Practice of Law; Definition; Criteria

1. RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA,

COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and DBM SEC. GUILLERMO CARAGUE,
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991, Paras [J].

Facts: This is a PETITION to review the decision of the Commission on Appointments.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners

who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC on 25 April 1991 and was confirmed on 5 June 1991. On June 18,
1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the
COMELEC. Petitioner Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues-paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo).

Issue: Whether Atty. Monsod’s work experience as a lawyer was considered a practice of law

Ruling: Yes, Atty. Monsod’s experience as a lawyer was considered a practice of law.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill.” (111 ALR 23)

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term “practice of law”, particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by
the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor—verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement—
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
2. IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS

BM No. 2540 ● September 24, 2013

Statement of Facts:

Petitioner Michael Medado, who obtained his law degree in the year 1979, took and passed
the same year’s bar examinations and took the Attorney’s Oath, failed to sign the Attorney’s Roll.
After more than 30 years of practicing the profession of law, he filed the instant Petition on
February 2012, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. Medado said that he
was not able to sign the Roll of Attorneys because he misplaced the notice given to him and he
believed that since he had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys is not urgent,
nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer.

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) after conducting clarificatory conference on the
matter recommended to the Supreme Court that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross
negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.

Issue:

WON the petitioner be allowed to sign in the roll of attorneys?

Ruling:

Yes, the Court allowed the petitioner to sign the Roll of Attorneys subject to the payment
of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.
The Court cannot forbid the petitioner from signing the Roll of Attorneys because such
action constitutes disbarment. Such penalty is reserved to the most serious ethical transgressions
of members of the Bar.

The Court cited three main points which demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-
fledged member of the Philippine Bar. First, Medado demonstrated good faith and good moral
character when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. It was Medado
himself who admitted his own error and not any third person. Second, petitioner has not been
subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of law. He strove to adhere to the strict
requirements of the ethics of the profession and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses
the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar. Third, Medado appears to have been
a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions at the Laurel Law Office,
Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy Development
Corporation.
 However, the Court cannot fully free Medado from all liability for his years of inaction.
His justification of his action, that it was “neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken
belief and an honest error of judgment” was opposed by the Court.

“A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is

presumed to know the law and its consequences.” Although an honest mistake of fact could be
used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts he could no longer claim it as a
valid justification by the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance
record. His action of continuing the practice of law in spite of his knowledge of the need to take
the necessary steps to complete all requirements for the admission to the bar constitutes
unauthorized practice of law. Such action transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

With respect to the penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have warranted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law. However, in the instant case the Court could not warrant the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law to Medado because he is not yet a full-fledged
lawyer. Instead, the Court see it fit to impose upon him a penalty similar to suspension by allowing
him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one ( 1) year after receipt of the Resolution and to fine him
in the amount of P32,000.

The instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is Affirmed. Petitioner Michael A.
Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of the
Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized
practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is
STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in
the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by the Court.
3. A.M. No. P-11-2980 June 10, 2013

LETICIA A. ARIENDA vs. EVELYN A. MONILLA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III

Facts:

Leticia A. Arienda alleged that Evelyn Monilla and Atty. Zaldy Monilla (Atty. Monilla) (together
referred to as the spouses Monilla), went to her house and offered their services in settling the
estate of her deceased mother. According to the spouses Monilla, they would prepare an
extrajudicial settlement for her and her siblings, while Evelyn’s brother, Engineer Matias A.
Arquero (Engr. Arquero), would conduct the survey of the estate. Everytime the spouses Monilla
went to Arienda’s house, they would ask for partial payment. Arienda repeatedly requested from
the spouses Monilla the approved survey plan prepared by Engr. Arquero, but the spouses Monilla
demanded that she first pay the P20,000.00 she still owed them before they give her the approved
survey plan and extrajudicial settlement of estate. Arienda subsequently learned that the spouses
Monilla had no authority to settle her deceased mother’s estate as Atty. Monilla was currently
employed at the DAR and Evelyn was not even a lawyer but an ordinary court employee. Evelyn
denied that it was she and her husband who offered Arienda their services in settling the estate of
her deceased mother. She averred that it was Arienda and her sister, Ester, who came to her house
and requested her to convince her brother Engr. Arquero, a geodetic engineer, to partition the four
lots left by Arienda’s parents. Evelyn was initially hesitant to accede to Arienda’s request because
of Arienda’s reputation in their locality as a troublemaker. However, Evelyn’s husband, upon
learning that Arienda was a relative, urged Evelyn to assist Arienda.

