Geological reasoning: Geology as an interpretive and historical science

Robert Frodeman Department of Geological Sciences and Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado,
Boulder, Colorado 80301

ABSTRACT widely acknowledged Copernican Revolu- scribing this single logical procedure one
tion in our conception of space.2 But despite would have a general account that with a few
The standard account of the reasoning the prominence of the concept of time modifications would be sufficient for all the
process within geology views it as lacking a within contemporary (especially Conti- sciences.
distinctive methodology of its own. Rather, nental) philosophy, philosophers have ig- Most of the thinking on the nature of ge-
geology is described as a derivative science, nored the decisive role played by Hutton ological reasoning has come from within the
relying on the logical techniques exempli- and Werner in reshaping our sense of geologic community itself. While limited in
fied by physics. I argue that this account is time.3 amount, and too often neglected, there ex-
inadequate and skews our understanding of This neglect may be explained by the gen- ists an important body of work beginning
both geology and the scientific process in erally held assumption that geology is a de- with essays dating from the classic era of geo-
general. Far from simply taking up and ap- rivative science.4 Geological reasoning has logy (e.g., Gilbert 1886; Chamberlin, 1890),
plying the logical techniques of physics, geo- been thought to consist of a few rules of when the connection between natural sci-
logical reasoning has developed its own dis- thumb (e.g., uniformity, superposition) guid- ence and philosophy was much more explicit
tinctive set of logical procedures. ing the use of mathematics and the applica- in the minds of scientists. Recent work in
I begin with a review of contemporary tion of the laws of chemistry and physics to this area ranges from reflections on the
philosophy of science as it relates to geol- geologic phenomena. Geology was also seen methodology underlying a particular field of
ogy. I then discuss the two distinctive fea- as having a host of problems that undercut geology (e.g., Anderton, 1985) to more syn-
tures of geological reasoning, which are its its claims to knowledge: incompleteness of optic accounts of geological reasoning (Al-
nature as (1) an interpretive and (2) a his- data, because of the gaps in and the poor britton, 1963; Schumm, 1991; Ager, 1993).
torical science. I conclude that geological resolution of the stratigraphic record; the In their own class are the writings of Ste-
reasoning offers us the best model of the lack of experimental control that is possible phen Jay Gould, whose work often bridges
type of reasoning necessary for confronting in the laboratory-based sciences; and the the gap between geology and the humanities
the type of problems we are likely to face in great spans of time required for geologic pro- and who may be the only geologist widely
the 21st century. cesses to take place, making direct observa- known outside the field.7 Finally, there are
tion difficult or impossible. two texts that explicitly focus on the task of
INTRODUCTION These factors have made geology seem to giving a full-fledged philosophy of geology:
be a less-than-ideal candidate for philo- Kitts (1977) and Von Engelhardt and Zim-
Contemporary philosophy has not recog- sophic consideration. In fact, the philosophy merman (1988).
nized geology as a fertile ground for reflec- of science has traditionally viewed physics This work has made real and lasting con-
tion; today, one finds no ‘‘philosophy of ge- (namely, classical mechanics) as the para- tributions to our understanding of geology
ology’’ as one does a philosophy of physics digmatic science. Physics was the first sci- and science in general. But most of this work
and of biology. With the slight exception of ence to establish itself on a firm footing, ex- is characterized by two qualities. First, it
the plate tectonics revolution, the two main emplifying the true nature of science as largely accepts the description of geology as
schools of contemporary philosophy, Ana- certain, precise, and predictive knowledge a derivative science. Second, for historical
lytic and Continental, have ignored geology. of the world. Since the 17th century, all and cultural reasons that I will discuss be-
They have assumed (few thought to argue other sciences (and philosophy) have been low, philosophically inclined geologists have
the point) that an examination of geology judged in terms of how well they meet these usually turned to only one of the two major
was unnecessary for understanding the na- standards.5 traditions of contemporary philosophy—
ture of science.1 Physics also fulfilled the demand that sci- Analytic Philosophy—for help in describing
Nothing better exemplifies philosophy’s entific knowledge be analytically derived. their science.
neglect of geology than the striking lack of This is the belief, originating with Descartes, I believe that the received view of geology
attention given to the concept of geologic that objects and processes are understood as outlined above is mistaken. My interest as
time. The discovery of ‘‘deep’’ or geologic by breaking them down into their simplest a philosopher is in challenging the assump-
time equals in importance the much more parts.6 A ‘‘synthetic’’ science such as geology tion that geology is merely applied and im-
was thought to resolve itself into its constit- precise physics, vainly attempting to achieve
uents of physics and chemistry. Important the latter’s degree of resolution and predict-
1
For footnotes 1–26, refer to the Endnotes be-
here too was the belief that science consti- ability. Rather, I believe that the challenges
tween the text and References Cited near the end tuted a unified subject, distinguished by one and difficulties inherent to geological rea-
of this paper. universally applicable methodology. By de- soning have prompted geologists to develop

GSA Bulletin; August 1995; v. 107; no. 8; p. 960–968.

