Recognition

Jochen A Frowein

Content type: Encyclopedia entries

Product: Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law
[MPIL]
Module: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International
Law [MPEPIL]
Article last updated: December 2010

Subject(s):
Diplomatic relations — Foreign relations law — Settlement of disputes — Recognition of governments —
Recognition of states
Published under the auspices of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International
Law under the direction of Professor Anne Peters (2021–) and Professor Rüdiger Wolfrum (2004–2020). 

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 A.  Notion
1  The importance which the legal notion of recognition has gained in international law is
due to the latter’s imperfect nature. While there is practically always a judge available to
decide disputes under municipal law, it is rare that a legal dispute can be settled by judicial
means in international law. Also, the States as primary → subjects of international law are in
most cases the only entities which decide whether or not the requirements for the
applicability of a specific rule are fulfilled or not. The coming into existence of a new State
as a subject of international law was for a long time crucial for the application of rules of
international law. The formalized recognition of States as subjects of international law
should be seen against that background. Where a change of government takes place under
circumstances giving rise to doubts, a formalized recognition of government is sometimes
expressed. The notion of recognition is, however, frequently used in a much wider sense
referring to the act by which a State confirms that a specific legal situation or consequence,
which may have been in dispute, will not be put into question. In that way recognition of
territorial changes etc may become very important. Recognition normally belongs to the
realm of → unilateral acts of States in international law, but a → declaration of recognition
may be included in a treaty.

B.  History
2  The first example of the recognition of a new State in international law arose from the
declaration of independence by the Republic of the United Netherlands in 1581. In the
treaty of 30 January 1648 Spain declared:

Premièrement déclare ledit Seigneur Roi et reconnait que lesdits Seigneur États
Généraux des Pays Bas Unis … sont libres et Souverains États … sur lesquels …
ledit Seigneur Roi ne prétend rien (In the first place the said Lord the King declares
and acknowledges that the said Lords the States General of the Low Countries …
are free and sovereign states … upon which … the said Lord the King has no
manner of pretentions) (Treaty of Peace between Spain and the Netherlands [signed
30 January 1648, entered into force 25 May 1648] [1648] 1 CTS 70; translation by
the editor).

3  When the United States of America declared its independence a famous dispute
developed between France and Britain as to the possibility of recognizing the new State as
an independent subject of public international law. While Britain argued that revolution or
war could never confer title to a territory without recognition by the former sovereign,
France relied on the doctrine of → effectiveness. In the 19th century this became the
accepted doctrine. With the changes in Eastern Europe 1990/1991 the Foreign Ministers of
the European Union adopted ‘Guidelines’ for the recognition of new States (see below para.
7). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia many new States were
recognized (→ Russia; → Yugoslavia, Dissolution of).

4  The recognition of governments has its origin in the tradition of the European States as
monarchies. Because of the many overlapping claims to succession which frequently
existed, recognition of a new monarch was quite common. When the first republic under
Cromwell was formed in England, Spain was the first country to ‘recognize’ the republic by
sending an ambassador to England. The principle of effectiveness was finally accepted for
the recognition of governments and it was frequently linked to the idea of the democratic
theory of the pouvoir constituant. As Jefferson stated in 1792 concerning the French
revolution: ‘It accords with our principles to acknowledge any Government to be rightful
which is formed by the will of the nation, substantially declared’ (Thomas Jefferson to
Gouverneur Morris [7 November 1792] in AA Lipscomb and AE Bergh [eds] Memorial
Edition vol 8 [Washington DC 1903–04] 437). In the 19th century some examples of

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 collective recognition became important. Art. 7 → Paris Peace Treaty (1856) ([1855–56] 114
CTS 409) was generally seen as a collective act with regard to admission and recognition of
Turkey as a member of the European legal order. The → Berlin Congress (1878) amounted
to the collective recognition of territorial changes and the independence of several States
formerly under Turkish → sovereignty.

