Case 1:22-cv-00734-GTS-CFH Document 9-1 Filed 07/20/22 Page 1 of 29

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IVAN ANTONYUK, GUN OWNERS OF )

AMERICA, INC., GUN OWNERS )
FOUNDATION, and GUN OWNERS OF )
AMERICA NEW YORK, INC., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
) Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-00734-GTS-CFH
v. )
)
KEVIN P. BRUEN, in his Official )
Capacity as Superintendent of the New )
York State Police, )
)
)
Defendant. )
____________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY AND/OR PERMANENT INJUNCTION
 Case 1:22-cv-00734-GTS-CFH Document 9-1 Filed 07/20/22 Page 2 of 29

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………1
II. Plaintiffs Have Standing………………………………………………………….........1
III. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to a Preliminary Injunction………………………………....….5
A. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits………………………………....….5
i. The CCIA is repugnant to a plain reading of the Second Amendment, and
contrary to the Supreme Court’s clear teachings in Bruen………………..…..6
ii. The CCIA is a legislative repudiation of Bruen……………………………….6
iii. “Good Moral Character”………………………………………………………8
iv. In Person Meetings, Social Media, and “Character References”………….......9
v. The CCIA declares nearly all of New York to be a “sensitive place”……….17
vi. The CCIA demands almost five-times the amount of training previously
required……………………………………………………………………....19
vii. Under Bruen’s “historical tradition” standard of review, New York cannot
come close to justifying the CCIA’s provisions…………………………...…20
B. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Suffer Irreparable Harm Absent Preliminary Relief…....23
C. The Balance of Equities Tips Overwhelmingly in Plaintiffs’ Favor……..............24
D. An Injunction Is in the Public Interest…………………………….………….…..24
IV. Conclusion……………………....…………………………………………………....25

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I. Introduction.

New York continues its history of infringing the Second Amendment right to bear arms,

treating most law-abiding people as unworthy of the natural right to self-defense. In response to

the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent vindication of the People’s rights to keep and bear arms in public

in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3055 (2022), New York has enacted

new restrictions in explicit contravention not only of the Court’s holdings, but also the text of the

First, Second, and Fourteenth Amendments. Compl. ¶¶ 46–50. New Yorkers now face the

impending reinstitution of discretionary licensing standards, imposition of draconian carry

restrictions in a cornucopia of nonsensitive public places, invasion of protected First Amendment

conduct, a four-and-a-half-times expanded training requirement and accompanying exorbitant

costs, and conversion of private property into de facto “gun free zones” that “would eviscerate the

general right to publicly carry arms for self-defense,” Bruen, at *38. Plaintiffs request that this

Court enter a preliminary injunction before the law goes into effect to prevent the irreparable harm

that will befall Plaintiffs absent emergency relief.

II. Plaintiffs Have Standing.

To show standing, an individual plaintiff must suffer a concrete and particularized invasion

of a legally protected interest that is either actual or imminent. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 560 (1992). This injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and

likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 560–61. For pre-enforcement challenges, “[a]

party facing prospective injury has standing to sue where the threatened injury is real, immediate,

and direct.” Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008). “[A]n actual arrest, prosecution, or other

enforcement action is not a prerequisite to challenging the law.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,

573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014). Finally, an organizational plaintiff has standing to sue as the

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representative of its members when “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their

own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c)

neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members

in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). Due to the

incontrovertible constitutional violations at issue here, Plaintiffs easily satisfy these requirements.

Plaintiff Antonyuk currently holds an unrestricted New York carry license, which has

enabled him to carry a handgun for self-defense in public places that will now be off limits under

New York’s so-called Concealed Carry “Improvement” Act (CCIA), scheduled to take effect on

September 1, 2022. See Compl. ¶¶ 106–07, 112–14. See also Dec. of Antonyuk, Compl. Ex. “6”,

¶ 3. Mr. Antonyuk wishes to “continue to lawfully carry [his] handgun in public, which [he] has

done since 2009.” Id. at ¶ 12. However, Mr. Antonyuk will be prohibited from carrying a firearm

in any of the numerous categories of “sensitive locations” and “restricted locations” as now defined

in the CCIA, including all private property, such as private businesses that do not take affirmative

steps to post signage that gun owners are allowed on the premises. Id. at ¶ 14. If Mr. Antonyuk

needs to visit (for instance, to obtain necessities such as food or gas) any one of those businesses

that does not take the steps to expressly opt-out of the state’s disarmament scheme, he will be

forced first to disarm himself in public, unload his firearm and then store it in a “safe storage box”

– but not in his “glovebox,” all without arousing suspicion from passers-by, and hopefully avoiding

potential confrontational police responses to “man-with-a-gun” calls. Id. at ¶ 15.

Of course, if a parking lot appurtenant to a business is also “private property” without

required signage allowing the carrying of firearms, then Mr. Antonyuk will not even be able to

disarm lawfully as the CCIA requires. Should Mr. Antonyuk wish to visit his family or friends –

people he has known for years or even to whom he is related, including those who are well aware

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that he is a gun owner who possesses a license to carry – he nevertheless will first be required to

obtain such persons’ express consent to his lawful bearing of arms in each and every location he

visits. Since the CCIA places the burden on the gun owner to establish the legality for each place

he carries, Mr. Antonyuk would be well-advised to obtain such consent in writing, imposing a

ridiculous recordkeeping obligation on gun owners who merely wish to go about their daily lives.

The definition of “sensitive locations” in the CCIA includes all manner of obviously

nonsensitive locations including public parks, public transportation, theaters, and public

gatherings, while the definition of “restricted locations” includes all private property, including

the homes of friends and family,1 and businesses without affirmative signage. See Compl. at ¶¶

69, 73–74. Should Plaintiff Antonyuk attempt to exercise his Second Amendment right, consistent

with Bruen, to public carry in any of these locations, he risks felony prosecution. See id. at ¶¶ 71,

75. In other words, on September 1, 2022, Mr. Antonyuk will be forbidden to carry in most places

he lawfully carries now. Id. at ¶¶ 18, 20. Based on the language of the CCIA, it appears that even

venturing off the public streets might mean unwittingly committing a felony. See Bruen, at *38

(“[E]xpanding the category of ‘sensitive places’ simply to all places of public congregation that

are not isolated from law enforcement defines the category of ‘sensitive places’ far too broadly.”)

