1.) G.R. No.

131636            March 5, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ARTEMIO INVENCION Y SORIANO, appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Before us for automatic review1 is the Decision2 dated 22 September 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac,
Tarlac, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 9375, finding accused-appellant Artemio Invencion y Soriano guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against his 16-year-old daughter Cynthia P. Invencion, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay Cynthia the sum of P50,000 as moral damages and
P25,000 as exemplary damages, as well as the costs of suit.

Artemio was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac with thirteen counts of rape in separate complaints
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9363 to 9375, all dated 17 October 1996. The cases were consolidated and jointly
tried. At his arraignment Artemio entered a plea of not guilty in each case.

The witnesses presented by the prosecution in its evidence in chief were Elven Invencion, Eddie Sicat, Gloria
Pagala, Dr. Rosario Fider, and Atty. Florencio Canlas. Presented as rebuttal witnesses were Gloria Pagala and
Celestino Navarro.

Elven Invencion, an 8-year-old grade two pupil of Sapang Tagalog Elementary School in Tarlac, Tarlac, testified that
he is a half-brother of Cynthia and son of Artemio with his second common-law wife. Sometime before the end of
the school year in 1996, while he was sleeping in one room with his father Artemio, Cynthia, and two other younger
brothers, he was awakened by Cynthia’s loud cries. Looking towards her, he saw his father on top of Cynthia, doing
a pumping motion. After about two minutes, his father put on his short pants.3

Elven further declared that Artemio was a very strict and cruel father and a drunkard. He angrily prohibited Cynthia
from entertaining any of her suitors. Whenever he was drunk, he would maul Elven and quarrel with his stepfather,
Celestino Navarro.4

Eddie Sicat, a 40-year-old farmer and neighbor of Artemio in Barangay Sapang Tagalog, Tarlac, Tarlac, testified
that on the second week of March 1996, between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m., while he was passing by the house of Artemio
on his way to the field to catch fish, he heard somebody crying. He then peeped through a small opening in the
destroyed portion of the sawali wall of Artemio’s house. He saw Cynthia lying on her back and crying, while her
father was on top of her, doing a pumping motion. Eddie observed them for about fifteen seconds, and then he left
and proceeded to the field to catch fish.5 He reported what he had witnessed to Artemio’s stepfather, Celestino, later
that morning.6

Gloria Pagala, the mother of Cynthia and former common-law wife of Artemio, testified that she and Artemio started
living together in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, in February 1969. Out of their common-law relationship, they had six
children, one of whom was Cynthia. In March 1982, she and Artemio parted ways permanently. Later, Gloria and
her children lived in Pura, Tarlac. When Artemio’s mother died sometime in 1996, Cynthia lived with Artemio in a
small one-room dwelling owned by Celestino and located in Barangay Sapang Tagalog, Tarlac, Tarlac.7 On 30
August 1996, her son Novelito told her that Cynthia was pregnant. Gloria then went to the house of Artemio and
asked Cynthia about her condition. The latter confessed that she had been sexually abused by her father. Gloria
then went to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Tarlac and reported what Artemio had done to
their daughter Cynthia.8

Dr. Rosario Fider of Tarlac Provincial Hospital testified that she examined Cynthia on 16 September 1996. She
found Cynthia to be five to six months pregnant and to have incomplete, healed hymenal lacerations at 3, 5, 8
o’clock positions, which could have been caused by sexual intercourse or any foreign body inserted in her private
part.9

Evidence II.
Atty. Florencio Canlas, an NBI agent, testified that on 18 September 1996, Cynthia, accompanied by her mother,
complained before him and NBI Supervising Agent Rolando Vergara that she was raped by her father Artemio. She
then executed a written statement,10 which she subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Canlas.11

The defense did not present Artemio as a witness. Instead, his counsel de parte, Atty. Isabelo Salamida, took the
witness stand and testified for the defense. He declared that on 24 June 1997 (the same day when he testified
before the court), between 10:45 and 11:00 a.m., he and his secretary went to the house of Artemio in Barangay
Sapang Tagalog. The hut was made of sawali. Its door was padlocked, and its windows were shut. When he went
around the house and tried to peep through the old sawali walls on the front and left and right sides of the hut, he
could not see anything inside the room where Artemio and his children used to sleep. Although it was then about
noontime, it was dark inside.12 Atty. Salamida then concluded that prosecution witness Eddie Sicat was not telling
the truth when he declared having seen what Artemio did to Cynthia when he peeped through a small opening in the
sawali wall of the house in the early morning sometime on the second week of March 1996.

On rebuttal, Gloria Pagala testified that the house where Artemio used to live was a small hut with some destroyed
portions in its sawali walls. When she went there to visit her children sometime in December 1995, there was a hole
in front and at the sidewall of the hut facing a vacant lot where people passed by to fish in a nearby brook.13 When
she went to the place again sometime in September 1996 after she was informed of Cynthia’s pregnancy, she
noticed that the destroyed portions of the hut’s sawali walls were not yet repaired.14

The second rebuttal witness Celestino Navarro, stepfather of Artemio, testified that he is the owner of the small
house where Artemio and his children used to reside. At the time that Artemio and his children, including Cynthia,
were living in that house, the hut’s old sawali walls had some small holes in them, thus confirming the testimony of
Eddie Sicat. After Artemio was arrested on the basis of Cynthia’s complaint before the NBI, Celestino made some
repairs in the hut by, among other things, placing galvanized iron sheets to cover the holes at the destroyed portions
of the sawali walls. Thereafter, a person named Alvin occupied the house.15

In its Decision of 22 September 1997, the trial court convicted Artemio in Criminal Case No. 9375. It, however,
acquitted him in all the other twelve cases for lack of evidence.

In his Appellant’s Brief, Artemio contends that the trial court erred in

x x x BELIEVING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES;

II

x x xNOT DISMISSING THIS CASE FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE [HIS] GUILT x x x
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Artemio attacks the competency and credibility of Elven as a witness. He argues that Elven, as his son,
should have been disqualified as a witness against him under Section 20(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.16 Besides, Elven’s testimony appears not to be his but what the prosecution wanted him to say, as the
questions asked were mostly leading questions. Moreover, Elven had ill-motive in testifying against him, as he
(Artemio) was cruel to him.

In another attempt to cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, Artemio points to the following
inconsistencies in their testimonies: (1) as to the time of the commission of the crime, Elven testified having seen
Artemio on top of his sister one night in March 1996, while Eddie Sicat testified having seen them in the same
position between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. in the second week of March 1996; (2) as to the residence of Cynthia in 1996,
Gloria testified that the former was living with her in Guimba from November 1995 to September 1996, while Elven
and Eddie declared that she was in Sapang Tagalog in March 1996; and (3) as to the residence of Artemio, Jr.,
Gloria stated that he was living with the appellant, but later she declared that he was living with her in Pura.

Evidence II.
Artemio also argues that since his house had no electricity and was dark even at daytime, it was impossible for
Elven and Eddie to see him allegedly doing pumping motion on top of Cynthia. In his Reply Brief, he likewise urges
us to disregard the testimonies of rebuttal witnesses Celestino and Gloria. According to him, Celestino had an ax to
grind against him (Artemio) because he had been badgering Celestino for his share of the lot where the hut stands,
which was owned by Artemio’s deceased mother. On the other hand, Gloria wanted to get rid of Artemio because
she was already cohabiting with another man.

In the Appellee’s Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the affirmation of Artemio’s conviction and
sentence, but recommends that a civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000 be awarded in addition to the awards of
moral and exemplary damages.

We find no cogent reason to overturn the findings of the trial court on the culpability of Artemio.

It is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the witnesses, are
accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. This is so because the trial court has the
advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry
flush of an insisted assertion, the sudden pallor of a discovered lie, the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer, the
forthright tone of a ready reply, the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the yawn, the sigh,
the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, or the carriage and mien.17 This rule,
however, admits of exceptions, as where there exists a fact or circumstance of weight and influence that has been
ignored or misconstrued by the court, or where the trial court has acted arbitrarily in its appreciation of the
facts.18 We do not find any of these exceptions in the case at bar.

As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that such is not affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court,19 otherwise known as the rule on "filial privilege." This rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification
because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant. 20 The rule refers to
a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other privileges. As correctly observed by the
lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his father; he chose to waive that filial privilege when
he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness against his father
of his own accord and only "to tell the truth."21

Neither can Artemio challenge the prosecution’s act of propounding leading questions on Elven. Section 10(c) of
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court22 expressly allows leading questions when the witness is a child of tender years like
Elven.

The alleged ulterior motive of Elven in testifying against his father also deserves scant consideration. Such
insinuation of ill-motive is too lame and flimsy. As observed by the OSG, Elven, who was of tender age, could not
have subjected himself to the ordeal of a public trial had he not been compelled by a motive other than to bring to
justice the despoiler of his sister’s virtue. There is no indication that Elven testified because of anger or any ill-motive
against his father, nor is there any showing that he was unduly pressured or influenced by his mother or by anyone
to testify against his father. The rule is that where there is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution
was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full
credence.23

We find as inconsequential the alleged variance or difference in the time that the rape was committed, i.e., during
the night as testified to by Elven, or between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. per the testimony of Eddie. The exact time or date
of the commission of rape is not an element of the crime. What is decisive in a rape charge is that the commission of
the rape by the accused has been sufficiently proved. Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters
irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be considered grounds for acquittal.24 In this case, we believe that the
crime of rape was, indeed, committed as testified to by Elven and Eddie.

The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of both Elven and Gloria do not impair the credibility of these
witnesses. We agree with the trial court that they are minor inconsistencies, which do not affect the credibility of the
witnesses. We have held in a number of cases that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses that refer to
minor and insignificant details do not destroy the witnesses’ credibility.25 On the contrary, they may even be
considered badges of veracity or manifestations of truthfulness on the material points in the testimonies. What is

Evidence II.
important is that the testimonies agree on essential facts and substantially corroborate a consistent and coherent
whole.26

Artemio’s allegation that it was impossible for both Elven and Eddie to have seen and witnessed the crime because
the room was dark even at daytime was convincingly disputed by rebuttal witnesses Gloria Pagala and Celestino
Navarro. Furthermore, as observed by the OSG, even if the hut was without electricity, Elven could not have been
mistaken in his identification of Artemio because he had known the latter for a long time. Moreover, Elven was at the
time only two meters away from Cynthia and Artemio. Even without sufficient illumination, Elven, who was jostled
out of his sleep by Cynthia’s loud cry, could observe the pumping motion made by his father.27

The alleged ill-motives on the part of Gloria and Celestino were not sufficiently proved. Nothing in the records
suggests any reason that would motivate Gloria to testify falsely against Artemio, who is the father of her other
children. Moreover, we have repeatedly held that no mother would subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace, and
trauma attendant to the prosecution for rape if she were not motivated solely by the desire to have the person
responsible for her child’s defilement incarcerated.28 As for Celestino, he testified that the lot where the hut stands is
owned by his daughter Erlinda, and not by Artemio’s mother.29 At any rate, even without Celestino’s testimony,
Artemio’s conviction would stand.

The remaining issue for our resolution is the correctness of the penalty of death imposed by the trial court. The
death penalty was imposed because of the trial court’s appreciation of the special qualifying circumstances that
Artemio is the father of the victim and the latter was less than 18 years old at the time the crime was committed.

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, which is the governing law in this case,
pertinently reads:

Article 335. When and how rape is committed. –

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

xxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
circumstances:

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim.

To justify the imposition of the death penalty in a rape committed by a father on a daughter, the minority of the victim
and her relationship with the offender, which are special qualifying circumstances, must be alleged in the complaint
or information and proved by the prosecution during the trial by the quantum of proof required for conviction. The
accusatory portion of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 9375 reads as follows:

That on or about the month of March 1996 at Sapang Tagalog, Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Artemio S. Invencion did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by using force and intimidation have carnal knowledge of
his daughter Cynthia P. Invencion who was sixteen (16) years old, in their house.

CONTRARY TO LAW.30

Although the relationship of Cynthia with her father Artemio was alleged in the complaint and duly established by
evidence during trial, the allegation in the complaint regarding her age was not clearly proved.

In the very recent case of People v. Pruna,31 we set the guidelines in appreciating age either as an element of the
crime or as a qualifying circumstance:

Evidence II.
 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or
date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or
relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly
and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document was presented and offered in evidence to
prove Cynthia’s age. The statement in the medical certificate showing Cynthia’s age is not proof thereof, since a
medical certificate does not authenticate the date of birth of the victim. Moreover, pursuant to Pruna, Gloria’s
testimony regarding Cynthia’s age was insufficient, since Cynthia was alleged to be 16 years old already at the time
of the rape and what is sought to be proved is that she was then 18 years old. Moreover, the trial court did not even
make a categorical finding on Cynthia’s minority. Finally, the silence of Artemio or his failure to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding Cynthia’s age could not be taken against him.

It must be stressed that the severity of death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once carried out,
makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and
evidence.32 Accordingly, in the absence of sufficient proof of Cynthia’s minority, Artemio cannot be convicted of
qualified rape and sentenced to suffer the death penalty. He should only be convicted of simple rape and meted the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

As regards the civil liability of Artemio, the awards of moral damages in the amount of P50,000 and exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000 are insufficient. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory upon the finding of the fact
of rape,33 should also be awarded. In simple rape, the civil indemnity for the victim shall not be less than P50,000.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac, Tarlac, in Criminal Case No. 9375 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that that accused Artemio Invencion y Soriano is held guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of simple rape, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the victim Cynthia Invencion the sums of P50,000 as indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages;
and P25,000 as exemplary damages.

Evidence II.
2.) G.R. No. 177861               July 13, 2010

IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF BIRTH,

EMMA K. LEE, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG, JULIAN K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE,
ROSA LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD LEE-MIGUEL, VICTORIANO K.
LEE, and THOMAS K. LEE, represented by RITA K. LEE, as Attorney-in-Fact, Respondents.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the grounds for quashing a subpoena ad testificandum and a parent’s right not to testify in a case
against his children.

The Facts and the Case

Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from
China. They had 11 children, namely, Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Martin K. Lee,
Rosa Lee-Vanderlek, Melody Lee-Chin, Henry K. Lee, Natividad Lee-Miguel, Victoriano K. Lee, and Thomas K. Lee
(collectively, the Lee-Keh children).

In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as housemaid. The
respondent Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another property of Lee
nearby, and had a relation with him.

Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu’s children with Lee (collectively, the Lee’s other
children) claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter. After conducting such an investigation, the NBI
concluded in its report:

[I]t is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger
woman, most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG is in a
quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of making his 8
children as their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the status of his second family and secure their
future. The doctor lamented that this complaint would not have been necessary had not the father and his second
family kept on insisting that the 8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG.1

The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the eldest of the Lee’s other children, Marcelo Lee (who
was recorded as the 12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother, when Keh was already 38 years
old at the time. Another of the Lee’s other children, Mariano Lee, was born of a 23-year-old mother, when Keh was
then already 40 years old, and so forth. In other words, by the hospital records of the Lee’s other children,
Keh’s declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly gave birth to such other children,
numbering eight.

On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two separate petitions, one of them before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City2 in Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from the certificate of
live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lee’s other children, the name Keh and replace the same with the
name Tiu to indicate her true mother’s name.

In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a subpoena ad
testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lee’s presumed mother, to testify in the case. The RTC granted the
motion but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule
Evidence II.
130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lee’s stepmother.3 On August 5,
2005 the RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and oppressive considering that Tiu was
already very old and that the obvious object of the subpoena was to badger her into admitting that she was Emma
Lee’s mother.

Because the RTC denied the Lee-Keh children’s motion for reconsideration, they filed a special civil action of
certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 92555. On December 29, 2006 the CA rendered a
decision,4 setting aside the RTC’s August 5, 2005 Order. The CA ruled that only a subpoena duces tecum, not a
subpoena ad testificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or unreasonable under Section 4, Rule 21 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA also held that Tiu’s advanced age alone does not render her incapable of
testifying. The party seeking to quash the subpoena for that reason must prove that she would be unable to
withstand the rigors of trial, something that petitioner Emma Lee failed to do.

Since the CA denied Emma Lee’s motion for reconsideration by resolution of May 8, 2007,5 she filed the present
petition with this Court.

The Question Presented

The only question presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court may
compel Tiu to testify in the correction of entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the correction
of the certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to show that she is not Keh’s daughter.

The Ruling of the Court

Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly quashed the subpoena ad testificandum it issued against Tiu on
the ground that it was unreasonable and oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter would be badgered on oral
examination concerning the Lee-Keh children’s theory that she had illicit relation with Lee and gave birth to the other
Lee children.

But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds cited—unreasonable and oppressive—are proper for subpoena ad
duces tecum or for the production of documents and things in the possession of the witness, a command that has a
tendency to infringe on the right against invasion of privacy. Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus
provides:

SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. — The court may quash a subpoena duces tecum upon motion promptly made
and, in any event, at or before the time specified therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the
books, documents or things does not appear, or if the person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to
advance the reasonable cost of the production thereof.

Notably, the Court previously decided in the related case of Lee v. Court of Appeals6 that the Lee-Keh children have
the right to file the action for correction of entries in the certificates of birth of Lee’s other children, Emma Lee
included. The Court recognized that the ultimate object of the suit was to establish the fact that Lee’s other children
were not children of Keh. Thus:

It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed by private respondents for
the correction of entries in the petitioners' records of birth were intended to establish that for physical
and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the
petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners' contention that the petitions before the
lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners
are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter's children.
There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and
petitioners.7 (Underscoring supplied)

Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh children’s action, obviously, they would want Tiu to testify or
admit that she is the mother of Lee’s other children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had died and so could not

Evidence II.
give testimony that Lee’s other children were not hers. The Lee-Keh children have, therefore, a legitimate reason for
seeking Tiu’s testimony and, normally, the RTC cannot deprive them of their right to compel the attendance of such
a material witness.

But petitioner Emma Lee raises two other objections to requiring Tiu to come to court and testify: a)
considering her advance age, testifying in court would subject her to harsh physical and emotional stresses; and b)
it would violate her parental right not to be compelled to testify against her stepdaughter.

1. Regarding the physical and emotional punishment that would be inflicted on Tiu if she were compelled at
her age and condition to come to court to testify, petitioner Emma Lee must establish this claim to the
satisfaction of the trial court. About five years have passed from the time the Lee-Keh children sought the
issuance of a subpoena for Tiu to appear before the trial court. The RTC would have to update itself and
determine if Tiu’s current physical condition makes her fit to undergo the ordeal of coming to court and being
questioned. If she is fit, she must obey the subpoena issued to her.

Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might subject her to badgering by adverse counsel. The
trial court’s duty is to protect every witness against oppressive behavior of an examiner and this is especially
true where the witness is of advanced age.8

2. Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her stepdaughter, petitioner Emma Lee,
invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, which reads:

SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct
ascendants, children or other direct descendants.

The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in
criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all
kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct ascendants
or descendants.

But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The
privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a
family tie connected by a common ancestry.  A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.
1avvphi1

Article 965 thus provides:

Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who
descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.

Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP 92555.

Evidence II.
3.) G.R. No. 137348             June 21, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
WILLIAM ONG y LI and CHING DE MING @ ROBERT TIU, appellants.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

"… the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut
deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts." 1

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger

The case at bar involves the clash of two classic values - - - the need for the State to stop crimes and preserve the
peace against the right of an individual to confront material witnesses to establish his innocence. In balancing the
two values, we shall scrutinize and set the parameters that ought to guide prosecution when to disclose the identity
of confidential informers.

On July 27, 1998 accused William Ong y Li and Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu were charged with violation of Section
15, Article III, in relation to Section 2, Article I, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, as amended. The Information2 reads:

That on or about the 24th day of July, 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping each other not having been authorized by law to sell,
dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully sell or offer for sale 980.50 grams of Methyl Amphetamine Hydrochloride, which is a
regulated drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, the two (2) accused, who are Chinese nationals, pled not guilty. The records do not show
whether they had sufficient knowledge of the English language. Their trial proceeded. In the course of the trial, the
two (2) accused were given the services of a Chinese interpreter.

The prosecution, through the testimony of SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales, sought to establish that on July 23, 1998 at
around 5:00 P.M., a confidential informant (CI) of the Special Operations Division (SOD), PNP Narcotics Group,
reported to Chief Inspector Albert Ignatius D. Ferro about the alleged illicit drug activities of a certain William Ong
and an unidentified Chinese male partner. After an evaluation of the confidential information, Chief Inspector Ferro
decided to conduct a buy-bust operation. He constituted a team of eight (8) with Police Inspector Medel N. Poñe as
team leader, SPO1 Gonzales as poseur-buyer and the rest as back-up support.

According to SPO1 Gonzales, the CI called up the alleged pusher, placed an order for one (1) kilo of shabu and
agreed to a ₱600,000.00 consideration. The CI likewise agreed to meet with his contact on July 24, 1998 at 6th
Street corner Gilmore Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City, between 4:00 and 5:00 A.M. The boodle money was
prepared consisting of six (6) bundles of cut bond paper with a marked ₱1,000.00 peso bill on top of each bundle.

On July 24, 2004 at 3:00 A.M., the CI received a call from the drug dealer changing the meeting time between 2:00
and 3:00 P.M. on the same day. The team, together with the CI, proceeded to the meeting place and arrived there
at around 1:30 P.M. The CI rode with SPO1 Gonzales. They parked their car along 6th Street corner Gilmore
Avenue. The rest of the team posted themselves at their back and their right side.

A little while, accused Ong approached their car. The CI introduced him to SPO1 Gonzales who told accused Ong in
broken Tagalog to get in the car. When Ong inquired about the money in payment of the shabu, SPO1 Gonzales
Evidence II.
showed him the slightly opened plastic bag containing the boodle money. SPO1 Gonzales then demanded to see
the shabu. Accused Ong excused himself, went out of the car, walked a few steps and then waved his right hand to
somebody. While accused Ong was walking back to the car, SPO1 Gonzales and the CI saw a green Toyota
Corolla coming. The Corolla parked in front of their car and a Chinese-looking male, later identified as accused
Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu alighted, approached accused Ong and handed to him a gift-wrapped package. SPO1
Gonzales opened it and inside was one (1) sealed plastic bag with a white crystalline substance. After its inspection,
accused Ong demanded for its payment. SPO1 Gonzales gave to accused Ong the boodle money placed in a "W.
Brown" plastic bag. Thereafter, SPO1 Gonzales signaled his back-up team by turning on the hazard lights of the
car. SPO1 Gonzales himself arrested accused Ong while the CI and the back-up agents arrested accused De Ming.

The officers brought the two (2) accused to their office where the corresponding booking sheets and arrest report
were prepared. The plastic bag containing the white crystalline substance was referred to the PNP Crime Laboratory
for examination. The two (2) accused were subjected to a physical and mental examination as required. They were
found to be free from any external signs of trauma.

Police Inspector Grace M. Eustaquio, Forensic Chemist, PNP Crime Laboratory, testified that the specimen she
examined had a net weight of 980.50 grams and manifested "positive results for methyl amphetamine
hydrochloride"3 or what is commonly known as shabu, a regulated drug. Her testimony was supported by her
Physical Sciences Report.4

Appellants denied the story of the prosecution. Accused William Ong, a Chinese citizen from the People’s Republic
of China, claimed that he came to the Philippines in 1997 to look for a job. Upon the recommendation of a friend, he
was able to work in a pancit canton factory in Quezon City. In June 1998, he stopped working at the factory and
hunted for another job. Two (2) weeks prior to his arrest, accused Ong was introduced by his friend Kian Ling to
Ong Sin for a possible job as technician in a bihon factory owned by Ong Sin.

On July 22, 1998, Ong Sin called up and set a meeting with accused Ong at the Tayuman branch of Jollibee the
next day. While waiting at Jollibee, accused Ong received a call from Ong Sin that he could not personally meet
him. Instead, his two (2) co-workers would meet accused Ong as instructed. Subsequently, two (2) men answering
to Ong Sin’s description approached accused Ong. He joined them inside a yellow car. When they reached a certain
place, the driver reached for his cellular phone and called up someone. After a brief conversation, the driver handed
the phone to him. Ong Sin was on the line and informed him that the driver would accompany him to
the bihon factory. The driver got out of the car and accused Ong followed him. After walking two (2) blocks, the
driver picked up something from the place. They returned to the car. Suddenly, the companion of the driver poked a
gun at him. He was arrested, blindfolded and brought to an undisclosed place. Several hours later, he was taken to
the police station. There he met the other accused Ching De Ming for the first time. He maintained innocence to the
crime charged.

On his part, accused Ching De Ming testified that he is a legitimate businessman engaged in the RTW business. He
claimed that he gets his products from Baclaran and sells them to customers in the cities of Naga and Daet in Bicol.

On July 23, 1998 at around 4:30 and 5:00 P.M., while waiting inside his car for his girlfriend and her mother who just
went in a townhouse at 8th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, he was approached by persons unknown to him. They
asked him what he was doing there. One of them went to the car parked at his back, ordered somebody inside to
get out and take a good look at him. The person pointed at him saying "maybe he is the one." He was then dragged
out of his car and brought to the other car. They took his clutch bag. They blindfolded and brought him to a place.
After a few hours, at Camp Crame, Quezon City, they removed his blindfold. He denied knowing accused Ong and
the charge of conspiring with him to deliver shabu in New Manila, Quezon City.

Avelina Cardoz, the mother of his girlfriend, and a divine healer, corroborated his story. She testified that she
requested accused De Ming to drive her to a townhouse at 8th Street, New Manila, to cure a patient. She declared
that the officers of the People’s Journal publication could attest to her profession. She asked accused De Ming to
wait for her and her daughter inside his car. When they returned to the car, accused De Ming was nowhere to be
found. They saw him next at the Quezon City Jail.

On November 18, 1998 the trial court convicted appellants as charged and imposed on them the penalty of death. It
likewise ordered each of them to pay a fine of P1 million pesos.5
Evidence II.
The case is with us on automatic review. Appellants insist on their innocence. They claim that their guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt.

We agree.

Rule 116, Section 1 (a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:

SECTION 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.-

(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or
assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing
the accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language or dialect
known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the
trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information. (Underscoring and emphasis
supplied.)

The arraignment of appellants violates the above rule. Appellants are Chinese nationals. Their Certificate of
Arraignment6 states that they were informed of the accusations against them. It does not, however, indicate whether
the Information was read in the language or dialect known to them. It merely states:

This 4th day of Aug., 1998, the undersigns (sic) states:

That, in open court, and in the presence of Trial Prosecutor Ruben Catubay, the following accused
William Ong and Ching De Ming AKA Robert Tiu was/were called and, having been informed of the
nature of the accusation filed against him/her/them, furnishing him/her/them a copy of the
complaint or information with the list of witnesses, the said accused in answer to the question of
the Court, pleaded Not Guilty to the crime as charged.

TO WHICH I CERTIFY.

Sgd. Mary Ruth Milo-Ferrer

Branch Clerk of Court

Sgd. William Ong

ACCUSED WILLIAM ONG

Sgd. Ching de Ming

ACCUSED CHING DE MING @ ROBERT TIU

Neither does the August 4, 1998 Order of Judge Diosdado M. Peralta of RTC-Br. 95, Quezon City,
disclose compliance with the rule on arraignment. It merely stated in part that "[w]hen both accused
William Ong y Li and Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu were arraigned, assisted by counsel de parte,
both accused entered a plea of not guilty."7

From the records, it is clear that appellants only knew the Chinese language. Thus, the services of a Chinese
interpreter were used in investigating appellants. SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales revealed in his testimony, viz:8

Q: Now, is it not a fact that you had the difficulty of investigating the two accused because of communication
problem from your informant?

Evidence II.
 A: We did not encounter such problem when we investigated them sir. We also asked question and we have
another Chinese who was arrested who can speak Tagalog and we used that Chinese man to
translate for us and for them if the questions are difficult to understand, sir.

Q: Now that Chinese interpreter that is also an accused?

A: Yes sir.9

After arraignment and in the course of the trial, the lower court had to secure the services of a certain Richard Ng
Lee as Chinese interpreter. This appears in the Order of August 28, 1998 of Judge Peralta, viz:

Considering that the counsel of the two (2) accused has still a lot of questions to ask on cross-examination x
x x x From hereon, Mr. Richard Ng Lee, a businessman and a part time interpreter, is hereby
designated by the Court as interpreter in this case considering that there is no official interpreter of
the Court who is knowledgeable in the Chinese language or any Chinese dialect whatsoever. The
appointment of Mr. Richard Ng Lee is without the objection of counsel of the accused and the public
prosecutor and considering that the court is convinced that he indeed possesses the qualifications of
an interpreter of a Chinese language or any other Chinese dialect known and spoken by the two (2)
accused.10 (Emphasis supplied.)

What leaps from the records of the case is the inability of appellants to fully or sufficiently comprehend any other
language than Chinese and any of its dialect. Despite this inability, however, the appellants were arraigned on an
Information written in the English language.

We again emphasize that the requirement that the information should be read in a language or dialect known to the
accused is mandatory. It must be strictly complied with as it is intended to protect the constitutional right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The constitutional protection is part
of due process. Failure to observe the rules necessarily nullifies the arraignment.11

II

More important than the invalid arraignment of the appellants, we find that the prosecution evidence failed to prove
that appellants willfully and unlawfully sold or offered to sell shabu.

Appellants’ conviction is based on the lone testimony of SPO1 Gonzales. He was the designated poseur-buyer in
the team formed for the buy-bust operation. But a careful reading of his testimony will reveal that he was not privy
to the sale transaction that transpired between the CI and appellant William Ong, the alleged pusher. It is
beyond contention that a contract of sale is perfected upon a meeting of the minds of the parties on the object and
its price.12 Not all elements of the sale were established by the testimony of SPO1 Gonzales, viz:

PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES

Q: After you have prepared the boodle money and you had made the proper marking which you presented
before this Honorable Court, what happen?

A: Out CI make a couple of call and he contacted William Ong thru a broken tagalog conversation.

Q: When your CI contacted with William Ong in broken tagalog?

A: I have a conversation with William Ong in broken tagalog the deal of one kilo gram of shabu was initially
closed.

Q: When you say "closed", what do you mean by that?

A: They agreed to the sale of the shabu.

Evidence II.
 ATTY. TRINIDAD (counsel of accused) to the COURT

We object to the line of questioning, Your Honor that would be hearsay.

COURT:

I think what you were asking is what happened he said it was the CI who talked.

PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES

Q: So after that, do you know what happen?

A: The CI informed us that the price of that shabu which we’re supposed to buy from them amounts
to 600,000.00 pesos, ma’am.

Q: Where did you come to know about this information that the amount is already 600,000.00 pesos?

ATTY. TRINIDAD to the COURT

Already answered, Your Honor.

COURT:

In other words what he say is that, there was a telephone conversation but he has no personal knowledge.
Your question then was what happened.

PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES

Q: After the CI informed you that the price of the shabu is 600,000.00 pesos?

