Case Digests -Torts and Damages[ATTY.

PAOLO DIMAYUGA]Contributors:|Christel Allena; Angel Alonso;

MargaritaBaña; Jeff De Gulan; Jeseth De Vera; Angelo Dizon; Lawrence Holanday; Leslie Jose; K.C.
Ochoa; Monique Pagarigan; Rainier Palogan; Cielo Santos; Kremlin Santos; Janine Villabeto. | UST
Faculty of Civil Law767.Robleza vs CAFacts:On June 24, 1979, in GeneralSantos City,Julita Robleza, with
the consent of her husband, Jesus Robleza, (petitioners), sold to spouses Elpedio Tan (Tan) and
Marianne Tan two lots respectively covered by two TCTs. In the Deed of Absolute Sale, the consideration
allegedly acknowledged as paid was P10,000. Tan is the baptismal godson of petitioners. The parents of
Tan and petitioners have known each other for over 40 years and are close to each other. The TCTs over
the two lots were given to Tan, who, thereafter, transferred the same in his name. Tan used the new
TCTs to execute a Deed of Mortgage, securing the payment of a promissory note he previously executed
in favor of Inter Island Fishing Gear & Equipment Inc. (private respondent). According to petitioners,
they did not receive a single centavo from Tan; that the purchase price of 10,000 appearing on the deed
of sale was not the true purchase price. The actual consideration was P50,000.00 for each lot. Since,
however, petitioners owed Tan‘s mother P6,000, it was agreed that this amount would be deducted
from the total purchase price. They presented 2 checks issued by Tan which represented the actual
stipulated price (1st: P50,000 and 2nd: P44,000). Both checks were dishonored ("account closed").
Petitioners demanded the return of the Titles, but Tan admitted that he had the Titles transferred in his
name, which were mortgaged and turned over to private respondent.When a lawyer of respondent
corporation went to General Santos City for the purpose of fencing the land, he was prevented from
doing so and was, instead, informed by petitioners about the nonpayment by the Tan spouses of the
purchase price and given xerox copies of the bouncing checks of Tan. Petitioner Jesus Robleza
thereafter went to Bacolod City, and informed the manager of respondent corporation of what had
transpired and of the fraud Tan had perpetrated. The private respondent‘s general manager, refused to
return the certificatesbut signified willingness to accept other collaterals provided a partial payment of
P50,000 would first be made by Tan.Failure of the Tans to pay their obligation forced the private
respondent to foreclose on the properties. On May 16, 1983 petitioners filed an action against private
respondent and Spouses Tan for the "Declaration of Nullity of Documents of Sale, Cancellation of
Torrens Titles, Injunction and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and Damages‖ with the RTC Branch XXII,
General Santos City. Petitioners claim: that they have always been in possession of the subject property,
that neither the Tan spouses nor private respondent ever took possession thereof and that respondent
corporation acted in bad faith.RTC Decision: in favor of petitioners. Petitioners were held as the
absolute and registered owner of the lots, entitled to possession thereof. The foreclosure sale was
declared void and defective. Damages awarded: Moral damages -100,000; Compensatory damages -
P50,000; Exemplary damages -10,000.CA:Reversed and dismissed action.Issues:1.WON the Deed of
Absolute Sale can be declared null and void. –No (proper action: resolution/rescission)2.WON the
respondent corporation acted in bad faith. -Yes3.WON the petitioners are entitled to moral damages. –
Yes (but amount awarded by RTC was modified by SC)Ruling: 1.When the parties intended to be bound
by the contract except that it did not reflect the actual purchase price, the contract cannot be declared
null and void. Nonpayment of the contract price results in a breach of contract for nonperformance and
warrants an action for rescission or specific performance under Article 1191 of the Civil Code. Where the
parties intended to be bound by the contract except that it did not reflect the actual purchase price of
the property, there is only a relative simulation of thecontract whichremains valid and enforceable, but
the parties shall be bound by their real agreement. The present contract cannot be declared null and
void or inexistent from the beginning since it does not fall under the category of an absolutely simulated
or fictitious contract the basic characteristic of which is that the apparent contract is not really desired
or intended to produce legaleffects or to alter in any way the juridical situation of the parties. 2.When
respondent corporation‘s lawyer went to see the property, bad faith had set in since, in that posture, it
was incumbent upon respondent corporation to initiate the proper legal remedies for the protection of
its supposed alleged rights. Its failure to do so is strongly indicative of bad faith for, if it really believed
that it had every right to the possession of the land as a mortgagee, it would not have treated the
matter so lightly and with indifference. Its unexplained silence may be deemed a recognition and an
admission on its part that petitioners are the true owners of the subject lots. The categorical refusal of
petitioners to surrender possession of the land and their unequivocal declaration that they are the true
owners thereof, made in the presence and within the observation of private respondent‘sagents who
did or said nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not
true, may be given in evidence against respondent corporation and, in this case, should be considered as
evidence adverse to it.

Aznar

EMMANUEL B. AZNAR, Petitioner, vs.

CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines), Respondent.

G.R. No. 164273; March 28, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner is a holder of a credit card and claims that when he presented his credit card in some
establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the same was not honored. And when he tried to
use the same in Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase plane tickets to
Bali, it was again dishonored for the reason that his card was blacklisted by the respondent bank.

To prove that respondent blacklisted his credit card, Petitioner presented a computer print-out,
denominated as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by
Ingtan Agency with the signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi which shows that his card in question was
“DECL OVERLIMIT” or declared over the limit.

The Regional Trial Court rendered its decision dismissing petitioner’s complaint for lack of merit. It held
that as between the computer print-out presented by petitioner and the Warning Cancellation Bulletins
presented by respondent, the latter had more weight as their due execution and authenticity was duly
established by respondent.

Upon motion for reconsideration, the decision was reversed. Judge De la Peña ruled that the computer
print-out was printed out by Nubi in the ordinary or regular course of business in the modern credit card
industry and Nubi was not able to testify as she was in a foreign country and cannot be reached by
subpoena. The same took judicial notice of the practice of automated teller machines (ATMs) and credit
card facilities which readily print out bank account status, therefore the print-out can be received as
prima facie evidence of the dishonor of petitioner’s credit card.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the computer print-out is an electronic document which
must be authenticated pursuant to Section 2, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence or under
Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court by anyone who saw the document executed or written;
Petitioner, however, failed to prove its authenticity, thus it must be excluded.

Issues:

i. Whether or not the “On Line Authorization Report” is an electronic document?

ii. Whether or not the “On Line Authorization Report” constitutes electronic evidence?

Held:

The petition was denied by the Supreme Court for lack of merit.
Petitioner puts much weight on the ON-LINE AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, a
computer print-out handed to petitioner by Ingtan Agency, to prove that his credit card was dishonored
for being blacklisted. On said print-out appears the words “DECL OVERLIMIT”.

As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such exhibit cannot be considered admissible
as its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently established by petitioner.

The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section 20 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the
document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the maker.

Petitioner, who testified on the authenticity did not actually see the document executed or written,
neither was he able to provide evidence on the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of Nubi,
who handed to him said computer print-out.

Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on August 1, 2001, and
which is being invoked by petitioner in this case, the authentication of the computer print-out would still
be found wanting.

Petitioner claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it constitutes the “other evidence
showing integrity and reliability of Exh. “G” to the satisfaction of the judge.” The Court is not convinced.
Petitioner’s testimony that the person from Ingtan Agency merely handed him the computer print-out
and that he thereafter asked said person to sign the same cannot be considered as sufficient to show
said print-out’s integrity and reliability. As correctly pointed out by Judge Marcos in his May 29, 1998
Decision, Exh. “G” does not show on its face that it was issued by Ingtan Agency as petitioner merely
mentioned in passing how he was able to secure the print-out from the agency. Petitioner also failed to
show the specific business address of the source of the computer print-out because while the name of
Ingtan Agency was mentioned by petitioner, its business address was not reflected in the print-out.

Indeed, petitioner failed to demonstrate how the information reflected on the print-out was generated
and how the said information could be relied upon as true.