C.  Recognition of States

1.  Requirements
5  It is frequently stated that the recognition of States presupposes the existence of the
criteria for statehood, ie a fixed territory, a population, and an effective government. When
the doctrine of recognition of States developed, the emphasis was put on cases of forcible
→ secession from the former mother-country. Here, the effectiveness of the separation was
seen as the most important criterion. The development of the process of → decolonization
after 1945 has shown that recognition of States is a matter of normal routine where there is
no dispute with a former mother-country. The many African, Asian, and American States
becoming independent on the basis of decisions taken by the former colonial powers were
recognized immediately by the community of nations. This also happened where their
borders were to a great extent in dispute or no effective government for the whole of the
country existed (eg the former Congo, 1960).

6  To establish what States consider to be the essential criteria for statehood it is more
expedient to consider under which circumstances they refuse recognition as a State
(→ Non-Recognition). There are two main reasons why States have withheld full recognition
although, at least on the face of it, some entity resembling a State existed. The reason most
frequently given is lack of independence in relation to a State which has brought the new
entity into existence by unlawful intervention. It is this reason which was advanced for the
non-recognition of Manchukuo as a Japanese ‘puppet-State’ in the 1930s or of Croatia as a
German creation of that sort in the 1940s. The German Democratic Republic which existed
from 1949 to 1990 was for a long time not recognized as a State because it was not
considered sufficiently independent vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and because no division of
the German State was seen as permissible by intervention (→ Germany, Legal Status after
World War II). The same reasons led to the refusal of the international community to
recognize Northern → Cyprus brought into existence by Turkish intervention, or to
recognize → South Ossetia and → Abkhazia where Russian intervention was decisive. The
South African homelands, although formally declared to be sovereign States by South Africa
in the 1970s, were not recognized by other States. The prevailing view was that they lacked
any real independence and were based on → apartheid (→ South African Bantustan Policy).
A second reason, which was used to withhold recognition in the case of Rhodesia
(→ Rhodesia/Zimbabwe), was the fact that independence had been brought about by a white
minority government in a former colonial territory in the 1960s. The clear lack of any act of
→ self-determination was seen as justifying non-recognition. When → Kosovo declared its
independence in 2008 it was partly under UN administration (→ International
Administration of Territories) but 63 States recognized the new State within a short period.

7  For the first time the ministers of the European Union adopted, on 16 December 1991,
‘Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union’.
The guidelines laid down the following requirements for recognition:

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 - Respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the
commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris,
especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights;

- Guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in
accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE;

- Respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful
means and by common agreement;

- Acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear

non-proliferation as well as to security and regional stability;

- Commitment to settle by agreement, including where appropriate by recourse to

arbitration, all questions concerning State succession and regional disputes.

The Community and its member States will not recognize entities which are the
result of aggression. They would take account of the effects of recognition on
neighbouring States.

The commitment to these principles opens the way to recognition by the Community
and its member States and to the establishment of diplomatic relations. It could be
laid down in agreements.

8  The guidelines show that recognition of States today may well take into account the
legitimacy of a new State (Frowein [1968] 227–32).

2.  Modes of Recognition

9  Recognition may be express, especially after the granting of independence. In addition, it
has long been accepted that there may be implied recognition. However, one should be
careful not to deduce recognition from acts which do not clearly show an intention to that
effect. It would seem that there is only one unequivocal act from which full recognition can
always be deduced: the establishment of full diplomatic relations. All other forms of contact
do not necessarily lead to recognition as a State. The distinction between de iure and de
facto recognition has always been a source of difficulties. In most cases recognition will not
be qualified by either of these terms. Where it is stated that recognition is de facto, this
implies some hesitation on the part of the recognizing government, either as to the coming
into existence of the new State or its territorial situation. Probably the last clear example
for de facto recognition of a State was the recognition of → Israel in 1948 by Great Britain.
A further difficulty is added by the fact that the notion de facto may be used not to qualify
the recognition, but to refer to the factual situation being recognized, as in the case of
recognition of a → de facto regime or government. The view that the de facto recognition
may be revoked without a change of circumstances would not seem to be confirmed by
State practice.