A: We prepared this boodle money and the 6,000 by our Chief SOD.

COURT to SPO1 GONZALES

Q: After the informant told you that there was an agreement to sell 600,000.00 pesos and that you have
already prepared the boodle money as you have stated, what happened after that?

A: The CI told us that the transaction is 600,000.00 pesos and venue is at 6th Street, corner Gilmore
Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City, between 4 o’clock to 5 o’clock in the morning of July 24, 1998,
ma’am.

Q: So when the CI informed you that they will meet at 6th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, what transpired
next?

A: On or about 3 o’clock in the morning William Ong made a call to our CI informing him that the sale of the
delivery of shabu was reset to another time.13

xxxx

PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES

Q: And when you were informed that there was a resetting of this deal?

COURT to SPO1 GONZALES

Evidence II.
 Q: How did you come to know that there was a resetting because he has no participation in the conversation
and it was the CI according to him and the alleged poseur-buyer.

A: The CI told our Chief Deputy.

ATTY. TRINIDAD to the COURT

That would be hearsay, Your Honor, and that would be a double hearsay.

COURT

Put on record that the counsel manifested that his answer is again hearsay and that a double
hearsay evidence.

PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES

Q: And what did the CI do?

A: The CI informed us that the time will be at about 2 to 3 o’clock in the afternoon of that same day
and the place.14

It is abundantly clear that it was the CI who made the initial contact, albeit only through the telephone, with the
pusher. The CI was likewise the one who closed the deal with appellant Ong as to the quantity of shabu to be
purchased and its price. He also set the venue and time of the meeting when the sale would take place. The Joint
Affidavit of Arrest15 executed by SPO1 Gonzales, PO2 Elmer N. Sarampote and PO1 Noli Jingo G. Rivel fortifies
these facts, viz:

xxxx

That after couple of calls made by our CI, suspect WILLIAM ONG was finally contacted on or about 9:30
in the evening of July 23, 1998 and through a broken Tagalog conversation, a drug deal/sale was initially
closed in the agreed amount of six hundred thousand pesos (P600,000.00) and the agreed venue is at
the corner of 6th Street and Gilmore Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City between 4:00 and 5:00 o’clock in the
morning of July 24, 1998 through "Kaliwaan or Abutan" (Cash upon Delivery);

That said information was relayed to our Deputy Chief, who upon learning said report, immediately
grouped and briefed the team for the said operation;

xxxx

That on or about 3:00 o’clock in the morning of July 24, 1998, WILLIAM ONG made a call to our
CI informing him (CI) to reset the time of the drug deal/sale of one (1) kilogram of SHABU and it was
scheduled again between 2:00 to 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of same date and same place;

It is therefore understandable that in his account of his meeting with appellant William Ong, SPO1 Gonzales made
no reference to any further discussion of the price and the quantity of the shabu. When they met, they just
proceeded with the exchange of money and shabu, viz:

PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES

Q: And when you were there stationed at the venue at 6th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, what
happened?

A: I and the CI parked our car at 6th Street corner Gilmore Avenue and then we saw William Ong emerged
from Gilmore Avenue and approached me and our CI, ma’am.16
Evidence II.
 xxxx

Q: And when he approached you what did you do if any?

A: Our CI introduced me to William Ong as an interested buyer of one kilo gram of shabu and afterwards I
asked William Ong in broken tagalog to get inside the car.17

xxxx

Q: And while inside the car, what happened next?

A: While inside the car William Ong asked me about the payment of the stuff and I got the paper bag and
slightly opened. So that I get the plastic bag and show to William Ong the boodle money.

Q: When you showed the boodle money to William Ong what did he do if there was any?

A: He looked at it, ma’am.

Q: And when he looked at it what happened next?

A: I told him that I should look at the stuff before I give the money.

Q: What stuff are you referring to?

A: The shabu, ma’am.

Q: And what did you do after expecting the boodle money or the bag where the boodle money was placed, if
there was any?

A: He excused himself and alighted from our car and told me to wait for his companion.

Q: And where you able to wait for that male companion he is referring to?

A: He walked a distance and waved at his companion as if somebody will come to him.

Q: How did he do that?

A: (put on record that the witness when answering the question he stood up and then used his right hand in
waving as if he is calling for somebody)

Q: When William Ong waved his right hand to his companion what happened?

A: William Ong walked towards to me and suddenly a green Toyota appeared and parked in front of our car.

Q: When a green Toyota corolla was parked in front of the car, what happened next?

A: Chinese looking male person alighted from the car and he went to William Ong and handed to William
Ong something that was gift wrapped.18

xxxx

Q: When that thing was handed to William Ong which identified in Court and which was marked, what did
William Ong do?

Evidence II.
 A: William Ong took it from Ching De Ming, ma’am.

Q: When this Exhibit was given to by William Ong what did you do in return?

A: I opened that something which was gift wrapped and I saw one sealed plastic bag containing white
crystalline substance suspected to be a shabu.19

xxxx

Q: When you saw this Exhibit C-2 crystalline substance which was opened according to you. What did you
do?

A: The companion of William Ong demanded to me the money and I gave to him the boodle money.

Q: When you gave the boodle money to him, what did he do if any these person who secured the money?

A: He took the money inside the bag.20

Since only the CI had personal knowledge of the offer to purchase shabu, the acceptance of the offer and the
consideration for the offer, we hold that SPO1 Gonzales is, in effect, not the "poseur-buyer" but merely the
deliveryman. His testimony therefore on material points of the sale of shabu is hearsay and standing alone cannot
be the basis of the conviction of the appellants.21

III

We further hold that the prosecution failed to establish its claim of entrapment.

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been accepted as a valid means of
arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law.22 It is commonly employed by police officers as an effective way of
apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a crime.23 In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime
originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense.24 Its opposite is
instigation or inducement, wherein the police or its agent lures the accused into committing the offense in order to
prosecute him.25 Instigation is deemed contrary to public policy and considered an absolutory cause.26

To determine whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were undertaken in effecting the
buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the details of the operation are clearly and
adequately laid out through relevant, material and competent evidence. For, the courts could not merely rely on but
must apply with studied restraint the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by law enforcement
agents. This presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally
protected rights of the individual.27 It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from the
prostitution of the criminal law through lawless enforcement.28 Courts should not allow themselves to be used as
instruments of abuse and injustice lest innocent persons are made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug
offenses.29

In People v. Doria,30 we stressed the "objective" test in buy-bust operations. We ruled that in such operations, the
prosecution must present a complete picture detailing the transaction, which "must start from the initial contact
between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until
the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale.31 We emphasized that the
manner by which the initial contact was made, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the 'buy-bust' money,
and the delivery of the illegal drug must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding
citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense."32

In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation is incomplete. The confidential
informant who had sole knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started and how it was perfected was not
presented as a witness. His testimony was given instead by SPO1 Gonzales who had no personal knowledge of the
same. On this score, SPO1 Gonzales’ testimony is hearsay and possesses no probative value unless it can be
Evidence II.
shown that the same falls within the exception to the hearsay rule.33 To impart probative value to these hearsay
statements and convict the appellant solely on this basis would be to render nugatory his constitutional right to
confront the witness against him, in this case the informant, and to examine him for his truthfulness.34 As the
prosecution failed to prove all the material details of the buy-bust operation, its claim that there was a valid
entrapment of the appellants must fail.

IV

The Court is sharply aware of the compelling considerations why confidential informants are usually not presented
by the prosecution. One is the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the
police.35 Another is the necessity to protect them from being objects or targets of revenge by the criminals they
implicate once they become known. All these considerations, however, have to be balanced with the right of an
accused to a fair trial.

The ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Roviaro v. U.S.36 on informer’s privilege is instructive. In said case, the
principal issue on certiorari is whether the United States District Court committed reversible error when it allowed the
Government not to disclose the identity of an undercover employee who had played a material part in bringing
about the possession of certain drugs by the accused, had been present with the accused at the occurrence of the
alleged crime, and might be a material witness to whether the accused knowingly transported the drugs as
charged.37 The Court, through Mr. Justice Burton, granted certiorari in order to pass upon the propriety of disclosure
of the informer’s identity.

Mr. Justice Burton explained that what is usually referred to as the informer’s privilege is in reality the Government’s
privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers
charged with enforcement of that law.38 The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of the
public interest in effective law enforcement. The privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate
their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-enforcement officials and, by preserving their anonymity,
encourages them to perform that obligation.

It was held that the scope of the privilege is limited by its underlying purpose. Thus, where the disclosure of the
contents of the communication will not tend to reveal the identity of an informer, the contents are not
privileged.39 Likewise, once the identity of the informer has been disclosed to those who would have cause to
resent the communication, the privilege is no longer applicable.40

A further limitation on the applicability of the privilege, which arises from the fundamental requirements of fairness
was emphasized. Where the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or the contents of his communication, is relevant
and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege
must give way.41 In these situations, the trial court may require disclosure and dismiss the action if the Government
withholds the information.42

In sum, there is no fixed rule with respect to disclosure of the identity of an informer. The problem has to be
resolved on a case to case basis and calls for balancing the state interest in protecting people from crimes against
the individual’s right to prepare his defense. The balance must be adjusted by giving due weight to the following
factors, among others: (1) the crime charged, (2) the possible defenses, (3) the possible significance of the
informer’s testimony, and (4) other relevant factors.43

In the case at bar, the crime charged against the appellants is capital in character and can result in the
imposition of the death penalty. They have foisted the defense of instigation which is in sharp contrast to
the claim of entrapment by the prosecution. The prosecution has to prove all the material elements of the
alleged sale of shabu and the resulting buy-bust operation. Where the testimony of the informer is
indispensable, it should be disclosed. The liberty and the life of a person enjoy high importance in our scale
of values. It cannot be diminished except by a value of higher significance.

Evidence II.
Moreover, the mishandling and transfer of custody of the alleged confiscated methyl amphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu further shattered the case of the prosecution. There is no crime of illegal sale of regulated drug when there
is a nagging doubt on whether the substance confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be
regulated drug.

After the arrest of the appellants, the records show that the substance allegedly taken from them was submitted to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination upon request of the Chief of the SOD Narcotics Group, Quezon
City.44 Police Inspector Grace M. Eustaquio, Forensic Chemist, PNP Crime Laboratory, testified that the qualitative
examination she conducted manifested "positive results for methyl amphetamine hydrochloride" with net weight of
980.50 grams.45 This is not in dispute. The issue is whether the substance examined was the same as that allegedly
confiscated from appellants.

The Joint Affidavit of Arrest46 merely states that the evidence confiscated was submitted to the "PNP Crime
Laboratory Group for qualitative examination." SPO1 Gonzales testified on direct examination that:

Q: When you arrested them according to you, what other steps did you take if any?

A: We brought them to our office and we requested the crime laboratory Camp Crame to test the suspected
shabu that we recovered from both of them.47

On cross-examination, the defense only got this statement from SPO1 Gonzales regarding the evidence allegedly
confiscated:

Q: And you immediately brought him to your office at Camp Aguinaldo?

A: After we gathered the evidences we turned them over to our office, sir.48

Clearly, there was no reference to the person who submitted it to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. It is
the Memorandum-Request for Laboratory Examination 49 which indicates that a certain SPO4 Castro submitted the
specimen for examination. However, the rest of the records of the case failed to show the role of SPO4 Castro in the
buy-bust operation, if any. In the Joint Affidavit of Arrest, the only participants in the operation were enumerated as
SPO1 Gonzales as the poseur-buyer, Police Inspector Medel M. Poñe as the team leader with PO2 Elmer N.
Sarampote and PO1 Noli Jingo G. Rivel as back-up support.50 Other members of the team who acted as perimeter
security were not identified. In fact, when SPO1 Gonzales was asked during the trial as to their identities, he was
only able to name another member of the team:

Q: When you say "team," who compose the team?

A: I and more or less eight (8) person, ma’am.

Q: Can you name the member of the team?

A: Our team led by Inspector Medel Poñe, I myself, PO2 Elmer Sarampote, PO1 Noli Jingo G. Rivel, SPO3
Ronaldo Sayson, and I can not remember the others, ma’am.51

These are questions which cannot be met with a lockjaw. Since SPO4 Castro appears not to be a part of the
buy-bust team, how and when did he52 get hold of the specimen examined by Police Inspector Eustaquio? Who
entrusted the substance to him and requested him to submit it for examination? For how long was he in possession
of the evidence before he turned it over to the PNP Crime Laboratory? Who else had access to the specimen from
the time it was allegedly taken from appellants when arrested? These questions should be answered satisfactorily to
determine whether the integrity of the evidence was compromised in any way. Otherwise, the prosecution cannot
maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.

VI

Evidence II.
Finally, the denials and proffered explanations of appellants assume significance in light of the insufficiency of
evidence of the prosecution.

Appellant Ong testified that he was arrested on July 23, 1998 when he was scheduled to meet with a certain Ong
Sin for a possible job as technician in a bihon factory. On his part, appellant De Ming claimed that when he was
arrested on July 23, 1998, he was in the area waiting for his girlfriend and her mother who just went inside a
townhouse at 8th Street, New Manila, Quezon City. His girlfriend’s mother, Avelina Cardoz, confirmed his
explanation. The prosecution tells a different story, the uncorroborated story of SPO1 Gonzales that their team
entrapped the appellants in a buy-bust operation on July 24, 1998. Our minds rest uneasy on the lone testimony of
SPO1 Gonzales.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants WILLIAM ONG y LI and
CHING DE MING @ ROBERT TIU, are ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Section 15, Article III, in relation to
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and are
ordered immediately released from custody unless held for some other lawful cause.

The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to implement this decision immediately and to inform this Court within five (5)
days from receipt of this decision of the date the appellants are actually released from confinement. Costs de officio.

Evidence II.
4.) G.R. No. 115103      April 11, 2002

BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, represented by the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondent.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Graft Investigation Officer II Christopher S. Soquilon of the Office of the Ombudsman (OMBUDSMAN, for brevity)
received information from an "informer-for-reward" regarding allegedly anomalous grant of tax refunds to Distillera
Limtuaco & Co., Inc. (Limtuaco, for brevity) and La Tondeña Distilleries, Inc. Upon receipt of the information,
Soquilon recommended to then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez that the "case" be docketed and subsequently
1 

assigned to him for investigation. 2

On November 29, 1993, the Ombudsman issued a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Atty. Millard
3 

Mansequiao of the Legal Department of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) ordering him to appear before
the Ombudsman and to bring the complete original case dockets of the refunds granted to Limtuaco and La
Tondeña.

The BIR, through Assistant Commissioner for Legal Service Jaime M. Maza, asked that it be excused from
complying with the subpoena duces tecum because (a) the Limtuaco case was pending investigation by Graft
Investigation Officer II Napoleon S. Baldrias; and (b) the investigation thereof and that of La Tondeña was mooted
when the Sandiganbayan ruled in People v. Larin that "the legal issue was no longer in question since the BIR had
4 

ruled that the ad valorem taxes were erroneously paid and could therefore be the proper subject of a claim for tax
credit."
5

Without resolving the issues raised by the BIR, the Ombudsman issued another subpoena duces tecum, dated
December 9, 1993, addressed to BIR Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato ordering her to appear before the
Ombudsman and to bring the complete original case dockets of the refunds granted to Limtuaco and La Tondeña. 6

The BIR moved to vacate the subpoena duces tecum arguing that (a) the second subpoena duces tecum was
issued without first resolving the issues raised in its Manifestation and Motion dated December 8, 1993; (b) the
documents required to be produced were already submitted to Graft Investigation Officer II Baldrias; (c) the issue of
the tax credit of ad valorem taxes has already been resolved as proper by the Sandiganbayan; (d) the
subpoena duces tecum partook of the nature of an omnibus subpoena because it did not specifically described the
particular documents to be produced; (e) there was no clear showing that the tax case dockets sought to be
produced contained evidence material to the inquiry; (f) compliance with the subpoena duces tecum would
violate Sec. 269 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NLRC) on unlawful divulgence of trade secrets and
7 

Sec. 277 on procuring unlawful divulgence of trade secrets; and (g) Limtuaco and La Tondeña had the right to
8 

rely on the correctness and conclusiveness of the decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 9

The Ombudsman denied the Motion to Vacate the Subpoena Duces Tecum, pointing out that the Limtuaco tax
10 

refund case then assigned to Baldrias was already referred to the Fact-Finding and Investigation Bureau of the
Ombudsman for consolidation with Case No. OMB-0-93-3248. The Ombudsman also claimed that the documents
submitted by the BIR to Baldrias were incomplete and not certified. It insisted that the issuance of the
subpoena duces tecum was not a "fishing expedition" considering that the documents required for production were
clearly and particularly specified. 1âwphi1.nêt

The BIR moved to reconsider the respondent's Order dated February 15, 1994 alleging that (a) the matter subject of
the investigation was beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman; (b) the subpoena duces tecum was
not properly issued in accordance with law; and (c) non-compliance thereto was justifiable. The BIR averred it had
the exclusive authority whether to grant a tax credit and that the jurisdiction to review the same was lodged with the
Court of Tax Appeals and not with the Ombudsman.

Evidence II.
According to the BIR, for a subpoena duces tecum to be properly issued in accordance with law, there must first be
a pending action because the power to issue a subpoena duces tecum is not an independent proceeding. The BIR
noted that the Ombudsman issued the assailed subpoena duces tecum based only on the information obtained from
an "informer-for-reward" and the report of Asst. Comm. Imelda L. Reyes. The BIR added that the subpoena duces
tecum suffered from a legal infirmity for not specifically describing the documents sought to be produced.

Finding no valid reason to reverse its Order dated February 15, 1994, the Ombudsman denied the motion for
reconsideration and reiterated its directive to the BIR to produce the documents. Instead of complying, the BIR
12 

manifested its intention to elevate the case on certiorari to this Court. The Ombudsman thus ordered Asst. Comm.
13 

Maza to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for contumacious refusal to comply with the
subpoena duces tecum. 14

However, before the expiration of the period within which Asst. Comm. Maza was required to file a reply to the show
cause order of the Ombudsman, the BIR filed before this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. 15

Petitioner BIR insists that the investigative power of the Ombudsman is not unbridled. Particularly on the issue of tax
refunds, the BIR maintains that the Ombudsman could validly exercise its power to investigate only when there
exists an appropriate case and subject to the limitations provided by law. Petitioner opines that the fact-finding
16 

investigation by the Ombudsman is not the proper case as it is only a step preliminary to the filing of recovery
actions on the tax refunds granted to Limtuaco and La Tondeña.

This Court is not persuaded. No less than the 1987 Constitution enjoins that the "Ombudsman and his Deputies, as
protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate case, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result
thereof."
17

Clearly, there is no requirement of a pending action before the Ombudsman could wield its investigative power. The
Ombudsman could resort to its investigative prerogative on its own or upon a complaint filed in any form or manner.
18 

Even when the complaint is verbal or written, unsigned or unverified, the Ombudsman could, on its own, initiate the
investigation. Thus –
19 

There can be no objection to this procedure in the Office of the Ombudsman where anonymous letters
suffice to start an investigation because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is
apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and manner," the framers of the Constitution
took into account the well-known reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official
wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from other
investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public
officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against
them. On the other hand complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to
hire lawyers.20

The term "in an appropriate case" has already been clarified by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez, thus –
21 

Rather than referring to the form of complaints, therefore, the phrase "in an appropriate case" in Art. XI, §12
means any case concerning official act or omission which is alleged to be "illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient," The phrase "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law" refers to such limitations as
may be provided by Congress or, in the absence thereof, to such limitations as may be imposed by courts.

Plainly, the pendency of an action is not a prerequisite before the Ombudsman can start its own investigation.

Petitioner next avers that the determination of granting tax refunds falls within its exclusive expertise and jurisdiction
and that its findings could no longer be disturbed by the Ombudsman purportedly through its investigative power as
it was a valid exercise of discretion. Petitioner suggests that what respondent should have done was to appeal its

Evidence II.
decision of granting tax credits to Limtuaco and La Tondeña to the Court of Tax Appeals since it is the proper forum
to review the decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

This contention of the BIR is baseless. The power to investigate and to prosecute which was granted by law to the
Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. The Ombudsman Act makes it perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the
22 

Ombudsman encompasses "all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance that have been committed by
any officer or employee xxx during his tenure of office. 23

Concededly, the determination of whether to grant a tax refund falls within the exclusive expertise of the BIR.
Nonetheless, when there is a suspicion of even just a tinge of impropriety in the grant of the same, the Ombudsman
could rightfully ascertain whether the determination was done in accordance with law and identify the persons who
may be held responsible thereto. In that sense, the Ombudsman could not be accused of unlawfully intruding into
and intervening with the BIR's exercise of discretion.

As correctly posited by the Office of the Solicitor General –

xxx (T)he Ombudsman undertook the investigation "not as an appellate body exercising the power to review
decisions or rulings rendered by a subordinate body, with the end view of affirming or reversing the same,
but as an investigative agency tasked to discharge the role as 'protector of the people' pursuant to his
24 

authority 'to investigate xxx any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." The OSG insists that the "mere finality
25 

of petitioner's ruling on the subject of tax refund cases is not a legal impediment to the exercise of
respondent's investigative authority under the Constitution and its Charter (RA 6770) which xxx is so
encompassing as to include 'all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance that have been
committed by any officer or employee during his tenure of office.'"26

Indeed, the clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime
committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official
or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be
connected with or arise from the performance of official duty. 27

Petitioner fears that the fact-finding investigation being conducted by respondent would only amount to "a
general inquisitorial examination on the 'case dockets' with a view to search through them to gather
evidence" considering that the subpoena duces tecum did not describe with particularity the documents
28 

sought to be produced.

This Court is unimpressed. We agree with the view taken by the Solicitor General that the assailed subpoena duces
tecum indeed particularly and sufficiently described the records to be produced. There is every indication that
petitioner knew precisely what records were being referred to as it even suggested that the tax dockets sought to be
produced may not contain evidence material to the inquiry and that it has already submitted the same to Baldrias.

The records do not show how the production of the subpoenaed documents would necessarily contravene
Sec. 269 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) on unlawful divulgence of trade secrets and Sec.
29 

277 of the same Code on procuring unlawful divulgence of trade secrets. The documents sought to be
30 

produced were only the case dockets of the tax refunds granted to Limtuaco and La Tondeña which are public
records, and the subpoena duces tecum were directed to the public officials who have the official custody of the said
records. We find no valid reason why the trade secrets of Limtuaco and La Tondeña would be unnecessarily
disclosed if such official records, subject of the subpoena duces tecum, were to be produced by the petitioner BIR to
respondent Office of the Ombudsman.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the case dockets of the tax refunds which were granted to
Limtuaco and La Tondeña contain trade secrets, that fact, however, would not justify their non-production
before the Ombudsman. As this Court has underscored in Almote v. Vasquez - 31 

At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets
bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such

Evidence II.
 paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even
though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights xxx

In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of
records pertaining to the personnel of EIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of
intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but
not limited to economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting. Consequently, while in cases which
involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is
reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military maters without compelling
production, no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other consideration. 1âwphi1.nêt

Above all, even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively privileged, this decision would
only justify ordering their inspection in camera but not their nonproduction xxx

Besides, under the facts of this case, petitioner should not have concerned itself with possibly violating the pertinent
provisions of the NLRC on unlawful divulgence or unlawful procurement of trade secrets considering Rule V of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman which provides that –
32 

(a) Any person whose testimony or production of documents or other evidence is necessary to determine
the truth in any inquiry, hearing, or proceeding being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman or under its
authority in the performance or furtherance or its constitutional functions and statutory objectives, including
preliminary investigation, may be granted immunity from criminal prosecution by the Ombudsman, upon
such terms and conditions as the Ombudsman may determine, taking into account the pertinent provisions
of the Rules of Court xxx

With regard to the manner in which the investigation was conducted, petitioner asserts that the investigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman violated due process, inasmuch as it commenced its investigation by
issuing the subpoena duces tecum without first furnishing petitioner with a summary of the complaint and requiring it
to submit a written answer. The Ombudsman labels this assertion of the BIR as premature maintaining that it is only
33 

when the Ombudsman finds reasonable ground to investigate further that it is required to furnish respondent with
the summary of the complaint. The Ombudsman insists that in the instant case, it has yet to make that
determination.

On this score, we rule in favor of petitioner BIR. Records show that immediately upon receipt of the information from
an "informer-for-reward", Graft Investigator Soquilon, in a Memorandum dated November 26, 1993 addressed to
then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez, requested that the "case" be docketed and assigned to him for a "full-
blown fact-finding investigation." In his Memorandum, Soquilon averred that he is "certain that these refunds can be
34 

recovered by reason of the Tanduay precedent xxx and using the power of this Office, we will not only bring back to
the government multi-million illegal refunds but, like the Tanduay case, we will be establishing graft and corruption
against key BIR officials." In a marginal note dated November 26, 1993, Ombudsman Vasquez approved the
35  36 

docketing of the case and its assignment to Soquilon. Likewise, in the Preliminary Evaluation Sheet of the Office of
37 

the Ombudsman, the Fact Finding Investigation Bureau of the Ombudsman was named as complainant against
Concerned High Ranking and Key Officials of the Bureau of Internal Revenue who granted multi-million tax refunds
to Limtuaco and La Tondeña Distilleries for alleged violation of RA 3019. On November 29, 1993 and December 9,
1993 Soquilon issued the assailed subpoena duces tecum requiring the concerned BIR officials to appear before
the Ombudsman and to bring with them the complete case dockets of the tax refunds granted to Limtuaco and La
Tondeña.

It is our view and we hold that the procedure taken by the respondent did not comply with the safeguards
enumerated in Sec. 26, §(2) of RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which clearly provides that –

(2) The Office of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in whatever form concerning an
official act or omission. It shall act on the complaint immediately and if it finds the same entirely baseless, it
shall dismiss the same and inform the complainant of such dismissal citing the reasons therefore. If it finds a
reasonable, ground to investigate further, it shall first furnish the respondent public officer or employee with
a summary of the complaint and require him to submit a written answer within seventy-two hours from
receipt hereof. If the answer is found satisfactory, it shall dismiss the case.
Evidence II.
The procedure which was followed by the respondent likewise contravened the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman, Sec. 4, Rule 11 of which provides that –
38 

(a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports, the investigating officer shall require
the complaint or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the complaints.

(b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a
copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and controverting evidence with proof of service thereof on
the complainant. The complainant may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service of the counter-
affidavits xxx

It is clear from the initial comments of Soquilon in his Memorandum to Ombudsman Vasquez that he undoubtedly
found reasonable grounds to investigate further. In fact, he recommended that the "case" be docketed immediately
and assigned to him for a "full-blown fact-finding investigation." Even during that initial stage, Soquilon was
convinced that the granting of the tax refunds was so anomalous that he assured Ombudsman Vasquez of the
eventual recovery of the tax refunds and the prosecution and conviction of key BIR officials for graft and corruption.

We commend the graft investigators of the Office of the Ombudsman in their efforts to cleanse our bureaucracy of
scalawags. Sometimes, however, in their zeal and haste to pin down the culprits they tend to circumvent some
procedures. In this case, Graft Investigation Officer Soquilon forgot that there are always two (2) sides to an issue
and that each party must be given every opportunity to air his grievance or explain his side as the case may be. This
is the essence of due process.

The law clearly provides that if there is a reasonable ground to investigate further, the investigator of the Office of
the Ombudsman shall first furnish the respondent public officer or employee with a summary of the complaint and
require him to submit a written answer within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof. In the instant case, the
BIR officials concerned were never furnished by the respondent with a summary of the complaint and were not
given the opportunity to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence. Instead, they were summarily
ordered to appear before the Ombudsman and to produce the case dockets of the tax refunds granted to Limtuaco
and La Tondeña. They are aggrieved in that, from the point of view of the respondent, they were already deemed
probably guilty of granting anomalous tax refunds. Plainly, respondent Office of the Ombudsman failed to afford
petitioner with the basics of due process in conducting its investigation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The respondent Office of the Ombudsman is prohibited and ordered to
desist from proceeding with Case No. OMB-0-93-3248; and its Orders dated November 29, 1993, December 9,
1993 and February 15, 1994 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Evidence II.
5.) G.R. No. 172835               December 13, 2007

AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
PENNSWELL, INC. Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation seeks, via the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
the nullification of the 16 February 2006 Decision1 and the 25 May 2006 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 86329, which affirmed the Order3 dated 30 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City,
Branch 64, in Civil Case No. 00-561.

Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air transportation
services. On the other hand, respondent Pennswell, Inc. was organized to engage in the business of manufacturing
and selling industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants.

On various dates, respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade, covered by Sales Invoices No.
8846,4 9105,5 8962,6 and 8963,7 which correspond to Purchase Orders No. 6433, 6684, 6634 and 6633,
respectively. Under the contracts, petitioner’s total outstanding obligation amounted to ₱449,864.98 with interest at
14% per annum until the amount would be fully paid. For failure of the petitioner to comply with its obligation under
said contracts, respondent filed a Complaint8 for a Sum of Money on 28 April 2000 with the RTC.

In its Answer,9 petitioner contended that its refusal to pay was not without valid and justifiable reasons. In particular,
petitioner alleged that it was defrauded in the amount of ₱592,000.00 by respondent for its previous sale of four
items, covered by Purchase Order No. 6626. Said items were misrepresented by respondent as belonging to a
new line, but were in truth and in fact, identical with products petitioner had previously purchased from
respondent. Petitioner asserted that it was deceived by respondent which merely altered the names and
labels of such goods. Petitioner specifically identified the items in question, as follows:

Label/Description Item No. Amount P.O. Date

1. a. Anti-Friction Fluid MPL-800 153,941.40 5714 05/20/99

b. Excellent Rust Corrosion (fake) MPL-008 155,496.00 5888 06/20/99

1. a. Contact Grease COG #2 115,236.00 5540 04/26/99

b. Connector Grease (fake) CG 230,519.52 6327 08/05/99

1. a. Trixohtropic Grease EPC 81,876.96 4582 01/29/99

b. Di-Electric Strength Protective EPC#2 81,876.96 5446 04/21/99
Coating (fake)

1. a. Dry Lubricant ASC-EP 87,346.52 5712 05/20/99

b. Anti-Seize Compound (fake) ASC-EP 124,108.10 4763 & 02/16/99 &
2000 5890 06/24/99

According to petitioner, respondent’s products, namely Excellent Rust Corrosion, Connector Grease,
Electric Strength Protective Coating, and Anti-Seize Compound, are identical with its Anti-Friction Fluid,
Contact Grease, Thixohtropic Grease, and Dry Lubricant, respectively. Petitioner asseverated that had
Evidence II.
respondent been forthright about the identical character of the products, it would not have purchased the
items complained of. Moreover, petitioner alleged that when the purported fraud was discovered, a conference
was held between petitioner and respondent on 13 January 2000, whereby the parties agreed that respondent
would return to petitioner the amount it previously paid. However, petitioner was surprised when it received a letter
from the respondent, demanding payment of the amount of ₱449,864.94, which later became the subject of
respondent’s Complaint for Collection of a Sum of Money against petitioner.

