Case 1: BUOT v. DUJALI | G.R.

No: 199885 |
Date: Oct. 2, 2017 | Ponente: Jardeleza, J.

Facts:

Buot’s Petition for Letters of Administration w/ RTC

● Alleged that the following were the surviving heirs of Gregorio:
1. Herself;
● Alleged that she is the deceased’s child with the first wife (Sitjar
Escalona)
2. Roque Dujali
3. Constantia Dujali-Tiongson;
4. Concepcion Dujali-Satiembre;
5. Marilou Sales-Dujali;
6. Marietonette Dujali;
7. Georgeton Dujalin, Jr.; and
8. Geomar Dujali

NOTE: #2-8 are children from another woman, Yolanda Rasay

Dujali’s Opposition w/ MTD

● Buot has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings because she did not prove that
she is an heir
○ She failed to attach any document to prove her filiation w/ the deceased, like a
certificate of live birth or marriage certificate
● Dujali attached a certificate of marriage between the deceased and their mother,
Yolanda Rasay
○ This certificate indicated that Gregorio had never been previously married to a
certain Sitjar Escalona

Buot’s Comment to the Opposition

● ROC states that only ultimate facts should be stated in an initiatory pleading; no need to
attach marriage certificate/certificate of live birth
● To prove filiation, she attached the following:
1. necrological services program where she was listed as one of Gregorio’s heirs;
2. Certification from the municipal mayor that she is Gregorio’s child
3. Copy of Amended Extrajudicial Settlement dated July 4, 2001, which includes
her as one of Gregorio’s heirs
● The Amended EJS pertains to parcels of land not included in the list of
properties annexed in Buot’s petition

RTC denied Dujali’s MTD →

Dujali’s MR
● Administration is improper considering the existence of the Amended EJS
○ When the estate has no debts recourse to administration proceedings is allowed
ONLY WHEN there are good and compelling reasons
○ Where an ACTION FOR PARTITION (whether in or out of court) is possible,
the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding

RTC granted Dujali’s MR

● Buot’s petition for letters of administration is already barred by the fact that
Gregorio’s estate has already been extrajudicially settled as evidenced by the
Amended EJS which she herself attached to her petition
● There are only 2 exceptions to judicial settlement: (1) extrajudicial settlement; and (2)
summary settlement of an estate of small value

Buot’s MR was denied by the RTC

Present Petition for Certiorari of Buot

● Heirs are not precluded from instituting a petition for administration if they do not, for
good reason, wish to pursue an ordinary action for partition
○ She has good faith reasons to pursue administration proceedings: [IMPT!!]
■ The Amended EJS did not cover the entire estate
■ No effort to partition the property
■ Dujali seeks to challenge Buot’s status as an heir
■ Other heirs have been deprived of the properties of the estate
■ Other heirs, particularly Constancia and Marilou, have already manifested
that they are amenable to the appointment of an administrator

Dujali’s Comment
● There is no good and compelling reason to grant Buot’s petition for
administration
○ Buot is not an interest person allowed to file a petition for administration of the
estate
■ While she claims to be Gregorio’s heir, her birth certificate and the
marriage certificate between Gregorio and Yolanda (the mother of Dujali)
state otherwise
○ Buot already received her share from the sale of properties made by the true
heirs
○ Buot was only allowed to participate in the Amended EJS by the true heirs
out of humanitarian considerations, not because she is a true heir

Issue: Whether letters of administration should be granted despite the existence of the
Amended EJS
Ruling: NO. Sec. 1, Rule 74 does not prevent the heirs from instituting administration
proceedings if they have good reasons for choosing not to file an action for partition. In this case
however, Buot’s reasons are not sufficient:
● That the Amended EJS did not cover Gregorio’s entire estate is by no means a sufficient
reason to order the administration of the estate
○ This does not automatically create a compelling reason
○ Parties seeking to challenge an extrajudicial settlement of estate already posses
sufficient remedies under the law and procedural rules
● Even if there was no effort to partition gregorio’s estate, the filing of an action for partition
before the proper court will leave his heirs with no choice but to proceed
● An action for partition is the proper venue to ascertain Buot’s entitlement to participate in
the proceedings as heir
● An action for partition would allow the full ventilation of the issues as to the properties
that ought to be included in the partition, true heirs entitled to receive the portions of the
estate. It is also the appropropriate forum to litigate questions of fact to ascertain if
partition is proper and who may participate in the proceedings.

Case 2: Jardeleza vs. Jardeleza,| G.R. No: 167975 |

 Date:June 17, 2015 | Ponente: BERSAMIN,J.

Facts:

● March 7,2997- The Spouses Gilda Jardeleza and Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. (Ernesto)
commenced Civil Case No.23499, was raffled in RTC Branch 33 against respondents
Spouses Melecio and Elizabeth Jardeleza, JMB Traders, Inc., and Teodoro Jardeleza
(Teodoro) respecting several parcels of their conjugal lands.
● January 13,2004- During the pendency of the case, Ernesto died. Hence, administration
proceedings (Special Proceedings No. 04-7705) were commenced in the RTC Branch
38 , and Teodoro was appointed as the administrator of the estate.
● Teodoro, in his capacity as the administrator, filed a motion to dismiss in Civil Case
No.23499 on the ground that because Melecio, one of the defendants, was also an heir
of Ernesto, the properties subject of the action for reconveyance should be considered
as “advances in the inheritance,” and, accordingly, the claim for reconveyance should be
heard in SpecialProceedings No. 04-7705 by Branch 38.

RTC Granted the Motion to Dismiss

● Gilda sought reconsideration, arguing that she had a personal cause of action of her
own distinct from that of Ernesto; that she neither signed nor consented to the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 23499; and that Teodoro should have first sought the approval of
Branch 38 as the intestate court considering that the estate could potentially recover
properties belonging to it.

RTC denied Gilda’s MR, Hence this direct petition

Issue: Whether or not the action for reconveyance which survived the intervening death
ofErnesto as co-plaintiff, should be maintained independently of Special Proceedings No. 04-
7705.

Ruling:

Conclusion Yes. the action for reconveyance, which survived the intervening death of
 Ernesto as co-plaintiff, should be maintained independently of Special
Proceedings No. 04-7705.

Rule In a cause of action that survives, the wrong complained of primarily and
principally affects property and property rights, the injuries to the person
being merely incidental; in a cause of action that does not survive, the injury
complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected
being incidental.

Application In this case, Civil Case No. 23499 survived the Death of Ernesto, hence it
should be maintained independently of Special Proceedings.

Issue: Did Branch 33 err in dismissing Civil Case No. 23499?

Ruling:

Conclusion Yes.

Rule The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) as a probate court relates
only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of
will of a deceased person, and does not extend to the determination of a que
tion of ownership that arises during the proceedings

Exception:

(1) Unless the claimants to the property are all heirs of the deceased and they
agree to submit the question for determination by the probate or
administration courtand the interests of third parties are not prejudiced;

(2) or unless the purpose is to determine whether or not certain properties

should be included in the inventory, in which case the probate or
administration court may decide prima facie the ownership of the property, but
such determination is not final and is without prejudice to the right of
interested parties to ventilate the question of ownership in a proper action.

Application In this case, in dismissing Civil Case No. 23499,Branch 33 shirked from its
responsibility to decide the issue of ownership and to let the probate court
decide the same. Branch 33 thereby did not consider that any decision that
Branch 38 as a probate court would render on the title and on whether or not
property should be included or excluded from the inventory of the assets of
the estatewould at best be merely provisional in character, and would yield to
a final determination in a separate action.
Case 3: MARCELO INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and heirs of Marcelo v
JOSE T. MARCELO, JR. | G.R. No. 209651 |
 November 26, 2014| PEREZ, J.:

Facts:
● On August 24 1987, Jose Sr. Died intestate. He was survived by his 4 compulsory
heirs, namely, Edward, George, Helen and respondent Jose Jr.
● On Sept 21, 1989 pending letters of administration, the RTC appointed Helen and Jose
Jr. as special administrators.
● On December 1991, RTC appointed Edward as regular administrator of Jose Sr’s
estate.
● Respondent Jose Junior filed for motion for reconsideration of such appointment and
raised omnibus motion alleging that the Judge had unusual interest and undue haste in
issuing such letters of administration(Ironic cause it took 2 years already noh?)
● RTC Denied Jose Jr’s motion for reconsideration and on the omnibus motion was in
favor of the Judge.
● Jose Jr being persistent took it up to Court of Appeals for which was again denied.
● On January 15, 2001, Edward the administrator filed a manifestation and motion for
liquidation of inventory of the estate wherein it required 4 of the compulsory heir’s
signatures. All 4 signed.
● On Sept 2001, the RTC archived the intestate proceedings pending the submission of
proof of payment of the estate tax of the estate.
● However, on 2009, Edward the regular administrator died.
● Wasting no time, Jose Jr. moved to revive intestate proceedings of the estate and
moved for his appointment as the new regular administrator, Petitioners MIMCO, heirs of
Edward, Helen and George opposed such motion.
● On January 6, 2010 RTC Appointed Jose Jr. as the new regular administrator of Jose
Sr’s estate. “Contrary to the assertions of the petitioners, there was no showing that
Jose Jr was unfit to administer the estate”
● “In the sound judgment of the [c]ourt, oppositor-movant [Jose, Jr.], a legitimate child of
the decedent, appears to occupy higher interest than Atty. Henry A. Reyes in
administering the subject estate.”

