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2019 GOLDEN BEACON

POLITICAL LAW
By:
Dean MANUEL R. BUSTAMANTE

1. WRIT OF AMPARO PROCEEDINGS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO OF NORIEL H.

RODRIQUEZ vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO et. al.
G.R. 191805, November 15, 2011, 660 SCRA 84

FACTS: Rodriguez, a member of KMP, was abducted by military men

and was tortured when he refused to confess to his membership in the
NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and
Habeas Data against President Arroyo et. al.

ISSUES
1) Whether President GMA may be held liable under the command
responsibility doctrine within the context of the amparo proceedings.

2) Whether the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez are

violated or threatened by respondents.

RULINGS

1) YES. To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command

responsibility, the following elements must obtain: (a) the existence of a
superior - subordinate relationship between the accused as his superior and
the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate ; (b) the superior knew
or had reason to know that the crime was about or had been
committed; and (c) the superior failed to take the necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the
perpetrators thereof. The President, being the commander-in-chief of all
armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies
him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility.

2) YES. The totality of the evidence adduced by Rodriguez indubitably

prove the responsibility and accountability of some respondents in violating
his life, liberty and security. The right to security of a person includes
the positive obligation of the government to ensure the observance of
the duty to investigate. In this case, there was an abject failure to
conduct a fair and effective official investigation of his ordeal in the
hands of the military wherein respondents solely relied on the reports
and narration of the military.

While on military custody, he was forced to sign documents

declaring that he had surrendered in an encounter and the soldiers
did not shoot him because he became a military asset.

SPOUSES NERIO & SOLEDAD PADOR vs. BARANGAY

CAPTAIN BERNABE ARCAYAN et. al.
G.R. No. 183460, March 12, 2013, 693 SCRA 192

FACTS: Respondents conducted a raid on the property of Padors based

on information that the latter were cultivators of marijuana . The barangay
captain sent them invitation letters without stating the purpose of the
invitation. Barangay Captain Arcayan refused to receive Padors’ letter-reply .
Anticipating the possibility more harassment cases , false accusations and
potential violence from respondents, the Padors filed a writ of amparo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Padors are entitled to a writ of Amparo.

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HELD: NO. To be entitled to the privilege of the writ of Amparo ,

petitioners must be proven by substantial evidence that their rights to
life, liberty and security are being violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission. It was undisputed that the intrusion
occurred, whether the entry was done with or without permission, it
was merely a violation of Padors’ property rights . The writ of Amparo
does not envisage the protection of concerns that are purely property
or commercial in nature.

2. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, ASSEMBLY AND OF THE PRESS

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ vs. RAUL M. GONZALES

G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, 545 SCRA 441

FACTS: Press Secretary Bunye told reporters that the opposition was
planning to destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape of a
mobile phone conversation allegedly between the President GMA and Comelec
Commissioner Garcillano. The conversation was audiotaped allegedly through
wire-tapping. Atty. Allan Paguia subsequently released an alleged authentic
tape recording of the wiretap. Included in the tapes were purportedly
conversations of the President, First Gentlemen, Comelec Commissioner
Garcillano and the late Senator Barbers . DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned
reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those
broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under
the Anti-Wiretapping Act. In another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales
ordered the NBI to go after media organizations “found to have
caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents
of a tape of an alleged wiretapped conversations involving the
President about fixing votes in the 2004 national elections . The NTC
issued this press release: “NTC GIVES FAIR WARNING TO RADIO
AND TELEVISION OWNERS/OPERATORS TO OBSERVE ANTI-WIRETAPPING LAW
AND PERTINENT CIRCULARS ON PROGRAM STANDARDS.”

ISSUE: Whether free speech and freedom of the press have been
infringed at the case at bar .

HELD: YES. Government action that restricts freedom of speech or

of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny ,
with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule.

This rule applies equally to all kinds of media , including

broadcast media. The acts of respondents focused solely on but one
object -- a specific content -- fixed as these were on the alleged
taped conversations between the President and a COMELEC official .
Undoubtedly these did not merely provide regulations as to the
time, place or manner of the dissemination of speech or
expression.

Free speech and free press may be identified to discuss

publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without
censorship and punishment . There is to be no previous restraint
on the communication of view or subsequent liability whether in
libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages or
contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger
of substantive evil that Congress has right to prevent.

BAYAN vs. ERMITA

G.R. No. 169838, April 29, 2006, 488 SCRA 226

*** Calibrated Pre-emptive Response (CPR) used to disperse rallies is

unconstitutional.

1) Authorities must strictly observe the policy of “maximum tolerance” in

dealing with rallies.

2) The “no permit, no rally” policy under BP 880 is upheld.

3) Local governments are ordered to designate “freedom parks” where

rallies can be held without a permit within 30 days after the court
ruling becomes final.
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4) All parks in cities and municipalities that fail to designate

“Freedom Park” will become freedom parks.

5) Mayors have two days to act on rally permit applications .

Applications are deemed approved if no action is taken.

6) Specific reasons must be stated in writing if a rally permit

application is denied, namely “clear and present danger to public order ,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAYOR LITO ATIENZA

G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010, 613 SCRA 518

FACTS: On June 15, 2006, the IBP filed with the Office of the Mayor
of Manila an application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola
Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.

Mayor Atienza issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP
to stage a rally on a given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda
as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which permit the IBP received
on June 19, 2006.

Aggrieved, IBP filed on June 21, 2006 a petition for certiorari at

the Court of Appeals. The petition having been unresolved within 24
hours from filing brought the matter to the Supreme Court . The high
court’s resolution of November 20, 2006 denied the petition for being
moot and academic.

ISSUES
1. Whether the instant petition no longer present a justiciable
controversy.

2. Whether the modification of the venue in IBP’s rally

permit constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

RULINGS

1. NO. An exception to the rule on mootness , courts will

decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition ,
yet evading review.

In the present case , the question of the legality of a

modification of a permit to rally will arise each time the terms
of an intended rally are altered by the concerned official , yet it
evades review, owing to the limited time in processing the
application where the shortest allowable period is five days to the
assembly.

2. YES. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or

modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard
for the decision reached . If he is of the view that there is
such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil , the
applicant must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision
whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the
earliest opportunity. Thus, if so minded, they can have recourse to
the proper judicial authority.

In modifying the permit outright , Mayor Atienza gravely abused

his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who
should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may
warrant the changing of the venue . The opportunity to be
heard precedes the action on the permit , since the applicant may
directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.

PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC. vs. FRANCIS THOENEN

G.R. No. 143372, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 482

FACTS: A news item was published by the petitioner that a certain

Swiss national was shooting cats and dogs that come up his walls
and driving barbarously with children playing around . It was proven
at the trial that the news article contained several inaccuracies .
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ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional privilege granted under the

freedom of speech and of the press extends to the petitioner
in this case.

HELD: NO. The freedom of speech and of the press is not

absolute. Libel is not protected speech . Although it has been stressed
that a newspaper “should not be held to account to a point of
suppression for honest mistakes, or imperfection in the choice of
words,” even the most liberal view of free speech has never
countenanced the publication of falsehoods , especially the persistent and
unmitigated dissemination of patent lies. “There is no constitutional
value in false statement of facts.”

POSTING OF TARPAULIN

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, 747 SCRA 1

FACTS: On February 21, 2013, the Diocese of Bacolod posted two (2)
tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral
of Bacolod.

The second tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and list
candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(PRO-
RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark.

The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the

adoption of the RH law . Those who voted for the passage of the law
were classified as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted
against it form “Team Buhay.”

The tarpaulins were neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. In
contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections.

The Comelec issued a Notice to Remove Campaign ordering the tarpaulins’

removal within three (3) days from receipt, otherwise, it will be constrained to
file an election offense against the Diocese of Bacolod.

ISSUE: Whether the removal of the tarpaulins violate the right to freedom of
expression and right to property.

HELD: YES. The removal of tarpaulins violates petitioner’s right to freedom

of expression. Comelec had no legal basis to issue an order as the
tarpaulins were not paid for by any candidate or political party and the
candidates were not consulted regarding the posting.

Comelec does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the
preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this
case.

First, the petitioner is a private individual who has lost his right to give
commentary on the candidates when the Comelec ordered the tarpaulin
removed.

Second, the tarpaulin is protected speech.

Third, the tarpaulins and their message are not religious speech.

More importantly, every citizen’s expression with political consequences

enjoys a high degree of protection . While the tarpaulin may influence the
success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does
not mean it is election propaganda.

3. RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATION

- Right of government employees to organize: limited to the formation

of unions or associations only, no right to strike.

GSIS vs. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGAGAWA NG GSIS (KMG)

G.R. No. 170132, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 622
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FACTS: For four (4) straight days, participating KMG members and other
GSIS employees staged a walkout and waged or participated in a mass
protest or demonstration right at the very doorstep of the GSIS main
building against Winston Garcia’s mismanagement of the financial
resources of the GSIS. Administrative sanctions were imposed against
those who participated in said mass action.

ISSUES
(1) Whether or not GSIS, a government owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC) is covered by Civil Service Law and thus its
employees are prohibited to conduct concerted mass actions.

(2) Whether or not the four-day mass actions of GSIS employees

to air grievances be considered an “assembly of citizens” or a
“striking crowd.”

RULING

(1) YES, under the 1987 Constitutions, government owned and

controlled corporations with original charters like GSIS are covered
by the Civil Service Law. As such, employees of GSIS are part of
the civil service system and are subject to the guidelines for the
exercise of the right to organize of government employees , however,
they are prohibited on concerted mass action in the public sector.

(2) It is an “STRIKING CROWD,” the stubborn fact remains that

the erring employees, instead of exploring non-crippling activities during
their free time, had taken a disruptive approach to attain whatever
it was they were specifically after . As events evolved, they assembled
in front of the GSIS main office building during office hours and
staged rallies and protests , and even tried to convince others to join
their cause, thus provoking work stoppage by government personnel and
service-delivery disruptions, the very evil sought to be forestalled by
the prohibition against strikes by government personnel.

Any collective activity undertaken by government employees with the

intent of effective work stoppage or service disruption in order to
realize their demands or force concession, economic or otherwise, is
a prohibited concerted mass actions.

4. POLICE POWER OF THE STATE

MMDA vs. DANTE GARIN
G.R. No. 130230, April 5, 2005, 456 SCRA 176

FACTS: Respondent Garin assails the validity of Section 5 (f) of RA 7924

creating the MMDA which authorized it to confiscate and suspend or
revoke driver’s license in the enforcement of traffic laws and
regulations. He further contended that the provision violates the
constitutional prohibition against delegation of legislative authority , allowing
as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and therefore
unlimited fines and other penalties.

ISSUE: Whether or not MMDA is vested with police and legislative power?

HELD: NO, RA 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power , let
alone legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in
nature.

MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation

endowed with legislative power. It has no power to enact ordinances
for the welfare of the community. With the passage of RA 7924,
Metropolitan Manila was declared as a “special development and
administrative region” and the administration of “metro-wide” basic services
affecting the region placed under “a development authority” referred to
as the MMDA.

The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts : formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management monitoring,
setting of policies, installation of a system and administration.
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“Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power

vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make , ordain and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws , statues and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
Constitution, as they judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth and for the subjects of the same.”

MMDA vs. TRACKWORKS RAIL TRANSIT ADVERTISING PROMOTIONS

G.R. No. 179554, December 16, 2009, 608 SCRA 335

FACTS: Pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, MMDA prohibited the

posting, installation and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs,
posters, streamers, in any part of the road , sidewalk, center island, posts,
trees, parks and open space. Trackworks entered into contract with MRT3
for advertising services, however, when Trackworks refused the request of
MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle the former’s billboards and similar
forms of advertisement.

ISSUE: Whether MMDA has authority to dismantle the subject billboards and
signages

HELD: NO, it is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to
justify the dismantling of Trackworks’ billboards , signages and other
advertising media. MMDA simply had no power of its own to dismantle ,
remove the billboards, signages and other advertising media on the MRT3
structures by Trackworks. The MMDA’s power were limited to the formulation ,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management monitoring, setting
of policies, installing a system and administration . Nothing in RA 7924
granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.

The prohibitions against posting, installation and display of billboards ,

signages and other advertising media applied only to public areas but
MRT3, being private property, was not one of the areas to which the
prohibition applied.

RODOLFO BELTRAN et. al. vs. SECRETARY OF HEALTH

G.R. No. 133640, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 168.

RA 7719 required the phase-out of commercial blood banks. Petitioners,

who operated commercial blood banks, argued that the law constituted deprivation
of property without due process.

HELD: The avowed policy of the law is the protection of public health
by ensuring an adequate supply of safe blood in the country through
voluntary blood donation. To give meaning to the purpose of the law, the
legislature deemed it necessary to phase out commercial blood banks . RA
7719 is a valid exercise of police power. The legislature adopted a course of
action that is both necessary and reasonable for the common good.

“Police power in the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.” (Pita
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80806, October 5, 1989, 178 SCRA 362).

“The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations . Thus,
persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in
order to secure the general welfare of the State and to this
fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be
subordinated.” (Patalinghug vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104786, January 27, 1994, 229 SCRA
554).

“The non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier

purpose targeted by the government.” (Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs.
Drilon, G.R. No. L-81958, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 386).

AMELIA CABRERA vs. MANUEL LAPID

G.R. No. 129098, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 55

FACTS: Petitioner’s fishpond was ordered demolished by the respondent

Governor in the presence of media representatives and other government
officials because it was purportedly illegal and blocked the flow of the
Pasak River. Respondent claimed that the demolition of the fishpond is
an exercise of police power.
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ISSUE: Whether the demolition of the fishpond is valid.

HELD: YES. The demolition of the illegal fishpond following the declaration
thereof as a nuisance per se constitutes exercise of the police power of
the state. The acts of blasting of the subject fishpond were only
impelled to serve the best interest of the general public - for the
good and the highest good.

ROBERT TAYABAN et. al. vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 150194, March 6, 2007, 517 SCRA 488

FACTS: A formal contract was executed by contractor Pugong and the

Cordillera Executive Board, the project owner, for the construction of the
Tinoc public market. While the construction was on progress, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Tinoc adopted Resolution No. 20 to demolish the erected structures
for the purpose of erecting the Public Market Building . On that same day,
Mayor Tayaban and his co-petitioners, together with some men, proceeded to
the construction site and demolished the structures and improvements
introduced thereon.

As a result, Mayor Tayaban and his co-petitioners were charged for

violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
alleging that in the performance of their official functions and acting in
evident bad faith, willfully and unlawfully pass and unanimously approve
Resolution No. 20, vesting upon themselves powers and authority to
demolish the half-finished Tinoc Public Market construction to the damage and
prejudice of the government particularly the Cordillera Executive Board (CEB),
being the owner of 0the project.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid exercise of police power in

the demolition.

HELD: NO, petitioners were guilty of bad faith in causing the demolition .
Evidence of this is the fact that Resolution No. 20 was implemented on
the same day that it was adopted without due notice of the planned
demolition given to the CEB and the private contractor.

Likewise, the Court is not persuaded by petitioner’s contention that the

subject demolition is a valid exercise of police power . The exercise of
police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the
fundamental law of the land , or an act of the legislatures , or unless
it is against public policy , or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating, or in derogation of a common right . In the present case,
the acts of petitioner have been established as a violation of law ,
particularly of the provisions of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION vs. CITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 416

FACTS: Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 prohibits short time rates and
admissions, wash-up rates in hotels, motels, inns and other similar establishments
in the City of Manila. The said ordinance was questioned for being
unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and freedom
of movement. It is also criticized as an invalid exercise of police power
and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.

ISSUE: Is a city ordinance absolutely prohibiting “short time” rates and

admissions in hotels, motels and other similar establishments a valid
exercise of police power?

HELD: NO. The prohibition not only affects the property rights of the
owners but also of third persons who would wish to avail of the
short time rates. The rights involved not only the property rights of
the petitioners but the liberty and privacy of third persons who may
be their customers.

It bears stressing that the test for the valid exercise of police
power requires that (1) it must be for the interests of the public
in general as distinguished from that of a particular class and (2)
the means employed must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and must not unduly oppressive of
private rights.
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MMDA vs. VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO. INC.

G.R. No. 170656, August 15, 2007, 530 SCRA 341

FACTS: E.O. 179 was issued providing for the establishment of greater
Manila transport system and designated MMDA to implement the removal of
bus terminals located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing a
more convenient access to the mass transport system and to the commuting
public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities.

ISSUE: Is E.O. 179 constitutional as a valid exercise of police power?

HELD: NO. The said E.O . failed to satisfy one of the valid tests of
the proper exercise of police power , namely, the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. Closure of the bus terminals would
not solve the traffic congestions in the street.

Furthermore, MMDA has no authority be it police power or

legislative power to implement the said E.O. for the order of
closure of bus terminals.

MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. vs. DSWD & DOF SECRETARY

G.R. No. 175356, December 3, 2013, 711 SCRA 302

FACTS: Upon the enactment of RA 9257 amending Sec. 4 of RA 7432

otherwise known as Expanded Senior Citizen Act , the DSWD and DOF
issued IRRs allowing business establishment to claim 20% discount given
to senior citizens as a tax deduction . Petitioner questions said tax
treatment as it contravenes to the former Sec. 4 (a) of RA 7432 which
allows 20% discount given to senior citizens as a tax credit . It
further claims that allowing the 20% tax deduction scheme would violate
Sec. 9 (1) Art. III of the Constitution which provides that “private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

ISSUE: Whether the 20% discount to senior citizens that may be claimed
as a tax deduction by private establishments, valid and constitutional.

HELD: YES. The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police

power where just compensation is not warranted contrary to the claim
that it is an exercise of eminent domain which would render it
unconstitutional because it is not a peso to peso reimbursement of the
20% discount given to senior citizens.

The 20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private

establishments to price their products and services relative to a special
class of individuals, senior citizens, for which the Constitution affords
preferential concern.

5. AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS

LAMBINO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160

FACTS: On 15 February 2006, petitioners, namely Lambino and Aumentado

(“Lambino Group”), commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition
to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group
filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify
their initiative petition under Section 5 (b) and (c) and Section 7 of
R.A. No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act (RA 6735).

However, in a Resolution dated 31 August 2006 , the COMELEC denied

due course to the initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution . The
COMELEC invoked the Court’s ruling in Santiago vs. Comelec declaring
RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to
amend the Constitution.

Thereafter, the Lambino Group prayed for the issuance of the

writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC
Resolution and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to
their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their petition since
Santiago is not a binding precedent . Alternatively, the Lambino Group
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claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case , and their
petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the “will of the
sovereign people.”

ISSUES
1. Whether or not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition
complies with Section 2 , Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendment to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.

2. Whether or not the Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago

declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms
and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to
amend the Constitution.

RULINGS

1. NO. Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly

state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed
amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution
clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American
jurisprudence on people’s initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the
people must first see the full context of the proposed amendments before
they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing
such full text. Indeed, Section 5 (b) of RA 6735, the Initiative and
Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid , requires that the
people must sign the “petition x x x as signatories.”

In the instant case, there is not a single word , phrase, or

sentence of text of the Lambino Group’s proposed changes in the
signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text
of the proposed changes is attached to it . The signature sheet merely
asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral
- Presidential to the Unicameral – Parliamentary system of government . The
signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the
proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet .
Clearly, the signature sheet is not the “petition” that the framers of the
Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2 ,
Article XVII of the Constitution.

Furthermore, the initiative petition violates Sec. 12 , Article XVI of the

Constitution disallowing revision through initiatives . A people’s initiative to
change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution
and not to its revision. Certainly, the Lambino group’s initiative is a
revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the proposed changes
alter substantially the basic plan of government , from presidential to
parliamentary; and from bicameral to unicameral legislature.

2. NO. The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with
the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the
conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution . There
is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
“incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions “to
cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution .” The Court must
avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the
case before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds . Such
avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will
not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved
on some other grounds.

The Court added that, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to

implement the constitutional provision on initiatives to amend the Constitution ,
this will not change the result because the present petition violates
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the
present initiative must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution even before complying with RA 6735.

6. CITIZENSHIP

TABASA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125793, August 29, 2006, 500 SCRA 9
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FACTS: The petitioner, Joevanie Arellano Tabasa, was a natural-born citizen of

the Philippines. His father, Rodolfo Tabasa, having acquired US citizenship
through naturalization, the petitioner also acquired American citizenship by
derivative naturalization.

Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995 , and was

admitted as a “balikbayan” for one year. Thereafter, petitioner was
arrested and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of the BID on May
23, 1996. The reason for the arrest and detention was a letter of
the Consul General of the US Embassy , Kevin Herbert, to the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID) saying that the petitioner’s passport has
been revoked by the US Department of State making the petitioner an
undocumented and undesirable alien in the Philippines . Thereafter, the BID
ordered deportation to his country of origin.

Petitioner then filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Habeas
Corpus. Afterwards, he also filed a Supplemental Petition alleging Filipino
citizenship by repatriation in accordance with RA 8171 and that because
he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the
respondent Bureau. The Court of Appeals ruled against the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship

under RA 8171 and therefore cannot be summarily deported to his
country of origin.

HELD: NO. The Court said that the only persons entitled to repatriation
under RA 8171 are the following:

(1) Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by

marriage to aliens; and

(2) Natural - born Filipinos including minor children who lost their
Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.

Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under

RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the
minor children of said natural - born citizen . This means that if a parent
who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic
reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171 , his repatriation will also
benefit his minor children according to the law. To claim the benefit of RA
8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition
for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not
have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity to
undertake a political act like the election of citizenship.

In the case at bar , petitioner was no longer a minor at the time

of his “repatriation” on June 13, 1996. The privilege under RA 8171
belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of
the petition for repatriation. Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino
who left the country due to political or economic necessity. Clearly, he
lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political
or economic exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated
by economic or political reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization . The
decision was his parent’s and not his.

SPOUSES DAVID & MARISA WILLIAMS vs. ATTY. RUDY ENRIQUEZ

A.C. No. 6353, February 26, 2006, 483 SCRA 204

FACTS: Respondent is the counsel of record of the plaintiffs in Civil

Case pending before the RTC of Dumaguete City where complainants are
the defendants. According to the complainant - spouses William, Marisa Williams
bought the lot subject of the controversy . A TCT was then issued in
her favor, stating that she is a “Filipino married to David W. Williams ,
an American Citizen.”

On January 8, 2004, respondent charged her with falsification of

public documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City .
Respondent maintained that complainant Marisa Williams was no longer a
citizen of the Republic of the Philippines as a result of her
marriage to David Williams.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mrs. Williams lose her Filipino citizenship when
she married David Williams.

HELD: NO. Section 4, Article IV of the Constitution provides : “Sec. 4.

Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their
 1

citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed under the
law, to have renounced it.”

There is no evidence shown by respondent that complainant

Marisa Bacatan - Williams has renounced her Filipino citizenship , except her
Certificate of Marriage, which does not show that she has automatically
acquired her husband’s citizenship upon her marriage to him.

MA. JANETTE TECSON et. al. vs. COMELEC & FPJ

G.R. No. 161634, March 3, 2004, 424 SCRA 277

FACT: Ronald Allan Kelly Poe also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) was
born on 20 August 1939 during the regime of 1935 Constitution.

His birth certificate revealed that his father Allan F. Poe , a Spanish
subject was married to his mother Bessie Kelley, an American citizen.

Lorenzo Pou, his grandfather, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan and

was 84 years old at the time of his death on September 11, 1954.

On December 3, 2003, FPJ filed his certificate of candidacy for the

President of the Philippines.

Petitions were filed to challenge his certificate of candidacy considering

FPJ was not a natural-born citizen as his parents were foreigners.

ISSUE: Whether Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, a natural born
Filipino citizen.

HELD: YES. Fernando Poe, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen.

Tracing FPJ’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo Pou having died on
September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 in San Carlos , Pangasinan, he
would have been born in 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish
rule, such that Lorenzo Pou would have been benefited from the “en
masse Filipinization” on April 11, 1899 that the Philippine Bill had effected
in 1902. Being so, Lorenzo’s Filipino citizenship would have extended to
his son, Allan Poe.

The 1935 Constitution, during which regime FPJ has seen the first light ,
confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of the citizenship of their mothers.

2ND LT. SALVADOR PARREÑO vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA)

G.R. No. 162224, June 7, 2007, 523 SCRA 390

FACTS: Salvador Parreño served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
for 32 years. On 5 January 1982, petitioner retired from the Philippine
Constabulary with the rank of 2 nd Lieutenant. Parreño availed and received
payment of a lump sum pension equivalent to three years pay . In 1985,
Parreño started receiving his monthly pension amounting to Php13,680.00.

Parreño migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen .

In January 2001, the AFP stopped Parreño’s monthly pension in accordance
with Section 27 of PD 1638 as amended by PD 1650 , provides that a
retiree who losses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the
retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino
citizenship. Parreño filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his
monthly pension but COA denied the same.

ISSUES
(1) Whether or not the COA has jurisdiction to rule on the
constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638 as amended.

(2) Whether or not COA commits grave abuse of discretion in

dismissing petitioner’s money claim.

(3) Whether PD 1638 as amended has retroactive or prospective

effect.
 1

(4) Whether or not petitioner has vested right to his retirement

benefits.

(5) Whether petitioner was denied of equal protection and due process
clause of the Constitution.

RULINGS

(1) NO. The jurisdiction of the COA over money claims against the
government does not include the power to rule on the constitutionality or
validity of laws.

The 1987 Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power
to declare unconstitutional a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the Supreme
Court and in all Regional Trial Courts.

(2) NO. Assuming that COA assumed jurisdiction over the instance case ,
claimant’s entitlement to the retirement benefits he was previously receiving
must necessarily be severed or stopped upon loss of his Filipino
citizenship as prescribed in Section 27, PD 1638 as amended.

The COA effectively denied petitioner’s claim because of the loss of his
Filipino citizenship.

(3) Since PD 1638, as amended, is about the new system of retirement

and separation from service of military personnel , it should apply to those who
were in the service at the time of its approval.

In fact, Section 2 of PD 1638 as amended provides that “the decree

shall apply to all military personnel in the service of the AFP . PD
1638, as amended, was signed on 10 September 1979. Parreño retired in
1982, long after the approval of PD 1638 as amended . Hence, the
provisions of PD 1638, as amended, apply to Parreño.

(4) NO. As a rule, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility
requirements, he acquires a vested right to the benefits that is protected
by the due process clause. At the time of the approval of PD 1638
and at the time of its amendments, Parreño was still in active
service. Hence, his retirement benefits were only future benefits and did not
constitute a vested right. Before a right to retirement benefits or pension
vests in an employee, he must have met the stated conditions of
eligibility with respect to the nature of employment , age and length of
service.

It is only upon retirement that military personnel acquires a vested

right to retirement benefits. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest
wherever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing
law.

Further, the retirement benefits of military personnel are purely gratuitous

in nature. They are not similar to pension plans where employer participation
is mandatory, hence, the employers have contractual or vested rights in the
pension which forms part of the compensation.

(5) NO. The constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is not
absolute but is subject to reasonable classification. To be reasonable, the

classification (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real

differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law ; (c) must not
be limited to existing conditions only ; and (d) must apply equally to each
member of the class.

There is compliance with all these conditions . There is a substantial

difference between retirees who are citizens of the Philippines and retirees
who lost their Filipino citizenship by naturalization in another country such
as Parreño in this case.

The constitutional right of the state to require all citizens to render

personal and military service necessarily includes not only private citizen but
also citizen who have retired from military service . A retiree who had
lost his Filipino citizenship already renounced his allegiance to the state ,
thus, he may no longer be compelled by the state to render compulsory
military service when the need arises . Parreño’s loss of Filipino citizenship
constitutes a substantial distinction that distinguishes him from other retirees
who retain their Filipino citizenship. If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated
and regulated differently from another.
 1

There was no denial of due process in this case . When Parreño

lost his Filipino citizenship, the AFP had no choice but to stop his
monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638 , as amended.
He had opportunity to contest the termination of his pension when he
requested for reconsideration of the removal of his name from the list of
retirees and the termination of his pension. The JAGS denied the request
pursuant to Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.

REPUBLIC vs. LIM

G.R. No. 153883, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 123

“By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother , she is a Filipino

since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached
the age of majority.”

ERNESTO MERCADO vs. EDUARDO MANZANO

G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999, 307 SCRA 630

FACTS: Edu Manzano was born in San Francisco , California, USA and he
acquired US citizenship by operation of the US Constitution and laws under
the principle of jus soli. He was a natural born Filipino citizen by
operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution , as his father and mother
were Filipinos at the time of his birth.

During the 1998 local elections , Manzano obtained the highest number
of votes among the candidates for vice mayor of Makati City but his
proclamation was suspended in view of a petition for disqualification as
Manzano was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manzano is a natural born citizen and qualified

as candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

HELD: YES. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus

sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli , at birth,
he was a national of both of the Philippines and of the United States .
By participating in 1998 Philippine elections, Manzano effectively renounced his
U.S. citizenship under American law so that now he is solely a Philippine
national. The filing of certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship and effectively removing any disqualification he might
have as a dual citizen.

CIRILO VALLES vs. COMELEC & ROSALIND Y. LOPEZ

G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000, 337 SCRA 543

FACTS: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Western
Australia to Filipino father and Australian mother . In 1952, she married to a
Filipino citizen, Leopoldo Lopez, in Manila. Since then, she has continuously
participated in the Philippine electoral process not only as a voter but as
a candidate. When she ran for governor of Davao Oriental , her election
was contested by her opponent as she was an Australian citizen.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a natural born

citizen.

HELD: YES. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen, having born to

a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not
tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship . If Australia follows the
principle of jus soli, then at most, she can also claim Australian
citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship . When she filed
her certificate of candidacy, such fact alone terminated her Australian
citizenship.

EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 696

FACTS: Eusebio Lopez was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought

American citizenship and renounced his Filipino citizenship . By virtue of
RA 9225, he became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship . He
returned to the Philippines and established his residence in Barangay
Bagacay where he ran as barangay chairman . He won the elections ,
took his oath and began to discharge the functions of Barangay
 1

chairman but this victory was challenged as he failed to personally

swear to a renunciation of foreign citizenship at the time of filing his
certificate of candidacy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a certificate of candidacy

operate as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.

HELD: NO. It is undisputed that Lopez reacquired his Filipino

citizenship under RA 9225. This new law explicitly provides that should
one seek elective public office , he should first “make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.” Lopez failed to renounce his
American citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will
prove the contrary. For failure of Lopez to prove that he abandoned his
allegiance to the United States , he is disqualified from running for an
elective position in the Philippines and the votes cast in his favor should
be considered stray votes.

NESTOR JACOT vs. ROGEN T. DAL & COMELEC

G.R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 295

FACTS: Nestor Jacot was a natural born citizen of the Philippines who
became a naturalized citizen of the U.S. on December 13, 1989 . He
reacquired his Filipino citizenship under RA 9225 . During the 2007
elections, he ran for vice mayor in Catarman , Camiguin and garnered the
highest number of votes for the said position . Just before the election,
Rogen Dal sought his disqualification for his failure to renounce his U.S.
citizenship as required under Section 5 (2) of RA 9225. Jacot countered
that his oath of allegiance in Los Angeles operated as an effective
renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nestor Jacot is disqualified from running as a

candidate for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of
his U.S. citizenship.

HELD: YES. Under Section 5 (2) of RA 9225, it categorically requires

person seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine
citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship , before a public officer
authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the
filing of the certificate of candidacy . For his failure to comply with
election requirements applicable to dual citizen , he is declared disqualified
to run for the position of vice mayor of Catarman, Camiguin.

LOSS AND REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

RENATO M. DAVID vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY & PEOPLE

G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015

FACTS: In 1974, David migrated to Canada where he became a

Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement, David and his
wife returned to the Philippines.

Sometime in 2000, David purchased a 600 - square meter lot along the
beach in Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where he constructed a residential house.

However, in the year 2004, he came to know that the portion where he
built his house is public land and part of salvage zone.

On April 12, 2007, David filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over
the subject land with the DENR and indicated that he is a Filipino
citizen.

Agbay opposed his application on the ground that David is a Canadian

citizen and disqualified to own land and also filed a criminal complaint
for falsification of public document for indicating in his MLA application that
he is a Filipino citizen.

Meanwhile, David re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of

RA 9225 on October 11, 2007.

David argued that he is a natural - born Filipino citizen and by re-

acquiring the same status under RA 9225, he was by legal fiction “deemed
not to have lost” it at the time of his naturalization is Canada and through
 1

the time when he was said to have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship in
his Miscellaneous Lease Application.

ISSUE: Whether the general policy that Filipinos who have become
citizens of another country shall be deemed “not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship” under RA 9225 on dual citizenship.

HELD: YES. Section 3 of RA 9225 lays down such conditions for two
categories of natural - born Filipinos.

Under the first paragraph are those natural – born Filipinos who have
lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-
acquire their Filipino citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines.

The second paragraph covers those natural – born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after RA 9225 took effect , who shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the same oath.

The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories

of natural - born citizens who became citizens of a foreign country but the
terminology used is different , “re-acquired” for the first group , and
“retain” for the second group.

In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country , they

shall be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which
was lost pursuant to CA 63 , under which naturalization in a
foreign country is one of the ways which Philippine citizenship may
be lost.

RA 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in

the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural – born
Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing
dual citizenship, and also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and
retaining Philippine citizenship.

In the case of those who became foreign citizens after RA 9225

took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired
citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new
law.

Considering that David was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to

the effectivity of RA 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural –
born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine
citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country . As the new law allows
dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by
taking the required oath of allegiance.

David made the untruthful statement in the MLA , a public document,

that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said
application, when in fact he was still a Canadian citizen. Under CA
63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian
citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by
which a natural – born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship.

While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 six

months later, the falsification was already a consummated act , the said
law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship
status is concerned.

VIVENNE K. TAN vs. VINCENT “BINGBONG” CRISOLOGO

G.R. No. 193993, November 8, 2017, 844 SCRA 365

FACTS: On 19 January 1993, Vivenne Tan, born to Filipino parents, became

a naturalized citizen of the United States of America (U.S.A.).

On 26 October 2009, Tan applied to be registered as a voter in

Quezon City. Her application was approved by the Election Registration Board
(ERB) on 16 November 2009.

On 30 November 2009 , Tan took an Oath of Allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines before a Notary Public.

The following day, or on 1 December 2009, she filed a petition

before the Bureau of Immigration (BI) for the reacquisition of her Philippine
 1

citizenship under RA 9225. Thereafter, the BI confirmed her reacquisition of

Philippine citizenship.

On the same day, Tan filed her Certificate of Candidacy to run as

congressman.

Crisologo filed a petition seeking the exclusion of Tan from voter’s list
because Tan was not a Filipino citizen when she registered as a voter.

Tan countered that she is a natural-born citizen having been born to

Filipino parents on 1 April 1968. Although she became a naturalized
American citizen on 19 January 1993, Tan claimed that since 1996 she
had effectively renounced her American citizenship as she had been
continuously residing in the Philippines.

ISSUES
1. Whether Tan can be considered a Philippine citizen at the time she
registered as a voter.

2. How does Tan lost her Philippine citizenship?

3. Whether reacquiring or retaining Filipino citizenship under RA 9225

has the same effect on Tan’s case.

RULINGS

1. NO, to be registered a voter in the Philippines , the registrant

must be a citizen at the time he or she filed the application.

It is undisputed that Tan filed her voter’s registration application on

26 October 2009, and that he only took her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on 30 November 2009 or more than a month
after the ERB approved her application.

Therefore, Tan was not a Filipino citizen at the time she registered
as a voter and the right to vote is reserved for Filipino citizens . And
the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through RA 9225 have no retroactive
effect as to make Tan a Filipino citizen.

2. The applicable law when Tan lost her Philippine citizenship on 19

January 1993 is Commonwealth Act No. 63 . Under this law, both the
renunciation of Philippine citizenship and the acquisition of a new citizenship
in a foreign country through naturalization are grounds to lose Philippine
citizenship.

Since the foregoing law was still in effect when Tan became an
American citizen, the loss of her Philippine citizenship is but a necessary
consequence.

As the applicable law at that time , Tan was presumed to know the
legal effects of her choice to become a naturalized U.S. citizen . The loss
of Tan’s Philippine citizenship is reinforced by the fact that she voluntarily
renounced her Philippine citizenship as a requirement to acquire U.S.
citizenship.

3. NO. There is a distinction between Filipino citizens who lost their

Philippine citizenship prior to the effectivity of RA 9225 and reacquired
their citizenship under the same law from those who lost their Philippine
citizenship after RA 9225 was enacted and retained their citizenship.

Section 3 of RA 9225 lays down such conditions for two

categories of natural - born Filipinos.

Under the first paragraph are those natural – born Filipinos who have
lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-
acquire their Filipino citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines.

The second paragraph covers those natural – born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after RA 9225 took effect , who shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the same oath.

The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories

of natural - born citizens who became citizens of a foreign country but the
terminology used is different , “re-acquired” for the first group , and
“retain” for the second group.
 1

7. S U F F R A G E
LOIDA NICOLAS - LEWIS vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006, 497 SCRA 649

A perusal of the Constitution suggests that Section 1 of Article V

prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for the right
to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 of the same article authorizes
Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote , implying that
a non-resident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the
preceding section, be allowed to vote. In response to this mandate , the
Congress enacted RA 9189 of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.

The Court also noted that there is no provision in the dual

citizenship law - RA 9225 - requiring “duals” to actually establish and
physically stay in the Philippine first before they can exercise their right
to vote. On the contrary, RA 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals”
are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5 (1) the same right
of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under RA 9189 . It cannot
be overemphasized that RA 9189 aims , in essence, to enfranchise as much
as possible all overseas Filipinos who , save for the residency requirements
exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions , are qualified
to vote.

** “Absentee Voting” refers to the process by which qualified citizens of

the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote.
** “Overseas Absentee Voter” refers to a citizen of the Philippines who
is qualified to register and vote under this Act , not otherwise disqualified by
law, who is abroad on the day of election.

ATTY. ROMULO MACALINTAL vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003, 405 SCRA 614

Section 5 (d) of RA 9189 is not a violation of Sec. 1, Art. V

of the Constitution and is therefore not unconstitutional . The interpretation
here of “residence” is synonymous with “domicile.” Under our election laws
and the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections , an
absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines , as
residence is considered synonymous with domicile.

Comelec should not be allowed to usurp a power that

constitutionally belongs to the Congress . The provisions of the Constitution
should be harmonized with the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003
and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the
winning candidates for president and vice president for the entire
nation must remain in the hands of Congress.

8. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
ARTURO TOLENTINO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 148334, January 21, 2004, 420 SCRA 438

In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of

Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy
in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of
the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the
unexpired term.

In case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before

the expiration of the term, Sec. 2 of RA 6645, as amended,
requires Comelec: (1) to call a special election by fixing the date of
the special election, which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days
nor later than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy
but in case of a vacancy in the Senate , the special election shall
be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election ; and
(2) to give notice to the voters of, among other things, the office
or offices to be voted for.

An election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by

the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the
election failed to do so.

The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation

to the failure to give notice of the special election is whether the want
of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of votes as
 1

would change the results of the special election . If the lack of official
notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that
there was no special election to fill a vacancy , a choice by a small
percentage of voters would be void.

In a general election, where the law fixes the date of the election , the
election is valid without any call by the body charged to administer the
elections.

In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that

expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at
the next general election fixes the date at which the special election
is to be held and operates as the call for that election .
Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is not
invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty
of calling the election failed to do so . This is because the right
and duty to hold the election by some authority and the law thus
charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the
election.

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERMITA

G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006, 488 SCRA 1

While attendance to Congressional hearings is discretionary on the part

of department heads during the “question hour,” such is not the
case in inquiries in aid of legislation , except upon a valid and express
claim of “executive privilege.”

The principle of separation of powers is the reason why executive

officials may not be compelled to attend hearings when the Congress
exercises its oversight functions . Though, this is not the case when the
Congress exercises its power of inquiry in aid of legislation . Sections 21
and 22, Article VI therefore, while closely related and complementary to
each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of
Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may
be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to
conduct a question hour, the objectives of which is to obtain information
in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.