Issue: Whether Evelyn A. Monilla committed a simple misconduct unbecoming of court personnel
while she was a court stenographer.

Ruling:

It bears to note that Evelyn admitted in her comment that she prepared and finalized the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Arienda’s deceased mother. The preparation of an
extrajudicial settlement of estate constitutes practice of law as defined in Cayetano v. Monsod, to
wit:

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill."

Not being a lawyer, Evelyn had no authority to prepare and finalize an extrajudicial settlement of
estate. Worse, she also admitted receiving money from Arienda for her services. Being a court
employee, she ought to have known that it was improper for her to prepare and finalize the
extrajudicial settlement of estate, a service only a lawyer is authorized to perform, and to receive
money therefor.

It is true that Evelyn prepared and finalized the extrajudicial settlement of estate pursuant to a
private agreement between her and Arienda. However, she is an employee of the court whose
conduct must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility as to let her be free from any suspicion that may taint the judiciary. She is expected
to exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of her official
duties but also in her personal and private dealings with other people to preserve the court’s good
name and standing.

Evelyn’s behavior and conduct, which led other people to believe that she had the authority and
capability to prepare and finalize an extrajudicial settlement of estate even when she is not a
lawyer, clearly fall short of the exacting standards of ethics and morality imposed upon court
employees.

Misconduct generally means wrongful, unlawful conduct, motivated by a premeditated, obstinate

or intentional purpose. Thus, any transgression or deviation from the established norm, whether it
be work-related or not, amounts to misconduct. In preparing and finalizing the extrajudicial
settlement of estate and receiving compensation for the same even when she is not a lawyer,
respondent is guilty of simple misconduct, punishable under Section 52(B)(2) of the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service with suspension for one month and
one day to six months. Considering that this is respondent's first offense and that she had served
the judiciary for almost 16 years, a suspension of four months would have been proper. Since
respondent had already retired, the Court instead imposes the penalty of a fine equivalent to her
salary for four months, to be deducted from her retirement benefits.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds Evelyn Monilla, retired Stenographer III
of RTC, Branch 4 of Legazpi City, GUILTY of simple misconduct.
4. FRANCISCO L. ROSARIO, JR. vs.

LELLANI DE GUZMAN, ARLEEN DE GUZMAN, PHILIP RYAN DE GUZMAN, and

ROSELLA DE GUZMANBAUTISTA

G.R. No. 191247 July 10, 2013

FACTS:

Sometime in August 1990, Spouses Pedro and Rosita de Guzman (Spouses de Guzman) engaged
the legal services of Atty. Francisco L. Rosario, Jr. (petitioner) as defense counsel in the complaint
filed against them by one Loreta A. Chong (Chong) for annulment of contract and recovery of
possession with damages involving a parcel of land in Parañaque City. Spouses de Guzman,
represented by petitioner, won their case at all levels. While the case was pending before this Court,
Spouses de Guzman died in a vehicular accident. Thereafter, they were substituted by their
children, namely: Rosella de Guzman-Bautista, Lellani de Guzman, Arleen de Guzman, and Philip
Ryan de Guzman (respondents).

On September 8, 2009, petitioner filed the Motion to Determine Attorney’s Fees before the RTC.
He alleged, among others, that he had a verbal agreement with the deceased Spouses de Guzman
that he would get 25% of the market value of the subject land if the complaint filed against them
by Chong would be dismissed. Despite the fact that he had successfully represented them,
respondents refused his written demand for payment of the contracted attorney’s fees. Petitioner
insisted that he was entitled to an amount equivalent to 25% percent of the value of the subject
land on the basis of quantum meruit.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to Attorney’s fees.