Issue: Whether or not an appointment of a regular administrator is still necessary at the

liquidation, partition, and distribution stage of Jose Sr’s estate?

Ruling:
 C Yes. The settlement of Jose, Sr.’s estate is not yet through and complete albeit it is at the
liquidation, partition and distribution stage.

R Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides for the Distribution and Partition of the Estate. The
rule provides in pertinent part: SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made.
– x x x No distribution shall be allowed until payment of the obligations above mentioned
has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a
sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such
time as the court directs.

A The inheritance tax is an obligation of the estate, indirectly the heirs.

How about Jose Jr’s previous declaration by the court that he was unfit and unsuitable to
administer his father’s estate? Can that be a ground to disqualify him?

C Yes. The court erred in making Jose Jr as regular administrator.

Undoubtedly, there has been a declaration that Jose, Jr. is unfit and unsuitable to
administer his father’s estate.

R More importantly, consistent with Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, not only is
George the eldest son of Jose, Sr. and, therefore, his most immediate kin, he has,
moreover, been chosen by the rest of the heirs of Jose, Sr. to perform the functions of
an administrator. In this regard, in addition to George and the heirs of Edward, Helen
executed an Affidavit to manifest her opposition to Jose, Jr. and to support the
appointment of George and herself as joint administrators, a copy of which was given to
the [Court of Appeals.]

A We thus issue Letters of Administration to George to facilitate and close the settlement
of Jose, Sr.’s estate.

CASE 4: GUEVARA VS. GUEVARA | G.R. No: L-48840 |

Date: Dec 29, 1943 | Ponente: Ozaeta

Facts:

➔ On August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara executed a will apparently with all the
formalities of the law.
◆ He made the following devises: "A mis hijos Rosario Guevara y Ernesto M.
Guevara y a mis hijastros, Vivencio, Eduviges, Dionisia, Candida y Pio,
 apellidados Guevara," a residential lot with its improvements situate having an
area of 960 square meters and assessed at P540
➔ He set aside 100 hectares of the same parcel of land to be disposed of either by him
during his lifetime or by his attorney-in-fact Ernesto M. Guevara in order to pay all his
pending debts and to pay his expenses and those of his family as to the time of his
death.
◆ Victorino executed a deed of sale whereby he conveyed to Ernesto the
southern half of the large parcel of land. Pursuant thereto, original certificate of
title No. 51691 was issued in favor of Ernesto M. Guevara over the whole parcel
of land described in the deed of sale above referred to.
➔ On September 27, 1933, Victorino died however, his last will and testament
was never presented to the court for probate , nor has any administration
proceeding ever been instituted for the settlement of his estate.
➔ In the meantime, Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father's last will and
testament in her custody, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions
made therein. It was only during the trial of this case that she presented the will to the
court, not for the purpose of having it probated but only to prove that the deceased
Victorino L. Guevara had acknowledged her as his natural daughter.

[KEY FACT] Rosario Guevara commenced this action to recover from Ernesto Guevara what
she claims to be her strict legitime as an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased
specifically a parcel of land described in original certificate of title issued in the name of
Ernesto M. Guervara and to order the latter to pay her P6,000 plus P2,000 a year as damages
for withholding such legitime from her.

RTC – ruled in favor of Rosario

CA – affirmed the ruling and held that it is preferable for the parties to resort to extrajudicial
settlement

Issue: Was the procedure adopted by Rosario Guevara proper?

Ruling: NO. The procedure adopted was in violation of procedural law and an attempt to
circumvent and disregard the last will and testament of the decedent.

The presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance by
the court is essential and indispensable to its efficacy.

Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the authenticity and
due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance
with that will without first securing its allowance or probate by the court for 2 reasons:

1. the law expressly provides that "no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless
it is proved and allowed in the proper court"; and

2. the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with the
substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against
public policy designed to effectuate the testator's right to dispose of his property by will in
accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees. Nor may the
 court approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such an action for partition,
which is one in personam, any more than it could decree the registration under the
Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary action for reinvindicacion or partition.

In this case, Rosario is claiming her legitime based on a will that was never presented for
probate.

Issue: Whether the decision of CA in applying Sec. 1, Rule 74 (extrajudicial settlement) is

proper.

Ruling: NO.

Section 1 of Rule 74 merely authorizes the extrajudicial or judicial partition of the estate of a
decedent "without securing letter of administration." It does not say that in case the decedent
left a will the heirs and legatees may divide the estate among themselves without the
necessity of presenting the will to the court for probate. The petition to probate a will and
the petition to issue letters of administration are two different things, although both may be
made in the same case.

Under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts and
the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must
first present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance
with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are
contrary to law. The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because
unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to
dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the
instant case.

In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present litigants
had received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the existence and of the
provisions of the will. Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be
obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the
court for probate.
 CASE 5: UY KIAO ENG vs. NIXON LEE | G.R. No: 176831 |
Date: January 15, 2010 | NACHURA, J.

Facts:
● A petition for mandamus with damages, was filed by respondent (son), in order to
compel petitioner (mother of defendendant) to produce the will so that probate
proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted.
○ [RESPONDENT’S ALLEGATIONS]: Respondent alleged that his father passed
away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a holographic will, which is now in the
custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother.
○ Allegedly, respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate
the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance,
but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason.
● [PETITIONER’S ANSWER]: In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner traversed the
allegations in the complaint and posited that the same be dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action, for lack of cause of action, and for non-compliance with a condition
precedent for the filing thereof.
○ Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she
knew of its whereabouts
○ She, moreover, asserted that photocopies of the will were given to respondent and to his
siblings
 ○ Petitioner further contended that respondent should have first exerted earnest efforts to
amicably settle the controversy with her before he filed the suit.
● [RTC]: RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondent’s
evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in
her custody the original holographic will. The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to
evidence. However, it granted the same on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the
appellate court.
● [CA]: The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit.
○ It ruled that the writ of mandamus would issue only in instances when no other remedy
would be available and sufficient to afford redress.
○ Under Rule 76, in an action for the settlement of the estate of his deceased father,
respondent could ask for the presentation or production and for the approval or probate
of the holographic will.
○ Eventually, CA issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment
of attorney’s fees. It ruled this time that the respondent was able to show by testimonial
evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will.
○ The CA further ruled that respondent, in the proceedings before the trial court, failed to
present sufficient evidence to prove that his mother had in her custody the original copy
of the will.

● Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court.

Issue #1: Is the CA correct in the issuance of the writ of mandamus?

Ruling #1: NO. The Court cannot sustain the CA’s issuance of the writ. Mandamus is a
command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the
sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person
requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the
official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition
recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be
resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no
interest.

The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the
Constitution. The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do
anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the
applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a
right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection
raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is
meritorious.
As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds:
[a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from office, trust, or station;or
[b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled

Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should
be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the
remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases
where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief.

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation
involved here—the production of the original holographic will—is in the nature of a public or a
private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee
because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of
the original for purposes of probate.

ISSUE : What remedy does Lee have, if any?

RULING: The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate
proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not.

Rule 76, Section 1 relevantly provides:

Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.—Any executor, devisee, or legatee named
in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time, after the death of the
testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his
possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for the production of the
original holographic will. Thus—

SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.—The person who has custody of a will shall, within twenty
(20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will to the court having
jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.

SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust.—A person named as executor in a
will shall within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, or within twenty (20)
days after he knows that he is named executor if he obtained such knowledge after the death of
the testator, present such will to the court having jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the court
in any other manner, and shall, within such period, signify to the court in writing his acceptance of
the trust or his refusal to accept it.
 SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect.—A person who neglects any of the
duties required in the two last preceding sections without excuse satisfactory to the court shall be
fined not exceeding two thousand pesos.

SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be committed.—A person having custody of a will after the
death of the testator who neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same, when ordered
so to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be committed to prison and there kept until he
delivers the will.

There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the
production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state
that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.
 Case 6: Codoy vs Calugay | G.R. No: 123486 |
Date: August 12, 1999 | Ponente: Pardo, J.

Facts: Respondents herein as the devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the
deceased, filed before the RTC for probate of the holographic will. Respondents claimed that
the deceased (Matilde Seno Vda. de Ramonal) was of sound mind when the will was executed
on August 30, 1978, that no fraud, undue influence, and duress was employed to the testator
and was written voluntarily. The assessed value of the property which includes all real and
personal properties was about P 400, 000.00 at the time of her death.

Petitioners filed an opposition to the probate of the will and alleging that the holographic will was
a forgery and the same was illegible. Petitioners argue that the dates and the signature should
appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done and not after every disposition and
that the will was executed by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiaries.

Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence. Petitioners then
filed a demurrer to evidence claiming that respondents failed to establish sufficient factual and
legal basis for the probate of the holographic will of the deceased. The lower court granted the
demurrer to evidence by petitioners and the probate of the holographic will was denied due to
insufficiency of evidence and lack of merits. Petitioners filed an appeal before the CA and the
probate of the holographic will was granted by said court because of its authenticity of the
handwriting and signature. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the provision of Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or permissive?

Ruling: Article 811 connotes mandatory.