Case Digests -Torts and Damages[ATTY. PAOLO DIMAYUGA]Contributors:|Christel Allena; Angel Alonso;
MargaritaBaña; Jeff De Gulan; Jeseth De Vera; Angelo Dizon; Lawrence Holanday; Leslie Jose; K.C.
Ochoa; Monique Pagarigan; Rainier Palogan; Cielo Santos; Kremlin Santos; Janine Villabeto. | UST
Faculty of Civil Law1338.Philippine Accident Insurance vs FloresFACTS: Private respondent, Concordia
Navalta, was a plaintiff in a civil case before CFI La Union against herein petitioner,
Phil.American Accident Insurance Co., Inc. (PAAICI) The trial judge,respondent Hon. Jose Flores,
rendered a judgment ordering PAAICI to pay Navalta P75,000.00 with legal interest from October 1968,
plus attorney‘s fees and cost of suit. Petitioner paid after the CA denied its appeal.Navalta thereafter
advised petitioner that the payment was not in full satisfaction of the judgment because the
latter had to pay a compound interest. Upon refusal of the petitioner to pay the sum
additionally claimed, Navalta secured a writ of execution for the same, which the petitioner sought
to quash. In resolving the question, the respondent judge issued an order in favor of Navalta on the
ground that the compound interest has been computed from the time the claim was judicially
demanded (July 1970). ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is obligated to pay compound interest under the
judgment.

HELD: The questioned Order cannot be sustained. The judgment, which was sought to be executed,
ordered the payment of a simple "legal interest" only. It said nothing about the payment of
compound interest. Accordingly, when the respondent judge ordered the payment of compound
interest, he went beyond the confines of his own judgment which had been affirmed by the CA and
which hadbecome final. Fundamental is the rule that execution must conform to that ordained or
decreed in the dispositive part of the decision. Likewise, a court cannot, except for clerical errors or
omissions, amend a judgment that has become final. Navalta invokes Sec. 5 of the Usury Law which
reads in part as follows: "In computing the interest on any obligation, promissory note or other
instrument or contract, compound interest shall not be reckoned, except by agreement, or, in default
thereof, whenever the debt is judicially claimed in which last case it shall draw six per centum per
annum interest ..." as well as Art. 2212 of the Civil Code, which provides: "Interest due shall earn
legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the obligation may be silent upon
this point." Both legal provisions are inapplicable for they contemplate the presence of stipulated or
conventional interest, which had accrued when demand was judicially made. In this case, no interest
had been stipulated by the parties. In other words, there was no accrued conventional interest which
could further earn interest upon judicial demand.

Case Digests -Torts and Damages[ATTY. PAOLO DIMAYUGA]Contributors:|Christel Allena; Angel Alonso;
MargaritaBaña; Jeff De Gulan; Jeseth De Vera; Angelo Dizon; Lawrence Holanday; Leslie Jose; K.C.
Ochoa; Monique Pagarigan; Rainier Palogan; Cielo Santos; Kremlin Santos; Janine Villabeto. | UST
Faculty of Civil Law1233.Quirante vs IACDr. Casasola (father of respondents) had a contract with a
building contractor named Norman GUERRERO. The Philippine AmericanGeneral Insurance Co. Inc.
(PHILAMGEN, for short) acted as bondsman for GUERRERO. In view of GUERRERO'S failure to perform
his part of the contract within the period specified, Dr. Casasola, thru his counsel, Atty. Quirante, sued
both GUERRERO and PHILAMGEN for damages, with PHILAMGEN filing a cross-claim against GUERRERO
for indemnification. RTC: ruled in favor of the plaintiff by rescinding the contract; ordering GUERRERO
and PHILAMGEN to pay the plaintiff actual damages in the amount of P129,430.00, moral damages
in the amount of P50,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P40,000.00 and attorney's
fees in the amount of P30,000.00; ordering Guerrero alone to pay liquidated damages of P300.00 a day
from December15, 1978 to July 16, 1979; and ordering PHILAMGEN to pay the plaintiff the amount of
the surety bond equivalent to P120,000.00. MR filed by PHILAMGEN was denied. Appeal by PHILAMGEN
denied because it was allegedly filed out of time. The trial court thereafter issued a writ of execution.A
petitionwas filed for the quashal of the writ of execution, which was dismissed, so the case was
elevated to this Court. In the meantime, Dr. Casasola died leaving his widow and several children as
survivors.Petitioner Quirante filed a motion in the trial courtfor the confirmation of his attorney's fees.
According to him, there was an oral agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard
to his attorney's fees, which agreement was allegedly confirmed in writing by the widow and the
two daughters of the deceased. Petitioner avers that pursuant to said agreement, the attorney's
feeswould be computed as follows:A. In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the
attorney's fees of the undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be P30,000.00.B. In case the
Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided equally
between the Heirs of I. Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz.The trial court granted
the motion for confirmation in an order, despite an opposition thereto. It also denied the
motion for reconsideration of the order of confirmation in its second order. Petition for certiorari was
filed before the IAC.IAC-set aside the order of confirmation of attorney‘s fees. Reasons: there is still
pending in the Supreme Court a petition which may or may not ultimately result in the granting to the
CASASOLA family of the total amount of damages given by the respondent Judge, and assuming that the
grant of damages to the family is eventually ratified,the alleged confirmation of attorney's fees will not
and should not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Quirante can claim attorney's fees. -NORULING: (Affirmed the decision of
IAC)What is being claimed here as attorney's fees by petitioners is, however, different from attorney's
fees as an item of damages provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made
in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor
who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by execution.Here, the petitioner's claims are
based on an alleged contract for professional services, with them as the creditors and the private
respondents as the debtors.In filing the motion for confirmation of attorney's fees, petitioners chose to
assert their claims in the same action. This is also a proper remedy under our jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, we agree with the respondent court that the confirmation of attorney's fees is
premature. Since the main case from which the petitioner's claims for their fees may arise has
not yet become final, the determination of the propriety of said fees and the amount thereof should
be held in abeyance. It is further observed that the supposed contract alleged by petitioners as
the basis for their fees provides that the recovery of the amounts claimed is subject to certain
contingencies. It is subject to the condition that the fee shall be P30,000.00 in case of recovery of the
P120,000.00 surety bond, plus an additional amount in case the award is in excess of said P120,000.00
bond, on the sharing basis hereinbefore stated.

With regard to the effect of the alleged confirmation of the attorney's fees by some of the
heirs of the deceased. We areof the considered view that the orderly administration of justice
dictates that such issue be likewise determined by the courta quoinasmuch as it also necessarily involves
the same contingencies in determining the propriety and assessing the extent of recovery of attorney's
fees by both petitioners herein. We, therefore, take exception to and reject that portion of the
decision of the respondent court which holds that the allegedconfirmation to attorney's fees should
not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto, since it is also premised on the eventual grant of
damages to the Casasola family, hence the same objection of prematurity obtains and such a holding
may be pre-emptive of factual and evidentiary matters that may be presented for consideration by the
trial court.-BACK TO TOP-