2. Whether the finality of the decision did not bar petitioner from filing the motion to recover
his attorney’s fees.

HELD:

In order to resolve the issues in this case, it is necessary to discuss the two concepts of attorney’s
fees – ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary sense, it is the reasonable compensation paid to
a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. In its extraordinary concept, it is awarded by the
court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages. Although
both concepts are similar in some respects, they differ from each other, as further explained below:
The attorney’s fee which a court may, in proper cases, award to a winning litigant is, strictly
speaking, an item of damages. It differs from that which a client pays his counsel for the latter’s
professional services. However, the two concepts have many things in common that a treatment of
the subject is necessary. The award that the court may grant to a successful party by way of
attorney’s fee is an indemnity for damages sustained by him in prosecuting or defending, through
counsel, his cause in court. It may be decreed in favor of the party, not his lawyer, in any of the
instances authorized by law. On the other hand, the attorney’s fee which a client pays his counsel
refers to the compensation for the latter’s services. The losing party against whom damages by
way of attorney’s fees may be assessed is not bound by, nor is his liability dependent upon, the fee
arrangement of the prevailing party with his lawyer. The amount stipulated in such fee arrangement
may, however, be taken into account by the court in fixing the amount of counsel fees as an element
of damages.

The two concepts of attorney’s fees are similar in other respects. They both require, as a
prerequisite to their grant, the intervention of or the rendition of professional services by a lawyer.
As a client may not be held liable for counsel fees in favor of his lawyer who never rendered
services, so too may a party be not held liable for attorney’s fees as damages in favor of the winning
party who enforced his rights without the assistance of counsel. Moreover, both fees are subject to
judicial control and modification. And the rules governing the determination of their reasonable
amount are applicable in one as in the other.

In the case at bench, the attorney’s fees being claimed by the petitioner refers to the compensation
for professional services rendered, and not as indemnity for damages. The said award, made in its
extraordinary concept as indemnity for damages, forms part of the judgment recoverable against
the losing party and is to be paid directly to Spouses de Guzman (substituted by respondents) and
not to petitioner. The Court now addresses two (2) important questions: (1) How can attorney’s
fees for professional services be recovered? (2) When can an action for attorney’s fees for
professional services be filed?

With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorney’s fees as an incident of the
main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client. Attorney’s fees cannot be
determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of the recovery is at the
disposition of the court. The issue over attorney’s fees only arises when something has been
recovered from which the fee is to be paid.

While a claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the determination
as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in abeyance until the
main case from which the lawyer’s claim for attorney’s fees may arise has become final.
Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will be premature. Of course, a petition for
attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds
thereof delivered to the client.

It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options as to when to file his
claim for professional fees. Hence, private respondent was well within his rights when he made
his claim and waited for the finality of the judgment for holiday pay differential, instead of filing
it ahead of the award’s complete resolution. To declare that a lawyer may file a claim for fees in
the same action only before the judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would deprive him of
his aforestated options and render ineffective the foregoing pronouncements of this Court.

In this case, petitioner opted to file his claim as an incident in the main action, which is permitted
by the rules. As to the timeliness of the filing, this Court holds that the questioned motion to
determine attorney’s fees was seasonably filed.

Because petitioner claims to have had an oral contract of attorney’s fees with the deceased spouses,
Article 1145 of the Civil Code allows him a period of six (6) years within which to file an action
to recover professional fees for services rendered. Respondents never asserted or provided any
evidence that Spouses de Guzman refused petitioner’s legal representation. For this reason,
petitioner’s cause of action began to run only from the time the respondents refused to pay him his
attorney’s fees.

With respect to petitioner’s entitlement to the claimed attorney’s fees, it is the Court’s considered
view that he is deserving of it and that the amount should be based on quantum meruit.