960
 GEOLOGY AS AN INTERPRETIVE AND HISTORICAL SCIENCE

a variety of reasoning techniques that are THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE values he or she might hold. Personal or cul-
quite similar to some of those described and IN THE 20TH CENTURY tural values must not enter into the scientific
used within Continental Philosophy. reasoning process. A closely related point
My claim, then, is that geological reason- One prominent geologist has described was the insistence that one must distinguish
ing consists of a combination of logical pro- the relationship between geology and phi- between the ‘‘logic of discovery’’ and the
cedures. Some of these it shares with the losophy as follows: ‘‘. . . earth scientists do ‘‘logic of explanation.’’ Identifying the par-
experimental sciences, while others are not find philosophical discussions of their ticular social or psychological processes re-
more typical of the humanities in general field very interesting. In fact, many scientists sponsible for the scientist’s insights was the
and Continental Philosophy in particular. treat the philosophy of science with ‘exas- job of the social scientist. The philosopher
This combination of techniques is not ut- perated contempt.’ ’’ (Schumm, 1991, p. 5). of science was only interested in the logical
terly unique to geology; in fact, I would ar- It is nonetheless true that self-understand- procedures that justified a scientific claim.
gue that such a combination is to one degree ing in the sciences, including geology, is de- Second, the scientific method is empiri-
rived in part from what philosophers have cal. Science is built upon a rigorous distinc-
or another present in most types of thinking,
told science about itself. This description— tion between observations (which again
scientific or otherwise. But I claim that this
science’s own understanding of the nature of were understood, at least ideally, as being
combination is especially characteristic of
science—is now significantly different from factual and unequivocal) and theory. Facts
geological reasoning. If this view is correct,
the account of science that has recently been themselves were not theory-dependent; ob-
then the ‘‘physics envy’’ that geology some-
developed within both Analytic and Conti- servation was thought to be a matter of ‘‘tak-
times seems to suffer from (i.e., the sense of nental philosophy of science. Many scien- ing a good look.’’ The distinction between
inferiority concerning the status of geology tists, busy with their own work, are only statements that describe and statements that
as compared with other, ‘‘harder’’ sciences) vaguely aware that the philosophy of science evaluate was viewed as unproblematic.
is misplaced. has been in turmoil since the mid-1970s. Al- Third, the scientific method constitutes an
The rest of this essay explains and devel- though these changes are far from complete, epistemological monism. Science was thought
ops these claims. I begin with a brief review the beginnings of a new consensus are to consist of an single, identifiable set of log-
of the philosophy of science in the 20th cen- discernible.9 ical procedures applicable to all fields of
tury. This section provides the background To appreciate the nature of this new con- study. This reduction of all knowledge to
necessary for understanding the standard sensus, and what it means for our under- one kind of knowledge proceeded in two
claims concerning the nature of geological standing of the science of geology, we must steps, summarized by the terms ‘‘scientism’’
reasoning as well as the position I will be first review the status quo to which it is a and ‘‘reductionism.’’ Scientism is the belief
staking out. In the next two sections I turn to response. During the 20th century, Western that the scientific method provides us with
a description of the two most distinctive fea- philosophy has consisted of two main the only reliable way to know. Reductionism
tures of geological reasoning: its nature as a schools of thought, Analytic and Continen- is the further claim that it is possible to re-
hermeneutic (i.e., interpretive) and a histor- tal. The fundamental difference between duce all sciences to one science, physics.
ical science. I conclude that geological rea- these two approaches has turned on their It is important to note that the original
soning does indeed embody a distinctive attitude toward the nature and scope of sci- research program of Analytic Philosophy,
methodology within the sciences, and one entific knowledge. At their most basic, the known as Logical Positivism, was challenged
which offers a better overall model than original claims of Analytic Philosophy (ca. from within Analytic Philosophy by the early
does physics for understanding the nature of 1940) can be reduced to two: (1) all knowl- 1950s. Authors such as Quine (1953), Good-
reasoning within the sciences and within ev- edge available to humans is exclusively de- man (1951), and Popper (1953) raised fun-
eryday life.8 rived through the method employed by sci- damental questions concerning many of the
This essay is a synthetic work, bringing ence, and (2) the scientific method itself points mentioned above. But for our pur-
consists of an identifiable procedure of in- poses the crucial point is this: these debates
together ideas from a number of different
ductive and deductive logic sharply distin- stayed ‘‘in-house’’ in the sense that the basic
authors and traditions. Its overall goal is po-
guished from other types of thought (i.e., orientation of Analytic Philosophy remained
litical, in the sense that I hope it encourages
other philosophic or literary techniques intact until at least the mid-1970s. Thus,
conversation between intellectual communi-
such as traditional metaphysics, phenome- while the exact status of scientific knowledge
ties who have much to say to one another,
nology, or literary criticism). became more problematic, the general as-
but who too often are estranged. For much sumption that science (i.e., physics) was the
Early Analytic philosophers such as Rus-
of what follows I make no claim to original- sell (1914), Carnap (1937), and Reichen- model for knowing was not seriously ques-
ity. Rather, my claim is that the question of bach (1928, 1958) developed a powerful tioned. Similarly, the degree of objectivity of
how geologists (and scientists in general) ac- characterization of the scientific method. scientific knowledge may have been unclear,
tually reason is of real importance and that Their conclusions may be summarized by but science was still thought of as essentially
it has not been given the attention it de- the following three claims. First, the scien- value-free in comparison with ethical or po-
serves. The dangers of an unrealistic under- tific method is objective. This means that the litical issues. Finally, while the positivist be-
standing of the nature and limits of science discovery of scientific truth can and must be lief in the strict reducibility of all knowledge
are exemplified by the putative ‘‘failure’’ of separate from any personal, ethical/political, to physics was abandoned, the belief in the
the U.S. National Acid Precipitation or metaphysical commitments. This is the existence of one uniform method for all the
Project, which was arguably a failure of ex- basis of the celebrated fact/value distinction, sciences was still generally held to.10
pectations rather than of science (Herrick which holds that the facts discovered by the Thus—and this bears emphasis—while at
and Jamieson, in press). scientist are quite distinct from whatever the ‘‘cutting-edge’’ of Analytic Philosophy,