121

Case Digests -Torts and Damages[ATTY. PAOLO DIMAYUGA]Contributors:|Christel Allena; Angel Alonso;
MargaritaBaña; Jeff De Gulan; Jeseth De Vera; Angelo Dizon; Lawrence Holanday; Leslie Jose; K.C.
Ochoa; Monique Pagarigan; Rainier Palogan; Cielo Santos; Kremlin Santos; Janine Villabeto. | UST
Faculty of Civil Law11715.People vs AspirasFACTS:Accused-appellant Dominador Aspiras, a police officer
assigned at Pilar Village Detachment in Las Pinas, Manila, was accused of the crime ofMurderfor the
killing of Renato Lumague, during a political rally in Urdaneta Pangasinan in April 6, 1992.Renato
Lumague was a crusher general supervisor of the Northern Cement Corporation and a supporter of the
NPC-KBL political party at the time of his death. The pertinent facts state that while the victim was
delivering a speech on stage, a man appeared in front of him and shot him three times. The victim died
instantly. The prosecution presented two eyewitness who positively identified the accused as the
assailant. The medico-legal, the Personnel Manager of the Northern Cement Corporation and the
victim‘s daughter were also presented before the court to testify.For his defense, accused presented his
own testimony and the testimony of his colleagues. He interposed an alibi, stating that he was at Las
Pinas at the time of the incident. The RTC found Aspiras GUILTY BEYONDREASONABLE DOUBT. For
the death of the victim, he was ordered to pay the heirs of Lumague the following:P50,000 for
indemnity;P50,000 for moral and exemplary damagesP82,250.00 for actual damagesP1,421,200 for
expected or future income.CostsISSUE: Whether the RTC erred in awarding the victim‘s heirs indemnity
for civil damages.RULING: The award for damages which should be paid by appellant to the heirs of the
victim is MODIFIED as follows:1.P50,000 for indemnity;2.P50,000 for moral and exemplary
damages3.P1,558 for actual damages4.P1,379,197.80 for expected or future incomeCosts against
appellant. Actual damagesOnly actual expenses duly supported by receipts may be granted.
Among the actual expense allegedly incurred by the family of the victim, only those for funeral
expenses (P17,000), materials for gravestone (P1,308) and the funeral mass (P250) were supported by
receipts.Further, it was shown that the funeral expenses were shouldered by Northern Cement
Corporation.The award for actual damages must be limited only to those they incurred for gravestone
and mass services, amounting to P1,558.00.Expected or future incomeThe correct formula for
computing the loss of earning capacity is as follows: 2/3 x (80 –age of the victim at the time of
death) x(reasonable portion of the annual net income which would have been received as support by
heirs).The age of the victim at the time of his death was 48. He was receiving a monthly salary of P7,610
and yearly benefits in theamount of P38,000. Hence, his annual gross income is P129,320. Net
income is 50% of the gross annual income, in the absence of proof showing the deceased living‘s
expenses. Hence:Net earning capacity = 2(80-48)/3x (P129,320 –64,660)= 2(32)/3x 64,660= 21.33 x
64,660= P1,379,197.80The award of P1,421200 should therefore be reduced to P1,379,197.80 only.-
BACK TO TOP-

Case Digests -Torts and Damages[ATTY. PAOLO DIMAYUGA]Contributors:|Christel Allena; Angel Alonso;
MargaritaBaña; Jeff De Gulan; Jeseth De Vera; Angelo Dizon; Lawrence Holanday; Leslie Jose; K.C.
Ochoa; Monique Pagarigan; Rainier Palogan; Cielo Santos; Kremlin Santos; Janine Villabeto. | UST
Faculty of Civil Law118BATCH 061.Pan Malayan Insurance vs CAPrivate respondents: Erlinda Fabie and
her Unknown DriverFACTS:On December 10, 1985, PANMALAY filed a complaint for damages with the
RTC of Makati against private respondents Erlinda Fabie and her driver. Petitioner averred the
following: that it insured a Mitsubishi Colt Lancer car with plate No. DDZ-431 and registered in
the name of Canlubang Automotive Resources Corporation[CANLUBANG]; that on May 26, 1985,
due to the "carelessness, recklessness, and imprudence" of the unknown driver of a pick-up with
plate no. PCR-220, the insured car was hit and suffered damages in the amount of P42,052.00; that
PANMALAY defrayed the cost of repair of the insured car and, therefore, was subrogated to the rights of
CANLUBANG against the driver of the pick-up and his employer, Erlinda Fabie; and that, despite
repeated demands, defendants, failed and refused to pay the claim of PANMALAY.Private respondents,
thereafter, filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars and a supplemental motion thereto. In
compliance therewith, PANMALAY clarified, among others, that the damage caused to the insured car
was settled under the "own damage", coverage of the insurance policy, and that the driver of the
insured car was, at the time of the accident, an authorized driver duly licensedto drive the vehicle.
PANMALAY also submitted a copy of the insurance policy and the Release of Claim and
Subrogation Receipt executed by CANLUBANG in favor of PANMALAY.On February 12, 1986, private
respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that PANMALAY had no cause of action against
them. They argued that payment under the "own damage" clause of the insurance policy
precluded subrogation under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, since indemnification thereunder was
made on the assumption that there was no wrongdoer or no third party at fault.RTC dismissed
PANMALAY's complaint for no cause of action. The CA upheld the RTC‘s decision.The RTC held that
payment by PANMALAY of CANLUBANG's claim under the "own damage" clause of the insurance
policy was an admission by the insurer that the damage was caused by the assured and/or its
representatives. On the other hand, the CA in applying the ejusdem generisrule held that Section III-1 of
the policy, which was the basis for settlement of CANLUBANG's claim, did not cover damage arising from
collision or overturning due to the negligence of third parties as one of the insurable risks.Both tribunals
concluded that PANMALAY could not now invoke Article 2207 and claim reimbursement from
private respondents as alleged wrongdoers or parties responsible for the damage.ISSUE: WON the
insurer may institute an action to recover the amount it had paid its assured in settlement of an
insurance claim against private respondents as the parties allegedly responsible for the damage caused
to the insured vehicle. –yesHELD:Article 2207 of the Civil Code is founded onthe well-settled principle of
subrogation. If the insured property is destroyed or damaged through the fault or negligence of a party
other than the assured, then the insurer, upon payment to the assured, will be subrogated to the rights
of the assured torecover from the wrongdoer to the extent that the insurer has been obligated
to pay. Payment by the insurer to the assured operates as an equitable assignment to the former
of all remedies which the latter may have against the third party whose negligenceor wrongful act
caused the loss.The right of subrogation is not dependent upon, nor does it grow out of, any privity of
contract or upon written assignment of claim. It accrues simply upon payment of the insurance claim by
the insurerThere are a few recognized exceptions to this rule. For instance, if the assured by his own act
releases the wrongdoer or third party liable for the loss or damage, from liability, the insurer's right of
subrogation is defeated. Similarly, where the insurer pays the assured the value of the lost goods
without notifying the carrier who has in good faith settled the assured's claim for loss, the
settlement is binding on both the assured and the insurer, and the latter cannot bring an action against
the carrier on his right of subrogation. And

Case Digests -Torts and Damages[ATTY. PAOLO DIMAYUGA]Contributors:|Christel Allena; Angel Alonso;
MargaritaBaña; Jeff De Gulan; Jeseth De Vera; Angelo Dizon; Lawrence Holanday; Leslie Jose; K.C.
Ochoa; Monique Pagarigan; Rainier Palogan; Cielo Santos; Kremlin Santos; Janine Villabeto. | UST
Faculty of Civil Law119where the insurer pays the assured for a loss which is not a risk covered
by the policy, thereby effecting "voluntary payment", the former has no right of subrogation against
the third party liable for the loss. None of the exceptions are availing in the present case.It must be
emphasized that the lower court's ruling that the "own damage" coverage under the policy implies
damage to the insured car caused by the assured itself,instead of third parties, proceeds from an
incorrect comprehensionof the phrase "own damage" as used by the insurer. —a phrase which,
incidentally, is not found in the insurance policy —to define the basis for its settlement of CANLUBANG's
claim under the policy, it simply meant that it had assumed to reimburse thecosts for repairing
thedamage to the insured vehicle.It is in this sense that the so-called "own damage" coverage under
Section III of the insurance policy is differentiated from Sections I and IV-1 which refer to "Third Party
Liability" coverage (liabilities arising from the death of, or bodily injuries suffered by, third parties) and
from Section IV-2 which refer to "Property Damage" coverage (liabilities arising from damage caused by
the insured vehicle to the properties of third parties).In conclusion, it must be reiterated that in this
present case, the insurer PANMALAY as subrogee merely prays that it be allowed to institute an
action to recover from third parties who allegedly caused damage to the insured vehicle, the amount
which it hadpaid itsassured under the insurance policy. Having thus shown from the above discussion
that PANMALAY has a cause of action against third parties whose negligence may have caused damage
to CANLUBANG's car, the Court holds that there is no legal obstacle to the filing by PANMALAY of a
complaint for damages against private respondents as the third parties allegedly responsible for the
damage. Respondent Court of Appeals therefore committed reversible error in sustaining the
lower court's order which dismissed PANMALAY's complaint against private respondents for no cause
of action.Hence, it is now for the trial court to determine if in fact the damage caused to the
insured vehicle was due to the "carelessness, recklessness and imprudence" of the driver of private
respondent Erlinda Fabie.-BACK TO TOP-