Quantum meruit – literally meaning as much as he deserves – is used as basis for determining an
attorney’s professional fees in the absence of an express agreement. The recovery of attorney’s
fees on the basis of quantum meruit is a device that prevents an unscrupulous client from running
away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for it and also avoids unjust
enrichment on the part of the attorney himself. An attorney must show that he is entitled to
reasonable compensation for the effort in pursuing the client’s cause, taking into account certain
factors in fixing the amount of legal fees.

As earlier mentioned, petitioner served as defense counsel for deceased Spouses de Guzman and
respondents for almost seventeen (17) years. The Court is certain that it was not an easy task for
petitioner to defend his clients’ cause for such a long period of time, considering the heavy and
demanding legal workload of petitioner which included the research and preparation of pleadings,
the gathering of documentary proof, the court appearances, and the various legal work necessary
to the defense of Spouses de Guzman. It cannot be denied that petitioner devoted much time and
energy in handling the case for respondents. Given the considerable amount of time spent, the
diligent effort exerted by petitioner, and the quality of work shown by him in ensuring the
successful defense of his clients, petitioner clearly deserves to be awarded reasonable attorney’s
fees for services rendered. Justice and equity dictate that petitioner be paid his professional fee
based on quantum meruit.

The fact that the practice of law is not a business and the attorney plays a vital role in the
administration of justice underscores the need to secure him his honorarium lawfully earned as a
means to preserve the decorum and respectability of the legal profession. A lawyer is as much
entitled to judicial protection against injustice, imposition or fraud on the part of his client as the
client against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to see that a lawyer
acts in a proper and lawful manner; it is also its duty to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With
his capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money
but in expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against
any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his just compensation. It would be ironic
if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice for his client he himself would not get his
due.

The Court, however, is resistant in granting petitioner's prayer for an award of 25% attorney's fees
based on the value of the property subject of litigation because petitioner failed to clearly
substantiate the details of his oral agreement with Spouses de Guzman. A fair and reasonable
amount of attorney's fees should be 15% of the market value of the property.

5. DOMINADOR P. BURBE vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA

AC No. 99-634. June 10, 2002

FACTS:

On September 1998, respondent agreed to legally represent petitioner Dominador Burbe in a

money claim and possible civil case against certain parties for breach of contract. In consequence
to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared the demand letter and some other legal
papers, for which services he was accordingly paid and an amount of P25,000.00 for the required
filing fee. A week later, petitioner was informed by the respondent that the complaint had already
been filed in court, and that he should receive notice of its progress. The petitioner waited for
several months for the notice from the court but there was no progress in the case, he was also
inquired repeatedly in the respondent’s Law Office, however he was told to just wait.

The petitioner decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court with the draft of Atty. Magulta’s
complaint to personally verify the progress of the case, and there told that there was no record at
all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on his behalf, copy of the Certification dated May
27, 1999. As such, the petitioner confronted the latter. The respondent admitted that he has not at
all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose he
offered to reimburse him by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the
amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00.

The petitioner filed a case against Atty. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive
conduct. The respondent denied the allegations and alleged that he was never been paid by
complainant for his acceptance and legal fees and that the amount he had paid was a deposit for
the acceptance fee

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Atty. Magulta is liable for misrepresentation of funds given to him for
the filing fee.

HELD:
YES. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust
all moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their possession.

Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and
are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. It may be true that they have a
lien upon the client’s funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their
possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid;
and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However,
these considerations do not relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the moneys they
received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. In any event, they must still
exert all effort to protect their client’s interest within the bounds of law.

Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted
to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former returned
the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.
 Case Title People vs. HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA
Docket Number [G.R. Nos. 89591-96.
Date January 24, 2000
Digest by: Oliver Salas

Summary/Nature of the Case: Lawyer’s Practice of Law while in Detention.

Facts of the Case:

1. Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against him. By such arrest, he
is deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the custody of
private respondent Javellana with the obligation "to hold and detain" him.

