he must have picked up General Flynn's, and they had the same password, and
51

he must have mistakenly sent me the email from General Flynn's cell phone.

MR. SCHIFF: So he said that the password for his phone was the same

password as General Flynn's phone?

MS. MCCORD: That's what he said.

MR. SCHIFF: Did he tell you whether the email that he sent to you the

previous day he had sent to you in the presence of General Flynn?

MS. MCCORD: He did not address that. My impression was it was not in

the -- well, he did not say. I mean, the explanation was when he picked up the

phone thereafter, he must have picked up General Flynn's phone, and their

passwords are the same, and so he had mistakenly sent it to me from that phone.

MR. SCHIFF: And that email that came from General Flynn's account said

what again?

MS. MCCORD: It said, you know, Dear, Mary, or Dear, Ms. McCord, I am

the deputy White House counsel for national security. I've been asked to follow

up with you regarding the matters you discussed with Don McGahn. Could we

have a secure call tomorrow?

Now, I did know who John Eisenberg is because I had been attending

Deputies Committee meetings on national security issues, well, for years, but

since the new administration had come in, and he had been present at some of

those deputies meetings on completely unrelated topics but in his role as legal

adviser to the national security counsel. So I did know who he was. I was

familiar with him.

MR. SCHIFF: So what happened the next day then?

-
MS. MCCORD: So after he explained that, I didn't push him on it. I didn't
push any further on the explanation.
-He then said that he wanted to know what
52

they would need to do to

basis of Ms. Yates and me going to the White House.

And, remember, we're on unsecure cell phones, so that's why he didn't refer

I knew what he was talking about. And I said,

well, that is something we contemplated. And we had actually, in fact -- I left this

out, but Ms. Yates had also indicated to Mr. McGahn on either Thursday or Friday

or both that we would also talk to the Bureau about providing access.

And so, I knew that that's what he was following up on, and I let John know

that I would need to talk to the Bureau and make those arrangements. And I then

called Ms. Yates on Sunday morning and told her that this inquiry had come in,

and I also told her about the oddity of the email coming from General Flynn's

account.

And the next morning, I did call the Bureau right away. Well, first I

checked -- no, I called the Bureau right away to see if they could get the

And they were able to accomplish that, got them into an office

that - because

And that was Monday, January 30.

And so, I had talked to the deputy attorney general's staff who said that

Ms. Yates was going to call back Mr. McGahn and let him know that we could

-
make those available. That was my expectation.
 -
So the next morning -- of course, Ms. Yates was fired that night,
53

January 30. So the next morning I inquired with her staff if anyone knew whether

she had actually connected with Mr. McGahn to let him know we'd make them

available, and they said she had.

And so I then contacted Mr. Eisenberg and gave him the information of the

contact Pete Strzok at the Bureau, told him that he was

interested in would be available that afternoon, and he should contact Mr. Strzok

directly to make arrangements to come over.

I then followed up for an additional couple of days to make sure he'd been

able to get access to what he needed to get access to. And as of Thursday

morning -- he told me Wednesday he wasn't able to get over there. And as of

Thursday morning, he said he thought he would be able to get over to the Bureau

that day, and then that is the last I heard.

Five minutes.
MR. SCHIFF: I apologize to my colleagues. I didn't mean to take this

much time.

Did Mr. Eisenberg inform you whether he intended to

MS. MCCORD: He did not.

MR. SCHIFF: Did you ever find out whether he did?

MS. MCCORD: I did not.

MR. SCHIFF: And what involvement did you have after that in this issue?

MS. MCCORD: No real -- no personal involvement.

MR. SCHIFF: Do you know what course either this issue or the

-
investigation of General Flynn took after that?
 -
MS. MCCORD: So, I mean -- as we would get regularly briefed on the
54

various strands of the counterintelligence investigation, that included, you know,

additional work with respect -- or additional investigation with respect to

Mr. Flynn's involvement.

And ongoing at the same time was Mr. Flynn was around the same

timeframe filing, you know, registration under FARA belatedly, again, not related to

Russia, but that provided some avenues of, you know, inquiry.

MR. SCHIFF: Did you have any involvement in the facts that led up to the

discovery of the discussions that General Flynn, Jared Kushner, and the Russian

ambassador had?

MS. MCCORD: I did not.

MR SCHIFF: Did that take place while you were there?

MS. MCCORD: It did not. I learned about that in June or July, whenever

that story broke. That was the first I knew about it.

MR. SCHIFF: And when did you leave the Department?

MS. MCCORD: May 12.

MR. SCHIFF: The Flynn investigation was open when? Do you know?