Additionally, when Mr. Antonyuk must recertify his carry permit in January 2023, he will

be subjected to the CCIA’s onerous new training requirement (even though he has already met the

training requirement in existing law), consisting of payment of hundreds of dollars, potentially

taking of multiple days off of work, and a considerable investment of time. Id. at ¶ 13.

1
See statement of Gov. Hochul’s office (“private property owners must expressly allow a person
to possess a firearm, rifle, or shotgun on their property”), https://on.ny.gov/3zi9BKz.
3
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Further, as a result of the CCIA, Mr. Antonyuk now faces having his protected First

Amendment rights chilled, as subsequent recertification of his carry license hinges on an

amorphous and entirely discretionary finding by public officials that he has “good moral

character,” in part predicated upon his providing his social media history to government agents to

scrutinize. See Compl. ¶¶ 59, 109. See also Dec. of Antonyuk, at ¶ 19. Additionally, he must

provide a list of his family and associates to the government so that they can be interrogated by

government agents, in violation of the rights of association and anonymity. Consequently, he faces

imminent curtailment of constitutionally protected conduct. In short, Mr. Antonyuk will be

required to trade his First Amendment rights for his Second Amendment rights when he recertifies

his permit come January 2023. These are undoubtedly injuries that “affect the plaintiff in a

personal and individual way.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992). And these

injuries are fairly traceable to Defendant Bruen, who is tasked with enforcing these impending

restrictions. See Compl. at ¶ 7. An injunction from this Court would prevent Mr. Antonyuk from

suffering those harms by preserving the status quo.

Plaintiffs Gun Owners of America (GOA), Gun Owners Foundation (GOF), and Gun

Owners of America New York (GOA-NY) have members and supporters in New York who will

face the same harms and similar harms as Plaintiff Antonyuk, due to the impending

implementation of CCIA. These GOA/GOF/GOA-NY associated persons would otherwise have

standing to sue in their own right. See id. at ¶¶ 2–5. The interests Plaintiffs GOA, GOF, and GOA-

NY seek to protect in this suit—preservation of New Yorker’s Second Amendment rights to bear

arms in public for self-defense—are germane to their purposes as Second Amendment advocacy

organizations. See id. Finally, individual participation of each of their members and supporters is

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wholly unnecessary to vindicate those members’ rights and interests. See Declaration of Erich

Pratt, Compl. Ex. “4”; Declaration of William Robinson, Compl. Ex. “5.”

III. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to a Preliminary Injunction.

The standard for a preliminary injunction requires Plaintiffs to “establish that [they are]

likely to succeed on the merits, that [they are] likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in [their] favor, and that an injunction is in the

public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “In cases alleging

constitutional injury, a strong showing of a constitutional deprivation that results in

noncompensable damages ordinarily warrants a finding of irreparable harm. Likelihood of success

on the merits is therefore ‘the dominant, if not the dispositive, factor.’” A.H. v. French, 985 F.3d

165, 176 (2d Cir. 2021). Because Plaintiffs seek a preservation of the status quo via a prohibitory

injunction of a statute yet to go into effect (see Compl. at ¶ 2), they need not “demonstrate a

‘substantial’ likelihood of success on the merits,” N.Y. Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 733 F.3d

483, 486 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Sunward Elecs., Inc. v. McDonald, 362 F.3d 17, 24 (2d Cir.

2004)), or “make a ‘strong showing’ of irreparable harm.’” A.H. v. French, 985 F.3d 165, 176 (2d

Cir. 2021) (quoting Yang v. Kosinski, 960 F.3d 119, 128 (2d Cir. 2020)).

Due to the CCIA’s blatant and imminent repudiation of the Second and Fourteenth

Amendments’ guarantees as affirmed by Bruen, as well as the significant, structural First

Amendment violations the CCIA enacts into law, Plaintiffs nonetheless are able to demonstrate a

substantial likelihood of success and make a strong showing of irreparable harm. Plaintiffs also

easily demonstrate that the balance of equities tips in their favor and that, pursuant to the

unambiguous guidance from Bruen, injunctive relief undoubtedly would be in the public interest.

A. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits.

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i. The CCIA is repugnant to a plain reading of the Second Amendment, and

contrary to the Supreme Court’s clear teachings in Bruen.

The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “A well regulated

Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms

shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. As the Supreme Court has now reiterated in Bruen,

the Second and Fourteenth Amendments together guarantee individual Americans not only the

right to “keep” firearms in their homes, but also the right to “bear arms,” meaning “to carry a

handgun for self-defense outside the home,” free from infringement by either federal or state

governments. Bruen, at *13. In Bruen, the Supreme Court first “decline[d] to adopt that two-part

approach” used in this and other circuits, and reiterated that, “[i]n keeping with Heller, we hold

that when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution

presumptively protects that conduct.” Bruen, at 8. Second, the Supreme Court held that:

[t]o justify [a] regulation, the government may not simply posit that the regulation
promotes an important interest. Rather, the government must demonstrate that the
regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only if
a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court
conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s ‘unqualified
command.’ [Bruen, at *21 (citation omitted).]

Third, in reviewing the historical evidence, because “not all history is created equal,” the Bruen

Court cabined review of relevant history to a narrow time period, focusing on the period around

the ratification of the Second Amendment, and perhaps the Fourteenth Amendment (but noted that

“post-ratification” interpretations “cannot overcome or alter that text,” and “we have generally

assumed that the scope of the protection applicable to the Federal Government and States is pegged

to the public understanding of the right when the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791.”). See Bruen,

at * 46 (discussing the lack of relevant historical prohibitions on concealed carry in public).