During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel10 respondent to give a detailed list of
the ingredients and chemical components of the following products, to wit: (a) Contact Grease and
Connector Grease; (b) Thixohtropic Grease and Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating; and (c) Dry
Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound.11 It appears that petitioner had earlier requested the Philippine
Institute of Pure and Applied Chemistry (PIPAC) for the latter to conduct a comparison of respondent’s
goods.

On 15 March 2004, the RTC rendered an Order granting the petitioner’s motion. It disposed, thus:

The Court directs [herein respondent] Pennswell, Inc. to give [herein petitioner] Air Philippines Corporation[,] a
detailed list of the ingredients or chemical components of the following chemical products:

a. Contact Grease to be compared with Connector Grease;

b. Thixohtropic Grease to be compared with Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating; and

c. Dry Lubricant to be compared with Anti-Seize Compound[.]

[Respondent] Pennswell, Inc. is given fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order to submit to [petitioner] Air
Philippines Corporation the chemical components of all the above-mentioned products for chemical
comparison/analysis.12

Respondent sought reconsideration of the foregoing Order, contending that it cannot be compelled to
disclose the chemical components sought because the matter is confidential. It argued that what petitioner
endeavored to inquire upon constituted a trade secret which respondent cannot be forced to divulge.
Respondent maintained that its products are specialized lubricants, and if their components were revealed, its
business competitors may easily imitate and market the same types of products, in violation of its proprietary rights
and to its serious damage and prejudice.

The RTC gave credence to respondent’s reasoning, and reversed itself. It issued an Order dated 30 June 2004,
finding that the chemical components are respondent’s trade secrets and are privileged in character. A priori, it
rationalized:

The Supreme Court held in the case of Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 299 SCRA 744,
p. 764, that "the drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that aside from national security matters and
intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other related
laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposit Act) are also exempted from
compulsory disclosure."

Trade secrets may not be the subject of compulsory disclosure. By reason of [their] confidential and privileged
character, ingredients or chemical components of the products ordered by this Court to be disclosed constitute trade
secrets lest [herein respondent] would eventually be exposed to unwarranted business competition with others who
may imitate and market the same kinds of products in violation of [respondent’s] proprietary rights. Being privileged,
the detailed list of ingredients or chemical components may not be the subject of mode of discovery under Rule 27,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which expressly makes privileged information an exception from its coverage.13

Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, which denied the Petition and affirmed the Order dated 30 June 2004
of the RTC.
Evidence II.
The Court of Appeals ruled that to compel respondent to reveal in detail the list of ingredients of its lubricants is to
disregard respondent’s rights over its trade secrets. It was categorical in declaring that the chemical formulation of
respondent’s products and their ingredients are embraced within the meaning of "trade secrets." In disallowing the
disclosure, the Court of Appeals expounded, thus:

The Supreme Court in Garcia v. Board of Investments (177 SCRA 374 [1989]) held that trade secrets and
confidential, commercial and financial information are exempt from public scrutiny. This is reiterated in Chavez v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government (299 SCRA 744 [1998]) where the Supreme Court enumerated the
kinds of information and transactions that are recognized as restrictions on or privileges against compulsory
disclosure. There, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that:

"The drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national security matters and
intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other related
laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) re also exempt from
compulsory disclosure."

It is thus clear from the foregoing that a party cannot be compelled to produce, release or disclose documents,
papers, or any object which are considered trade secrets.

In the instant case, petitioner [Air Philippines Corporation] would have [respondent] Pennswell produce a detailed
list of ingredients or composition of the latter’s lubricant products so that a chemical comparison and analysis
thereof can be obtained. On this note, We believe and so hold that the ingredients or composition of [respondent]
Pennswell’s lubricants are trade secrets which it cannot be compelled to disclose.

[Respondent] Pennswell has a proprietary or economic right over the ingredients or components of its lubricant
products. The formulation thereof is not known to the general public and is peculiar only to [respondent] Pennswell.
The legitimate and economic interests of business enterprises in protecting their manufacturing and business
secrets are well-recognized in our system.

[Respondent] Pennswell has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and
other confidential programs and information against the public. Otherwise, such information can be illegally and
unfairly utilized by business competitors who, through their access to [respondent] Pennswell’s business secrets,
may use the same for their own private gain and to the irreparable prejudice of the latter.

xxxx

In the case before Us, the alleged trade secrets have a factual basis, i.e., it comprises of the ingredients and
formulation of [respondent] Pennswell’s lubricant products which are unknown to the public and peculiar only to
Pennswell.

All told, We find no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public
respondent Judge in finding that the detailed list of ingredients or composition of the subject lubricant products
which petitioner [Air Philippines Corporation] seeks to be disclosed are trade secrets of [respondent] Pennswell;
hence, privileged against compulsory disclosure.14

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Unyielding, petitioner brought the instant Petition before us, on the sole issue of:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PREVAILING LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT UPHELD THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE CHEMICAL
COMPONENTS OR INGREDIENTS OF RESPONDENT’S PRODUCTS ARE TRADE SECRETS OR INDUSTRIAL
SECRETS THAT ARE NOT SUBJECT TO COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE.15

Petitioner seeks to convince this Court that it has a right to obtain the chemical composition and
ingredients of respondent’s products to conduct a comparative analysis of its products. Petitioner assails
Evidence II.
the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the matters are trade secrets which are protected by
law and beyond public scrutiny. Relying on Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, petitioner argues that the
use of modes of discovery operates with desirable flexibility under the discretionary control of the trial court.
Furthermore, petitioner posits that its request is not done in bad faith or in any manner as to annoy, embarrass, or
oppress respondent.

A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner and
those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it.16 The definition also extends to a secret
formula or process not patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in compounding some
article of trade having a commercial value.17 A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or
compilation of information that: (1) is used in one's business; and (2) gives the employer an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not possess the information. 18 Generally, a trade secret is a
process or device intended for continuous use in the operation of the business, for example, a machine or formula,
but can be a price list or catalogue or specialized customer list.19 It is indubitable that trade secrets constitute
proprietary rights. The inventor, discoverer, or possessor of a trade secret or similar innovation has rights therein
which may be treated as property, and ordinarily an injunction will be granted to prevent the disclosure of the trade
secret by one who obtained the information "in confidence" or through a "confidential relationship."20 American
jurisprudence has utilized the following factors21 to determine if an information is a trade secret, to wit:

(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the employer's business;

(2) the extent to which the information is known by employees and others involved in the business;

(3) the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the information;

(4) the value of the information to the employer and to competitors;

(5) the amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing the information; and

(6) the extent to which the information could be easily or readily obtained through an independent
source.22

In Cocoland Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,23 the issue was the legality of an
employee’s termination on the ground of unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets. The Court laid down the rule that
any determination by management as to the confidential nature of technologies, processes, formulae or other so-
called trade secrets must have a substantial factual basis which can pass judicial scrutiny. The Court rejected the
employer’s naked contention that its own determination as to what constitutes a trade secret should be binding and
conclusive upon the NLRC. As a caveat, the Court said that to rule otherwise would be to permit an employer to
label almost anything a trade secret, and thereby create a weapon with which he/it may arbitrarily dismiss an
employee on the pretext that the latter somehow disclosed a trade secret, even if in fact there be none at all to
speak of.24 Hence, in Cocoland, the parameters in the determination of trade secrets were set to be such substantial
factual basis that can withstand judicial scrutiny.

The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of respondent’s special lubricants are trade secrets within
the contemplation of the law. Respondent was established to engage in the business of general manufacturing and
selling of, and to deal in, distribute, sell or otherwise dispose of goods, wares, merchandise, products, including but
not limited to industrial chemicals, solvents, lubricants, acids, alkalies, salts, paints, oils, varnishes, colors, pigments
and similar preparations, among others. It is unmistakable to our minds that the manufacture and production of
respondent’s products proceed from a formulation of a secret list of ingredients. In the creation of its lubricants,
respondent expended efforts, skills, research, and resources. What it had achieved by virtue of its investments may
not be wrested from respondent on the mere pretext that it is necessary for petitioner’s defense against a collection
for a sum of money. By and large, the value of the information to respondent is crystal clear. The ingredients
constitute the very fabric of respondent’s production and business. No doubt, the information is also valuable to
respondent’s competitors. To compel its disclosure is to cripple respondent’s business, and to place it at an undue
disadvantage. If the chemical composition of respondent’s lubricants are opened to public scrutiny, it will stand to
lose the backbone on which its business is founded. This would result in nothing less than the probable demise of
respondent’s business. Respondent’s proprietary interest over the ingredients which it had developed and expended
Evidence II.
money and effort on is incontrovertible. Our conclusion is that the detailed ingredients sought to be revealed have a
commercial value to respondent. Not only do we acknowledge the fact that the information grants it a competitive
advantage; we also find that there is clearly a glaring intent on the part of respondent to keep the information
confidential and not available to the prying public.

We now take a look at Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, which permits parties to inspect documents or
things upon a showing of good cause before the court in which an action is pending. Its entire provision reads:

SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection order. – Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefore,
the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon
designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying,
or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the
time, place and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms
and conditions as are just.

A more than cursory glance at the above text would show that the production or inspection of documents or things
as a mode of discovery sanctioned by the Rules of Court may be availed of by any party upon a showing of good
cause therefor before the court in which an action is pending. The court may order any party: a) to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, which are not privileged;25 which constitute or contain evidence material to
any matter involved in the action; and which are in his possession, custody or control; or b) to permit entry upon
designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying,
or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon.

Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things that may be produced and inspected should not be privileged.26 The documents must not be
privileged against disclosure.27 On the ground of public policy, the rules providing for production and inspection of
books and papers do not authorize the production or inspection of privileged matter; that is, books and papers
which, because of their confidential and privileged character, could not be received in evidence.28 Such a condition is
in addition to the requisite that the items be specifically described, and must constitute or contain evidence material
to any matter involved in the action and which are in the party’s possession, custody or control.

Section 2429 of Rule 130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of privileged communication, to wit: (a)
communication between husband and wife; (b) communication between attorney and client; (c) communication
between physician and patient; (d) communication between priest and penitent; and (e) public officers and public
interest. There are, however, other privileged matters that are not mentioned by Rule 130. Among them are the
following: (a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of published news; (b) voters may not be
compelled to disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information contained in tax census returns; and
(d) bank deposits. 30

We, thus, rule against the petitioner. We affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals which upheld the finding of the
RTC that there is substantial basis for respondent to seek protection of the law for its proprietary rights over the
detailed chemical composition of its products.

That trade secrets are of a privileged nature is beyond quibble. The protection that this jurisdiction affords to trade
secrets is evident in our laws. The Interim Rules of Procedure on Government Rehabilitation, effective 15 December
2000, which applies to: (1) petitions for rehabilitation filed by corporations, partnerships, and associations pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 902-A,31 as amended; and (2) cases for rehabilitation transferred from the Securities and
Exchange Commission to the RTCs pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as The Securities
Regulation Code, expressly provides that the court may issue an order to protect trade secrets or other confidential
research, development, or commercial information belonging to the debtor.32 Moreover, the Securities Regulation
Code is explicit that the Securities and Exchange Commission is not required or authorized to require the revelation
of trade secrets or processes in any application, report or document filed with the Commission.33 This confidentiality

Evidence II.
is made paramount as a limitation to the right of any member of the general public, upon request, to have access to
all information filed with the Commission.34

Furthermore, the Revised Penal Code endows a cloak of protection to trade secrets under the following articles:

Art. 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500
pesos shall be imposed upon any manager, employee or servant who, in such capacity, shall learn the secrets of his
principal or master and shall reveal such secrets.

Art. 292. Revelation of industrial secrets. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods
and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon the person in charge, employee or workman of any
manufacturing or industrial establishment who, to the prejudice of the owner thereof, shall reveal the secrets of the
industry of
the latter.

Similarly, Republic Act No. 8424, otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, has a restrictive
provision on trade secrets, penalizing the revelation thereof by internal revenue officers or employees, to wit:

SECTION 278. Procuring Unlawful Divulgence of Trade Secrets. - Any person who causes or procures an officer or
employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to divulge any confidential information regarding the business, income
or inheritance of any taxpayer, knowledge of which was acquired by him in the discharge of his official duties, and
which it is unlawful for him to reveal, and any person who publishes or prints in any manner whatever, not provided
by law, any income, profit, loss or expenditure appearing in any income tax return, shall be punished by a fine of not
more than two thousand pesos (₱2,000), or suffer imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than five
(5) years, or both.

Republic Act No. 6969, or the Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes Control Act of 1990, enacted
to implement the policy of the state to regulate, restrict or prohibit the importation, manufacture, processing, sale,
distribution, use and disposal of chemical substances and mixtures that present unreasonable risk and/or injury to
health or the environment, also contains a provision that limits the right of the public to have access to records,
reports or information concerning chemical substances and mixtures including safety data submitted and
data on emission or discharge into the environment, if the matter is confidential such that it would divulge
trade secrets, production or sales figures; or methods, production or processes unique to such
manufacturer, processor or distributor; or would otherwise tend to affect adversely the competitive position
of such manufacturer, processor or distributor.35

Clearly, in accordance with our statutory laws, this Court has declared that intellectual and industrial property rights
cases are not simple property cases.36 Without limiting such industrial property rights to trademarks and trade
names, this Court has ruled that all agreements concerning intellectual property are intimately connected with
economic development.37 The protection of industrial property encourages investments in new ideas and inventions
and stimulates creative efforts for the satisfaction of human needs. It speeds up transfer of technology and
industrialization, and thereby bring about social and economic progress.38 Verily, the protection of industrial secrets
is inextricably linked to the advancement of our economy and fosters healthy competition in trade.

Jurisprudence has consistently acknowledged the private character of trade secrets.  There is a privilege not to
1âwphi1

disclose one’s trade secrets.39 Foremost, this Court has declared that trade secrets and banking transactions are
among the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information as embodied in the Constitution.40 We said
that the drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national security matters and
intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other related
laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act), are also exempted from
compulsory disclosure.41

Significantly, our cases on labor are replete with examples of a protectionist stance towards the trade secrets of
employers. For instance, this Court upheld the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its
employees from marrying employees of any competitor company, on the rationalization that the company has a right
to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and

Evidence II.
information from competitors.42 Notably, it was in a labor-related case that this Court made a stark ruling on the
proper determination of trade secrets.

In the case at bar, petitioner cannot rely on Section 7743 of Republic Act 7394, or the Consumer Act of the
Philippines, in order to compel respondent to reveal the chemical components of its products. While it is true that all
consumer products domestically sold, whether manufactured locally or imported, shall indicate their general make or
active ingredients in their respective labels of packaging, the law does not apply to respondent. Respondent’s
specialized lubricants -- namely, Contact Grease, Connector Grease, Thixohtropic Grease, Di-Electric Strength
Protective Coating, Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound -- are not consumer products. "Consumer products," as
it is defined in Article 4(q),44 refers to goods, services and credits, debts or obligations which are primarily for
personal, family, household or agricultural purposes, which shall include, but not be limited to, food, drugs,
cosmetics, and devices. This is not the nature of respondent’s products. Its products are not intended for personal,
family, household or agricultural purposes. Rather, they are for industrial use, specifically for the use of aircraft
propellers and engines.

Petitioner’s argument that Republic Act No. 8203, or the Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs, requires the disclosure
of the active ingredients of a drug is also on faulty ground.45 Respondent’s products are outside the scope of the
cited law. They do not come within the purview of a drug46 which, as defined therein, refers to any chemical
compound or biological substance, other than food, that is intended for use in the treatment, prevention or diagnosis
of disease in man or animals. Again, such are not the characteristics of respondent’s products.

What is clear from the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is that the chemical formulation of
respondent’s products is not known to the general public and is unique only to it. Both courts uniformly ruled that
these ingredients are not within the knowledge of the public. Since such factual findings are generally not
reviewable by this Court, it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in
the proceedings below.47 We need not delve into the factual bases of such findings as questions of fact are beyond
the pale of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Factual findings of the trial court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court.48

We do not find merit or applicability in petitioner’s invocation of Section 1249 of the Toxic Substances and Hazardous
and Nuclear Wastes Control Act of 1990, which grants the public access to records, reports or information
concerning chemical substances and mixtures, including safety data submitted, and data on emission or discharge
into the environment. To reiterate, Section 1250 of said Act deems as confidential matters, which may not be made
public, those that would divulge trade secrets, including production or sales figures or methods; production or
processes unique to such manufacturer, processor or distributor, or would otherwise tend to affect adversely the
competitive position of such manufacturer, processor or distributor. It is true that under the same Act, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources may release information; however, the clear import of the law is
that said authority is limited by the right to confidentiality of the manufacturer, processor or distributor, which
information may be released only to a medical research or scientific institution where the information is needed for
the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment of a person exposed to the chemical substance or mixture. The right
to confidentiality is recognized by said Act as primordial. Petitioner has not made the slightest attempt to show that
these circumstances are availing in the case at bar.

Indeed, the privilege is not absolute; the trial court may compel disclosure where it is indispensable for doing
justice.51 We do not, however, find reason to except respondent’s trade secrets from the application of the rule on
privilege. The revelation of respondent’s trade secrets serves no better purpose to the disposition of the main case
pending with the RTC, which is on the collection of a sum of money. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner
received respondent’s goods in trade in the normal course of business. To be sure, there are defenses under the
laws of contracts and sales available to petitioner. On the other hand, the greater interest of justice ought to favor
respondent as the holder of trade secrets. If we were to weigh the conflicting interests between the parties, we rule
in favor of the greater interest of respondent. Trade secrets should receive greater protection from discovery,
because they derive economic value from being generally unknown and not readily ascertainable by the public.52 To
the mind of this Court, petitioner was not able to show a compelling reason for us to lift the veil of confidentiality
which shields respondent’s trade secrets.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 16 February 2006, and the Resolution dated 25 May
2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86329 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
Evidence II.
Evidence II.
 6.) G.R. No. 216600, November 21, 2016

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION AND RHICKE S. JENNINGS, Petitioners, v. AIRFREIGHT

2100, INC. AND ALBERTO D. LINA, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
Federal Express Corporation (FedEx) and Rhicke S. Jennings (Jennings), assailing the January 20,
2015 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 135835, which affirmed the May 7,
2014 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Pasig City (RTC), dismissing its petition for the
issuance of a confidentiality/protective order.

FedEx is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines primarily engaged in international air
carriage, logistics and freight forwarding, while Jennings serves as its Managing Director for the
Philippines and Indonesia. Respondent Airfreight 2100 (Air21) is a domestic corporation likewise
involved in the freight forwarding business, while Alberto Lina (Lina) is the Chairman of its Board of
Directors.

The Antecedents

FedEx, having lost its International Freight Forwarder's (IFF) license to engage in international freight
forwarding in the Philippines, executed various Global Service Program (GSP) contracts with Air21,
an independent contractor, to primarily undertake its delivery and pick-up services within the
country.4

Under the GSP arrangement, the packages sent by FedEx customers from abroad would be picked up
at a Philippine airport and delivered by Air21 to its respective consignees. Conversely, packages from
Philippine clients would be delivered by Air21 to the airport and turned over to FedEx for shipment to
consignees abroad. As stipulated in the GSP contracts, Air21 guaranteed that all shipments would be
cleared through customs in accordance with Philippine law. In the implementation of these contracts,
however, several issues relating to money remittance, value-added taxes, dynamic fuel charge,
trucking costs, interests, and penalties ensued between the parties.

On May 11, 2011, in an effort to settle their commercial dispute, FedEx and Air21 agreed to submit
themselves to arbitration before the Philippine Dispute Resolution Center (PDRC). Thus, on June 24,
2011, FedEx filed its Notice of Arbitration. On October 3, 2011, the Arbitral Tribunal was constituted.

As part of the arbitration proceedings, Jennings, John Lumley Holmes (Holmes), the Managing
Director of SPAC Legal of FedEx; and David John Ross (Ross), Senior Vice President of Operations,
Middle East, India and Africa, executed their respective statements5 as witnesses for FedEx. Ross and
Holmes deposed that Federal Express Pacific, Inc., a subsidiary of FedEx, used to have an IFF license
to engage in the business of freight forwarding in the Philippines. This license, however, was
suspended pending a case in court filed by Merit International, Inc. (Merit) and Ace Logistics, Inc.
(Ace), both freight forwarding companies, which questioned the issuance of the IFF to FedEx. Absent
the said license, FedEx executed the GSP contracts with Air21 to be able to conduct its business in
the Philippines. Ross and Holmes, in their individual statements, averred that Merit and Ace were
either owned or controlled by Air21 employees or persons connected with the Lina Group of
Companies, which included Air21.

Jennings, in his cross-examination, was identified as the source of the information that Merit and Ace

Evidence II.
were Air21's proxies and was asked if he had any written proof of such proxy relationship.6 He
answered in the negative. In his re-direct examination, he was made to expound on the supposed
proxy relationship between Merit, Ace and Air21.7 He responded that Merit and Ace were just very
small companies with meager resources, yet they were able to finance and file a case to oppose the
grant of IFF license to FedEx. Jennings also disclosed that one of the directors of Ace was a friend of
Lina and that Lorna Orbe, the President of Merit, was the former "boss" of Lito Alvarez, who was also
associated with Air21.

Feeling aggrieved by those statements, Lina for himself and on behalf of Air21, filed a complaint for
grave slander against Jennings before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Taguig City.8 Lina claimed
that the defamatory imputation of Jennings that Merit and Ace were Air21's proxies
brought dishonor, discredit and contempt to his name and that of Air21. Lina quoted certain
portions of the written statements of Holmes and Ross and the Transcript of Stenographic Notes
(TSN) of the April 25, 2013 arbitration hearing reflecting Jennings' testimony to support his
complaint.

Consequently, FedEx and Jennings (petitioners) filed their Petition for Issuance of a
Confidentiality/Protective Order with Application for Temporary Order of Protection and/or Preliminary
Injunction before the RTC alleging that all information and documents obtained in, or related to, the
arbitration proceedings were confidential.9 FedEx asserted that the testimony of Jennings, a
witness in the arbitration proceedings, should not be divulged and used to bolster the
complaint-affidavit for grave slander as this was inadmissible in evidence.

On January 16, 2014, the RTC granted petitioners' application for the Temporary Order of Protection.

Meanwhile, on February 3, 2014, the arbitral tribunal rendered an award in favor of FedEx.

Subsequently, in the assailed Order, dated May 7, 2014, the RTC denied FedEx's petition for lack of
merit, stating that the statements and arbitration documents were not confidential information. It
went on to state that "[t]he statement and 'Arbitration Documents' which purportedly consists the
crime of Grave Slander under Articles 353 and 358 of the Revised Penal Code are not in any way
related to the subject under Arbitration." The RTC further wrote that "a crime cannot be protected by
the confidentiality rules under ADR. The said rules should not be used as a shield in the commission
of any crime." Thus, it disposed:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Issuance of a Confidentiality/Protective Order
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

The case is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.10 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Dissatisfied, petitioners challenged the RTC order before the CA via a petition for review.

On January 20, 2015, the CA denied the petition. In its assailed decision, the CA explained that the
declarations by Jennings were not confidential as they were not at all related to the subject of
mediation as the arbitration proceedings revolved around the parties' claims for sum of
money.11 Thus, the CA ruled that "statements made without any bearing on the subject proceedings
are not confidential in nature." It must be emphasized that other declarations given therein, if
relative to the subject of mediation or arbitration, are certainly confidential.12

Hence, this present petition before the Court.

GROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION

A.

Evidence II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPLY, OR OTHERWISE MISAPPLIED, SECTIONS 3(H)
AND 23 OF THE ADR ACT.

B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPLY RULE 10.5 OF THE SPECIAL ADR RULES.

C.

THE TEST APPLIED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR DETERMINING CONFIDENTIALITY OF

INFORMATION IS NOT SANCTIONED BY AND IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE ADR ACT AND
THE SPECIAL ADR RULES.

D.

THE ASSAILED DECISION RESULTS TO SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE TO PETITIONERS.

E.

THE ASSAILED DECISION DEFEATS PUBLIC POLICY ON CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE

RECORDS OF AND COMMUNICATIONS MADE IN THE COURSE OF ARBITRATION. 13
FedEx argues that the Jennings' statements were part of the (a) records and evidence of
Arbitration (Section 23); (b) witness statements made therein (Section 3[h][3]); and (c)
communication made in a dispute resolution proceedings (Section 3 [h][1]). 14 They, thus,
averred that Jennings' oral statements made during the April 25, 2013 arbitration hearing
and the TSN of the hearings, conducted on April 22 and 25, 2013, form part of the records
of arbitration and must, therefore, be considered confidential information.

For said reason, petitioners assert that Rule 10.5 of the Special Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
Rules, allowing for the issuance of a confidentiality/protective order, was completely disregarded by
the CA when it denied the petition filed by FedEx as a result of Lina divulging what were supposed to
be confidential information from ADR proceedings.

Petitioners also claim that in ruling that Jennings' statements were not confidential information, by
applying the test of relevance that "statements made without any bearing on the subject proceedings
are not confidential in nature," the CAused a "test" that had no basis in law and whose application in
its petition amounted to judiciallegislation.15

Respondent Air21 and Lina (respondents), in their Comment,16 essentially countered that:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

While the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 (the "ADR Law") confers
communications made during arbitration the privilege against disclosure, otherwise known
as the confidentiality principle, to assist the parties in having a speedy, efficient and
impartial resolution of their disputes, said privilege cannot be invoked to shield any party
from criminal responsibility. The privilege is not absolute. The ADR Law does not exist in a
viacuum without regard to other existing jurisprudence and laws, particularly the Revised Penal
Code. Otherwise, we will permit a dangerous situation where arbitration proceedings will be used by
an unscrupulous disputant as a venue for the commission of crime, which cannot be punished by the
simple invocation of the privilege. Such an absurd interpretation of our laws cannot be deemed to be
the underlying will of our Congress in framing and enacting our law on arbitration. To be sure, a
crime cannot be protected or extinguished through a bare invocation of the confidentiality rule.17
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Court's Ruling

The crucial issue in this case is whether the testimony of Jennings given during the arbitration
proceedings falls within the ambit of confidential information and, therefore, covered by
Evidence II.
the mantle of a confidentiality/protection order.

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Section 3(h) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9285 or the Alternative Dispute Resolution of 2004 (ADR Act)
defines confidential information as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

"Confidential information" means any information, relative to the subject of mediation or

arbitration, expressly intended by the source not to be disclosed, or obtained under circumstances
that would create a reasonable expectation on behalf of the source that the information shall not be
disclosed. It shall include (1) communication, oral or written, made in a dispute resolution
proceedings, including any memoranda, notes or work product of the neutral party or non-party
participant, as defined in this Act; (2) an oral or written statement made or which occurs during
mediation or for purposes of considering, conducting, participating, initiating, continuing of
reconvening mediation or retaining a mediator; and (3) pleadings, motions manifestations, witness
statements, reports filed or submitted in an arbitration or for expert evaluation. [Emphases
Supplied] ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The said list is not exclusive and may include other information as long as they satisfy the
requirements of express confidentiality or implied confidentiality.18

Plainly, Rule 10.1 of A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC or the Special Rules of Court on Alternative
Dispute Resolution (Special ADR Rules) allows "[a] party, counsel or witness who
disclosed or who was compelled to disclose information relative to the subject of ADR
under circumstances that would create a reasonable expectation, on behalf of the source,
that the information shall be kept confidential x x x the right to prevent such information from
being further disclosed without the express written consent of the source or the party who made the
disclosure." Thus, the rules on confidentiality and protective orders apply when:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. An ADR proceeding is pending; chanrobleslaw

2. A party, counsel or witness disclosed information or was otherwise compelled to disclose

information; chanrobleslaw

3. The disclosure was made under circumstances that would create a reasonable expectation, on
behalf of the source, that the information shall be kept confidential; chanrobleslaw

4. The source of the information or the party who made the disclosure has the right to prevent
such information from being disclosed; chanrobleslaw

5. The source of the information or the party who made the disclosure has not given his express
consent to any disclosure; and

6. The applicant would be materially prejudiced by an unauthorized disclosure of the information

obtained, or to be obtained, during the ADR proceeding.

Gauged by the said parameters, the written statements of witnesses Ross, Holmes and
Jennings, as well as the latter's oral testimony in the April 25, 2013 arbitration hearing,
both fall under Section 3 (h) [1] and [3] of the ADR Act which states that "communication,
oral or written, made in a dispute resolution proceedings, including any memoranda, notes
or work product of the neutral party or non-party participant, as defined in this Act; and
(3) pleadings, motions, manifestations, witness statements, reports filed or submitted in
an arbitration or for expert valuation," constitutes confidential information.

Notably, both the parties and the Arbitral Tribunal had agreed to the Terms of Reference (TOR) that
"the arbitration proceedings should be kept strictly confidential as provided in Section 23 of the ADR
Act and Article 25-A19 of the PDRCI Arbitration Rules (Arbitration Rules) and that they should all be
Evidence II.
bound by such confidentiality requirements."

The provisions of the ADR Act and the Arbitration Rules repeatedly employ the word "shall" which, in
statutory construction, is one of mandatory character in common parlance and in ordinary
signification.20 Thus, the general rule is that information disclosed by a party or witness in an ADR
proceeding is considered privileged and confidential.

In evaluating the merits of the petition, Rule 10.8 of the Special ADR Rules mandates that courts
should be guided by the principle that confidential information shall not be subject to discovery and
shall be inadmissible in any adversarial proceeding, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Rule 10.8. Court action. - If the court finds the petition or motion meritorious, it shall issue an order
enjoining a person or persons from divulging confidential information.

In resolving the petition or motion, the courts shall be guided by the following principles applicable to
all ADR proceedings: Confidential information shall not be subject to discovery and shall be
inadmissible in any adversarial proceeding, whether judicial or quasi judicial. However, evidence or
information that is otherwise admissible or subject to discovery does not become inadmissible or
protected from discovery solely by reason of its use therein. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Article 5.42 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)21 of the ADR Act likewise echoes that
arbitration proceedings, records, evidence and the arbitral award and other confidential information
are privileged and confidential and shall not be published except [i] with the consent of the parties;
or [ii] for the limited purpose of disclosing to the court relevant documents where resort to the court
is allowed. Given that the witness statements of Ross, Holmes and Jennings, and the latter's
arbitration testimony, fall within the ambit of confidential information, they must, as a
general rule, remain confidential. Although there is no unbridled shroud of confidentiality on
information obtained or disclosed in an arbitration proceeding, the presence of the above criteria
must be apparent; otherwise, the general rule should be applied. Here in this case, only a perceived
imputation of a wrongdoing was alleged by the respondents.

In denying the said application for confidentiality/protection order, the RTC and the CA did not
consider the declarations contained in the said witness statements and arbitration testimony to be
related to the subject of arbitration and, accordingly, ruled that they could not be covered by a
confidentiality order.