Article 811 of the Civil Code provides that “In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be
necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator
explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is
contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.” The word “shall” commonly
denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that when “shall” is used in a statute, it necessarily means mandatory.

Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief that aims
to prevent it. In the present case, the goal is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the
evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will
employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.

Issue 2: Is the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seno Vda. de Ramonal authentic?

Ruling 2: No. The respondents failed to establish the authenticity of the holographic will. The
will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the respondents
which was already kept with them even before the death of the deceased. It was revealed that
respondents had in possession of the holographic will as early as 1985 or five years before the
death of the deceased.

There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and handwriting of the
deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. A visual
examination of the holographic will provide that the strokes are different when compared to
other documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of the dispositions
is not readable. The strokes were uneven, retracing and had erasures on the will.
 Case 7: PASTOR v. CA | G.R. No: L-56340 |
Date: June 24, 1983 | Ponente: J. Plana

Facts:

● Type of will: Holographic

● Content: The will contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of
QUEMADA consisting of 30% of PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share in the operation by Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation (ATLAS) of some mining claims in
Pina-Barot, Cebu.
● Decedent: Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City on
June 5, 1966
● Survivors: Spanish wife Sofia Bossio (who also died on October 21, 1966), their two
legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely
(SOFIA), and an illegitimate child, not natural, by the name of Lewellyn Barlito Quemada
QUEMADA PASTOR, JR. is a Philippine citizen, having been naturalized in 1936.
SOFIA is a Spanish subject. QUEMADA is a Filipino by his mother's citizenship.
● Problem: The one questioned in this case is the Probate Order of December 5, 1972
which allegedly resolved the question of ownership of the disputed mining properties.

ARGUMENT: That before the provisions of the holographic win can be implemented, the
questions of ownership of the mining properties and the intrinsic validity of the holographic will
must first be resolved with finality.

Issue: Whether the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 resolved with finality the
questions of ownership and intrinsic validity.

Ruling:

C NO.

R In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the
extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of Court,
Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9.)

As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court
cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the
Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not
 conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.

A Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific

properties. On the contrary, it is manifest therein that ownership was not resolved.
● For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need
for and propriety of appointing a special administrator.
● Thus it allowed and approved the holographic will with respect to its extrinsic
validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law.
● It declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed " subject
to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real
and personal properties in Civil Case 274-T before Branch IX of the CFI of Cebu.
● Then again, the Probate Order (while indeed it does not direct the implementation
of the legacy) conditionally stated that the intestate administration aspect must
proceed "unless . . . it is proven . . . that the legacy to be given and delivered to
the petitioner does not exceed the free portion of the estate of the testator," which
clearly implies that the issue of impairment of legitime (an aspect of intrinsic
validity) was in fact not resolved.
● Finally, the Probate Order did not rule on the propriety of allowing QUEMADA to
remain as special administrator of estate properties not covered by the
holographic will, "considering that this (Probate) Order should have been properly
issued solely as a resolution on the issue of whether or not to allow and approve
the aforestated will. "
 Case 8: Nuguid vs Nuguid | G.R. No: L-23445 |
Date: JUNE 23, 1996 | Ponente: Sanchez, J.
[
Facts:
● Rosario (Decedent) died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate.
● Surviving her were her legitimate parents – Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and
sisters.
● Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed
by Rosario instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties.
She prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letter of administration
be issued to her.
● Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the
institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors – who are
compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line – were illegally preterited and that
in consequence, the institution is void.
● Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance
rather than one of preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not
apply in the case at bar.

ISSUE: WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal
heir preterited the compulsory heirs.

RULING:

C Yes, the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal
heir preterited the compulsory heirs.

R Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs
in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir.

Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left
forced heirs in the direct ascending line – her parents, and her holographic will
does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the
case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.

Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, through
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited”.
Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory
heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law”.
 A Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir
and preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or
bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And
intestate succession ensues.

Case 9: Nepomuceno vs CA | G.R. No. L-62952|

Date: October 9, 1985 | Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr., J.

FACTS:
 ● Martin Jugo, the testator in this case, devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife
Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free
portion to petitioner.

● It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina
Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952,
he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner
as husband and wife.

● On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and
Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo and asked for the issuance to her of letters
testamentary.

● On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed
an opposition alleging inter alia that:
(1) the execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper influence on the
part of the petitioner;
(2) that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick;
and
(3) that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the testator, she
is wanting in integrity and thus letters testamentary should not be issued to her.

RTC → Denied the probate of the Will.

HELD: As the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from
December 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will be an idle
exercise because on the face of the Wills the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.

CA → Set aside the decision of RTC.

HELD: The will in question declared valid except the devise in favor of the appellant
which is declared null and void. The properties so devised are instead passed on in intestacy
to the appellees in equal shares, without pronouncement as to costs.

CONTENTION OF PARTIES

PETITIONER RESPONDENT

1. The validity of the testamentary provision in 1. The fact that the last Will and Testament
 her favor cannot be passed upon and decided itself expressly admits indubitably on its face
in the probate proceedings but in some other the meretricious relationship between the
proceedings because the only purpose of the testator and the petitioner and the fact that
probate of a Will is to establish conclusively petitioner herself initiated the presentation of
as against everyone that a Will was executed evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true
with the formalities required by law and that civil status of the testator, which led private
the testator has the mental capacity to respondents to present contrary evidence,
execute the same. merits the application of the doctrine
enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid and
Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio Martinez, et
al.

2. Even if the provisions of paragraph 1 of 2. The admission of the testator of the illicit
Article 739 of the Civil Code of the Philippines relationship between him and the petitioner
were applicable, the declaration of its nullity put in issue the legality of the devise.
could only be made by the proper court in a
separate action brought by the legal wife for
the specific purpose of obtaining a declaration
of the nullity of the testamentary provision in
the Will in favor of the person with whom the
testator was allegedly guilty of adultery or
concubinage.

ISSUE: WON respondent court has jurisdiction to declare the testamentary provision in
favor of the petitioner as null and void.

RULING:

C YES. Respondent court has jurisdiction. The probate of a will might become an idle
ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.

In the case of Nuguid vs Nuguid, this court ruled that:

“If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be
gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears
in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists
that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic
validity or nullity of the will. Result. waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we
might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in
question.”

R Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:

"The following donations shall be void:

 (1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage
at the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense,
in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants,
by reason of his office.

"In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought
by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be
proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.

Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:

"The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter
vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions."

A There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage
when Martin Jugo executed his Will. There is also no dispute that the petitioner and
Mr. Jugo lived together in an ostensible marital relationship for 22 years until his
death.

The prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation
between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which
becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive.
The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he
was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in
concubinage.
 Case 10: Pizzaro vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No: L-31979 | Date: August 6, 1980 | Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.

Facts:
Petitioners: Filomena G. Pizarro (surviving spouse of the late Aurelio Pizarro, Sr.), and
their children: Misael, Aurelio, Jr., Luzminda, Delia-Thelma, Rogelio,Virgilio, Rosalinda,
Jose Elvin and Maria Evelyn (children)

Respondents: Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani (children)

● Upon the death of Aurelio Pizarro Sr., the petitioners instituted a Special Proceeding in the Court
of First Instance of Davao, presided by Judge Bullecer. → appointed Clerk of Court Gaudencio
A. Corias as Administrator of the estate.
● The Administrator, through Atty. Regalado C. Salvador, filed a Motion for Authority to
Sell the properties located at Agdao and Jose Palma Gil Streets, Davao City, to settle
the debts of the estate initially estimated at P257,361.23, including inheritance and
estate taxes.
● The respondent opposed the Motion claiming that the estate had not yet been properly determined
and that the sale of the Agdao lot with an area of 13,014 sqm. would be more than sufficient to
cover the supposed obligations of the estate. → authorized by the court
➔ The document of sale stipulated that the vendor was to cause the ejectment of all occupants in the
property on or before July 31, 1967, otherwise, the vendee was to have the right to rescind the sale
and demand reimbursement of the price already paid.
● The heirs filed a Motion to set aside or hold in abeyance the Order authorizing the sale on the
ground that they were negotiating for the sale of said lot to Mr. Benjamin Gonzales, whose
theater was being constructed on a 1,187 square meter portion thereof. → denied. MR was also
denied.
● The heirs prayed that the Administrator be asked to resign or be removed for having
abused his powers and duties, and also terminated the services of Atty. Regalado C.
Salvador, who had acted as counsel for the Administrator.
● Subsequently, the Administrator presented another Motion for Authority to Sell the Claro M.
Recto lot stating that the proceeds from the sale of the Agdao lot were not sufficient to settle the
obligations of the estate and that the sale of the property on J. Palma Gil Street was unanimously
opposed by the heirs. → granted.
● Except for the respondents, the heirs filed a "Motion for Cancellation or Rescission
of Conditional Contract of Sale" of the Agdao lot in favor of Alfonso L. Angliongto
reiterating that it was unnecessary and prejudicial to their interests, that the sale of the
lot in Claro M. Recto Street for P370.000.00 was more than sufficient to settle the
obligations of the estate, that it was impossible to eject all nineteen tenants, not later
than July 31, 1967, and that the vendee had failed to pay the last four installments due
despite repeated demands.
➔ Angliongto's counsel countered that the condition of the sale had not been
complied with so that the vendee would hold in abeyance payment of the balance
of the purchase price until all the squatters were ejected.
 ● The Court denied rescission of the sale. The heirs filed a MR, which was eventually
denied.
● The Administrator presented a "Motion to Approve Final Sale" of the Agdao lot to spouses
Angliongtos stating that the latter had paid the full balance of P58,728.00. → approved by the
court. TCT was issued in favor of Alfonso Angliongto.
● Then, Judge Bullecer was transferred to the Court of First Instance at Mati, Davao
Oriental while Gaudencio Corias ceased to be Administrator.
● The petitioners filed a verified Complaint for the cancellation and rescission of the
sale against the Angliongto spouses, Administrator, Judge Vicente P. Bullecer, Atty.
Regalado C. Salvador, and the respondents.
➔ All the defendants adopted the same Motion predicated mainly on plaintiffs' lack of legal capacity to
sue and lack of cause of action. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition and supplemental Opposition.