3.  Legal Consequences

10  After recognition it is clear that all rules of public international law governing the
relations between sovereign States are applicable ipso iure. Without recognition that may
be a matter of dispute. However, even an entity not recognized but in effective control of a
territory has a position in international law. Controversy has existed for a long time as to
whether recognition has merely a declaratory or a constitutive effect. Anzilotti and Kelsen,
in particular, have advanced theoretical reasons why recognition must have a constitutive
meaning in a system of law based on the understanding of States as to the legal
consequences of a specific factual situation. Lauterpacht has argued that where dispute

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 exists as to the existence of the elements of statehood, recognition constitutively settles
that dispute. He saw a duty for recognition where the criteria are met. However, it is clear
that recognition does not create the State. It only confirms that an entity has reached
statehood. As soon as all or practically all States take the same view the matter is settled.
Art. 12 Charter of the Organization of American States (‘OAS Charter’) (119 UNTS 3)
states: ‘The political existence of the State is independent of recognition by other States.
Even before being recognized, the State has the right to defend its integrity and
independence.’ The two theories connected with recognition focus on different problems. In
practice they do not help to explain recognition or to clarify the position of entities which
are not recognized. No obligation to establish full diplomatic relations or any other specific
links flow from recognition. This is a matter of discretion for the States concerned. Only
those rules of international law which do not require a specific relationship apply
automatically with recognition.

4.  Legal Effects in Domestic Law

11  English and American courts have frequently held that they cannot apply the laws of a
State or give effect to its acts if this State is not recognized by their government. The main
justification advanced for the rule seems to be the danger that otherwise the State would
speak with different tongues. Courts in Switzerland and Germany have never found it
difficult to apply the law which is effectively implemented in a given territory, even where
the latter is not recognized as a State. In the United States the rule of non-application of the
law of a non-recognized State is not respected where the government expresses the view
that this would not be harmful. At least the limits set by the Namibia Advisory Opinion for
the consequences of non-recognition should be respected also in this context (→ South West
Africa/Namibia [Advisory Opinions and Judgments]). According to the ICJ non-recognition
should not extend to ‘for instance, the registration of births, deaths and marriages, the
effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants of the
Territory’ ([1971] ICJ Rep para. 125). The ‘Namibia Principle’ has been applied by the
→ European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) when dealing with the legal situation in
Northern Cyprus (Cyprus v Turkey para. 96; Demopoulos v Turkey paras 92–8). It is quite
understandable that non-recognized States or governments should not have the right to sue
or claim other rights of a governmental character, but it is hard to see why it should not be
possible to apply their laws in a suit between private parties where the application of any
other law would do injustice to those concerned.

5.  The Impact of the United Nations on Recognition of States

12  Mosler has underlined that recognition of a State, although very important in former
times, has been substituted to a large extent by admission to the United Nations (‘UN’)
(Mosler 44). With the admission to the UN all rules of the → United Nations Charter apply
to the new member. Although claims of non-recognition have been upheld even after the
respective States became UN members (eg in the cases of the Arab States with respect to
Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany with respect to the German Democratic
Republic), it is clear that the quality as State of a UN member cannot be denied. Thus, while
non-recognition will have a very specific political meaning, for example underlining the
wish to have a change brought about in the future, that change can only be brought about
in full respect of Charter obligations, especially Art. 2 (4).

13  It is even more important that the UN has become the forum to coordinate non-
recognition. In several cases the UN Security Council, frequently on the basis of resolutions
adopted by the UN General Assembly, has called upon States not to recognize specific
entities as States. This was first done when Rhodesia declared its independence in 1965
(UNSC Res 216 [1965] [12 November 1965]). The same attitude was adopted after South
Africa declared the independence of Transkei as a homeland (UNSC Res 402 [1976] [22

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 December 1976]). When the Turkish Cypriot authorities proclaimed an independent State in
Northern Cyprus in 1983, the UN Security Council called upon all States not to recognize
any Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus (UNSC Res 541 [1983] [18 November
1983]). In the last two cases the reason for the attitude of the UN which was not contested
in the Security Council was similar: the lack of independence of the entities in question vis-
à-vis South Africa or Turkey and some legal defects in their creation. In fact, the
independence of the homelands was considered to be part of the apartheid policy and the
independence of Northern Cyprus as incompatible with the treaties of 1960 and caused by
illegal Turkish intervention. The resolutions are clearly a justification for withholding
recognition by all States. In fact, in the cases in question non-recognition became the
general attitude. Where the Security Council decides on the basis of Chapter VII UN
Charter the resolution will be binding. The examples show that the UN plays an important
role in matters of recognition today.