MS. MCCORD: So when Mr. McCabe first called me to tell me about the

And so -- but I was not aware of that until I learned from Mr. McCabe about

-
MR. SCHIFF: And did Mr. McCabe tell you what the basis was for the
 - General Flynn?
55

MS. MCCORD: I don't remember if this came from Mr. McCabe or later in

a briefing from Mr. Priestap or others, but I believe the basis for that had been,

MR. SCHIFF: Mr. Himes.

MR. HIMES: How much time do we have?

Two minutes, sir.

MR. HIMES: All right. In the spirit of that, why don't we pass, and if we

want to take a break, that's fine.

MR. ROONEY: Do you want a break?

MS. MCCORD: Yeah.

MR. PROBER: We'll take a couple minutes.

[Recess.]

MR. GOWDY: Ms. McCord, the email that you were making reference to,

Mr. Eisenberg, Mr. Schiff was asking you about, do you have access to that still, or

can you direct us where we could go to gain access to that email exchange?

MS. MCCORD: So it should be in -- I mean, it is a Justice Department

unclassified email, so to the extent you have had access to Justice Department

emails, it should be in that collection. But I also do have access to it that we can

make -- provide to you.

MR. PROBER: Yeah. I am happy to sort of follow up with the committee

on that and have a discussion.

-
-· based on our prior discussion, I had mentioned to you that she
 -
doesn't have anything that wouldn't be on DOJ servers, which is entirely accurate.
56

But there's a small group of documents that she had printed out and is in

possession of, which, again, would be on DOJ's servers, but I am happy to talk to

you about this.

I think Mr. Gowdy's request is if you could just provide those

documents.

MR. GOWDY: Pardon me?

MS. MCCORD: The emails.

MR. GOWDY: Thank you.

MR. CONAWAY: Could I ask one real quick. So the cell phones that

these two gentlemen were using, they were the brand new issued government cell

phones or --

MS. MCCORD: I don't know.

MR. CONAWAY: They didn't look like yours?

MS. MCCORD: I didn't see them. This was a phone conversation where

he explained to me.

MR. CONAWAY: Oh, okay. Gotcha. Thank you.

MR. ROONEY: I think that we can safely assume that the incoming NSA

Director probably shouldn't have the same password as anybody else, but that's

just my commentary.

I want to ask you a couple questions that are kind of --

MR SCHIFF: Jim was suggesting everyone has the same password. It's

MAGA. Probably not very secure, but -

MR. ROONEY: It might be.

-
MR. SCHIFF: You never know.
 -
MR. PROBER: It's easy to remember.
57

MR. ROONEY: A couple follow-up questions from Trey and then I am just

going to ask you a few questions of my own, if I might.

With regard to Mr. Steele and the FISA application, do you know if it made it

through the FISA court unscathed, or do you know if it was rejected at any point,

and if so, why?

MS. MCCORD: I don't have any reason to believe it was rejected at any

point.

MR. ROONEY: Do you know if there was ever any problems with it?

MS. MCCORD: I don't believe there were ever any problems with it.

MR. ROONEY: Would that application -- do you know or think that that

application would have had probable cause to authorize surveillance if you

removed the information provided from Mr. Steele?

MS. MCCORD: I would have to see the application again to opine on that.

I should also just be clear that when I say I don't believe it ever was turned down

or was ever -- had to have modifications, I say that based on I certainly don't recall

that, and it's something that I feel pretty confident Mr. Evans would have told me.

But it's possible I am not recalling or that somebody didn't tell me. It's just I don't

recall there being any issues with the court on that application.

MR. ROONEY: Are you aware of any DOJ or FBI employee who met or

talked with Mr. Steele, either in person or over electronic means?

MS. MCCORD: Well, I know that FBI did talk to Mr. Steele because he

provided information, but I don't know which employee, if that's your question.

MR. ROONEY: Right. Yeah. Well, you'd said before that Mr. Steele had

-
been considered, I think, by the Bureau as a credible source historically. And I
 -
don't know if Mr. Gowdy already asked this, but were you or the Bureau, were you
58

aware, retrospectively, that he was being employed at that point by a private firm?

MS. MCCORD: What I became aware of was that this research that he

was providing to the Bureau he had obtained in the course of his employment,

private employment for the purpose of doing opposition research. Whether he

was still under contract with that private entity at the time, which I, at some point,

learned was Fusion GPS, but certainly not at the beginning, whether he was still

employed by that entity at the time he brought the information to the Bureau, I

don't know.

MR. ROONEY: So they are relying on this guy based on, I think you said,

you know, their relationship prior. Do you have any knowledge as to what

that -- why that relationship was seen as something that they could rely on this guy

historically? Like why was he a reliable source, in your opinion?

MS. MCCORD: Well, my recollection is that -- and this would have been

included in the affidavit - is that he had provided information previously which had

been verified, and so that's pretty typical in law enforcement for, you know, finding

somebody to be a credible source.