CFI now presided by Judge Manases G. Reyes: dismissed the rescission case on the
ground that it could not review the actuations of a coordinate Branch of the Court
besides the fact that a Motion for Reconsideration was still pending resolution before the
Probate Court. Petitioners elevated their cause to the Court of Appeals on
"Certiorari and Mandamus with Prohibition and Injunction.”

CA: dismissed the petition.

Issue: Was the trial court devoid of authority to review the actuations of a coordinate
Branch of the Court?

Ruling: NO, because no actuation of the Probate Court had to be reviewed. An order of the
probate court approving the sale of the decedent's property is final. The heirs of the deceased
may file a complaint in another court for the rescission of the sale. No judicial interference by the
court where the complaint for rescission was filed over the action of a co-equal court is involved.
The probate court’s province is the settlement of the estate only.

Sub-Issue: What did the petitioners actually sought to achieve when they filed the
Rescission Case?
It was to rescind the sale mainly for failure of the vendee to pay the full
consideration. That cause of action was within the judicial competence and
authority of the trial court as a Court of First Instance with exclusive original
jurisdiction over civil cases the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation. It was beyond the jurisdictional bounds of the Probate
Court whose main province was the settlement of the estate.

As a matter of fact, the Rescission Case was instituted after the Probate
Court itself had stated that petitioners’ cause of action was not within its
authority to resolve but should be filed with the competent Court. The
cause of action in one is different from that obtained in the other. Therefore, it
behooved the trial Court to have taken cognizance of and to have heard the
Rescission Case on the merits and it was reversible error for the Court of
Appeals to have upheld its dismissal.
 Case 11: BERMUDO v. TAYAG-ROXAS | G.R. No: 172879 |
Date: Feb. 2, 2011 | Ponente: Abad, J.

Facts:

Atty. Bermudo as executor of Hilario’s will filed a petition for his appointment as administrator of
Hilario’s estate and for allowance and probate of the latter’s will before the RTC.
The relatives of Hilario opposed the probate of the will because only Fermina Roxas was
instituted as Hilario’s heir.
● NOTE: Atty. Bermudo ALSO served as Roxas’s counsel in action
concerning her inheritance
RTC allowed the will and recognized Roxas as sole heir.

Atty. Bermudo then filed a motion to fix his legal fees and to constitute a charging lien against
the estate for the legal services he rendered
● RTC granted him Attorneys Fees = 20% of the estate and constituted the same as lien
on the estate’s property
● CA later modified the grant to 20% of the value of the LAND belonging to the estate
● Atty. Bermudo was okay with this and filed a Motion for Execution and appraisal of the
estate

● RTC’s Valuation of Atty’s Fees = Php12,644,300.00 w/ 6% interest per annum

○ Basis of value:
■ Advice of an amicus curiae regarding the value of the lands belonging to
the estate.

● CA’s FINAL VALUATION = Php 4,234,770.00 w/ 6% interest per annum

○ Basis of value:
■ City Assessor’s valuation

Atty. Bermudo assils the CA’s reduction saying that the RTC’s valuation is correct.

Roxas argues that Atty. Bermudo is not entitled to attorney’s fees, but only ro compensation as
administrator in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court

Issue: Whether Atty. Bermudo is entitled to Atty’s fees from Roxas despite already being
compensated for being the administrator of the estate?

Ruling: YES. Atty. Bermudo did not only serve as administrator of the estate. He also served as
Roxas' counsel in the suit that assailed her right as sole heir. Atty. Bermudo brought the contest
all the way up to this Court to defend her rights to her uncle's estate. And Atty. Bermudo
succeeded. Acting as counsel in that suit for Roxas was not part of his duties as administrator of
the estate. Consequently, it was but just that he is paid his attorney's fees.

Besides, Atty. Bermudo's right to attorney's fees had been settled with finality in CA-G.R. CV
53143. This Court can no longer entertain Roxas' lament that he is not entitled to those fees.

Case 12: Metrobank vs Absolute Management Corp. | G.R. No: G.R. No. 170498|
Date: January 9, 2013| Ponente: BRION,J

Facts:
 ● October 5, 2000- Sherwood Holdings Corporation,Inc. (SHCI) filed a complaint for a
sum of money against Absolute Management Corporation (AMC) in the RTC of Quezon
City.
● SHCI alleged in its complaint that it made advance payments to AMC for the purchase of
27,000 pieces of plywood and 16,500 plyboards, covered by Metrobank Checks, which
were all crossed, and were all made payable to AMC. They were given to Chua,
AMC’s General Manager, in 1998.
● 1999- Chua died, and a special proceeding for the settlement of his estate was
commenced before the RTC of Pasay City. This proceeding was pending at the time
AMC filed its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint.
● SHCI made demands on AMC, after Chua’s death, for allegedly undelivered items worth
P8,331,700.00.According to AMC, these transactions could not be found inits records.
Upon investigation, AMC discovered that in 1998, Chua received from SHCI 18
Metrobank checks worth P31,807,500.00.
● In its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint, AMC averred that it had no
knowledge of Chua’s transactions with SHCI and it did not receive any money from the
latter. AMC also asked the RTC to hold Metrobank liable for the subject checks in
case it is adjudged liable to SHCI.
● December 1,2003- Metrobank admitted that it deposited the checks in question to the
account of Ayala Lumber and Hardware, a sole proprietorship Chua owned and
managed. The deposit was allegedly done with the knowledge and consent of
AMC.According to Metrobank, Chua then gave the assurance that the arrangement for
the handling of the checks carried AMC’s consent. Chua also submitted documents
showing his position and interest in AMC. Further, Chua's Records show that the
proceeds of the checks were remitted to AMC which cannot therefore now claim that it
did not receive these proceeds. Subsequently, Metrobank filed a motion for leave to
admit a fourth-party complaint against Chua’s estate. It alleged that Chua’s estate
should reimburse Metrobank in case it would be held liable in the third-party
complaint filed against it by AMC.

RTC CA

Denied the Motion of Chua Affirmed the RTC

-categorized Metrobank’s allegation in the -According to the CA, the relief that
fourth-party complaint as a “cobro de lo Metrobank prayed for was based on a quasi-
 indebido”—a kind of quasi-contract that contract and was a money claim categorized
mandates recovery of what has been as an implied contract that should be filed
improperly paid. under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court.
Quasi-contracts fall within the concept of
implied contracts that must be included in - Based on the statutory construction
the claims required to be filed with the principle of lex specialis derogat
judicial settlement of the deceased’s generali , the CA held that Section 5,
estate under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rule86 of the Rules of Court is a
Rulesof Court. As such claim, it should have special provision that should prevail
been filed in SpecialProceedings No. 99- over the general provisions of Section
0023, not before the RTC as a fourth-party 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court. The
complaint. latter applies to money claims ordinary
actions while a money claim against a
person already deceased falls under
the settlement of his estate that is
governed by the rules on special
proceedings

ARGUMENT OF METROBANK IN THE SC

Metrobank asserts that it should be allowed to file a fourth-party complaint against Chua’s
estate in the proceedings before the RTC; its fourth-party complaint was filed merely to
enforce its right to be reimbursed by Chua’s estate in case Metrobank is held liable to AMC. It
argues that Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court should apply because it impleaded
Chua’s estate for reimbursement in the same transaction upon which it has been sued by
AMC

Issue: Are quasi-contracts included in claims that should be filed pursuant to Rule 86, Section
5 of the Rules of Court? And Whether Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint falls within the claims
that should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court

Ruling:

Conclusion Yes. Quasi-contracts are included in claims that should be filed under
Rule 86, Section 5 of the Rules of Court and Yes, Metrobank’s claim
against the Estate of Jose Chua is based on Quasi-Contract, specifically
Solutio Indebiti.

Rule Section 5, Rule 86 states that All claims for money against the decedent,
arising from contract, express or implied , whether the same be due, not due,
or contingent , all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last
 sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must
be filed within the time limited in thenotice

The term “implied contracts,” as used in our remedial law, originated from the
common law where obligations derived from quasi-contracts and from law are
both considered as implied contracts. Thus, the term quasi-contract is included
in the concept “implied contracts” as used in the Rules of Court.

A Quasi-contract involves a juridical relation that the law creates on the basis
of certain voluntary, unilateral and lawful acts of a person, to avoid unjust
enrichment.