The trial courts order specifically provided for private respondents detention at the residence of Atty. del Rosario.
However, private respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to be held as detention
prisoner in said residence.

2. However, This order of the court was not strictly complied with because private respondent was not detained in
the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a free man, including engaging
in the practice of law. Despite our resolution of July 30, 1990 prohibiting private respondent to appear as counsel
in Criminal Case No. 4262,[1] the latter accepted cases and continued practicing law.

Senior State Prosecutor Guingoyon filed with the Supreme Court a motion seeking clarification on the following
questions: "(1) Does the resolution of this Honorable Court dated July 30, 1990, prohibiting Atty. Javellana from
appearing as counsel refer only to Criminal Case No. 4262? (2) Is Atty. now (Judge) Deogracias del Rosario still the
custodian of Atty. Javellana? and (3) Since it appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosario never really held and
detained Atty. Javellana as prisoner in his residence, is not Atty. Javellana considered an escapee or a fugitive of
justice for which warrant for his arrest should forthwith be issued?

Issues at Hand:
1. Whether or not motion filed by Senior State Prosecutor Guingoyon has grounds against the respondents?

Held:
1. The perceived threats to private respondent Javelanas life no longer exist. Thus, the trial courts order dated
August 8, 1989 giving custody over him to the clerk of court must be recalled, and he shall be detained at the
Provincial Jail of Antique at San Jose, Antique.

2. Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is not allowed to
practice his profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention prisoner.
 1. The perceived threats to private respondent Javelanas life no longer exist. Thus, the trial courts order dated
August 8, 1989 giving custody over him to the clerk of court must be recalled, and he shall be detained at the
Provincial Jail of Antique at San Jose, Antique.

2. Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is not allowed to
practice his profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention prisoner.

The trial courts order was clear that private respondent "is not to be allowed liberty to roam around but is to be
held as a detention prisoner." The prohibition to practice law referred not only to Criminal Case No. 4262, but to
all other cases as well, except in cases where private respondent would appear in court to defend himself.

The Court stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not
practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE. All accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355, including Avelino T.
Javellana and Arturo F. Pacificador are ordered detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique, effective
immediately, and shall not be allowed to go out of the jail for any reason or guise, except upon prior written permission of
the trial court for a lawful purpose.

Additional Relevant Notes:

1. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private respondent Javellana with the obligation
"to hold and detain" him in Atty. del Rosarios residence in his official capacity as the clerk of court of the regional
trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be the personal custodian of accused
Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the custodian under the same undertaking.
7. STA. MARIA VS. TUASON 11 SCRA 562 (Ethics)
January 29, 2010 at 9:24 am (1)
FACTS:
This is a petition for the disbarment of Atty. Eduardo M. Tuason, instituted by Emilio Sta. Maria.
Sometime in June 1955, Atty. Tuason represented the partnership of Sta. Maria, Guanzon and
Chincuanco in a collection case against Enriqueta de Hidalgo, involving a promissory note of
P50,000.00. Defendant Hidalgo in this case was declared in default and was ordered to pay. By
virtue of a writ of execution, the provincial sheriff of Pampanga was able to obtain the amount of
P22,930.64.
Respondent Tuason got the whole amount from the sheriff and applied it in the following manner
: P10,000 attorney’s fees, P1,648 supposed expenses of litigation which he claimed to have
advanced during the prosecution and the balance of P11,282.64 to Fausto Chincuanco, his uncle.
Despite demands from Sta. Maria to turn over the money to him or to the sheriff, respondent failed
to comply and contempt proceedings were instituted against Tuason. The matter was referred to
the Office of the Solicitor General who made the findings and recommendation that: respondent
Tuason was not in connivance with his uncle Chincuanco in depriving petitioner of his lawful
share in the liquidation of partnership assets, however, the collection of P10,000 as attorney’s fees
after the case was terminated after one brief hearing is unreasonable. There was also no evidence
presented to show that Tuason actually spent P1,648 for the expenses.
The Sol. Gen. recommended that instead of a more severe penalty which he would otherwise
deserve, respondent be reprimanded for professional indiscretion, with a warning that a more
severe penalty be imposed for the repetition of the same of similar acts.