Geological Society of America Bulletin, August 1995 961

these assumptions were to some degree be- Thus, as a first approximation, it is accu- sible to imagine a plurality of scientific ap-
ing questioned, and the received wisdom— rate to say that Analytic Philosophy became proaches to a given problem, each with its
within the philosophic community and for that part of philosophy concerned with the own particular strength or virtue.
others such as those within the scientific natural world, while Continental Philosophy The irony is that while Kuhn undercut the
community—retained a fundamentally pos- concerned itself with those questions relat- main body of assumptions of Analytic Phi-
itivistic orientation. Our basic story concern- ing to our cultural and personal life. One losophy, raising issues from a perspective
ing the nature of science came to be ques- result of this division was that Continental more typical of Continental Philosophy, he
tioned only with the Kuhnian revolution.11 Philosophy (with its pluralist attitude toward has been placed traditionally (if not always
The claims of Continental Philosophy— the question of how we know) did not use its comfortably) within the framework of Ana-
the other main school of contemporary phi- conceptual tools to describe the nature of lytic Philosophy. Conversely, Continental
losophy— concerning science can also be reasoning in the various sciences, particu- Philosophy itself (with a few exceptions) still
summarized in two points: (1) whereas sci- larly the natural sciences. Another was that has not examined scientific knowledge with
ence offers us a powerful tool for the dis- what most scientists came to know as phi- the tools at its disposal.14 My project here is
covery of truth, science is not the only, or losophy was the tradition and assumptions to use the approach and concepts of the
even necessarily the best way that humans of Analytic Philosophy, particularly in the Continental tradition to describe what is dis-
come to know reality, and (2) the existence guise of Logical Posivitism. tinctive about the theory and practice of
of ‘‘the’’ scientific method (understood as This division of philosophy has begun to geology.
above) is a myth. Science has neither the change only during the past few years. The
priority in the discovery of truth, nor the single most important cause of its break- GEOLOGY AS A HERMENEUTIC
unity and cohesiveness of one identifiable down has been the influence of Thomas SCIENCE
method, nor the distance from ethical, epis- Kuhn (1970).12 Trained as a physicist before
temological, and metaphysical commit- turning to the history and philosophy of sci- The two distinctive characteristics of rea-
ments that Analytic Philosophy claims it has. ence, Kuhn shook the foundations of Ana- soning in the earth sciences that I will dis-
lytic philosophy of science. Kuhn under- cuss in the following sections are geology’s
Thus, Continental Philosophy’s basic orien-
mined each of the assumptions described nature as a hermeneutic (interpretive) and
tation (since Hegel, ca. 1806) comes from its
above, arguing persuasively that the history as a historical science.
attempt to define the scope and limits of
of science is not simply the story of unequiv- The term hermeneutics means theory of
scientific knowledge as well as to identify
ocal progress. Rather, conceptual revolu- interpretation; hermeneutics is the art or
what other ways we have for discovering
tions in science are often the result of aban- science of interpreting texts. A text (by
truth. The 200 year history of Continental
doning one set of questions or assumptions which is meant, typically, a literary work) is
Philosophy can be seen as a series of at-
for another. a system of signs, the meaning of which is
tempts to invent or define other ways of
Kuhn argued that there is often no com- not apparent but must be deciphered. This
knowing (e.g., dialectics, phenomenology,
mon measure for comparing different ac- deciphering takes place through assigning
hermeneutics, existentialism).
counts of a given set of phenomena. Each differing types or degrees of significance to
Initially, Analytic Philosophy and Conti-
account may be irreducible to any other, the the various elements making up the text.
nental Philosophy engaged in a common de- differences in description being the result of The status of this deciphered meaning has
bate on the nature of knowledge, but by the the different types of questions asked, the been the source of some dispute; in the 19th
mid-20th century an informal division of la- different types of criteria used, and the dif- century it was claimed that, when properly
bor had taken place. Analytic Philosophy fo- ferent goals of the research. This claim en- applied to a text, hermeneutic technique re-
cused on the intricacies of the philosophy of tailed that knowledge, rather than being sulted in knowledge as objective as that of
science. It understood philosophy as being value free, cannot be separated from human the natural sciences. In the 20th century,
ancillary to science, codifying and making interests. What is called scientific truth now however, hermeneutics has claimed that the
explicit the logic of science that scientists may depend as much on our needs and de- deciphering of meaning always involves the
already practiced, as well as deflating the sires as on any unequivocal or objective set subtle interplay of what is ‘‘objectively’’
claims of other pseudo-scientific and non- of criteria.13 there in the text with what the reader brings
scientific modes of knowing. For its part, For instance, epistemological and prag- to the text in terms of presuppositions and
Continental Philosophy mostly ceded the matic values can be in competition. If our expectations. In effect, hermeneutics rejects
analysis of science to Analytic Philosophy. criteria for understanding is predictive con- the claim that facts can ever be completely
Its main interest in science was not in sci- trol, we may decide to tolerate theoretical independent of theory.15
entific methodology per se, but in identi- inconsistencies. If, on the other hand, our Hermeneutics originated in the early 19th
fying what science left out in its ‘‘one paramount goal is rational consistency, we century as a means of reconciling contradic-
dimensional’’ (Marcuse, 1964) approach to may set aside the question of prediction or tory statements in the Bible through a sys-
knowledge and experience. Continental Phi- pragmatic control. More overtly political de- tematic interpretation of its various claims.
losophy focused its attention on those types cisions can also affect what seems to be an In the early 20th century hermeneutics was
of experience not amenable to the scientific ‘‘objective’’ process: if the energy crisis is de- applied to historical (including legal) docu-
method: art, culture, subjectivity, and the fined as a problem of supply (‘‘we need more ments to help discover the original meaning
force of the irrational in our lives. Conti- oil’’), we will find a different set of facts and of the author. Hermeneutics was (and still
nental Philosophy insisted that these areas a different range of possible solutions than if is) used when a theologian argues which
were not truly understandable through the it is defined as a problem of demand (‘‘we parts of the Bible to read literally and which
scientific method. need to conserve’’). Kuhn thus made it pos- metaphorically, and what weight to give to