Application In this case, Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint is based on quasi-contract. It

fulfills the requisites of solutio indebiti. A distinctive character of Metrobank’s
fourth-party complaint is its contingent nature—the claim depends on the
possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that
may or may not happen. This characteristic unmistakably marks the complaint
as a contingent one that must be included in the claims falling under the terms
of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court

Also, The court agrees with the CA’s use of the statutory construction principle
of lex specialis derogat generali ,leading to the conclusion that the specific
provisions ofSection 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court should prevail over the
general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court; the settlement
of the estate of deceased persons(where claims against the deceased should
be filed) is primarily governed by the rules on special proceedings,while the
rules provided for ordinary claims, including Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of
Court, merely apply suppletorily.

Case 13: ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER v ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER| G.R. No.
157912 |
December 13, 2007 | December 13, 2007

Facts:
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter
issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate.

On October 7, 2002 petitioner filed a contingent claim for agent's commission due him
amounting to approximately ₱206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of
land belonging to the estate, and the amount of ₱275,000.00, as reimbursement for
expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the
sale of said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of
said money claim against the estate on the grounds that:

(1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, had not been paid;
(2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and
(3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed
and served personally.

RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim based on
the grounds advanced by respondent.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

Petitioner now filed for review on certiorari raising the RTC erred in strictly applying to a
probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a written
explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees upon filing of the
claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in
ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.

Issue: Whether or not rules in ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in
special proceedings

Ruling:

C No. special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special
proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in
Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special
proceedings, as far as practicable.
 R The word “practicable” is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of
being put into practice, done or accomplished.

This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may
be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would
not pose an obstacle to said proceedings.

Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary
actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings.

A Thus, in the case at bar, Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification
of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written
explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for
money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate
proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such as the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.

Issue 2: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against
respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against
non-forum shopping?

Ruling:

C Yes. The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and
other initiatory pleadings.

The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a
decedent is an initiatory pleading.

R Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of
testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the
decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of
their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain
exceptions.

A In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of
the petition for allowance of the decedent's will.

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for
creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper
disposition of the properties of the estate.

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of
 the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot
even institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein
petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not
require a certification against non-forum shopping.

So how about the failure to file fees of money claim and failure of petitioner to attach a written
explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally?

With regard to the filing of fees - The trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim
(attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist
her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of separate docket fees because the
filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time.

After all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the
estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is
not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.

With regard to requirement of a written explanation - In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v.

Ricafort, this Court held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed
if said rule is not complied with.
In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for
respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City.

The lower court should have taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and
realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally.

Thus, following Medina v. Court of Appeals, the failure of petitioner to submit a written
explanation why service has not been done personally, may be considered as
superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13,
not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.

Case 14: Heirs of Gabatan vs CA | G.R. No: 150206 |

Date: March 13, 2009 | Ponente: Leonardo- De Castro

Facts:
 ● This case involves an action for Recovery of Property and Ownership and Possession
over a parcel of land filed by Respondent Pacana. There are 2 contending parties of this
case, both insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent.

Petitioners Respondent

● Denied that respondent’s mother ● She is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5,
Hermogena was the daughter of Juan having inherited the same from her
Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and deceased mother, Hermogena
that Hermogena or respondent is the Gabatan Evero (Hermogena)
rightful heir of Juan Gabatan
● Her mother, Hermogena, is the only
● maintained that Juan Gabatan died child of Juan Gabatan and his wife,
single in 1934 and without any issue Laureana Clarito
and that Juan was survived by one
brother and two sisters, namely: ● Upon the death of Juan Gabatan, Lot
Teofilo (petitioners’ predecessor-in- 3095 C-5 was entrusted to his brother,
interest), Macaria and Justa. Teofilo Gabatan and Teofilo’s wife,
Rita Gabatan, for administration.
● These siblings and/or their heirs,
inherited the subject land from Juan ● Prior to her death Hermogena
Gabatan and have been in possession demanded for the return of the land
in the concept of owners for more than but to no avail
50 years
● Petitioners refused to heed the
numerous demands of the respondent
for the surrender the subject property.
○ According to respondent, when
Teofilo and his wife died,
petitioners Jesus Jabinis and
Catalino Acantilado took
possession of the disputed
land despite respondent’s
demands for them to vacate
the same.

RTC - decided in favor of Pacana

CA - affirmed the RTC's ruling

Issue: Can a declaration of heirship be done in an ordinary civil action?

Ruling: Qualify.

GENERAL RULE: the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
 ● Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased
must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the
action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that
the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that
such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.

EXEMPTION: Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran where Court relaxed its rule and allowed the trial
court in a proceeding for annulment of title to determine the status of the party therein as heirs
since the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the disputed land and to subject it to
a special proceeding would be impractical and not expeditious.

The exemption is applicable in the present case as there appears to be only one parcel of
land being claimed by the contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would
be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of
the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan since they voluntarily submitted the
issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in such
proceeding. Also, the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and consequently rendered
judgment thereon.

Case 15: De Leon vs. CA | G.R. No. 128781|

Date: August 6, 2002 | Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Facts:
● Herein petitioner Teresita N. de Leon was appointed administratrix of the estate of
Rafael C. Nicolas. Deceased spouses Rafael and Salud Nicolas were the parents of
petitioner Teresita N. de Leon, Estrellita N. Vizconde, Antonio Nicolas (deceased
husband of petitioner Zenaida Nicolas and predecessor of the petitioners Heirs of
Antonio Nicolas), Ramon Nicolas and Roberto Nicolas.
 ● On September 19, 1994, private respondent Ramon G. Nicolas, an oppositor–applicant
in the intestate proceedings, filed a "Motion for Collation," claiming that deceased
Rafael Nicolas, during his lifetime, had given real properties to his children by
gratuitous title and that administratrix-petitioner Teresita failed to include the same in
the inventory of the estate of the decedent.
● On September 27, 1994, the RTC issued an Order directing Ramon "to submit
pertinent documents relative to the transfer of the properties from the registered
owners during their lifetime and on November 11, 1994, the RTC issued an Order, to
include the properties of oppositor-applicant Ramon for collation in the instant probate
proceedings.
● On November 18, 1994, petitioner Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for
Reconsideration alleging that the properties subject of the Order "were already titled in
their names years ago" and that titles may not be collaterally attacked in a motion for
collation. The RTC issued an Order denying said motion, ruling that it is within the
jurisdiction of the court to determine whether titled properties should be collated.
Petitioner Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated
February 23, 199510 which respondent opposed.
● On November 4, 1996, the RTC removed petitioner from her position as
administratrix on ground of conflict of interest considering her claim that she paid
valuable consideration for the subject properties acquired by her from their deceased
father and therefore the same should not be included in the collation; and, ordered the
hearing on the collation of properties covered by TCT No. T-V- 1211 and T-V-1210 only.
● On November 28, 1996, acting on the impression that the collation of the real properties
enumerated in the Order dated November 11, 1994 is maintained by the RTC, petitioner
Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that her appointment
as administratrix be maintained; and that the properties be declared and decreed as
the exclusive properties of the registered owners mentioned therein and not subject to
collation.
● The RTC denied said motion in its Order dated December 23, 1996.
● Petitioners Teresita N. de Leon, Zenaida Nicolas (the surviving spouse of Antonio
Nicolas) and the Heirs of Antonio Nicolas filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order
and writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue:
Whether or not the probate court can pass upon the question of title?

Ruling:
The court finds the petition partly meritorious. Contrary to the finding of the CA that the Order of
November 11, 1994 had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal therefrom in due time,
we hold that said Order is interlocutory in nature. Our pronouncement in Garcia v. Garcia
supports this ruling:
 "The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the filing
of the corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties, and
under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the
administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and credits which the law requires
the administrator to set out in his inventory. In compliance with this duty the court has also
inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased should be
included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or person interested in the properties
of a deceased person duly call the court’s attention to the fact that certain properties, rights or
credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the court’s duty to hear the observations,
with power to determine if such observations should be attended to or not and if the properties
referred to therein belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such determination is final and
ultimate in nature as to the ownership of the said properties."

A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of
title provisionally. The rationale therefor and the proper recourse of the aggrieved party are
expounded in Jimenez v. Court of Appeals:
"The patent reason is the probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of
title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can
only be settled in a separate action. "All that the said court could do as regards said properties
are determined whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties
to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the
opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so."

Guided by the above jurisprudence, it is clear that the Court of Appeals committed an error in
considering the assailed Order dated November 11, 1994 as final or binding upon the heirs or
third persons who dispute the inclusion of certain properties in the intestate estate of the
deceased Rafael Nicolas. Under the foregoing rulings of the Court, any aggrieved party, or a
third person for that matter, may bring an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims.

What seems to be a conflict between the above-quoted Rule and the afore–discussed
jurisprudence that the Order in question is an interlocutory and not a final order is more
apparent than real. This is because the questioned Order was erroneously referred to as an
order of collation both by the RTC and the appellate court. For all intents and purposes, said
Order is a mere order including the subject properties in the inventory of the estate of the
decedent.

The Court held in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals that the order of exclusion (or
inclusion) is not a final order; that it is interlocutory in the sense that it did not settle once and for
all the title to the subject lots; that the prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court
may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the
final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties.