MR. ROONEY: And was this -- I mean, as far as you know, was this

information verified as well for this occasion?

MS. MCCORD: Well, there was a variety of information that Mr. Steele

provided

And it would - and that -- you know, that's information that was included in
the affidavit. Like they are very explicit when it's an unverified source or

unverified reporting versus when it -

-
MR. ROONEY: Did anybody raise any red flags about this information like
before it was going to FISA?
- 59

MS. MCCORD: Well, I don't know if you would call this a red flag. I know

that Mr. Evans and I discussed making sure that we -- that the application would

be very clear to the court about what's, you know -- which sources are sources

with whom the FBI has, you know, personal knowledge and personal experience,

direct experience, and which are sub sources that the FBI doesn't have its own,

you know, personal knowledge of, and can't independently, you know, verify the

veracity of.

MR. ROONEY: Okay. I want to switch gears, because one of the prongs

of our --

MS. MCCORD: And I am sorry. I don't mean to interrupt you -

MR. ROONEY: No. Go ahead.

MS. MCCORD: -- but I also -- I think I indicated maybe earlier that I read a

draft of the affidavit. It was modified -- and we had some of these discussions we

are talking about, and it was modified thereafter, not as a result of court, but just

our own internal DOJ discussions. But I never read the final draft that went to

the -- that went for approval.

MR. ROONEY: One of our focuses on this investigation in our role as

oversight for the Intelligence Community is to try to figure out how we respond to

the Russian active measures in the last election cycle. What role, if any, did you

have in advising the prior administration on how to respond to Russian -- the

Russian active measure campaign?

MS. MCCORD: So I began going to, you know, deputies committee

meetings, certainly through the fall as the discussions were taking place among

-
the National Security Council deputies about what would be appropriate
responses.
- 60

MR. ROONEY: Okay. When did the FBI first approach the National

Security Division to open a criminal investigation regarding Russia and the 2016

elections? Like was there one thing that like sort of kicked that off that started

that?

MS. MCCORD: There's really not. You know, the -- after the incident-- or

not incident. After knowledge of the phone conversations between General Flynn

and Ambassador Kislyak occurred, there was certainly discussion of, you know,

that violating, you know, a criminal statute.

-
And, you know, we had some discussions about how we -- you know, this is
 -
a statute that hadn't been used ever, you know, in 200 years on the books, and
61

that we imagined that in many incoming administrations, it's probably pretty

common for incoming officials to reach out to who their counterparts are in

advance of the transition to just sort of say we want to start developing a

relationship.

So I think a lot of us were -- when I say "us," I am talking about like senior

DOJ-level people talking with senior FBI people, sort of hesitant to think -- I mean,

certainly it formed the basis of the about to do a criminal investigation. There's no

question about that. It would appear to violate that statute. But we weren't sure

that it would ever be something as a matter of discretion that a prosecutor would

determine to indict.

Five.

MS. MCCORD: And the reason I focus on this is just because to the

extent there was ever time we started talking about a criminal investigation, the

only thing I can recall specific timing was is with regard to General Flynn and the

fact that that -- those conversations certainly did seem to violate this statute.

And if I could just clarify one -- my previous response on the sanctions

MR. ROONEY: With regard to all that -- the active measures that you all

were tracking, and even leading up to the Flynn phone call, was there any

-
evidence that you saw during your time in government that this transcended over
 -
to actual coordination or conspiracy, or any kind of collusion with the Russian
62

Government and the Trump campaign in a way -- and this might be out of your

lane -- in a way to assist the Trump campaign from winning the election at

the -- obviously at the expense of the Clinton campaign?

MS. MCCORD: So I think you are -- I want to make sure I understand the

question. Certainly the Intelligence Community assessed that that was the goal

of the Russian establishment was to influence the campaign and through a whole

variety of ways, including the cyber intrusions.

The investigation into whether there was any conspiracy by any members

of the Trump campaign is what was ongoing when I left and certainly wasn't at a

point then to be ready to be charged as --

MR. ROONEY: In May of this year?

MS. MCCORD: [No verbal response.]

MR. ROONEY: Do you think it's possible that with all the active measures

that we have seen, that all those things -- if all those things are true, at the same

time there was also no actual coordination with the Trump campaign to -- and the

Russian Government to collaborate, in some nefarious way, to affect the outcome

of the election against Mrs. Clinton?

Do you think that both those things could be true, that they were

taking - using RT and Facebook ads and whatever else they were doing as far as

propaganda, but at the same time, they weren't actually coordinating with the

Trump campaign?

MS. MCCORD: That could be true. It could also be true that there was

coordination. That's what the investigation is about.

MR. ROONEY: That's fine.