962 Geological Society of America Bulletin, August 1995

each part. Similarly, the literary scholar pro- duced a set of concepts for ‘‘reading’’ the The founding concept of hermeneutics is
ceeds hermeneutically when she claims that artwork, the piece would undergo the most known as the hermeneutic circle. Heidegger
a narrator’s comments are to be taken seri- striking change. Aided by these concepts, I (1927, 1962) argued that understanding is
ously rather than ironically, as does the psy- now saw the piece as if for the first time. fundamentally circular; when we strive to
chologist when he interprets a slip of the Like art history, with which it shares a comprehend something, the meaning of its
tongue to be significant or not. strongly visual component, geology is an es- parts is understood from its relationship to
In the 20th century, however, hermeneu- pecially hermeneutic science: the outcrop the whole, while our conception of the
tics has moved from being a rather straight- typically means nothing to the uninitiated whole is constructed from an understanding
forward methodology of the Geistwissen- until the geologist introduces concepts for of its parts. So, for instance, the meaning of
shaften (i.e., the humanities; literally, the ‘‘seeing’’ the rock.16 this sentence is conceived in terms of the
‘‘spiritual sciences’’) to a more general ac- This shift from the belief that data are entire paper, and vice versa. More to the
count of knowing. Hermeneutic philoso- objectively given to the scientific observer, point, our understanding of an outcrop is
phers such as Heidegger (1927, 1962) have to the view that all human knowledge is fun- based on our understanding of the individ-
argued that all human understanding (in- damentally hermeneutic—that our percep- ual beds, which are in turn made sense of in
cluding the natural sciences, although this tions are always to some degree structured terms of their relationship to the entire out-
was not his main concern) is fundamentally by our conceptions— has portentious impli- crop. This back-and-forth process of reason-
interpretive. Not only books, but the entire cations for our understanding of both the ing operates on all levels; wholes at one level
world was a ‘‘text’’ to be read; in no field nature of scientific knowledge and the rela- of analysis become parts at another. Thus,
does one find completely objective data or tionship between science and society at our understanding of a region is based on
information ‘‘purely given.’’ How we per- large. In sum, it makes the question of hu- our interpretation of the individual outcrops
ceive the object is always shaped (though not man interests—personal, ethical/political, in that region, and vice versa; and our in-
completely determined; objects assert their and metaphysical—intrinsic rather than ex- terpretation of an individual bed within an
own independence) by how we conceive and ternal to the work of science. The theoretic outcrop is based on our understanding of
act on the object with the sets of tools, con- assumptions that the scientist brings to his the sediments and structures that make up
cepts, expectations, and values that we bring or her work—what counts as significant, that bed, and vice versa. On a still more
to the object. what work is worth doing—structure to one complex level, our overall comprehension of
When we apply this point to geology, this degree or another all that is examined, seen, the Cenomanian–Turonian boundary event
becomes the claim: geologic understanding and reported. is determined through an intricate weighing
is best understood as a hermeneutic process. Contemporary hermeneutics claims that of the various types of evidence (e.g., lithol-
The geologist assigns different values to var- this mix of percept and concept is funda- ogy, macro- and micropaleontology, and
ious aspects of the outcrop, judging which mental to all human understanding. All the geochemistry). This overall interpretation is
characteristics or patterns in the rock are world is a text; all understanding is, in the then used to evaluate the status of the indi-
significant and which are not. Examining an words of Merleau-Ponty (1960; contained in vidual pieces of evidence.
outcrop is not simply a matter of ‘‘taking a Johnson, 1993), a combination of ‘‘eye and Such circular reasoning is usually viewed
good look.’’ Rather, the geologist picks up mind.’’ The exact degree of ‘‘objectivity’’ (to as a vice, a logical fallacy to be avoided at all
on the clues of past events and processes in use a word that no longer serves us well) in cost. But Heidegger argued that this type of
a way analogous to how the physician inter- our accounts of the world is open to argu- circularity is not only unavoidable, it is ac-
prets the signs of illness or the detective ment; but the belief in the scientist as the tually, if properly handled, the means by
builds a circumstantial case against a purely objective observer is no longer viable. which understanding progresses. Under-
defendant. But this does not entail (except on the most standing begins when we develop a first con-
Most of us are familiar with the herme- radical reading) that all of our accounts of ception of the overall meaning of the object.
neutical aspect of understanding, the shift in the world, scienctific or otherwise, are en- Without this initial conception we would
our awareness of an object when we ap- tirely subjective. The truths of science, as have no criterion for making sense of the
proach it with a fresh set of concepts or ex- with most things, fall somewhere in the object. This provisional interpretation is
pectations. This happens regularly to stu- middle. called into question when we are ‘‘pulled up
dents when they are first introduced to a Philosophic hermeneutics does not pur- short’’ by details in the object (or text) that
subject. While in college I enrolled in an port to offer a strict methodology analogous do not jibe with our overall conception. This
introductory course in art history. Lacking to how Analytic Philosophy understood the forces us to revise our interpretation of the
previous instruction in art, but armed with scientific method to operate. The role of whole as well as our interpretation of the
my prejudices, I approached the course with hermeneutics is not to develop a set of rules other particulars. Comprehension deepens
a sceptical attitude. Each class began with for proper interpretation, but to clarify the in this circular fashion, as we revise our con-
lights dimmed, as the professor showed a general conditions under which understand- ception of the whole by the new meaning
slide of a famous work of art. She then gave ing takes place. There are, however, three suggested by the parts, and our understand-
us a few minutes to consider it on our own. basic concepts of hermeneutics which are ing of the parts by our new understanding of
Typically— especially at the beginning of the worth outlining, for they play a fundamental the whole.
semester—I saw nothing of any significance role in any hermeneutic process, including One consequence of the hermeneutic cir-
in the slide, and I could not understand why geological reasoning. These are the herme- cle is that it puts to rest the claim that it is
it was considered a great work of art. Yet it neutic circle, the forestructures of under- possible to approach an object in a neutral
became a truism that after a few minutes of standing, and the historical nature of manner, open to all possibilities. Rather, we
lecture, during which the professor intro- knowledge.17 always come to our object of study with a set