D.  Recognition of Governments

1.  Introductory Remarks
14  Change of government in a given State is a matter within its domestic sphere and does
not as such concern international law or the international community. This is true whether
the procedure is in line with the constitutional rules applicable in the country or not.
International law is not concerned with the constitutionality of any such change. This shows
that there must be a special reason for the issue of recognition of a new government to
arise at all. The reason may be an uncertainty as to the effectiveness of the government
after a period of revolutionary change, or the existence of two competing governments.
There was a time when certain tendencies existed in international law to recognize
revolutionary governments only after elections (Tobar Doctrine [1907]). However, this was
never generally accepted and the Estrada Doctrine of 1930, which was based on the
understanding that a change of government is an internal matter for each State in which
other States have no right to intervene, certainly starts from the correct premise (→ Tinoco
Concessions Arbitration). For these reasons Britain in 1980 adopted the same position. The
Foreign Secretary announced that after a comparison with the practice of partners and
allies it had been decided ‘ … that we shall no longer accord recognition to Governments’ (G
Marston [ed] ‘United Kingdom Materials on International Law’ [1980] BYIL 367). However,
a growing tendency exists not to easily accept the change of government by military coup.
In many international and regional organizations sanctions have been applied because of
changes of government brought about by undemocratic unconstitutional means. Under
special circumstances the Security Council may decide that the overthrow of a democratic
government amounts to a threat to the peace in the sense of Art. 39 UN Charter (→ Peace,
Threat to) and order the reinstatement of the ousted government. This was decided as to
Haiti in 1993 and → Sierra Leone in 1997 (UNSC Res 841 [1993] [16 June 1993]; UNSC Res
940 [1994] [31 July 1994]; UNSC Res 1132 [1997] [8 October 1997]; UNSC Res 1270 [1999]
[22 October 1999]; UNSC Res 1289 [2000] [7 February 2000]).

2.  Requirements
15  A formal recognition of a new government is permissible only where there is some
reason to clarify the situation after a revolutionary change. The first and generally accepted
requirement for the recognition of a government is that this government be in control of the
territory and the administration of the State. Where this control is unquestionable, no issue
will arise. Therefore, this requirement has to be seen in the perspective of the need for the
recognition of a government in doubtful circumstances. Effective control means control of
at least the larger part of the territory with no real threat for development in the future. As
for the recognition of States, effective control must not be brought about by foreign
intervention. Indeed, foreign intervention in a change of government is a typical reason for

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 non-recognition. Where there are still two competing governments, recognition of the
revolutionary government as the government of the State is unlawful unless it has
established its authority to such an extent that the outcome of the conflict is clear and the
former government’s authority is reduced to a negligible area. Typical examples of
premature and unlawful recognition were the declarations by which Germany and Italy
recognized the Franco Government as the government of Spain at the beginning of the
→ Spanish Civil War (1936–39). Where a conflict exists for a longer time, limited recognition
as a de facto regime may be extended to the revolutionary government.

16  Besides effectiveness, it is frequently stated by governments that two criteria may be
taken into account for recognition: whether there is consent or at least acquiescence by the
people; and whether the new government has indicated its willingness to comply with its
obligations under international law. While acquiescence may have some connection to the
effective control and stability of the government, it may also refer to democratic legitimacy.
It has clearly been used in the latter sense, for instance by taking into account whether
elections have been announced by a revolutionary government. Insofar as these two criteria
have nothing to do with the question of effectiveness of the new government, it is doubtful
whether they can really be used to withhold recognition in the sense of not treating the new
government as the government of the State. The correct view would seem to be that an
effective government fully in control of the country must be accepted as the government of
the State wherever contacts with that State exist except where the Security Council
determines the existence of a threat to the peace and orders otherwise under Chapter VII
UN Charter. Since there is no obligation under general international law to establish or
continue diplomatic relations, the criteria just discussed may be of importance concerning
renewal or continuation of diplomatic relations. It is in this sense that one frequently uses
the terminology ‘diplomatic recognition’. However, one must conclude from State practice
that States not infrequently justify their decision concerning the recognition of
revolutionary governments with reasons going beyond the mere effectiveness of these
governments.