The Court does not agree. Suffice it to say that the phrase "relative to the subject of mediation
or arbitration" need not be strictly confined to the discussion of the core issues in the
arbitral dispute. By definition, "relative" simply means "connected to," which means that parties in
arbitration proceedings are encouraged to discuss openly their grievances and explore the
circumstances which might have any connection in identifying the source of the conflict in the hope of
finding a better alternative to resolve the parties' dispute. An ADR proceeding is aimed at resolving
the parties' conflict without court intervention. It was not designed to be strictly technical or legally
confined at all times. By mutual agreement or consent of the parties to a controversy or dispute,
they acquiesce to submit their differences to arbitrators for an informal hearing and extra-judicial
determination and resolution. Usually, an ADR hearing is held in private and the decision of the
persons selected to comprise the tribunal will take the place of a court judgment. This avoids the
formalities, delays and expenses of an ordinary litigation. Arbitration, as envisioned by the ADR Act,
must be taken in this perspective.

Verily, it is imperative that legislative intent or sp1nt be the controlling factor, the leading star and
guiding light in the application and interpretation of a statute.22 If a statute needs construction, the
influence most dominant in that process is the intent or spirit of the act.23 A thing which is within the
intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is
within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.24 In
Evidence II.
other words, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent and legislative intent is part and
parcel of the statute. It is the controlling factor in interpreting a statute. Any interpretation that
contradicts the legislative intent is unacceptable.

In the case at bench, the supposed questionable statements surfaced when FedEx's suspended IFF
license was discussed during the arbitration hearing. In fact, when Jennings was asked by Arbitrator
Panga to expound on how the opposition of Ace and Merit could be related to the ongoing arbitration,
Jennings replied that, to his mind, it was indicative of the leverage that Air21 had over FedEx as it
was able to withhold large sums of money and siphon their joint plans from being properly
established. Whether the information disclosed in the arbitration proceeding would be given
weight by the tribunal in the resolution of their dispute is a separate matter. Likewise, the
relevance or materiality of the said statements should be best left to the arbitrators' sound
appreciation and judgment. Even granting that the weight of the said statements was not
fundamental to the issues in the arbitration process, nevertheless, they were still
connected to, and propounded by, a witness who relied upon the confidentiality of the
proceedings and expect that his responses be reflected.

Arbitration, being an ADR proceeding, was primarily designed to be a prompt, economical and
amicable forum for the resolution of disputes. It guarantees confidentiality in its processes to
encourage parties to ventilate their claims or disputes in a less formal, but spontaneous manner. It
should be emphasized that the law favors settlement of controversies out of court. Thus, a person
who participates in an arbitration proceeding is entitled to speak his or her piece without fear of
being prejudiced should the process become unsuccessful. Hence, any communication made towards
that end should be regarded as confidential and privileged.

To restate, the confidential nature of the arbitration proceeding is well-entrenched in Section 23 of

the ADR Act:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 23. Confidentiality of Arbitration Proceedings. - The arbitration proceedings, including the
records, evidence and the arbitral award, shall be considered confidential and shall not be published
except (1) with the consent of the parties, or (2) for the limited purpose of disclosing to the court of
relevant documents in cases where resort to the court is allowed herein. Provided, however, that the
court in which the action or the appeal is pending may issue a protective order to prevent or prohibit
disclosure of documents or information containing secret processes, developments, research and
other information where it is shown that the applicant shall be materially prejudiced by an authorized
disclosure thereof. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

If Lina had legal grounds to suspect that Jennings committed slanderous remarks even before the
arbitration proceeding commenced, then he must present evidence independent and apart from some
quoted portions of the arbitration documents.

It must be stressed that the very soul of an arbitration proceeding would be rendered useless if it
would be simply used as an avenue for evidence gathering or an entrapment mechanism to lure the
other unsuspecting party into conveying information that could be potentially used against him in
another forum or in court.

Ultimately, the RTC and the CA failed to consider the fact that an arbitration proceeding is essentially
a unique proceeding that is non-litigious in character where the parties are bound by a different set
of rules as clearly encapsulated under the Special ADR Rules. Inevitably, when Lina cited portions of
the said arbitration documents, he violated their covenant in the TOR to resolve their dispute through
the arbitration process and to honor the confidentiality of the said proceeding. To disregard this
commitment would impair the very essence of the ADR proceeding. By itself, this would have served
as a valid justification for the grant of the confidentiality/protection order in favor of FedEx and
Jennings.

Thus, the claimed slanderous statements by Jennings during the arbitration hearing are deemed
Evidence II.
confidential information and the veil of confidentiality over them must remain.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The January 20, 2015 Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 135835, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The Petition for the Issuance of a Confidentiality/Protective Order filed by Federal Express
Corporation and Rhicke S. Jennings is hereby GRANTED.

Evidence II.
7.) G.R. No. 21911           September 15, 1924

EL VARADERO DE MANILA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
INSULAR LUMBER COMPANY, defendant-appellee.

Ernesto Zaragoza for appellant.

Ross, Lawrence & Selph and Antonio T. Carrascoso, Jr., for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

El Varadero de Manila completed satisfactorily certain repairs on the lighter Tatlo, the property of the Insular Lumber
Company. The work was performed pursuant to no express agreement, but with the implicit understanding that the
price would be as low as, or lower than, could be secured from any other company.

The Insular Lumber Company being of the opinion that the bill as presented by El Varadero de Manila was grossly
exorbitant and a proposed compromise having failed of realization, the matter was taken to court with the result that
in the Court of First Instance of Manila, El Varadero de Manila, the plaintiff, secured judgment against the Insular
Lumber Company, the defendant, in the amount of P5,310.70, with legal interest from the presentation of the
complaint, and costs. Still dissatisfied, the plaintiff has appealed to this court and here as asked us to increase the
amount of the judgment to P12,412.62.

To arrive at as correct a judgment as is possible, it will first be necessary to set down a number of figures and
thereafter to seize upon a few salient facts as having influence.

The itemized bill presented by the plaintiff, the amount which it still claims, totals P12,412.62. At one time during the
course of the negotiations, the plaintiff was willing to accept P10,241.37. (Exhibit I.) The witnesses for the plaintiff
naturally took the view that the bill was correct. But the trial judge was of the opinion that it was excessive.

The defendant, on the other hand, says that a reasonable figure for the work would be P5,310.70. Witnesses were
offered to substantiate this contention. Their testimony so impressed the trial judge that he adopted their statements
as his own. During the course of the abortive negotiations, however, the defendant expressed a willingness to pay
the plaintiff P8,070.12. (Exhibit G.)

Now to emphasize three points which will materially assist us in rendering judgment. The first point relates to the
offer of compromise which naturally, under the general rules of evidence, must be excluded, except that as
the amounts named in the offers to accept certain sums in settlement appear to have been arrived at as a fair
estimate of value, they are relevant. (City of Springfield vs. Schmook [1878], 68 Mo., 394; Daniels vs. Town of
Woonsocket [1874], 11 R. I., 4; Teasley vs. Bradley [1900], 110 Ga., 497.) Here, there was no denial of liability and
the only question discussed was the amount to be paid which the plaintiff insisted should not be more than
P8,070.12. The second point of interest relates to the testimony of Mariano Yengko, inspector of vessels, admittedly
a disinterested witness, who in one synopsis of a fair value of the repairs, arrived at P5,134.20, but which, on cross-
examination, he raised to between seven and eight thousand pesos. And the third point is that the tacit
understanding between the parties was that the cost of the repairs should be approximately the same as what other
companies would charge. The defendant admits that El Varadero de Navotas would have done the work for about
P8,000.

Basing our findings, therefore, on the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion that the reasonable value of
the repairs performed by El Varadero de Manila on the Tatlo owned by the Insular Lumber Company, was
something less than P8,000. We fix the sum definitely at P7,700.

Judgment is modified, and in lieu of the judgment rendered in the lower court, another shall issue in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant for the recovery of P7,700, with legal interest to begin to run from the date when
this judgment shall become final and to continue until payment, without express finding as to costs in either
instance. So ordered.
Evidence II.
Evidence II.
 8.) [G.R. No. 10566. August 20, 1915. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REGINO TORRES AND PABLO

PADILLA, Defendants-Appellants.

Ledesma, Clarin, Gabaldon & Recto for appellant Torres.

P. E. del Rosario for appellant Padilla.

Attorney-General Avanceña for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. OPIUM; PRESUMPTION OF POSSESSION OF DRUG. — Where a person entertains an offer to sell

his opium, goes to the house of the vendor, examines the drug and leaves the house with three tins
of it, and where the person is not authorized to have the drug in his possession, it is presumed that
he was the owner thereof by purchase.

2. POSSESSION DEFINED. — Civil possession is the holding of a thing with the intention of acquiring
ownership. (Civil Code, art. 430.)

3. OFFER TO COMPROMISE. — An offer to compromise is not a confession of debt and is not

admissible in evidence.

DECISION

ARELLANO, C.J. :

The reason in this case has come before us on appeal by both defendants from the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu whereby they were convicted of a violation of Act No. 1761. Regino
Torres was sentenced to imprisonment for three years, Pablo Padilla to one year and one month, and
each to pay one-half of the costs. The three tins of opium, the corpus delicti, were ordered
confiscated.

On examination of the record it appears: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That the testimony of George W. Walker and Juan Samson, secret service agents of the Cebu
Customhouse who arrested the defendants, and the seizure of the corpus delicti (Exhibits A, B, and
C) were held by the trial court to be conclusive evidence against defendants.

That Walker testified that he had received information that on the night of January 20, 1914, Regino
Torres would go to the house of the widow of one Franco to get some opium; that at 7:30 that
evening they stationed themselves in Calle de Colon, where the said house stood, and a short while
afterwards saw the two defendants come out of the door of the garage on the premises; that Samson
seized Torres, and as Padilla started to run away Walker went in pursuit of him and on passing by
Samson and Torres saw two tins of opium; that three times he ordered Padilla to halt, and, as the
latter continued to run, witness fired a shot into the air, whereupon Padilla stopped, after he had
thrown one tin over a fence; that, after the arrest of both defendants, Walker and Samson set out
with lights to search for the tins and found the one thrown by Padilla inside the inclosure, and the
other two tins, about a meter from the place where Samson had been holding Torres.

That the other officer, Samson, gave nearly the same testimony. He added, however, when
Evidence II.
questioned by the defense as to whether Walker had said anything to him on his return from his
pursuit of Padilla, that Walker did say that he saw Regino Torres throw away two tins and that he
was looking for them. He was also asked by the defense whether Walker had proposed to the
defendants that they pay a fine in the form of a compromise, to which he replied that he had not, but
that, on the contrary, it was the defendants who made this offer.

That the defendant Regino Torres testified that Padilla told him that there was a large amount of
opium, and they agreed that at 6 o’clock in the evening they would go to the house above
mentioned; that Padilla went to Torres’ house at 6 o’clock in the evening and hurried him up, saying:
"Eat in a hurry, for the owner of the opium needs money" ; that when they arrived at the house of
Franco’s widow, Padilla entered the door of the place where the automobiles were kept, and five
minutes afterwards called witness to enter the garage and there Padilla showed Torres a tin of
opium, at the same time saying that it was first class and cost P60 without haggling; that witness
replied that he would first show it to some trustworthy friends to determine its class; that Padilla
agreed and they both left for this purpose, but that when they had gone about ten brazas from the
door, he was seized by Samson and saw that Padilla had run away and was being pursued by Walker.
The court asked Torres whether he had wished to investigate first and buy afterwards, to which he
replied that he did, and that if he had been convinced of the quality of the opium he would have
bought about 20 or 25 tins. "But have you so much money?" inquired the judge. The defendant
replied: "Yes, sir."
cralaw virtua1aw library

That, upon arraignment, Pablo Padilla pleaded guilty. "The defendant’s counsel," says the trial court
in his decision, "requested that his client be permitted to state the circumstances that surrounded the
case and which induced this defendant to commit the crime under prosecution." The court further
says therein: "It is preferable that counsel himself state the circumstances that, in his opinion,
attended the crime and which may be considered as extenuating." cralaw virtua1aw library

Pantaleon del Rosario, Padilla’s counsel, stated that according to the information given by his client,
the latter is a poor man who accompanied the other defendant Regino Torres principally in order
that, in case they were caught by the authorities, Torres might transfer the material possession of
the opium to counsel’s client and the latter would assume liability for such possession and suffer the
legal consequences.

That the trial court took that statement into consideration in extenuation of the penalty he imposed
upon Padilla, concluding by saying that this defendant appeared to be a poor man who, impelled by
poverty, had accompanied Torres for the purpose, as every probability indicated, of obtaining a
relatively small share in the business in which Torres was engaged; while, with respect to Torres, the
court said that he played the most important role, for he confessed to have sufficient means to
purchase opium to the amount of twenty tins at P60 a tin.

From the judgment of conviction Regino Torres bases his appeal on four assignments of error: (1) In
that the trial court concluded that two tins were taken from the appellant’s possession; (2) in holding
that the appellant had incurred the penalties provided in section 31 of Act No. 1761; (3) in holding
been engaged in the business of buying and selling opium, and in grounding the judgment of
conviction on the said confession; (4) in accepting, as evidence for the prosecution, the
compromise that it is asserted he proposed to the agent George Walker; and (5), in that the
penalty imposed upon the appellant was excessive.

Pablo Padilla bases his appeal only on this last assignment.

Errors 1, 2, and 3 will not lie. Where a person entertains an offer to sell, goes to the house where the
sale is to be effected, making haste because the vendor needs money and because he was urged to
do so by the agent who made him the offer, enters the house, examines the article, leaves the house
with three tins which contained the thing offered for sale and which is a prohibited article by a reason
of its being opium, and if the purchaser is not a person authorized to have it in his possession, it can
Evidence II.
not be held that the purchaser took the three tins with him to sample their contents; such a purpose
must be proven and unless it is there can be no other inference than that he carried away with him
the thing purchased and that its acquisition was a consummated fact, for the presumption is that the
acts took place in the ordinary course of things and the general routine of dealings between men,
and it cannot be doubted that the person who had the control over the opium at the moment it was
seized, whoever it was that carried it, could be no other than the owner of the money which the
vendor so urgently desired to acquire on that day in exchange for the opium. Civil possession is the
holding of a thing by a person with the intention of acquiring ownership thereof (Civ. Code, art. 430).
It was Torres who had the intention of having the opium as belonging to him, and as he intended, so
he had it, and it was afterwards taken from him, as being a thing that he could not hold, possess nor
lawfully have as his own. Padilla was not the owner of the money which the person who sold the
opium needed. Padilla was but an agent who made the offer to Torres. Padilla had no intention of
holding, possessing and having as his own the opium which, on the part of another, he had offered to
Torres. The possession or material holding in this case gives way to the civil possession which,
according to Torres’ confession, was the reason that took him to the house of Franco’s widow, thus
putting into effect the intention to possess which he had a priori entertained as the cause of his
presence in the place of the sale. After all, the seizure of the two tins at a place one meter away from
the spot where Torres was arrested by Samson, and the seizure of one tin in the possession of
Padilla, who had thrown it into an inclosure, are facts held by the trial court to have been proven,
and this finding, which does not violate any law and which we do not find to be erroneous, should not
be changed in this review of the evidence. We confirm the finding and hold that it is in accord with
the merits of the case.

With regard to the fourth cause of action, the facts are as follows: The witness, Walker,
testified, among other things, that Regino Torres endeavored to compromise the case and
that he (Walker) was willing to accept the compromise through the payment of P1,500,
but subject to the approval of his superiors. The defense asked that this testimony be
stricken out, alleging that, in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure, the compromise
in such cases must be made in writing. "When made in civil cases, it is proper; but in criminal
causes, it is not," the court said, and accordingly overruled the objection. The defense excepted.

We have already seen above what Samson’s testimony was concerning this point and how thereby he
corroborated that given by Walker.

An offer to compromise is not a confession of debt and is not admissible in evidence (Code
of Civ. Proc., sec. 346). In a criminal cause for theft (U. S. v. Maqui, 27 Phil. Rep., 97) this court
said that the weight both of authority and reason sustains the rule which admits evidence
of offers to compromise, in criminal cases, but permits the accused to show that such
offers were not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the
inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by
the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt and an
attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.

It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the
matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, in so far as public vengeance and
private interests are concerned, no compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the penal
action, however it may be with respect to the civil liability. But section 25 of Act No. 1761, under
which this cause was prosecuted, expressly authorizes the Collector of Internal Revenue to
compromise a case after action has been begun, "instead of commencing or prosecuting suit
thereon." The words in quotation marks are textual. A compromise necessarily implies two elements,
one of which is the offer and the other the acceptance, in order that the penal action may be
extinguished and there remain only the civil liability to deal with. Of course ordinarily it is the
defendant who makes the offer, — a lawful act sanctioned by law in this class of prosecutions, — and
because it is made, no presumption of guilt must be raised against the maker, as occurs in other
criminal causes for public crimes in which the offer is not lawful because it is a thing prohibited by
Evidence II.
law. The offer may have been prompted simply to avoid the annoyance of a prosecution, as
sometimes happens in a civil case where a person involved in the litigation is perhaps entirely in the
right but prefers to lose a sum of money rather than commence and prosecute an action. This case
is, therefore, on all fours with that of section 346 of the Code of Civil Procedure, above cited. At all
events, for the conviction of the defendants it is not necessary to consider and weigh this evidence; it
could only be considered as cumulative, and it was not taken into account by the trial court.

With regard to the 5th assignment of error which alleges that the penalty was excessive, it must be
remembered that the trial court exercised his discretion in fixing the penalty within the limits
established by law and that, in principle, what is authorized by law cannot be held to be arbitrary.
But the penalty imposed by the trial court in his discretion will not necessarily have to stand for that
reason. If such a principle governed, appeals would be useless. This Supreme Court also exercises its
discretion, and, in a higher degree, by its right of review in criminal causes brought up on appeal or
consultation and of high inspection over the administration of justice, it has the power to modify
within the limits of the penalty provided by law, in order to maintain uniformity in its application. If
judicial decisions vary in the different provinces of the Archipelago, even in identical or at least
analogous cases, it is principally due to the fact that the judges, acquainted with the extent of crime
in their respective jurisdictions, are justified, in order to suppress crime, in applying the law more
strictly and severely in some provinces than in others in accordance with the greater or lesser
propensity to disobey the laws and the peculiar circumstances that prevail in each locality. But within
the same province such variation would not be justifiable, as it would transgress the law which fits
the penalty to the crime. In the Province of Cebu the court sentenced Lao Lock Hing, for the
possession of 70 tins of opium, to five years’ imprisonment and a fine of P10,000, or, in case of
insolvency, to subsidiary imprisonment; but this Supreme Court reduced the penalty to two years’
imprisonment and a fine of P3,000 (14 Phil. Rep., 86 1). In the same Province of Cebu, Miguel Villano
was charged with having bought and sold 190 tins of opium — although one of the charges was for
100 tins only, valued at P3,000, because the 190 tins were received on different dates — and was
sentenced on the charge for the 100 tins, to one year and two months’ imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P2,500, a judgment which was affirmed by this Supreme Court (18 Phil. Rep., 359 2). In
another cause also tried in Cebu against one Look Chaw for the sale of 30 tins of opium, the penalty
imposed was one year’s imprisonment and a fine of P2,000; this also was affirmed by this Supreme
Court (19 Phil. Rep., 343 3).

The foregoing sentences are in notable contrast to the case at bar in which Regino Torres is
sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for the possession of two tins of opium, valued at scarcely
P120, and Pablo Padilla to one year and one month for the possession of one tin of the same drug,
worth probably P60.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the understanding that the imprisonment to be
imposed upon Regino Torres shall be that of nine months, and that upon Pablo Padilla, six months,
each of them to pay the costs of this instance in equal shares. So ordered.

Evidence II.
9.) G.R. Nos. 115908-09 December 6, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DANNY GODOY, * accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:

Often glossed over in the emotional arguments against capital punishment is the amplitude of legal protection
accorded to the offender. Ignored by the polemicist are the safeguards designed to minimally reduce, if not
altogether eliminate, the grain of human fault. Indeed, there is no critique on the plethora of rights enjoyed by the
accused regardless of how ruthlessly he committed the crime. Any margin of judicial error is further addressed by
the grace of executive clemency. But, even before that, all convictions imposing the penalty of death are
automatically reviewed by this Court. The cases at bar, involving two death sentences, apostrophize for the
condemned the role of this ultimate judicial intervention.

Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two separate informations filed before the Regional Trial Court, for
Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, with rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention, respectively
punished under Articles 335 and 267 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

In Criminal Case No. 11640 for Rape:

That on or about the evening of the 21st day of January, 1994, at Barangay Pulot Center,
Municipality of Brooke's Point, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused by means of force, threat and intimidation, by using a knife and
by means of deceit, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with one Mia Taha to her damage and prejudice. 1

In Criminal Case No. 11641 for Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention:

That on or about the 22nd day of January, 1994, at Barangay Ipilan, Municipality of Brooke's Point,
Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, a private individual, and being a teacher of the victim, Mia Taha, and by means of deceit
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap or detained (sic) said Mia Taha, a girl of
17 years old (sic), for a period of five (5) days thus thereby depriving said Mia Taha of her liberty
against her will and consent and without legal justification, to the damage and prejudice of said Mia
Taha. 2

During the arraignment on both indictments, appellant pleaded not guilty to said charges and, after the pre-trial was
terminated, a joint trial of the two cases was conducted by the trial court.
3

According to complainant Mia Taha, at around 7:00 P.M. of January 21, 1994, she went to the boarding house of
her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, at Pulot Center, Brooke's Point which is near the Palawan National School (PNS),
Pulot Branch, where she was studying. When she saw that the house was dark, she decided to pass through the
kitchen door at the back because she knew that there was nobody inside. As soon as she opened the door,
somebody suddenly grabbed her, poked a knife on her neck, dragged her by the hand and told her not to shout.
She was then forced to lie down on the floor. Although it was dark, complainant was able to recognize her assailant,
by the light coming from the moon and through his voice, as accused-appellant Danny Godoy who was her Physics
teacher at PNS.

When she was already on the floor, appellant removed her panty with one hand while holding the knife with the
other hand, opened the zipper of his pants, and then inserted his private organ inside her private parts against her
will. She felt pain because it was her first experience and she cried. Throughout her ordeal, she could not utter a
Evidence II.
word. She was very frightened because a knife was continually pointed at her. She also could not fight back nor
plead with appellant not to rape her because he was her teacher and she was afraid of him. She was threatened not
to report the incident to anyone or else she and her family would be killed.

Thereafter, while she was putting on her panty, she noticed that her skirt was stained with blood. Appellant walked
with her to the gate of the house and she then proceeded alone to the boarding house where she lived. She did not
see where appellant went after she left him at the gate. When she arrived at her boarding house, she saw her
landlady but she did not mention anything about the incident.

The following morning, January 22, 1994, complainant went home to her parents' house at Ipilan, Brooke's Point.
She likewise did not tell her parents about the incident for fear that appellant might make good his threat. At around
3:00 P.M. of that same day, appellant arrived at the house of her parents and asked permission from the latter if
complainant could accompany him to solicit funds because she was a candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot." When her
parents agreed, she was constrained to go with appellant because she did not want her parents to get into trouble.

Appellant and complainant then left the house and they walked in silence, with Mia following behind appellant,
towards the highway where appellant hailed a passenger jeep which was empty except for the driver and the
conductor. She was forced to ride the jeep because appellant threatened to kill her if she would not board the
vehicle. The jeep proceeded to the Sunset Garden at the poblacion, Brooke's Point where they alighted.

At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought her to a room where they staye d for three days. During the
entire duration of their stay at the Sunset Garden, complainant was not allowed to leave the room which was always
kept locked. She was continuously guarded and constantly raped by appellant. She was, however, never drunk or
unconscious. Nonetheless, she was forced to have sex with appellant because the latter was always carrying a knife
with him.

In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant brought her to the house of his friend at Edward's Subdivision
where she was raped by him three times. She was likewise detained and locked inside the room and tightly guarded
by appellant. After two days, or on January 27, 1994, they left the place because appellant came to know that
complainant had been reported and indicated as a missing person in the police blotter. They went to see a certain
Naem ** from whom appellant sought help. On that same day, she was released but only after her parents agreed to
settle the case with appellant.

Immediately thereafter, Mia's parents brought her to the District Hospital at Brooke's Point where she was examined
by Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia who made the following medical findings:

GENERAL: Well developed, nourished, cooperative, walking, conscious, coherent Filipina.

BREAST: Slightly globular with brown colored areola and nipple.

EXTERNAL EXAM.: Numerous pubic hair, fairly developed labia majora and minora, hymenal
opening stellate in shape, presence of laceration superficial, longitudinal at the fossa navicularis,
approximately 1/2 cm. length.

INTERNAL EXAM.: Hymenal opening, stellate in shape, laceration noted, hymenal opening admits 2
fingers with slight resistance, prominent vaginal rugae, cervix closed.

CONCLUSION: Hymenal opening admits easily 2 fingers with slight resistance, presence of
laceration, longitudinal at the fossa navicularis approximately 1/2 cm. length. Hymenal opening can
admit an average size penis in erection with laceration. 4

Dr. Divinagracia further testified that the hymenal opening was in stellate shape and that there was a laceration,
which shows that complainant had participated in sexual intercourse. On the basis of the inflicted laceration which
was downward at 6 o'clock position, he could not say that there was force applied because there were no scratches
or bruises, but only a week-old laceration. He also examined the patient bodily but found no sign of bruises or
injuries. The patient told him that she was raped.
Evidence II.
During the cross-examination, complainant denied that she wrote the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2"; that she
never loved appellant but, on the contrary, she hated him because of what he did to her; and that she did not notice
if there were people near the boarding house of her cousin. She narrated that when appellant started to remove her
panty, she was already lying down, and that even as appellant was doing this she could not shout because she was
afraid. She could not remember with which hand appellant held the knife. She was completely silent from the time
she was made to lie down, while her panty was being removed, and even until appellant was able to rape her.

When appellant went to their house the following day, she did not know if he was armed but there was no threat
made on her or her parents. On the contrary, appellant even courteously asked permission from them in her behalf
and so they left the house with appellant walking ahead of her. When she was brought to the Sunset Garden, she
could not refuse because she was afraid. However, she admitted that at that time, appellant was not pointing a knife
at her. She only saw the cashier of the Sunset Garden but she did not notice if there were other people inside. She
likewise did not ask the appellant why he brought her there.

Complainant described the lock in their room as an ordinary doorknob, similar to that on the door of the courtroom
which, even if locked, could still be opened from the inside, and she added that there was a sliding lock inside the
room. According to her, they stayed at Sunset Garden for three days and three nights but she never noticed if
appellant ever slept because everytime she woke up, appellant was always beside her. She never saw him close his
eyes.

Helen Taha, the mother of complainant, testified that when the latter arrived at their house in the morning of January
22, 1994, she noticed that Mia appeared weak and her eyes were swollen. When she asked her daughter if there
was anything wrong, the latter merely kept silent. That afternoon, she allowed Mia to go with appellant because she
knew he was her teacher. However, when Mia and appellant failed to come home at the expected time, she and her
husband, Adjeril, went to look for them at Ipilan. When they could not find them there, she went to the house of
appellant because she was already suspecting that something was wrong, but appellant's wife told her that he did
not come home.

Early the next morning, she and her husband went to the Philippine National Police (PNP) station at Pulot, Brooke's
Point and had the incident recorded in the police blotter. The following day, they went to the office of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) at Puerto Princess City, then to the police station near the NBI, and finally to the radio
station airing the Radyo ng Bayan program where she made an appeal to appellant to return her daughter. When
she returned home, a certain Naem was waiting there and he informed her that Mia was at Brooke's Point.
He further conveyed appellant's willingness to become a Muslim so he could marry Mia and thus settle the
case. Helen Taha readily acceded because she wanted to see her daughter.

In the morning of January 27, 1994, she went to the house of Naem who sent somebody to fetch complainant. She
testified that when Mia arrived, she was crying as she reported that she was raped by appellant, and that the latter
threatened to kill her if she did not return within an hour. Because of this, she immediately brought Mia to the
hospital where the latter was examined and then they proceeded to the municipal hall to file a complaint for rape
and kidnapping. Both Mia and Helen Taha executed separate sworn statements before the PNP at Brooke's Point.

Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their house and offered P50,000.00 for the settlement of the
case. On their part, her husband insisted that they just settle, hence all three of them, Adjeril, Helen and Mia
Taha, went to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor where they met with the mother of appellant who gave
them P30,000.00. Adjeril and Helen Taha subsequently executed an affidavit of desistance in Criminal Case
No. 7687 for kidnapping pending in the prosecutor's office, which was sworn to before Prosecutor II Chito S.
Meregillano. Helen Taha testified that she agreed to the settlement because that was what her husband
wanted. Mia Taha was dropped from the school and was not allowed to graduate. Her father died two months later,
supposedly because of what happened.

The defense presented a different version of what actually transpired.

According to appellant, he first met Mia Taha sometime in August, 1993 at the Palawan National School (PNS).
Although he did not court her, he fell in love with her because she often told him "Sir, I love you." What started as a
joke later developed into a serious relationship which was kept a secret from everybody else. It was on December
20, 1993 when they first had sexual intercourse as lovers. Appellant was then assigned at the Narra Pilot
Evidence II.
Elementary School at the poblacion because he was the coach of the Palawan delegation for chess. At around 5:00
P.M. of that day, complainant arrived at his quarters allegedly because she missed him, and she then decided to
spend the night there with him.

Exactly a month thereafter, specifically in the evening of January 20, 1994, Erna Baradero, a teacher at the PNS,
was looking inside the school building for her husband, who was a security guard of PNS, when she heard voices
apparently coming from the Orchids Room. She went closer to listen and she heard a girl's voice saying "Mahal na
mahal kita, Sir, iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo." Upon hearing this, she immediately opened the door
and was startled to see Mia Taha and Danny Godoy holding hands. She asked them what they were doing there at
such an unholy hour but the two, who were obviously caught by surprise, could not answer. She then hurriedly
closed the door and left. According to this witness, complainant admitted to her that she was having an affair with
appellant. Desirous that such illicit relationship must be stopped, Erna Baradero informed appellant's wife about it
when the latter arrived from Manila around the first week of February, 1994.

Upon the request of appellant's wife, Erna Baradero executed an affidavit in connection with the present case, but
the same was not filed then because of the affidavit of desistance which was executed and submitted by the parents
of complainant. In her sworn statement, later marked in evidence as Exhibit "7", Erna Baradero alleged that on
January 21, 1994, she confronted Mia Taha about the latter's indiscretion and reminded her that appellant is a
married man, but complainant retorted, "Ano ang pakialam mo," adding that she loves appellant very much.

Appellant testified that on January 21, 1994, at around 7:00 P.M., Mia Taha went to his office asking for help with
the monologue that she would be presenting for the Miss PNS contest. He agreed to meet her at the house of her
cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan. However, when he reached the place, the house was dark and he saw Mia waiting for
him outside. Accordingly, they just sat on a bench near the road where there was a lighted electric post and they
talked about the matter she had earlier asked him about. They stayed there for fifteen minutes, after which
complainant returned to her boarding house just across the street while appellant headed for home some fifteen
meters away.