Case Digests -Torts and Damages[ATTY. PAOLO DIMAYUGA]Contributors:|Christel Allena; Angel Alonso;
MargaritaBaña; Jeff De Gulan; Jeseth De Vera; Angelo Dizon; Lawrence Holanday; Leslie Jose; K.C.
Ochoa; Monique Pagarigan; Rainier Palogan; Cielo Santos; Kremlin Santos; Janine Villabeto. | UST
Faculty of Civil Law1202.Royal Traders Bank vs NLRCPetitioner union retained the services of Atty.
Emmanuel Noel A. Cruz for P3,000.00 in consideration of his law firm's undertaking to render the
services enumeratedin their contract. During the existence of that agreement, petitioner union referred
to private respondent the claims of its members for holiday, mid-year and year-end bonuses against
their employer, Traders Royal Bank (TRB). The complaint was filed and the NLRC rendered a decision in
favor of the employees, awarding them holiday pay differential, mid-year bonus differential, and year-
end bonus differential. TRB challenged the decision of the NLRC before the Supreme Court. The Court, in
its decision modified the decision of the NLRC by deleting the award of mid-year and year-end bonus
differentials while affirming the award of holiday pay differential. The bank voluntarily complied with
such final judgment and paid its concerned employees their respective entitlement in said sum through
their payroll. After private respondent received the above decision of the Supreme Court, he notified the
petitioner union, the TRB management and the NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his attorney's
lien over the award of holiday pay differential. Private respondent filed a motion before Labor Arbiter
Lorenzo for the determination of his attorney's fees, praying that ten percent(10%) of the total award
for holiday pay differential computed by TRB at P175,794.32, or the amount of P17,579.43, be declared
as his attorney's fees, and that petitioner union be ordered to pay and remit said amount to him. Labor
arbiter granted the motion which was affirmed by NLRC on appeal. Petitioner now posits that the NLRC
acted without jurisdiction in making the award of attorney's fees, as said act constituted a modification
of a final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court which did not award attorney's fees. It then
cited decisions of the Court declaring that a decision which has become final and executory can no
longer be altered or modified even by the court which rendered the same.ISSUE:1. WON respondent can
file his claim for professional fee after the finality of the judgment.2. WON respondent can exercise his
attorney‘slien over the award of holiday pay differential in addition to his retainer‘s fee.3. WON
respondent had already waived his right to charge additional fees because of their failure to come to an
agreement as to its payment.4. WON the attorney‘s fees should be pegged at 10% based on Article 111
of the Labor Code.HELD: 1.YES. A lawyer has two options as to when to file his claim for professional
fees. Hence, private respondent was well within his rights when he made his claim and waited for the
finality of the judgment for holiday pay differential, instead of filing it ahead of the award's complete
resolution. To declare that a lawyer may file a claim for fees in the same action only before the
judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would deprive him ofhis aforestated options and render
ineffective the foregoing pronouncements of this Court.2.There are two commonly accepted concepts of
attorney's fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the
reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the
latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the
client. In its extraordinary concept, an attorney's fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court
to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where
such award can be made, such as those authorized in Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the
lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional
compensation or as part thereof.It is the first type of attorney's fees which private respondent
demanded before the labor arbiter. It is elementary that an attorney is entitled to have and receive a
just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance and request of his
client. As long as the lawyer was in good faith and honestly trying to represent and serve the interests of
the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for such services. The provisions of the retainer
contract are clear and need no further interpretation; all that is required to be done in the instant
controversy is its application. The P3,000.00 which petitioner pays monthly to private respondent does
not cover the services the latter actually rendered before the labor arbiter and the NLRC in behalf of the
former. As stipulated in

Case Digests -Torts and Damages[ATTY. PAOLO DIMAYUGA]Contributors:|Christel Allena; Angel Alonso;
MargaritaBaña; Jeff De Gulan; Jeseth De Vera; Angelo Dizon; Lawrence Holanday; Leslie Jose; K.C.
Ochoa; Monique Pagarigan; Rainier Palogan; Cielo Santos; Kremlin Santos; Janine Villabeto. | UST
Faculty of Civil Law121Part C of the agreement, the monthly fee is intended merely as a consideration
for the law firm's commitment to render the services enumerated in Part A (General Services) and Part B
(Special Legal Services) of the retainer agreement.There are two kinds of retainer fees a client may pay
his lawyer. These are a general retainer, or a retaining fee, and a special retainer. a.A general retainer, or
retaining fee, is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as general counsel for any ordinary
legal problem that may arise in the routinary business of the client and referred to him for legal action.
The future services of the lawyer are secured and committed to the retaining client. The reason for the
remuneration is that the lawyer is deprived of the opportunity of rendering services for a fee to the
opposing party or other parties. In fine, it is a compensation for lost opportunities.b.A special retainer is
a fee for a specific case handled or special service rendered by the lawyer for a client. A client may have
several cases demanding special or individual attention. If for every case there is a separate and
independent contract for attorney's fees, each fee is considered a special retainer.3.NO. The fact that
petitioner and private respondent failed to reach a meeting of the minds with regard to the payment of
professional fees for special services will not absolve the former of civil liability for the corresponding
remuneration in favor of the latter.Obligations do not emanate only from contracts. One of the sources
of extra-contractual obligations found in our Civil Code is the quasi-contract premised on the Roman
maxim that nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari protest. As embodied in our law, 32 certain
lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no
one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another A quasi-contract between the
parties in the case at bar arose from private respondent's lawful, voluntary and unilateral prosecution of
petitioner's causewithout awaiting the latter's consent and approval. Petitioner cannot deny that it did
benefit from private respondent's efforts as the law firm was able to obtain an award of holiday pay
differential in favor of the union. It cannot even hide behind the cloak of the monthly retainer of
P3,000.00 paid to private respondent because, as demonstrated earlier, private respondent's actual
rendition of legal services is not compensable merely by said amount.A quasi-contract is based on the
presumed will or intent of the obligor dictatedby equity and by the principles of absolute justice. Some
of these principles are: (1) It is presumed that a person agrees to that which will benefit him; (2) Nobody
wants to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another; and (3) We must do unto others what we
want them to do unto us under the same circumstances. Viewed from another aspect, since it is claimed
that petitioner obtained respondent's legal services and assistance regarding its claims against the bank,
only they did not enter into a special contract regarding the compensation therefor, there is at least the
innominate contract of facio ut des (I do that you may give). 36 This rule of law, likewise founded on the
principle against unjust enrichment, would also warrant payment for the services of private respondent
which proved beneficial to petitioner's members. In any case, whether there is an agreement or not, the
courts can fix a reasonable compensation which lawyers should receive for their professional services.
4.However, the value ofprivate respondent's legal services should not be established on the basis of
Article 111 of the Labor Code alone. Article 111 fixes only the limit on the amount of attorney's fees the
victorious party may recover in any judicial or administrative proceedings and it does not even prevent
the NLRC from fixing an amount lower than the ten percent (10%) ceiling prescribed by the article when
circumstances warrant it.The measure of compensation for private respondent's services as against his
client should properly be addressed by the rule of quantum meruit long adopted in this jurisdiction.
Quantum meruit, meaning "as much as he deserves," is used as the basis for determining the lawyer's
professional fees in the absence of a contract, but recoverable by him from his client. Where a lawyer is
employed without a price for his services being agreed upon, the courts shall fix the amount on
quantum meruit basis. In such a case, he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services. It
is essential for the proper operation of the principle that there is an acceptance of the benefits by one
sought to be charged for the services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the
lawyer performing the task was expecting to be paid compensation therefor. The doctrine of quantum
meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a
person to retain benefit without paying for it.

Over the years and through numerous decisions, this Court has laid down guidelines in ascertaining the
real worth of a lawyer's services. These factors are now codified in Rule 20.01, Canon 20 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and should be considered in fixing a reasonable compensation for services
rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit. These are: (a) the time spent and the extent of
services rendered or required; (b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (c) the importance
of the subject matter; (d) the skill demanded; (e) the probability of losing other employment as a result
of acceptance of the proffered case; (f) the customary charges for similar services and the schedule of
fees of the IBP chapter to which the lawyer belongs; (g) the amount involved in the controversy and
thebenefits resulting to the client from the services; (h) the contingency or certainty of compensation; (i)
the character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and (j) the professional standing of
the lawyer.It, therefore, behooves the adjudicator in questions and circumstances similar to those in the
case at bar, involving a conflict between lawyer and client, to observe the above guidelines in cases
calling for the operation of the principles of quasi-contract and quantum meruit, and to conduct a
hearing for the proper determination of attorney's fees. The criteria found in the Code of Professional
Responsibility are to be considered, and not disregarded, in assessing the proper amount. Here, the
records do not reveal that the parties wereduly heard by the labor arbiter on the matter and for the
resolution of private respondent's fees.In the exercise of our sound discretion, we hold that the amount
of P10,000.00 is a reasonable and fair compensation for the legal services rendered by private
respondent to petitioner before the labor arbiter and the NLRC.