ROMULO L. NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY

G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77

FACTS: Neri was invited by the Senate Committee to attend the joint
investigation on NBN project. He testified that Abalos brokered for ZTE
and was offered P200 million for his approval of the project . He
informed the president about the bribery attempt and was told not to
accept the bribe. When asked what had Neri and the President discussed
about the NBN project, he refused to answer invoking “executive privilege.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the questions that Neri refused to answer are
covered by “executive privilege.”

HELD: YES. The questions are covered by presidential communications

privilege and that this privilege has been validly claimed by the executive
department.

Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of

executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22
find their basis in the principle of separation of powers . While the
executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot
frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with
its demand for information.

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS

G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007, 541 SCRA 456

FACTS: The Senate Committee conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on

account of Senator Enrile’s privilege speech denouncing Standard Chartered
Bank (SCB) for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of RA
8799. During that investigation, SCB representative submitted a letter
presenting its position that these were cases pending in court involving
the same issues subject of the legislative inquiry.

ISSUE: Whether or not the pending cases before the courts could
divest the power of inquiry from the legislature
 1

HELD: NO. The unmistakable objective of the investigation was simply

“to denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank in
selling unregistered foreign securities by conducting an inquiry in aid of
legislation so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent
activity in the future.

Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint

before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the
conduct of legislative investigation.

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV vs. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL

G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 471

FACTS: Trillanes is currently under detention due to charge of coup d’etat

filed against him for his participation in the Oakwood accident . As a
result of his election as Senator, he asked the RTC to allow him to
leave detention in order to attend to his functions as a Senator and to
be allowed to set up an office at his place of detention.

ISSUE: Whether or not Trillanes be allowed to leave detention in

order to attend to his duties as Senator?

HELD: NO. Election to public office does not itself merit the temporary
release of a detention prisoner in order for him to attend to his
official duties. The necessary consequence of arrest and detention is to
curtail the detainee’s physical movement and practice of profession or
occupation including that of holding offices.

ANTERO J. POBRE vs. SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO

A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, 597 SCRA 1

FACTS: Out of personal anger and frustration at not being considered

for the post of Chief Justice, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago delivered
a privilege speech on the Senate floor where she was quoted as
saying that she wanted “to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court ” and calling the
Court a “Supreme Court of idiots.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the privilege speech is actionable criminally or in

a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.

HELD: NO, because her statements, being part of her privilege speech
as a member of Congress was covered by the constitutional provision on
parliamentary immunity. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.

PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY DOES NOT COVER MEDIA

INTERVIEW
ANTONIO TRILLANES IV vs. JUDGE CASTILLO-MARIGOMEN
G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018, 859 SCRA 271

FACTS: During the senate hearing regarding the overpriced Makati City Hall
II Parking Building, some references were made on a 350-hectare estate in
Batangas also referred to a Hacienda Binay, supposedly owned by Tiu.

During media interviews in between the hearings and in response to

media’s request for him to comment on the matter , Trillanes IV expressed
his opinion that Tiu appear to be a “nominee” or “front” or acting as
“dummy” of the actual beneficial owner, former Vice President Binay.

Tiu sued Trillanes IV for damages on his defamatory and libelous

statements. Trillanes IV invoked parliamentary immunity claiming that his
statements were part of public debate on the matter.

ISSUE
Whether the statements made in media interviews covered by
parliamentary immunity.
 2

RULING

NO, the statements made in media interviews were not covered by

the parliamentary immunity.

The privilege of speech or debate under Section 11, Article IV of

the Constitution covers speech delivered in the Senate or any of its
committees, spoken in the course of any debate in said fora , or made
in the official discharge or performance of duties as a Senator . The
statement must be part of or integral to legislative process.

The statements were made during the breaks and gaps of the
hearing, not delivered in Senate committees nor spoken during a debate
therein. They were also not made in the official discharge of duties as
a Senator.

To participate in or respond to media interviews is not demanded by

his sworn duty nor a component of the process of enacting laws .
Indeed, a lawmaker may well be able to discharge his duties and
legislate without having to communicate with the press.

9. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

GEN. GUDANI vs. GEN. SENGA

G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006, 498 SCRA 671

The President has constitutional authority to prevent a member of the

armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry , by virtue of her
power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military
officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice . At
the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance
before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has
adequate remedies under the law to compel such attendance. Any
military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be
compelled to do so by the President . If the President is not so
inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel
the attendance of the military officer . Final judicial orders have the
force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to
faithfully execute.

PIMENTEL vs. ERMITA

G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005, 472 SCRA 587

The President has the authority to issue acting appointments while

Congress is in session.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while

Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of
the president, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have
the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a
department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a
person of her choice even while Congress is in session . That person
may or may not be the permanent appointee , but practical reason may
make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent
appointee.

Distinguishing ad-interim appointments from appointments in an acting

capacity:

Both of them are effective upon acceptance.

But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess

of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended
any time there is a vacancy.

Moreover, ad-interim appointments are submitted to the

Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments.

PIMENTEL vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005, 462 SCRA 622
 2

Under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President ,

subject to the concurrence of the Senate . The role of the Senate ,
however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent or
concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the
President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate , or having secured
its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of
a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a
serious step that should not be taken lightly , such decision is within the
competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by the
Court via a writ of mandamus.

CONSTANTINO vs. CUISIA

472 SCRA 505, G.R. No. 106064, October 13, 2005, 472 SCRA 505

*** Whether the President can delegate to the Secretary of Finance the
constitutional authority to incur foreign debts.

- - - It fell upon the Secretary of Finance as the alter ego of the

President to formulate a scheme for the implementation of the policy
expressed by the President and respect sovereign debt.

- - - the lack of showing that the President countermanded the acts of

the Secretary of Finance lead to the conclusion that they carried
presidential approval.

RUFINO vs. ENDRIGA

G.R. Nos. 139554 & 139565, July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 112

The source of the President’s power to appoint , as well as the

Legislature’s authority to delegate the power to appoint , is found in
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Under the same section,
the Congress may, by law, vest in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards the appointment of officers lower in
rank. However, the express language of the Constitution and its framers
intend that the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards,
upon whom the legislature may delegate the power of appointment , must
appoint officers of lower rank and not of co-equal rank . Section 6
(b) and (c) of PD 15 is, thus, irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15
empowers the remaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in
the CPP Board, allowing them to elect their fellow trustees. And since
the pertinent section is unconstitutional , the President has the power to
appoint the trustees by virtue of Sec. 16 , Art. VII of the Constitution
which gives the President the power to appoint officers whose
appointments are not provided for by the law.

CLUSTERING OF NOMINEES BY THE JBC

Judge PHILIP A. AGUINALDO et. al. vs. President

BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III et. al.
G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016, 811 SCRA 304

FACTS: The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) submitted to President Aquino
six shortlists contained in six separate letters for the six newly created
positions of Associate Justice of Sandiganbayan . The nominees were clustered
into several lists like for example 17 th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st with five (5)
nominees for each cluster.

On January 20, 2015, President Aquino appointed Justices to the vacant

positions, but did not pick up the nominees from the clustered concerned
but appointed Justices from one cluster to another position.

Petitioners who were listed in the cluster for the 17 th Justice questioned
the appointments. They contented that the President could chose one
nominee from each of the six separate shortlists for each specific vacancy
and no other and the appointment made in deviation of this procedure
is a violation of Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution.

ISSUE
Whether the President is limited to appoint only from the nominees
in the shortlist submitted by the JBC for each specific vacancy.

RULING
 2

NO. The power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to

restrict or limit the President’s power to appoint as the latter’s
prerogative to choose someone whom he considers worth appointing to
the vacancy in the judiciary is still paramount.

As long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated

by the JBC, the appointment is valid.

President Aquino was not obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan

from each of the shortlists submitted by the JBC , especially when the
clustering of nominees into the six shortlists encroached on President
Aquino’s power to appoint members of the Judiciary from all those whom
the JBC had considered to be qualified for the same position of
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.

Clustering nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for

Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into six separate shortlists impairs the
President’s power to appoint members of the Judiciary and his statutory
power to determine seniority of the newly appointed Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice.

Moreover, the clustering can be used as device to favor or

prejudice a qualified nominee. A favored nominee can be included in a
cluster with no other strong contender to ensure his/her appointment , or
conversely, a nominee can be placed in a cluster with many strong
contenders to minimize his/her chances of appointment . Furthermore, the
Court ruled that there are no objective criteria, standards, or guidelines for
the clustering of nominees set by the JBC.
10. RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE

ALEJANO vs. CABUAY

468 SCRA 188, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005

*** Whether the right to privacy of the petitioners who were detained and
charged with staging a coup d’etat was violated because the officials
of the detention center opened and read the letters they were
sending for mailing.

- - Inmates are deemed to have no right to correspond confidentially with

anyone.

- - Inmate mail may be censored for the furtherance of a substantial

government interest such as security or discipline.

- - The inspection of the letters is a valid measure as it serves

the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection
of the contraband.

- - Since the letters were not confidential communication between the

detainees and their lawyer, the officials of the detention center could
read the letter.

- - If the letters are marked confidential communications between the detainees

and their lawyer, the officials should not read the letter but only open
the envelop for inspection in the presence of detainees.

11. JUDICIARY DEPARTMENT

KILOSBAYAN vs. EDUARDO ERMITA
G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007, 526 SCRA 353

FACTS: Justice Gregory Ong was appointed Associate Justice of the

Supreme Court by the president through the Executive Secretary . The
appointment was questioned because Ong is a Chinese citizen as
indicated in his own birth certificate which also reveals both his
parents were Chinese at the time of his birth . Justice Ong
claimed he is a natural born citizen as indicated in the
certification of the Bureau of Immigration and the opinion of the
DOJ Secretary Guingona.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gregory Ong is a natural born citizen.

HELD: NO. He is a naturalized Filipino citizen because his Chinese

father was naturalized in 1964 when he was only eleven years old . The
alleged subsequent recognition of his natural born status by the
Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot prevail since citizenship
status cannot be changed without a judicial order . Until he obtains a
 2

judicial order changing his citizenship status , he cannot accept an

appointment to the Supreme Court as that would be a violation of the
Constitution.

Naturalized Filipino citizens are disqualified from being a member of

the Supreme Court. Under the Constitution, only natural born Filipino
citizen can be appointed as member of the Supreme Court.

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL & BAR COUNCIL

G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 496

FACTS: Under Section 8 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides
that: “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress, as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar , a
professor of law, a retired member of the Supreme Court and a
representative of the private sector.”

In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially

altered. An eight member was added to the JBC as the two (2)
representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in the JBC ,
with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.

In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives

from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.

ISSUE: Whether or not the practice of having two (2) representatives from
each House of Congress with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the
Constitution.

HELD: NO, the provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need
any further interpretations. Construction and interpretation come only after
it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
without them.

Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in the

Council, with one vote each, is to negate the principle of equality
among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the
Constitution.

The unmistakable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8 (1), was to

treat each ex officio member as representing one co-equal branch of
the government. Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven voting

members with the three ex-officio members having equal say in the
choice of judicial nominees.

12. TERM LIMITS

FRANCIS ONG vs. JOSEPH ALEGRE
G.R. No. 163295, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 473

FACTS: In May 1995 elections, Francis Ong was elected mayor of

San Vicente, Camarines Norte. He was re-elected in May 1998 elections,
however, respondent Alegre filed an election protest. The RTC declared
Alegre as the duly elected mayor in 1998 mayoralty contest , albeit
the decision came out only on July 4, 2001 , when Francis Ong
had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact
already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the
municipality of San Vicente.

ISSUE: Whether or not Francis Ong’s assumption of office as

Mayor for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be considered
as full service for the purpose of the three - term limit rule.

HELD: YES. The Court held that such assumption of office constitutes , for
Francis Ong, “service for the full term ,” and should be counted as a full
term in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the Constitutional
and statutory provisions barring local executive officials from being elected
and serving for more than three consecutive term for the same
position.
 2

It is true that the RTC ruled in Election Protest that it was

respondent Alegre who “won” in the 1998 mayoralty race and therefore ,
was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente . However, that
disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and legal use
and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested
office has expired. Petitioner Francis Ong’s contention that he was only
a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation
was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected
Mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San
Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election
coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of
the functions thereof from start to finish of the term , should legally
be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-
term rule.

For the three - term limit for elective government officials to apply ,
two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: 1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three (3) terms in the same local
government post, and 2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive
terms.

ROMEO LONZANIDA vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602

Petitioner Lonzanida was elected and served for two consecutive

terms as mayor of San Antonio , Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995
elections. He then ran again for the same position in the May
1995 elections, won and discharged his duties as Mayor. However, his
opponent contested his proclamation and filed an election protest before
the RTC of Zambales, which, in a decision dated January 9, 1997,
ruled that there was a failure of election and declared the position
vacant. The Comelec affirmed this ruling and petitioner Lonzanida
acceded to the order to vacate the post. Lonzanida assumed the
office and performed his duties up to March 1998 only . Now, during
the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again ran for mayor of the same
town. A petition to disqualify, under the three-term rule, and was
eventually granted. However, the Court held that Lonzanida cannot be
considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May
1995, and that he did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoralty term
by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office . As the Court pointed
observed, Lonzanida “cannot be deemed to have served the May
1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate and in
fact vacated his post before the expiration of the term.

DIFFERENCE between ONG & LONZANIDA rulings

In Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election was declared a
nullity for the stated reason of “failure of election,” and as a
consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor - elect was
nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of
mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998
mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a
result of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective interruption
of the continuity of service.

On the other hand, the failure - of - election factor does not obtain
in Ong’s case. There was actually no interruption or break in the
continuity of Francis Ong’s service respecting the 1998-2001 term . Unlike
Lonzanida, Ong was never unseated during the term in question , he
never ceased discharging his duties and responsibilities as Mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte for the entire period covering the 1998-2001
term.

ATTY. VENANCIO RIVERA vs. COMELEC & MARINO MORALES

G.R. No. 167591, May 9, 2007, 523 SCRA 41

FACTS: It is undisputed that respondent Marino Morales was elected to

the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following consecutive terms:

a) July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998

b) July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001
c) July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004
d) July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007
 2

Respondent Morales argued and the Comelec held that the July
1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 term is not his fourth because his
second term, July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 to which he was
elected and which he served, may not be counted since his
proclamation was declared void by the RTC of Angeles City , which
decision became final and executory on August 6, 2001 and besides
he was preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-graft
case from January 16, 1999 to July 15, 1999 . He claimed he was
only a “caretaker of the office” or as a “de facto officer.”

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Morales had served as mayor for

three consecutive terms and therefore is ineligible to run for
another term or fourth term.

HELD: YES. Respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998
to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as Mayor until
June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the
decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee
ousting respondent as mayor. Such circumstance does not constitute an
interruption in serving the full term. Respondent Morales is now
serving his fourth term . He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously
without any break since July 1, 1995 . By June 30, 2007, he will
have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years.
Respondent Morales should be promptly ousted from the position of
mayor of Mabalacat.

In the light of the foregoing, respondent Morales cannot be

considered a candidate in the May 2004 elections. Not being a
candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and
must be considered stray votes.

As a consequence of Morales’ ineligibility , a permanent vacancy in

the contested office has occurred . This should now be filled by the
vice mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government
Code.

RAYMUNDO ADORMEO vs. COMELEC & RAMON TALAGA

G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002, 376 SCRA 90

Assumption of the office of mayor in a recall election for the

remaining term is not the “term” contemplated under Section 8, Article
X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA 7160.

As the Court observed , there was a “break” in the service of

private respondent Ramon T. Talaga as mayor . He was a “private
citizen” for a time before running for mayor in the recall elections.

JOEL G. MIRANDA vs. ANTONIO M. ABAYA

G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 617

“There can be no valid substitution where a candidate is

excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and cancellation
of his certificate of candidacy.”

ROBERTO LACEDA vs. RANDY LIMENA

G.R. No. 181867, November 25, 2008, 571 SCRA 603

Where a person has been elected for three consecutive terms

as Punong Barangay and prior to the end or termination of such
three-year term, the municipalities of Sorsogon and Bacon were merged
and converted into Sorsogon City as a new political unit , without the
city charter interrupting his term until the end of the three-year term ,
the prohibition applies to prevent him from running for the fourth
time as Punong Barangay thereof, there being no break in the
continuity of his term.

FEDERICO MONTEBON vs. COMELEC & SESINANDO POTENCIOSO

G.R. No. 180444, April 9, 2008, 551 SCRA 50

FACTS: Potencioso was elected for three consecutive terms as

municipal councilor in 1998-2001 , 2001-2004 and 2004-2007. However, the
service of his second term in 2001-2004 was interrupted on
January 12, 2004 when he succeeded as vice mayor due to the
retirement of Vice Mayor Petronilo L. Mendoza . During the 2007
 2

elections, his candidacy for municipal councilor was assailed because

he is allegedly disqualified from running for the same position as
it would be his fourth consecutive terms.

ISSUE: Whether or not Potencioso deemed to have fully served his

second term thereby disqualifying him to run for municipal councilor.

HELD: NO. His assumption of office as vice mayor in January

2004 was an involuntary severance from his office as municipal
councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-
2004 term. Consequently, he is qualified to run for municipal
councilor.

13. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICER

CONSTANTINO GUMARU vs. QUIRINO STATE COLLEGE
G.R. No. 161496, June 22, 2007, 525 SCRA 412

FACTS: On June 25, 1985, C. T. Gumaru Construction and Quirino

State College through its president Julian Alvarez , entered into an
agreement for the construction of the state college’s building . On
October 17, 1997, Gumaru filed a complaint for damages against the
respondent college and its president . Respondent state college was
instead represented by a private lawyer who made no move to
protect its interest except to file a motion to dismiss the complaint
filed against the state college, which was eventually denied by the
trial court. No answer to the complaint was filed notwithstanding
due receipt of the order directing its filing, as a consequence of
which the state college was declared in default . The order of
default itself was not reconsidered , no move whatsoever having
been made in that direction. Gumaru was allowed to present its
evidence ex-parte. When the decision was rendered adjudging the state
college and its president Alvarez liable to the plaintiff, no effort was
made to appeal the decision notwithstanding due receipt of a copy
thereof by the private lawyer. Thus, a writ of execution was issued
against the properties of the state college which by this time
remained as the sole defendant , Julian Alvarez having died during the
pendency of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state college be bound by or estopped

by the mistakes or negligent acts of its officials or agents, much
more non-suited as a result thereof.

HELD: NO. The State has to protect its interests and cannot be
bound by, or estopped by the mistakes or negligent acts of its
officials or agents, much more non-suited as a result thereof . The
legality of legal representation can be raised and questioned at any
stage of the proceedings.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is mandated to act

as the law office of the government, its agencies, instrumentalities,
officials and agents in any litigation or proceeding requiring the services
of a lawyer. With respect to government–owned or controlled corporations
(GOCCs), the OSG shall act as counsel only when authorized by the
President or by the head of the office concerned.

The principal law office of GOCCs is the Office of the Government

Corporate Counsel (OGCC).

Respondent state college is classified under the Administrative Code

as a chartered institution, viz:

(12) Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or

operating under a special charter, and vested by law with
functions relating to specific constitutional policies or
objectives. This term includes the state universities and
colleges and the monetary authority of the State.

The Solicitor General cannot refuse to represent the government , its

agencies, instrumentalities, officials and agents without a just and valid
reason. He should not desist from appearing before the Court even in
those cases where his opinions may be inconsistent with the
government or any of its agents he is expected to represent. (Orbos vs. Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990, 189 SCRA 459).
 2

As in the case of fiscals or prosecutors, bias or prejudice and

animosity or hostility do not constitute legal and valid excuses for
inhibition. (Enriquez vs. Hon. Gimenez, 107 Phil. 932 (1960)]

Unlike a practicing lawyer who has the right to decline

employment, a fiscal or prosecutor, or the Solicitor General in the
case at bar, cannot refuse to perform his functions without violating
his oath of office. (Enriquez vs. Gimenez, supra).

Government agencies were admonished not to reject the services of

the Solicitor General, or otherwise fail or refuse to forward the papers
of a case to the OSG for appropriate action . (Orbos vs. Civil Service
Commission, supra).

The fee of the lawyer who rendered legal service to the government
in lieu of the OSG or the OGCC is the personal liability of
the government official who hired his services without the prior
written conformity of the OSG or the OGCC, as the case may be.
(Polloso vs. Gangan, 390 Phil. 1101 (2000).