ISSUE : Whether respondent committed acts that would merit his disbarment.

RULING:
The fact that the respondent placed his private and personal interest over and above that of his
clients constitutes a breach of the lawyer’s oath, to say the least. Call it professional indiscretion
or any other name, but the cold fact remains that the act is not conducive to the health growth of
the legal profession. Respondent is hereby admonished that a repetition of similar acts will merit
more drastic action.

8. Office of the Court Administrator vs Atty. Misael M. Ladaga

(A.M. No. P-99-1287, January 26, 2001)

Facts: Atty. Misael Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, appeared
as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case
No. 84-885 for “Falsification of Public Documents” before the METC of Quezon City. It is also
denied that the appearance of said respondent in said case was without the previous permission of
the Court.

During the occasions that the respondent appeared as such counsel before the METC of Quezon
City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan
was aware of the case he was handling. Respondent appeared as pro bono counsel for his cousin-
client NarcisaLadaga. Respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was
and respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her out of his
compassion and high regard for her.

This is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member of his family who is like a
big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case amicably.
Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top
of this, during all the years that he has been in government service, he has maintained his integrity
and independence.

He failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of the
court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by law.

Issue: WON Atty. Ladaga, upon such several appearances, was engages into private practice? NO
Held: Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice
of their profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession.
THERE WAS NO PRIVATE PRACTICE: In People vs. Villanueva: Practice is more than an
isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42
LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment
for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on
one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practiceof law.

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro
bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 doesnot constitute the “private practice”
of the law profession contemplated by law.

DECISION: Reprimanded.

9. Pimentel vs. LEB

GR No. 230642, September 10, 2019

FACTS:
The Congress, on December 23, 1993, passed into law R.A. No. 7662 (AN ACT PROVIDING
FOR REFORMS IN THE LEGAL EDUCATION, CREATING FOR THE PURPOSE, A LEGAL
EDUCATION BOARD AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES). It created the LEB, an executive
agency which was made separate from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).
Court's Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters (CLEBM), through its Chairperson,
Justice Jose C. Vitug, noted several objectionable provisions of R.A. No. 7662 namely Section 2,
Section 3, Section 7 (e) and (h) which allegedly violates Article VIII of the Constitution. CLEBM
suggested amendments but RA 7662 remained unaltered.
Despite the passage of the enabling law in 1993, the LEB became fully operational only in June
2010. Since then, the LEB had issued several orders, circulars, resolutions, and other issuances
which are made available through their website.
Among them is the PhiLSAT, which is essentially an aptitude test measuring the examinee's
communications and language proficiency, critical thinking, verbal and quantitative reasoning. It
was designed to measure the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law.
Petitioners pray that R.A. No. 7662 be declared unconstitutional and that the creation of the LEB
be invalidated together with all its issuances, most especially the PhiLSAT, for encroaching upon
the rule-making power of the Court concerning admissions to the practice of law, violates
academic freedom and the right to education.
They also argue that the Congress cannot create an administrative office that exercises the Court's
power over the practice of law and it gives the JBC additional functions to vet nominees for the
LEB in violation of Section 8(5), Article VIII of the Constitution.
Likewise, petitioner questions LEB’s powers to prescribe qualifications and compensation of
faculty members and its power to adopt a system of continuing legal education.

ISSUES:
Whether RA 7662 is unconstitutional;
Whether LEB has jurisdiction over the supervision and regulation of legal education;
Whether PhiLSAT violates academic freedom and right to education.