Lemoine vs AlkanFacts: On the 10th day of July, 1913, the plaintiff and defendant signed a written
contract whereby the defendant hired the plaintiff, an expert automobile mechanic, to perform services
as such expert mechanic in his automobile repair shop in the city of Manila for the period of three years
from the date of the contract at a salary of P350 a month. Plaintiff entered defendant‘s service on
theday on which the contract was executed and continued therein until he was discharged by the
defendant the latter part of August of the same year, plaintiff actually leaving defendant‘s service on the
5th day of September. On the 8th of the same month this action was begun to recover, as damages
for breach of contract, the wages to which he was entitled under the contract.The
defendant presents three defenses to the action.The first is that plaintiff was incompetent and
insubordinate and that he unduly and without permission absented himself fromthe repair shop
during the hours when, under the contract, he should have been at work.The second is founded on the
claim that plaintiff, if he had used due diligence, would have been able to obtain a like position in the
city of Manila.The defendant claims as his third defense that on the 6th of December, 1913, in a letter
addressed to plaintiff, he offered to take him back into his employ under term and conditions
substantially the same as those specified in the original contract of service and at the same rate of
wages; and that plaintiff, without reason or justification, refused to accept the offer.The court found for
the defendant on his second defense but allowed plaintiff wages for three months, which the court
considered a reasonable time which ought to be conceded to him in which to obtain other employment.
Both parties appealed.Issue:Whether or not the plaintiff is entitle to damages for having been illegaly
discharged by his employer?Held: While we agree with the findings of fact as to these alleged defenses,
we do not agree with the conclusion of law which the trial court draws therefrom.The defendant
asserts the principle of law that, where a servant has been illegally discharged and has failed to
obtain otheremployment, he must accept the offer of the employer who discharged him to
receive him back into his employ under terms and conditions substantially those of his previous
employment and at the same rate of wages on pain of having his damages on a suit for breach of
contract reduced to the extent of the wages which he would have received if he had accepted the offer.
We understand that the facts on which this defense rests are admitted by both parties. There
remains only the discussion as to whether such facts constitute a defense or whether they may
be used in mitigation of damages to which plaintiff may prove himself entitled. The action in this
case is founded on that provision of the Civil Code which provides that "field-hands, mechanics, artisans,
and other hired laborers, for a certain time and for a certain work, shall not leave nor be dismissed,
without just cause, before the fulfillment of the contract" (art. 1586); and also that disposition of the
same code which provides that "those who, in fulfilling their obligations, are guilty of fraud, neglect or
delay, or who violate the provisions thereof, are liable for the damages caused thereby." (Art.
1101.)Under both the Spanish and American law, then, the action based on a wrongful discharge is
one to recover damages for breach of contract.That which defendant alleges to be his second and third
defenses, even if all the facts necessary to establish the defenses as alleged were proved, could not
really be called defenses, but even considering them as matters in mitigation of damages, the defendant
has not proved facts sufficient to avail himself of the benefit thereof under his so-called second
defense. There is nothing in the record showing the wages of a particular position or the usual wages
paid in such employment. We understand it to be the rule that before

Case Digests -Torts and Damages[ATTY. PAOLO DIMAYUGA]Contributors:|Christel Allena; Angel Alonso;
MargaritaBaña; Jeff De Gulan; Jeseth De Vera; Angelo Dizon; Lawrence Holanday; Leslie Jose; K.C.
Ochoa; Monique Pagarigan; Rainier Palogan; Cielo Santos; Kremlin Santos; Janine Villabeto. | UST
Faculty of Civil Law108defendant can take advantage of the failure of plaintiff to obtain like
employment, it must apear: (1) That it is like employment, (2) that it is in the same locality; (3) that it is
under substantially the same conditions; and (4) the wages which he could have earned. We are of the
opinion that defendant has successfully established the first three conditions; but, on the other hand, he
has utterly failed to established the fourth. Defendant is more successful with his third defense. We are
of opinion that plaintiff should have accepted the offer of defendant and that, in refusing to do so, he
conferred on the defendant the right to present his offer in mitigation of any damages which
plaintiff might have sustained by reason of the wrongful discharge.It has been held that, when a
contract of employment has once been broken by the employer by a wrongful discharge of the
employee and that status has been recognized by both parties, the employee is not obliged to do
anything more under the original contract; that, it having been broken voluntarily by the employer, his
employees is no longer under any obligation to comply with the terms thereof. But, notwithstanding
this, we believe that, under such circumstances, the employee should accept an offer even under the old
contract, as long as it does not involve a renunciation of any right already accrued, although it is
doubtful if it can be said in the case at bar that the offer was in reality one to return to employment
under the old contract but was, rather, the creation of a new contract, the terms and conditions of
which were substantially those of the old.The mere acceptance of the offer of defendant would not
constitute a waiver of his right to recover damages for the time intervening from the date of the
wrongful discharge to the time when he returned to work under the new offer, which would consist in
the loss of wages for that period, and any other damages which might have been sustained and which
plaintiff could prove.Plaintiff proved no other damages than the loss of wages. The damages in an action
for wrongful discharge are prima facie theamount of wages for the full term. These are the damages and
the only damages which plaintiff proved. Plaintiff can recover in this action only for the three months‘
period. The court below allowed plaintiff his wages for the months of September, October and
November, but on a different theory from that on which we have based his right; but, whatever the
theory, the amount is correct and the judgment of the trial court is to that extent proper.The judgment
appealed from is affirmed.

Case Digests -Torts and Damages[ATTY. PAOLO DIMAYUGA]Contributors:|Christel Allena; Angel Alonso;
MargaritaBaña; Jeff De Gulan; Jeseth De Vera; Angelo Dizon; Lawrence Holanday; Leslie Jose; K.C.
Ochoa; Monique Pagarigan; Rainier Palogan; Cielo Santos; Kremlin Santos; Janine Villabeto. | UST
Faculty of Civil Law1058.Hicks vs Manila HotelFacts:on the 9th of November 1912, plaintiff and
defendant entered into a written contract by which the defendant ceded to the plaintiff the exclusive
right to serve its patrons with five-passenger automobiles for a period of one year from the date
thereof, with certain rights with respect to a renewal of the contract for a second year. Plaintiff
successfully discharged them during the first year.When about half of the first year had expired,the
defendant company, disregarding, the terms of its agreement with him, invited proposals from various
garages for its five-passenger automobile privilege for the ensuing year, the time covered by the
second year of plaintiff's contract. Under these proposals various garages competed for the privilege,
including that of George E. Brown, and, after certain negotiations with the latter, his offer was accepted
by the defendant company and a written contract made with him for the exclusive right to the
privilege during the year. This contract with Brown was executed some months prior to the
termination of the first year of plaintiff's contract.Upon the termination of the first year of the contract
the defendant company having, already entered into a contract with Brown relative to the matter
included in plaintiff's contract for the period representing the second year thereof, refused, to permit
him to continue for the second year, deprived him of the privilege which the contract conferred, and
evicted him from the hotel.This action was brought to recover damages for breach of contract.The
contract between the parties hereto contains a clause "This agreement to remain in effect for a period
of one year from date, with preference over others of renewing for a further period of one year."Issue:
whether that portion of the agreement gave the plaintiff an enforceable right to renew the contract for
a second year.whether the plaintiff, even though he had that right, waive that right and thereby exempt
the defendant from the liability, if any, which it incurred by its eviction of plaintiff and the refusal to
permit him to enjoy the privilege for the second year.Held:1. the clause "with preference over others of
renewing for a further period of one year" was intended to confer a right either on the plaintiff or upon
the defendant.The grammatical structure of the stipulation shows both that the thing to be renewed
was agreement in force the first year and that the party who possessed the right to renew was the
plaintiff.As to the second question:the plaintiff sought to make arrangements with the hotel of a
nature different from those contained in the contract under consideration and also that he had
negotiations with Brown looking to an agreement with him whereby he might assist him in handling the
five-passenger automobile business under the privilege which it appeared the hotel would concede to
him. No contract, however, was made with either and the plaintiff at no time found himself under any
obligation to the defendant or Brown by reason of the acts which appellee makes the basis of its
argument.the defendant had, prior to the negotiations and offers of plaintiff, repudiated its contract
with him so far as it related to the renewal for the second year and was preparing itself to make a
contract with any person with whom it might secure the most advantageous terms. When a person who
is under an obligation to another to perform certain acts upon the demand of that person, repudiates
that obligation prior to the time when the demand for its fulfillment is necessary, the person to whom
that obligation runs is not required to sit down, fold his hands and calmly await the disaster which the
violation of the obligation entails. He waives nothing, when he seeks other employment or the same or
similar employment with others. The waiver will not be presumed; and, if the intention to waive or
release is denied, such waiver or release must be proven by the party alleging it by a
preponderance of the evidence.the plaintiff was under no obligation to defendant with respect to a
renewal of the contract. The obligation was wholly on the side of the defendant. In doing whatever
he did to obtain other employment, he was not violating any obligation which he owed to the
defendant and, therefore, gave it no legal reason for complaint. Issue: plaintiff's damages.The plaintiff
claims his damage to be P10,800, basing that claim upon the profits which he would have received if he
had continued the business for the second year.The appellee makes no objection to this amount, the
question of the amount of damages not having been referred to in its brief. It is the practiceof this court,
in case of reversal of a judgment dismissing the complaint on the merits, to examine the evidence and
enter or order entered the judgment which the inferior court should have rendered; and, where
the action is for a sum of money or damages,to find from the evidence the amount due or the
damages suffered and to render or order the trial court to render judgment for the amount. if appellee
had any objection to urge as to the amount of damages which should be awarded to the plaintiff in case
judgment should be found for him in this court, it would have presented it in its brief.The only damages
claimed relate to profits. Article 1106 and 1107 of the Civil Code reads as follows:Indemnity for losses
and damages includes not only the amount of the loss which may have suffered, but also that
of the