The Solicitor General is thus expected to be the official who

would best uphold and protect the legal interests of the government .
His non-representation of the government is dangerous and should not
be allowed.

GERARDO R. VILLASEÑOR vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 180700, March 4, 2008, 547 SCRA 658

FACTS: Villaseñor is facing both criminal and administrative charges

in connection with the Manor Hotel disaster. He was preventively
suspended for a period of six months in the administrative case .
During the pendency of the criminal case , the Sandiganbayan ordered
his suspension for a period of 90 days upon the motion of
the Special Prosecutor. He questions the said suspension as the
same was absorbed in the administrative case as both the
criminal and administrative cases were anchored on the same set
of facts.

ISSUE: Whether or not the preventive suspension in an administrative

proceeding a bar for a preventive suspension in a criminal case
on the same facts and circumstances.

HELD: NO. It is well-settled preventive suspension under Section 13

of RA 3019 is mandatory. There are three kinds of remedies that

are available against a public officer for impropriety in the

performance of his powers and discharge of his duties : (1) civil, (2)
criminal, and (3) administrative. These remedies may be invoked separately ,
alternately, simultaneously or successively. Sometimes, the same offense
may be the subject of all three kinds of remedies.

It is clear that criminal and administrative cases are distinct from

each other. The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are
altogether different from administrative matters. Verily, administrative case
may proceed independently of criminal proceedings.

PRUDENCIO QUIMBO vs. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN GERVACIO

G.R. No. 155620, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 277

FACTS: Quimbo was placed under preventive suspension without pay for a
period of two (2) months and seventeen (17) days. The Deputy Ombudsman
found him guilty of oppression and recommended that he be suspended
from office for a period of eight (8) months. On appeal, the appellate
court modified the decision and reduced the penalty for a period of
two (2) months suspension without pay.

ISSUE: Whether or not the service of preventive suspension of 2

months and 17 days be credited as service of penalty of 2
months suspension without pay.

HELD: NO. Preventive suspension is not a penalty but merely a

preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.
The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused
from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his
service to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which
may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after
 2

such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated

is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he
is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.

Clearly, service of the preventive suspension cannot be credited as

service of penalty.

DR. DEMETRIO BEROÑA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 142456, July 27, 2004, 435 SCRA 303

FACTS: Dr. Beroña was the Provincial Health Officer when he was
charged for violation of RA 3019 before the Sandiganbayan . During
the pendency of the proceeding , he resigned from the Health
Office and he ran and won as Municipal Mayor of Pilar , Abra.
After the arraignment, Sandiganbayan suspended him from office for
90 days. Dr. Beroña claims that preventive suspension would no
longer applicable to him as he no longer occupying the position
when he was charged under RA 3019.

ISSUE: Whether or not suspension pendente lite applies to any

office the officer might be currently holding.

HELD: YES. The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all

persons indicted upon a valid information. The term “office” in Section
13 of the law applies to any office which the officer might
currently be holding and not necessarily the particular office in
relation to which he is charged.

Preventive suspension is mandatory and there are no “ifs” and

“buts” about it.

GUALBERTO CASTRO vs. HON. RICARDO GLORIA

G.R. No. 132174, August 20, 2001, 363 SCRA 417

FACTS: Castro was found guilty of immorality by the DECS

Regional Office and was meted the penalty of dismissal from the
service. He impugns the correctness of the penalty of dismissal from
the service and seeks the payment of back salaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not Castro is entitled for reduction of his

penalty of dismissal, reinstatement and payment of back salaries.

HELD: YES so far as the reduction of penalty of dismissal from

the service and reinstatement are concerned . Inasmuch as the present
charge of immorality constitutes the first charge of this nature , the
Supreme Court reduced the penalty of dismissal imposed to one (1)
year suspension from office without pay. In view of the length of time
he has been out of the service , the penalty of suspension to have
been fully served. He was ordered to be reinstated to office
immediately.

The issue regarding payment of back salaries during the period

that a member of the civil service is out of work , but subsequently
ordered reinstated is settled in our jurisdiction . Such payment of salaries
corresponding to the period when an employee is not allowed to
work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges . However,
if the employee is not completely exonerated of the charges such as
when the penalty of dismissal is reduced to mere suspension , he would
not be entitled to the payment of his back salaries.

UPON DEATH OF RESPONDENT - DENIAL OF

DUE PROCESS PRECLUDES ADMINISTRATIVE
CASE

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. CAROLINA P. JUEN

G.R. No. 200577, August 17, 2016, 800 SCRA 646

FACTS: In an administrative case, respondent Carolina, Budget Officer I, was

adjudged guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service , when she allegedly paid someone to take
the December 20, 1996 Civil Service Professional Examinations on her behalf .
 2

Carolina denied the allegations and claimed that she personally took the
examinations.

On appeal, Carolina argued that she was denied of her right to due
process and of her right to be informed of the cause of accusations
against her.

On the other hand, CSORO V claims that Carolina was given an

opportunity to present her case . It stated that although it was true that
the notice for the September 3, 2003 hearing was only received by
Carolina on the same day , her counsel received the notice of hearing for
November 13, 2003 two days prior to the scheduled hearing or on
November 11, 2003.

However, during the pendency of her appeal to the CA , Carolina died

from ovarian cancer. The counsel manifested that the Carolina’s heirs are
very much interested on the outcome of the petition as they stand to
benefit from whatever claims and benefits Carolina may be entitled should
a favorable judgment be rendered.

ISSUE
Whether Carolina was denied of her right to due process for CSC’s
failure to notify her of the hearing.

RULING
YES. Carolina was denied of her right to due process for CSC’s
failure to notify her of the hearing.

As a general rule, the death of a respondent does not preclude the

finding of administrative case , except in cases when: (a) due process may
be subverted (b) equitable and humanitarian cases and (c) the penalty
imposed or imposable would render the proceeding useless. The Court finds
that first exception applies.

Here, the case was pending appeal with the CA when the respondent
Carolina passed away. The CA was duty bound to render a ruling on
the issue of whether or not the respondent was indeed administratively
liable of the alleged infraction. However, in its decision, the CA found
that the respondent Carolina was deprived of her right to due process.

Nonetheless, the Court agrees with the CA when it found that the
respondent was deprived of her right to due process. The Court noted

that Carolina’s non-appearance cannot be attributed to her . As Carolina’s

counsel was in Cebu City and the hearing was to be conducted in
Legazpi City, it would be impossible for Carolina to attend the hearing .
Also, Carolina and her counsel were not given enough time to attend
the scheduled hearing, As such, she was deprived of her right to
adduce evidence.

MERE MISDECLARATION OF SALN IS NOT DISHONESTY

ATTY. AMADO Q. NAVARRO vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 210128, August 17, 2016, 801 SCRA 46

FACTS: Navarro, a CPA-Lawyer, was employed by the BIR as chief

revenue officer IV.

Subsequently, DOF-RIPS found that Navarro, based on his SALN, amassed

landholdings in Baguio since he became the Revenue District Officer there
and had already constructed three structures on these lands . The DOF-RIPS
came to the conclusion that Navarro’s substantial real property ownership is
manifestly out of proportion to his lawful income.

Afterwards, the Ombudsman found Navarro guilty of the charges against

him.

Navarro submits that he accomplished his annual SALN in accordance

with the prescribed format by the CSC , the details of which. to the
best of his knowledge and belief, were generally accepted in the
government service and was in substantial compliance with the provisions of
law. He could not have declared other assets or exclusively his as
he co-owns these properties with his siblings.

ISSUE
 3

Whether Navarro’s failure to declare in detail his assets and business

interests in his SALN sufficient to hold him administratively liable for
dishonesty and grave misconduct.

RULING
NO. Dishonesty implies that the person intends to lie , cheat, deceive,
betray, or defraud.

Misconduct, on the other hand , is the intentional wrongdoing or

deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. The
misconduct must relate to or be connected with the performance of the
public officer’s duties for it to be considered an administrative offense.

In this case, the Court believes that Navarro’s lumping of his

properties in his SALN does not automatically amount to making an
untruthful statement. The mere misdeclaration in the SALN does not
automatically amount to dishonesty except in cases where public employee’s
wealth becomes manifestly disproportionate to the income without sufficient
explanation. Also Navarro cannot be said to have committed simple
negligence for improper accomplishment of SALNs , as he was not given
the opportunity to correct the entries in his SALNs.

CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEE INVALIDLY DISMISSED IS

ENTITLED FOR BACKWAGES AND REINSTATEMENT
JULIUS B. CAMPOL vs. MAYOR RONALD S. BALAO-AS et. al.
G.R. No. 197634, November 28, 2016, 810 SCRA 501

FACTS: Campol served as Secretary of the Sanggunian Bayan (SB) of the

Municipality of Baliney, Abra since 1999.

During the 2004 elections , Balao-as and Sianen won as mayor and
vice mayor, respectively. Thereafter their assumption to office, The SB
passed a resolution terminating Campol as SB Secretary on the ground
that he was absent without approved leave from August 1, 2004 to
September 30, 2004.

Campol challenged his dismissal before the CSC-CAR which ruled in

his favor, however, Vice Mayor Sianen issued a Memorandum dropping
Campol from the rolls.

The CSC granted his appeal and ruled that Campol was properly
dropped from the rolls.

The CA ruled that Campol was illegally dropped from the rolls ,
however, it refused his reinstatement as he was gainfully employed with
the PAO since October 2005 . He was awarded backwages only from the
time of his dismissal until October 2005 , prior to his employment with
another government agency.

ISSUES
1) Whether Campol is entitled to reinstatement.

2) Whether Campol should be awarded backwages only for the period

covering his illegal dismissal until his new employment with the PAO.

RULINGS
1) YES, Campol should be reinstated to his position as SB Secretary.

In the event that another person has already been appointed to his
post, that person has to give way to the employee whose right to the
office has been recognized by the competent authorities.

In the eyes of the law , the position never became vacant since
Campol was illegally dropped from the rolls.

2) NO. Campol is entitled to the payment of backwages from the time

of his illegal dismissal until he is reinstated to his position . The CA
erred in ruling that the backwages should only cover the period of his
illegal dismissal until his new employment with the PAO.
 3

An employee of the civil service who is ordered reinstated is also

entitled to the full payment of his backwages during the entire period
that he was wrongfully prevented from performing the duties of his position
and from enjoying its benefits. This is necessarily so because, in the
eyes of the law, the employee never truly left the office.

In cases like this, the twin award of reinstatement and payment of

full backwages as dictated by the constitutional mandate to protect civil
service employee’s right to security of tenure. Anything less that this fails
short of the justice due to government employee unfairly removed from
office.

14. NATIONAL EMERGENCY

RANDY DAVID vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 171390, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160

*** DECLARATION OF A STATE OF REBELLION vs. DECLARATION OF

A STATE OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY.
- - - President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was
merely an act declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest.
- - - it is harmless, without legal significance and deemed not
written. (Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary, 421 SCRA 656, G.R. No.
159085, February 3, 2004).
- - - In declaring a state of national emergency , President Arroyo
did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution -
- - a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. (CALLING-OUT POWER).
- - - She also relied on Section 17, Article XII -- a provision on
the state’s extra ordinary power to take over privately-owned public
utility and business affected with public interest.
- - - Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power

- - Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless , without

legal significance or not written, as in the case of declaration of
a state of rebellion.

*** The DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW is a “warning to citizens

that the military power has been called upon by the executive to
assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while
emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment,
not commit any acts which will any way render more difficult the
restoration of order and the enforcement of law. (Aquino vs. Ponce
Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 (1974).

*** Powers that can be exercised by the President as commander-

in-chief where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus:
1. arrests and seizures without judicial warrants
2. ban on public assemblies
3. take-over of news media and agencies and press
censorship
4. issuance of Presidential Decrees

*** “TAKE CARE” POWER

- - - the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws
as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws.
- - - he sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials
and employees of his department.

- - - we all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President

Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause states: “to enforce
obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.

- - - Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued

by President Arroyo is: “ to enforce obedience to all the laws and
to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction.”
**** Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate
“decrees”?
- - - - She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by former
Pres. Marcos under PP 1081.
 3

- - - - Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category

and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the
President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period
of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.

- - - the President is granted an Ordinance Power where she may

issue any of the following:
1. Executive Order (EO)
2. Administrative Order (AO)
3. Proclamations (PP)
4. Memorandum Order (MO)
5. Memorandum Circular (MC)
6. General or Special Orders (GO or SO)

- - - President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing

issuances.

- - - The Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional

insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate “decrees.”

**** Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and

laws through the military?

- - - With respect to “laws,” she cannot call the military to

enforce or implement certain laws, such as custom laws, laws
governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and
contracts and the like.

--- She can only order the military , under PP 1017, to enforce
laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

*** POWER TO TAKE OVER

- - - President’s authority to declare “a state of national emergency”

vs. authority to exercise emergency powers.

- - - President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state

of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional
enactment.

- - - But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking

over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest, is a different matter -- this requires delegation from
Congress.

- - - Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers.

Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it.

- - - During grave emergencies, for possible or practical purposes, it

is deemed wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to
the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
1. there must be a war or other emergency
2. the delegation must be for a limited period only.
3. the delegation must be subject to such restrictions
as the Congress may prescribe.
4. the emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a
national policy declared by Congress.

- - - Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of

the emergency powers clause and that power refers to Congress,
not the president.

--- the taking over of private business affected with public

interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally
reposed upon Congress.

- - - “tsunami,” “typhoon,” “hurricane” and “similar occurrences” are

limited view of “emergency.”

- - - “Emergency” as contemplated in our Constitution may include

rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood or
other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportion or effect.

- - - Legislative power, through which extraordinary measures are

exercised, remains in Congress even in times of crisis . (Araneta
vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949).
 3

- while the President alone can declare a state of national

emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take
over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest.

- - - Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to

point out the types of businesses affected with public
interest that should be taken over.

- - - in short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise

all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article XII in the
absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

**** “AS APPLIED CHALLENGE”

- - - the rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the right

against warrantless arrest, and the freedom of speech, of
expression, of the press, and of assembly under the Bill of
Rights suffered the greater blow

**** Can the Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O.

No. 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In general, does the
illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional?

- - - Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare

statutes invalid although they may be abused and misabused and
may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application.

- - - the validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined

from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish
the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case.

- - - PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the President’s calling-out

power but there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police,
expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or
violate the citizen’s constitutional rights

- - - the Court cannot adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional

on the ground that its implementation committed illegal acts.

- - - the criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance

is to be measured is the essential basis for the exercise of
power and not a mere incidental result arising from its execution.

- - - the absence of a law defining “acts of terrorism” may result

in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military
and therefore the Court declares that the “acts of terrorism”
portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.

- - - there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizes the military or

police to commit acts beyond what are necessary and appropriate
to suppress and prevent lawless violence the limitation of their
authority in pursuing the Order. Otherwise such acts are considered
illegal.

- - - “Assembly” means a right on the part of the citizens to

meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs . It is
a necessary consequence of our republican institution and
complements the right of speech.

- - - As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not

to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a
right to prevent.

- - - Like other rights embraced in the freedom of expression, the

right to assemble is not subject to previous restraint or
censorship.

- - - it may not be conditional upon the prior issuance of a

permit or authorization from the governmental authorities except, of
course, if the assembly is intended to be held in a public place
and not for the assembly itself, may be validly required.

- - - the ringing truth is that petitioner David et. al. were arrested
while they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly. They
were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of
a clear and present danger that warranted the limitation of that
right.
 3

- - - Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a

crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot
be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meeting
cannot be branded as criminals on that score.

- - - the dispersal and arrest of the members of the KMU was

done merely on the basis of Malacañang directives canceling all
permits previously issued by local government unit is arbitrary - - -
the wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant
disregard of the principle that “freedom of assembly is not be
limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right
to prevent.

- - - Under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies

is lodged with the local government units . They have the power
to issue permits and to revoke such permit after due notice and
hearing on the determination of the presence of clear and present
danger.

- - - while admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and

sealed like the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers,
yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their
enforcement duties.

--- the search and seizure of materials for publication, the

stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the Daily Tribune offices ,
and the arrogant warning of government officials to media , are
plain censorship.

15. ELECTION LAW

COMELEC JURISDICTION vs. HRET JURISDICTION
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 522
G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013, 709 SCRA 197

FACTS: On 31 October 2012, Joseph Tan filed before the Comelec a petition
to deny due course or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Regina
Reyes on the ground of material representations specifically among others
that she is not a Filipino citizen but rather an American citizen .

During the course of the proceedings , Joseph Tan presented a database

record of the Bureau of Immigration indicating that Regina O. Reyes is an
American citizen and a holder of a U.S. passport which she used in the
various travels abroad.

On 27 March 2013, the Comelec First Division found that , contrary to the
declarations she made in her COC, Regina O. Reyes is not a citizen of
the Philippines because of her failure to comply with requirements of RA
9225 or the Citizenship Re-acquisition and Retention Act of 2003 namely :
(1) to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines ; and
(2) to make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship
before any public officer to administer an oath . In addition, the Comelec
ruled that she did not have the one year residency requirement under
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, she is ineligible to run
for the position of representative for the lone district of Marinduque.

On 8 April 2013, Reyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that

she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she has not lost such
status by simply obtaining and using an American passport.

On 14 May 2013, the Comelec en banc promulgated a resolution denying

Reyes’ Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, Regina Reyes was proclaimed

winner of the 13 May 2013 elections.

On 5 June 2013, the Comelec en banc issued a Certificate of Finality

declaring its 14 May 2013 Resolution final and executory.

On same day, Regina Reyes took her oath of office before Speaker
Belmonte of the House of Representatives.

Reyes has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts at
noon of 30 June 2013.
 3

ISSUES: (1) Who has jurisdiction over the case?

(2) When is a candidate considered a Member of the House of

Representatives?

HELD: (1) The Comelec retains jurisdiction for the following reasons:

First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of
Reyes’ qualifications, as well as over the assailed Comelec
Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal .
Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action.

Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the

candidate is considered a member of the House of Representatives
as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

(2) To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives , there

must be a concurrence of the following requisites : (a) a valid proclamation; (b)
a proper oath; and (c) assumption of office.

The Court has invariably hold that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House
of Representatives, the Comelec jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his election, returns, and qualification ends, and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins.

Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of

Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office as
the term of office begins only at noon on the 30 th day of June next
following their election. Thus, until such time, the Comelec retains
jurisdiction.

Disqualified Candidate cannot be voted upon

REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 163776, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23

FACTS: Cayat and Palileng were the only candidates for the mayoralty post
in Buguias, Benguet, in the 10 May 2004 local elections . Palileng filed a
petition for disqualification against Cayat . Palileng’s petition alleged that:
Cayat is not eligible to run as Mayor having been convicted by final
judgment for a criminal offense for the Crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness. In fact, Cayat is still under probation at the time he
filed his Certificate of Candidacy.

COMELEC cancelled Cayat’s COC. In the local elections held on 10

May 2004, Cayat’s name remained on the COMELEC’s list of candidates.
Cayat received the highest number of votes . Cayat was thus proclaimed
the duly elected Mayor of Buguias, Benguet. Cayat took his oath of
office on 17 May 2004.

Palileng moved for the execution of COMELEC’s order canceling the

certificate of candidacy of Cayat . The latter thereby, annulled the
proclamation of petitioner Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat . The new MBOC
proclaimed Palileng as Mayor of Buguias , Benguet. Palileng took his oath
of office on the same day.

ISSUE: Whether or not the orders canceling Cayat’s COC, nullifying Cayat’s
proclamation as Mayor of Buguias , Benguet, and declaring Palileng as Mayor
of Buguias, Benguet are valid.

HELD: YES. There is no doubt as to the propriety of Palileng’s

proclamation. The COMELEC’s Resolution of 12 April 2004 canceling Cayat’s
certificate of candidacy due to disqualification became final and executory on
17 April 2004 when Cayat failed to pay the prescribed filing fee . Thus,
Palileng was the only candidate for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet in the 10
May 2004 elections. Twenty-three days before Election Day, Cayat was
already disqualified by final judgment to run for Mayor in the 10 May
2004 elections. Palileng was not a second placer. On the contrary, Palileng
was the sole and only placer. Consequently, Palileng’s proclamation as Mayor
of Buguias, Benguet is beyond question.