In the Rodriguez case, the Court distinguished between an order of collation and an order of
exclusion from or inclusion in the estate’s inventory, thus:
"In this appeal, it is not proper to pass upon the question of collation and to decide whether Mrs.
Rustia’s titles to the disputed lots are questionable. The proceedings below have not reached the
stage of partition and distribution when the legitimes of the compulsory heirs have to be
determined."

Based thereon, we find that what the parties and the lower courts have perceived to be as an
Order of Collation is nothing more than an order of inclusion in the inventory of the estate which,
as we have already discussed, is an interlocutory order. The motion for collation was filed with
the probate court at the early stage of the intestate estate proceedings. We have examined the
records of the case and we found no indication that the debts of the decedent’s spouses have
been paid and the net remainder of the conjugal estate has already been determined, and the
estates of the deceased spouses at the time filing of the motion for collation were ready for
partition and distribution. In other words, the issue on collation is still premature.

And even if we consider, en arguendo, that said assailed Order is a collation order and a final
order, still, the same would have no force and effect upon the parties. It is a hornbook doctrine
that a final order is appealable. As such, the Order should have expressed clearly and distinctly
the facts and the laws on which it is based as mandated by Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.

Note.—The jurisdiction of the regional trial court as a probate or intestate court relates only to
matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and the probate of will of deceased
persons and does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during
the proceedings. (Ortañez-Enderes vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 178 [1999])
 Case 16: Valarao vs Pascual | G.R. No: 150164 |
Date: November 26, 2002 | Ponente: Bellosillo, J.

Facts: Felicidad Pascual died at 71 years old, femme sole, leaving a substantial inheritance for
her querulous collateral relatives who all appear disagreeable to any sensible partition of their
windfall. Respondent Pascual was the brother of the deceased and Manuel Diaz a nephew, son
of her sister Carmen Diaz. Petitioner Valarao is a niece of the decedent. Petitioner filed before
the RTC of Paranaque City a special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration in
her favor over the estate of the deceased. Respondents also filed with the same probate court a
petition for probate of an alleged holographic will of the deceased. The two special proceedings
were consolidated.

During the proceedings, Petitioner Valarao and Respondent Diaz were appointed as joint
administrators of the estate of the deceased. The RTC of Paranaque then dismissed the
probate of the alleged holographic will of the deceased thus rendering the intestate settlement
of the estate. Upon appeal by respondent Pascual, petitioner Valarao moved in the probate
court for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate while respondent Diaz also
asked for his designation as co-administrator with petitioner. Petitioner opposed to respondents
request on the ground that the latter allegedly neglected his previous assignment as co-
administrator of the estate and thus the probate court appointed Valaro as special administratrix
based on said observation.

Issue: Did the probate court erred in appointing Valarao as administrator of the estate of the
deceased?

Ruling: No. The appointment of Valarao as administrator of the estate of the deceased was
proper.

The probate court had ample jurisdiction to appoint petitioner Valarao as special administratrix
and to assist her in the discharge of her functions, even after respondents had filed a notice of
appeal from the Decision disallowing probate of the holographic will of Felicidad C. Pascual.
This is because the appeal is one where multiple appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is
required. In this mode of appeal, the probate court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter
of the appeal but retains jurisdiction over the special proceeding from which the appeal was
taken for purposes of further remedies which the parties may avail of, including the appointment
of a special administrator.
Moreover, there is nothing whimsical nor capricious in the action of the probate court not to
appoint respondent Diaz as special co-administrator since the Orders of 7 June 2000 and 11
September 2000 clearly stipulate the grounds for the rejection. The probate court weighed the
evidence of the applicants for special administrator before concluding not to designate
respondent Diaz as the latter was found to have been remiss in his previous duty as co-
administrator of the estate in the early part of his administration.
 Case 17: UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANTIBANEZ
| G.R. No: 149926 |
Date: February 23, 2005 | Ponente: J. Caballero

Facts:
● The petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines claims to be a creditor of the late Efraim
Santibañez.
● LOAN 1: First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibañez entered into a
loan agreement3 in the amount of ₱128,000.00 → to pay for (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-
Purpose Diesel Tractor.
○ PROMISSORY NOTE: In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal
annual amortizations of ₱43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and every May 31st
thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
● LOAN 2: December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement,4 this
time in the amount of ₱123,156.00 → to pay for the balance of the purchase price of another unit
of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit Howard
Rotamotor Model AR 60K.
○ PROMISSORY NOTE 2: Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such
promissory note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the loan
dated December 13, 1980.
● DECEDENT: Efraim (father)
● TYPE OF WILL: Holographic will
○ Testate proceedings were commenced
○ Heirs agreed to divide the properties among themselves
● FCCC → Union Bank → Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities9 was executed by
and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor,
among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
● CASE FILED BY UNION BANK: Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of
Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150,
docketed as Civil Case No. 18909.
○ Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not
served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his
address or the date of his return to the Philippines.
○ Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.

Issue: Whether the heirs (herein defendant) is liable for the indebtedness of their
deceased father (decedent)

Ruling:
C No. The loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the
late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate
court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court,

R The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is
mandatory.

● This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by
informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him
to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should
be allowed.
● The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of
the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees,
or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the
claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as
soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.

A Based on the records of the case:

● Nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for
any liability incurred by her late father.
● The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the
continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim
Santibañez and his son Edmund.Thus, as the petitioner failed to file its money
claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of
the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course,
subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court
had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to
delve into the matter further.
● Petitioner had not sufficiently shown that it is the successor-in-interest of the
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets and
liabilities.
○ The petitioner in its complaint alleged that "by virtue of the Deed of
Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First
Countryside Credit Corporation and Union Bank of the Philippines…"
○ However, the documentary evidence clearly reflects that the parties in the
deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of Bancom
Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the petitioner’s participation
therein as a party be found.
○ Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial evidence was presented
during trial to show that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact,
petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines.
○ Plaintiff failed to prove or did not present evidence to prove that Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the Philippines.
Judicial notice does not apply here. "The power to take judicial notice is to
[be] exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be promptly resolved in the negative." (Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).36
 Case 18: Jamero vs Nelicor | G.R. No: 140929 |
Date: May 26, 2005| Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.

Facts:

● Petitioner filed Special Proceedings No. 1618 for the Administration and
Settlement of the Estate of his deceased mother Consuelo Jamero with the RTC
 ● Private respondent Ernesto R. Jamero, a brother of petitioner, opposed the
latter’s petition for appointment as regular administrator of the estate.
● Upon motion of private respondent Ernesto and over the objections of petitioner,
the respondent court appointed Atty. Alberto Bautista as special administrator
pending the appointment of a regular administrator.
● Petitioner received said Order on December 11, 1998 and filed a motion for
reconsideration on December 28, 1998, the last day of the 15-day reglementary
period, that is, December 26, 1998, falling on a Saturday during which, according
to petitioner, the Bureau of Post Office held no office.
● The court a quo denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in its Order dated
February 26, 1999 which petitioner received on March 4, 1999.
● Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.

CA → ruled that If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time
after notice of said judgment, order or resolution the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If
the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but
which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No
extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and
in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.

Hence, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46, the petition may be
dismissed outright. In any case, even if we consider the date of the Motion for
Reconsideration (December 26, 1998) as the date of its filing, the petition would be late
by three (3) days.

Issue 1: WON the CA erred in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 53020 for having been filed
out of time

Ruling 1:

C Yes, the Court finds merit to the claim of petitioner that A.M. Circular No. 00-2-
03-SC as herein quoted earlier, further amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, should be given retroactive effect.

R
The Court held in Republic vs. Court of Appeals

The amendment under A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC quoted above is procedural or

remedial in character. It does not create new or remove vested rights but only
operates in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.
It is settled that procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive operation of statutes.
They may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may
 feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there is no vested rights in rules
of procedure.

A
Thus, applying the same to CA-G.R. SP No. 53020, the petition for certiorari
filed by petitioner with the CA should now be considered as having been filed
within the reglementary period provided under said circular. Petitioner would
have had sixty days from March 4, 1999 or until May 3, 1999 within which to file
his petition in the CA. The petition for certiorari was filed on April 21, 1999.

However, far from rendering the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 53020 moot and
academic, as claimed by petitioner, the third issue will have to be passed upon
by the CA in the petition for certiorari filed with it.

Issue 2: WON the CA erred in ruling that the appointment of special administrator is
discretionary to the appointing court and that being an interlocutory order, the same is
not appealable nor subject to certiorari

Ruling 2: Yes, the appointment of a special administrator is interlocutory, discretionary

on the part of the RTC and non-appealable. However, it may be subject of certiorari if it
can be shown that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion or lack of or in excess
of jurisdiction. As the Court held in Pefianco vs. Moral, even as the trial court’s order
may merely be interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari is the proper remedy to
annul the same when it is rendered with grave abuse of discretion.

Issue 3: WON the appointment of a special administrator is in accordance with law and
jurisprudence.

Ruling 3: It is for this reason that the third issue, as already stated, will have to be
considered and passed upon by the CA.
 Case 19: Lee vs RTC of Quezon City | G.R. No:146006 |
Date: February 23, 2004 | Ponente: Corona, J.

Facts:

● Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance

Company, Inc. on July 6, 1956. At the time of the company’s incorporation, Dr. Ortañez
owned ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed capital stock.