It appears that while complainant was then waiting for appellant, Filomena Pielago, a former teacher of Mia at PNS
and who was then on her way to a nearby store, saw her sitting on a bench and asked what she was doing there at
such a late hour. Complainant merely replied that she was waiting for somebody. Filomena proceeded to the store
and, along the way, she saw Inday Zapanta watering the plants outside the porch of her house. When Filomena
Pielago returned, she saw complainant talking with appellant and she noticed that they were quite intimate because
they were holding hands. This made her suspect that the two could be having a relationship. She, therefore, told
appellant that his wife had finished her aerobics class and was already waiting for him. She also advised Mia to go
home.

Prior to this incident, Filomena Pielago already used to see them seated on the same bench. Filomena further
testified that she had tried to talk appellant out of the relationship because his wife had a heart ailment. She also
warned Mia Taha, but to no avail. She had likewise told complainant's grandmother about her activities. At the trial,
she identified the handwriting of complainant appearing on the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2", claiming that
she is familiar with the same because Mia was her former student. On cross-examination, Filomena clarified that
when she saw the couple on the night of January 21, 1994, the two were talking naturally, she did not see Mia
crying, nor did it appear as if appellant was pleading with her.

In the afternoon of the following day, January 22, 1994, appellant met Mia's mother on the road near their house
and she invited him to come up and eat "buko," which invitation he accepted. Thirty minutes thereafter, complainant
told him to ask permission from her mother for them to go and solicit funds at the poblacion, and he did so. Before
they left, he noticed that Mia was carrying a plastic bag and when he asked her about it, she said that it contained
her things which she was bringing to her cousin's house. Appellant and Mia went to the poblacion where they
solicited funds until 6:30 P.M. and then had snacks at the Vic Tan Store.

Thereafter, complainant told appellant that it was already late and there was no more available transportation, so
she suggested that they just stay at Sunset Garden. Convinced that there was nothing wrong in that because they
already had intimate relations, aside from the fact that Mia had repeatedly told him she would commit suicide should
he leave her, appellant was prevailed upon to stay at the hotel. Parenthetically, it was complainant who arranged
their registration and subsequently paid P400.00 for their bill from the funds they had solicited. That evening,
Evidence II.
however, appellant told complainant at around 9:00 P.M. that he was going out to see a certain Bert Dalojo at the
latter's residence. In truth, he borrowed a motorcycle from Fernando Rubio and went home to Pulot. He did not bring
complainant along because she had refused to go home.

The following morning, January 23, 1994, appellant went to the house of complainant's parents and informed them
that Mia spent the night at the Sunset Garden. Mia's parents said that they would just fetch her there, so he went
back to Sunset Garden and waited for them outside the hotel until 5:00 P.M. When they did not arrive, he decided to
go with one Isagani Virey, whom he saw while waiting near the road, and they had a drinking session with Virey's
friends. Thereafter, Virey accompanied him back to Sunset Garden where they proceeded to Mia's room. Since the
room was locked from the inside, Virey had to knock on the door until it was opened by her.

Once inside, he talked to complainant and asked her what they were doing, but she merely answered that what she
was doing was of her own free will and that at that moment her father was not supposed to know about it for,
otherwise, he would kill her. What complainant did not know, however, was that appellant had already reported the
matter to her parents, although he opted not to tell her because he did not want to add to her apprehensions.
Isagani Virey further testified that when he saw appellant and complainant on January 23 and 24, 1994, the couple
looked very happy.

Appellant denied that they had sexual intercourse during their entire stay at Sunset Garden, that is, from January 22
to 24, 1994, because he did not have any idea as to what she really wanted to prove to him. Appellant knew that
what they were doing was wrong but he allegedly could not avoid Mia because of her threat that she would commit
suicide if he left her. Thus, according to appellant, on January 24, 1994 he asked Isagani Virey to accompany him to
the house of Romy Vallan, a policeman, to report the matter.

Additionally, Virey testified that appellant and Mia went to see him at his aunt's house to ask for assistance in
procuring transportation because, according to appellant, the relatives of Mia were already looking for them and so
they intend to go to Puerto Princesa City. Virey accompanied them to the house of Romy Vallan, whose wife was a
co-teacher of appellant's wife, but the latter refused to help because of the complicated situation appellant was in.

Nevertheless, Vallan verified from the police station whether a complaint had been filed against appellant and after
finding out that there was none, he told appellant to just consult a certain Naem who is an "imam." Appellant was
able to talk to Naem at Vallan's house that same day and bared everything about him and Mia. Naem suggested
that appellant marry complainant in Muslim rites but appellant refused because he was already married. It was
eventually agreed that Naem would just mediate in behalf of appellant and make arrangements for a settlement with
Mia's parents. Later that day, Naem went to see the parents of complainant at the latter's house.

The following day, January 25, 1994, allegedly because complainant could no longer afford to pay their hotel bills,
the couple were constrained to transfer to the house of appellant's friend, Fernando Rubio, at Edward's Subdivision
where they stayed for two days. They just walked along the national highway from Sunset Garden to Edward's
Subdivision which was only five hundred to seven hundred meters away. The owner of the house, Fernando Rubio,
as well as his brother Benedicto Rubio, testified that the couple were very happy, they were intimate and sweet to
each other, they always ate together, and it was very obvious that they were having a relationship.

In fact, Fernando Rubio recalled that complainant even called appellant "Papa." While they were there, she would
buy food at the market, help in the cooking, wash clothes, and sometimes watch television. When Fernando Rubio
once asked her why she chose to go with appellant despite the fact the he was a married man, Mia told him that she
really loved appellant. She never told him, and Fernando Rubio never had the slightest suspicion, that she was
supposed to have been kidnapped as it was later claimed. He also testified that several police officers lived within
their neighborhood and if complainant had really been kidnapped and detained, she could have easily reported that
fact to them. Mia was free to come and go as she pleased, and the room where they stayed was never locked
because the lock had been destroyed.

On cross-examination, Fernando Rubio declared that appellant was merely an acquaintance of his; that it was
Naem who went to the lodging house to arrange for Mia to go home; that complainant's mother never went to his
house; and that it was Chief of Police Eliseo Crespo who fetched appellant from the lodging house and brought him
to the municipal hall.

Evidence II.
Shortly before noon of January 26, 1994, Naem again met with appellant at Edward's Subdivision and informed him
that complainant's parents were willing to talk to him at Naem's house the next day. The following morning, or on
January 27, 1994, appellant was not able to talk to complainant's parents because they merely sent a child to fetch
Mia at Edward's Subdivision and to tell her that her mother, who was at Naem's house, wanted to see her. Appellant
permitted complainant to go but he told her that within one hour he was be going to the police station at the
municipal hall so that they could settle everything there.

After an hour, while appellant was already on his way out of Edward's Subdivision, he was met by Chief of Police
Eliseo Crespo who invited him to the police station. Appellant waited at the police station the whole afternoon but
when complainant, her parents and relatives arrived at around 5:00 P.M., he was not given the chance to talk to any
one of them. That afternoon of January 27, 1994, appellant was no longer allowed to leave and he was detained at
the police station after Mia and her parents lodged a complaint for rape and kidnapping against him.

During his detention, Mia's cousin, Lorna Casantosan, delivered to appellant on different occasions two letters from
complainant dated February 27, 1994 and March 1, 1994, respectively. As Mia's teacher, appellant is familiar with
and was, therefore, able to identify the handwriting in said letters as that of Mia Taha. After a time, he came to know,
through his mother, that an affidavit of desistance was reportedly executed by complainants. However, he claims
that he never knew and it was never mentioned to him, not until the day he testified in court, that his mother paid
P30,000.00 to Mia's father because, although he did not dissuade them, neither did he request his mother to talk to
complainants in order to settle the case.

Under cross-examination, appellant denied that he poked a knife at and raped Mia Taha on January 21, 1994.
However, he admitted that he had sex with Mia at the Sunset Garden but that was already on January 24, 1994.
While they were at Edward's Subdivision, they never had sexual relations. Appellant was told, when complainant
visited him in jail, that her father would kill her if she refused to testify against him, although by the time she testified
in court, her father had already died.

Appellant further testified that complainant has had several illicit relations in the boarding house of her cousin,
Merlylyn Casantosan, which was a well-known fact in Pulot. However, he decided to have a relationship with her
because he wanted to change her and that was what they had agreed upon. Appellant denied that, during the time
when they were staying together, Mia had allegedly asked permission to leave several times but that he refused. On
the contrary, he claimed that on January 27, 1994 when she told him that her parents wanted to see her, he readily
gave her permission to go.

He also identified the clothes that Mia brought with her when they left her parents' house on January 22, 1994, but
which she left behind at the Rubios' lodging house after she failed to return on January 27, 1994. The bag of clothes
was brought to him at the provincial jail by Benedicto Rubio.

Appellant likewise declared that he had been detained at the provincial jail since January 27, 1994 but the warrant
for his arrest was issued only on January 28, 1994; and that he did not submit a counter-affidavit because according
to his former counsel, Atty. Paredes, it was no longer necessary since the complainants had already executed an
affidavit of desistance. He admits having signed a "Waiver of Right to Preliminary Investigation" in connection with
these cases.

On rebuttal, Lorna Casantosan, the cousin of Mia Taha, denied that she delivered any letter to appellant when the
latter was still detained at the provincial jail. She admitted, on cross-examination, that she was requested by Mia
Taha to testify for her, although she clarified that she does not have any quarrel or misunderstanding with appellant.

Mia Taha was again presented on rebuttal and she denied the testimony of Erna Baradero regarding the incident at
the Orchids Room because, according to her, the truth was that she was at the boarding house of Toto Zapanta on
that date and time. She likewise negated the claim that Erna Baradero confronted her on January 21, 1994 about
her alleged relationship with appellant contending that she did not see her former teacher on that day. Similarly, she
disclaimed having seen and talked to Filemona Pielago on the night of January 21, 1994. She vehemently
disavowed that she and appellant were lovers, much less with intimate relations, since there never was a time that
they became sweethearts.

Evidence II.
She sought to rebut, likewise through bare denials, the following testimonies of the defense witnesses: that she told
appellant "iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo;" that she answered "wala kang pakialam" when Erna
Baradero confronted her about her relationship with appellant; that she was the one who registered them at Sunset
Garden and paid for their bill; that appellant left her at Sunset Garden to go to Ipil on January 22, 1994; that Isagani
Virey came to their room and stayed there for five minutes, because the only other person who went there was the
room boy who served their food; that they went to the house of Virey's aunt requesting help for transportation; and
that she was free to roam around or to go out of the lodging house at Edward's Subdivision.

Mia Taha also rejected as false the testimony of appellant that she went to see him at Narra, Palawan to have sex
with him and claims that the last time she went to Narra was when she was still in Grade VI; that she ever told him "I
love you, sabik no sabik ako sa iyo" when she allegedly went to Narra; that she wrote to him, since the letters
marked as Exhibits "1" and "2" are not hers; that she threatened to commit suicide if appellant would leave her since
she never brought a blade with her; and that at Sunset Garden and at Edward's Subdivison, she was not being
guarded by appellant.

However, on cross-examination, complainant identified her signature on her test paper marked as Exhibit "4" and
admitted that the signature thereon is exactly the same as that appearing on Exhibits "1" and "2". Then,
contradicting her previous disclaimers, she also admitted that the handwriting on Exhibits "1" and "2" all belong to
her.

On sur-rebuttal, Armando Pasion, a provincial guard of the Provincial Jail, Palawan who volunteered to testify in
these cases, identified Lorna Casantosan as the person who visited appellant in jail on February 27, 1994 at around
4:00 P.M. Since he was on duty at that time, he asked her what she wanted and she said she would just visit
appellant. Pasion then called appellant and told him he had a visitor. Lorna Casantosan and appellant talked at the
visiting area which is around ten meters away from his post, and then he saw her hand over to appellant a letter
which the latter immediately read. This witness declared that appellant never requested him to testify.

Another sur-rebuttal witness, Desmond Selga, a jeepney driver, testified that in the afternoon of January 22, 1994,
he was plying his regular route in going to Brooke's Point and, when he passed by Ipilan, he picked up appellant
and Mia Taha. At that time, there were already several passengers inside his jeepney. The two got off at the
poblacion market. He denied that he brought them to the Sunset Garden.

On May 20, 1994, the court a quo rendered judgment  finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
5

crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and sentencing him to the maximum penalty of death in
both cases.  By reason of the nature of the penalty imposed, these cases were elevated to this Court on automatic
6

review.

The records show that, on the basis of the complaints for rape  and kidnapping with serious illegal detention  filed by
7 8

Mia Taha and Helen Taha, respectively, the Municipal Trial Court of Brooke's Point issued a resolution  on February
9

4, 1994 finding the existence of a prima facie case against appellant. On February 10, 1994, the spouses Adjeril
Taha and Helen Taha executed an affidavit of desistance withdrawing the charge of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention.  However, pursuant to a joint resolution  issued on March 11, 1994 by Prosecutor II Reynaldo R. Guayco
10 11

of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, two separate informations for rape and for kidnapping with serious illegal
detention were nevertheless filed against appellant Danny Godoy with no bail recommended in both charges.

Appellant is now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of the court below, on the following assignment of
errors:

I. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant (of) the crime of rape despite the fact that
the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

II. The trial court erred by failing to adhere to the doctrine/principle in reviewing the evidence
adduced in a prosecution for the crime of rape as cited in its decision reiterating the case of People
vs. Calixto (193 SCRA 303).

Evidence II.
 III. The trial court erred in concluding that the accused-appellant had consummated the crime of rape
against private complainant.

IV. The trial court erred by its failure to give any credence to Exhibits "1" and "2" as evidence of the
defense.

V. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of kidnapping with serious
illegal detention as the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

VI. The trial court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
and completely ignoring the testimonies of the defense witnesses.

VII. The trial court erred in concluding that there was implied admission of guilt on the part of the
accused-appellant in view of the offer to compromise.

VIII. The trial court erred in ordering that the complainant be indemnified in the sum of one hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) for each of the alleged crimes committed.

IX. The trial court gravely erred by imposing the death penalty for each of the crimes charged on the
accused-appellant despite the fact that the crimes were allegedly committed prior to the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 7659. 12

A. The Rape Case

A rape charge is a serious matter with pernicious consequences. It exposes both the accused and the accuser to
humiliation, fear and anxieties, not to mention the stigma of shame that both have to bear for the rest of their
lives.  By the very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the credibility of the
13

complainant's testimony because of the fact that usually only the participants can testify as to its occurrence.   This
14

notwithstanding, the basic rule remains that in all criminal prosecutions without regard to the nature of the defense
which the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any material element, and the prosecution
is then unable to overcome this evidence, the prosecution has failed to carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted. 15

The rationale for the rule is that, confronted by the full panoply of State authority, the accused is accorded the
presumption of innocence to lighten and even reverse the heavy odds against him. Mere accusation is not enough
to convict him, and neither is the weakness of his defense. The evidence for the prosecution must be strong per se,
strong enough to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.  In other words, the accused may be
16

convicted on the basis of the lone uncorroborated testimony of the offended woman, provided such testimony is
clear, positive, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.

There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate court in reviewing the evidence presented in a
prosecution for the crime of rape. These are: (1) while rape is a most detestable crime, and ought to be severely and
impartially punished, it must be borne in mind that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but
harder to be defended by the party accused, though innocent;  (2) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of
17

rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution;  and (3) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be
18

allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 19

In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate and ineluctably convince this Court that
there was no rape committed on the alleged date and place, and that the charge of rape was the contrivance of an
afterthought, rather than a truthful plaint for redress of an actual wrong.

I. Two principal facts indispensably to be proven beyond reasonable doubt for conviction of the crime of rape under
paragraph (1), Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code are, first, that the accused had carnal knowledge of the
complainant; and, second, that the same was accomplished through force or intimidation.
Evidence II.
1. The prosecution has palpably failed to prove beyond peradventure of doubt that appellant had sexual congress
with complainant against her will. Complainant avers that on the night of January 21, 1994, she was sexually
assaulted by appellant in the boarding house of her cousin, Merlelyn Casantosan. Appellant, on the other hand,
denied such a serious imputation and contends that on said date and time, he merely talked with complainant
outside that house. We find appellant's version more credible and sustained by the evidence presented and of
record.

According to complainant, when she entered the kitchen of the boarding house, appellant was already inside
apparently waiting for her. If so, it is quite perplexing how appellant could have known that she was going there on
that particular day and at that time, considering that she does not even live there, unless of course it was appellant's
intention to satisfy his lustful desires on anybody who happened to come along. But then this would be stretching
the imagination too far, aside from the fact that such a generic intent with an indeterminate victim was never
established nor even intimated by the prosecution.

Moreover, any accord of credit to the complainant's story is precluded by the implausibility that plagues it as regards
the setting of the supposed sexual assault.  It will be noted that the place where the alleged crime was committed is
20

not an ordinary residence but a boarding house where several persons live and where people are expected to come
and go. The prosecution did not even bother to elucidate on whether it was the semestral break or that the boarding
house had remained closed for some time, in order that it could be safely assumed that nobody was expected to
arrive at any given time.

Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on that fateful day, he went to the boarding house upon the invitation of
complainant because the latter requested him to help her with her monologue for the Miss PNS contest. However,
they were not able to go inside the house because it was locked and there was no light, so they just sat on a bench
outside the house and talked. This testimony of appellant was substantially corroborated by defense witness
Filomena Pielago. She affirmed that in the evening of January 21, 1994, she saw both appellant and complainant
seated on a bench outside the boarding house, and that she even advised them to go home because it was already
late and appellant's wife, who was the head teacher of witness Pielago, was waiting for him at the school building.
On rebuttal, complainant could only deny that she saw Pielago that night. Doctrinally, where the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to support a conviction.
21

It was further alleged by complainant that after her alleged ravishment, she put on her panty and then appellant
openly accompanied her all the way to the gate of the house where they eventually parted ways. This is
inconceivable. It is not the natural tendency of a man to remain for long by the side of the woman he had
raped,  and in public in a highly populated area at that. Given the stealth that accompanies it and the anxiety to end
22

further exposure at the scene, the logical post-incident impulse of the felon is to distance himself from his victim as
far and as soon as practicable, to avoid discovery and apprehension. It is to be expected that one who is guilty of a
crime would want to dissociate himself from the person of his victim, the scene of the crime, and from all other
things and circumstances related to the offense which could possibly implicate him or give rise to even the slightest
suspicion as to his guilt. Verily, the guilty flee where no man pursueth.

It is of common knowledge that facts which prove or tend to prove that the accused was at the scene of the crime
are admissible as relevant, on the theory that such presence can be appreciated as a circumstance tending to
identify the appellant.  Consequently, it is not in accord with human experience for appellant to have let himself be
23

seen with the complainant immediately after he had allegedly raped her.  It thus behooves this Court to reject the
24

notion that appellant would be so foolhardy as to accompany complainant up to the gate of the house, considering
its strategic location vis-a-vis complainant's boarding house which is just across the street,  and the PNS
25

schoolbuilding which is only around thirty meters away. 26

Complainant mentioned in her narration that right after the incident she went directly to her boarding house where
she saw her landlady. Yet, the landlady was never presented as a witness to corroborate the story of complainant,
despite the fact that the former was the very first person she came in contact with from the time appellant allegedly
left her at the gate of the Casantosan boarding house after her alleged traumatic ordeal. Even though they
supposedly did not talk, the landlady could at least have testified on complainant's physical appearance and to

Evidence II.
attest to the theorized fact that indeed she saw complainant on said date and hour, possibly with dishevelled hair,
bloody skirt and all.

We are, therefore, justifiedly inclined to believe appellant's version that it was Mia Taha who invited him to the
boarding house to help her with the monologue she was preparing for the school contest. This is even consonant
with her testimony that appellant fetched her the following day in order to solicit funds for her candidacy in that same
school affair.

In contrast, complainant's professed reason for going to the boarding house is vague and tenuous. At first, she
asserted that she was at the boarding house talking with a friend and then, later, she said it was her cousin.
Subsequently, she again wavered and said that she was not able to talk to her cousin. Furthermore, she initially
stated that on January 21, 1994 at around 7:00 P.M., she was at the boarding house conversing with her cousin.
Then in the course of her narration, she gave another version and said that when she reached the boarding house it
was dark and there was nobody inside.

The apparent ease with which she changed or adjusted her answers in order to cover up or realign the same with
her prior inconsistent statements is readily apparent from her testimony even on this single episode, thus:

Q Sometime on January 21, 1994, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, do you
remember where you were?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where were you?

A I was in the boarding house of Merlylyn Casantosan, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Why were you there?

A I was conversing with my friend there, Sir.

COURT:

Q Conversing with whom?

A With my cousin, Your Honor.

Q Your cousin's name?

A Merlylyn Casantosan, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:

Q You said that this Dane or Danny Godoy raped you, will you please relate to this
Honorable Court how that rape happened?

A On Friday and it was 7:00 o'clock in the evening.

COURT:

Q Of what date?
Evidence II.
 A January 21, 1994, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:

Q Then what happened?

A I went to the boarding house of my cousin Merlylyn Casantosan. I passed

(through) the kitchen and then when I opened the door somebody grabbed me
suddenly.

xxx xxx xxx

Q During that time were there other people present in that boarding house where you
said Danny Godoy raped you?

A None, Sir.

COURT:

Q So, the house was empty?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q I thought your cousin was there and you were conversing?

A When I went there she was not there, Your Honor.  (Corrections and emphasis
27

supplied.)

2. Complainant testified that appellant raped her through the use of force and intimidation, specifically by holding a
knife to her neck. However, the element of force was not sufficiently established. The physical facts adverted to by
the lower court as corroborative of the prosecution's theory on the use of force are undoubtedly the medico-legal
findings of Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia. Upon closer scrutiny, however, we find that said findings neither support nor
confirm the charge that rape was so committed through forcible means by appellant against complainant on January
21, 1994.

The reported hymenal laceration which, according to Dr. Divinagracia, was a week old and already healed, and the
conclusion therefrom that complainant had sexual intercourse with a man on the date which she alleged, do not
establish the supposed rape since the same findings and conclusion are likewise consistent with appellant's
admission that coitus took place with the consent of complainant at Sunset Garden on January 24, 1994.  Further,
28

rather than substantiating the prosecution's aforesaid theory and the supposed date of commission of rape, the
finding that there were no evident signs of extra-genital injuries tends, instead, to lend more credence to appellant's
claim of voluntary coition on a later date and the absence of a struggle or the lack of employment of physical
force.  In rape of the nature alleged in this case, we repeat, the testimony of the complainant must be corroborated
29

by physical evidence showing use of force. 30

Thus, on the basis of the laceration inflicted, which is superficial at 6 o'clock position, the aforesaid medico-legal
expert opined that it could not be categorically stated that there was force involved. On further questioning, he gave
a straightforward answer that force was not applied.  He also added that when he examined the patient bodily, he
31

did not see any sign of bruises.  The absence of any sign of physical violence on the complainant's body is an
32

indication of complainant's consent to the act.  While the absence in the medical certificate of external signs of
33

physical injuries on the victim does not necessarily negate the commission of rape,  the instant case is clearly an
34

exception to this rule since appellant has successfully cast doubt on the veracity of that charge against him.

Evidence II.
Even granting ex gratia argumenti that the medical report and the laceration corroborated complainant's assertion
that there was sexual intercourse, of course the same cannot be said as to the alleged use of force. It has been held
that such corroborative evidence is not considered sufficient, since proof of facts constituting one principal element
of the crime is not corroborative proof of facts necessary to constitute another equally important element of the
crime.35

Complainant testified that she struggled a little but it was not really strong because she was afraid of appellant.
Again assuming that a sexual assault did take place as she claims, we nevertheless strongly believe that her
supposed fear is more imaginary than real. It is evident that complainant did not use the manifest resistance
expected of a woman defending her honor and chastity.  She failed to make any outcry when appellant allegedly
36

grabbed her and dragged her inside the house. There is likewise no evidence on record that she put up a struggle
when appellant forced her to lie on the floor, removed her panty, opened the zipper of his trousers, and inserted his
organ inside her genitals. Neither did she demonstrate that appellant, in committing the heinous act, subjected her
to any force of whatever nature or form.

Complainant's explanation for her failure to shout or struggle is too conveniently general and ruefully unconvincing
to make this Court believe that she tenaciously resisted the alleged sexual attack on her by appellant. And, if ever
she did put up any struggle or objected at all to the involuntary intercourse, such was not enough to show the kind of
resistance expected of a woman defending her virtue and honor.  Her failure to do anything while allegedly being
37

raped renders doubtful her charge of rape,  especially when we consider the actual mise-en-scene in the context of
38

her asseverations.

There is a rule that the rape victim's panty and blood-stained dress are not essential, and need not be presented, as
they are not indispensable evidence to prove rape.  We incline to the view, however, that this general rule holds true
39

only if there exist other corroborative evidence sufficiently and convincingly proving the rape charge beyond
reasonable doubt. The rule should go the other way where, as in the present case, the testimony of complainant is
inherently weak and no other physical evidence has been presented to bolster the charge of sexual abuse except
for the medical report which, as earlier discussed, even negated the existence of one of the essential elements of
the crime. We cannot, therefore, escape the irresistible conclusion that the deliberate non-presentation of
complainant's blood-stained skirt, if it did exist, should vigorously militate against the prosecution's cause.

II. The conduct of the outraged woman immediately following the alleged assault is of the utmost importance as
tending to establish the truth or falsity of the charge. It may well be doubted whether a conviction for the offense of
rape should even be sustained from the uncorroborated testimony of the woman unless the court is satisfied beyond
doubt that her conduct at the time when the alleged rape was committed and immediately thereafter was such as
might be reasonably expected from her under all the circumstances of the
case. 40

Complainant said that on the day following the supposed rape, appellant went to her parents' house and asked
permission from them to allow her to go with him to solicit funds for her candidacy. Nowhere throughout her entire
testimony did she aver or imply that appellant was armed and that by reason thereof she was forced to leave with
him. In brief, she was neither threatened nor intimidated by appellant. Her pretense that she was afraid of the
supposed threat previously made by appellant does not inspire belief since appellant was alone and unarmed on
that occasion and there was no showing of any opportunity for him to make good his threat, even assuming that he
had really voiced any. On the contrary, complainant even admitted that appellant respectfully asked permission from
her parents for her to accompany him.

Complainant's enigmatic behavior after her alleged ravishment can only be described as paradoxical: it was so
strangely normal as to be abnormal.  It seems odd, if not incredible, that upon seeing the person who had allegedly
41

raped her only the day before, she did not accuse, revile or denounce him, or show rage, revulsion, and
disgust.  Instead, she meekly went with appellant despite the presence of her parents and the proximity of
42

neighbors which, if only for such facts, would naturally have deterred appellant from pursuing any evil design. From
her deportment, it does not appear that the alleged threat made by appellant had instilled any fear in the mind of
complainant. Such a nonchalant, unconcerned attitude is totally at odds with the demeanor that would naturally be
expected of a person who had just suffered the ultimate invasion of her womanhood. 43

Evidence II.
III. Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categorical: admiration and sympathy
for the courageous female publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous violation, and condemnation of the rapist.
However, being interpreters of the law and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge without those
proclivities, and deal with it with extreme caution and circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural
tendency to be overprotective of every woman decrying her having been sexually abused, and demanding
punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes
through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice
based on the law. 44

The rule, therefore, that this Court generally desists from disturbing the conclusions of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses  will not apply where the evidence of record fails to support or substantiate the lower court's
45

findings of fact and conclusions; or where the lower court overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, would affect the outcome of the case; or where the disputed decision is based on a misapprehension of
facts.
46

The trial court here unfortunately relied solely on the lone testimony of complainant regarding the January 21, 1994
incident. Indeed, it is easy to allege that one was raped by a man. All that the victim had to testify to was that
appellant poked a knife at her, threatened to kill her if she shouted and under these threats, undressed her and had
sexual intercourse with her. The question then that confronts the trial court is whether or not complainant's
testimony is credible.  The technique in deciphering testimony is not to solely concentrate on isolated parts of that
47

testimony. The correct meaning of the testimony can often be ascertained only upon a perusal of the entire
testimony. Everything stated by the witness has to be considered in relation to what else has been stated. 48

In the case at bar, the challenged decision definitely leaves much to be desired. The court below made no serious
effort to dispassionately or impartially consider the totality of the evidence for the prosecution in spite of the teaching
in various rulings that in rape cases, the testimony of the offended party must not be accepted with precipitate
credulity.  In finding that the crime of rape was committed, the lower court took into account only that portion of the
49

testimony of complainant regarding the January 21, 1994 incident and conveniently deleted the rest. Taken singly,
there would be reason to believe that she was indeed raped. But if we are to consider the other portions of her
testimony concerning the events which transpired thereafter, which unfortunately the court a quo wittingly or
unwittingly failed or declined to appreciate, the actual truth could have been readily exposed.

There are easily perceived or discernible defects in complainant's testimony which inveigh against its being
accorded the full credit it was given by the trial court. Considered independently of any other, the defects might not
suffice to overturn the trial court's judgment of conviction; but assessed and weighed conjointly, as logic and
fairness dictate, they exert a powerful compulsion towards reversal of said judgment.  Thus:
50

1. Complainant said that she was continuously raped by herein appellant at the Sunset Garden and around three
times at Edward's Subdivision. In her sworn statement she made the same allegations. If this were true, it is
inconceivable how the investigating prosecutor could have overlooked these facts with their obvious legal
implications and, instead, filed an information charging appellant with only one count of rape. The incredibility of
complainant's representations is further magnified by the fact that even the trial court did not believe it, as may be
inferred from its failure to consider this aspect of her testimony, unless we were to uncharitably assume that it was
similarly befuddled.

2. She claims that appellant always carried a knife, but it was never explained how she was threatened with the
same in such a manner that she was allegedly always cowed into giving in to his innumerable sexual demands. We
are not unaware that in rape cases, this claim that complainant now advances appears to be a common testimonial
expedient and face-saving subterfuge.

3. According to her, they stayed at Sunset Garden for three days and three nights and that she never noticed if
appellant slept because she never saw him close his eyes. Yet, when asked if she slept side by side with appellant,
complainant admitted that everytime she woke up, appellant was invariably in bed beside her. 51

4. She alleged that she could never go out of the room because it was always locked and it could not be opened
from the inside. But, this was refuted by complainant's own testimony, as follows:

Evidence II.
 Q And yet the door could be opened by you from the inside?

A No, Sir, it was locked.

Q Can you describe the lock of that room?

A It's like that of the door where there is a doorknob.

ATTY. EBOL:

Let it be recorded that the lock is a doorknob and may I ask that the door be locked
and opened from the inside.

COURT:

Alright (sic) you go down the witness stand and find out for yourself if you can open
that door from the inside.

CLERK OF COURT:

Witness holding the doorknob.