Geological Society of America Bulletin, August 1995 963

of prejudgments: an idea of what the prob- gathered that would give us a different (pos- as well as by the institutional structures of
lem is, what type of information we are look- sibly a quite different) sense of the object. the scientific field and the culture at large.
ing for, and what will count as an answer. This concept of ‘‘fore-having’’ also includes
What keeps these prejudgments from slip- the various skills that the geologist learns in
ping into dogmatism and prejudice—that is, the field or the laboratory: map-making, GEOLOGY AS A HISTORICAL
what makes science as distinguished from measuring strike and dip, preparing sam- SCIENCE
ideology still possible—is the fact that they ples, cleaning and preserving specimens,
are not ‘‘blind.’’ We remain open to correc- and even how to properly wield a hammer to Hull (1976) identified four historical sci-
tion, allowing the text or object to instruct us split a rock without destroying fossils. In- ences: cosmology, geology, paleontology,
and suggest new meanings and approaches. cluded here as well are the mathematical and human history. A historical science is
This brings us to a second point revelant and statistical techniques used in research. defined by the role that historical explana-
to geological reasoning. Heidegger identi- Just as crucial, however, and often dis- tion plays in its work. While explanation
fied three types of prejudgments or ‘‘fore- counted, are the social and political struc- within the historical sciences uses many of
structures’’ that we bring to every situation. tures of science: professors, various gradu- the tools common to all sciences (i.e., the
First are our preconceptions, the ideas and ate students, research groups, professional deductive-nomological model of explana-
theories that we rely on when thinking about associations, and other types of groups. Sci- tion, defined below), there remains a fun-
an object. Concepts are not neutral tools; ence is a social as well as a mental activity, damental and distinctive difference in his-
rather, they allow us to get hold of an object dependent on the existence of a community torical explanation. This difference as it
in a particular way, opening up certain pos- of scholars. The work of science proceeds relates to geology can be characterized in
sibilities and encouraging certain ways of through having colleagues to bounce ideas terms of three points: the limited role or
understanding while closing off others. off of, professional societies and journals to relevance of laboratory experiments, result-
Thus, for instance, to approach the Western define ‘‘hot’’ topics and favored lines of re- ing in geology’s dependence on other types
Cordillera with concepts like ophiolite com- search, and graduate students for help with of reasoning; the problem of natural kinds
plexes and accretionary terranes will affect running labs and collecting samples.18 (i.e., the question of defining the object of
what one sees in the field. These preconcep- The third basic concept of hermeneutics, study within historical geology); and geolo-
tions include our initial definition of the ob- applicable to geology and indeed to all the gy’s nature as a narrative science.
ject to be investigated as well as the criteria sciences, is the historical nature of human Insofar as their work is based on labora-
used to identify which facts are significant understanding. Here the claim (distinct tory experimentation, the experimental sci-
and which are not. from the argument of the next section) is ences (e.g., physics and chemistry) are es-
Second is our foresight, our idea of the that the particular prejudgments we start sentially non-historical: the particularities of
presumed goal of our inquiry and our sense with have a lasting effect. It is often claimed place and time play no significant role in the
of what will count as an answer. Heidegger that, no matter what assumptions or goals reasoning process. Work takes place in the
argues that without some vague (and, one we begin with, the scientific method will lab, an ideal space where conditions can be
hopes, open-minded) sense of what type of eventually bring us to the same final under- controlled. Truth claims in these disciplines
answer we are looking for, we would not rec- standing of objective reality. Hermeneutics presuppose that other researchers can rec-
ognize it when we find it. Again, this implies argues otherwise: our original goals and as- reate the identical conditions of the initial
that the values of the scientist—what he or sumptions result in certain facts being dis- experiment within their own laboratory.
she hopes to find or achieve—are intrinsic covered rather than others, which in turn Thus, for a truth claim to count as scientific,
rather than extrinsic to the scientific lead to new avenues of research and sets of a scientist in Oslo must be able to reproduce
enterprize. facts. Any scientist can name areas of po- results identical to those of the original ex-
Third, we always approach the object of tential importance that do not get pursued perimenter in Seattle. In this sense, time and
study with a set of practices we have in ad- because of the lack of time and resources or history have no place in the experimental
vance, what Heidegger called our ‘‘fore-hav- the lack of sufficient commitment on the sciences.19
ing.’’ These are the culturally acquired set of part of the scientific community. As these Of course, in another sense time and his-
implements, skills, and institutions that one decisions get multiplied over the decades tory are an inescapable part of every science;
brings to the object of study. In field geol- the body of scientific knowledge comes to a chemical reaction takes time to complete,
ogy, implements include the geologist’s have a strongly historical component. and every chemical reaction is historical in
hammer, 0.10% HCl, a measuring tape, a Heidegger’s claims as they relate to sci- that it has some feature, no matter how in-
hand lens, a Jacob’s staff, pencil and paper, ence and especially to geology can be sum- significant, that distinguishes it from every
and a Brunton compass. At the lab there is marized in two theses. First, he rejects the other reaction. But our interest in chemical
another set of tools: display trays, rock saws, view that data are purely given and that the- reactions typically is not in chronicling the
computers, acids, a light microscope, and a ories are totally objective constructions. specific historical conditions that affect a
scanning electron microscope. Rather, science is seen as involving various given reaction, but rather in abstracting a
As with our preconceptions, the nature of types of values that are not only unavoidable general or ideal truth about a given class of
these tools shape the type of information but also necessary and productive to the dis- chemical reactions. Even the chemicals used
collected; without a light microscope one covery of truth. Second, science is not only are idealized, in that the supplies used by the
could not study the structure of nannoplank- something that one thinks; it is also some- chemist have been assayed for purity. A par-
ton; without a mass spectrometer isotopic thing one does. Science is a social and his- ticular chemical reaction thus becomes
geochemistry would be impossible. With a torical activity structured to a significant de- merely an instance of a general law or
different set of tools other data would be gree by the scientist’s skills and equipment, principle.