The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final

judgment before an election cannot be voted for , and votes cast for him
shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law under Section
6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987.
 3

Cayat’s proclamation is void because the decision disqualifying him had

already become final on 17 April 2004 . There is no longer any need to
ascertain whether there was actual knowledge by the voters of Cayat’s
disqualification when they cast their votes on Election Day because the law
mandates that Cayat’s votes “shall not be counted .” There is no
disenfranchisement of the 8,164 voters . Rather, the 8,164 voters are deemed
by law to have deliberately voted for a non-candidate , and thus their votes
are stray and shall not be counted.

Valid Substitution to non-age Candidate

JOY CHRISMA B. LUNA vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 165983, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 107

FACTS: On 15 January 2004, Luna filed her COC for the position of vice-
mayor of Lagayan, Abra as a substitute for Hans Roger, who withdrew his
certificate of candidacy on the same date . The name of Hans Roger was
removed from the list of candidates and was replaced by the name of
Luna.

Private respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of the certificate

of candidacy or disqualification of Luna alleging that Luna’s COC was
not validly filed because the substitution by Luna for Hans Roger was
invalid due to the fact that Hans Roger was only 20 years old on
election day and therefore, was disqualified to run for vice-mayor and
cannot be substituted by Luna.

The COMELEC ruled that Hans Roger, being under age, could not be
considered to have filed a valid COC and therefore , is not a valid
candidate who could be substituted by Luna.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it

ruled that there was no valid substitution by Luna for Hans Roger.

HELD: YES. The substitution of Luna for Hans Roger was valid . When a
candidate files his COC, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive
and acknowledge its receipt pursuant to Sec. 76 of the Election Code .
Since Hans Roger withdrew his COC and the COMELEC found that Luna
complied with all the procedural requirements for a valid substitution , Luna
may validly substitute for Hans Roger.

The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form . In
Sanchez vs. Del Rosario, the Court ruled that the question of eligibility or
ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper
cognizance of the COMELEC.

If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of

birth or age in his COC, his eligibility may only be impugned through a
verified petition to deny due course to or cancel such COC under Section
78 of the Election Code.

UNDER AGE CANDIDATE VALIDLY SUBSTITUTED

OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014, 743 SCRA 426

FACTS: On 1 October 2012, Kimberly filed her COC for councilor of Taguig
City for the 2013 Elections. Her COC stated that she was born on 29
October 1992, or that she will be twenty (20) years of age on the day
of elections, in contravention of the requirement that one must be at
least twenty three (23) years of age on the day of election.

As such, Kimberly was summoned to a clarificatory hearing due to the

age qualification.

Instead of attending the hearing, Kimberly opted to file a sworn

Statement of Withdrawal of COC on 17 December 2012 . Olivia, who
belongs to and is certified by the same political party filed her own
COC as a substitute of Kimberly. Owing to these events, the clarificatory
hearing no longer pushed through.
 3

However, the Comelec Law Department recommended the cancellation of

Kimberly’s COC, and consequently, the denial of the substitution of
Kimberly by Olivia. This recommendation was affirmed by Comelec.

ISSUES
(1) Whether the cancellation of Kimberly’s COC was proper.

(2) Whether Olivia complied with all of the requirements for a

valid substitution.

RULINGS
(1) NO. The Comelec has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge
receipts of COCs.

Comelec has no discretion to give or not to give due course to

COCs and its duty to give due course to COCs in due form is
ministerial in character.

While the Comelec may look into patent defects in the COCs , it may
not go into matters not appearing on their face.

The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the

usual and proper cognizance of the Comelec.

As such, the cancellation of Kimberly’s COC was not proper.

(2) YES. Under the express provision of Sec. 77 of BP Bldg. 881 , not
just any person, but only “an official candidate of a registered or
accreditated political party may be substituted.

In the case at bar , Kimberly was an official nominee of the Liberal

Party, thus, she can be validly substituted.

All the foregoing requisites were complied with in the case at bar .
First, there was a valid withdrawal of Kimberly COC after the last day

for the filing of COCs. Second, Olivia belongs to and is certified to by

the same political party to which Kimberly belongs; and third, Olivia filed
her COC not later than mid-day of election day.

Therefore, Olivia can substitute Kimberly.

No valid Substitution - Material Representation

SILVERIO TAGOLINO vs. COMELEC & LUCY TORRES GOMEZ

G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013, 693 SCRA 574

FACTS: Richard Gomez filed his COC with Comelec for congressman of
Leyte for May 2010 elections . A petition was filed before the Comelec
to cancel COC of Richard Gomez for his failure to meet the one (1)
year residency requirement. The Comelec granted the petition without
qualification stating that Richard Gomez is disqualified. Thereafter, Richard’s
wife, Lucy Torres filed her COC as official substitute candidate of
Richard Gomez with the party’s endorsement. Comelec allowed the
substitution.

When the elections were conducted, Richard Gomez, whose name

remained on the ballots, garnered the highest number of votes. In view of
substitution, Lucy Torres was proclaimed the winner.

ISSUE: Whether Lucy Torres validly substituted Richard Gomez as a

congressional candidate in the said election.

HELD: NO. The substitution is invalid. Considering that section 77 of the OEC
requires that there be a candidate in order for substitution to take
place, as well as the precept that a person without a valid COC is
not considered as a candidate at all , it necessarily follows that if a
person’s COC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or
she cannot be validly substituted in the electoral process . The existence
of a valid COC is therefore a condition sine qua non for a
disqualified candidate to be validly substituted.

Moreover, Section 77 expressly enumerates that substitution is permissible

when an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party
“dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause.” Noticeably, material
 3

representation cases are not included and therefore cannot be a valid

basis to proceed with candidate substitution.

Richard Gomez’ failure to comply with the residency requirement

constitutes a material representation of one’s qualification which is a
ground for the denial to and/or cancellation of his COC and not for
disqualification. This makes COC void ab initio. Consequently, his wife
cannot validly substitute him as a candidate in the said election.

NUISANCE CANDIDATE

JOSEPH B. TIMBOL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015, 751 SCRA 456

FACTS: On October 5, 2012, Timbol filed a certificate of candidacy for

councilor of the Second District of Caloocan City.

On January 15, 2013, Timbol was ordered to appear before the

Comelec for a clarificatory hearing in connection with his certificate of
candidacy.

Timbol, together with his counsel, appeared before Election Officer Valencia.
During the clarificatory hearing, Timbol argued that he was not a nuisance
candidate and contended that in the 2010 elections, he ranked eight
among all the candidates who ran for councilors in the second district .
He allegedly had sufficient resources to sustain his campaign.

The clarificatory panel assured him that his name would be deleted
from the list of nuisance candidates and that his certificate of
candidacy would be given due course.

Despite Election Officer Valencia’s favorable recommendation , Timbol’s name

was not removed from the list of nuisance candidates posted in the
Comelec website.

With the printing of ballots for the automated elections set on

February 4, 2013, Timbol filed on February 2, 2013, a petition praying
that his name be included in the certified list of candidates.

In the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013 , the Comelec denied the
petition for being moot considering that the printing of ballots had
already begun.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether Timbol was denied due process for being considered a
nuisance candidate.

(2) Who are nuisance candidates?

(3) When is a case moot and academics and what are the
recognized exceptions.

HELD: (1) YES. The opportunity to be heard is a chance “to explain

one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. In election cases, due process requirements are
satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand.

To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates , their

certificate of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by
Comelec. This denial or cancellation may be “moto propio or upon a
verified petition of an interested party subject to an opportunity to be
heard.

(2) Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificate of candidacy
“to put the election process in mockery or disrespect or to cause
confusion among the voters by the similarity of the name of the
registered candidates or other circumstances or acts clearly demonstrate
that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for
which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and, thus prevent a
faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.

(3) A case is moot and academic, if it “ceases to present a justiciable

controversy because of supervening events so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value.
 3

When a case is moot and academic , court generally declines jurisdiction

over it. There are recognized exceptions to this rule:

(1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution.

(2) the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was

of paramount public interest.

(3) the issues raised required the formulation of controlling

principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public, and

(4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading review.

16. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW - Prospective Extraditee is entitled to

the grant of bail

GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG vs. HON. FELIXBERTO OLALIA, JR.

G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007, 521 SCRA 470

While the Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to

bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international
treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights , particularly the
right to life and liberty, a re-examination of the Court’s ruling in
Purganan is in order.

First, the Court noted that the exercise of the State’s power to
deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal
proceedings. Respondent, in administrative proceedings, such as deportation
and quarantine, have likewise been detained.

Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our

eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the
exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only . The Court had
admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings.

In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in

detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings (e.g. deportation
proceedings) taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under
international conventions to uphold human rights. If bail can be granted in
deportation cases, the Court sees no justification why it should not
also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases , there is no
reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases . After all, both
are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person
detained is not in issue.

Finally, while our extradition law does not provide for the grant
of bail to an extraditee , however, there is no provision prohibiting
him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process
under the Constitution. The applicable standard of due process, however,
should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings . A new
standard which is termed “clear and convincing evidence ” should be
used in granting bail in extradition cases . This standard should be
lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance
of evidence.

EDUARDO RODRIGUEZ vs. PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC BRANCH 17 of MANILA

G.R. No. 157977, February 27, 2006, 483 SCRA 290

In Purganan case, the Court said that a prospective extraditee is not

entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest ,
because notifying him before his arrest only tips him of his pending
arrest. But this is for cases pending the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, not in a cancellation of a bail that had been issued after
determination that the extraditee is a no-flight risk . The policy is that a
prospective extraditee is arrested and detained to avoid his flight from
justice. On the extraditee lies the burden of showing that he will not
flee once bail is granted. If after his arrest and if the trial court find
that he is no-flight risk , it grants him bail. The grant of the bail ,
presupposes that the co-petitioner has already presented evidence to
prove her right to be on bail , that she is no-flight risk , and the
trial court had already exercised its sound discretion and had already
determined that under the Constitution and laws in force , co-petitioner is
entitled to provisional release. Considering, therefore, that she has not been
shown to be a flight risk nor a danger to the community, she is
entitled to notice and hearing before her bail could be cancelled .
 4

Absent prior notice and hearing , the bail’s cancellation was in violation
of her right to due process.

EXTRADITION TO HONGKONG MAY BE HAD

IF DOUBLE CRIMINALITY IS PROVED
GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG VS. JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ
G.R. No. 207342, November 7, 2017, 844 SCRA 212

FACTS: Petitioner Government of Hongkong filed a motion for

reconsideration of a previous decision by the Supreme Court regarding the
extradition of Muñoz.

In the previous case , the Court ruled that Muñoz can only be
extradited for seven counts of conspiracy to defraud but not for accepting
an advantage as agent because such crime (bribery in private capacity) does
not exist in the Philippines.

Petitioner now cites the case of B vs. Commissioner decided by the

Court of Final Appeal of Hongkong to the effect that agent in Sec. 9
of HKSAR covered public servants in other jurisdiction , supposedly giving
effect to the principle of dual criminality.

ISSUES
1. Whether a person who committed the crime of accepting an
advantage as an agent be extradited.

2. Whether our court take judicial notice of a foreign court’s ruling.

RULINGS

1. NO. Under the rule of specialty in International Law , a Requested

State shall surrender to a Requesting State a person to be tried only
for a criminal offense specified in their treaty of extradition.

Conformably with the dual criminality rule embodied in the extradition

treaty between Philippines and Hongkong , however, the Philippines as the
Requested State is not bound to extradite respondent Muñoz to the
jurisdiction of Hongkong as the Requested State for the offense of
accepting an advantage as an agent considering that extradition treaty is
forthright in providing that surrender shall only be granted for an offense
coming with the descriptions of offenses in its Article 2 insofar as the
offenses are punishable by imprisonment or other forms of detention for
more than one year, or by a more severe penalty according to the laws
of both parties.

2. NO. The Court is not at liberty to take judicial notice of the

ruling of B vs. Commissioner which contravenes our own rules on evidence
under which foreign judgment and laws are not considered as a matter
of a public or notorious nature that proved themselves.

Foreign judgment have to alleged and competently proved like any

other disputed fact.

NON - SIGNATORY TO UNCLOS

MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, et. al. vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT et. al.
G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014, 735 SCRA 102

FACTS: On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian while transiting the Sulu Sea
ran aground on the shoal of Tubbataha Reefs which caused
environmental damage.

On April 17, 2013, the above-named petitioners, including minors or

generations yet unborn filed a petition against the U.S. military officers
involved, President Pinoy and officials of the Philippine government involved in
military exercise and environmental protection for the institution of civil ,
administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of
environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident.
 4

The U.S. government invoked the doctrine of immunity from suit and
being a non-signatory to the treaty of UNCLOS.

ISSUES
(1) Whether the minors petitioners have personality to sue
on behalf of generations yet unborn.

(2) Whether the acts of U.S. respondents are governed by

the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

3) Whether the non-membership in the UNCLOS of U.S. would

disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its
internal waters and territorial sea.

RULINGS
(1) YES. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations
can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned .

Such right is based on “rhythm and harmony of nature” indispensably

include the judicious disposition, utilization and conservation of country’s natural
resources.

Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that

rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology.

The minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes ,

at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.

(2) YES. The U.S. respondents were sued in their official capacity as
commanding officers of the U.S. Navy who had control and supervision over
the USS Guardian and its crew.

The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the

USS Guardian on the Tubbataha Reefs was committed while they were
performing military duty.

Considering that the satisfaction of the judgment against said officials

will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the U.S.
government, the suit is deemed to be one against the U.S. itself.

The principle of State Sovereign Immunity therefore bars the exercise of

jurisdiction of our Supreme Court over the persons of respondents Swift , Rice
and Robling.

(3) NO. The non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the
U.S. will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State
over its internal waters and territorial sea.

The U.S. government has to bear “international responsibility” under Art.

31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adverse
affected the Tabbataha reefs.

The rationale of U.S. refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its
disagreement with UNCLOS’ regime of deep seabed mining which considers
the ocean and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind and has
nothing to do with the U.S. acceptance of customary international rules
on navigation.

CONDUCT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS BY

THE EXECUTIVE
- PACTA SUNT SERVANDA
ISABELITA C. VINUYA et. al. vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROMULO
G.R. No. 162230, August 13, 2014, 732 SCRA 596

FACTS: Petitioners pray that the Court reconsider the April 28, 2010
decision and declare (1) that the rapes, sexual slavery, torture and other
forms of sexual violence committed against the Filipina comfort women
 4

are crimes against humanity and war crimes under customary international
law; (2) that the Philippines is not bound by the Treaty of Peace with
Japan, insofar as the waiver of the claims of the Filipina comfort
women against Japan is concerned ; (3) that the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs and the Executive Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion
in refusing to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women and for
an apology, legal compensation and other forms of reparation from
Japan.

ISSUE: Whether the public respondents can be compelled to espouse

their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations
against Japan.

HELD: NO. The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department

the conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines whether or not to
espouse petitioners’ claim against the Government of Japan is left to
the exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive Department .

The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the

conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department .

The Waiver Clause in the Treaty of Peace with Japan bound the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to the international law principle of
pacta sunt servanda. The validity of the Treaty of Peace was the
result of the ratification by two consenting parties.

Consequently, the obligations embodied in the Treaty of Peace must

be carried out in accordance with the common and real intention of
the parties at the time the treaty was concluded .

17. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

DENMARK VALMORES vs. DR. CRISTINA ACHACOSO et. al.

G.R. No. 217453. July 19, 2017, 831 SCRA 442

FACTS: Valmores is a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church whose

fundamental beliefs include the strict observance of the Sabbath as a sacred
day which is Saturday, the seventh day of the week.

Valmores was enrolled as a first year student at the MSU-College of

Medicine. Some of his classes and examinations were moved from weekdays
to Saturdays. Hence, he failed to take his Histo Pathology laboratory
examination and received a failing grade despite prior requests to excuse
him.

He elevated the matter before the CHED and in turn indorsed it

directly to MSU President who instructed Achacoso to enforce the CHED
Memorandum which ensures that all higher educational institutions render
respect and compliance to Sec. 5 of the Bill of Rights on the exercise
of the freedom of religion. Despite the foregoing correspondence, Valmores’
request still went unheeded.

Valmores brings the cause to the highest court based on his

constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion, which he argues was violated
by respondents when they refused to enforce the CHED Memorandum.
Respondents, on the other hand, chiefly based their defense on the fact
that MSU had other students who were able to graduate despite being
member of said religion.

ISSUE
Whether the respondents are duty bound by law to enforce CHED
Memorandum which ensures that all higher educational institutions render
proper respect and compliance to Sec. 5 of the Bill of Rights.

RULING

YES, they are bound to enforce the CHED Memorandum in the case
of Valmores.

The freedom of religion enjoys a preferred status among the rights

conferred to each citizen by our fundamental charter.
 4

Our fundamental law, by “imploring the aid of Almighty God,” makes

manifest the State’s respect and recognition of the collective spirituality of
the Filipino embodied under Sec. 5 Article II of the Constitution . The
Constitution guarantees the freedom to believe absolutely, while the freedom
to act based on belief is subject to regulation by the State when
necessary to protect the right of others and in the interest of public
welfare.

The CHED laid down principles for the exemption of teachers,

personnel and students from participating in school or related activities due
to compliance with religious obligations.

Respondents refused to excuse Valmores from Saturday classes and

examinations fundamentally rests only on the fact that there were other
Seventh-Day Adventists who had successfully completed their studies at the
MSU-College of Medicine.

Even worse, respondents suggest that the “sacrifice” of other students

of the common faith justifies their refusal to give Valmores exceptional
treatment. This is non-sequitur.

Respondents brush aside Valmores’ religious belief as if it were subject

of compromise; one man’s conviction and another man’s transgressions are
their alone to bear. That other fellow believers have chosen to violate
their creed is irrelevant to the case at hand , for in religious discipline ,
adherence is always the general rule, and compromise, the exception.

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA vs. SOLEDAD ESCRITOR

A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 1

FACTS: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las

Piñas City. She has been living with Quilapio , a man who is not her
husband for more than 25 years and had a son with him as well.

Escritor’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary
while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the judge of said RTC to investigate

Escritor. According to complainant, Escritor should not be allowed to remain
employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Respondent Escritor claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted

by her religion - the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the
Bible Tract Society. They allegedly have a “Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness” under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is
effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to
legalize their union.

ISSUE
Whether the State could penalize Escritor for such conjugal arrangement.

RULING

NO. The State could not penalize Escritor for she is exercising her
right to freedom of religion.

The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the

fundamental rights in our Constitution.

As Jefferson put it, it is most inalienable and sacred of human

rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely
abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a
free exercise claim.

In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest
in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against Escritor or her
partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation
of an unenforced prohibition.

Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and

religious morality should be kept in mind . The jurisdiction of the Court
extends only to public and secular morality.
 4

The Court further states our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as
required by the Free Exercise Clause.

This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality

based on religion provided it does not offend compelling state interest.

18. QUALIFICATION OF SENATORIAL CANDIDATES

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs. DANGEROUS DRUG BOARD
G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410

ISSUE: May RA 9165 add drug testing as a requirement for candidacy

for Senator?

HELD: NO. The Constitution expressly limits the qualifications of a person

to run and become a Senator as those that are limited to the following
matters:

(1) citizenship
(2) voter registration
(3) age
(4) residency.

Congress’ power to legislate while given broad recognition must not

overflow the bounds set by the Constitution . Where the Constitution has
expressly set out the qualification , these are exclusive and may not be
broadened nor circumscribed by legislative fiat.

19. REMOVAL OF AN ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIAL

SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BARANGAY DON MARIANO MARCOS

vs. MARTINEZ
G.R. No. 170626, March 3, 2008, 547 SCRA 416

ISSUE: May the Sangguniang Bayan remove an elective official from

office?

HELD: NO. An elective local official may be removed from office on the
grounds provided by law only by order of the proper court.

20. POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

FORFORM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. PNR

G.R. No. 124795, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 350

FACTS: The San Pedro - Carmona Commuter Line Project was implemented
with the installation of railroad facilities and appurtenances to serve the
squatters’ resettlement areas. The properties of Forform were traversed as
right-of-way and the PNR occupied the Forform properties without previous
condemnation proceedings and payment of just compensation.

ISSUES
1. Whether Forform can recover possession of its property because
PNR failed to file any expropriation case and just compensation.