3.  Modes of Recognition

17  Although recognition may be expressed in the same way as for States, recognition of
governments is more likely to be implied. The continuation of diplomatic relations is in fact
the normal way to clarify the situation. It seems that more and more States avoid the label
of recognition after revolutionary changes and prefer to establish their position through
concrete dealings with the new government. The distinction between de iure and de facto
recognition has apparently also become obsolete for the recognition of governments.

4.  Legal Consequences

18  After recognition a government will be treated as being fully entitled to represent the
State concerned. In most instances diplomatic relations will be established or continued,
although no obligation is created in this respect. As a consequence of recognition, the right
of the government concerned to represent its State in all international organizations of
which the State is a member cannot subsequently be questioned. This does not mean that
the acceptance by the other parties of a non-recognized government as representing its
State in an international organization amounts to full recognition. State practice clearly
shows that not infrequently the position of non-recognition has been upheld, although the
government at issue was accepted as representing its State in the UN or other international
organizations (eg → China).

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 19  It is frequently stated that the recognition of a government has retroactive effect.
However, no rule of international law would seem to require this to be so. Rather, the
internal law of States may attach this retroactive effect to recognition, especially as far as
the applicability of the law of the formerly non-recognized government may be concerned.
On the other hand a rule of international law overlapping with the principle of retroactivity
has been applied by arbitral tribunals, according to which States are responsible for acts of
revolutionary governments from their very beginning. The idea is that such a government’s
success proves retroactively that the acts of the revolutionary organs were attributable to
the State. However, no automatic effect of this sort is created by recognition.

5.  Legal Effects in Domestic Law

20  As with the recognition of States, the recognition of governments may have important
effects in domestic law if courts act on the basis of the principle that they may not apply or
take notice of law promulgated by a non-recognized government. While such a rule was
generally not applied in Germany or Switzerland, it prevailed for a long time in England
and, to a lesser extent, in the United States. However, it seems that the unjustified effects of
that attitude have now been recognized practically everywhere. In the United States several
cases have established that the law of unrecognized governments may well be applied
under the rules concerning conflicts of law (→ Private International Law) as the effective
law in force in a specific territory. One of the changes of the British position as to the
recognition of governments would seem to be that there will no longer be such a concept as
a non-recognized government. Even earlier the House of Lords had indicated a change of
attitude (→ Zeiss Cases).

6.  The Impact of the United Nations on Recognition of Governments

21  Within international organizations the question whether or not a specific government
may represent a State comes up as a matter of the → credentials of the delegates. A
credentials committee normally decides whether or not these credentials should be
recognized. The final decision is taken by the organ representing all the members. Within
the UN such problems are regularly dealt with by the General Assembly. States which do
not recognize a government will normally not accept the credentials of its delegates in the
General Assembly. However, this is not necessarily the rule. In the case of China the
General Assembly until 1971 had to vote regularly on the question which government
should represent China. In Resolution 2758 (XXVI) ‘Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the
People’s Republic of China in the United Nations’ of 25 October 1971 the General Assembly
decided

to restore all its rights to the People’s Republic of China and to recognize the
representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to
the United Nations.

With that resolution the long-lasting dispute as to the recognition of the two Chinese
governments was finally settled within the Untied Nations. The developments within the UN
certainly influenced many of the States which had not by then recognized the Government
of the People’s Republic as the government of China.

22  Where an effective government of a State exists, an international organization such as

the UN must be held to be under an obligation to recognize it as the government of the
Member State. The question is more difficult where competing governments exist. Where
one of these is in control of the vast majority of the territory and of the population the
international organization would seem to be under an obligation to recognize it. This must
be the case especially where the last part of the territory is held by the old government on

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 the basis of foreign intervention. Therefore, in the case of China the original position taken
by the UN, albeit maintained over many years, cannot be used as a lawful precedent.