964 Geological Society of America Bulletin, August 1995

In the historical sciences, in contrast, the tional explanation. Just as claims within hu- contemporary environment. Second, there
specific causal circumstances surrounding man history must assume that we can anal- are inescapable disanalogies between our
the individual entity (what led up to it, and ogize from what we know of human human experience of time and the expanses
what its consequences were) are the main motivations today to make sense of past ac- of geologic time. Thus, uniformity can never
concern of the researcher.20 In geology, the tions, reasoning in historical geology is built tell us how to adjust modern conditions to
goal is not primarily to identify general laws, upon the assumption that ‘‘the present is the rocks that have been altered by diagenesis or
but rather to chronicle the particular events key to the past’’—that present-day geologic other time-dependent factors. By traveling
that occurred at a given location (at the out- processes operate in a manner similar to to the Caroina coast, we can see a burrower
crop, for the region, or for the entire plan- those of the past. and the trail it leaves behind, but no process
et). This means that hypotheses are not test- Within geology the assumption of analogy that we can observe today will tell us how
able in the way they are in the experimental between past and present has been given ex- this burrow will look after 100 million yr. Of
sciences. Although the geologist may be able plicit recognition in the principle of unifor- course, we can attempt to model these dif-
to duplicate the laboratory conditions of an- mitarianism. Recent discussions of uniform- ferences in the lab or on a computer, but this
other’s experiment (e.g., studying the nature ity (Rudwick, 1976a; Berggren and Van ultimately only recapitulates our problem,
of deformation through experiments with Couvering, 1984; Gould, 1987) have de- for we cannot be certain of the parameters
play-doh), the relationship of these experi- scribed the confused way this principle has we set, nor can we run our model for geo-
ments to the particularities of Earth’s his- sometimes been used. Following Rudwick, logic amounts of space or time.23
tory (e.g., the Idaho-Wyoming overthrust Gould argues that geologists have at times Physicists may, if they like, retest the grav-
belt) remains uncertain. conflated four different types of uniformity. itational constant at the beginning of each
The crucial point here is that the histor- The first two, the methodological claims of day; and historians of human culture have
ical sciences are distinguished by a different uniformity of law and process, are nothing modern examples of revolution or mass hys-
set of criteria for what counts as an expla- more than geology’s version of science’s teria to examine for comparison with
nation. To borrow and adapt an example twin assumptions that nature is governed by records of the past. But geology (as well as
from Hull (1976), when we ask why some- lawlike behavior, and that we should not in- the other historical sciences of paleontology
one has died, we are not satisfied with the vent new or unknown causes until we have and cosmology) is historical in a deeper
appeal to the law of nature that all orga- exhausted the ones we have. The second sense; given the complexity of geologic
nisms die, true as that is; we are asking for two, uniformity of rate (gradualism) and of events, our lack of experience of all geologic
an account of the particular circumstances state (i.e., that the Earth is in steady state, environments and of geologic spans of time,
surrounding that person’s demise. Similarly, with no periods of significantly warmer cli- and our interest in the singularity of each
in geology we are largely interested in his- mate, higher sea level, or more volcanic ac- event, geologists cannot simply project the
torical ‘‘individuals’’ (this outcrop, the West- tivity) make substantive claims about the present onto the past. Of course, the geol-
ern Interior Seaway, the lifespan of a spe- Earth’s history that have been largely re- ogist is not entirely disarmed; the extrapo-
cies) and their specific life history. It is jected by the geological community. lation from current rates of erosion to ar-
possible to identify general laws in geology The overall effect of Gould’s account is guments concerning the time it takes a
that have explanatory power— e.g., Wal- deflationary; uniformitarianism becomes a mountain range to be leveled provide us
ther’s law— but the weight of our interest rather common-sense principle embodying with some sense of things. This result via
lies elsewhere. The central role played by no peculiarly geological claims. By separat- analogy is then compared with the results of
the question of what counts as an explana- ing methodological from substantive unifor- other lines of reasoning, such as the method
tion again highlights—and this is one of the mitarianism Gould empties the principle of of hypothesis, where one ‘‘reasons back’’
main points of this essay—the impossibility any specifically geological meaning. He from the existence of a feature to a hypoth-
of separating knowledge from human therefore arrives at a position identical to esized explanation consistent with the evi-
interests.21 Nelson Goodman (1967), who concludes dence at hand. But it is this sense of the
Faced with the difficulties of modeling the ‘‘. . . the Principle of Uniformity dissolves overall coherence of a theory, rather than a
geologic past because of problems of tem- into a principle of simplicity that is not pe- simple correspondence between present
poral and spatial scale and the singularity culiar to geology but pervades all science.’’ and the past, that defines geologic
and complexity of geologic events, the geol- The nature of geological reasoning is again reasoning.
ogist turns to other types of explanation, not different in principle from any other There is a second aspect of the historical
such as reasoning by analogy, the method of science. sciences that merits mention. Historical en-
hypothesis, and eliminative induction. A But this reduction of uniformitarianism to tities present a unique challenge as an object
thorough analysis of the strengths and weak- the principle of simplicity leaves too much of study (cf. White, 1963; Hull, 1976, 1981).
nesses of these and other argumentative unexplained. The problem is that the The issue is deceptively simple: How does
techniques is the subject of another paper.22 present is too small a window into the past one define the object of study? In other sci-
Here I limit myself to a discussion of the role to provide the geologist with a full set of ences, the objects of study appear as ‘‘nat-
of arguments from analogy in geological analogs. This is true in two senses. First, by ural kinds.’’ The nucleus of an atom consists
reasoning. rejecting the claims of uniformity of state, of neutrons and protons, the distinction be-
Arguments from analogy play a crucial the geologic community is acknowledging tween which seems written into the very
role in the historical sciences; the assump- that some of the depositional environments structure of the atom. But historical entities
tion of analogy between past and present is of the past (e.g., epeiric seas, Bretz floods) do not spring into being fully formed, nor do
what makes it possible to treat these subjects do not exist today; but, one can scarcely they remain unchanged to the time of their
as sciences at all, that is, as amenable to ra- draw a strict analogy from a nonexistent destruction. The researcher in the historical