2. Whether leasing out of portion of the property to third person

is beyond the scope of public use.

HELD
1. NO. The owner of the land , who stands by, without objection,
and sees as public railroad constructed over it , cannot, after the road
is completed, or large expenditures have been made thereon upon the
faith of his apparent acquiescence, reclaim the land, or enjoin its use
by the railroad company.

In such a case, there can only remain to the owner a right of

compensation.
 4

2. NO. The public use requisite for the valid exercise of the power
of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by
changing conditions.

At present, it may be amiss to state that whatever is

beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of
public use. The term “public use” has now been held to be
synonymous with “public interest,” “public benefit,” “public welfare,” and
“public convenience.” Whatever may be beneficially employed for the
general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

REPUBLIC vs. SPOUSES AGUSTIN & IMELDA CANCIO

G.R. No. 170147, January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 346

- The payment of the provisional value as a condition for the

issuance of a writ of possession is different from the payment of
just compensation for the expropriated property.

- While the provisional value is based on the current zonal

valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing fair market
value of the property.

HON. VICENTE P. EUSEBIO vs. JOVITO M. LUIS

G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009, 603 SCRA 576

FACTS: The City of Pasig had taken the parcel of land of Luis and
used the same as municipal road now known as Sandoval Avenue . After
16 years, Mayor Eusebio informed Luis that Pasig City cannot pay him
more than the amount set by the Appraisal Committee . Thereafter, Luis
filed an action for reconveyance. Mayor Eusebio contended that Luis’ action
for just compensation for the property taken for public use is already
barred by prescription.

ISSUE: Whether Luis’ action to claim just compensation for the property
taken for public use is already barred by prescription.

HELD: NO. Where private property is taken by the government for

public use without first acquiring title either through expropriation or
negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the land or the
value thereof does not prescribe.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. SANTA LORO VDA. DE CAPIN

G.R. No. 175176, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 648

- Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property

with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right of
way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property
rights over the land traversed by transmission lines also falls
within the ambit of the term “expropriation.”

21. RIGHT TO TRAVEL

REV. FR. ROBERT REYES vs. RAUL M. GONZALEZ
G.R. No. 182161, December 3, 2009, 606 SCRA 58

ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s right to travel is covered by the Rule

on the Writ of Amparo.

HELD: NO. The right to travel refers to the right to move one
place to another. Here, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as
a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against
him was not unlawful. Fr. Reyes failed to establish that his right to
travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it
amounted to a serious violation of his right, liberty and security, for
which there exists no readily available legal resource or remedy.

The direct recourse to the Supreme Court is inappropriate considering the

provision of Section 22 of the Rule of the Writ of Amparo which
states that “when a criminal action has been commenced , no separate
petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be
available by motion in the criminal case.
 4

THE DOJ HAS NO AUTHORITY TO RESTRICT THE

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL WITHOUT
LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT EMPOWERING TO DO SO

EPHRAIM C. GENUINO, et. al. vs. HON. LEILA DE LIMA et. al.
G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018, 861 SCRA 325

FACTS: After the expiration of GMA’s term as president , criminal

complaints were filed against her . In view of these complaints , then DOJ
Secretary De Lima issued multiple watch list orders (WLO).

GMA subsequently requested for the issuance of an Allow Departure

Order (ADO) so that she may seek medical attention abroad , with
undertaking to return to the Philippines once her treatment is completed.

Her application was denied by the DOJ but the SC issued a TRO
against DOJ Circular 41 and the WLOs subject to conditions, all of which
GMA complied with.

Despite the SC order , the Bureau of Immigration refused to process

her travel documents. De Lima argues that DOJ Circular No. 41 is a
limitation on the right to travel which was to keep individuals under
preliminary investigation within the jurisdiction of the Philippine justice system.

GMA argued that the TRO issued by the SC was immediately

executory and its open defiance is tantamount to gross disobedience and
resistance to a lawful order by the Court.

ISSUE
Whether the DOJ Circular No. 41 is a valid limitation on the
constitutional right to travel.

RULING

NO, the DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a valid limitation on the

constitutional right to travel.

Sec. 6, Art. III of the Constitution provides that the right to travel
may be impaired only in the interest of national security , public safety or
public health, as may be provided by law. When the exigencies of time
call for a limitation on the right to travel, the Congress must respond
to the need by explicitly providing for the restriction in a law.

Here, there is no law particularly providing for the authority of the

Secretary of Justice to curtain the exercise of the right to travel , in the
interest of national security, public safety or public health.

To be clear, DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law . It is a mere

administrative issuance apparently designed to carry out the provisions of
an enabling law.

Section 3, Book IV, Table III, Chapter 1 of E.O. No. 292 does not
authorize the DOJ to issue WLOs and HDOs to restrict the constitutional
right to travel.

There is even no mention of the exigencies stated in the Constitution

that will justify the impairment. The provision simply grants the DOJ the
power to investigate the commission of the crimes and prosecute offenders,
which are basically the functions of the agency.

The DOJ’s reliance on the police power of the state cannot also be
countenanced. On its own, the DOJ cannot wield police power since the
authority pertains to Congress.

Even if it claims to be exercising the same as the alter ego of

the President, it must first establish the presence of a definite legislative
enactment evidencing the delegation of power from its principal.

In this case, DOJ Circular No. 41 is declared unconstitutional as it

does not fall under any of the grants of power to the DOJ.
 4

The DOJ likewise cannot claim that it is necessary for preliminary

investigation because the presence of the accused is not necessary for the
prosecutor to discharge his investigatory duties . The power to issue Hold
Departure Order remains with the Court.

22. CREATION OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT

SEN. BENIGNO C. AQUINO III vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010, 617 SCRA 623

FACTS: RA 9716 created an additional district for the Province of

Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative
districts of the province.

Sen. Aquino contends that the reapportionment run afoul of the explicit
constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of 250,000 for
the creation of a legislative district and RA 9716 is unconstitutional
because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less
than 250,000 or only 176,383.

ISSUE: Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional

requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.

HELD: NO. Section 5 (3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000

minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative ,
but not so for a province.

BAI SANDRA SEMA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008, 558 SCRA 700

FACTS: ARMM Regional Assembly exercised its power to create provinces

under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 , enacted MMA Act 201
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.

ISSUES
1. Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly can create the Province
of Shariff Kabunsuan.

2. Whether Congress can validly delegate to the ARMM Regional

Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of
Representatives.

3, Whether Sharif Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in

Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution.

RULINGS
1. NO. A province cannot be created without a legislative district
because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.

2. NO, the power to create a province or a city with a

population of 250,000 or more requires also the power to create a
legislative district exclusively vested in Congress.

3. NO. The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion

legislative districts, not the regional assemblies.

23. MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENT

IN RE: APPOINTMENT DATED MARCH 30, 1998 OF JUDGES

MATEO VALENZUELA AND PLACIDO VALLARTA
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998, 298 SCRA 408

FACTS: President Ramos appointed Judges Mateo Valenzuela and Placido

Vallarta as RTC Judges on March 30, 1998 during the election ban
and the said appointment was transmitted to the Office of the Chief
Justice on May 14, 1998. Both Judges took their oath of office and
 4

entered upon the performance of their duties on the basis of the

appointment documents coming from Malacañang.

ISSUE: Whether the president can make appointments to the judiciary

during the period of an election ban in the interest of public
service.

HELD: NO. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly

in the public interest, there is no showing of any compelling reason
to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the
ban.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL & BAR COUNCIL

G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

- the appointment of Justice Renato Corona as the new Chief

Justice of the Supreme Court during the election ban as successor
to retiring Chief Justice Reynato Puno is valid under the principle
of pro hac vice.

24. JURISDICTION IN ELECTION CASES

Contests involving SK Officials

INDIRA R. FERNANDEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 176296, June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 765

- The 1987 Constitution vests in the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction

over all contests involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.

- Construed in relation to the provision in RA 7160 that

includes in the enumeration of barangay officials the SK Chairman , the
constitutional provision indeed sanctions the appellate review by the
COMELEC of election protests involving the position of SK Chairman.

Intra Party Disputes

JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010, 612 SCRA 761

- The COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute in

a proper case brought about it as an incident of its power to
register political parties.

Validity of Voter’s Registration

JAMELA SALIC MARUHOM vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 179430, July 27, 2009, 594 SCRA 108

- It must be underscored that in addition to the express jurisdiction

of COMELEC over petition for cancellation of COCs on the ground
of false material representations , under Section 78 of the OEC , the
Constitution also extends to COMELEC all the necessary and incidental
powers for it to achieve the holding of free , orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections.

Interlocutory Order

EDDIE T. PANLILIO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 181478, July 15, 2009, 593 SCRA 139

- Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raised

before the COMELEC en banc.

- Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution mandates that

only motion for reconsideration of final decision shall be decided by
the COMELEC en banc.

Jurisdiction of the PET and the SET

BANAT PARTY LIST vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009, 595 SCRA 477
 4

- The jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only be invoked
once the winning presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidates
have been proclaimed.

- Under Section 37, Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall

determine only the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass. Congress and COMELEC en banc shall exercise this power
before the proclamation of the winning presidential , vice presidential and
senatorial candidates.

HRET Jurisdiction over Party-List Representatives

CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN vs. H R E T

G.R. No. 189506, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 375

- Since party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House of

Representatives no less than the district representatives are , the
HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualification.

25. AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO CONTRACTS

SEVERINO B. VERGARA vs. OMBUDSMAN

G.R. No. 174567, March 12, 2009, 580 SCRA 693

- When the local chief executive enters into contracts, the law
speaks of prior authorization or authority from the Sangguniang
Panlunsod and not ratification.

- It cannot be denied that the City Council issued Resolution No.

280 authorizing Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject lots . As aptly
pointed out by the Ombudsman , ratification by the City Council is
not a condition sine qua non for Mayor Lajara to enter into
contracts.

26. CONCURRENCE OF SANGGUNIAN

MELANIE MONTUERTO vs. MAYOR ROLANDO TY

G.R. No. 177736, October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 670

- The verbal concurrence allegedly given by the Sanggunian is not the

concurrence required and envisioned under RA 7160 . The Sanggunian, as
a body, acts through a resolution or an ordinance.

27. PROHIBITION TO HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE

DENNIS FUNA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 308

FACTS: President Gloria M. Arroyo appointed Maria Elena H. Bautista as

undersecretary of DOTC. Upon the resignation of MARINA Administrator ,
Bautista was designated as OIC Administrator of MARINA in concurrent
capacity as DOTC undersecretary.

ISSUE: Whether the designation of Bautista as OIC of MARINA and

concurrently DOTC undersecretary violated the constitutional proscription
against dual or multiple offices for cabinet members and their deputies
and assistants.

HELD: YES. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple

offices, as well as incompatible offices , refers to the holding of the
office and not the nature of the appointment or designation. To
“hold” an office means to “possess or occupy” the same or “to
be in possession and administration ” which implies nothing less than
the actual discharge of the function and duties of the office.

DENNIS A.B. FUNA vs. ACTING DOJ SECRETARY ALBERTO C. AGRA

G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013, 691 SCRA 196

FACTS: Agra was the Government Corporate Counsel when he was

designated as Acting Solicitor General and Acting Secretary of Justice
 5

when Agnes Devanadera resigned in order to run for Congress in the

May 2010 elections. He relinquished the position as Government Corporate
Counsel and assumed the positions of Acting Secretary of Justice and
Acting Solicitor General in concurrent capacity.

ISSUE: Whether the designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice ,

concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General , violates the
constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple offices for the members
of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.

HELD: YES. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice

concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional
and void for being in violation of the constitutional prohibition under
Section 13, Article VII of the l987 Constitution.

It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or

temporary capacity.

To hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or

to be in possession and administration of the office, which implies
nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of
the office.

The language of Section 13 makes no reference to the nature of the

appointment or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices
being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all
appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary.

28. DOCTRINE OF OPERATIVE FACTS

The doctrine of operative facts means that before a law was
declared unconstitutional, its actual existence must be taken
into account and whatever was done while the law was in
operation should be recognized as valid.

CLAUDIO S. YAP vs. THENAMARIS SHIP’S MANAGEMENT

AND INTERMARE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC.
G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 369

FACTS: Claudio was employed by Vulture Shipping as electrician for a

vessel. The contract was for a duration of 12 months . On the 3 rd
month, he was illegally dismissed. The Court of Appeal awarded him
salaries for three months, however, on appeal, the clause “for three
months for every year of the unexpired term under Section 10 of
RA 8042 was declared unconstitutional for being violative of the
rights of OFWs to equal protection of the law.

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of unconstitutionality of Section 10 of

RA 8042 applies retroactive to the present case.

HELD: NO. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law ; it

confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at
all. An exception to this is the doctrine of operative fact . The doctrine
is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue
burden on those who have relied on the invalid law . Thus, if it was
applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would
put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts
done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.

MIRALLOSA vs. CARMEL DEVELOPMENT, INC.

G.R. No. 194538, November 27, 2013, 711 SCRA 30

FACTS: Carmel was the registered owner of Pangarap Village with a

total land area of 156 hectares. On October 14, 1973, President Marcos
issued PD 293 which invalidated the titles of Carmel and declared them
open for disposition to the members of MHAI.

On the basis of PD 293 , Juan, member of MHAI, occupied Lot 32

and subsequently built houses there.

On January 29, 1988, the Supreme Court declared PD 293 as

unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its part in Tuason case.
 5

Sometime in 1995, Juan executed an affidavit authorizing Mirallosa to

occupy Lot 32 and built his structures on the premises.

In April 2002, Carmel made several oral & written demands on

Mirallosa to vacate the premises but to no avail until Carmel filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer.

Mirallosa claimed that Carmel has no cause of action against him

under the doctrine of operative fact and he should not be prejudiced by
Tuason case because he was not a party to the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mirallosa can avail of the Operative Fact Doctrine.

HELD: NO. The Operative Fact Doctrine is a rule in equity . As such, it

must be applied as an exception to the general rule that an
unconstitutional laws produces no effects. The doctrine is applicable when
a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on
those who relied on the invalid law but it can never be invoked , to
validate as constitutional an unconstitutional act.

Mirallosa merely anchored his right over the property to an Affidavit

issued by Juan in 1995 or seven years after the Tuason case was
promulgated. At the time he built the structures on the premises , he
aught to have been aware of the binding effects of the Tuason case
and the subsequent unconstitutionality of PD 293 . These circumstances
necessarily remove him from the ambit of the operation fact doctrine.

29. CALLING-OUT POWER

DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN vs. HON. RONALDO PUNO

G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011, 651 SCRA 228

FACTS: After the Maguindanao Massacre, PGMA issued Proclamation 1946

placing Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and City of Cotabato under a state of
emergency. She directed the AFP and PNP to undertake such measures as
may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and
suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named places.

ISSUE: Whether then President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers

when she ordered the deployment of the AFP and PNP.

HELD: NO. Such deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency

powers under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution . The President
did not proclaim a national emergency , only a state of emergency in
the three places mentioned . And she did not act pursuant to any
law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary
powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution
directly vests in the President under Section 18 , Article VII, and to
suppress or prevent violence springs from the power vested in her
as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP.

30. CITIZENSHIP - NATURALIZATION AND NATURAL-

BORN CITIZEN

RENALD F. VILANDO vs. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011, 656 SCRA 17

FACTS: Limkalchong won as the Representative of Negros Oriental in the

2007 elections. Vilando, a losing candidate, filed a petition for quo warranto
before the HRET. The petition challenged the eligibility of Limkalchong
asserting that she was a Chinese citizen , having been born to a
father whose naturalization had not attained finality and to a mother
also acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her
marriage to the latter.

ISSUES
1. Whether the HRET has jurisdiction to rule on one’s citizenship.
 5

2. Whether Limkalchong is a natural-born citizen.

RULINGS
(1) NO. The HRET has no authority to delve into the legality of
the judgment of naturalization. To rule otherwise would operate as a
collateral attack on the citizenship of Limkalchong’s father which is not
permissible. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person’s citizenship may
only be done through a direct action for its nullity.

(2) YES. It was ruled that with Limkalchong’s father having been
conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a
naturalized Filipino born to a Filipino father . Even on the assumption that
the naturalization proceeding and the subsequent issuance of certificate of
naturalization were invalid, Limkalchong can still be considered a natural-born
citizen, having been born to a Filipino mother and having impliedly elected
Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age.

31. RULES ON SUCCESSION OF ELECTIVE OFFICERS

BARBARA TALAGA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 197

FACTS: Mayor Ramon Talaga and Vice Mayor Castillo filed their respective
Certificates of Candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City
in the scheduled May 10, 2010 elections.

Four (4) days later, Castillo filed with the Comelec a petition to
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Talaga for having already
served three (3) terms as a City Mayor of Lucena.

The Comelec declared Ramon Disqualified to run for mayor of

Lucena City. Three (3) days before the election, Barbara filed her own
CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon.

On election day, Barbara garnered 44,099 votes as against Castillo’s

39,615 votes.

Castillo promptly filed a petition for annulment of proclamation of

Barbara with the Comelec where he alleged that Barbara could not
substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled and denied
due course, and Barbara could not be considered a candidate because
the Comelec en banc had approved her substitution three (3) days
after the elections, hence, the votes cast for Ramon should be
considered stray.

ISSUES
(1) Was the substitution of Barbara as candidate valid in place of
her husband Ramon?

(2) In case of permanent vacancy , who must succeed and assume

the position of Mayor?

(3) When may a second placer be allowed to take the place

of a disqualified winning candidate?

RULINGS
(1) NO. The filing of a CoC within 60 days prior to the regular
election is mandatory requirement to be a candidate in a national
or local election. Since Barbara filed her own CoC three (3) days
before the election, there can be no valid substitution of the candidate
under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code as she has no
valid CoC to be considered a candidate.

(2) The duly elected Vice-Mayor must succeed and assume the
position of Mayor due to a permanent vacancy in the office.

(3) The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the
place of a disqualified winning candidate is when two requisites concur ,
namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is
disqualified, and (b) the electorate was fully aware in fact and in
law of that candidate’s disqualification as to bring such awareness
within the realms of notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality
 5

of votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Under this sole exception,

the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of
their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away
their votes. In which case the eligible candidate with the second
highest number of votes may be deemed elected.

RENATO M. FEDERICO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 199612, January 22, 2013, 689 SCRA 134

FACTS: Edna Sanchez (Edna) and Maligaya were candidates for the
position of Mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas in the May 2010 elections.

On April 27, 2010, Armando Sanchez, husband of Edna and gubernatorial

candidate for the province of Batangas, died. Two days later, Edna
withdrew her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the position of mayor and
filed a new CoC for the position of Governor as substitute candidate
for her deceased husband.

On May 5, 2010, Renato filed his CoC as substitute candidate for

Mayor, in view of the withdrawal of Edna.

On May 10, 2010, the day of elections, the name “SANCHEZ, Edna
P.” was retained in the list of candidates for Mayor of Sto. Tomas
and garnered the highest number of votes - 28,389 against Maligaya’s
22, 577 votes. A second print-out of the COCVP was issued by the
MBOC crediting the votes garnered by Edna to Renato. Subsequently,
Maligaya filed his Petition to Annul Proclamation of Renato.

ISSUES
(1) Did Renato validly substitute Edna who withdrew her candidacy for
the mayoralty position?

(2) Should Maligaya be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor?

RULINGS
(1) NO. When Edna withdrew her candidacy for Mayor on April
29, 2010, the deadline for substitution in case of withdrawal had already
lapsed, no person could substitute her as mayoralty candidate. Her
substitution as the widow of her late husband in the gubernatorial
race could not justify a belated substitution in the mayoralty race.

(2) Therefore, there being no valid substitution , the candidate with the
highest number of votes should be proclaimed as the duly elected
mayor. Being the only candidate , Maligaya received the highest number
of votes. Accordingly, he should be proclaimed as the duly elected
mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas.

CASAN MAQUILING vs. COMELEC & ROMMEL ARNADO

G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 420

FACTS: Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen . As a consequence of

his subsequent naturalization as US citizen, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. He applied for repartriation under RA 9225 and took the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10,
2008 in San Francisco, California, USA.

On April 3, 2009, Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the

Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign
citizenship. He ran and won the mayoralty of Kauswagan , Lanao del
Norte, in connection with the May 10, 2010 elections . Casan Maquiling,
placed second having garnered highest number of votes , filed a petition
to disqualify Arnado or cancel his COC on the ground that Arnado’s
nationality is USA - American as per certification of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID). The Comelec En Banc granted the
petition for disqualification of Arnado.