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Under the Bruen test, then, it does not matter whether a government restriction “minimally”

or “severely” burdens (infringes) the Second Amendment. There are no relevant statistical studies

to be consulted. There are no sociological arguments to be considered. The ubiquitous problems

of crime or the density of population do not affect the equation. The only appropriate inquiry,

according to Bruen, is what the “public understanding of the right to keep and bear arms” was

during the ratification of the Second Amendment in 1791, and perhaps during ratification of the

Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. Bruen, at *47.

In striking down New York’s discretionary “proper cause” requirement, the Supreme Court

found no Founding-era historical tradition that permits a state to condition the right to carry arms

in public on subjective requirements within the discretion of licensing officials. See id. at *47–48.

In doing so, the Court pointed to the entirely different “shall-issue” licensing schemes that a

supermajority2 of states have implemented, so long as they “contain only ‘narrow, objective, and

definite standards’ guiding licensing officials, rather than requiring the ‘appraisal of facts, the

exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion.’” Id. at *48 n.9 (citation omitted).

ii. The CCIA is a legislative repudiation of Bruen.

After Bruen was handed down, the Governor of New York called an extraordinary session

of the state legislature for the purpose of enacting a new statutory scheme (the CCIA), designed to

give some appearance of compliance with Bruen, while in reality thwarting the Supreme Court’s

decision. Indeed, during the process, Governor Kathy Hochul issued several statements critical

and disrespectful of the Supreme Court’s ruling:

2
In fact, more than half of the states do not require any sort of government issued-permit in order
for a law-abiding person to carry a firearm in public, known as “constitutional carry” or “permitless
carry.” Many more are “shall issue” states where licensing officials must issue permits if an
applicant meets certain basic criteria. Altogether, a reported 41 states operate under one or the
other of these permissive regimes. See https://bit.ly/3OjmyYE.
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[t]he Supreme Court’s reckless and reprehensible decision to strike down New York’s
century-old concealed carry law puts lives at risk here in New York,3 [and] [a] week ago,
the Supreme Court issued a reckless decision removing century-old limitations on who is
allowed to carry concealed weapons in our state — senselessly sending us backward and
putting the safety of our residents in jeopardy[.]4

On the contrary, it is the Governor’s signing of the CCIA which was the “reckless,”

“reprehensible,” “senseless[]” and “backward” act, which unconstitutionally puts the safety of

New Yorkers in jeopardy by ensuring their continued disarmament in public.

iii. “Good Moral Character.”

The CCIA made one “improvement” to New York’s licensing scheme, removing from the

statute the repudiated “proper cause” requirement held unconstitutional by Bruen. However, the

CCIA replaced the tyranny of “proper cause” with an entirely new tyranny, redefining the phrase

“good moral character” with an utterly subjective and amorphous standard. See Compl. Ex. “1” at

p 2 (“[G]ood moral character . . . for the purposes of this article, shall mean having the essential

character, temperament and judgement [sic] necessary to be entrusted with a weapon . . . .”). This

“entrust[ment]” contemplated by the CCIA is a perversion of the Second Amendment’s

unqualified guarantee of a right of all “the people,” not just those lucky few who government

officials choose to “entrust” with a firearm. Indeed, those disqualified from licensure for allegedly

not having “good moral character” will be those who otherwise would have qualified for a permit

– those who the Bruen Court describes as “ordinary, law-abiding citizens” (Bruen, at *102) – but

who nevertheless are disfavored by a licensing official applying a vague standard.

On the contrary, the Second Amendment’s plain text protects the right of the people to bear

arms in public without having to demonstrate anything to the government or obtain anything from

3
https://on.ny.gov/3aLXqwc.
4
https://on.ny.gov/3zglMY3.
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the government (such as approval, or a license). No other constitutional right works in that way.

See Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150

(2002). Indeed, more than half of states within this country now properly recognize the right to

bear arms in its purest form without the government “permitting” its citizens to exercise their

natural rights). Moreover, as Bruen notes, even when it comes to states that require a permit, the

supermajority are “shall issue” states which freely issue permits to those who meet clear,

attainable, objective licensing requirements, such as the passing of a background check or receipt

of a training certification, entirely immune from government officials’ assessments of suitability,

character or purpose. See Bruen, at *48 n.9. Indeed, the Bruen Court explicitly rejected such a

statutory scheme as New York has enacted, which “grant[s] licensing officials discretion to deny

licenses based on a perceived lack of need or suitability.” Bruen, at *17 (emphasis added).5

iv. In Person Meetings, Social Media, and “Character References.”

After requiring an applicant to meet the amorphous standard of having “good moral

character” before being permitted to exercise Second Amendment rights, the CCIA imposes a

litany of unconstitutional prerequisites on those applying for, or recertifying, a carry license. See

Compl. Ex. “1”, at 4-5. First, the CCIA’s requirement of an in-person interview with a “licensing

officer” (Ex. “1” at 5) violates numerous constitutional protections. A right that can only be

exercised after an in-person interview with a “licensing officer” is no right at all. This interview

has no bounds, to discuss whatever the officer wishes to discuss, for however long or to whatever

satisfaction the licensing officer sees fit. This is an affront to applicants’ First and Second

5
The Second Amendment unequivocally protects a law-abiding citizen’s exercise of the right to
“bear arms,” because “[t]he Second Amendment ‘is the very product of an interest balancing by
the people’ and it ‘surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible
citizens to use arms’ for self-defense.” Id. at *31 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)).
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Amendment rights, and, depending on the questions, also their Fifth Amendment right to remain

silent.6 Additionally, the CCIA requires that the applicant provide “names and contact

information” for the applicant’s “spouse or domestic partner,” other adults in the home, adult

children in the home, and whether minors reside “full time or part time” in the home.7 Id. This

allows New York to contact and interrogate those persons however desired on any topic bearing

on suitability without regard to existing protections, such as the spousal privilege (Obergefell v.

Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 670, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015)) that “protects private and confidential

communications between spouses from disclosure.” Shih v. Petal Card, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 3d 557,

572 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (citations omitted). This violates both the applicant’s right of association, as

well as the anonymity rights of those who do not want to be contacted by government officials, or

have their personal information entered into a government database.

Second, the CCIA mandates that the applicant provide “such other information required by

the licensing officer that is reasonably necessary and related to the review of the licensing

application.” Id. at 5. This is an invitation to a fishing expedition using a casting net rather than

a rod and reel. Could the “officer” decide to require a report of a blood or urine sample to check

whether the applicant has any medications or drugs in his system? Could the “officer” require a

6
Indeed, the Second Circuit held that “… compelled speech presents a unique affront to personal
dignity. The decision to withhold speech depends on views and calculations known only to the
individual...” and “[a]s the Supreme Court has explained, between compelled silence and
compelled speech, compelled speech is the more serious incursion on the First Amendment. . .”
Burns v. Martuscello, 890 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2018).
7
The requirement that a normal citizen must turn over his closest contacts to the government for
who-knows-what is reminiscent of the former Soviet Union. Mr. Antonyuk, when he lived in
Ukraine in the 1990’s, no doubt would not have wished to provide government officials with a list
of his closest associations and relations, social media accounts, or be interviewed in person by a
licensing “officer” to discuss his private activities. That reluctance did not change when Mr.
Antonyuk moved to the United States, and there is nothing amiss with a law-abiding person not
desiring to be interrogated by state actors as a precondition to exercise an enumerated right.
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report from a hair or fingernail sample to test for ethyl glucuronide (EtG) to determine if the

applicant abuses alcohol?8 While the “interview” is ostensibly limited to only those things

“reasonably necessary and related to the review of the licensing application,” the CCIA’s invitation

for a licensing official to probe “any other information” invites abuse. It is hardly speculative to

predict that some licensing officer will conduct a deep dive into an applicant’s activities and

lifestyle simply because he is able to.

Third, the CCIA requires “names and contact information” of four character references

who must attest to the applicant’s “good moral character[.]”9 Id. at 5. No other constitutional right

is predicated upon what others think about you, or conditioned on having friends who will agree

to stand up to government interrogation and scrutiny (or retaliation) in order to help you obtain a

carry license. Those who do not have four qualifying “character references” presumably will be

unable to exercise their Second Amendment rights. Making matters worse, the CCIA demands

that “character references” attest that the applicant “has not engaged in any acts, or made any

statements that suggest they are likely to engage in conduct that would result in harm to themselves

or others.” Id. Of course, how someone would be in the omniscient position to attest that another

person has never engaged in “any act” or made “any statements” of a certain nature seems a tall

order indeed. The requirement that nothing “suggest [an applicant is] likely to engage in conduct

that would result in harm [justified or not] to themselves or others” would deny a carry permit to

those who would defend their own life in a lawful act of self-defense.

8
See https://bit.ly/3PyMMHy (“Ethyl glucuronide, especially in fingernails, may have potential as
a quantitative indicator of alcohol use.”).
9
Current state law does not require “character references,” however the permit application has a
section requiring “four character references who by their signature attest to your good moral
character.” See https://on.ny.gov/3PGQorf. Unlike the CCIA, the application requires nothing
more than a signature from the reference.
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Fourth, the CCIA’s requirement to list “former and social media accounts … for the past

three years” is a staggering overreach into protected First Amendment activity, requiring citizens

to disclose protected information to the government so that an unnamed “licensing officer” can

rummage through their personal affairs, as a condition precedent to engaging in protected Second

Amendment activity. As a preliminary matter, it is entirely unclear what is meant by the CCIA’s

use of the term “social media accounts,” which is left undefined. Thus, it is a certainty that different

licensing officials across New York state will interpret the phrase differently, some applying it far

more broadly and to numerous more platforms and interfaces than others. As the dictionary

definition of “social media” is all “forms of electronic communication (such as websites for social

networking and microblogging) through which users create online communities to share

information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (such as videos),”10 a broad

understanding of the phrase “social media” is hardly unreasonable.11

Many social media platforms permit entirely anonymous speech and profiles, such as

Reddit, etc., and the CCIA would breach that anonymity, forcing a person to specifically identify

his anonymous speech. The First Amendment clearly protects even anonymous speech, and the

CCIA’s demand that anonymous individuals unmask themselves violates those protections. See

Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092-93 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (noting that the

10
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20media.
11
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) used
the terms “social media” and “social networking” interchangeably, likely because it is next to
impossible to draw any sort of meaningful distinction between the two. The very same websites,
apps, and other platforms that permit a person to post information publicly also permit quasi-public
postings, private communications and anonymous postings. For example, a Facebook profile can
be set to “Public,” or to be viewable only to “Friends (+ friends of anyone tagged),” to “Only Me,”
or even to “Custom” which allows a user to “selectively share something with specific people, or
hide it from specific people.” https://bit.ly/3PExm4N. LinkedIn allows for both public postings
and private communications, with some information available only in relation to how many
degrees of connection a user is with another user. See https://bit.ly/3B41fHO.
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exchange of ideas on the internet is ‘driven in large part by the ability of Internet users to

communicate anonymously’)”). See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342, 115

S. Ct. 1511, 1516 (1995) (“The freedom to publish anonymously extends beyond the literary

realm.”). The CCIA’s demand for social media accounts is analogous to the government

demanding to see what books a person is buying and reading: “The right to engage in expressive

activities anonymously, without government intrusion or observation, is critical to the protection

of the First Amendment rights of book buyers and sellers, precisely because of the chilling effects

of such disclosures.” Tattered Cover v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1053 (Colo. 2002).