E.  Other Forms of Recognition

1.  Recognition of Provisional Situations
23  International law has developed forms of recognition to bring into operation some of the
rules of public international law to cope with situations of a provisional nature. For the
specific effects which a civil war may have for third parties recognition of → belligerency
was used, for instance during the → American Civil War (1861–65). There have been no
clear examples for this form of recognition since World War II. The alternative recognition
of → insurgency, having no clearly circumscribed consequences in law but giving the
recognizing State the possibility of declaring some rules of international law applicable, has
not been used in recent times either. In several of the conflicts concerning decolonization
recognition of → national liberation movements has been used. Such recognition has also
been accorded to the → Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). This sort of recognition
mainly confirms that some sort of official relations will be or have been established with the
movement concerned. Especially where civil wars last for a long time or parts of a State
become factually independent without being recognized as State, the status of de facto
regime has gained acceptance. Sometimes a recognition of the fact that an insurgent
government has de facto control over a territory is expressed, especially where courts have
to be informed of the situation.

2.  Recognition of International Organizations

24  While international organizations have legal personality upon their creation in relation
to Member States, this does not apply vis-à-vis third States since treaties between the
Member States and such organizations have no effect for third States under normal
circumstances (→ Treaties, Third-Party Effect). Third States may, however, accord
recognition to international organizations by concluding treaties, etc (→ International
Organizations or Institutions, General Aspects). For the UN, the ICJ has accepted that it
possesses objective international personality, not being in need of formal recognition by
third States (→ Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of the United Nations [Advisory
Opinion] [1949] ICJ Rep 174).

3.  Recognition of Territorial Changes

25  Recognition or non-recognition plays an important role in regard to territorial situations
whose lawfulness is open to challenge. The Stimson Doctrine (→ Doctrines [Monroe,
Hallstein, Brezhnev, Stimson]) has been influential for the adoption by the UN of the rule
according to which: ‘No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall
be recognized as legal’ (→ Friendly Relations Declaration [1970] UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) [24
October 1970]). As the case of Goa shows, this rule is open to exceptions where the former
sovereign later recognizes the → territorial change, but the example of the → Baltic States
illustrates a long practice of not recognizing an → annexation. The final recognition by
Germany of the territorial changes brought about by the outcome of World War II shows the
importance of recognition in relation to territorial changes (→ Oder-Neisse Line; → Potsdam
Conference [1945]). UN organs have sometimes called upon States not to recognize
territorial situations brought about by illegal means or upheld, as in the case of Namibia,
against UN decisions. As with the recognition of States or governments, the recognition of a
territorial situation may have important consequences for the application of the law valid in

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 the territory concerned by courts of a third State (→ Recognition of Foreign Legislative and
Administrative Acts).

F.  Evaluation
26  The importance of recognition in international law is a consequence of the imperfect
nature of international law. Since disputes can frequently not be settled by judicial
procedures with binding results, the position which is taken by the other subjects of
international law becomes crucial in case of doubt. Where the procedure of recognition is
used in → good faith (bona fide) by all members of the international community it will have
no detrimental effects. However, where ideological and political motives influence the
decision whether or not to recognize a State, a government, or a territorial situation, abuse
is quite possible. History and State practice clearly provide examples of such abuse (eg
China; Israel; Soviet republics). Since international law is unable to eliminate such abuse it
is of crucial importance that the legal position of non-recognized entities be clarified. Non-
recognition must never mean that States are free to use force against an entity which they
do not recognize as a State.

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H Mosler The International Society as a Legal Community (Sijthoff & Noordhoff
Alphen aan den Rijn 1980).
ZM Nedjati ‘Acts of Unrecognised Governments’ (1981) 30 ICLQ 388–415.
C Warbrick ‘The New British Policy on Recognition of Governments’ (1981) 30 ICLQ
568–92.
B Loudwin Die konkludente Anerkennung im Völkerrecht (Duncker & Humblot Berlin
1983).
W Grewe Epochen der Völkerrechtsgeschichte (Nomos Baden-Baden 1984).
J Verhoeven ‘Relations internationales de droit privé en l’absence de reconnaissance
d’un Etat, d’un gouvernement ou d’une situation’ (1985) 192 RdC 9–232.