COURT:

The key is made to open if you are outside, but as you're were (sic) inside you can
open it?

A Yes, sir.

Q Is there no other lock aside from that doorknob that you held?

A There was, Your Honor.

Q What is that?

A The one that slides, Your Honor.

Q And that is used when you are already inside?

A Yes, Your Honor.  (Emphases ours.)

52

5. During their entire stay at the Sunset Garden or even at Edward's Subdivision, beyond supposedly offering token
or futile resistance to the latter's sexual advances, she made no outcry, no attempt to flee or attract attention to her
plight.  In her own declaration, complainant mentioned that when they checked in at Sunset Garden, she saw the
53

cashier at the information counter where appellant registered. She did not do anything, despite the fact that
appellant at that time was admittedly not armed. She likewise stated that a room boy usually went to their room and
brought them food. If indeed she was bent on fleeing from appellant, she could have grabbed every possible
opportunity to escape. Inexplicably, she did not. What likewise appears puzzling is the prosecution's failure to
present these two people she mentioned and whose testimonies could have bolstered or corroborated
complainant's story.

6. When appellant fetched complainant in the afternoon of January 22, 1994, they left the house together and
walked in going to the highway. In her own testimony, complainant stated that appellant went ahead of her. It is
highly improbable, if appellant really had evil motives, that he would be that careless. It is likewise beyond
comprehension that appellant was capable of instilling such fear in complainant that she could not dare take
Evidence II.
advantage of the situation, in spite of the laxity of appellant, and run as far away from him as possible despite all the
chances therefor.

7. Helen Taha, the mother of Mia, testified that as a result of the filing of the rape case, complainant was dropped
from school and was not allowed to graduate. This is absurd. Rather than support and commiserate with the ill-fated
victim of rape, it would appear that the school authorities were heartless people who turned their backs on her and
considered her an outcast. That would be adding insult to injury. But what is more abstruse yet significant is that Mia
and her parents were never heard to complain about this apparent injustice. Such complacency cannot but make
one think and conclude that there must necessarily have been a valid justification for the drastic action taken by the
school and the docile submission thereto by the Taha family.

On the other hand, in evaluating appellant's testimony, the trial court's decision was replete with sweeping
statements and generalizations. It chose to focus on certain portions of appellant's testimony, declared them to be
preposterous and abnormal, and then hastened to conclude that appellant is indeed guilty. The court in effect
rendered a judgment of conviction based, not on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, but on the weakness of
that of the defense, which is totally repugnant to the elementary and time-honored rule that conviction should be
made on the basis of strong, clear and compelling evidence of the prosecution. 54

IV. The main defense proffered by appellant is that he and complainant were sweethearts. While the "sweetheart
theory" does not often gain favor with this Court, such is not always the case if the hard fact is that the accused and
the supposed victim are, in truth, intimately related except that, as is usual in most cases, either the relationship is
illicit or the victim's parents are against it. It is not improbable that in some instances, when the relationship is
uncovered, the alleged victim or her parents for that matter would rather take the risk of instituting a criminal action
in the hope that the court would take the cudgels for them than for the woman to admit to her own acts of
indiscretion. And this, as the records reveal, is precisely what happened to appellant.

Appellant's claim that he and complainant were lovers is fortified by the highly credible testimonies of several
witnesses for the defense, viz.:

1. Filomena Pielago testified that on the night of January 21, 1994, she saw appellant and complainant sitting on a
bench in front of the house where the sexual attack allegedly took place, and the couple were talking intimately. She
had warned Mia about the latter's illicit affair with appellant.

2. Fernando Rubio, an acquaintance of appellant and owner of the house at Edward's Subdivision, testified that he
asked Mia why she decided to have an affair with appellant who is a married man. Mia answered that she really
loves him.  He heard her call appellant "Papa".  The couple looked happy and were sweet to each other.
55 56 57

3. Benedicto Rubio, the younger brother of Fernando, testified on redirect examination that he asked Mia if she
knew what she getting into and she answered, "Yes;" then he asked her if she really loved Sir Godoy, and she again
answered in the affirmative. When he was trying to give counsel to appellant, complainant announced that if
appellant left her, she would commit suicide.  He could see that the couple were happy together.
58 59

4. Isagani Virey, who knew appellant because the Municipal Engineering Office where he worked was located within
the premises of PNS, attested that he was able to talk to the couple and that when he was advising appellant that
what he was doing is wrong because he is married and Mia is his student, complainant reacted by saying that no
matter what happened she would not leave Godoy, and that if she went home her father would kill her.  He also
60

observed that they were happy. 61

5. Erna Baradero, a co-teacher of appellant, saw the couple the day before the alleged rape incident, inside one of
the classrooms and they were holding hands, and she heard Mia tell appellant, "Mahal na mahal kita Sir, iwanan mo
ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo."  She tried to dissuade complainant from continuing with her relationship with
62

appellant.63

The positive allegations of appellant that he was having an intimate relationship with complainant, which were
substantially corroborated by several witnesses, were never successfully confuted. The rebuttal testimony of
complainant merely consisted of bare, unexplained denials of the positive, definite, consistent and detailed

Evidence II.
assertions of appellant.  Mere denials are self-serving negative evidence. They cannot obtain evidentiary weight
64

greater than the declarations of credible disinterested witnesses. 65

Besides, appellant recounted certain facts that only he could have supplied. They were replete with details which
could have been known only to him, thereby lending credence and reliability thereto.  His assertions are more
66

logical, probable and bear the earmarks of truth. This is not to say that the testimony of appellant should be
accorded full credence. His self-interest must have colored his account, even on the assumption that he could be
trusted to stick to the literal truth. Nonetheless, there is much in his version that does not strain the limits of credulity.
More to the point, there is enough to raise doubts that do appear to have some basis in reality. 67

Thus, the trial court's hasty pontification that appellant's testimony is improbable, ridiculous, nonsensical and
incredible is highly uncalled for. The rule of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not mandatory. It is not a positive rule
of law and is not an inflexible one.  It does not apply where there is sufficient corroboration on many grounds of the
68

testimony and the supposed inconsistencies arise merely from a desire of the witness to exculpate himself although
not completely. 69

Complainant's denial that she and appellant were lovers is belied by the evidence presented by the defense, the
most telling of which are her two handwritten letters, Exhibits "1" and "2", which she sent to the latter while he was
detained at the provincial jail. For analysis and emphasis, said letters are herein quoted in full:

27 Feb. 94

Dane,

Kumusta kana? Kong ako hito hindi na makatiis sa sakit.

Sir, sumulat ako sa inyo dahil gusto kong malaman mo ang situation ko. Sir, kong mahal mo ako
gagawa kang paraan na mailayo ako dito sa bahay. nalaman ng nanay at tatay ko na delayed ang
mens ko ng one week. pinapainom nila ako ng pampalaglag pero ayaw ko. pagnalaman nila na hindi
ko ininom ang gamot sinasaktan nila ako.

Sir, kong maari ay huwag ng maabutan ng Martes. dahil naabutan nila akong maglayas sana ako.
kaya ngayon hindi ako makalabas ng bahay kong wala akong kasama, kong gaano sila kahigpit
noon doble pa ngayon. ang mga gamit ko ngayon ay wala sa lalagyan ko. tinago nila hindi ko
makita, ang narito lang ay ang bihisan kong luma. Sir kong manghiram ka kaya ng motor na
gagamitin sa pagkuha sa akin. Sa lunes ng gabi manonood kami Ng Veta eksakto alas 9:00 ay
dapat dito ka sa lugar na may Veta. tanungin mo lang kay Lorna kong saan ang Veta nila Navoor
Lozot. Mag busina ka lang ng tatlo bilang senyas na lalabas na ako at huwag kang tatapat ng bahay
dahil nandoon ang kuya ko. kong ano ang disisyon mo maari bang magsulat ka at ipahatid kay
Lorna.

alang-alang sa bata. Baka makainon ako ng gamot dahil baka pagkain ko hahaluan nila.

Please sir . . .

(Sgd.) Mia Taha 70

3/1/94

Dane,

I'm sorry kong problem ang ipinadala o sinulat sa iyo sa halip sa kasiyahan. oo nag usap na tayo
nagawa ko lang naman ang sumulat sa iyo dahil naiinis na ako sa pagmumukha ng mga magulang
kong suwapang. Ang paglayas ko sana ay dahil sa narinig ko. Sir narinig ko na magreklamo si
nanay kay Arquero yong superentende sa Palawan high tapos ang sabi ay magreklamo itong si
Arquero sa DECS para matanggal ka sa pagtuturo yan ang dahilan kong bakit naisipan kong
Evidence II.
 lumayas ng wala sa oras at wala akong tensyon na masama laban so iyo. hindi ko sinabi sa kanila
na delayed ako ay sinabi sa iyo ni Eden na sa harap niya mismo binigyan ako ng gamot
samantalang noong Sabado ng gabi lang nalaman dahil gusto kong masuka. Oo aaminin ko
nagkasala ako sa iyo, pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila ako sa
sulsul nila. hindi ko naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban ngunit kong iniisip mong minahal lang
kita dahil sa may kailangan lang ako sa iyo nagkakamali ka. alam ng Diyos na hindi ganon ang
hangarin ko sa iyo. higit pa sa binilanggo ang kalagayan ko kong alam mo. kinukunsinsiya, nagtitiis
na saktan at pagsasakripisyo ng damdamin ko na gusto kang makita at yakapin ka pero ano ang
magagawa ko kong ang paglabas ko ng bahay ay hindi ako makalabas ng mag isa may guardiya pa.
tanungin mo si Lorna kong ano ginagawa nilang pagbantay sa akin para akong puganti. hindi ito
ayon sa kagustuhan ng mga magulang ko sarili kong plano ito. Magtitiis pa ba akong hindi makakain
maghapon tubig lang ang laman ng tiyan, kong may masama akong hangarin sa iyo.

Oo, magtiis ako para maipakita kong mahal rin kita. March 2 darating ako sa bahay na sinasabi mo.
hindi ko matiyak kong anong oras dahil kukuha pa ako ng tiyempo na wala rito ang tatay ko. Alam
mo bang pati ang kapatid kong si Rowena ay inuutusan akong lumayas dahil naawa no siya sa
situation ko. siya lang ang kakampi ko rito sa bahay malaki ang pag-asa kong makalabas ako ng
bahay sa tulong niya.

Love
you

(Sgd.)
Mia
Taha 71

There is absolutely nothing left to the imagination. The letters eloquently speak for themselves. It was complainant's
handwriting which spilled the beans, so to speak. Aside from appellant, two other defense witnesses identified the
handwriting on the letters as belonging to Mia Taha. They are Filomena Pielago and Erna Baradero who were
admittedly the former teachers of complainant and highly familiar with her handwriting. The greatest blunder
committed by the trial court was in ignoring the testimonies of these qualified witnesses and refusing to give any
probative value to these two vital pieces of evidence, on the dubious and lame pretext that no handwriting expert
was presented to analyze and evaluate the same.

Well-entrenched by now is the rule that resort to questioned document examiners, more familiarly called handwriting
experts, is not mandatory. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or
comparing handwriting.  This is so since under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a
72

person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person, because he has seen
the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and
has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. The said section further provides that evidence
respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge. 73

The defense witnesses were able to identify complainant's handwriting on the basis of the examination papers
submitted to them by her in their respective subjects. This Court has likewise carefully examined and compared the
handwriting on the letters with the standard writing appearing on the test papers as specimens for comparison and,
contrary to the observations and conclusions of the lower court, we are convinced beyond doubt that they were
written by one and the same person. More importantly, complainant herself categorically admitted that the
handwriting on the questioned letters belongs to her.

It is, therefore, extremely disconcerting, to say the least, why the trial court again chose to turn a deaf ear to this
conclusive portion of complainant's testimony:

ATTY. EBOL:

Evidence II.
 Q Did I get you right on rebuttal that Mrs. Erna Baradero and Filomena Pielago were
your teachers?

A Yes, sir.

Q And they have been your teachers for several months before this incident of
January 21, 1994, am I not correct?

A That is true, sir.

Q And you have (sic) during these past months that they have been your teachers
you took examinations in their classes in their particular subject(s)?

A Yes, sir.

Q And some of those test papers are in the possession of your teachers, am I
correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q I will show you Exhibit "4" previously marked as Exhibit "4", it appears to be your
test paper and with your signature and the alphabet appears in this exhibit appears
to be that of Mia Taha, please examine this and tell the Honorable Court if that is
your test paper?

A Yes, sir.

Q That signature Mia Taha I understand is also your signature?

A Yes, sir.

Q I will show you Exhibit "4-A", will you please examine this Exhibit "4-A" and tell this
Honorable Court if you are familiar with that.

A What subject is that?

Q I am just asking you whether you are familiar with that.

A I cannot remember if I have this kind of subject, sir.

Q How about this signature Mia Taha, are you not familiar with that signature?

A That is min(e), sir.

Q I will show you Exhibit "4-C" which appears to be that in Math, are you familiar with
that signature?

A Yes, sir.

Q That is your signature?

A Yes, sir.

Q In fact, these letters in alphabet here are in your own handwriting?

Evidence II.
 A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You will deny this Exhibit "1" your signature?

xxx xxx xxx

Q You will deny that this is your handwriting?

A That is my handwriting, sir.

Q Also Exhibit "2"?

A Yes, sir. 74

While rebuttal witness Lorna Casantosan insisted that she never delivered any letter of complainant to herein
appellant, the witness presented by the defense on sur-rebuttal, Armando Pasion, who was the guard on duty at the
provincial jail at that time, testified of his own accord because he knew that what Casantosan said was a blatant lie.
Appellant never talked to Amando Pasion nor requested him to testify for the defense, as related by the witness
himself. Hence, there exists no reason whatsoever to disbelieve the testimony of witness Pasion to the effect that
Lorna Casantosan actually went to visit appellant in jail and in truth handed to him what turned out to be the letters
marked as Exhibits "1" and "2" for the defense.

V. The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made by appellant is deemed to be an admission of
guilt. This inference does not arise in the instant case. In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally
admissible as evidence against the party making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the
bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, no
compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the penal action. It has long been held, however, that in such
cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to
avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that
the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences
which would ordinarily ensue therefrom. 75

A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the defense overwhelmingly proves appellant's innocence of
the offense charged. Further, the supposed offer of marriage did not come from appellant but was actually
suggested by a certain Naem, who is an imam or Muslim leader and who likewise informed appellant that he
could be converted into a Muslim so he could marry complainant. As a matter of fact, when said offer was
first made to appellant, he declined because of the fact that he was already married. On top of these,
appellant did not know, not until the trial proper, that his mother actually paid P30,000.00 for the settlement
of these cases. Complainant's own mother, Helen Taha, testified that present during the negotiations were
herself, her husband, Mia, and appellant's mother. Appellant himself was never present in any of said
meetings. 76

It has been held that where the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary consideration
was made, such offer of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution.  In another case, this Court
77

ruled that no implied admission can be drawn from the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court,
where the accused did not take part in any of the negotiations and the effort to settle the case was in
accordance with the established tribal customs, that is, Muslim practices and traditions, in an effort to prevent further
deterioration of the relations between the parties. 78

VI. Generally, an affidavit of desistance by the complainant is not looked upon with favor. It may, however, create
serious doubts as to the liability of appellant, especially if it corroborates appellant's explanation about the filing of
criminal charges. 79

Evidence II.
In the cases at bar, the letters written by complainant to appellant are very revealing. Most probably written out of
desperation and exasperation with the way she was being treated by her parents, complainant threw all caution to
the winds when she wrote: "Oo, aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo, pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa mga
magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila, hindi ko naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban," obviously referring to
her ineptitude and impotence in helping appellant out of his predicament. It could, therefore, be safely presumed
that the rape charge was merely an offshoot of the discovery by her parents of the intimate relationship between her
and appellant. In order to avoid retribution from her parents, together with the moral pressure exerted upon her by
her mother, she was forced to concoct her account of the alleged rape.

The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies are strictly required
to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their reputations shall remain untainted.
Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character humiliates their entire families.  It could precisely be
80

that complainant's mother wanted to save face in the community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an
effort to conceal her daughter's indiscretion and escape the wagging tongues of their small rural community, she
had to weave the scenario of this rape drama.

Although the trial court did observe that a mother would not sacrifice her daughter to tell a story of defloration, that is
not always the case as this Court has noted a long time ago. The books disclose too many instances of false
charges of rape.  While this Court has, in numerous cases, affirmed the judgments of conviction rendered by trial
81

courts in rape charges, especially where the offended parties were very young and presumptively had no ill motives
to concoct a story just to secure indictments for a crime as grave as rape, the Court has likewise reversed
judgments of conviction and acquitted the accused when there are strong indications pointing to the possibility that
the rape charges were merely motivated by some factors except the truth as to their commission.  This is a case in
82

point. The Court, therefore, cannot abdicate its duty to declare that the prosecution has failed to meet the exacting
test of moral certainty and proof of guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

This is not to say that the Court approves of the conduct of appellant. Indisputably, he took advantage of
complainant's feelings for him and breached his vow of fidelity to his wife. As her teacher, he should have acted as
adviser and counselor to complainant and helped her develop in manners and virtue instead of corrupting
her.  Hence, even as he is freed from physical detention in a prison as an instrument of human justice, he remains
83

in the spiritual confinement of his conscience as a measure of divine retribution. Additionally, these ruminations do
not rule out such other legal options against him as may be available in the arsenal of statutory law.

VII. The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the presumptio hominis that a young Filipina will not charge a
person with rape if it is not true. In the process, however, it totally disregarded the more paramount constitutional
presumption that an accused is deemed innocent until proven otherwise.

It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more presumptions are involved. Sometimes the presumptions
conflict, one tending to demonstrate the guilt of the accused and the other his innocence. In such case, it is
necessary to examine the basis for each presumption and determine what logical or social basis exists for each
presumption, and then determine which should be regarded as the more important and entitled to prevail over the
other. It must, however, be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating guilt does not in itself destroy
the presumption against innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all of the evidence, or the lack
of any evidence or explanation, is sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence by proving the defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the defendant's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence
continues.84

The rationale for the presumption of guilt in rape cases has been explained in this wise:

In rape cases especially, much credence is accorded the testimony of the complaining witness, on
the theory that she will not choose to accuse her attacker at all and subject herself to the stigma and
indignities her accusation will entail unless she is telling the truth. The rape victim who decides to
speak up exposes herself as a woman whose virtue has been not only violated but also irreparably
sullied. In the eyes of a narrow-minded society, she becomes a cheapened woman, never mind that
she did not submit to her humiliation and has in fact denounced her assailant. At the trial, she will be
the object of lascivious curiosity. People will want to be titillated by the intimate details of her
violation. She will squirm through her testimony as she describes how her honor was defiled, relating
Evidence II.
 every embarrassing movement of the intrusion upon the most private parts of her body. Most
frequently, the defense will argue that she was not forced to submit but freely conjoined in the sexual
act. Her motives will be impugned. Her chastity will be challenged and maligned. Whatever the
outcome of the case, she will remain a tainted woman, a pariah because her purity has been lost,
albeit through no fault of hers. This is why many a rape victim chooses instead to keep quiet,
suppressing her helpless indignation rather than denouncing her attacker. This is also the reason
why, if a woman decides instead to come out openly and point to her assailant, courts
are prone to believe that she is telling the truth regardless of its consequences. . . .
85

The presumption of innocence, on the other hand, is founded upon the first principles of justice, and is not a mere
form but a substantial part of the law. It is not overcome by mere suspicion or conjecture; a probability that the
defendant committed the crime; nor by the fact that he had the opportunity to do so.  Its purpose is to balance the
86

scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone individual pitted against the People and all
the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and influence of the prosecution,
the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of a doubt.  This is in
87

consonance with the rule that conflicts in evidence must be resolved upon the theory of innocence rather than upon
a theory of guilt when it is possible to do so. 88

On the basis of the foregoing doctrinal tenets and principles, and in conjunction with the overwhelming evidence in
favor of herein appellant, we do not encounter any difficulty in concluding that the constitutional presumption on the
innocence of an accused must prevail in this particular indictment.

B. The Kidnapping/Illegal Detention Case

It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactor was to
deprive the offended party of her liberty.  In the present charge for that crime, such intent has not at all been
89

established by the prosecution. Prescinding from the fact that the Taha spouses desisted from pursuing this charge
which they themselves instituted, several grave and irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil the prosecution's
evidence thereon and cast serious doubts on the guilt of appellant, as hereunder explained:

To recall, complainant testified that appellant by himself went to fetch her at her parents' house the day after the
alleged rape incident. In her own words, appellant courteously asked her parents to permit her to help him solicit
contributions for her candidacy. When they left the house, appellant walked ahead of her, obviously with her parents
and their neighbors witnessing their departure. It is difficult to comprehend how one could deduce from these normal
and innocuous arrangement any felonious intent of appellant to deprive complainant of her liberty. One will look in
vain for a case where a kidnapping was committed under such inauspicious circumstances as described by
complainant.

Appellant declared that when they left the house of the Taha family, complainant was bringing with her a plastic bag
which later turned out to contain her clothes. This bag was left behind by Mia at Edward's Subdivision, as
hereinbefore noted, and was later delivered to appellant by Benedicto Rubio. Again, we cannot conceive of a
ridiculous situation where the kidnap victim was first allowed to prepare and pack her clothes, as if she was merely
leaving for a pleasant sojourn with the criminal, all these with the knowledge and consent of her parents who
passively looked on without comment.

Complainant alleged that appellant always kept her locked inside the room which they occupied, whether at Sunset
Garden or at Edward's Subdivision, and that she could not unlock the door from the inside. We must, however,
recall that when she was asked on cross-examination about the kind of lock that was used, she pointed to the
doorknob of the courtroom. The court then ordered that the door of the courtroom be locked and then asked
complainant to open it from the inside. She was easily able to do so and, in fact, she admitted that the two locks in
the room at Sunset Garden could also be opened from the inside in the same manner. This demonstrably
undeniable fact was never assailed by the prosecution. It also failed to rebut the testimony of Fernando Rubio that
the room which was occupied by the couple at Edward's Subdivision could not even be locked because the lock
thereof was broken.

When the couple transferred to Edward's Subdivision, they walked along the national highway in broad daylight.
Complainant, therefore, had more than ample opportunity to seek the help of other people and free herself from
Evidence II.
appellant if it were true that she was forcibly kidnapped and abused by the latter.  In fact, several opportunities to do
90

so had presented themselves from the time they left complainant's home and during their extended stay in the hotel
and in the lodging house.

According to appellant, he went to see the parents of complainant the day after they went to Sunset Garden to
inform them that Mia spent the night in said place. This was neither denied nor impugned by Helen Taha, her
husband, or any other person. On the other hand, the allegation of Helen Taha that she made a report to the police
about her missing daughter was not supported by any corroborative evidence, such as the police blotter, nor was
the police officer to whom she allegedly reported the incident ever identified or presented in court.

We agree with appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to prove any motive on his part for the commission
of the crime charged. In one case, this Court rejected the kidnapping charge where there was not the slightest hint
of a motive for the crime.  It is true that, as a rule, the motive of the accused in a criminal case is immaterial and, not
91

being an element of a crime, it does not have to be proved.  Where, however, the evidence is weak, without any
92

motive being disclosed by the evidence, the guilt of the accused becomes open to a reasonable doubt and, hence,
an acquittal is in order.  Nowhere in the testimony of either the complainant or her mother can any ill motive of a
93

criminal nature be reasonably drawn. What actually transpired was an elopement or a lovers' tryst, immoral though it
may be.

As a closing note, we are bewildered by the trial court's refusal to admit in evidence the bag of clothes belonging to
complainant which was presented and duly identified by the defense, on its announced supposition that the clothes
could have easily been bought from a department store. Such preposterous reasoning founded on a mere surmise
or speculation, aside from the fact that on rebuttal the prosecution did not even seek to elicit an explanation or
clarification from complainant about said clothes, strengthens and reinforces our impression of an apparently
whimsical exercise of discretion by the court below. Matters which could have been easily verified were thus
cavalierly dismissed and supplanted by a conjecture, and on such inferential basis a conclusion was then drawn by
said court.

We accordingly deem it necessary to reiterate an early and highly regarded disquisition of this Court against the
practice of excluding evidence in the erroneous manner adopted by the trial court:

It has been observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously administered where trivial
objections to the admission of proof are received with least favor. The practice of excluding evidence
on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections to the form of the questions should be
avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of
the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether the testimony is relevant or not;
and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the attorney offering the evidence, the
court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof
offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle over
which he presides, a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging the relevancy of
proof where a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the
proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and
possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without returning the case for a new trial, a step
which this court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of
first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result
in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law and it is its duty,
upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and
immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal,
this court then has all the materials before it necessary to make a correct judgment. 94

At any rate, despite that procedural lapse, we find in the records of these cases sufficient and substantial evidence
which warrant and demand the acquittal of appellant. Apropos thereto, we take this opportunity to repeat this age-
old observation and experience of mankind on the penological and societal effect of capital punishment: If it is
justified, it serves as a deterrent; if injudiciously imposed, it generates resentment.

Finally, we are constrained to reiterate here that Republic Act No. 7659 which reimposed the death penalty on
certain heinous crimes took effect on December 31, 1993, that is, fifteen days after its publication in the December
Evidence II.
16, 1993 issues of the Manila Bulletin, Philippine Star, Malaya and Philippine Times Journal,  and not on January 1,
95

1994 as is sometimes misinterpreted.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused-appellant Danny
Godoy is hereby

of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 11640 and 11641
of the Regional Trial Court for Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 49. It is hereby ORDERED that he be
released forthwith, unless he is otherwise detained for any other valid cause.

Evidence II.
10.) G.R. No. 117217 December 2, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GENER DE GUZMAN y SICO, accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

On 1 April 1992, complainant Gilda Ambray filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bacoor, Cavite, a
complaint 1 charging accused Gener de Guzman y Sico with the crime of rape allegedly committed at 9:00 p.m. of
31 March 1992 in Meadow Wood, Executive Village, Barangay Panapaan, Bacoor, Cavite. On even date, Gener de
Guzman was arrested and detained at the Municipal Jail of Bacoor, Cavite, but was released on 14 April 1992 upon
the filing and approval of his bail bond. 2

Gener de Guzman did not submit any counter-affidavit as required in the subpoena   issued by the MTC on 14 April
3

1992. Finding a prima facie case against him on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution, the MTC forwarded
the record of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for the filing of the necessary information with the
appropriate court.  4

On 14 July 1992, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bacoor, Cavite, Branch 19, an information   charging accused Gener de Guzman with the crime of rape, allegedly
5

committed as follows:

That on or about the 31st day of March 1992 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening at Meadow Wood
Subd., Executive Village, Barangay Panapaan, Municipality of Bacoor, Province of Cavite,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have carnal knowledge of one Gilda B. Ambray against her will and consent, to the
damage and prejudice of said Gilda B. Ambray.

Contrary to law.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. B-92-216.

Upon arraignment on 10 August 1992, accused Gener de Guzman entered a plea of not guilty.   Trial on the merits
6

thereafter ensued and the prosecution moved for the cancellation of the bail bond.

On 9 December 1992, after complainant Gilda Ambray, Police Officer Efren Bautista, and Dr. Valentin Bernales of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), completed their testimony as witnesses for the prosecution, the trial court
cancelled the bail bond of Gener de Guzman on the ground that the evidence of his guilt was strong.   He was re-
7

arrested, and on 22 January 1993, his motion for reconsideration   of the order cancelling his bail bond was denied
8

by the trial court for lack of merit as he was charged with a capital offense punishable by reclusion perpetua and the
evidence of his guilt was strong. 9

Two other witnesses were presented by the prosecution, namely: Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, a kumadre of the
accused, and Aquilino Flores Ambray, the husband of the complainant.

The testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution established the following facts:

Homeward bound on 31 March 1992 from Anson Department Store where she worked as a sales clerk, complainant
Gilda Ambray, the 32-year old wife of Aquilino mores Ambray and a mother of two children, was at the gate of

Evidence II.
Meadow Wood Subdivision, Panapaan, Bacoor, Cavite, at about 8:45 p.m. waiting for a tricycle ride toward her
residence. She waited for about ten minutes. When she noticed the accused, then wearing army pants, sitting at the
guardhouse, she approached him and asked him some questions. He answered in a stammering manner. The
complainant recognized the accused very well because it was summertime and the gate of the subdivision was well-
lit. 
10

After Gilda started to walk, the accused mounted his tricycle, followed her and offered her a ride, to which she
agreed. While on board the tricycle, Gilda noticed that the accused took a different route. She got scared but
managed not to show it. The accused would once in a while stop the tricycle and tell her that it was not in good
condition.   When they reached Phase II of the same subdivision near an unfinished house, the accused stopped
11

and told Gilda to push the tricycle. She alighted from the tricycle and paid him P5.00, which he did not accept. Gilda
then walked away, but after she had taken about ten steps, the accused embraced her from behind, covered her
mouth and held her neck tightly. She tried to shout but the accused threatened her. The accused then dragged her
to a vacant lot ten meters away from the unfinished house. She attempted to shout again, but he threatened to kill
her if she made noise. She fought to free herself from his hold, but the accused pushed and slapped her. He tried to
raise her T-shirt while holding her neck tightly. He shouted and commanded her to raise her T-shirt, which she
obligingly followed because of fear. He removed her bra and kissed her breast. She shouted "Saklolo! Tulungan
ninyo ako!," but the accused covered her mouth and again held her neck that she could hardly breathe. He held her
hand tightly and positioned himself on top of her. He unzipped her pants and pulled it down her knees. She
struggled to liberate herself, but to no avail. The accused then tried to insert his penis into her, but failed to do so
because she struggled and fought back, then slapped him while covering her vagina with her hand. When she tried
to stand, he pushed her down and, in the process, was able to completely pull down her pants and underwear. She
pleaded to him to have mercy on her and told him that she had two children. He warned her: "Huwag kang
sisigaw, papatayin kita!" The accused again tried to insert his penis into her, but she prevented him from doing so.
The accused took her hand and let her hold his penis to make it stiff. As Gilda became too weak to struggle against
the accused's sexual advances, the accused was able to finally consummate his dastardly desire. He then pulled
out his penis and "fingered" her private organ for a short while. The accused then warned Gilda not to tell anybody,
otherwise, he would kill her and all members of her family.   He told her that she was his third victim but the two did
12

not complain. He then dressed up. Gilda picked up her pants and underwear and hurriedly ran toward her home,
without looking back. 13

When Gilda arrived home, she told her mother and her husband, Aquilino Flores Ambray, that she was raped by the
accused. Aquilino got angry and wanted to retaliate but was prevailed upon not to by Gilda's mother.  14

At almost midnight of 31 March 1992, Gilda and her mother reported the incident to one Tony Antonio, the
President of the Homeowners' Association and President of the National Press Club. Antonio radioed the
Bacoor Police Station to send an investigator. PO3 Efren Bautista and Sgt. Saguisame responded to the
alarm immediately. Upon their arrival at the house of Antonio, PO3 Bautista saw Gilda with her mother.
Gilda, who was crying, related to PO3 Bautista that she was raped and described to him her assailant as a
tricycle driver, tall, strong, with curly hair and in army cut.  Gilda also gave PO3 Bautista a vivid description
15

of the accused's tricycle, viz., blue in color with the name "Dimple" at the back.   The policemen left and
16

went to the house of the accused. PO3 Bautista invited the accused to go with him because the Mayor
wanted to talk to him. The accused, together with PO3 Bautista, went to the residence of Antonio. When the
accused entered the house of Antonio, Gilda Ambray cried hysterically while pointing to the accused as her
rapist. The accused was then brought to the municipal jail.  7 1

Gilda Ambray was medically examined at the Las Piñas Hospital and issued a medical certificate.   She then
18

proceeded to the NBI for a medico-legal examination. Dr. Valentin Bernales, a medico-legal officer of the NBI,
conducted the examination on Gilda. His findings, contained in his medico-legal report,   were as follows:
19

I. Physical Injuries:

Abrasion, brownish; lips, upper, left side, mucosal, 2.0 x 1.5 cm.;
elbow, right, postero-lateral aspect, 2.0 x 1.5 cm. and postero-medial
aspect, multi-linear, with brown scab formation, 3.0 x 1.0 cm.