Geological Society of America Bulletin, August 1995 965

sciences is faced with identifying the set of ‘‘make sense’’ until it contributes to and is a There are two important consequences of
characteristics that define an individual en- component of an overall story.24 these claims. First, scientific reasoning in
tity, and with deciding how much change can Narrative is often dismissed as a vague general and geological reasoning in partic-
occur before we have a new entity rather and literary form of knowledge lacking in ular are complex operations. It stands to
than simply a modification of the old. Thus, the logical rigor and evidential support ap- reason that a greater degree of self-con-
in considering the Colorado Plateau as a his- propriate to the ‘‘hard’’ sciences.25 But this sciousness about the nature of the reasoning
torical entity, we are faced with defining its begs the question of whether narrative has a process can help the scientist in his or her
nature and extent and at what point in the logic or rigor of its own and whether scien- work. Second, the goal of this essay is not
geologic past it became an identifiable and tific explanation itself is dependent on nar- only to identify the different logical proce-
discrete ‘‘individual.’’ Similarly, the paleon- rative logic. Continental philosophers have dures operating within the sciences, but also
tologist must decide when a fossil in an argued that these two types of knowing are to point the way to a more relevant and vi-
evolving lineage constitutes a new species. integrally related to and complement one brant notion of reasoning within the sci-
White (1963) and Hull (1976) argue that another. In Time and Narrative, Paul ences and our culture in general.
it is the concept of a central subject that Ricoeur (1985; see also Ricoeur, 1987) Scientific reasoning is too often carica-
allows the construction of a historical expla- claims that narrative is our most basic way of tured as a cookbook method that provides
nation. A central subject is the organiza- making sense of experience. Scientific expla- us with infallible answers. This misrepresen-
tional identity that ties together disparate nation is based on narrative in the sense tation damages both science and culture
facts and incidents. In human history a wide that, through telling a story, we create a con- when the inevitable disappointment sets in.
variety of entities can function as the prin- text that defines and gives meaning to our The scientific reasoning process typified by
ciple of organization: individuals or social research and data. Thus, the examination of geology offers an account of reasoning more
groups, corporate entities (companies, na- the Greenland Ice Sheet Project ice core is applicable to the uncertainties and complex-
tions), even ideas (the idea of progress). In explained and justified by our concern with ities of our lives. We are seldom in posses-
geology there is a similar range of historical global climate change, and the study of black sion of all the data we would like for making
individuals: the Laramide orogeny, the Cre- shales is funded because of the larger ‘‘story’’ a decision, and it is not always clear that the
taceous Western Interior seaway, the Bridge it fits within (e.g., its relevance to hydrocar- data we possess are unbiased or objective.
Creek Limestone, and the species Mytiloides bon exploration). In historical geology, sci- We are forced to fill in the gaps in our
mytiloides are examples of central subjects. entific reasoning is placed within the context knowledge with interpretation and reason-
Central subjects provide the coherence of a narrative of a locality or region of Earth able assumptions that we hope will be sub-
necessary for an intelligible narrative to be (or the entire Earth). It is characteristic of sequently confirmed. Thus, the methods of a
constructed out of a seemingly disconnected their discipline that geologists tell a story hermeneutic and historical science better
set of objects or events. But since these sub- that gives a larger context and meaning to mirror the complexities we face as historical
jects are not natural kinds, they can be de- their research—a skill that all scientists may beings.
fined in different ways. This means that ge- be called upon to master in an era when It is likely that this type of reasoning will
ologists may come to define different objects science faces a struggle for funding. become more crucial in the next century.
of study and thus develop different interpre- Many of the issues we face (global warming,
tations of what at first appeared to be an CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION and various types of risk and resource as-
unproblematic subject of investigation. A sessment) are by their nature both scientific
simple example of this is the different inter- In this account of geological reasoning I and ethical, with the scientific aspect of the
pretations that can result from dividing a have argued that while geology depends in problem deeply influenced by interpretation
stratigraphic section into different units part on the classic deductive-nomological and uncertainty. Yucca Mountain may sym-
according to different criteria, for example, method of the experimental sciences, geol- bolize the type of problems we will face, as
by physical characteristics (shale, stand- ogy is also distinguished by a discrete set of we ask how to scientifically evaluate the vi-
stone, etc.) or in terms of genetically as- logical procedures. Viewing geology from ability of this proposed site for the perma-
sociated relationships (transgressive-regres- the perspective of physics skews our under- nent disposal of nuclear waste, while includ-
sive sequences, etc.). standing of geological reasoning. Geology ing in our decision-making the rights of
Finally, the historical sciences are distin- only partially lives up to the classic model of future generations to a safe environment.26
guished by the decisive role of narrative scientific reasoning. But rather than viewing In an uncertain world, where we are con-
logic in their explanations. Narrative logic is geology as somehow a lesser or derivative stantly asked to compare incommeasurables
a type of understanding where details are science, I have argued that geological rea- (present needs versus obligations to the fu-
made sense of in terms of the overall struc- soning provides an outstanding model of an- ture; quantitative and qualitative factors)
ture of a story. Unlike the experimental sci- other type of scientific reasoning based in geology provides another, and I believe bet-
ences, where predictions are made by com- the techniques of hermeneutics and those of ter, model for reasoning than has our tradi-
bining general laws with a description of the historical sciences. Geology is a preem- tional model of the sciences.
initial conditions (the deductive-nomologi- inent example of a synthetic science, com-
cal model), the historical sciences are not bining a variety of logical techniques in the ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
primarily in the business of making predic- solution of its problems. The geologist ex-
tions. Historical narratives do not explain an emplifies Levi-Strauss’s (1966) bricoleur, the Thanks to Erle G. Kauffman, whose sup-
event by subsuming it under a generaliza- thinker whose intellectual toolbox contains port has been vital; to Chris Buczinsky and
tion, but rather by integrating it into an or- a variety of tools that he or she selects as Dugald Owen, who have discussed these is-
ganized whole. Thus an outcrop does not appropriate to the job at hand. sues with me on many occasions; and to Ste-