 One minute.
- 63

MR. GOWDY: Real quickly, I will try to do this in 1 minute. I will go back

to the courtroom days. You may have an informant that's working off charges;

that's kind of one concern in front of the jury. You have got an informant who's

being paid; that's another concern in front of a jury. And then you have got these

rare informants that just want to be solid citizens, and they come forward, and

that's not that much of a concern in front of a jury.

Assume information can be correct or incorrect regardless of who the

source is. An enemy could provide accurate information; a friend could lie about

you. So those two aren't super-related.

With respect to Steele, I am trying to figure out whether the

Bureau -- whether he approached the Bureau as a former informant, as a

concerned citizen, or as someone who worked for a private entity called Fusion

GPS. Do you know how the Bureau took that initial call from Steele?

MS. MCCORD: So you would have to ask the Bureau that. All I can tell

you is the way it was conveyed to me, it was a concerned citizen who knew who to

reach out to because he had had a private -- a previous, you know, relationship

with the Bureau. It wasn't Fusion GPS has asked me to pass it along or anything

remotely like that, at least as conveyed to me.

MR. GOWDY: All right. I don't want to intrude on their time. This is the

last question.

Who would the Bureau -- understanding you would have been second or

third removed, who at the Bureau could answer that question of how Steele first

manifests himself to the Bureau in this fact pattern?

-
MS. MCCORD: Yeah. I would think that Mr. Priestap would be able to
 -
answer that, and if he couldn't, he would certainly know who. I mean, I don't
64

know that he was the one who was called. I don't know who was the one that

was contacted, but he would know.

MR. GOWDY: Thank you.

MR. HIMES: Thank you.

Thank you, Ms. McCord, for being here.

I want to start with a question. Ms. Yates testified in front of the Senate

about the second meeting that you were talking about before meeting with Don

McGahn on January 27. She remembered in testimony to the Senate that he

brought up four points: Whether the information about General Flynn triggered

any statute; asked why it was in DOJ's interest whether one member of the

White House might lie to another; third, whether any action the White House would

take would interfere with the investigation of General Flynn; and fourth, whether

they could get access to the underlying information.

I wonder - that's her testimony. Does that refresh your memory of that

meeting, and is there anything you might add to that?

MS. MCCORD: Well, those are all things within the scope of what I hope I

had conveyed earlier. And -- but I just don't -- I just - to my mind, it wasn't that

much different than the previous meeting; in other words, we went over really

those four subjects the previous meeting as well.

MR. HIMES: Okay. Okay. Let me shift gears here. We are getting into

the process by which the investigation was established, by which people came

forward to the investigation.

So just for the benefit of those of us and the readers ultimately of our report

-
who are not blessed with law degrees, I want to do.a bunch of just sort of basic
 -
foundational stuff around the process to both establish investigations as well as
65

the process associated with the FISA process. So maybe we can move relatively

quickly through these questions.

As a general matter, what criteria or authorities apply to the FBl's decision

to open a counterintelligence investigation?

MS. MCCORD: The Director has a -- their own guidelines for when they

can open a counterintelligence investigation.

MR. HIMES: And are these the same as with criminal or other

investigations?

MS. MCCORD: They are different types of guidelines.

MR. HIMES: Okay. Are investigations - when we use the word

"investigations," are they the same as assessments or preliminary investigations,

and if not, what are the differences?

MS. MCCORD: So I am not an expert, on the DIOG, and you should

probably talk to general counsel for the FBI. But when I think of assessments

and preliminary investigations and full investigations, I think of that in the context

of criminal investigations as opposed to Cl investigations.

I actually can't tell you whether they have the three different categories for

Cl investigations that aren't criminal, because my experience with Cl investigations

are these are opened up for the long term. They are opened up to be long-term

intelligence-gathering investigations.

MR. HIMES: In general, if the FBI opens a counterintelligence

investigation, is it fair to say that it has found at least some credible reason to

proceed?

MS. MCCORD: Yes.

 MR. HIMES: Okay.
- 66

MS. MCCORD: There still would be criteria for opening it. It's just I am not

sure it's staggered the same way it is on the criminal side.

MR. HIMES: Okay. How much does the FBI have to know for certain

about a counterintelligence threat before opening an investigation?

MS. MCCORD: I don't know. I don't know exactly what their criteria for

openings says. I mean, certainly by the time you seek anything like a FISA, you

have very specific authorities and standards that have to be met.

MR. HIMES: Yeah. We will come to that hopefully.

Who at FBI would make a decision -- and in this particular case, -

who at FBI would have made the decision to

commence a Cl investigation?

MS. MCCORD: So I don't know for sure if it - so I probably shouldn't

opine, except that if, you know, there are a lot of different squads responsible for

different counterintelligence threats at the Bureau. And those agents assigned to

that particular threat monitor very closely what's happening in that area. And if

they think they need to open something, I think they would push that up to their

superiors to open them.