Evidence II.
 Contusion, reddish; back, right, scapular area, 7.0 x 5.0 cm. and left,
15.0 x 8.0 cm.

Contused abrasion, reddish black, scapular area, left, medial aspect,

3.0 x 2.0 cm.

II. Genital Examination:

Pubic hair, fully grown, moderate. Labia majora, gaping. Labia

minora, coaptated. Fourchette, lax. Vestibulae, pinkish, smooth.
Hymen, reduced to carunculae myrtiformis. Vaginal orifice, admits a
tube, 3.0 cm. in diameter. Vaginal wall, lax. Rugosities, obliterated.

III. Conclusions:

1. The above physical injuries were noted on the body

of the subject at the time of the examination.

2. Medical evidence indicative of recent sexual

intercourse with man on or about the alleged date of
examination.

IV. Remarks:

Laboratory Report S-92-94   shows positive result for the presence of

20

human spermatozoa.

Dr. Bernales opined that the physical injuries sustained by Gilda Ambray resulted from force applied to her,"   while
21

the presence of human spermatozoa in Gilda's genitals indicated recent sexual intercourse.  22

On 3 April 1992, "Bebey" and Linda de Guzman, the parents of the accused, asked the help of Resurreccion
Talub Quiocho, the accused's kumadre, to beg for Gilda's forgiveness for the accused's sake. The following
day, Resurreccion accompanied the accused's parents, wife, children and sister-in-law to Gilda's
house.   Gilda met them, but to their plea for forgiveness, she told them "that should not be tolerated." 
23 24

Gilda further testified that she suffered moral damages, had to resign from her job due to shame, and had spent
P28,500.00 for attorney's fees. 
25

Gener de Guzman interposed the defense of alibi and presented Alfredo Fenandez and Teotimo Camagong as his
witnesses.

According to Gener de Guzman, on 31 March 1992 at around 9:00 p.m., he was about to go home and was at the
corner of Meadow Wood Subdivision coming from Justineville Subdivision. On his way home on his tricycle, he saw
Gilda Ambray, who flagged him down and hoarded his tricycle. After traveling about half a kilometer, his tricycle
malfunctioned. He told her that she better walk home because her house was already near. He pushed his tricycle
home, and on his way, one Alfredo Fenandez approached him and inquired what was wrong with his tricycle.
Alfredo helped him push the tricycle towards his (accused's) home, and upon arrival thereat, he told Alfredo not to
leave at once. At around 9:10 p.m., they started to drink liquor until 11:00 p.m., and after their drinking spree, he
cleaned their mess and slept. Then at around 12:50 a.m. of 1 April 1992, PO3 Efren Bautista fetched and apprised
him that he was accused of rape by a certain Gilda Ambray. Thereafter, an investigation was conducted and he was
brought to the Bacoor Police Station.

Alfredo L. Fernandez, 37 years old, jobless, and a resident of Justineville Subdivision, corroborated Gener's story
about the malfunctioning tricycle and the drinking session. 
26

Evidence II.
Teotimo Camagong testified that he was present when the accused was investigated at the residence of Tony
Antonio and that the complainant did not pinpoint and identify the accused as her alleged molester.  7
2

In its Decision   dated 30 June 1994 and promulgated on 25 July 1994, the trial court found the accused guilty
28

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged, and rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered herein accused GENER SICO DE GUZMAN is hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape punishable by Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. He should suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua and indemnify herein private
complainant Gilda Ambray the following: actual damages representing her lost monthly salary when
she resigned from her office due to shame for being a rape victim, in the sum of P30,000.00, moral
damages in the sum of P30,000.00, exemplary damages of P10,000.00, litigation expenses of
P5,000.00, and attorney's fee[s] including appearance fees for the private prosecutor in the sum of
P28,500.00.

It gave full gave weight to the testimony of Gilda Ambray because "[w]ithout doubt, the complainant had endured the
rigors of recalling her harrowing ordeal and had vividly, credibly and candidly portrayed in detail how she was raped
by the accused."  29

As to whether sexual intercourse was consummated against the will or consent of the offended party, the trial court
said:

No less than NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Valentin Bernales had corroborated the stance of herein
private complainant that she was raped by the accused. The victim had sustained contusions and
abrasions at her body that indicated that she struggled against the sexual advances of the accused.
As a result of the doctor's examination on the victim, he confirmed the occurrence of a recent sexual
intercourse and presence in her private part of human spermatozoa as denoted in his Medico Legal
Report (Exh. F) and Laboratory Report (Exh. D).  30

Likewise it ruled that since the accused was drunk, he was more aggressive and sexually capable.   Finally,
31

it considered as evidence of the accused's guilt the plea of his parents, wife and relatives for forgiveness
and compromise.  32

The accused seasonably appealed from the trial court's judgment of conviction, and in urging us to acquit him,
interposes the following assignment of errors in his Appellant's Brief:

1. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED HAS INDUBITABLY EMPLOYED FORCE
AND INTIMIDATION IN THE RAPE OF THE VICTIM.

2. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED WAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE
VICTIM.

3. THE COURT ERRED IN STRESSING THAT THE ACCUSED WAS DRUNK AT THE TIME OF
THE COMMISSION OF RAPE.

In the Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with the accused and prays that we
affirm in toto the appealed decision.

The first and second assigned errors may be taken up together. The upshot of the accused's stance in these alleged
errors is that he was not positively identified and that neither force nor intimidation was proven. As to the latter he
cites these facts: (a) Gilda's assailant had three acts of sexual intercourse with her; (b) the physical examination
showed that she suffered injuries on the dorsal portion only, and none was found on her neck; (c) her personal
belongings — bra, pants, T-shirt and underwear — were completely intact; and (d) no signs of physical violence
were discernible on both the persons of the accused and Gilda Ambray.

Evidence II.
Rape is essentially an offense of secrecy, not generally attempted except in dark or deserted and secluded places
away from prying eyes, and the crime usually commences solely upon the word of the offended woman herself and
conviction invariably turns upon her credibility, as the People's single witness of the actual occurrence.  33

In the review of rape cases, therefore, this Court is guided by the following principles: (1) an accusation for rape can
be made with facility: it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove it;
(2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its on merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 34

The resolution then of the first two assigned errors and the determination of the guilt of the accused depend
primarily on the credibility of the complainant Gilda Ambray, since only she and the accused witnessed the incident
when it happened. Her testimony alone, if credible, would render the accused's conviction inevitable.

A meticulous assessment of Gilda's testimony demonstrates beyond doubt the truthfulness of her story, which she
narrated in a categorical, straightforward and candid manner. Further strengthening her credibility in recounting her
ordeal at the hands of the accused was her conduct immediately after the sexual assault. She ran home without
looking back, and upon her arrival she reported the rape to her husband and her mother at once. Immediately
thereafter, she reported it to Tony Antonio, the President of the Homeowners' Association and President of the
National Press Club, who then sought police assistance. When the policemen arrived at Antonio's residence in
response to the latter's call, Gilda narrated the rape to the policemen and gave them the description of the assailant.
When the policemen brought the accused to the residence of Antonio, Gilda forthwith pointed to the accused as the
person who raped her. Gilda voluntarily submitted herself to a medical examination at the Las Piñas Hospital and
then to an examination of her private parts by Dr. Bernales of the NBI. The following day she submitted herself to an
investigations   by the PNP of Bacoor, Cavite, and filed on the same day a complaint for rape against the accused
35

with the MTC of Bacoor, Cavite.

All the foregoing acts of Gilda were done within twenty-four hours after the commission of the crime. The quickness
and spontaneity of these deeds manifested the natural reactions of a virtuous woman who had just undergone
sexual molestation against herself,   and evinced nothing more than her instant resolve to denounce the beast who
36

criminally abused and ravished her, and to protect her honor. Moreover, she rejected the plea for forgiveness
sought by the accused's parents, wife, and children, then suffered the travails of a public trial which necessarily
exposed her to humiliation and embarrassment by unraveling the details of the rape and enduring a cross-
examination which sought to discredit her.

What Gilda endured could only come from one whose obsession was to bring to justice the person who had abused
her and vindicate her honor, even if such vindication would never erase from her memory that excruciatingly painful
chapter in her life which left her psychologically and emotionally scarred forever. This Court has repeatedly held that
no complainant would admit that she has been raped, make public the offense, allow the examination of her private
parts, undergo the troubles and humiliation of public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying to all its gory details if
she had not in fact been raped.   7
3

We likewise agree with the trial court that the accused used force and intimidation upon Gilda.

Another established rule in rape cases is that the force need not be irresistible; all that is necessary is that the force
used by the accused is sufficient to consummate his evil purpose, or that it was successfully used. It need not be so
great or of such character that it could not be repelled.   Intimidation, on the other hand, must be viewed in light of
38

the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule; it
is enough that it produces fear — fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused,
something would happen to her at that moment, or even thereafter as when she is threatened with death if she
would report the incident.39

In this case, the accused embraced Gilda from behind, held her neck tightly, and covered her mouth. As she
struggled to free herself, she sustained her injuries. Dr. Bernales confirmed the use of force, and according to him,
the abrasions and contusions on Gilda's body were due to force applied on her. Moreover, the accused also
threatened Gilda with death if she would not yield to his bestial desires. The threat certainly constituted intimidation.

Evidence II.
The accused's contention that it was highly incredible that there was force or intimidation since the assailant
committed three acts of sexual intercourse with Gilda in three hours, deserves scant consideration. In the first place,
Gilda explained in her re-direct examination that the three hours mentioned in her cross-examination referred to the
time which elapsed from the moment she was at the gate of Meadow Wood Subdivision and until she reported the
incident to Tony Antonio.   The principal object of re-direct examination is to prevent injustice to the witness and the
40

party who has called him by affording an opportunity to the witness to explain the testimony given on cross-
examination, and to explain any apparent contradiction or inconsistency in his statements, an opportunity which is
ordinarily afforded to him during cross-examination. The re-direct examination serves the purpose of completing the
answer of a witness, or of adding a new matter which has been omitted, or of correcting a possible misinterpretation
of testimony.   In the second place, on direct examination, Gilda categorically declared that the accused tried to
41

thrice insert his penis into her vagina. He failed in the first and second attempts because she struggled, but
succeeded on the third because she was already weak. While it may be true that on cross-examination she testified
that she was raped once, yet on re-direct examination she said that she was raped three times, no inconsistency at
all may be deduced therefrom. There was merely confusion as to the legal qualifications of the three separate
acts, i.e., Gilda's answers were conclusions of law. A witness is not permitted to testify as to a conclusion of law,
among which, legal responsibility is one of the most conspicuous. A witness, no matter how skillful, is not to be
asked or permitted to testify as to whether or not a party is responsible to the law. Law in the sense here used
embraces whatever conclusions belonging properly to the court.  42

What is clear to us is that there were, at least, two acts of attempted rape and one consummated rape, committed in
light of the testimony of Gilda. The information, however, charged the accused with only one act of rape; hence,
consistent with the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him,   he cannot be held liable for more than what he was charged. There can only be one conviction for
43

rape if the information charges only one offense, even if the evidence shows three separate acts of sexual
intercourse. 
44

Neither are we persuaded by the claim that Gilda was not able to positively identify the accused. He was familiar to
Gilda one or two weeks before the incident because she saw him driving a tricycle and had, in fact, been once a
passenger of his. She saw him clearly at the guardhouse before the incident because the guardhouse was well-lit;
she was his passenger that evening until he stopped his tricycle near the unfinished house; and she had ample
opportunity to see and recognize him during the assault. Then, Gilda did not hesitate to point to and identify the
accused as her rapist when the latter was brought by the policemen to the house of Tony Antonio.

The accused's defense of alibi, which is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to concoct and fabricate, cannot
prevail over his positive identification by Gilda. 45

Moreover, any scintilla of doubt both as to the identification of the accused and as to his guilt was
dissolved by the overtures of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law on pleading for forgiveness from
Gilda. The accused did not disown their acts, which were testified to by his kumadre, Resurreccion Talub
Quiocho, and Gilda herself. He chose not to deny their testimony. Finally, despite the unequivocal
pronouncement by the trial court that his guilt was "strongly established by the acts of his parents, wife
and relatives, who had gone to the house of the victim to ask her forgiveness and to seek a compromise,"
the accused dared not assign that finding and conclusion as an error and his Appellant's Brief is
conspicuously silent thereon. Indubitably then, the accused was a party to the decision to seek for
forgiveness, or had prior knowledge of the plan to seek for it and consented to pursue it, or confirmed and
ratified the act of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law. A plea for forgiveness may be considered as
analogous to an attempt to compromise. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offense (criminal
negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.   No one would ask for forgiveness unless he had
46

committed some wrong, for to forgive means to absolve, to pardon, to cease to feel resentment against on
account of wrong committed; give up claim to requital from or retribution upon
(an offender).   7 In People vs. Calimquim,   we stated:
4 48

The fact that appellant's mother sought forgiveness for her son from Corazon's father is an indication
of guilt. (See People vs. Olmedillo,
L-42660, August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA 193).

Evidence II.
The accused may be correct in the third assigned error because no testimony of a witness established that the
accused was in a state of drunkenness when he sexually assaulted Gilda. The trial court may have formed its
conclusion that the accused was drunk from his testimony that he and Alfredo Fernandez were drinking liquor in his
house from 9:00 to 11:00 p.m. of 31 March 1992. In any event, that erroneous conclusion is innocuous.

We do not then hesitate to conclude that the accused, having had carnal knowledge of complainant Gilda Ambray
through the use of force and intimidation, committed the crime of rape as defined and penalized in Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty being reclusion perpetua.

The damages awarded by the trial court stand modification. No damage for loss of income due to Gilda's resignation
from her employment should have been awarded, the resignation being unnecessary. Conformably however with
the current jurisprudence, she is entitled to indemnity of P50,000.00. For her shame, as well as mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation which rape necessarily brings to
the offended party,  she is entitled to recover moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Article 2217 of the
49

Civil Code. However, since no aggravating circumstance had been proved, exemplary damages may not be
awarded. In Article 2230 of the Civil Code, such damages may be awarded in criminal cases when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision of 30 June 1994 of Branch 19 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, in Criminal Case No. B-92-216 is AFFIRMED, subject to the modification on
the civil liabilities, and as so modified, the awards of P30,000.00 as actual damages for loss of monthly salary and
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages are deleted, and accused-appellant Gener de Guzman y Sico is further ordered
to pay the complainant Gilda Ambray the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity. The awards for moral damages, litigation
expenses and attorney's fees stand.

Evidence II.
 11.) [G.R. No. 117702. February 10, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRISPIN YPARRAGUIRRE, Accused-

Appellant.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Accused-appellant Crispin Yparraguirre was charged with the crime of rape in an Information that
reads as follows:

"That on or about July 6, 1990, in the Municipality of Panabo, Province of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a hunting
knife, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of Rosita Bacaling, against her will."1 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The prosecution established that Rosita Bacaling was a housemaid of appellant and his wife; that on
or about 7:00 in the evening of July 6, 1990 at the spouses' room in Panabo, Davao, Rosita was
cooking porridge for the spouses' two children, one aged four years old and the other nine months
old. Accused-appellant arrived from work and found the two children asleep. He approached Rosita
and gave her a small white envelope said to contain medicine for her skin disease. Rosita was
afflicted with rashes on her thighs and stomach which she allegedly contracted from one of the
children. Rosita opened the envelope and counted fifteen (15) tablets inside. As instructed by
appellant, Rosita took all the tablets. A few minutes later, she felt weak and fell down. Suddenly, she
realized that appellant was dragging her to the spouses' bed. She tried to get up but appellant
pushed her down the bed and pointed a hunting knife at her neck. He ordered Rosita not to move or
he would kill her. Then he removed her clothes and went on top of her. He kissed her face, breasts,
stomach and private parts and then entered her. Rosita cried out in pain but appellant continued
entering her. After satisfying his lust, appellant pulled out and punched Rosita in the stomach. She
lost consciousness. Exsm

A few minutes later, Rosita woke up and saw blood in her private parts. She wiped the blood and
changed her clothes. Seeing her awake, appellant threatened to kill her should she report the
incident to her parents. Appellant then left the house.2 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Rosita did not say a word about the incident. She continued serving the Yparraguirres for one month
before leaving them to return to her mother's house in Barrio Cagangohan. Her mother found Rosita
in a state of shock. She could not eat nor talk, neither could she perform ordinary daily functions
such as dressing herself. In short, Rosita became helpless. She was brought to the Municipal Health
Officer by her mother for examination. On August 22, 1990, the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Imelda
T. Bendijo, interviewed the girl and found her unresponsive and unable to talk. She conducted a
physical examination and also found that:

"x x x Physical examination externally no abnormal findings;

Pelvic examination -- normal vagina with old laceration found at 2:00 [position]; hymen not intact;

Internal examination -- admits one finger;

Advised for pregnancy test and for consultation by [sic] psychiatrist.

x x x."3
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Evidence II.
Upon the Municipal Health Officer's advice, Rosita was confined at the Davao City Mental Hospital for
observation and treatment. After a week of treatment, Rosita began to talk and revealed that she
was raped by appellant.4 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Accused-appellant pled not guilty to the crime charged. He claimed that on the night of the alleged
rape he was selling fish at the public market. Allegedly, he was at the market at 4:00 in the morning,
and worked straight until 8:00 in the evening. He never left the fish stall until after 8:00 in the
evening because of his many customers.5 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also
ordered him to indemnify Rosita Bacaling P50,000.00 as moral damages and pay P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees, thus:

"WHEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the court finds accused Crispin Yparraguirre guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape punishable under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. Correspondingly, the court hereby sentences the said accused to suffer and undergo the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the
costs.

Accused Crispin Yparraguirre is also ordered to indemnify the victim Rosita Bacaling the amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus payment of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED."6

In this appeal, accused-appellant contends that:

"THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF RAPE;

II

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT WITNESS MARY ANN YPARRAGUIRRE WENT TO THE
MOTHER OF THE ACCUSED ON NOVEMBER 23, 1990 TO NEGOTIATE FOR THE DROPPING OF
THE CASE."7 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The appeal has no merit. After reviewing the records, we find that the prosecution evidence, which
rests mainly on the testimony of Rosita Bacaling, is credible, reliable and trustworthy. Rosita testified
in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner and never wavered even on cross-examination
and rebuttal. The inconsistencies in her testimony are minor which tend to buttress, rather than
weaken, the conclusion that her testimony was not contrived.8 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The question of whether Rosita contracted the skin disease from the children of appellant is not
important. The undisputed fact is that she was afflicted with the disease and that appellant gave her
tablets for treatment of the disease. Appellant's allegation that Rosita should have fallen asleep for
hours after ingesting the tablets is speculative. There is no evidence that the tablets were sleeping
tablets. They, however, weakened Rosita and prevented her from making any resistance to
appellant's lewd acts.9 The delay in filing the complaint does not in any way affect Rosita's
credibility.10 She was afraid of appellant's threat to her life. The complaint was filed three months
after Rosita told her mother of the incident, and three months is not too long a period to file a
complaint for rape.

Rosita was a seventeen-year old barrio lass and a high school dropout. She was also the breadwinner
of the family.11 It is hard to believe that Rosita would fabricate a story of defloration, open herself to
Evidence II.
public trial and place her family, who depended on her, in a very humiliating and compromising
situation for no reason at all.12 Rosita suffered psychologically from the incident. Before the rape, she
had been working for the Yparraguirres for two months13 and the spouses actually found her to be a
good worker.14 When Rosita returned to her family, however, she lost her speech and could not
perform ordinary daily functions that she had to seek psychiatric treatment. Indeed, Rosita's
psychological condition could not have been the product of ill-motive and fabrication.

Anent the second assigned error, there is evidence that after Rosita revealed the rape to her
mother, appellant's wife, Mary Ann Yparraguirre, offered the victim's mother, Merlyn
Bacaling, fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) to dissuade her from filing the
complaint.15 When Merlyn refused, Mary Ann increased the offer to twenty-five thousand
pesos (P25,000.00). Still Merlyn refused to accept it. 16 As pointed out by appellant, no
criminal complaint had been filed at the time the compromise offer was made.
Nevertheless, the rape incident was already known to appellant's wife. Mary Ann herself
testified that Merlyn told her about it on November 3, 1990, the day when Mary Ann first
offered the money.17 An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal complaint be
first filed before the offer can be received in evidence against the offeror. 18 What is
required is that after committing the crime, the accused or his representative makes an
offer to compromise and such offer is proved.

The positive identification of accused-appellant as the rapist prevails over his defense of alibi.19 It was
not physically impossible for appellant to have been at the scene of the crime. The public market was
merely a ten-minute walk from their rented room20 and during work breaks, appellant would
sometimes go home to bring food to his children.21 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision dated May 10, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4,
Panabo, Davao is affirmed. Costs against appellant.

Evidence II.
 12.) [G.R. No. 8931. March 14, 1914. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUAN MARQUI, Defendant-Appellant.

Alejo Mabanag for Appellant.

Solicitor-General Harvey for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; EVIDENCE; NEGOTIATIONS FOR COMPROMISE. — The weight of authority and
reason sustains the rule which admits evidence of offers to compromise, in criminal cases, but
permits the accused to show that such offers were not made under a consciousness of guilt, but
merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a
claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt and an
attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.

2. ID.; ARTICLE 11, PENAL CODE. — The beneficent provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code, as
amended by Act No. 2142 of the Philippine Legislature, are peculiarly applicable to offenders who are
shown to be members of those uncivilized tribes, and to other offenders who, as a result of the fact
that their lives are cast with such people far away from the centers of civilization, appear to be so
lacking in "instruction and education" that they should not be held to so high a degree of
responsibility as is demanded of those citizens who have had the advantage of living their lives in
contact with the refining influences of civilization.

3. ID.; ID.; THEFT AND ROBBERY. — While it is true that this court has quite uniformly held that
convicts of the crimes of theft and robbery were not entitled to the benefits of the provisions of
article 11 of the Penal Code prior to its amendment by Act No. 2142: Held, That under the provisions
of the article thus amended, the courts may and should, even in cases of theft and robbery, take into
consideration the lack of instruction and education of the offender where it appears that under all the
circumstances attending the commission of the offense, he should not be held to the strict degree of
responsibility prescribed in the Code for the ordinary offender.

4. ID.; ID.; ID. — Mere ignorance or lack of education will not always be sufficient to justify the
mitigation of the prescribed penalties for crimes such as theft or robbery, though cases may and will
arise wherein under all the "circumstances attending" the commission of these offenses the benefits
of the provisions of this article as amended should be extended to convicts of these offenses.

DECISION

CARSON, J. :

The appellant in this case was convicted in the court below of the theft of a caraballa and her calf,
and sentenced to imprisonment for a period of five years, to suffer the accessory penalties prescribed
by law, and to pay his share of the costs of the proceedings.

Counsel for the accused contends that the trial court erred in giving probative value to the
testimony of one Dagsa, the principal witness for the prosecution; in accepting proof as to certain
extrajudicial admissions alleged to have been made by the accused, including an offer to
compromise the case by the payment of a sum of money; and in declining to accept as true the
testimony of the accused in his own behalf at the trial. We find nothing in the record, however, which
would justify us in disturbing the findings of the trial judge as to the degree of credit which should be
Evidence II.
accorded the various witnesses called at the trial.

Counsel rests his contention that evidence as to the extrajudicial statements made by the accused
should have been excluded on the ground that, as counsel insists, there is no formal proof in the
record that they were made voluntarily, and that they were therefore inadmissible as proof in so far
as they can be construed as admission or confessions of guilt. In answer to this contention it is
sufficient to say that there is no suggestion in the record in the court below that these extrajudicial
statements were not made voluntarily, and we are satisfied that if the evidence as to the
circumstances under which these incriminating statements were made accepted as true it clearly
rebuts the possibility that they were made involuntarily, or extorted by force, threats, or promise of
reward. The record clearly discloses that these extrajudicial statements were made in the
course of offers to compromise and that they were made by the accused voluntarily,
though doubtless these offers to compromise were made in the hope that if accepted he
would escape prosecution.

The question as to the admissibility of offers to compromise in criminal cases has frequently been
discussed in the courts of the United States, and the practice there does not appear to be wholly
uniform. We think, however, that the weight both of authority an of reason sustains the rule which
admits evidence of offers to compromise, but permits the accused to show that such offers
were not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of
imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the
offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the
legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.

Satisfaction to the owner of the goods stolen is admissible, as evidence against the accused, but if
made merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment, and not under a consciousness of guilt, it
is not evidence. (U. S. v. Hunter, 1 Cranch, C.C., 317.)

In a prosecution for seduction, evidence that the accused had sought an adjustment with the
prosecutrix is inadmissible, if such offer of adjustment did not contain an admission of guilt. (Wilson
v. State, 73 Ala., 527.)

On a prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape upon a married woman, evidence is
admissible on behalf of the prosecution to show that the defendant sent a third person to the father
of the prosecutrix to ascertain if the case could be compromised. (Barr v. People, 113 Ill., 471.)

In a larceny case, evidence is not admissible to show that defendant stated that he would pay $50 if
it could be settled, in reply to threats by the owner of the goods stolen that he would prosecuted for
damages, and a solicitation to settle. (Frain v. State, 40 Ga., 530.)

In a prosecution for larceny, evidence is not admissible that the defendant paid a sum of money in
settlement of a civil action brought to recover the property alleged to have been stolen. (State v.
Emerson, 48 Iowa, 172.)

An offer of compromise, voluntarily made by the accused, without threat or promise, and
the reply thereto, are admissible in evidence upon his trial for a crime. (State v. Bruce, 33
La. Ann., 186.)

An offer compromise of a crime, unaccepted by the prosecutor, may be proven by the state as an
admission of guilt, or as disclosing possession of the property which is the subject of the burglary and
larceny charged in the indictment. (State v. Rodrigues, 45 La. Ann., 1040; 13 Southern, 802.)

It may be shown that the prisoner sent a message to the prosecutor, proposing to take a whipping
and to be let go. (State v. DeBerry, 92 N. C., 800.)

Evidence II.
We are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, but we are of opinion that
in imposing the penalty the trial court should have taken into consideration as a mitigating
circumstance the manifest lack of "instruction and education" of the offender. It does not clearly
appear whether he is or is not an uncivilized Igorot, although there are indications in the record
which tend to show that he is. But in any event, it is very clear that if he is not a member of an
uncivilized tribe of Igorot, he is a densely ignorant and untutored fellow, who lived in the Igorot
country, and is not much, if any, higher than are they in the scale of civilization. The beneficent
provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code as amended by Act No. 2142 of the Philippine Legislature
are peculiarly applicable to offenders who are shown to be members of these uncivilized tribes, and
to other offenders who, as a result of the fact that their lives are cast with such people far away from
the centers of civilization, appear to be so lacking in "instruction and education" that they should not
be held to so high a degree of responsibility as is demanded of those citizens who have had the
advantage of living their lives in contact with the refining influences of civilization.

It is true that this court has quite uniformly held that convicts of the crimes of theft and robbery are
not entitled to the benefits of the provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code prior to its amendment by
Act No. 2142, this on the theory that under the provisions of the article prior to its amendment the
ground upon which the courts were authorized in their discretion to mitigate the penalties prescribed
by the code was "the circumstance of the offender being a native, mestizo, or Chinese." As to crimes
of this nature we declined to hold that the mere fact that one is a native of the Philippine Islands, a
mestizo or a Chinese would justify a claim that upon conviction of crimes such as theft or robbery he
should be treated more leniently than the members of any other race or people, no sound
presumption arising from the mere racial affiliation of the convict that he was less able to appreciate
the criminal character of such offenses or to resist the temptation to commit them than are they.

Under the provisions of the article as amended by Act No. 2142, the ground upon which the courts
are authorized to mitigate the prescribed penalties is not the racial affiliation of the convict, but "the
degree of instruction and education of the offender;" and while mere ignorance or lack of education
will not always be sufficient to justify the mitigation of the prescribed penalties for crimes such as
theft and robbery, there can be no doubt that cases may and will arise wherein under all the
"circumstances attending" the commission of these offenses the exercise of a sound discretion will
justify a more lenient treatment of an ignorant and semicivilized offender, than that which should be
accorded one who has had the advantage of such a degree of instruction and education as would fully
and properly understanding and appreciating the criminal character of the offense committed by him.

We conclude, therefore, that under the provisions of article 11 as amended by Act No. 2142, the
courts may and should, even in cases of theft and robbery should, even in cases of theft and
robbery, take into consideration the lack of instruction and education of the offender where it
appears that under all the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, he should not be
held to the strict degree of responsibility prescribed in the code for the ordinary offender.

The larceny was of large cattle and falls within articles 517, 518, and 520 of the Penal Code, as
amended by Act No. 2030. According to those sections, as amended, the value of the animals stolen
being 650 pesetas, a penalty one degree higher than arresto mayor in its medium degree to presidio
correctional in its minimum degree should have been imposed; in other words, presidio correctional
in its medium degree to presidio mayor in its minimum degree. Giving the convict the benefit of the
provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code, as amended, this penalty should be imposed its minimum
degree — that is to say, the penalty applicable in this case is that of presidio correctional in its
medium degree.