HELD:
In general, R.A. No. 7662, as a law meant to uplift the quality of legal education, does not encroach
upon the Court's jurisdiction to promulgate rules under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
Constitution. It is well-within the jurisdiction of the State, as an exercise of its inherent police
power, to lay down laws relative to legal education, the same being imbued with public interest.
However, certain provisions and clauses of R.A. No. 7662 which, by its plain language and
meaning, go beyond legal education and intrude upon the Court's exclusive jurisdiction suffer from
patent unconstitutionality and should therefore be struck down.
Moreover, the exercise of the power to supervise and regulate legal education is circumscribed by
the normative contents of the Constitution itself, that is, it must be reasonably exercised.
Accordingly, the Court recognizes the power of the LEB under its charter to prescribe minimum
standards for law admission. The PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test to guide law
schools in measuring the applicants' aptness for legal education along with such other admissions
policy that the law school may consider, is such minimum standard. But, if it is used to exclude,
qualify, and restrict admissions to law schools, as its present design mandates, the PhiLSAT goes
beyond mere supervision and regulation, violates institutional academic freedom, becomes
unreasonable and therefore, unconstitutional.

10. BAR MATTER NO. 914

Posted by kaye lee on 11:00 PM
Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999
Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar
vs.
Vicente D. Ching, petitioner

Facts:
Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese father, was born
on April 11, 1964 in Tubao La Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has resided in the
Philippines

He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed an application to take
the 1998 Bar Examination.
The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submit to the Court the
following documents as proof of his Philippine Citizenship:
1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified accountant;
2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered
voter of his place; and
3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao,
La Union
On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony was scheduled on
May 5, 1999.
Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take oath.
He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for
admission to the Philippine Bar.
In his report:
1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and continue to be so, unless upon
reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under the compliance with the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 265 "an act providing for the manner in which the option
to elect Philippine citizenship shall be declared by a person whose mother is a Filipino citizen"
2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, and if ever he does,
it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the present jurisprudence.

Issue:
Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable time".

Rulings:
1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within a
reasonable time. The reasonable time means that the election should be made within 3 years from
“upon reaching the age of majority", which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine
citizenship 14 years after reaching the age of majority which the court considered not within the
reasonable time. Ching offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship, as
procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is
required is an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file the same with the nearest civil
registry.

11. RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH

BAR MATTER No. 712. March 19, 1997

DOCTRINE: The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict
intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and
efficient administration of justice.

FACTS:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the 1993 bar exams. The Court however deferred his oath-
taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.

In September 1991, petitioner was involved in a criminal case involving the death of a neophyte
during fraternity initiation rites. Petitioner and 7 other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty
to homicide charges. They later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment, all pleaded
guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

The trial court rendered judgment on February 1993 finding them guilty as charged.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted petitioner’s application for probation.

On 11 June 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report submitted by the Probation
Office recommending petitioner’s discharge from probation.

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer’s
oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court issued a resolution requiring petitioner to submit to the Court evidence
that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed
upon those seeking admission to the bar.

In compliance with the resolution, petitioner submitted at least 15 certifications/letters executed

by senators, trial court judges and members of religious orders. Petitioner also submitted evidence
that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim,
through the joint efforts of Camaligan’s family and the 8 accused.

The Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner.’s prayer to
be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

In his comment, Camaligan said that he still believes that the infliction of the injuries was
deliberate and that the offense should have been murder. He consented to the accused’s plea of
guilty to the lesser offense only out of pity because the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife
of one of the accused went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, on
their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. That as a Christian, he has
forgiven the accused. However, as a father, he still feels pain from his son’s death. He continued
that he is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar and
leaves the matter to the Court.

ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONER MAY BE ALLOWED TO TAKE THE LAWYER’S OATH

RULING: YES.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration
o f justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a
disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from
taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent
years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
The senseless beatings inf1icted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral
fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and
uncalled for. However in the 13 July 1995 Resolution, the Court stated that it is prepared to
consider de novo the question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency
in moral character referred to.
After a careful evaluation of the case, the Court resolve to allow petitioner to take the lawyer's
oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino
is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that
he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of
Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice
of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
The lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should
at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the
lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer
and easier for everyone concerned.