ISSUE: Whether or not the second placer eligible candidate be

declared as the winner.

HELD: YES. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do

not constitute the sole and total expression of sovereign voice. The
votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidate form part of
that voice, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher
number of votes may be deemed elected.
 5

Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not

necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a
disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in
the vote count is actually the first placer among the qualified
candidates. That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed
and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification
based on a substantial ground that existed prior to the filing of
the Certificate of Candidacy void not only the COC but also the
proclamation.

32. THE POWER OF REMOVAL BY THE PRESIDENT

EMILIO A. GONZALES III vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012, 679 SCRA 614

FACTS: For finding Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales guilty of Gross

Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public
trust, the Office of the President (OP) dismissed him from service.

Gonzales claims that the Office of the President (OP) has no

jurisdiction over him considering that the Office of the Ombudsman to
which he belongs is clothed with constitutional independence thus necessarily
bear the constitutional attributes of said office.

ISSUE: Does the Office of the President have a constitutional or valid

statutory authority to subject Deputy Ombudsman to an administrative
investigation and to thereafter order his removal from office?

HELD: YES. Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries
with it the power to remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers
appointed by the President are also removable by him . The exception to
this is when the law expressly provides otherwise - that is, when the
power to remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other
than the appointing power.

In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman

simply laid down in express terms an authority that is implied from
the President’s constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid official in
the Office of the Ombudsman.

It is true that the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to

conduct administrative investigations proceeds from its constitutional mandate
to be an effective protector of the people against inept and corrupt
government officers and employees. While the Ombudsman’s authority to
discipline administratively is extensive and covers all government officials,
whether appointive or elective with the exception only of those officials
removable only by impeachment , the members of Congress and the
Judiciary, such authority is by no means exclusive . Gonzales cannot
insist that he should be solely and directly subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman.

While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly

provided for in the Constitution which is by impeachment , there is,
however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal
from the office of a Deputy Ombudsman for that matter.

33. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATION - INACTION

OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

EVALYN I. FETALINO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 191890, December 4, 2012, 686 SCRA 813

FACTS: On February 10, 1998, President Ramos extended an interim

appointment to Fetalino and Calderon as Comelec Commissioners . Congress,
however, adjourned in May 1998 before the CA could act on their
appointments. The constitutional ban on midnight appointments later took
effect and Fetalino and Calderon were no longer re-appointed as Comelec
Commissioners. Thus, the two merely served as Comelec Commissioners
for more than four months.

Subsequently, Fetalino and Calderon applied for their retirement benefits

and monthly pension with the Comelec pursuant to RA 1568 . However, the
 5

Comelec disapproved their claim for a lump sum benefit stating that
they whose ad interim appointments were not acted upon by the
Commission on Appointments (CA) and who were subsequently, not
reappointed, are not entitled to the five-year lump sum gratuity because
they did not complete in full the seven-year term of office.

ISSUE: Can ad interim appointments lapsed by the inaction of the CA be

considered as a having served a “term of office” to entitle such
appointees to benefits?

HELD: NO. While an ad interim appointment is characterized as a permanent

appointment that takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office .
To hold otherwise would mean that the President by his unilateral
action could start and complete the running of a term of office in
the Comelec without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments.

Therefore, based on these considerations, Fetalino and Calderon can

never be considered to have retired from the service not only
because they did not complete the full term , but more importantly
because they did not serve a “term of office” as required by
Section 1 of RA 1568, as amended.

34. WARRANTLESS ARREST

PEOPLE vs. NAZARENO VILLAREAL

G.R. No. 201363, March 18, 2013, 693 SCRA 549

FACTS: PO3 Renato de Leon was driving his motorcycle on his way
home along 5 th Avenue when he saw Nazareno from a distance of
about 8 to 10 meters , holding and scrutinizing in his hand a
plastic sachet of shabu. Thus, PO3 de Leon alighted from his
motorcycle and approached Nazareno whom he recognized as someone
he had previously arrested from illegal drug possession . Upon seeing
PO3 de Leon, Nazareno tried to escape but was quickly apprehended
with the help of a tricycle driver. PO3 de Leon was able to board
Nazareno on to his motorcycle and confiscate the plastic sachet of
shabu in his possession.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid.

HELD. NO. Nazareno’s acts of walking along the street and holding
something in his hands even if they appeared to be dubious ,
coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same offense , are
not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or
to create probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest under
Section 5 of Rule 113.

“Probable Cause” has been understood to mean a reasonable

ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.

UNCONSUMMATED BUY-BUST OPERATION PRECLUDES

WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OLIVER RENATO EDAÑO

G.R. No. 188133, July 7, 2014, 729 SCRA 255

FACTS: On the evening of August 6, 2002 , member of Drug Enforcement

Group together with a female informant went to the parking area of
McDonalds to conduct an entrapment operation.

Edaño arrived at around 7:00 p.m. on board a space wagon. The

informant approached Edaño and talked to him inside the vehicle.

Afterwards, the informant waived at PO3 Corbe who then approached

Edaño. The latter went out of the vehicle and ran away.

PO3 Corbe was able to grab Edaño , causing the latter to fall on the
ground. PO3 Corbe recovered a “knot-tied” transparent plastic bag from
Edaño’s right hand.
 5

ISSUES: Whether the search and seizure that followed warrantless arrest
is valid.

HELD: NO, the warrantless arrest of Edaño was not valid . Consequently,
the search and seizure that followed the warrantless arrest was
likewise not valid.

In this case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious

enterprise that could be properly attributed to Edaño to rouse
suspicion in the mind of the police that he had just committed , was
actually committing or was attempting to commit a crime in their
presence.

Informant and Edaño were just talking to each other , there was
no exchange of money and drugs as the police approached the car.

Edaño is entitled to acquittal since the shabu purportedly seized

from him is inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of
the poisonous tree.

35. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES - “STOP AND FRISK”

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICTOR COGAED

G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014, 731 SCRA 427

FACTS: An informant thru a text message told the police that a certain
Marvin would be transporting marijuana from Barangay Lun-Oy.

The police organized checkpoints in order “to intercept the suspect.” A

passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at the checkpoint . The
jeepney driver disembarked and signaled to SPO1 Taracatas indicating a male
passenger was carrying marijuana.

SPO1 Taracatas approached the male passenger who was identified as

Victor who was carrying a blue bag . SPO1 Taracatas asked Victor about the
contents of his bag and he said he did not know since he was
transporting the bag as a favor to his barrio mate named Marvin.

After this exchange, Victor opened the blue bag revealing three bricks of
marijuana. SPO1 arrested Victor and was brought to the police station.

The RTC and the CA found Victor guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of RA 9165 when Victor waived his right against warrantless
searches “without prompting from SPO1 Taracatac , he voluntarily opened his
bag.

ISSUE: Whether the search and seizure was illegal.

HELD: YES. “Stop and frisk” searches should be balanced with the need to
protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III , Section 2 of the
Constitution.

The balance lies in the concept of “suspiciousness” present in the

situation where the police officer finds himself in . Experienced police
officers have personal experience dealing with criminal and criminal behavior.
Thus, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his personal
knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit
act.

In the case at bar , Victor was simply a passenger carrying a bag

and traveling aboard a jeepney . There was nothing suspicious , moreover,
criminal, about riding jeepney or carrying a bag. Hence, the search and
seizure against the accused Victor is illegal because of the absence
of the requisite of “suspiciousness.”

The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but
by the jeepney driver who signaled to the police that Victor was
“suspicious.”

The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and

seizures are:

1. warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.

 5

2. seizure of evidence in “plain view”

3. search of moving vehicle

4. consented warrantless search

5. customs search

6. stop and frisk, and

7. exigent and emergency circumstances.

Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be

committed in flagrante delicto, and the search conducted within the vicinity
and within reach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there
are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.

“Stop and frisk” are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a

crime. It’s object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious
individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police
officer to obtain more information.

There can be no valid waiver of Victor’s constitutional rights even if

we assume that he did not object when the police asked him to
open his bag.

His silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such

search as it is a mere passive conformity given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances created by the presence of the police officer and
thus no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee.

37. RIGHT AGAINST SELF - INCRIMINATION

JAIME D. DELA CRUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014, 730 SCRA 655

FACTS: On January 31, 2006, the NBI Regional office received a complaint
from Corazon and Charito that Ariel , the live-in partner of Corazon and
son of Charito, was detained at the police station for selling drugs .
In the said police station , they met PO1 James who demanded
P40,000 in exchange for the release of Ariel.

A team was immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation

which took place inside Jolibee where the nbi operatives were able to
nab PO1 James by using a pre-marked 500 – peso bill dusted with
fluorescent powder.

PO1 James was brought to the NBI forensic laboratory and was required
to submit his urine for drug testing and it later yielded a positive
result for presence of dangerous drugs.

Petitioner claimed that he refused the urine sample collection and

requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his
urine sample but to no avail.

The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

violating Sec. 15, Art. II of RA 9165.

The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the drug test conducted upon the accused is legal.

HELD: NO. The drug test is illegal. It violates the constitutional right
of an accused against self-incrimination which proscribes the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused
and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be
material.

First, the drug test in Sec. 15, Art. II of RA 9165 does not
cover person apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act , but only
for unlawful acts listed under Art. II of RA 9165.
 5

Second, the drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial

compulsion. The RTC and CA failed to see how a urine sample
could be material to the charge of extortion.

Third and most importantly, the drug test was a violation of

PO1 James’ right to privacy and right against self-incrimination . He refused
and also asked for a lawyer prior to the urine test . However,
all of his efforts proved futile because he was still compelled to
submit his urine for drug testing.

38. RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY

PEOPLE vs. LINO ALEJANDRO

G,R, No. 223099, January 11, 2018, 851 SCRA 120

FACTS: Alejandro was charged with 2 counts of rape of AAA , a 12-year

old minor. Upon arraignment, Alejandro entered a plea of not guilty and
trial ensued.

During the trial, accused Alejandro, through his counsel, manifested in

open court that he would no longer present any evidence for the defense
and submitted the same for decision.

The RTC promulgated a decision acquitting the accused Alejandro . On

the same day, however, the RTC, recalled the said decision upon a
manifestation by the prosecution admitting that it erroneously declared that
private complainant did not testify in Court , when in truth and in fact
said private complainant AAA took the witness stand . The mistake was due
to a mix-up with another case involving Alejandro and another victim.

ISSUES
1. May the order of acquittal be recalled?

2. State the exceptions to the rule of double jeopardy . Are these

applicable to the present case?

RULINGS
1. NO, the order of acquittal may not be recalled since it would
place the accused twice in jeopardy.

For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur : (1)
a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction of the crime charged ; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction ; (3)
the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded ; and (4) the accused was
convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express
consent.

Here, all the elements were present. There was a valid information
for two counts of rape which the RTC has jurisdiction and to which
the accused entered a plea of not guilty . After the trial, a judgment of
acquittal was rendered and promulgated.

What is peculiar in this case is that a judgment of acquittal was

rendered based on the mistaken notion that the private complainant failed
to testify, allegedly because of the mix-up of orders with a different case
involving the same accused. This, however, does not change the fact that
a judgment of acquittal had already been promulgated . Indeed, a judgment
of acquittal whether ordered by the trial court or the appellate court, is
final, unappealable and immediately executory upon its promulgation.

Thus, the order of acquittal may not be reconsidered since it would

place the accused twice in jeopardy.

2. The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions,

which are: (1) where there has been deprivation of due process and
where there is a finding of mistrial , or (2) where there has been a
grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances.

These exceptions do not exist in this case . Here, there was no

deprivation of due process or mistrial because the records show that the
prosecutor was actually able to present their case and their witnesses.
 5

A mere manifestation also will not suffice in assailing a judgment of

acquittal.

39. STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

HEIRS OF DIOSDADO MENDOZA vs. DPWH

G.R. No. 203834, July 9, 2014, 729 SCRA 299

FACTS: Mendoza, who is doing business under the name and style
Superior Builders, won in the biddings for the construction of roads in
Benguet.

Due to delay in the construction , Superior Builders incurred negative

spillage of 31.852% prompting the DPWH to order the forfeiture of the
contract and rebidding and awarding the project to another contractor.

Mendoza filed with the RTC an action for specific performance and
enjoining the DPWH from rebidding and awarding the project to another
contractor.

DPWH claimed its contractual obligation was made in the exercise of

its governmental functions.

ISSUE: Whether the DPWH is immune from suit.

HELD: YES. Pursuant to Sec. 3, Art. XVI of the Constitution : The

State may not be sued without consent.

The DPWH is an unincorporated government agency without any

separate juridical personality of its own and it enjoys immunity from suit.

Hence, Mendoza cannot claim that there was an implied waiver by

the DPWH simply entering into a contract . Thus, the DPWH enjoys
immunity from suit and may not be sued without its consent.

HERMANO OIL MANUFACTURING vs. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD

G.R. No. 167290, November 26, 2014, 742 SCRA 395

FACTS: Hermano owned a parcel of land located at the right side of

the Sta. Rita Exit of the NLEX and the said parcel of land was
bounded by the access fence along NLEX.

Hermano requested the TRB for the grant of an easement of right

of way considering that it had been totally deprived of the enjoyment
and possession property by the access fence that barred its entry into
and exit from NLEX.

The TRB denied the Hermano’s request because it would have an

adverse effect on the schedule rehabilitation and improvement of NLEX
interchange.

Hermano sued the TRB and its officers for specific performance for
the grant of right of way and damages . It impleaded PNCC and DPWH
as indispensable parties.

TRB filed a motion to dismiss as the action could be considered as

a suit against the state without its consent.

ISSUE: Whether TRB and DPWH can invoke the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.

HELD: YES. The TRB and the DPWH perform purely an essentially
government or public function. As such, they are invested with the
inherent power of sovereignty.

Being unincorporated agencies or entities of the national government,

they not be sued , otherwise the doctrine of sovereign immunity is
violated.

It appears that Hermano’s complaint principally sought to restrain TRB

& DPWH from implementing an access fence on its property and to
direct them to grant a right of way to NLEX.
 6

Clearly, the reliefs being sought by Hermano were beyond the

jurisdiction of the RTC because no court except the Supreme Court
could issue an injunction against an infrastructure project of the
government.

This is because PD 1818 issued on January 16, 1981 prohibited

judges from issuing restraining order against government infrastructure
projects.

40. EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY

ATTY. ALICIA R. VIDAL vs. COMELEC & JOSEPH ESTRADA
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015, 747 SCRA 210

FACTS: On September 22, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former

President Estrada for the crime of plunder and sentenced him to suffer
Reclusion Perpetua and an accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification.

On October 25, 2007, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended

executive clemency by way of pardon to former President Estrada.

In the text of the said pardon especially in the whereas clause

states that Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer
seek any elective position or office, however, Joseph Estrada was granted
executive clemency of pardon and restored his civil and political rights.

On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of

Candidacy for Mayor of Manila.

ISSUES: (1) Whether Erap Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted.

(2) What are the instances in which the President may not extend
pardon?

HELD: (1) YES. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute

pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights , which naturally
includes the right to seek public elective office.

The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is

complete, unambiguous and unqualified.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former

President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua and his accessory penalties are included in the pardon.

(2) The instances in which the President may not extend pardon are
the following:

a) impeachment cases.

b) cases that have yet resulted in a final conviction.

c) cases involving violation of election laws, rules and

regulation in which there was no favorable recommendation
coming from the Comelec.

41. MARITIME REGIMES UNDER UNCLOS

1) Internal water is 12 nautical miles from the shore to
the baseline.

2) Territorial sea is 12 nautical miles from the baseline.

3) Contiguous zone is a zone contiguous to the territorial

sea. The maximum limit is 24 nautical miles from the
baseline of the territorial sea.
 6

4. The Exclusive Economic Zone extends no farther than 200

nautical miles from the baselines of the territorial sea.

5. The Continental Shelf gives the coastal state rights to

explore and exploit the resources of the shelf by operation
of law.

42. NATIONAL PATRIMONY

PROHIBITION TO FOREIGNER TO ACQUIRE LAND

TAINA MANIGQUE – STONE vs. CATTLEYA LAND, INC.

G.R. No. 195975, September 5, 2016, 802 SCRA 173

FACTS: On November 6, 1992, Cattleya entered into a Contract of

Conditional Sale with the Tecson spouses covering nine parcels of land ,
including the subject property.

However, while following up the registration of the August 30, 1993

Deed of Absolute Sale at the Office of the Register of Deeds , Cattleya
learned that the owner’s copy of the title to the land in question was
with Taina.

The subject land had apparently been sold to Taina’s common-law

husband, Michael Stone, by Spouses Tecson in 1985, but the title was
placed in Taina’s name as Stone was a foreigner.

Cattleya instituted a civil action for quieting of title and/or recovery

of ownership and cancellation of title.

Taina posits that while Michael’s legal capacity to own or acquire real
property in the Philippines was not entirely unassailable , there was
nevertheless no actual violation of the constitutional prohibition, because in
this case no real transfer of ownership had been effected in favor of
Michael from Col. Tecson. Taina claimed that she was not exactly dummy
Michael’s dummy at all but his active partner.

Cattleya counters that the sale between Col. Tecson and Michael was
absolutely null and void, as this was a flagrant violation of the
constitutional provision barring or prohibiting aliens or foreigners from acquiring
or purchasing land in the Philippines.

ISSUE
Whether the sale of land by Spouses Tecson to Michael Stone , a
foreigner although ostensibly made in Taina’s name , was valid, despite the
constitutional prohibition against the sale of lands in the Philippines to
foreigners.

RULING

NO, the sale is null and void by reason of the constitutional

prohibition against the sale of lands in the Philippines to foreigners or
aliens.

Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that “Save in

cases of hereditary succession , no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”

Given the plain and explicit language of this constitutional mandate , it

has been held that “aliens, whether individual or corporations, are
disqualified from acquiring lands of public domain . Hence, they are also
disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of the
constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.

In the case at bench , Taina admitted that it was Michael who paid
with his own funds the subject lot , hence, Michael Stone was its real
purchaser or buyer. More than that, it bears stressing that if the deed
of sale proclaimed that she was the purchaser or buyer of the subject
property and this subject property was placed under her name, it was
simply because she and Michael wanted to skirt or circumvent the
constitutional prohibition barring or outlawing foreigners or aliens from
acquiring or purchasing lands in the Philippines.
 6

43. PRESIDENT DUTERTE’S DECISION OF MARCOS

REMAINS TO BE INTERRED AT LIBINGAN NG MGA
BAYANI IS A POLITICAL QUESTION

SATURNINO C. OCAMPO et. al. vs. Rear Admiral

ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ, et. al.
G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016, 807 SCRA 223

FACTS: During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election , then
candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the
burial of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga
Bayani (LNMB).

Duterte won the election and thereafter formally assumed his office .
The Secretary of the National Defense issued a memorandum to the AFP
regarding the interment of Marcos to the LNMB.

Petitions were filed alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the President for reasons
that Marcos is not qualified to be interred at the LNMB on the
ground that he was dishonorably discharged when he was ousted from
power by the 1986 February Revolution . They likewise alleged that he
committed offenses involving moral turpitude for his gross human rights
violations, massive graft and corruption and dubious military records . By
going into exile, he deliberately evaded liability for his actions.

It was further contended that in 1992 , the government and the

Marcos family entered into an agreement that the body of President
Marcos would be interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. Hence, the contention that
he should not be buried at the LMNB.

ISSUES
1) Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of
Marcos interred at the LNMB poses a justiciable controversy on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion.

2) Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth

from the Marcos and their cronies , and the pronouncements of the
Court on the Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement as a soldier
and former president to the interment at the LNMB.

3) Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial

of the remains of former President Marcos at the LNMB after they
entered into an agreement with the government as for the conditions and
procedures by which his remains shall be brought back and interred in
the Philippines.

RULINGS

1) NO, President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Marcos

interred at the LNMB involves a political question.

In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and the

Administrative Code to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB ,
which is a land of the public domain devoted for national military
cemetery and military shine purposes.