Case Digests -Torts and Damages[ATTY. PAOLO DIMAYUGA]Contributors:|Christel Allena; Angel Alonso;
MargaritaBaña; Jeff De Gulan; Jeseth De Vera; Angelo Dizon; Lawrence Holanday; Leslie Jose; K.C.
Ochoa; Monique Pagarigan; Rainier Palogan; Cielo Santos; Kremlin Santos; Janine Villabeto. | UST
Faculty of Civil Law106profits which the creditor many have failed to realize, reserving the provisions
contained in the following articles.The losses and damages for which a debtor in good faith is liable, are
those foreseen or which may have been foreseen, at the time of constituting the obligation, and which
may be necessary consequence of its non-fulfillment.In case of fraud, the debtor shall be liable for all
those which clearly may originate from the no-fulfillment ofthe obligation.Plaintiff testified that he
made P11,000 profit the first year and that he would unquestionably have made a net profit of
P1,200 a month if he had been left to enjoy the second year of the contract. There is no evidence
contradicting this,and while the estimation of speculation, it is inherent in the nature of the subject
matter and not in its manner of treatment. There is more or less inaccuracy in every action for damages
for breach of contract, but in order to justify a recovery in anycase, a there are two necessary elements
to be considered: One that a damage has been done; the other that such damage is the result of the
breach. The amount of the one should be computed with reasonable accuracy. The fact of the
other must be determinedwith reasonable certainty. A less degree of accuracy is required in the
former than of certainty in the latter, but neither is required to be absolute or beyond conjectural
possibilities. Where it reasonably appears that a party has been damaged, and thatsuch damage is the
direct result of the breach, then a recovery is justified. The next step is to ascertain how much will
reasonably compensate the injured party. This should be computed by the plainest,easiest, and most
accurate measure which will do justice in the premises, and if from the conditions in the
contract, and the nature of the breach, it reasonably appears that the extent or amount of damages
may be more readily, easily, correctly, and justly ascertained by applying the loss of profits as
ameasure, if it is evident that profits were lost and the amount thereof can be calculated with
reasonable accuracy, then such profits are the true measure to be applied. In such cases, however, it
should appear evident that profits were lost.It is undisputed that the business was a very profitable one
the first year and that the second year would have been more profitable than the first. While the
estimate of the amount of profits for the second yearisan estimate of necessity, it is one which is based
upon facts testified to by the plaintiff, which were within his knowledge and which appear to the court
to sustain his contention.While the evidence is not as conclusive as in cases where the damages are
certain and capable of accurate statement, we are satisfied with its sufficiency, particularly in view of
the fact that all that courts may require of litigants is the production of the best evidence of which the
case is susceptible.As to whether or not the plaintiff in an action of this character may recover only that
portion of the profits which had accrued up to the time of bringing the action, or whether he may sue
for all the damages resulting from the breach in a single action, even though that action is begun long
before the period during which the profits will accrue has expired, the plaintiff need bring but one action
and that he may recover the damages sustained for the whole period even though it be by
anticipation.Whatever profits plaintiff had gained up to the time of the action or might reasonably be
expected to gain during the period sued for. No evidence, however, has been introduced on that
subject. The opportunity to earn wages or profits in reduction of the damages claimed will not be
presumed but must be affirmatively shown by the defendant.-

Law1047.RCPI vs CARCPI the freight company claimed that due to "utter, patent, and wanton
carelessness, gross negligence and unpardonable fault" of the personnel of RCPI, the latter
transmitted erroneously a telegram which should have read " No truck available " but instead read "
Truck available ". As a consequence, the freight company suffered damages, and prayed for an award of
P100,000.00 as actual damages, P30,000.00 as moral damages, exemplary or corrective damages
in the discretion of the Court, and P15,000.00 as attorney's feesThe trial Court, upheld by the Court of
Appeals, awarded damages as follows:P10,000.00 as compensatory, plus P500.00 as actual, and
P5,000.00 as corrective damages plus P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses with the
costs of this suit.3. RCPI elevated the case on the following grounds:First: The respondent court erred
in finding that the suit was predicated on quasi-delicti.Second: The respondent court erred in
virtually ruling that the petitioner's acts were the proximate cause of the alleged damage.Third:
The respondent court erred in awarding compensatory in addition to actual damages.Fourth: The
respondent court erred in condemning the petitioner to pay corrective damages and attorney's fees plus
costs and litigation expenses.Fifth: The respondent court erred in not finding that private
respondent had committed negligence which was the proximate cause of the alleged damage or at
least, amounted to contributory negligence warranting reduction of the award.Held:Respondent Court
correctly concluded that the error in the transmission of the telegram was due to the gross negligence of
RCPI employees and not to atmospheric disturbances as it claimed, and that there was no contributory
negligence on the part of the freight company.In respect of compensatory and actual damages, it is
not-entirely erroneous to grant both items of damages. True, compensatory and actual damages
are dealt with in the Civil Code under the same Chapter 2 thereof and that the two terms are used
therein as equivalent to one another. However, as provided for in Article 2200, indemnification
for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, or actual damages
("damnum emergens"), but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain, or
compensatory damages ("lucrum cessans"). In other words, t here are two components to actual or
compensatory damages.The value of the actual loss suffered by Yabut has been proven to be P132.12
(not P500.00 ,as held by respondent Court). This is compensable. Compensatory damages were also
awardedfor injury to Yabut's "business reputation or business standing", "loss of goodwill and loss of
customers or shippers who shifted their patronage to competitors". The grant thereofis proper under
the provisions of .Article 2205 of the Civil Code, which provides that damages may be recovered "for
injury to the plaintiff's Business standing or commercial credit." And even if not recoverable
compensatory damages, they may still be awarded in the concept of temperale or moderate
damages.Exemplary damages were likewise properly imposed. In contracts and quasi-contracts,
exemplary damages may be awarded if the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, opressive
or malevolent manner. There was gross negligence on the aprt of the RCPI personnel in transmitting
the wrong telegram, for which RCPI must be held liable. Gross carelessness or negligence
constitutes wanton misconduct.But while the assessment of damages, except liquidated ones, is
generally left to the discretion of the Court according to the circumstances of each case, we find that the
damages and attorney's fees awarded are excessive and should be reduced.
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 188602 February 4, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.