13. Emilio Grande vs. Atty. Evangeline De Silva

FACTS:
Complainant Grande was the private offended party in certain Criminal Cases entitled “People vs.
Sergio Natividad.
During the proceedings, respondent Atty. De Silva, counsel of the accused, tendered to
complainant a check drawn against her account as settlement of the civil aspect of the said case.
Complainant refused to accept it but respondent assured him that the same will be paid upon its
presentment and as a lawyer she will not issue a check which is not sufficiently funded. So,
complainant accepted the check.
When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the
reason: “Account Closed”. Then, he wrote a demand letter to the respondent but the latter ignored
it. Hence, complainant instituted a criminal case for violation of B.P. 22 and the instant disbarment
case against respondent.
A Resolution requiring her to comment on the complaint was sent to her, but she moved to another
location. So, a second Resolution was sent to her new address, but she refused to accept it.
The case was referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline which recommended that the
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for 2 years for deceit, gross misconduct and
violation of Lawyer’s Oath.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the same.
ISSUE:
W/N respondent violated the Lawyer’s Oath.
RULING:
YES. Respondent assured that the check has sufficient funds. In doing so, she deceived
complainant into withdrawing his complaint against her client in exchange for a check which she
drew against a closed account. It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing
a bouncing check amounted to deceit and constituted a violation of her oath, for which she should
be accordingly penalized. Such an act constitutes gross misconduct.
Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served on her
betrays a deplorably willful character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal
profession. Her conduct not only underscores her utter lack of respect for authority; it also brings
to the fore a darker and more sinister character flaw in her psyche which renders highly
questionable her moral fitness to continue in the practice of law: a defiance for law and order which
is at the very core of her profession.
Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration of justice
because obedience to the dictates of the law and justice is demanded of every lawyer; as stated in
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

14. CASE DIGEST

Topic: Lawyer’s Duties to the Legal Profession

MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO v ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA,

A.C. No. 6593

Facts:
Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a disbarment against Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana
P.Valencia before IBP charging them with gross immorality.

MS Garrido is the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido, with six (6) children. E. Garrido and Atty.
Romana Paguida Valencia married in Hongkong ang had a child. He failed to financial support to
the children who stopped schooling because of financial constraints. Thus, this disbarment
proceedings against him and his his mistress

E. Garrido claimed Maelotisea was not his legal wife. He was married to Constancia when he
married M. He married M after he and Constancia parted ways. E. Garrido and M grew apart due
to financial problems,

E. Garrido met Atty. Valencia who became his personal confidante and help him solve his financial
burdens. He denied that he failed to give financial support to his children with all his children
educated in private schools inspite of M not employed for the past ten (10) years.

Atty. Valencia denied being the mistress of E. Garrido with M being not the legal wife of E.
Garrido.
M knew of the romantic relationship between her and E. Garrido but M kept silent and had
maintained this silence Valencia financially helped E, Garrido build a house for his family with
M. Valencia alleged that M kept silent when things were favorable to her. Valencia also alleged
that M had no cause of action against her.

Issue: WON a disbarment case against E. Garrido and Valencia can prosper.

Ruling:

DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of the
Lawyers Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and

E Garrido misrepresented himself to M as a bachelor, an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited

relationship. He contracted his second marriage with M notwithstanding the subsistence of his first
marriage. He engaged in an extra-marital affair with Valencia while his two marriages were in
place. Instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with M upon the death of
Constancia, he married Valencia and bore him a daughter. He misused his legal knowledge and
convinced Valencia (who was not then a lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his
marriage with M was not valid. He simultaneously cohabited and had sexual relations with two (2)
women who at one point. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more than
ten (10) years. By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal
profession, specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyers oath, and of the ethical
rules of the profession.

DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Valencia married a man who was married to another. She did not object to sharing her husband
with the woman of his second marriage and helped the second family build a house prior to her
marriage. She consented to be married in Hongkong, for the added security of avoiding any charge
of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. This, is a clear
demonstration Valencia’s perverse sense of moral values.
Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality,
including honesty, integrity and fair dealing

Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective .The requirement of
good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect
the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers
from themselves.[38] Each purpose is as important as the other.