And that's not always something that would be shared with DOJ's lawyers

and National Security Division, unlike criminal investigations, where you would

have interactivity with prosecutors pretty early. That's not necessarily the case at

the very -- at the beginning of a counterintelligence investigation.

MR HIMES: Okay. Thank you.

Do either FBI or DOJ authorities allow either the FBI or the DOJ to take

-
political considerations or the preference of a politician, the preference of a party
 -
into account in deciding whether to undertake an investigation?
67

MS. MCCORD: No.

MR. HIMES: Okay. During your 28-year career at DOJ, are you aware of

FBI or DOJ bringing a counterintelligence investigation in order to damage or

undercut a political candidate or opponent?

MS. MCCORD: No.

MR.

MS. MCCORD: I can't answer that.

MR. HIMES: Okay. Is it at least possible that a counterintelligence -- that

counterintelligence information could come from a biased source, as is sort of to

what Mr. Gowdy was alluding to, someone who has been paid off and still be

reliable?

MS. MCCORD: Yes, of course.

MR. HIMES: Okay. Can you give me an example of that?

MS. MCCORD: On an intelligence investigation? I mean, I can't give you

a specific example. I can certainly tell you in years of prosecuting that in

prosecuting criminal cases, oftentimes our -- you know, the sources that

prosecutors rely on have got some baggage, either bias-related or otherwise,

and you deal with that.

MR. HIMES: So in opting to begin a Cl investigation, just about beginning

an investigation, is it common for the FBI to scrutinize the sources of its

information?

MS. MCCORD: Yes.

-
MR. HIMES: And just to be a little bit repetitive to a previous question,
 -
must the FBI, to begin a Cl investigation, corroborate all of its information before
68

an investigation begins?

MS. MCCORD: I would assume not. Again, I don't know exactly what

the DIOG says on opening a Cl investigation, and I apologize for that. But I

didn't -- I was not ever part of the initial decisions to open a Cl investigation, and

that's not something that required any approval from DOJ.

MR. HIMES: Okay. Did anyone at NSD or you personally play a role in

the decision to begin the FBl's Cl investigation into Russian meddling and related

issues in the summer of 2016?

MS. MCCORD: Not me, and no one at DOJ that I am aware of.

MR. HIMES: Okay.

MS. MCCORD: Now - I am sorry. On the cyber side, when the intrusions

became known, I don't know that there was any direction, because it was clear,

you know, everyone at the Bureau, at DOJ, I mean, it was obvious that was going

to be investigated. It was -- it was what appeared to be a nation state-sponsored

cyber attack, and those are things that we investigate very readily.

My answer no was with respect to the other Cl investigations of the

individuals that I had discussed earlier today. I am not aware of anyone at DOJ

directing or asking for those to be open.

MR. HIMES: Okay. Let me push you a little bit on an answer you gave

earlier to the question as to the role that the Steele information played in the

investigation. And do I have that right? Was the Steele information, him coming

forward, was that important to the start of the investigation?

MS. MCCORD: My understanding from the Bureau is that, yes, that was

-
one piece -- well, actually, I don't know the timing of what came first.
 -
MR. HIMES: I guess what I am asking is, because I want to be clear here,
69

you had talked about more than two sentences with respect to the FISA

application.

MS. MCCORD: Yeah. That's separate.

MR. HIMES: So I am asking about the origination --

MS. MCCORD: Right.

MR. HIMES: -- of the Cl investigation.

MS. MCCORD: Ri ht. I believe there was other information that came

MR. HIMES: Can you be more detailed on that other information?

MS. MCCORD: The problem is, I don't have great recollection about it,

and I worry that I will conflate things I have read in news reporting with what I

actually knew. And I just don't want to do that.

I recall -- what I can -- what I tell you that I recall is information being

But I don't want to get any more specific because I just worry, in the

passage of more than a year, that I will conflate public reporting with what I knew.

MR. HIMES: Okay. Let's shift now to the FISA application process, which

we have been talking a little bit about. And let me ask a few questions about the

process by which an application is submitted under title I of FISA.

-
Briefly, can you tell me what title I of FISA requires?
 -
MS. MCCORD: Well, it requires that the target be an agent of a foreign
70

power, and that there be probable cause that the target is an agent of a foreign

power. And so -- go ahead.

MR. HIMES: Okay. Is it also true that a FISA matter cannot ever be

initiated solely on the basis of First Amendment activities?

MS. MCCORD: That's true.

MR. HIMES: Okay. So if the government simply thinks a U.S. person's

associations are sketchy, the government cannot use that alone as the basis to

conduct a FISA electronic surveillance?

MS. MCCORD: Yes. Sketchy wouldn't be a criteria in the statute.