What is more, even the existence of a particular social media account, username, or screen

name can serve to divulge highly personal information to the government. Like a phone number

or seemingly innocuous cell-site location information, such information can paint a “precise,

comprehensive record of a person’s public [life] that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial,

political, professional, religious, and sexual associations [including] ‘trips to the psychiatrist, the

plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense

attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar

and on and on.’” United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring);

see also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). For example, an applicant’s reporting

his “Grindr” screen name could divulge his sexual orientation, an AR15.com, Armslist, or

Gunbroker profile reveals a fairly-serious Second Amendment advocate, a “Gatalog” account

reveals a likely hobbyist engaged in 3-D printing homemade firearms, and a Truth Social, Parler,

or Gab profile indicates someone with probable alt-right and pro-Trump political views.

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The list of “social media” apps, websites, and platforms that would be covered under the

CCIA is nearly endless,12 and a given carry applicant is likely to have numerous such profiles and

accounts, the existence of each of which would need to be turned over to the state in order to

qualify for a carry license (good luck remembering them all, since the application is signed upon

penalty of fines and imprisonment13). Like the ubiquitous cellular phone, a person’s social media

history paints “a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S.

373, 375 (2014). New York cannot demand that “digital record” as a condition of a person being

permitted to exercise enumerated Second Amendment rights.

Finally, the CCIA is entirely unclear to what end a licensing official will be reviewing a

person’s social media history. An invitation to a licensing official to consider a person’s morality

– aside from their law-abiding record – invites inconsistency, corruption, abuse, discriminatory,

prejudicial, arbitrary and capricious behavior. For example, the vague nature of the CCIA’s

standard begs the question whether someone who attends a BLM “parade” or “rally” that turns

violent could be denied a permit. Does a teacher who regrets her appearance on “OnlyFans” have

“good moral character?”14 How about those who believe that the 2020 election was “stolen,” or

who publicly advocate against Covid-19 vaccination? Does a person lack “good moral character”

if he has multiple speeding tickets within school zones? How about those who have engaged in

quintessentially political speech that happens to be critical of the Governor, the local sheriff, a

judge, or even the licensing official considering the application? Indeed, numerous past

publications by federal and state governments have warned of potential domestic extremist

tendencies by those who stockpile firearms and ammunition, receive tactical training, or even who

12
Google, YouTube, Discord, Snapchat, Pinterest, Twitch, Instagram, and on and on.
13
See https://troopers.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2020/12/ppb-3.pdf.
14
See https://bit.ly/3v2vStn.
14
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vigorously advocate for constitutional rights.15 The constitutional problems are evident when

government licensing officials are equipped with unbridled discretion to engage in not only

content-based discrimination, but viewpoint discrimination.16 See Rosenberger v. Rectors and

Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (“When the government targets not

subject matter but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First

Amendment is all the more blatant. … The government must abstain from regulating speech when

the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for

the restriction.). The CCIA’s creation of a “pre-crime”17 style prohibition on the exercise of an

enumerated right is expressly foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s admonition in Bruen that states

enact licensing schemes “without granting licensing officials discretion to deny licenses based on

a perceived lack of need or suitability.”) Ex. “1” at 4.

Finally, the CCIA’s social media requirement will undoubtedly chill protected speech, as

individuals seeking to exercise their Second Amendment rights will stop using social media, delete

their accounts, or self-censor what they are saying prior to applying for or renewing a carry license.

See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007) (“the First Amendment requires us

to err on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it[]”).

It is axiomatic that the exercise of one constitutional right cannot be conditioned on the

forfeiture or violation of another. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 393-394

(1968) (rejecting a situation where a defendant was forced to forfeit his Fifth Amendment right to

15
See, e.g., “Crisis Controlled, Assessing Potential Threats of Violence,” Virginia State Police,
https://bit.ly/3yU7Th2.
16
See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307, 85 S. Ct. 1493, 1496-97 (1965) (holding
unconstitutional a requirement that an individual wanting to receive “communist propaganda”
write the post office and inform it of his intent to receive that mailer. . . ).
17
See “Minority Report,” 20th Century Fox (2002).
15
 Case 1:22-cv-00734-GTS-CFH Document 9-1 Filed 07/20/22 Page 18 of 29

keep silent in order to assert his Fourth Amendment right, calling that a “condition of a kind to

which this Court has always been peculiarly sensitive,” and concluding it to be “intolerable that

one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another.”); see also Perry

v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (the government may not deny a person a benefit “on a

basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests”).

Notwithstanding the CCIA’s blatant First Amendment overreach, its draconian licensing

provisions also fail under the simple standard articulated most recently in Bruen, because there is

no historical analog requiring an individual seeking to bear arms in public to provide his newspaper

clippings, private letters, or handbills before he is deemed “suitable” to carry a firearm. Quite to

the contrary, the Fourth Amendment was designed specifically to protect against such a “general

warrant” by the government, and this nation’s Founders often used anonymous political speech to

discuss the importance of protecting the right to keep and bear arms. For example, in Federalist

No. 46, James Madison (under the pseudonym “Publius”) wrote of “the advantage of being armed,

which the Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation,” which “forms a barrier

against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of

any form,” in contrast with “the several kingdoms of Europe, which … are afraid to trust the people

with arms.” It is ludicrous to imagine that this nation’s founding generation would have

countenanced a New York statute which required Madison to seek permission to bear arms from

his government in the first place18 (something not required in New York until the Sullivan Act was

enacted in 1911, a period in history that the Supreme Court has explained is most definitely not

18
See Bruen, at *57 (“there is little evidence of an early American practice of regulating public
carry by the general public”)
16
 Case 1:22-cv-00734-GTS-CFH Document 9-1 Filed 07/20/22 Page 19 of 29

part of this nation’s “historical tradition” (Bruen, at *46-47)), much less to unmask his true identity

in the Federalist Papers to a licensing official, as a condition of “being armed.”

v. The CCIA declares nearly all of New York to be a “sensitive place.”

The CCIA’s laundry list of “sensitive places” includes places which are sensitive in name

only, sweeping up all manner of entirely ordinary venues that the New Yorkers visit on a daily

basis for a whole host of activities that are entirely unrelated to the administration of government.