966 Geological Society of America Bulletin, August 1995

phen Jay Gould, Victor R. Baker, and an derstanding the nature of science, and indeed of Kuhn. Rouse (1987) speaks of there being two
anonymous reviewer, whose comments knowledge in general. Kuhns, one more radical and the other more con-
6. For the classic statement of this claim, cf. ventional in his attitude toward this question.
saved this paper from numerous errors and
Descartes’s Rules for the direction of the mind 14. Exceptions to the general neglect of the
omissions. (1964; written in 1627, first published in 1701). philosophy of science by Continental Philosophy
7. Gould (1987, 1989) is especially relevant to include the work of Heelan (1983), Kockelmans
the points I will be making. Cf. Gould (1989, and Kisiel (1970), and Rouse (1987).
ENDNOTES p. 277–291) for an argument that parallels much 15. For an introductory text in hermeneutics,
of what follows. see Bleicher (1980). Gadamer (1975) offers a
1. Philosophic consideration of the revolution 8. In the interests of full disclosure, it should more sophisticated historical account.
in plate tectonics can be found in Giere (1988). be noted that my own limited training in geology 16. On the visual nature of the science of ge-
Typical conclusions by philosophers concerning (I am presently completing a Masters in geology) ology, see Martin J. S. Rudwick (1976b).
the status of geology are those of Nelson Good- is in biostratigraphy. Someone with another type 17. The argument that follows depends on an
man (1967, p. 99) (‘‘In conclusion, then, the Prin- of training (e.g., geochemistry) might well put entire tradition of hermeneutic philosophy, the
ciple of Uniformity dissolves into the principle of more emphasis on the causal aspect of geological most important source being Heidegger (1927,
simplicity that is not peculiar to geology but per- reasoning. Nevertheless, I believe it is possible to 1962).
vades all science and even daily life.’’) and Rich- set these differences to one side in recognition of 18. To adequately consider this topic would
ard A. Watson (1969, p. 488) (‘‘Geology is a sci- the fact that what is crucial about geological rea- require another paper. Since Latour and Wool-
ence just like other sciences, for example physics soning is (1) its historical and interpretive com- gar’s Laboratory life: The social construction of sci-
or chemistry.’’). Although not concerned with the ponents, and (2) how these components tie into entific fact (1981), there has been a great deal of
question of the status of geology as a science, the undeniably causal element of geology. work on the social and political influences on sci-
John Sallis’s Stone (1994) is a recent exception to 9. What follows summarizes a complex and entific research. Important sources in this area
the general neglect of geology within philosophy. controversial history. The complexity in part de- include Pickering (1992), Traweek (1988), and
2. For accounts of the Copernican Revolution rives from the fact that we are simultaneously con- Knorr Cetina (1981).
in our conception of space, cf. Koyre (1957) and sidering discussions within the community of phi- 19. Cf. Collins and Pinch (1993) for an ac-
Kuhn (1957). The phrase ‘‘deep time’’ for geo- losophers of science, as well as the impact of these count of the extraordinary difficulties in duplicat-
logic spans of time was coined by John McPhee discussions on those within the scientific commu- ing experiments often faced by researchers in the
(cf. McPhee, 1981). nity. For other accounts see Hacking (1983), experimental sciences.
3. Time has been the central issue within Rajchman and West (1985), Rorty (1979), Giere 20. I do not mean to deny the fact that there
Continental Philosophy since Hegel, ca. 1806. (1988), Rouse (1987), and Kitchner (1993). It is another aspect of geological research that em-
One measure of this is the importance of Heideg- should be emphasized that the new view of sci- phasizes laws and processes (i.e., physical geolo-
ger’s Being and Time (1927, 1962), the most in- ence that I argue for in terms of Continental Phi- gy). But my focus is on what is distinctive about
fluental work in Continental Philosophy in the losophy, could also, with some modifications, be geology when compared with other sciences, that
20th century. But despite the prominence of his- made in terms of recent Analytic philosophy of is, the perspective and interests of historical
toricist approaches to epistemology within con- science. Much (though far from all) of the latter geology.
temporary Continental Philosophy, to my knowl- (e.g., see Kitcher, 1993) is keenly aware of the 21. The classic statement of this point is made
edge no attention has been given to the concept of hermeneutic nature of science. Thus, my account in Habermas’s Knowledge and human interests
geologic time. Awareness of the cultural or philo- of Analytic philosophy of science becomes inad- (1971).
sophic implications of the revolution in geologic equate and even to some extent unfair when we 22. The first chapter of Rachel Laudan’s
time is more typical of the history of ideas than of consider its work during the past decade. But From mineralogy to geology (1987) discusses 19th
philosophy (cf. Gillispie, 1959; Toulmin and these new developments have not made much of century accounts of the various logical procedures
Goodfield, 1965; Goldman, 1982). an impression upon the scientific community’s un- used by scientists (procedures, I would argue, that
4. In addition to the authors cited in Endnote derstanding of the nature of the scientific method. are still constantly employed today). Stanley
1, cf. Schumm (1991) (‘‘It is generally agreed that I make these points through Continental Philos- Schum (1991) offers a succinct discussion of the
geology is a derivative science.’’) and Bucher ophy first because of my own greater familiarity distinctive aspects of geological reasoning in To
(1941). with this tradition. But more importantly, I be- interpret the Earth: Ten ways to be wrong. Schumm
5. My account here is a gloss upon a story that lieve that Continental Philosophy has greater con- groups his ten ways into three categories: prob-
is obviously quite complex. One might well reply ceptual resources for describing the nature of ge- lems of scale and place, of cause and process, and
that today, when the philosophy of science con- ology and of the sciences in general. of system response.
siders physics the paradigm science, it is physics 10. Feyerabend was an important early excep- 23. Derek V. Ager (1993, p. 81) makes a sim-
qua relativity theory and quantum mechanics tion to the belief in the unity of the scientific ilar point in The nature of the stratigraphical record
rather than classical mechanics that are being re- method. Cf. Feyerabend (1965). when he asks, ‘‘Is the present a long enough key
flected on. My claim rests upon the distinction 11. This positivist orientation remains impor- to penetrate the deep lock of the past?’’
between the state of knowledge within a given tant within Analytic philosophy of science to this 24. Gould (1989, p. 280–291) also argues for
field, and the representation of that field outside day. Recent work in the fields of cognitive science, the narrative nature of geology and the historical
the realm of specialists. Possibly the most remark- artifical intelligence, and evolutionary epistemol- sciences in general.
able thing about the new physics is how little im- ogy still share these general assumptions. Cf. 25. There is a wide and varied literature on
pact it has had on our culture’s epistemological Giere (1988), Kornblith (1985), Churchland the question of narrative and the historical sci-
views, whether within the intellectual community (1986), and Thagard (1992). ences. Cf. Carr (1986) for an excellent summary
or with the public at large. Physics qua classical 12. While Kuhn’s work was the single most and a set of references.
mechanics still provides us with our basic model important impetus for the changes that I will dis- 26. For further discussion of this point, see
for understanding the nature of knowledge. Con- cuss, he is to a certain degree a symbolic figure Frodeman and Turner (1995).
sider, for instance, how introductory physics is representative of a larger movement within the
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968 Geological Society of America Bulletin, August 1995