● When Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez died, he left behind:

○ Wife: Juliana Salgado Ortañez
○ Three legitimate children: Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortañez
○ Common law wife: Ligaya Novicio
○ Illegitimate children: Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes, Jose, Romeo, Enrico
Manuel and Cesar Ortañez.

● Rafael and Jose Ortañez were appointed by the court as the special administrator. They
submitted a total inventory of the estate of their father, which included, among other
properties, 2,029 shares of stocks in Philinterlife.

SHARES OF STOCK WERE SOLD:

● During the pendency of the settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortaez, his wife
Juliana Ortañez sold the 1,014 Philinterlife shares of stock in favor of
petitioner FLAG without the approval of the intestate court.

● Her son Jose Ortañez later sold the remaining 1,011 Philinterlife shares
also in favor of FLAG without the approval of the intestate court.

● Special Administrator Jose Ortañez, acting in his personal capacity and claiming
that he owned the remaining 1,011 Philinterlife shares of stocks as his
inheritance share in the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase also
in favor of herein petitioner FLAG.

● Juliana Ortañez failed to repurchase the shares of stock within the stipulated
period, thus ownership thereof was consolidated by petitioner FLAG in its name.
CONTEXT FOR THE BASIS OF THE # OF SHARE SEPARATELY SOLD: It appears that
during the pendency of the intestate proceedings at the RTC Juliana Ortañez and her two
children, Special Administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez, entered into a memorandum of
agreement for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, partitioning the
estate.

● Private respondents filed a motion for appointment of special administrator of Philinterlife

shares of stock which the intestate court granted and appointed private respondent
Enderes special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock. Enderes filed several
motions, to wit:
○ An urgent motion to declare void ab initio the memorandum of agreement
between the Juliana Ortañez and her two children;
○ A motion to declare the partial nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the
decedent’s estate.
○ An urgent motion to declare void ab initio the deeds of sale of Philinterlife shares
of stock.

INTESTATE COURT → Granted the motion of Special Administratrix Enderes for the annulment of the
March 4, 1982 memorandum of agreement or extrajudicial partition of estate.

CA → Affirmed intestate court’s decision.

HELD: there was no legal justification whatsoever for the extrajudicial partition of the estate by Jose
Ortañez, his brother Rafael Ortañez and mother Juliana Ortañez during the pendency of the settlement of the estate
of Dr. Ortañez, without the requisite approval of the intestate court, when it was clear that there were other heirs to
the estate who stood to be prejudiced thereby. Consequently, the sale made by Jose Ortañez and his mother Juliana
Ortañez to FLAG of the shares of stock they invalidly appropriated for themselves, without approval of the intestate
court, was void.

● Meanwhile, the FLAG-controlled board of directors, increased the authorized capital

stock of Philinterlife, diluting in the process the 50.725% controlling interest of Dr.
Juvencio Ortañez, in the insurance company. Enderes filed an action at the SEC. The
SEC hearing officer dismissed the case acknowledging the jurisdiction of the civil courts.

● Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao as president and secretary of Philinterlife ignored the
orders nullifying the sales of the shares of stock.

Issue 1: WON the sale of the shares of stock of Philinterlife is void.

C YES. There was no legal justification whatsoever for the extrajudicial partition of the
estate by Jose Ortañez, his brother Rafael Ortañez and mother Juliana Ortañez during
 the pendency of the settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortañez, without the requisite
approval of the intestate court, when it was clear that there were other heirs to the
estate who stood to be prejudiced thereby. Consequently, the sale made by Jose
Ortañez and his mother Juliana Ortañez to FLAG of the shares of stock they invalidly
appropriated for themselves, without approval of the intestate court, was void.

R Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that:

(1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir

pending final adjudication requires court approval; and
(2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the
probate court, there being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized
disposition.

An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration
under Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary property
is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the
decedent. However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be
allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after final
adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees
shall have been given their shares. This means that an heir may only sell his ideal or
undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein.

A In this case, Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate in
favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending the final adjudication
of the estate by the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the
other claimants to the estate, as what happened in the present case.

Issue 2: WON the intestate or probate court can execute its order nullifying the invalid
sale?

Ruling 2: YES. The intestate court has the power to execute its order with regard to the nullity
of an unauthorized sale of estate property, otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or
fraudulent disposition of estate property would be meaningless. In other words, enforcement is a
necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate court’s power to annul unauthorized or fraudulent
transactions to prevent the dissipation of estate property before final adjudication.
 Case 20: The Estate of Hilario M. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No: 118671 | Date: January 29, 1996 | Ponente: PUNO, J.

Facts:
● Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic bequeathed substantial cash, personal and real
property to his heirs:
1. Edmond Ruiz (his only son) → named executor
2. Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes (his adopted daughter; private respondent)
3. Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine, and Maria Angeline (his granddaughters;
children of Edmond Ruiz; private respondents) The testator and namedEdmond
Ruiz executor of his estate.
● When Hilario Ruiz died, the cash component of his estate was distributed among
Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedent’s will.
➔ However, Edmond did not take any action for the probate of his father’s
holographic will.
● Four years later, Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes filed before the RTC of Pasig a petition for the
probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz’s will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to
Edmond Ruiz.
➔ Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under
undue influence. → eventually withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will
● Subsequently, Edmond leased out to third persons one of the properties of the estate—
the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva Street, Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the testator
bequeathed to the granddaughters.
➔ Probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the
rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year
lease of the Valle Verde property.
➔ In compliance, Edmond turned over P348,583.56, representing the balance of
the rent after deducting P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses.
➔ He eventually moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real
properties of the estate. → probate court approved the release of P7,722.00.
● The probate court admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters
testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00. Then the
Letters testamentary were issued.

Petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Montes Opposition

Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor

Filed an “Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Opposed and filed a “Motion for Release
Funds” praying for the release of the rent of Funds to Certain Heirs” and “Motion for
payments. Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of
Probate Will” praying for the release of
the said rent payments to the grand
daughters and for the distribution of the
testator’s properties, specifically the Valle
 Verde property and the Blue Ridge
apartments, in accordance with the
provisions of the holographic will.

PROBATE COURT: denied petitioner's motion for release of funds but granted
respondent Montes’ motion. MR denied.

CA: dismissed the petition and sustained the probate court’s order

Issue 1: After admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate's debts and
obligations, does the probate court have the authority:

(1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator’s
grandchildren?
Ruling: NO. Allowances for support under Section 3, Rule 83 should not be limited to
the “minor orincapacitated” children of the deceased. Article 188, Civil Code of the
Philippines, the substantive law in force at the time of the testator’s death, provides that
during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse and
children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to
provisional support from the funds of the estate. The law is rooted on the fact that the
right and duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age
of majority.

Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the
funds of the decedent’s estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to “widow and
children” and does not extend it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their
minority or incapacity.

(2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs?

Ruling: NO. An order releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance
distribution of the estate which is allowed only under the following conditions:
compliance with Sec. 2, Rule 109; and Sec. 1, Rule 90.

In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be
made: (1) after all the debts,funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to
the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only
if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned
upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when
provision is made to meet those obligations.

In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde
property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six
months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order
 speaks of “notice” to creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz
allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been
paid, much less ascertained. Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of
the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.

It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six
months after admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due
execution and extrinsic validity and settles only the question of whether the testator,
being of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the
legality of any device or legacy may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.

(3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will?
Ruling: NO. Petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his
right to take possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The Right of
an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and
personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised “so long
as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration.”

Section 3, Rule 84 explicitly provides:

“Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain the whole estate to pay debts, and to
administer estate not willed .—An executor or administrator shall have the right to
the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the
deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses
for administration.”

When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited, he had been
previously granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and maintenance
expenses on the properties of the estate, and payment of the real estate taxes thereon.
But petitioner moved again for the release of additional funds for the same reasons he
previously cited. It was correct for the probate court to require him to submit an
accounting of the necessary expenses for administration before releasing any further
money in his favor.

It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with it only a
portion of the one-year rental income from the Valle Verde property.Petitioner did not
deposit its succeeding rents after renewal of the lease. Neither did he render an
accounting of such funds.

NOTE: Petitioner’s right of ownership over the properties of his father is merely inchoate as long
as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. As executor, he is a mere trustee of his
father’s estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties
and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order.

He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents’ properties and the fruits
thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of
the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of administration,
the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the
court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.

Case 21: SAN LUIS v. SAN LUIS | G.R. No: 133743 |

Date: Feb. 6, 2007 | Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.