In fact, the CCIA’s grossly overexpansive nature of “sensitive places,” makes analysis for purposes

of injunctive relief clear cut. As the Bruen Court explained, a “sensitive place” under Second

Amendment jurisprudence is not just any “place[] where people typically congregate and where

law-enforcement and other public-safety professionals are presumptively available.” Id. at *38.

Rather, the Court explained that states have extremely narrow latitude to limit the places where

firearms may be carried in public, mentioning only a limited number of “sensitive places such as

schools and government buildings.” Bruen, at *38. Although the Court acknowledged that other

“new and analogous sensitive places” may exist, it cautioned that such potential locations would

be highly limited, and certainly could not be defined so broadly as to “include all ‘places where

people typically congregate’” or for New York to “effectively declare the island of Manhattan a

‘sensitive place’” by claiming nearly every category of place to be a sensitive one. Bruen, at *38.

The concept of a “sensitive place” as used by the Court in Bruen and Heller refers to the

government’s control as proprietor of facilities designated for certain specific and limited

government purposes. The term relates to the government’s relationship with the facility and the

facility’s designated use — not the number of people who might attend an event there. In a

“sensitive place,” such as a courthouse designated for official judicial business, the government as

proprietor enjoys the power of exclusion just as would any other private property owner would

17
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possess. On the other hand, the government’s relationship with places like public parks and transit

is entirely different. Instead of the location being used for a designated and specific governmental

purpose, the government merely manages the property on behalf of the public, and the location is

designated for public use and is widely available to all comers to use for any of a variety of lawful

purposes. The government is not thereafter free to single out for discriminatory treatment a

subclass of citizens attempting to use or frequent those venues, who merely happen to be exercising

a constitutionally-protected right while otherwise lawfully making use of the space.

In addition to the large number of designated “sensitive locations,” the CCIA also bans the

carry of firearms in what it calls “a restricted location,” when a person:

enters into or remains on or in private property where such person knows or reasonably
should know that the owner or lessee of such property has not permitted such possession
by clear and conspicuous signage indicating that the carrying of [firearms] on their
property is permitted or has otherwise given express consent. [Compl. Ex. “1” at 19
(emphasis added).]

Violation of this prohibition, like the prohibition on “sensitive locations,” is a “class E felony,”

conviction of which leads to the loss of Second Amendment rights for life. Ex. “1” at 20.19 This

provision, declaring much of the state to be a “restricted location,” usurps the right of land owners

and makes all private property in the entire state of New York a “restricted location” by default,

requiring the business owner to “opt out” of the regime by placing a “conspicuous” sign to allow

the carry of a firearm in that location. In doing so, New York has again violated one constitutional

right in order to violate another, taking private property without compensation, and putting it to

public use in order to enact the legislature’s anti-gun political agenda and deprive New Yorkers of

19
Not content with banning licensed carriers from carrying in most of New York, the CCIA would
require individuals who are otherwise licensed to carry, but who are entering a “no carry” zone,
remove the ammunition from their firearm and secure the firearm in an “appropriate safe storage
depository out of sight from outside of the vehicle.” Ex. “1” at 25.
18
 Case 1:22-cv-00734-GTS-CFH Document 9-1 Filed 07/20/22 Page 21 of 29

their constitutional right to bear arms – requiring all property owners to engage in compelled

speech in order to get around the state’s anti-gun agenda. The CCIA’s designation of “restricted

locations” makes New York the extreme outlier among the states, where the general rule leaves it

to property owners to decide whether to allow or prohibit firearms, such as through the posting of

a “no guns” sign. Even then, in some states, “no guns” signs do not carry the force of law unless

they mirror specific language.20 This is based on the notion that it is up to a property owner – not

the legislature – to decide what sorts of persons and activities are permitted on the property.

Together, the CCIA’s “sensitive locations” and “restricted locations” provisions convert most of

New York into a gun free zone. In enacting these provisions, New York has thumbed its nose at

the Supreme Court, which in Bruen disapproved of that very situation.

vi. The CCIA demands almost five-times the amount of training previously required.

For years, New York implemented different training requirements in different counties and

left some counties to come up with their own standards. See N.Y. PL § 400(1) (discussing

Westchester County requirement for a “firearms safety course and test”). Schenectady County

requires an approved “handgun safety course”21 which lasts four hours.22 But after Bruen, New

York now believes that 16 hours of classroom training, plus an additional 2 hours of live-fire, is

necessary. This new training requirement adds a significant monetary cost to the price of obtaining

the license necessary to “bear arms” in New York state. For example, the cost to obtain such

training could run in the neighborhood of $400. Compl. ¶84. In addition, the handgun ammunition

expended during two hours of live-fire could conservatively be 100-200 rounds or more, at an

20
See https://bit.ly/3aTd3Sn (“… if the private property owner chooses to post a notice, it must
comply with the 1-inch block-letter, contrasting color, and other requirements specified in Sections
30.06 and 30.07.”).
21
See https://bit.ly/3aS4YgQ.
22
See https://northeastfirearmstraining.net/classes/category/ny-pistol-permit-class/.
19
 Case 1:22-cv-00734-GTS-CFH Document 9-1 Filed 07/20/22 Page 22 of 29

additional cost of at least $40. In addition to that, whereas under the existing regime, an applicant

may be able to meet the 4-hour training requirement by attending a class in an evening or on a

weekend, that is doubtful given the CCIA’s 18-hour mandate. If a license applicant were required

to take even a single day off work to obtain the necessary training, that could run another $300 or

more, on average.23 And, of course, an applicant would still be required to pay the up to $10 fee

for the license application,24 which is routinely circumvented by localities through charging

additional exorbitant fees for other services.25 In other words, all told, the cost of obtaining a carry

license under the CCIA will run into the many hundreds of dollars, before an ordinary law-abiding

person is permitted to exercise his constitutional right to bear arms in public. For those who cannot

afford such costs, their right to bear arms is extinguished, evidencing the CCIA’s clear attempt to

deprive the lower earning classes of society their constitutional rights.