MR. HIMES: So can you just briefly describe your overall experience at

NSD with the FISA process?

MS. MCCORD: So, you know, it's probably the area of NSD that I was the

least involved with, because I was not a person with authority to sign FISAs. And

Stu Evans, who'd been in the Office of Intelligence for many, many years, was so

expert on this. I deferred a lot to him.

I was much more involved with our CTS and CES prosecutions and our law

and policy piece and some of the National Security Council pieces, just because

that was more in my area of expertise, frankly.

MR. HIMES: Okay. That said, you know, based on the experience that

you do have, let me just ask a couple of questions around your view of the rigor

involved in this process, starting with how closely do FBI and DOJ review

assertions of fact in a FISA application before they take that application to the

court?

-
MS. MCCORD: Well, I mean, quite thoroughly. It's -- like I said, when the
 -
FBI wants to seek a FISA, they will send over, you know, a preliminary affidavit to
71

an attorney in the Office of Intelligence, and that begins a process that sometimes

can go on for months to get to a point where the attorney has a comfort level, and

the agent, that the information is reliable and it supports probable cause.

MR. HIMES: Okay. Can you compare how demanding that review is,

say, relative to something we may be more familiar with, the preparation of a, you

know, wiretap application in a State criminal proceeding?

MS. MCCORD: I would say it's very comparable.

MR. HIMES: Okay. Are there multiple layers of review of a FISA

application before it's submitted to the court?

MS. MCCORD: Yes, there are.

•
MR. HIMES: Can you describe those layers?

MS. MCCORD: So they are -- and I may leave a layer out, to be honest

with you, but the attorney in the Office of Intelligence would complete the

application. It would be submitted to that person's supervisor; I think then yet

another supervisor before it would come across the deputy AAG's desk; and then,

of course, it goes to whomever is signing it, whether it's the AAG, the deputy

attorney general, or the attorney general.

MR. HIMES: So the process until it gets to the deputy AG or other political

appointees is conducted largely or exclusively by professional civil servants?

MS. MCCORD: Yes, exclusively.

MR. HIMES: Exclusively.

MS. MCCORD: In fact, by -- I think it's by statute, that position of deputy

AAG over Office of Intelligence must be a career. Most of the other deputy AAG

-
positions and principal deputy can be political positions, but not that one.
 -
MR. HIMES: Okay. To the extent that you can characterize it, how long
72

would it typically take to prepare a typical title I FISA application?

MS. MCCORD: Mr. Evans would be better able to answer that, so I don't

think I can say typical. All I know is it's not a quick process.

MR. HIMES: Are you familiar with --

MS. MCCORD: Now, excuse - let me make a caveat.

MR. HIMES: Yeah.

MCCORD:

MR. HIMES: Okay. But these were not employed for the FISA application

we are talking about here with respect to Mr. Page?

MS. MCCORD: No. No. No. That's almost always terrorism,

counterterrorism.

MR. HIMES: Yeah. Are you familiar with the FBI so-called "woods"

procedures for FISA applications?

MS. MCCORD: Familiar, but not -- it's not something I have spend a lot of

time with.

MR. HIMES: Under these procedures, can the FBI base a FISA

application on completely unverified allegations?

MS. MCCORD: No.

-
MR. HIMES: Okay. What happens if the FBI or DOJ makes an error in a
FISA application?
-
Will the court get involved?
73

MS. MCCORD: Yes, absolutely. I mean, we have a very rigorous -- we.

I am not there anymore. NSD has a very rigorous oversight process, and any

time the oversight process -- through the oversight process NSD becomes aware

of any type of mistake, it immediately advises the court about that, and

sometimes, you know, moves to remedy it, however, depending on what type of

mistake they have found. And I think the court has, I think, become pretty

comfortable over the last number of years that it can trust that NSD will advise

about One minute, Mr. Himes.

MR. HIMES: Okay. Thank you.

So I read a piece by a former FBI agent that described the FISA drafting

process -- approval process before court submission. He called it extreme

vetting. Does that sound about right to you?

MS. MCCORD: That sounds right. That's good.

MR. HIMES: Okay. A common criticism of FISA is the court rarely rejects

applications outright, but instead asks for more information and revisions from the

government. Of course, the ultimate approval rate is actually -- actually is fairly

high, but my understanding is that that's because there is a very deep iterative

process before a final determination is made. Does that sound right to you?

MS. MCCORD: There is with some, but not others. As I indicated earlier,

I think with some, particularly at the staff level, there's an iterative process, but

that's not the case for all FISAs.

MR. HIMES: Last question: How, if at all, would the association of a

target with a prominent presidential campaign affect the preparation of a FISA

application?
 -
MS. MCCORD: So that would be considered a very sensitive
74

circumstance, and that would mean it would get extra vetting and more reviews.