FORD GUTIERREZ y DIMAANO, Appellant.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

On appeal is the March 12, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02680,
which affirmed with modifications the August 7, 2006 decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 62, in Criminal Case Nos. 03-3639, 03-3640, and 03-3641-43, finding appellant Ford
Gutierrez y Dimaano (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, frustrated murder and three
(3) counts of attempted murder.

On August 15, 2003, five (5) separate Informations for murder, frustrated murder and three (3) counts
of attempted murder were filed against appellant. The accusatory portions of the Informations read:

Criminal Case No. 03-3639

For: Murder

That on or about the 17th day of May, 2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with [a] gun, by means of
treachery and abuse of superior strength, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fired his gun towards the person of LEO SALVADOR REGIS, thereby hitting him and inflicting
mortal wounds which caused his death.3

Criminal Case No. 03-3640

For: Frustrated Murder

That on or about the 17th day of May, 2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with [a] gun, by means of
treachery and abuse of superior strength, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shot one ALEXIS DALIT y BALOSBALOS hitting him on the arm, thus
performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence
but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of a cause independent of the will of the accused, that is
due to the timely and able medical attendance rendered to the said ALEXIS DALIT y BALOSBALOS which
prevented his death.4

Criminal Case No. 03-3641

For: Attempted Murder

That on or about the 17th day of May, 2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a gun, with treachery, with
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fired his gun towards one Jaypee S.
Boneo, thus commencing the commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt acts but did not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of Murder by reason of cause or
causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is due to the fact that he was not able to hit the
said Jaypee S. Boneo.5

Criminal Case No. 03-3642

For: Attempted Murder

That on or about the 17th day of May, 2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a gun, with treachery, with
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fired his gun towards one Randy S.
Marcelo, thus commencing the commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt acts but did not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of Murder by reason of cause or
causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is due to the fact that he was not able to hit the
said Randy S. Marcelo.6

Criminal Case No. 03-3643

For: Attempted Murder

That on or about the 17th day of May 2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a gun, with treachery, with
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fired his gun towards one Jefferson
S. Gallemit, thus commencing the commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt acts but did not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of Murder by reason of cause or
causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is due to the fact that he was not able to hit the
said Jefferson S. Gallemit.7

When arraigned, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the
charges. Trial on the merits then ensued.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summed up the prosecution’s version as follows:

On May 17, 2003 at nine o’clock in the evening, the deceased Leo Salvador Regis, private complainants
Randy Marcelo, Jefferson Gallemit, Jaypee Boneo and Alexis Dalit were talking to each other in front of
the house of the deceased at 477 Narra St., Cembo, Makati City. They noticed the presence of appellant
along the street and thought that appellant would just pass by. However, when appellant was two (2)
arms length away in front of them, appellant suddenly raised his arm and shot the deceased Regis with a
.45 caliber pistol. After he was hit on the chest, Regis said "Aray!," embraced Randy Marcelo who was
seated on his left, and fell off his chair to the ground (TSN, June 2, 2004, pp. 8-11, 17-26).

Jefferson Gallemit, Jaypee Boneo and Alexis Dalit stood from their seats. Appellant fired several shots
thereafter, one of which hit Dalit’s arm. Boneo and Gallemit ran up the street while Dalit ran in the
opposite direction and hid behind a car. In the meantime, the deceased Leo Salvador Regis and Randy
Marcelo were still huddled together at the spot where the deceased fell. Appellant stayed at the same
spot where he fired the first shot even after the three ran away. (Ibid., pp. 26-31).

Appellant then pursued Dalit down the street but did not catch him, prompting appellant to say:
"Pagnaabutan ko kayo, pagpapatayin ko kayo!" Dalit then sought refuge at BLISS Makati and contacted
the police from there (Ibid., pp. 31-34).

The police arrived at the scene after twenty (20) minutes. Dalit was brought to the Ospital ng Makati
where his wound was dressed. He was operated on at the Philippine Orthopedic Hospital (Ibid., pp. 34-
41). Regis was brought to the Ospital ng Makati by Randy Marcelo where he died that night (TSN, June
22, 2005, p. 14). 8

Appellant for his part asserted self-defense. He testified that:

At around 8 o’clock p.m. of May 17, 2003, he went to an ihaw-ihaw restaurant with live band in
Guadalupe in order to relax. After taking two (2) bottles of beer, he decided to go home, took a jeepney
ride and alighted in front of a bakery owned by Barangay Captain Leo Magbantay, one hundred twenty
(120) meters away from his house. While passing by, he noticed a group of five youngsters who were at
the right side of the street. Among them, he only knew Loloy (Jaypee) Boneo, whom he used to babysit
when the latter was still young.

While walking, one in the group cursed him and shouted "tang ina mo!" Since he was the only passerby,
he stopped and looked at them, but two (2) from the group approached him. He was suddenly boxed by
Regis Ado, while Dalit was just beside Ado. When he fell on the ground, Ado continuously beat him, then
suddenly, a gun fell from Leo Regis. He immediately got hold of it, and when Leo Regis was supposed to
attack him again, he kicked Leo which made him [to fall] down. When he stood up and saw Regis
standing up, he fired a shot at him. He continuously fired the gun, which was directed towards the
ground so as to warn the others.
Thereafter, he fled the scene, and threw the gun on a vacant lot. Since he did not know what to do, and
confused, he took a jeepney going to Pateros, but since, he had no money, he alighted somewhere, and
rested. When he finally regained his senses, he went to Cubao and borrowed money from one of their
retailers. 9

Not finding credence in appellant's claim of self-defense, the RTC convicted him of murder, frustrated
murder and attempted murder on three (3) counts:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
murder of Leo Salvador Regis, the frustrated murder committed against Alexis B. Dalit, and the three
counts of attempted murder committed against Jaypee S. Boneo, Randy S. Marcelo & Jefferson S.
Gallemit, the court hereby imposes the following penalties:

1. in criminal case no. 03-3639 for murder of Leo Salvador E. Regis, the court hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment reclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and the amount of Php 102,337.25 as actual damages;

2. in criminal case no. 03-3640 for the frustrated murder committed against Alexis B. Dalit, the [c]ourt
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and 20 days as minimum to 14
years, 10 months and 20 days as maximum and to indemnify the sum of Php 22,596.50, representing the
victim’s expenses for medical services and medicine;

3. in criminal case no. 03-3641 for the attempted murder committed against Jaypee S. Boneo, the court
hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of from Two (2) years, Four (4)
months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum;

4. in criminal case no. 03-3642 for the attempted murder committed against Randy S. Marcelo, the court
hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of from Two (2) years, Four (4)
months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum;
5. in criminal case no. 03-3643 for the attempted murder committed against Jefferson S. Gallemit, the
court hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of from Two (2) years, Four
(4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum.

Appellant filed an appeal before the CA, assigning in his brief this lone error allegedly committed by the
trial court:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED,
WHEN HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, BY GIVING WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION EYEWITNESSES.11

The OSG, on behalf of the People, also filed its brief12 with a recommendation for the modifications of
the felony and of the award for damages. It asserted that the trial court correctly gave credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and rejected appellant’s claim of self-defense. The OSG
insisted that appellant’s guilt for murder in Criminal Case No. 03-3639 and attempted murder on three
(3) counts in Criminal Case Nos. 03-3641-43 was proven beyond reasonable doubt. However, in Criminal
Case No. 03-3640, appellant should be held liable only for attempted murder and not for frustrated
murder, since the wound inflicted on Alexis B. Dalit was not life-threatening. The OSG, therefore, prayed
that appellant’s conviction for frustrated murder be reduced to attempted murder with the
corresponding reduction of penalty. Finally, it prayed for modification of the actual damages awarded,
and for the grant of moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of Leo Salvador E. Regis.

On March 12, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, affirming, but with modifications, the RTC
decision, viz.:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 7 August 2006 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City
(Branch 62) in Criminal Case No. 03-3639 for murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the award
of damages. The award of actual damages in favor of the heirs of Leo Salvador E. Regis is reduced to
₱42,337.25. Moral damages of ₱50,000.00, temperate damages of ₱10,000.00, and exemplary damages
of ₱10,000.00 are additionally awarded to the heirs of Leo Salvador E. Regis.

The 7 August 2006 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 62) in Criminal Case No.
03-3640 for frustrated murder is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Ford D. Gutierrez is found GUILTY of
committing the crime of ATTEMPTED MURDER and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate imprisonment
of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. The award of actual damages in favor of the victim Alexis
B. Dalit is AFFIRMED.