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 S Oeter ‘Die Entwicklung der Westsahara-Frage unter besonderer Berücksichtigung
der völkerrechtlichen Anerkennung’ (1986) 46 ZaöRV 48–74.
J Dugard Recognition and the United Nations (Grotius Cambridge 1987).
PK Menon ‘Some Aspects of the Law of Recognition’ (1989) 67 RDI 161–82; (1990) 68
RDI 1–29, 157–96, 265–91; (1991) 69 RDI 19–49, 83–124, 227–58.
R Kherad ‘La reconnaissance internationale des Etats Baltes’ (1992) 96 RGDIP 843–
72.
J Salmon ‘Reconnaissance d’Etats’ (1992) 25 RBDI 226–39.
S Talmon ‘Recognition of Governments: An Analysis of the New British Policy and
Practice’ (1992) LXIII BYIL 231–97.
P Hilpold ‘Die Anerkennung der Neustaaten auf dem Balkan’ (1993) 31 Archiv des
Völkerrechts 387–408..
C Hillgruber Die Aufnahme neuer Staaten in die Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft: Das
völkerrechtliche Institut der Anerkennung von Neustaaten in der Praxis des 19. und
20. Jahrhunderts (Lang Frankfurt am Main 1998).
KO Kufuor ‘The OAU and the Recognition of Governments in Africa: Analyzing its
Practice and Proposals for the Future’ (2002) 17 AmUIntlLRev 369–401.
S Talmon ‘The Constitutive versus the Declaratory Theory of Recognition: Tertium non
datur?’ (2004) LXXV BYIL (2004) 101–81.
J Crawford The Creation of States in International Law (2nd edn Clarendon Oxford
2006).
S Talmon Kollektive Nichtanerkennung illegaler Staaten: Grundlagen und
Rechtsfolgen einer international koordinierten Sanktion dargestellt am Beispiel der
Türkischen Republik Nord-Zypern (Mohr Siebeck Tübingen 2006).
M Fabry Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New
States Since 1776 (OUP Oxford 2010).
U Saxer Die internationale Steuerung der Selbstbestimmung und der
Staatsentstehung: Selbstbestimmung, Konfliktmanagement, Anerkennung und
Staatennachfolge in der neueren Völkerrechtspraxis (Springer Heidelberg 2010).

Select Documents
Cyprus v Turkey (ECtHR) Reports 2001-IV, 1.
Demopoulos v Turkey (ECtHR) App 46113/99.
European Communities ‘Declaration on the “Guidelines on the Recognition of New
States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union”’ (16 December 1991) (1992) 31
ILM 1486.
European Communities ‘Declaration on Yugoslavia’ (16 December 1991) (1992) ILM
1485.
International Conference on Yugoslavia ‘Interlocutory Decision (Opinions No. 8,9 and
10)’ (4 July 1992) (1993) 4 EJIL 84.
International Conference on Yugoslavia ‘Opinion No. 4 on International Recognition of
the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the European Community and its
Member States’ (11 January 1992) (1993) 4 EJIL 74.
International Conference on Yugoslavia ‘Opinion No. 5 on the Recognition of the
Republic of Croatia by the European Community and its Member States’ (11 January
1992) (1993) 4 EJIL 76.
International Conference on Yugoslavia ‘Opinion No. 6 on the Recognition of the
Socialist Republic of Macedonia by the European Community and its Member
States’ (11 January 1992) (1993) 4 EJIL 77.

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 International Conference on Yugoslavia ‘Opinion No. 7 on International Recognition of
the Republic of Slovenia by the European Community and its Member States’ (11
January 1992) (1993) 4 EJIL 80.
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory
Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16.

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Subscriber: Max Planck Institute Luxembourg; date: 14 October 2021