Yet this is precisely what the Supreme Court in Bruen warned against, noting that the Court

would “not rule out constitutional challenges to … regimes where, for example, lengthy wait times

in processing license applications or exorbitant fees deny ordinary citizens their right to public

carry.” Bruen, at fn 9. New York would have no authority to demand that a person attend

journalism school before being allowed to publish an article, and it similarly has no authority to

demand 18 hours of training and the payment of many hundreds of dollars of costs prior to the

exercise of an enumerated Second Amendment right.

23
See https://on.ny.gov/3IQ4og4 (estimating New York state’s average hourly earnings to be about
$36/hr in May of 2022).
24
See NY Penal Law § 400.00 (“Elsewhere in the state, the licensing officer shall collect and pay
into the county treasury the following fees: for each license to carry or possess a pistol or revolver,
not less than three dollars nor more than ten dollars as may be determined by the legislative body
of the county….).
25
For example, Schenectady County, where Mr. Antonyuk resides, charges $10 for the license
application, and $116.50 for fingerprinting. See https://bit.ly/3B62Psu at p.3.
20
 Case 1:22-cv-00734-GTS-CFH Document 9-1 Filed 07/20/22 Page 23 of 29

vii. Under Bruen’s “historical tradition” standard of review, New York cannot come
close to justifying the CCIA’s provisions.

Under Heller and Bruen, the standard for assessing Second Amendment challenges

requires Plaintiffs to show that their conduct falls under the Second Amendment’s plain text. Id.

at *20. Plaintiffs have clearly made this showing. Compl. ¶¶ 21-25, 128-29. Under “text, history,

and tradition,” the initial analysis of the Second Amendment’s plain text requires an examination

of whether 1) Plaintiffs are part of “the People” protected by the amendment, 2) the weapons in

question are in fact “arms” protected by the amendment, and 3) the regulated conduct falls under

the phrase “keep and bear.” See id. at *39–41. Courts have acknowledged that handguns are “arms”

without further analysis, because they are “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful

purposes,” “in common use,” and the “quintessential self-defense weapon[]”. Heller, 554 U.S. at

625–27, 629; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010); Bruen, at *39. And, of

course, the Court in Bruen has explicitly found that ordinary, law-abiding persons such as Plaintiffs

carrying handguns in public is clearly within the bearing of arms protected by the amendment.

Thus, as Plaintiffs have shown that the conduct regulated by the CCIA falls under the

Second Amendment’s plain text, New York must rebut the strong resulting presumption of Second

Amendment protection:

[T]he government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest.
Rather, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this
Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm regulation is consistent
with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct
falls outside the Second Amendment’s “unqualified command.” [Bruen at *20–21 (quoting
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 50 n.10 (1961)).]

Defendant thus bears the burden of justifying the regulation by “affirmatively prov[ing] that [the]

firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to

keep and bear arms.” Bruen, at *23. Defendant cannot even come close.

21
 Case 1:22-cv-00734-GTS-CFH Document 9-1 Filed 07/20/22 Page 24 of 29

The Second Amendment analysis “requires courts to assess whether modern firearms

regulations are consistent with” the Second Amendment’s “text and historical understanding,” id.

at *31–32, meaning courts must examine the original public understanding of the right when it

was adopted. See id. at *42 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35) (“[W]hen it comes to interpreting

the Constitution, not all history is created equal. ‘Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope

they were understood to have when the people adopted them.’”). Courts must consider whether

the challenged regulation finds constitutional support from directly related or analogous historical

regulation from the Founding era, which evidences adoption-era acceptance of the regulation as

not infringing on the pre-existing right to keep and bear arms. See id. at *32–39. In assessing the

existence of historical analogues, if any, Heller and McDonald guide courts with “at least two

metrics: how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.”

Id. at *36.

Suffice it to say there are no founding-era analogues in accord with the CCIA’s demands.

In 1776, it would have been preposterous to have required William Floyd (an original signatory to

the Declaration of Independence from New York)26 to sit down with a British licensing official to

receive a permit to carry a firearm. Perhaps one of those interview questions would be, “Why do

you need to carry a firearm, Mr. Floyd?” And perhaps the answer would have been, “Well

governor, we intend to sign a Declaration of Independence, and withdraw our consent to be

governed.” It is doubtful the Crown’s licensing official would have given Mr. Floyd a license.

Would Alexander Hamilton have been approved to carry a firearm if the government learned that

he wrote Federalist No. 33: “If the federal government should overpass the just bounds of its

authority and make a tyrannical use of its powers, the people, whose creature it is, must appeal to

26
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript.
22
 Case 1:22-cv-00734-GTS-CFH Document 9-1 Filed 07/20/22 Page 25 of 29

the standard they have formed, and take such measures to redress the injury done to the

Constitution as the exigency may suggest and prudence justify”? Likely no British “licensing

officer” would have found any of this nation’s Founders to have “good moral character” defined

as “the essential character, temperament and judgement [sic] necessary to be entrusted with a

weapon.” And because licensing for concealed firearms did not start until the 1890s, long after

ratification, none of these absurd and imaginary analogues could have occurred in the first place.

B. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Suffer Irreparable Harm Absent Preliminary Relief.

“Irreparable harm is ‘injury for which a monetary award cannot be adequate

compensation.’” Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1996) (citation

omitted). Further, “[i]n cases alleging constitutional injury, a strong showing of a constitutional

deprivation that results in noncompensable damages ordinarily warrants a finding of irreparable

harm.” French, 985 F.3d at 176. Even an ephemeral constitutional violation causes irreparable

harm. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even

minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”); French, 985 F.3d at 184

(quoting Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n, 92 F.3d at 71) (“The denial of a constitutional right ordinarily

warrants a finding of irreparable harm, even when the violation persists for ‘minimal periods’….”).