Facts:
● Deceased - Felicisimo San Luis (contracted 3 marriages)
○ Died Dec. 18, 1992
● First Wife - Virginia Sulit
○ 6 Children
 ■ Rodolfo (oppositor to petition for letters of administration), Mila,
Edgar (petitioner), Linda, Emilita & Manuel

● Second Wife - Merry Lee Corwin (American citizen; obtained a divorce

in Hawaii)
○ 1 Child
■ Tobias

● Third Wife (RESPONDENT) - Felicidad Sangalongos

○ No Children
○ Lived with her for 18 years until he died
○ Filed petition for letters of administration

1. Felicidad sought dissolution of their conjugal partnership and the settlement of

Felicisimo’s estate
2. She filed a petition for letters of administration before the RTC of Makati City
● Allegations in Petition
○ She is the widow of Felicisimo
○ At the time of his death, the decedent was residing in Alabang,
Muntinlupa
○ The surviving heirs are herself as legal spouse, his 6 children by the first
wife, and the son from the second wife
○ The decedent left real properties, both conjugal & exclusive, valued at
Php30.3M more or less
○ The decedent foes not have any unpaid debts
● She prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of
administration be issued to her

3. Rodolfo, the son from the first marriage, filed a MTD on grounds of improper
venue and failure to state a cause of action
● The petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province
of Laguna because this was the decedent’s place of residence prior to
death
● Felicidad has no legal capacity to file the petition because she was only a
mistress of the deceased considering that at the time they were married, the
latter was still legally married to the first wife
4. RTC Makati denied Rodolo’s MTD
5. Unaware of the denial of the MTD, Felicidad filed an opposition to the MTD
● Evidence Attached to Opposition
○ Documentary evidence showing that while the deceased exercised
power as Provincial Governor of Laguna, he regularly went home to
their house in Alabang, Muntinlupa which they bought sometime in
1982
 ○Decree of Absolute Divorce between the second wife and the deceased
issued in Hawaii
■ The deceased had legal capacity to marry by virtue of Para. 2, Art.
26 of the CC & the Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. doctrine
6. RTC dismissed the petition for letters of administration
● Petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, and not Makati City,
because the deceased was the Provincial Governor and was a resident of
Laguna at the time of his death
● Felicidad has no legal capacity to file the petition because her marriage to the
deceased was bigamous
7. CA reversed the RTC upon Felicidad’s appeal
● RTC Order denying Rodolfo’s MTD reinstated
● Rule 73, Sec. 1 of the ROC defines “place of residence” of the decedent, for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the
personal, actual, or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a
person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile
○ Because the deceased ACTUALLY RESIDED in Alabang, Muntinlupa
City, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in
Makati City
● The decedent had legal capacity to marry Felicidad

Present Petition
● Edgar (son from first marriage) & Rodolfo insist that the venue is in Sta. Cruz, Laguna
● Nuval v. Guray & Romualdez v. RTC
○ “Residence” is synonymous with “domicile”, which denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one intends to return
● A person can only have one residence at any given time
● Since the deceased never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz Laguna

Issue: Whether the venue was properly laid?

Ruling: YES.

Conclusion The venue was properly laid because the deceased was a resident of
Alabang, Muntinlupa

Ruling For the purpose of fixing venue under the ROC, the “residence” of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his
 residence in one place and domicile in another.

Application While the deceased was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, he ALSO
maintained a residence in Alaband, Muntinlupa.

Evidence to Show Residence

● Deed of Absolute Sale showing the deceased purchased the
property in Alabang
● Billing statements from PH Heart Center and Chinese General
Hospital for the period of Aug.-Dec. 1992 indicating the address
in Alabang
● Proof of membership in the Ayala Alabang Village Association
and Ayalaba Country Club, Inc.
● Letter-envelopes from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s
children to him at his Alabang address
● Deceased’s calling cards stating that his home/city address is
at Alabang WHILE his office/provincial address in in Laguna

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of

Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement
of his estate.

Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was

validly filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City which has
territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa.

The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993.

At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches

of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region
which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then
seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No.
3. Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City.

Case 22: Pilapil vs Heirs of Maximino Briones, | G.R. No:150175 |

Date: February 5, 2007| Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO,J

Preliminary Facts:

● 10 May 2006, a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Decision was filed by Atty.
Celso C. Reales on behalf of the respondents, heirs of Maximino R. Briones.
● On 19 May 2006, petitioners ErlindaPilapil and the other co-heirs of Donata Ortiz Vda.
de Briones, through counsel, filed an Opposition toRespondents’ Motion for
Reconsideration, to which the respondents filed a Rejoinder on 23 May 2006.
Facts:

● Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones. Respondents, on the other
hand, are the heirs of the late Maximino Briones,
● Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children. When
Maximino died on 1 May 1952, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her
husband’s estate with the Court of First Instance (CFI), designated as Special
Proceedings No. 928-R. On 8 July 1952, the CFI issued Letters of Administration
appointing Donata as the administratrix of Maximino’s estate and subsequently issued
an Order awarding ownership of real properties to Donata. The Property was recorded in
the Primary Entry Book of the ROD

Controversy Arose:

● Donata died. Erlinda, one of her nieces, instituted with the RTC a petition for the
administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio,
were appointed by the RTC as administrators of Donata’s intestate estate.
● Erlinda claimed exclusive ownership of three parcels of land, covered by TCTs No.
21542, 21545, and 58684, based on two Deeds of Donation allegedly executed in her
favor by her aunt Donata.
● The other heirs of Donata opposed Erlinda’s claim. The SC, however, was no longer
informed of the subsequent development in the intestate proceedings of the estate of
Donata.

● January 21, 1985- Silverio Briones (Silverio), a nephew of Maximino, filed a Petition with
the RTC for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino, which was
initially granted by the RTC. The RTC also issued an Order, dated 5 December 1985,
allowing Silverio to collect rentals from Maximino’s properties.
● Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to Set Aside the Order, dated 5 December 1985,
claiming that the said properties were already under his and his wife’s administration as
part of the intestate estate of Donata. Silverio’s Letters of Administration for the intestate
estate of Maximino was subsequently set aside by the RTC.
● The heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC against the heirs of Donata for the
partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real property,
● They alleged that Donata, as administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud and
misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs,
 succeeded in registering in her name the real properties belonging to the intestate
estate of Maximino.

RTC CA

RTC declared that the heirs of Maximino were -Affirmed the RTC
entitled to 1/2 of the real properties.o ordered
Erlinda to reconvey to the heirs of Maximino
the said properties and to render an
accounting of the fruits thereof.

Ruling of SC in the Original Case

-Reversed the ruling of the RTC and CA dismissed the Complaint for partition, annulment, and
recovery of possession of real property filed by the heirs of Maximino.

Ratio: The heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Donata
managed, through fraud, to have the real properties, belonging to the intestate estate of
Maximino, registered in her name. Donata was able to register the real properties in her
name, not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued
by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R.

Respondents move fore reconsideration arguing that

● Donata committed fraud in securing the Court of First Instance Order

● That respondents’ right to succession to the disputed properties was transmitted or
vested from the moment of Maximino’s death and which they could no longer be
deprived of
● That Donata merely possessed and held the properties in trust for her co-heirs/owners
● respondents’ action to recover title to and possession of their shares in Maximino’s
estate, held in trust for their benefit by Donata, and eventually, by petitioners as the
latter’s successors-in-interest, is imprescriptible.
● That the CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, being based on the fraudulent
misrepresentation of Donata that she was Maximino’s sole heir, was a void order, which
produced no legal effect.
● Respondents assert that, by relying on certain procedural presumptions in its Decision,
dated 10 March 2006, this Court has sacrificed their substantive right to succession,
thus, making justice “subservient to the dictates of mere procedural fiats.”
Issue: Whether an Implied Trust under Article 1456 of the NCC had been sufficiently
established in the case.

Ruling:

Conclusion No.

Rule The existence of any trust relations between petitioners and respondents shall
be examined in the light of Article 1456 of the New Civil Code, which provides
that, “[i]f property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it
is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property comes.”

Application In this case, there was insufficient evidence to establish that Donata committed
fraud. It should be remembered that Donata was able to secure certificates of
title to the disputed properties by virtue of the CFI Order in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R (the proceedings she instituted to settle Maximino’s
intestate estate), which declared her as Maximino’s sole heir. In the absence
of proof to the contrary, the Court accorded to Special Proceedings No. 928-R
the presumptions of regularity and validity.

Issue: Whether or not CFI failed to send notices of Special Proceedings to the heroes of
Maximino or that it did not require presentation of proof of service of such notices.

Ruling:

Conclusion There was sufficient notice

Rule The settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem,

and that the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of
the date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a
notice to the whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the
hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication

Application In this case, A review of the records fails to show any allegation or concrete
proof that the CFI also failed to order the publication in newspapers of the
notice of the intestate proceedings and to require proof from Donata of
compliance therewith. Neither can this Court find any reason or explanation as
to why Maximino’s siblings could have missed the published notice of the
intestate proceedings of their brother.
 Case 23: AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON v MA. LOURDES BELEN | G.R. No. 189121 |
July 31, 2013 | PEREZ, J.
Rule 73 Venue and Process

Facts:

● This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo
Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and
daughter.
● The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to
whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon
(Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
● Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
● On 1994, herein respondents filed a petition for letters of administration before the RTC
of Las Pinas City.
● Elise(respondent) the daughter sought her appointment as administratix, she attached
her birth certificate of live birth in the petition.
 ● Amelia, herein petitioners with her daughters claim that the venue of the petition was
improper as Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac not Las Pinas City.
● In 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting
the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly
laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that
Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay.
● Motion for reconsideration of petitioners were denied.
● Petitioners were also denied in Court of Appeals
● Petitioners file rule 45 appeal by certiorari

Issue: Whether THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO
QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIÑAS

Ruling:

C No, Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of
the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent
resides at the time of his death.

R Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than
domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.

As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a
person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.

A Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for
affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was
properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo
resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason,
the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.

Other facts:
Supreme Court declared lower courts erred in not ruling Eliseo’s first marriage with herein
petitioners were void ab initio cause Marie Lourdes Belen was still married.
void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can
be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the
action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party
may attack a void marriage.