For example, even though my role was never to actually sign these, I only, you

know -- I would occasionally be asked to read one and consult on one, and that

was, you know, usually either because it was novel, or particularly sensitive it, and

didn't happen that often but certainly in the case of Carter Page it did happen.

-
 [1:20 p.m.]
- 75

MR. HIMES: It did. So that additional scrutiny you referred to occurred in

this case?

MS. MCCORD: Uh-huh.

MR. HIMES: Okay. All right. Thank you.

I yield back.

MR. GOWDY: Ms. McCord, I think they're going to call votes, so this will

probably be the last time I will have a chance to ask you questions. I want to start

again the same way I did last time. Thank you for being here and thank you for

your service to our country in a very important and difficult job.

I want to pick up where my friend Mr. Himes left off, but I want you to

imagine you're in a courtroom and you are either examining or cross-examining

Mr. Steele. All right? I'll let you pick. You're either the prosecutor and you want

to take the sting out of it before the defense attorney does it or you're being paid

handsomely as a defense attorney.

Would you ask Mr. Steele who his employer was?

MS. MCCORD: Yes.

MR. GOWDY: He's an informant.

Would you ask him whether he had a pecuniary interest in the outcome?

MS. MCCORD: Yes.

MR. GOWDY: Would you ask him -- and this is separate -- how he was

being compensated for his time either that day or through the course of the

investigation?

MS. MCCORD: Yes.

-
MR. GOWDY: Would you inquire as to what motive he may have had to
 -
provide the information that he was provided?
76

MS. MCCORD: Yes.

MR. GOWDY: Would you inquire as to whether or not he was associated

with any other parties that may also be principals in that ongoing investigation or

prosecution?

MS. MCCORD: Yes, probably, depending on the facts.

MR. GOWDY: I would ask all of those things, too. But let me ask you,

why with you do that? Why would you ask those series of questions about motive

and bias and opportunity and all that stuff? Why would you do that?

MS. MCCORD: Because it's important for, in the case of a courtroom,

which is what the premise of your question was, it is important for the fact-finder to

know. And if I was the prosecutor, which I always was, I did not Idid want to

take the sting out of that. I wanted to be able to characterize it in a way, if I had

found and my investigators had found a particular witness to be credible and we'd

overcome whatever biases or other Giglio information might exist, then I would

want the opportunity to explain that to the jury and to the fact-finder.

And so, too, to the extent that you're making an analogy to a FISA, the idea,

just like in a search warrant application or in a Title Ill application, is to be as

candid with the court as possible about, you know, where there could be biases.

MR. GOWDY: I wasn't making the analogy yet. We're still back in the

courtroom.

MS. MCCORD: I'm getting ahead of you.

MR. GOWDY: It's relevant and it's important.

MS. MCCORD: Uh-huh.

-
MR. GOWDY: Always the same thing, but in this case it is both relevant
 -
and important. It goes directly to whether or not the fact-finder can believe what
77

is coming out of the mouth of the witness.

MS. MCCORD: I agree.

MR. GOWDY: So how much of that information was included about Mr.

Steele in the FISA application?

MS. MCCORD: Like I said, I have not read that for over a year, so I cannot

tell you how much. I know everything we knew to include, at least that I was

aware of, was included.

MR. GOWDY: When you say "we," does that include you and the Bureau

or just main Justice?

MS. MCCORD: Well, I can't speak for anything the Bureau knew that

wasn't shared with main Justice. So I can only speak for what information we

were able to glean having asked additional questions and made sure that anything

we had was put in there.

MR. GOWDY: I'm sure no one in the room would do it, but to the extent

there may be an outlier somewhere that is critical of Republicans for asking

questions about the dossier and how it may have come into the hands of the

Bureau, are these irrelevant questions for wanting to ask the Bureau: How did

this witness come forward? How did you vet the sourcing and the subsourcing?

Are those irrelevant, unimportant questions to inquire?

MS. MCCORD: I don't think it's irrelevant or unimportant. I think that

when the affidavit was presented to DOJ, DOJ asked questions about the source

and the subsource and the subsourcing and tried to convey as candidly as

possible what information we had at that time.

-
I would point out that it is a probable cause determination and not a beyond
 -
a reasonable doubt determination like you would see in a court of law in a criminal
78

case. And I, you know --

MR. GOWDY: I'm with you. And on the counterintelligence part, that's

important, because it may not ever result in a prosecution.

MS. MCCORD: That's right.

MR. GOWDY: Most criminal inquiries at some point the purpose might be

to move it beyond a reasonable doubt. So if all you've got is probable cause, that

ain't much when you're going have a little higher burden in a couple of months.

So I'm with you, probable cause is the bare minimum for an arrest warrant.