The CCIA declares a large portion of New York’s public places to be “sensitive locations,”

with all private property labeled “restricted locations,” increases the training requirement to almost

five-times as much as previously required thereby unnecessarily raising the cost to exercise a right,

and mandates waiver of numerous First Amendment rights in exchange for the state’s permission

to exercise Second Amendment rights. Each of these constitutes an impending irreparable injury

which an injunction can prevent.27

Moreover, Plaintiffs’ First Amendment concerns bear a striking similarity to those of the dairy-
27

manufacturer plaintiffs who won a preliminary injunction on appeal in International Dairy Foods
23
 Case 1:22-cv-00734-GTS-CFH Document 9-1 Filed 07/20/22 Page 26 of 29

C. The Balance of Equities Tips Overwhelmingly in Plaintiffs’ Favor.

In assessing this injunction factor, courts “must ‘balance the competing claims of injury

and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.’”

Yang, 960 F.3d at 135 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 24). This prong is closely tied to whether the

injunction is in the public interest and, to satisfy it, this Court need look no further than the

extensive explanation of the right to bear arms outside of the home in Bruen. In its zeal to engage

in guerrilla warfare with the Supreme Court, New York’s legislature has tripped over the

Constitution in its rush to limit the rights of the people to bear arms outside the home. Rather than

learning from Bruen that the right to keep and bear arms is no longer a “second-class right,” New

York turned the Second Amendment’s protections into the equivalent of constitutional “steerage,”

unilaterally reversing the Supreme Court by trampling clearly enumerated rights. Bruen, at *12.

Further, as explained above, the impact of the CCIA is not only to enumerated Second Amendment

rights, but also to well established First Amendment rights.

D. An Injunction Is in the Public Interest.

“[T]he public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction” are not

just the vindication of constitutional rights but also the prevention of their egregious curtailment.

Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d. Cir. 1996). In that case, Dairy manufacturers challenged a statute
compelling speech, requiring labeling when a certain growth hormone had been used. Id. at 69–
70. The Second Circuit found that “[b]ecause the statute at issue requires appellants to make an
involuntary statement whenever they offer their products for sale . . . the statute causes the dairy
manufacturers irreparable harm,” regardless of whether or not the compelled speech was merely
commercial in nature. Id. at 71–72. “The wrong done” by a statute to the “constitutional right not
to speak is a serious one,” and it must be “given proper weight by [a] district court.” Id. at 71.
Here, private property and business owners must engage in compelled speech by posting “clear
and conspicuous signage” to derestrict their own properties from the CCIA’s mandates. See
Compl. ¶ 74. Compelled speech through submitting to an “interview” by government licensing
officials or to indicate a property owner’s public support for constitutionally guaranteed rights is
anathema to the First Amendment.
24
 Case 1:22-cv-00734-GTS-CFH Document 9-1 Filed 07/20/22 Page 27 of 29

Yang, 960 F.3d at 135–36 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 24). Here, such egregious curtailment is

exactly the types of limitations that the Supreme Court warned would be unconstitutional in Bruen.

Furthermore, although public interest is a necessary prong for injunctive relief, under Bruen, New

York can no longer rely on the typical public safety talisman as an automatic justification for public

interest. As Justice Thomas explained, “the Second Amendment does not permit—let alone

require—‘judges to assess the costs and benefits of firearms restrictions’ under means-end

scrutiny.” Bruen, at *27. Therefore, in assessing whether injunctive relief would be in the public

interest, this Court must assess whether the CCIA infringes upon the Second Amendment in a

manner foreclosed by Bruen. Because Plaintiffs are “the people” and the CCIA infringes upon

their right to “bear arms,” New York carries the burden of justifying, via historical analog, how

the CCIA is constitutionally permissible. New York cannot shoulder this burden, because the

CCIA consists of unprecedented restrictions on constitutional rights that have no historical analog.

Without historical support, the public interest requirement clearly weighs in favor of the Plaintiffs,

as it is always in the public interest to enjoin an unconstitutional law. See, e.g., Martin-Marietta

Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 568 (6th Cir. 1982).28

IV. Conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should preliminarily and permanently enjoin the

challenged provisions of New York’s Concealed Carry Improvement Act.

28
Although Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c) requires that a bond or other security be provided as a
condition of issuing preliminary injunctions, this requirement may be dispensed with when there
is no risk of financial harm. Federal Prescription Serv. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass’n, 636
F.2d 755, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Doctor’s Assocs. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975, 985 (2d Cir. 1996).
Even courts that view Rule 65(c) as mandatory are open to the idea of the bond being set at zero.
See Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 421 n.3 (4th Cir. 1999).
Given the nature of this case, the Court should dispense with the bond requirement.
25
 Case 1:22-cv-00734-GTS-CFH Document 9-1 Filed 07/20/22 Page 28 of 29

Respectfully submitted, this the 20th of July 2022.

/s/ Stephen D. Stamboulieh Robert J. Olson (VA # 82488)

Stephen D. Stamboulieh William J. Olson, PC
Stamboulieh Law, PLLC 370 Maple Ave. West, Suite 4
P.O. Box 428 Vienna, VA 22180-5615
Olive Branch, MS 38654 703-356-5070 (T)
(601) 852-3440 703-356-5085 (F)
stephen@sdslaw.us wjo@mindspring.com
NDNY Bar Roll# 520383 *Pro Hac Vice paperwork forthcoming

26
 Case 1:22-cv-00734-GTS-CFH Document 9-1 Filed 07/20/22 Page 29 of 29

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I Stephen D. Stamboulieh, hereby certify that I have on this day, caused the foregoing

document or pleading to be electronically mailed to the following non-ECF participants, and

certify that I have spoken with Counsel listed below, and advised that a Motion for Preliminary

Injunction would be filed, and was advised I could send to him by electronic mail:

Michael G. McCartin
Assistant Attorney General | Special Counsel
Litigation Bureau
N.Y.S. Attorney General’s Office
The Capitol
Michael.McCartin@ag.ny.gov

Dated: July 20, 2022.

/s/ Stephen D. Stamboulieh

Stephen D. Stamboulieh

27