The 7 August 2006 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 62) in Criminal Case Nos.
03-3641, 03-3642 and 03-3643 for attempted murder is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.13

Appellant is now before this Court, submitting for resolution the same matters argued before the CA.
Through his Manifestation in Lieu of Supplemental Brief,14 appellant states that he will not file a
Supplemental Brief and, in lieu thereof, he will adopt the Appellant’s Brief he filed before the appellate
court. The OSG, likewise, manifests that it is no longer filing a supplemental brief.15

Appellant assails the trial court and the CA for giving credence to the prosecution’s evidence. He admits
having killed Regis and wounding Dalit, but insists that he did so in self-defense.

Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation from liability for crimes only if
satisfactorily proved. It requires (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed by the accused to repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on his
part.16

In People of the Philippines v. Bienvenido Mara, we explained:

One who admits killing or fatally injuring another in the name of self-defense bears the burden of
proving: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming
self-defense. By invoking self-defense, the burden is placed on the accused to prove its elements clearly
and convincingly. While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and foremost on proof
of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may
be successfully pleaded. 17
In this case, appellant utterly failed to discharge the burden of proving unlawful aggression. His version
of the events was uncorroborated, and his testimony was found to be less credible by the trial court. On
the other hand, the surviving victims were unanimous that appellant suddenly fired at them, without
any provocation on their part. The credibility of the prosecution witnesses had been weighed by the trial
court, and it found their testimonies to be more convincing. As a rule, the appellate court gives full
weight and respect to the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, since the trial
judge has the best opportunity to observe their demeanor.18 While this rule admits of exceptions, none
of such exceptions obtains in this case.

In Razon v. People,19 we held:

Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent

evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of
evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not on the weakness of the prosecution.20

The trial court and the CA cannot, therefore, be faulted for rejecting appellant’s plea of self-defense.

This Court also agrees with the trial court in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance. The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on unsuspecting victims,
depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its commission without
risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victims.21

The pieces of evidence gleaned by the trial court, the facts, are enough to show that treachery was
employed by appellant. The attack was sudden, as testified to by the witnesses, and unexpected.
Provocation on the part of the victims was not proven, and appellant’s testimony that the victims were
about to attack him cannot be given credence. The victims had no inkling that an attack was forthcoming
and had no opportunity to mount a defense. Thus, treachery was correctly appreciated as a
circumstance to qualify the crime to murder.

Under Article 24822 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, the penalty imposed for the crime of
murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the
penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 223 of the RPC.
The prison term imposed by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 03-3639 is correct.
We also affirm the CA ruling that appellant is guilty of attempted murder, not of frustrated murder, in
Criminal Case No. 03-3640 for the injury sustained by Dalit. No convincing proof was offered to show
that the wound inflicted on Dalit was fatal and would have caused his death had medical help not been
provided. It is well settled that where the wounds inflicted on the victim are not sufficient to cause his
death, the crime is only attempted murder, as the accused had not performed all the acts of execution
that would have brought about the victim's death.24

The CA correctly assessed the penalty to be imposed on appellant for attempted murder in Criminal
Case Nos. 03-3640 to 03-3643. The penalty for attempted murder is two degrees lower than that
prescribed for the consummated felony under Article 51 of the RPC. Accordingly, the imposable penalty
is prision mayor. Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its
medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty to be imposed should
be within the range of prision correccional, and the maximum penalty to be imposed should be within
the range of prision mayor in its medium period. Hence, for the crime of attempted murder, appellant
was rightly sentenced by the CA to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as maximum.

And now, the award of damages. When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered:
(1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in
proper cases.25

The CA awarded ₱42,337.25 as actual damages and ₱10,000.00 as temperate damages to the heirs of
Regis. In People v. Villanueva26 and People v. Abrazaldo,27 we ruled that temperate and actual
damages are mutually exclusive in that both may not be awarded at the same time. Hence, no
temperate damages may be awarded if actual damages have already been granted. The award of
₱10,000.00 as temperate damages must, therefore, be deleted.

The grant of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages is proper, and thus, we
sustain the same. In murder, the grant of civil indemnity, which has been fixed by jurisprudence at
₱50,000.00, requires no proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of the
accused's responsibility therefor.28 Moral damages, on the other hand, are awarded in view of the
violent death of the victim. There is no need for any allegation or proof of the emotional sufferings of
the heirs.291avvphi1
Likewise, the award of exemplary damages is warranted when the commission of the offense is
attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,30 as in this case. Accordingly,
we sustain the CA’s award of exemplary damages to the heirs of Regis, but we increase the award to
₱30,000.00.

Similarly, we affirm the award of ₱22,596.50 as actual damages to Dalit, who is, likewise, entitled to
moral damages, which this Court fixes in the amount of ₱40,000.00. Ordinary human experience and
common sense dictate that the wounds inflicted on the surviving victims would naturally cause physical
suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar injuries. Finally, the award in the amount of
₱20,000.00, as exemplary damages to Dalit, is also in order considering that the crime was attended by
the qualifying circumstance of treachery.31

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 02680 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Ford Gutierrez y Dimaano is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER (Criminal Case No. 03-3639) and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant is also ordered to pay the heirs of Leo Salvador E. Regis the
amounts of ₱42,337.25 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Ford Gutierrez y Dimaano is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of ATTEMPTED
MURDER (Criminal Case Nos. 03-3640 to 03-3643) and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, on each count, with all the accessory penalties imposed by law.
Appellant is further ordered to pay Alexis B. Dalit the amounts of ₱22,596.50 as actual damages,
₱40,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

JACOBUS BERNHARD HULST v. PR BUILDERS INC. (G.R. No. 156364)FACTS: The Petitioner and his spouse,
both Dutch Nationals, entered into a Contract to Sell withPR Builders, Inc. to purchase a 210-sq m
residential unit in the respondent's townhouseproject in Batanagas. When PR Builder's failed to comply
with their verbal promise tocomplete the project, the spouses Hulst filed a complaint for recession of
contract withinterest, damages and attorney's fees before the Housing and Land Regulatory
Board(HLURB), which then was granted. A Writ of Execution was then addressed to the Ex-Officio Sheriff
of the RTC of Tanauan, Batangas, but upon the complaint of therespondent, the levy was set aside,
leaving only the respondent's personal properties tobe levied first. The Sheriff set a public auction of the
said levied properties, however, therespondent filed a motion to quash Writ of levy on the ground that
the sheriff made anover levy since the aggregate appraised value of the properties at P6,500 per sq m
isP83,616,000. Instead of resolving the objection of the respondent's regarding theauction, the Sheriff
proceeded with the auction since there was no restraining order fromthe HLURB. The 15 parcels of land
was then awarded to Holly Properties Realty at a bidof P5,450,653. On the same day, the Sheriff
remitted the legal fees and submitted tocontracts of sale to HLURB, however, he then received orders to
suspend proceedingson the auction for the reason that the market value of the properties was not fair.
Therewas disparity between the appraised value and the value made by the petitioner and theSheriff,
which should've been looked into by the Sheriff before making the sale. While aninadequacy in price is
not a ground to annul such sale annul such sale, the court is justified to suchintervention where the
price shocks the conscience.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not the Sheriff erred in the value that was attached to the properties duringthe
auction and as well as disregarding the objection made by the respondent's? 2. Whether or not the
market value of the said property was inadequate?2. Whether or not the spouses Hulst's request for
damages is actionable?

No. Under Article 12, Sec.7 of the 1987 Constitution, foreign nationals, the spousesHulst, are disqualified
form owning real property. However, under article 1414 of the CivilCode, one who repudiates the
agreement and demands his money before the illegal acthas taken place is entitled to recover.
Petitioner is therefore entitled to recover what hehas paid, although the basis of his claim for rescission,
which was granted by theHLURB, was not the fact that he is not allowed to acquire private land under
thePhilippine Constitution. But petitioner is entitled to the recovery only of the amount
ofP3,187,500.00, representing the purchase price paid to respondent. No damages maybe recovered on
the basis of a void contract; being nonexistent, the agreement producesno juridical tie between the
parties involved. Further, petitioner is not entitled to actual aswell as interests thereon, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.