My guess is you had lots of conversations with FBI agents that they had probable

cause, but they did not have enough beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore

you may have declined the case, even though they had probable cause. Has that

ever happened?

MS. MCCORD: That wasn't presented at all when we were talking about

Carter Page. There was never a discussion at the time of the FISA about, you

know, it was intelligence collection.

MR. GOWDY: Right. It wasn't calculated towards a criminal prosecution.

MS. MCCORD: Yes. I just want to be clear on that.

MR. GOWDY: Right. No, I was with you on that. But to the extent there

is a difference in how probable cause would play into those, one calculated

towards investigation another towards a prosecution where the burden changes.

MS. MCCORD: Yeah, that's right.

MR. GOWDY: That's all I have unless Mr. Rooney or- or the

chairman have something.

-
MR. GOWDY: Thank you for coming.
 MS. MCCORD: You're welcome.
- 79

MR. SWALWELL: Thank you, Ms. McCord, for your service and for

coming in today.

When you left in May, what was the status of General Flynn's case? Was

it open or closed?

MS. MCCORD: It was open.

MR. SWALWELL: How about Mr. Manafort's.

MS. MCCORD: Open.

MR. SWALWELL: How about Mr. Page?

MS. MCCORD: Open.

MR. SWALWELL: And we know now with Mr. Papadopoulos.

In your 28 years of experience at the Department of Justice, particularly in

the National Security Division, have you ever seen a Presidential campaign with

so many contacts with a foreign adversary? Have you ever seen that before?

Has that ever been presented to you before?

MS. MCCORD: I was not at any NSD during any other campaign, so I

really can't answer. And just to be clear, just because this is recorded, I think I

began with DOJ in 1994, so that would be like 23 years. I have 27 years in

government, but not all of it at DOJ.

MR. SWALWELL: Was it ever discussed to give the Trump campaign a

defensive briefing, to alert them that people on their team had these contacts, like

Mr. Papadopoulos or Mr. Page?

MS. MCCORD: So during the -- if we're talking about like sort of during the

fall, that was never discussed with me. There were other defensive briefings that

-
were provided with respect -- not with respect to Russia at all, but with respect to a
 -
few people that -- some other involvement not related to Russia that I can
80

remember discussing with the Bureau.

MR. SWALWELL: At any point during your time at DOJ, during the

Presidential campaigns, both primary and general, did anybody, to your

knowledge, come forward to the FBI or DOJ and say, we have seen these

contacts or we have been approached by Russians with information on hacked

emails? Does that question make sense? Other than an FBI --

MS. MCCORD: Other than the briefings we've talked about?

MR. SWALWELL: -- or other than a law enforcement official, did any

citizen or --

MS. MCCORD: Not that I'm aware of.

MR. SWALWELL: And what I'm referring to is evidence has come out and

Mr. Papadopoulos's stipulation of facts said that, you know, he was approached

about dirt on Secretary Clinton. You've seen the emails with Don Jr. and Kushner

and Manafort where they were approached about dirt on Secretary Clinton.

Did anyone proactively, to your knowledge, go to the FBI or DOJ saying

that they were contacted about Russians having information on the Secretary?

Other than Mr. Steele.

MS. MCCORD: Yeah, right. I'm assuming other than Mr. Steele.

Not me, not anybody at DOJ. I do recall -- and I don't know if this person

came forward independently or if this is somebody that the Bureau reached out to

talk to. And it may - and I've been wondering since I read some of the

documents about Mr. Papadopoulos's case, this professor. I believe there is a

professor that the Bureau talked with. Again, I don't know if that's a professor

-
who had come to them independently or they went to him and I don't know if it is
 -
the same professor. But I do have a recollection.
81

MR. SWALWELL: It looks like we are wrapping this up and I don't think

we're going to come back. Is there anything, Ms. McCord, that you would have

asked with respect to what you did that did not come up that you'd like to share

with us?

MS. MCCORD: Can you just give me a moment?

[Discussion off the record.]

MS. MCCORD: I don't think so. I think within the scope of what I

understand the interest here to be, I think we've hit pretty much all of the salient

points.

MR. SWALWELL: Okay. And back to -- on Mr. Steele, you knew him to

be a British -- a former British intelligence officer?

MS. MCCORD: So I believe it was explained to me that he had worked

also with the Bureau formerly as well, but was a British intelligence officer.

MR. SWALWELL: And finally, attempt is also a crime. Is that right? If

you attempt to commit a crime, that itself, even if the crime is not completed, is a

crime in the Federal system.

MS. MCCORD: Yes.

MR. SWALWELL: Thank you. Nothing further.

MR. ROONEY: Thank you, Ms. McCord. That concludes our interview

and we are adjourned.

MS. MCCORD: Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 1:34 p.m., the interview was concluded.]