President Duterte decided a question of policy based on the wisdom

that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness . Presumption of
regularity in the performance of his official duty prevails over the
petitioners’ highly disputed factual allegation that, in the guise of exercise,
a presidential prerogative, the Chief Executive is actually motivated by
utang na loob (debt of gratitude) and bayad utang (payback) to the
Marcoses.

2) NO. For his alleged human right abuses and corrupt practices , the
Court may disregard Marcos as a President and a Commander-in-chief , but
 6

the Court cannot deny him the right to be acknowledged based on the
other positions he held or the awards he received . Despite all the
ostensibly persuasive arguments, the fact remains that Marcos was not
convicted by final judgment of any offense involving moral turpitude . No
less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that the person shall not be
held to answer for a criminal offense without due process.

At present, there is no law or executive issuance specifically excluding

the land in which the LNMG is located from the use it was originally
interred by the past presidents. In the absence of any executive issuances
or law to the contrary, the AFP regulation remains to be the sole
authority in determining who are entitled and disqualified to be interred at
the LNMB. Interestingly, even they were empowered to do so, former
Presidents Corazon Aquino and Benigno Simeon Aquino III , who were
themselves aggrieved at the Martial Law, did not revise the rules by
expressly prohibiting the burial of Marcos at the LNMB.

3) NO, it was not waived.

The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of

Government is a self-executing provisions of the Constitution and does not
require statutory implementation nor may its exercise be limited, much less
be withdrawn by the legislature. This is why President Duterte is not
bound by the alleged 1992 Agreement between former President Ramos and

the Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos interred in Batac , Ilocos
Norte.

44. QUO WARRANTO CASE AGAINST CJ SERENO

REPUBLIC vs. MARIA LOURDES SERENO

G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018, 863 SCRA 1

FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines , represented by the Solicitor

General Calida, filed a Petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ
of Quo Warranto to declare void respondent Sereno’s appointment as
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and to oust and altogether exclude
her therefrom for her failure to submit SALNs as mandated by the
Constitution and required by law.

ISSUES
1) Whether the Supreme Court can assume jurisdiction and give due
course to the instant petition for quo warranto against respondent Sereno
who is an impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment
complaint has already filed with the House of Representatives.

2) Whether respondent Sereno is an impeachable officer and such that

quo warranto petition cannot prosper.

3) Whether there is a forum shopping.

4) Whether impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an

impeachable official may be removed from office.

5) Whether the petition is dismissible outright on the ground of

prescription.

6) Whether respondent’s failure to file her SALNs as mandated by the

Constitution and required by law voids the nomination and appointment of
respondent Sereno as Chief Justice.

7) Whether respondent Sereno is a de jure or de facto officer.

RULINGS

1) YES, SC has original jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto.

Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution states that the SC has

original jurisdiction over petitions for quo warranto . This jurisdiction is
concurrent with the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Court
(RTC).
 6

Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the venue

for an action for quo warranto is in the RTC of Manila , CA, or SC
when commenced by the Solicitor General.

While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the

appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs , a direct
invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction in this case is justified
considering that the qualification of a member of the Court is in
question, and the issue is of public concern.

2) NO. The Court held that the origin , nature and purpose of
impeachment and quo warranto are materially different.

While both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the ouster
of the public official, the two proceedings materially differ.

At its most basic, impeachment proceedings are political in nature

while an action for quo warranto is judicial or a proceeding traditionally
lodged in the courts.

3) There is NO forum shopping because quo warranto and impeachment

can proceed independently and simultaneously as they differ as to (1)
jurisdiction (2) grounds (3) applicable rules pertaining to institution , filing and
dismissal, and (4) limitations.

The causes of action in the two proceedings are unequivocably

different. In quo warranto, the cause of action lies on the usurping,
intruding, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office , while in
impeachment, it is the commission of an impeachable offense.

Likewise, the reliefs sought in the two proceedings are different .

Respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be ordered to cease
holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. On the other
hand, in impeachment, a conviction shall result in the removal of the
respondent from the public office that he/she is legally holding.

4) YES. Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an

invalidly appointee or invariably elected impeachable official may be removed
from office.

Even the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) rules expressly provide for
the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto
to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice President , both
of whom are impeachable officers.

In fact, this would not be the first time the Court shall take
cognizance of a quo warranto petition on impeachable officer . In the
case of Estrada vs. Macapagal Arroyo where the SC took cognizance of
quo warranto petition against former President Macapagal Arroyo whether the
former President Estrada’s act of resignation ended his official status as
President.

5) NO. Prescription does not lie against the State.

The one-year limitation is not applicable when the Petition is not

mere private individual pursuing a private interest , but the government
itself seeking a relief for a public wrong and suing for public
interest.

In the three instances enumerated by Rules of Court , the Solicitor

General is mandated under the Rules to commence the necessary quo
warranto petition, as seen in the use of the word “must”

As a general principle it may be stated that ordinary statutes of

limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding
brought to enforce a public right . In effect, when the government is
the real party and is proceeding mainly to assert its right , there
can be no defense on the grounds of laches or prescription.

6) YES. Compliance with the Constitutional and statutory requirement

of filing of SALN intimately relates to a person’s integrity . Contrary to
respondent Sereno’s postulation that the filing of SALN bears no
relation to the requirement of integrity , the filing of SALN itself is a
Constitutional and statutory requirement.
 6

7) DE FACTO OFFICER. The effect of a finding that person appointed

to an office is ineligible therefore is that his presumably valid
appointment will give him color of title that confers to him the status
of a de facto officer.

For lack of a Constitutional qualification , Respondent is ineligible to

hold the position of Chief Justice and merely holding a colorable
right or title thereto. As such, respondent Sereno has never attained
the status of an impeachable official and her removal from office other
than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo
warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust respondent
from the appointive position of Chief Justice.

45 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

OMBUDSMAN’S TERM IS FOR 7 YEARS REGARDLESS
OF THE CAUSE OF VACANCY

RAY IFURUNG vs. HON. CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES

G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018, 862 SCRA 684

FACTS: Ifurung avers Sec. 8 (3) of the Ombudsman Act which provides
that in case of vacancy due to death , resignation, removal, or permanent
disability, the succeeding Ombudsman and his deputies should serve for a
full term of seven (7) years. According to him, the successors should
only serve for the unexpired portion of the term , consistent with other
constitutionally created positions and that the intent of the framers of the
Constitution is to put the Ombudsman on the same status as
Constitutional Commissioners.

Morales contend that verba legis, Section 11 of Art. XI of the

Constitution provides that the Ombudsman should serve the full term of 7
years without distinguishing if the predecessor completed his term or
vacated it due to causes under the Ombudsman Act. The rotational
system does not apply to it and that there are also constitutionally
created positions which do not serve for the unexpired portion of its
predecessor such as the JBC, HRET and SET.

ISSUE
Should the Ombudsman serve only for the unexpired portion of the
term in case of death, resignation, removal, or permanent disability?

RULING

NO, the Ombudsman should serve the full term of 7 years.

First, the Ombudsman is not a Constitutional Commission unlike the

CSC, COA and Comelec. The Ombudsman was primarily tasked with
receiving complaints from persons aggrieved by administrative action or in
action, conducting investigation thereon, and making recommendations to the
appropriate administrative agency based on its findings . It is not a collegial
body that decides by majority vote of all its members a case or matter
brought before it but are rather confined within the sphere of their
respective jurisdiction.

Second, when Sec. 10, Art. XI of the Constitution provides that the
Ombudsman should have the same “rank and salary” as that of a
Constitutional Commissioner, but it does not include term of office .
Reviewing the deliberations of the framers , Commissioner Romulo commented
the comparison with Constitutional Commissioners is only for the purposes
of referencing the rank and salary that an Ombudsman may receive . It
does not involve term of office.

Third, the rotational scheme also does not apply because serving for
the unexpired term was not provided for on the provision of the
Constitution with respect to the Ombudsman , unlike in COA, CSC and
COMELEC. The Ombudsman Act remains consistent with the Sec. 11 , Art.
XI of the Constitution.
 6

OMBUDSMAN’S DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT IS

DISCRETIONARY IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE, NOT IN
CRIMINAL CASE

JONNEL ESPALDON vs. RICHARD BUBAN et. al.

G.R. No. 202784, April 18, 2018, 861 SCRA 651

FACTS: Atty. Garbo of the NBI received information that Ferrotech Steel
Corporation and/or its president, Benito Keh, employed schemes to evade
payment of taxes by failing to issue sales invoices and falsifying sales
invoices in violation of NIRC.

On December 17, 2010, search warrants were issued by the RTC of

Manila and these were served by NBI agents , PNR personnel and private
individuals.

Atty. Espaldon, counsel of Ferrotech Steel Corporation, alleged that

several irregularities attended the implementation of the search warrants , i.e.,
heavily armed NBI agents were present; the non-NBI agents were not
authorized in writing to participate in the search ; private individuals
orchestrated the search and pointed the items to be searched; and
documents and items belonging to Metalex International, Inc. not mentioned
in the search warrants were also seized; and the employees were illegally

detained, prohibited from using their phones and leaving the office ; and
threatened with bodily harm.

Consequently, Espaldon filed a criminal complaint before the Ombudsman

against NBI and PNR agents due to the irregularities . Later, he filed a
supplemental complaint affidavit praying for their preventive suspension.

The administrative and criminal complaints were dismissed by the

Ombudsman. It averred that, the dismissal of both the administrative and
criminal complaints were grounded on Section 20 (1) of RA 6770 which
provides that: “The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the
necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of
if it believes that the complainant has an adequate remedy in another
judicial or quasi-judicial body.”

ISSUES
1. Should the Ombudsman conduct investigation on the criminal
complaints?

2. Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in

refusing to conduct an investigation on the criminal complaint of on the
basis of Section 20 (1) of RA 6770.

RULINGS

1. YES, the Ombudsman should conduct investigation on the criminal

complaints.

Jurisprudence has settled that dismissal based on the ground provided

under Section 20 is not mandatory and is discretionary on the part of the
evaluating Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman evaluating an administrative
complaint.

It’s invocation in the present criminal case is therefore misplaced.

Contrariwise, the procedure in criminal cases requires that the

Ombudsman evaluate the complaint and after evaluation, to make its
recommendation.

The only instance when an outright dismissal of a criminal complaint

is warranted is when such complaint is palpably devoid of merit.

The assailed Orders are empty except for the citation of Section 20
as basis for outright dismissal. It is thus inaccurate and misleading for
the Ombudsman to profess that the criminal complaint was dismissed only
after the conduct of a preliminary investigation when the complaint never
reached that stage to begin with.
 6

2. The Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when it

evaluated and consequently dismissed a criminal complaint based on
grounds peculiar to administrative cases and in an unexplained deviation
from its rules of procedure.

In this case, the exercise of judicial restraint in view of the

Ombudsman’s awesome powers to investigate and prosecute is ill-judged.

THE EXONERATION OF PUBLIC OFFICERS BY THE

OMBUDSMAN IN A CHARGE ALLEGING GRAVE
MISCONDUCT IS GENERALLY UNAPPEALABLE
JEROME R. CANLAS vs. GONZALO A. BONGOLAN et. al.
G.R. No. 199625, June 6, 2018, 864 SCRA 335

FACTS: As a guaranty of the government’s obligation to the investors in

the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project, the Home Guaranty
Corporation in due consultation with the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel, sold two parcels of land included in the asset pool of the
project.

Jerome Canlas, in his personal capacity, filed an administrative and

criminal complaints with the Ombudsman against the officers of the Home
Guaranty Corporation (HGC) alleging that the price of the sale was grossly
inadequate per fair market value.

The Ombudsman dismissed both complaints for lack of proof that the
transaction was disadvantageous to the government. The CA affirmed the
dismissal.

Canlas insists that the HGC officials should be held guilty for
misconduct for entering into a contract grossly disadvantageous to the
government. The HGC officials, however, question the propriety of the appeal
as Canlas has no standing in the petition and that the dismissal of the
complaint by the Ombudsman is unappealable.

ISSUES
1. Whether the decision of exoneration of public officers by the
Ombudsman in a charge alleging grave misconduct is generally unappelable.

2. What is the only remedy against unappelable decisions?

3. Whether Canlas has the right to appeal the decision of the

Ombudsman dismissing the complaint.

RULINGS

1. YES. In administrative cases filed before the Ombudsman, Rule III

of A.O. No. 7 provides that where the respondent is absolved by the
charge, or in cases of conviction where the penalty imposed is merely
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month , or
a fine equivalent to one month salary , the decision shall be final ,
executory and unappelable.

2. The only remedy against unappelable decisions or orders is a

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the proper court , if the
Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

3. NO, since Canlas filed the appeal in his personal capacity and he
is not a real party in interest or a party adversely affected by the
decision.

While Ombudsman may entertain complaints from any person, even from
those without substantial interest in the matter , however, appeals from the
decisions of the Ombudsman are governed by the Rules of Court which
requires that an appealing party by real party in interest . Moreover, in
administrative case filed under the Civil Service Law , an allowed appeal
may only be brought by a party adversely affected by the decision.

46. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION

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CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION COMMENCES WHEN A

PERSON IS SINGLED OUT AS A SUSPECT IN THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME
PEOPLE vs. RUBELYN CABANADA
G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017, 831 SCRA 485

FACTS: On April 12, 2009, Catherine and her family visited her mother
in Bulacan. Cabanada was left at the house since she was not feeling
well and would rather clean the house.

On April 13, 2009, Catherine asked her husband Victor for the P47,000
he was supposed to give for their household expenses . Victor went to
his service vehicle to get the money he kept in the glove compartment ,
and was surprised that P20,000 was missing . When Victor informed his
wife, Catherine checked their room and discovered that several pieces of
her jewelry were also missing. She immediately called the police station to
report the incident.

In the course of the interview at Catherine’s residence , Cabanada

admitted to PO2 Cotoner that she took the money . She led them to her
room and took a pouch containing P16,000 cash.

Thereafter, Cabanada was brought at the Criminal Investigation Unit (CIU)

for further investigation. Cabanada apologized to Catherine, and admitted that

she still had some of the missing jewelry in her room . The police went
to her house and recovered the missing jewelry placed in a tool box.

ISSUES
1. Whether Cabanada’s admission obtained at Catherine’s residence is
under custodial investigation.

2. Whether the admission of Cabanada made at the CIU is inadmissible

in evidence.

RULINGS

1. NO, Cabanada was not under custodial investigation when she made
the confession, without counsel, to PO2 Cotoner that she took the missing
P20,000.00.

The confession was elicited during the initial interview of the police
after Catherine called to report the missing money and personal effects . The
investigation was still a general inquiry of the crime and has not focused
on a particular subject.

She admitted to the crime while at the residence of her employer ,

thus, she was not yet taken into custody or otherwise deprived of her
freedom.

Therefore, the confession made by Cabanada during the general

inquiry is admissible and can be used against her.

2. YES. The circumstances surrounding Cabanada’s appearance before the

police station falls within the definition of custodial investigation.

The subsequent confession of Cabanada at the CIU office can be

considered as having been done in a custodial setting because (1) after
admitting the crime, Cabanada was brought to the police station for further
investigation; (2) the alleged confession happened in the office of the CIU
chief; (3) PO2 Cotoner was present during Cabanada’s apology and admission
to Catherine. The compelling pressure of custodial setting were present
when the accused was brought to the police station along with Catherine.

Cabanada’s confession without counsel at the police station , which led

to the recovery of the other items at her house, is inadmissible.

47. DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW

EDCEL C. LAGMAN et. al. vs. HON. SEC. MEDIALDIA et. al.
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774. July 4, 2017, 829 SCRA 1
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FACTS: Proclamation No. 216 was the President’s declaration of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus which is
effective for 60 days. It was issued on May 23, 2017 and expired on
June 23, 2017.

Petitioners claim that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient

factual basis because the President’s Report contained “false, inaccurate,
contrived and hyperbolic accounts.

Petitioners further contend that the extraordinary powers of the president

should be dispensed sequentially , i.e., the power to call out the armed
forces; second, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus; and finally, the power to declare Martial Law. They maintain that
the President has no discretion to choose which extraordinary power to
use.

ISSUES
1. Whether the Court may examine the facts discovered after the
president has made the decision to declare martial law.

2. Whether the President has the discretion to choose which

extraordinary power to use.

3. Whether the power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the

factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus independent of the actions taken
by Congress.

RULINGS

1. NO, those facts cannot be considered in determining sufficiency of

factual basis.

Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the

President, the determination of the Court must be based only on facts or
information known by or available to the President at the time he made
the declaration or suspension, which facts or information are found in the
proclamation as well on the written Report submitted by him to Congress.

In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration

and/or the suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or
totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. To require
precision in the President’s appreciation of facts would only unduly burden
him and therefore impede the process of his decision making.

In determining existence of rebellion , the President only needs to

convince himself that there is a probable cause or evidence showing that
more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is being committed. To
require him to satisfy a high standard of proof would restrict the
exercise of his emergency powers.

2. YES, the President has discretion to choose which extraordinary

power to use. It cannot be overemphasized that time is paramount in
situations necessitating the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Indeed the 1987 Constitution gives the President as Commander-in-chief , a

‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these
are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the power to declare martial law.

It must be stressed, however, that the graduation refers only to

hierarchy based on scope and effect . It does not in any manner refer to
a sequence, arrangement, or order which the Commander-in-chief must follow.
This so-called “graduation power” does not dictate or restrict the manner
by which the President decides which power to choose.

The power to choose, initially, which among these extraordinary powers

to wield in a given set of conditions is a judgment call on the part
of the President. As Commander-in-chief, his powers are broad enough to
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include his prerogative to address exigencies or threats that endanger the

government, and the very integrity of the State.

It is beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not

extend to calibrating the President’s decision pertaining to which extraordinary
power to avail given a set of facts or condition.

3. YES, the power of the Court is independent of the actions taken

by Congress.

The power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by

Congress are not only totally different but likewise independent from each
other although concededly.

POWER OF CONGRESS TO EXTEND

MARTIAL LAW
EDCEL LAGMAN et. al. vs. AQUILINO PIMENTEL III et. al.
G.R. Nos. 235935, 236061, 236145 & 236155, February 6, 2018, 854 SCRA 184

FACTS: The President requested the Congress to extend the effectivity of

Proclamation No. 216.

In a Special Joint Session, the Congress adopted Resolution of both

House No. 2 extending Proclamation No. 216 until December 31, 2017.

Acting on said recommendation, the President asked both the Senate

and the House of Representatives to further extend the proclamation of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus in the
entire Mindanao for one year from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018
or for such period as the Congress may determine.

The Senate and the House of Representatives in a joint session

adopted Resolution of both Houses No. 4 further extending the period of
Martial Law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
in the entire Mindanao for one year.

Petitioners contend that the Constitution allows only a one-time

extension of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, not a series of extensions amounting to perpetuity.

Petitioners question the manner that the Congress approved the

extension of Martial Law in Mindanao . They premised their argument on
the fact that the Joint Rules adopted by both Houses provided for an
inordinately short period of interpellation of resource persons and for
explanation by each member after the voting is concluded.

ISSUES
1. Whether Congress have the power to further extend the period of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.

2. Whether the Congressional rule on the extension of martial law is

subject to judicial review.

RULINGS

1. YES, the Congress has the power to extend the martial law
declaration.

Section 18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution is indisputably silent as

to how many times the Congress , upon the initiative by the president ,
may extend the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The limitations to the exercise of the congressional authority to extend

such proclamation or suspension are (1) that the extension should be upon
the President’s initiative; (2) that it should be grounded on the persistence
of the invasion or rebellion and the demands of public safety ; and (3)
that it is subject to the Court’s review on the sufficiency of its factual
basis upon the petition of any citizen. However, it clearly gave the
Congress the authority to decide on its duration ; thus, the provision states
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that the extension shall be “for a period to be determined by the

Congress.”

2. NO, the Court ruled that they cannot review the rules promulgated
by Congress in the absence of any constitutional violations.

No less than the Constitution under Section 16 of Article VI , grants

the Congress the right to promulgate its own rules to govern its
proceedings - a right granted with full discretionary authority to each House
of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its rules.

As such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from

judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute denial of
due process.

The limitation of this unrestricted power deals only with the imperative
of quorum, voting and publications.

In the instant case, the rules in question did not pertain to quorum,
voting or publication. Deliberations on extending martial law certainly cannot
be equated to the consideration of regular or ordinary legislation. The
Congress may consider such matter as urgent as to necessitate swift action.

“GODSPEED”