Modified by imposing the penalty prescribed for the offense of which the defendant and appellant was
convicted in the minimum degree — that is to say, by imposing upon accused the penalty of two
years four months and one day of presidio correctional, in lieu of that of five years’ imprisonment
imposed by the court below — the judgment convicting and sentencing him should be is hereby
affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the Appellant.
Evidence II.
Evidence II.
 13.) G.R. No. 127569. July 30, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SENEN PRADES, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court for automatic review is the August 13, 1996 judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Iriga City, Branch 36, in Criminal Case No. IR-3666, finding accused-appellant Senen Prades guilty of
rape and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death. The judgment likewise ordered
appellant to pay private complainant P50,000.00 by way of moral damages, as well as the costs.1 cräläwvirtualibräry

The information in Criminal Case No. IR-3666 alleges:

That on or about the 24th day of March, 1994, at about 12:00 oclock midnight, as San Vicente Ogbon,
Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, armed with a handgun, by means of force and intimidation and with lewd design, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said Emmie R. Rosales
against the latters will, and that the accused perpetrated the offense charged at the dwelling of
herein complainant and with the use of a firearm in threatening complainant, to the latters damage
and prejudice in such amount as may be proven in court.2 cräläwvirtualibräry

With the assistance of counsel de oficio, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.3 The defense
waived the pre-trial4 and the case proceeded to trial in due course.

The private complainant and the physician who conducted a medical examination on her were
presented in the trial court to establish the case for the People. After the physician had testified as
the first witness, appellant absconded. The records of the case reveal that appellant escaped from his
escort guard while he was being transported from a hearing at the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City
to the Tinangis Penal Farm in Pili, Camarines Sur on March 29, 1995.5 Trial accordingly continued in
absentia.

Private complainant Emmie R. Rosales was seventeen years old when the dastardly outrage befell her
on March 24, 1994. She testified that she and her younger sister, Melissa, were asleep in a room in
their house and were then the only persons at home because their grandfather, who lived with them,
was in the hospital at that time.6
cräläwvirtualibräry

At around midnight, complainant suddenly awoke as she felt a heavy weight pressing down upon her.
She thereupon realized that a man, clad only in his underwear, lay on top of her. She was about to
shout when he poked a gun at her neck and warned her not to create any noise or he would kill
her.7cräläwvirtualibräry

Although the house lights were off, moonlight streamed through the sawali door of the room,
enabling complainant to see the intruder.8 She recognized him as appellant Senen Prades, her
barriomate. It appears that he gained entry into the house through a passageway in the kitchen.9 cräläwvirtualibräry

Appellant attempted to remove complainants pants and underwear even as he continued to jab the
gun at her neck. Complainant resisted him and struggled for twenty to thirty minutes until she was
overcome by his strength.10 He knelt on her knees and succeeded in removing her clothing.11 He then
spread her legs apart, forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina,12 and bodily pinned her down. He
fondled her breast and private parts and made push and pull movements with his genital organ for

Evidence II.
about two minutes.13 Complainant was resultantly in pain as she felt blood ooze out of her
vagina.14 She continued to struggle against appellant but to no avail.

After satisfying his lust, appellant pulled away from complainant and once again nudged her with the
gun. He warned her not to tell anyone about the event or he would kill her and her family.15 Appellant
left complainant stunned and in tears. She did not inform anyone about the incident.

Several days later, complainant received two letters from appellant. 16 She saw appellant
hand the first letter to her grandmother who later gave it to her. 17 The other letter was
given by appellant to complainant through the latters sister. 18 Aggrieved by all these
circumstances, complainant decided to disclose to her grandfather the sexual assault that
transpired on March 24.

Complainant and her grandfather forthwith reported the matter to the Barangay Captain who advised
them to proceed to the police headquarters of Nabua, Camarines Sur.19 After filing a report with the
police, complainant underwent physical examination at a rural health center in Sto. Domingo.20 She
then instituted a complaint for rape against appellant.

Pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Nabua, Camarines
Sur,21 appellant was arrested and detained at the municipal jail of Nabua. He filed a motion for bail
but the same was denied by the lower court.22 Trial commenced in Branch 36 of the Regional Trial
Court on December 14, 1994.

Dr. Stephen A. Beltran,23 the Rural Health Physician of Nabua, Camarines Sur, testified that he
conducted a physical examination on complainant on April 8, 1994 and found indications of sexual
intercourse.24 The medical certificate issued by said physician revealed the following:

FINDINGS: VAGINAL EXAMINATION

(+) Hymenal laceration scar at 6:00 oclock

(-) Gross blood

(-) (S)eminal fluid

IMPRESSION: VAGINAL PENETRATION, COMPLETE.25 cräläwvirtualibräry

As earlier noted, appellant escaped from confinement before the prosecution had completed the
presentation of its evidence. A general warrant of arrest was issued for his apprehension and it was
ordered that he be included in the list of wanted criminals.26 Appellant, however, has not been
recaptured up to now.

Fearing for her life and for the safety of her family members, complainant left her home in San
Vicente, Nabua, Camarines Sur, and moved to Naga City.27 All she hoped for was to begin a new life,
away from the stigma created by the crime on her name and her family, and away from the dread of
possibly being killed by appellant who was at large and, perhaps, lurking in the shadows.

After the presentation of its evidence, the prosecution rested its case. Because appellant had taken
flight, he was deemed to have waived his right to adduce evidence hence counsel for the defense was
unable to introduce evidence to dispute the charge.28 cräläwvirtualibräry

In its decision dated August 13, 1996, the court a quo found appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape, aggravated by the circumstance of dwelling, and imposed upon him the
penalty of death. The lower court issued another warrant of arrest for the capture of appellant.29 It
Evidence II.
has not been served to date as he remains at large, a fugitive from justice. Because appellant was
condemned to suffer the principal penalty of death, his conviction is now before the Court on
automatic review.

As its lone assignment of error, the defense alleges that the court below erred in finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It is contended that the testimony of
complainant on the identity of appellant as the author of the crime is doubtful not only because there
was insufficient lighting in the room of the complainant, where the alleged act of rape took place, but
also because complainant had never been face to face with appellant prior to the incident.30 cräläwvirtualibräry

The Court has exhaustively reviewed and objectively analyzed the records of this case, especially so
because a capital offense is involved, and sees no cogent reason to depart from the findings and
conclusions of the court below. We consequently affirm the conviction of appellant.

The contention that the identity of appellant has not been established deserves exiguous
consideration because it is undisputed that appellant was known to the victim long before the
assault. They lived in the same barrio31 and the wife of appellant was the goddaughter of
complainants grandmother.32 Appellant also used to periodically pass by the house of
complainant.33 cräläwvirtualibräry

The defense adverts to the fact that on the night of the occurrence, there were no lights in the room
where the rape took place. It is further claimed that it was impossible for moonlight to penetrate
the sawali door and enable complainant to identify her assailant because the spaces in
the sawali were as small as the diameter of a mungo bean x x x (a)nd these small spaces are set
wide apart between the slats.34 cräläwvirtualibräry

This contention must fail. The evidence shows that the crime scene was not in total darkness. As
already stated, complainant was able to identify appellant because the room was lit by moonlight
that filtered through the sparse, woven bamboo slats of the sawali door. The amount of light emitted
by the moon is relative. While there are evenings of pitch darkness, there are moonlit nights when
the brightness of the moon is sufficient to enable one to see distinct details of objects.

In addition to this consideration, the house of complainant was a typical provincial home made of
bamboo,35 usually consisting of bamboo stilts, interwoven slats of bamboo forming walls of sawali,
and similar materials. Such constructional pattern naturally allowed light to penetrate into the house
and this fact reasonably induces the conclusion that complainant was truthful in claiming that there
was sufficient illumination in the room which permitted her to identify her aggressor.

Furthermore, complainant had an extended and adequate look at the features of appellant during the
assault, with ample opportunity to recognize him. As this Court has repeatedly held, a man and a
woman cannot be physically closer to each other than during the sexual act.36 Not surprisingly,
therefore, complainant readily and positively identified appellant in court during the trial as the man
who raped her on March 24, 1994.

Doctrinally, the credibility of a rape victim is augmented when, as in the instant case, she has no
motive to testify against the accused or where there is absolutely no evidence which even remotely
suggests that she could have been actuated by such motive.37 We are thus convincingly assured that
the lower court prudently fulfilled its obligation as a factual assessor and a legal adjudicator. We
accordingly give due respect to the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of the complaining
witness.

Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by, inter alia, force or intimidation. The
degree of the force or intimidation required is relative. It need not be overpowering or irresistible

Evidence II.
because all that is necessary is that it is sufficient to consummate the purpose which appellant had in
mind.38cräläwvirtualibräry

It is indubitable that complainant put up a struggle when appellant forced himself upon her. She was
inevitably subdued by his strength and she ultimately succumbed to his venery. Even
assuming arguendo that complainant did not repel the physical aggression of appellant, this does not
preclude a finding that she was raped. It is well settled that physical resistance need not be
established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself,
against her will, to the rapists advances because of fear for her life and personal safety.39 cräläwvirtualibräry

In the case now before us, although complainant had a companion who was asleep in the room when
she was attacked by appellant, she could not have dared risk her life by screaming for help because
appellant pressed a handgun at her neck and threatened to kill her and her family if she would resist
him or report the incident. The evidence establishes that the sexual intercourse between appellant
and complainant was consummated through force and intimidation and ineluctably constituted the
crime of rape. The fact that it was committed in a room where there was another occupant does not
rule out the crime.40 cräläwvirtualibräry

In addition, and virtually foreclosing further chicanery by appellant, it is conceded that

after the rape, he sent complainant two letters in which he implored her forgiveness and
offered to leave his wife so that he could be with her. In fine, appellant sealed his own fate
by admitting his crime under the seal of a virtual confession in fact, if not in law.

In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those allowed by law to be

settled through mutual concessions, an offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. 41 For this rule to apply, it is not
necessary that a complaint be first filed by the victim because all that is required is that
after committing the crime, appellant or his representative makes an offer to compromise
and such offer is proved.42 cräläwvirtualibräry

Evidently, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong and a
plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. 43 The
letters of appellant containing an appeal for condonation of his acts cannot but be
construed as an implied admission of his guilt.

The Court is persuaded that appellant sent complainant the letters introduced in evidence
by the prosecution and that said letters contained an admission of his guilt, thus
confirming his culpability. If appellant did not forcibly rape complainant on the night of
March 24, 1994, complainant may possibly have accepted appellants offer to live with her.
At the very least, she would not have revealed her misfortune so as not to expose the
despoliation of her virtue. That complainant chose to divulge the incident and subject
herself to the disgrace of public scrutiny and scandal buttresses the charge that she had
been criminally ravished by appellant.

Further, because no evidence was presented by the defense to discredit this affirmation of guilt
derived from the contents of the letters, the authenticity of said letters is no longer open to question.
The letters thus bolster and corroborate complainants testimony on the identity and guilty of
appellant.44 cräläwvirtualibräry

Another factor supporting appellants conviction is his flight. By escaping from confinement during
trial and failing to turn himself in despite his subsequent conviction by the trial court, and despite the
standing warrant of arrest, appellant has become a fugitive from justice.

Evidence II.
Flight is the evasion of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself in order to avoid
arrest, detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings.45 It is considered an
indication of guilt.46 A fugitive from justice, on the other hand, is one who flees after conviction to
avoid punishment, as well as one who, after being charged, flees to avoid prosecution.47 By his flight
and thereafter becoming a fugitive, appellant waived his right to adduce evidence and consequently
denied himself the opportunity to dispute the charge against him.

It is a fundamental rule that criminal cases rise and fall on the strength of the evidence of the
prosecution and not on the weakness or, as in this case, the absence of evidence of the defense. We
emphasize that the flight of appellant, by itself, does not sustain his conviction because the law
requires therefor no less than the proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In the case before us,
however, complainants testimony and positive identification of appellant were sufficiently
corroborated by the testimony of the physician who examined her, the medico-legal report, and the
letters of appellant in which he acknowledged his guilt and sought complainants mercy. These
considerations convince the Court that appellant was the perpetrator of the crime. His flight and
status as a fugitive from the law merely dispel any remaining shred of doubt on his guilt.

Incidentally, to obviate any question as to the propriety of the course of action we have taken in this
case, that is, of subjecting the judgment of conviction of the trial court to automatic appellate review
despite the fact that appellant was partially tried and convicted by said court in absentia, and is and
has been a fugitive from justice since then and up to the present, we draw upon our ruling in People
vs. Esparas, et al.48 which declared:

x x x On August 20, 1996, we issued an extended resolution upholding the power of this Court to
review all death penalty cases regardless of the escape of the accused from confinement prior to the
judgment of the trial court, thus:

We hold, however, that there is more wisdom in our existing jurisprudence mandating our review of
all death penalty cases, regardless of the wish of the convict and regardless of the will of the court. x
x x. Ours is not only the power but the duty to review all death penalty cases. No litigant can
repudiate this power which is bestowed by the Constitution. x x x.

On the question as to whether or not the Court can validly promulgate this judgment in the case at
bar, the answer is in the affirmative. As graphically elucidated in Florendo vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.:49
cräläwvirtualibräry

The last paragraph of Section 6 of Rule 120* is a new provision introduced by the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, which provides for the promulgation of judgment in absentia (Gupit Jr., Rules of
Criminal Procedure 362-363 [1986]). The amendment was intended to obviate the situation in the
past where the judicial process could be subverted by the accused jumping bail to frustrate the
promulgation of judgment. In explaining the amendment, Justice Florenz D. Regalado commented:

Without this amendatory provision, the ends of public justice would be set at naught and, where the
civil liability ex delicto was instituted with the criminal action, the offended party could not enforce
either the primary liability of the accused or any subsidiary liability, where proper and involved in the
case, as no judgment could be promulgated. Since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions only
require prior arraignment as an indispensable requisite and the trial may thereafter proceed in the
absence of the accused, the judgment in this case being merely the procedural culmination of the
trial, the promulgation thereof can justifiably be made in absentia in the manner set out in this
section (II Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 369, [6th ed., 1989]).

If, for any reason, it should be claimed that the provision under discussion is intended to be the
procedure in the trial courts, the simple rejoinder is that there is no reason why, on considerations of
its rationale and procedural expediency, the same should not apply to the same factual situation in

Evidence II.
the appellate courts. In the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the judgment is promulgated
by merely filing the signed copy thereof with the Clerk of Court who causes true copies of the same
to be served upon the parties,50 hence the appearance of the accused is not even required there as
his presence is necessary only in the promulgation of the judgments of trial courts.51 Thereafter,
when the judgment of the appellate court becomes executory, the records of the case together with a
certified copy of the appellate court judgment are returned to the court a quo for execution of the
judgment.52 On this issue, however, one member of this Court has submitted a separate opinion.

At this juncture, we also note that when the rape was committed the governing law was Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4111 and 7659,53 under which the use
of a deadly weapon in committing the felony of rape was, as it still is, punished by reclusion
perpetua to death.

Reclusion perpetua and death are indivisible penalties and Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
provides the rules for their application, one of which, pertinent to this case, is that when in the
commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall
be applied.

Two aggravating circumstances were alleged in the information, namely, nocturnity and dwelling. We
agree with the court below that nocturnity cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in
this case because although the crime was committed late that night, the evidence does not positively
establish that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime, or that it was especially sought by
the offender to ensure its commission, or that the offender took advantage thereof for impunity. It
cannot, therefore, be considered herein under either the so-called objective or subjective tests for
determining the existence of this circumstance.

It is clear, however, that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is attendant in the commission of
the crime. Article 14(5) of the Revised Penal Code provides that this circumstance aggravates a
felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given
provocation. In the instant case, the aforesaid circumstance of dwelling was definitely present in the
commission of the crime of rape with the use of a deadly weapon. From all the foregoing
considerations, the presence of this aggravating circumstance mandates that the supreme penalty of
death be imposed.

The lower court, however, erred in classifying the award of P50,000.00 to the offended party as
being in the character of moral damages. Jurisprudence has elucidated that the award authorized by
the criminal law as civil indemnity ex delicto for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the
prevailing judicial policy and aside from other proven actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual or
compensatory damages in civil law.54 For that matter, the civil liability ex delicto provided by the
Revised Penal Code, that is, restitution, reparation and indemnification,55 all correspond to actual or
compensatory damages in the Civil Code,56 since the other damages provided therein are moral,
nominal, temperate or moderate, liquidated, and exemplary or corrective damages57 which have
altogether different concepts and fundaments.

We reiterate here that said civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape; it is
distinct from and should not be denominated as moral damages which are based on different jural
foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.58 Evidently, therefore, the
lower court actually intended the award of P50,000.00 as indemnification to be paid to the victim.

On this score, we have to take note of a new policy adopted by the Court. The recent judicial
prescription is that the indemnification of the victim shall be in the increased amount of P75,000.00 if
the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the
death penalty is authorized by the applicable amendatory laws.59 Applying the foregoing policy, the
civil indemnity to be awarded to the offended party in the case at bar is and should be P75,000.00.

Evidence II.
One other cognate development in the case law on rape is applicable to the present disposition. The
Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that under consideration, moral damages may
additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems
just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the practice.
Indeed, the conventional requirement of allegata et probata in civil procedure and for essentially civil
cases should be dispensed with in criminal prosecutions for rape with the civil aspect included
therein, since no appropriate pleadings are filed wherein such allegations can be made.

Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological
sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages60 are too obvious to still require the recital
thereof at the trial by the victim, since the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such agony
on her part as a gauge of her credibility. What exists by necessary implication as being ineludibly
present in the case need not go through superfluity of still being proven through a testimonial
charade.

The People having established the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt, his conviction and the
penalty imposed by the court a quo is correct and must consequently be affirmed. Withal, four
Members of this Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659 insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty is unconstitutional; but they nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the
law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be imposed in this case.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 36, in Criminal Case No.
IR-3666 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Senen Prades is
ordered to indemnify the offended party, Emmie R. Rosales, in the amount of P75,000.00 as
compensatory damages, and to pay the additional amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, with
costs in all instances.

In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act
No. 7659, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.

Evidence II.
14.) G.R. No. 185522               June 13, 2012

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
HELEN T. KALALO, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This Rule 45 Petition assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30473.
1  2 

The CA affirmed the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, Manila, in Crim. Cases Nos.
3  4 

04-230278-84, which had in turn affirmed the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 11, Manila, in
5 

Crim. Case No. 372535-41. The MeTC acquitted respondent Helen T. Kalalo ("Kalalo") of a violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22, or the Bouncing Checks Law, but ruled that she was civilly liable to petitioner San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) for the amount of ₱ 71,009 representing the value of unpaid goods. 6

As culled from the records, it appears that respondent Kalalo had been a dealer of beer products since 1998. She
had a credit overdraft arrangement with petitioner SMC whereby, prior to the delivery of beer products, she would be
required to issue two checks to petitioner: a blank check and a check to be filled up with an amount corresponding
to the gross value of the goods delivered. At the end of the week, Kalalo and an agent of SMC would compute the
actual amount due to the latter by deducting the value of the returned empty beer bottles and cases from the gross
value of the goods delivered. Once they succeeded in determining the actual amount owed to SMC, that amount
would be written on the blank check, and respondent would fund her account accordingly. 7

In time, respondent’s business grew and the number of beer products delivered to her by SMC increased from 200
to 4,000 cases a week. Because of the increased volume of deliveries, it became very difficult for her to follow and
keep track of the transactions. Thus, she requested regular statements of account from petitioner, but it failed to
comply.8

In 2000, SMC’s agent required Kalalo to issue several postdated checks to cope with the probable increase in
orders during the busy Christmas season, without informing her of the breakdown of the balance. She complied with
the request; but after making several cash payments and returning a number of empty beer bottles and cases, she
noticed that she still owed petitioner a substantial amount. She then insisted that it provide her with a detailed
statement of account, but it failed to do so. In order to protect her rights and to compel SMC to update her account,
she ordered her bank to stop payment on the last seven checks she had issued to petitioner, the details of which
9 

are as follows:10

Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Date Amount

Check No.
0012825 Sept. 16, 2000 ₱ 62,200.00
0008250 Sept. 18, 2000 190,000.00
0012801 Sept. 25, 2000 190,000.00
0012802 Sept. 30, 2000 208,162.00
0012826 Sept. 30, 2000 62,200.00
0012823 Sept. 30, 2000 104,327.00
0012824 Oct. 14, 2000 104,326.00
TOTAL ₱ 921,215.00

On 19 October 2000, instead of updating the account of respondent Kalalo, petitioner SMC sent her a demand letter
for the value of the seven dishonored checks. 11

On 5 December 2000, and in the face of constant threats made by the agents of SMC, respondent’s counsel
12 

wrote a letter (the "Offer of Compromise") wherein Kalalo "acknowledge[d] the receipt of the statement of
Evidence II.
account demanding the payment of the sum of ₱ 816,689.00" and "submitt[ed] a proposal by way of
‘Compromise Agreement’ to settle the said obligation." 13

It appears, however, that SMC did not accept the proposal. On 9 March 2001, it filed a Complaint against
respondent for violating the Bouncing Checks Law. 14

In the meantime, Kalalo kept reiterating her demands that SMC update her account. During trial, and after the
prosecution had rested its case, petitioner finally complied. After tallying all cash payments and funded checks and
crediting all returned empty bottles and cases, the Statement of Account showed that the net balance of the amount
owed to petitioner was ₱ 71,009. Respondent thereafter recanted her Offer of Compromise and stated that, at
15 

the time she had the letter prepared, she was being threatened by SMC agents with imprisonment, and that
she did not know how much she actually owed petitioner. 16

After trial on the merits, the MeTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, these cases are hereby dismissed and the accused is hereby acquitted of all the charges against
her. However, it appearing that she still owes the private complainant, the accused is hereby ordered to pay the
amount of ₱ 71,009.00 to private complainant. 17

As the right against double jeopardy prevented an appeal of the criminal aspect of the case, SMC appealed only the
civil aspect of the MeTC’s Decision to the RTC. Petitioner claimed that it was entitled to the larger amount of ₱
921,215. After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the RTC found no reversible error in the MeTC’s
18 

Decision, dismissed the appeal of petitioner, and denied the latter’s Motion for Reconsideration.
19  20

Dissatisfied with the RTC’s Decision, SMC filed with the CA a Rule 42 Petition for Review, which was eventually
dismissed by the appellate court. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, to no avail.
21  22

SMC thereafter filed this Rule 45 Petition before this Court. 23

The Court’s Ruling

We deny the instant Petition and uphold the assailed Decision and Resolution of the appellate court.

The Offer of Compromise may not be considered as evidence against respondent Kalalo.

Petitioner argues that, in her Offer of Compromise, respondent "unequivocally admitted her liability to
private complainant-appellant duly assisted by her counsel." 24

We quote in full Kalalo’s Offer of Compromise addressed to petitioner:

December 5, 2000

Mr. JOSELITO MANALO

GENERAL MANAGER
San Miguel Corporation
Biglang Awa Street
Caloocan City

Dear Sir:

My client, Ms. HELEN T. KALALO of No. 1055-A Dagupan Street, Tondo, Manila, hereby acknowledges the receipt
of the Statement of Account demanding the payment of the sum of ₱ 816,689.00 representing her unpaid accounts.

Evidence II.
The reason why she was not able to pay her accounts on time is because she had great difficulty in collecting from
the following wholesalers:

1. MRS. EVELYN R. MONTILLA/MINES & LYN General Merchandise

624 Chacon St., Tondo, Manila
₱ 413,444.50 amount of Pilsen, Red Horse and Grande Beers (full goods)
₱ 115,500.00 amount of empties.

2. Mr. DANIEL TOMAS/ MRS. FORTUNE TOMAS

Ladies and Rum Gen. Merchandizing (sic)
1501 N. Zamora St., Tondo, Manila
₱ 150,000.00 amount of full goods, Pilsen and Red Horse beers.

She is respectfully submitting her proposal by way of "Compromise Agreement" to settle the said obligation:

Advance payment for the empties: ₱ 11,500.00

Installment of ₱ 10,000.00 per month for the principal, then later on for the interest due.

Considering the economic crisis, she is hoping that her proposal merits your kind consideration and approval.

Very respectfully yours,

SGD
Vicente G. Villamil
Counsel for Helen T. Kalalo 25

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the aforequoted letter does not contain an express acknowledgment of
liability. At most, what respondent acknowledged was the receipt of the statement of account, not the
existence of her liability to petitioner.

Furthermore, the fact that respondent made a compromise offer to petitioner SMC cannot be considered as
an admission of liability. In Pentagon Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we examined the reasons why
26 

compromise offers must not be considered as evidence against the offeror:

First, since the law favors the settlement of controversies out of court, a person is entitled to "buy his or her
peace" without danger of being prejudiced in case his or her efforts fail; hence, any communication made
toward that end will be regarded as privileged. Indeed, if every offer to buy peace could be used as evidence
against a person who presents it, many settlements would be prevented and unnecessary litigation would
result, since no prudent person would dare offer or entertain a compromise if his or her compromise
position could be exploited as a confession of weakness.

Second, offers for compromise are irrelevant because they are not intended as admissions by the parties
making them. A true offer of compromise does not, in legal contemplation, involve an admission on the part
of a defendant that he or she is legally liable, or on the part of a plaintiff, that his or her claim is groundless
or even doubtful, since it is made with a view to avoid controversy and save the expense of litigation. It is
the distinguishing mark of an offer of compromise that it is made tentatively, hypothetically, and in contemplation of
mutual concessions.  (citations omitted)
27 

Petitioner further argues that respondent’s Offer of Compromise may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt. It quotes Rule 130, Section 27 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which states:
28 

Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. – In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any
liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.

Evidence II.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be
compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.

We do not agree. As correctly pointed out by respondent, the Offer of Compromise dated 5 December 2000
was made prior to the filing of the criminal complaint against her on 9 March 2001 for a violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law. The Offer of Compromise was clearly not made in the context of a criminal
29 

proceeding and, therefore, cannot be considered as an implied admission of guilt.

Finally, during the testimony of respondent and after her receipt of the Statement of Account from SMC, she
recanted the contents of the Offer of Compromise. She explained that, at the time she had the letter prepared, the
final amount owed to petitioner SMC was yet undetermined; and that she was constantly facing threats of
imprisonment from petitioner’s agents.  The trial courts and the CA gave weight to her justification, and we find no
30  31 

cogent reason to disturb their findings. We rule, therefore, that the Offer of Compromise may not be considered as
evidence against respondent Kalalo, nor can it be the basis of her liability to petitioner in the amount of ₱ 921,215.

II

SMC failed to prove that Kalalo is indebted to it in the amount of ₱ 921,215.

SMC claims that it is entitled to collect the amount of ₱ 921,215 representing the value of unpaid goods from
respondent Kalalo. It argues that the MeTC erred in ruling that respondent was liable to it to the extent of only ₱
71,009, because the Statement of Account does not reflect the transactions covered by the dishonored checks, as it
only covers cash transactions. 32

We find, however, that aside from its bare assertions on appeal, SMC failed to present any evidence to prove that
cash transactions were treated differently from check transactions. Respondent correctly argues that if the check
transactions were covered by other statements of account, petitioner should have presented evidence of those
transactions during the proceedings before the lower court. 33

In any event, we cannot allow SMC to recover the amount of ₱ 921,215 from respondent, as it failed to prove the
existence of the purported indebtedness. The records are bereft of any evidence, other than the dishonored checks,
establishing the existence of that obligation. Checks, however, are not issued merely for the payment of a
preexisting obligation. They may likewise be issued as a guarantee for the performance of a future obligation. In this
case, it was sufficiently established that the dishonored checks were issued merely to guarantee the performance of
a future obligation; that is, the payment of the net value of the goods after the value of the empty bottles and beer
cases returned to petitioner were deducted from the gross value of the goods delivered to respondent. 1âwphi1

As to the amount of ₱ 71,009, both parties admit that the Statement of Account provided by SMC to respondent
showed a liability of only ₱ 71,009. Respondent presented in evidence the Statement of Account, which petitioner’s
witness confirmed to have come from SMC’s accounting department. 34

We therefore rule that SMC failed to present enough evidence to prove Kalalo’s indebtedness to it in the amount of
₱ 921,215, but that respondent’s obligation to petitioner in the amount of ₱ 71,009 is unrebutted and supported by
sufficient evidence.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no reversible error committed by the appellate court, the instant
Petition for Review is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 30473 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Evidence II.
15.) G.R. No. 178467

SPS. CRISTINO & EDNA CARBONELL, Petitioners,

vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The petitioners assail the decision promulgated on December 7, 2006,   whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
1

with modification the decision rendered on May 22, 1998  by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 157, in Pasig City
2

(RTC) dismissing the petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. 65725 for its lack of merit, and awarded attorney's fees
under the respondent's counterclaim.

Antecedents

The petitioners initiated against the respondent Civil Case No. 65725, an action for damages, alleging that they had
experienced emotional shock, mental anguish, public ridicule, humiliation, insults and embarrassment during their
trip to Thailand because of the respondent's release to them of five US$ 100 bills that later on turned out to be
counterfeit. They claimed that they had travelled to Bangkok, Thailand after withdrawing US$ l ,000.00 in US$ 100
notes from their dollar account at the respondent's Pateros branch; that while in Bangkok, they had exchanged five
US$ 100 bills into Baht, but only four of the US$ 100 bills had been accepted by the foreign exchange dealer
because the fifth one was "no good;" that unconvinced by the reason for the rejection, they had asked a companion
to exchange the same bill at Norkthon Bank in Bangkok; that the bank teller thereat had then informed them and
their companion that the dollar bill was fake; that the teller had then confiscated the US$ 100 bill and had threatened
to report them to the police if they insisted in getting the fake dollar bill back; and that they had to settle for a Foreign
Exchange Note receipt. 3

The petitioners claimed that later on, they had bought jewelry from a shop owner by using four of the remaining
US$100 bills as payment; that on the next day, however, they had been confronted by the shop owner at the hotel
lobby because their four US$ 100 bills had turned out to be counterfeit; that the shop owner had shouted at them:
"You Filipinos, you are all cheaters!;" and that the incident had occurred within the hearing distance of fellow
travelers and several foreigners.

The petitioners continued that upon their return to the Philippines, they had confronted the manager of the
respondent's Pateros branch on the fake dollar bills, but the latter had insisted that the dollar bills she had released
to them were genuine inasmuch as the bills had come from the head office; that in order to put the issue to rest, the
counsel of the petitioners had submitted the subject US$ 100 bills to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) for
examination; that the BSP had certified that the four US$100 bills were near perfect genuine notes;  and that their
4

counsel had explained by letter their unfortunate experience caused by the respondent's release of the fake US
dollar bills to them, and had demanded moral damages of ₱10 Million and exemplary damages. 5

The petitioners then sent a written notice to the respondent, attaching the BSP certification and informing the latter
that they were giving it five days within which to comply with their demand, or face court action.  In response, the
6

respondent's counsel wrote to the petitioners on March 1996 expressing sympathy with them on their experience
but stressing that the respondent could not absolutely guarantee the genuineness of each and every foreign
currency note that passed through its system; that it had also been a victim like them; and that it had exercised the
diligence required in dealing with foreign currency notes and in the selection and supervision of its employees. 7

Prior to the filing of the suit in the RTC, the petitioners had two meetings with the respondent's
representatives. In the course of the two meetings, the latter's representatives reiterated their sympathy and
regret over the troublesome experience that the petitioners had encountered, and offered to reinstate
US$500 in their dollar account, and, in addition, to underwrite a round-trip all-expense-paid trip to Hong
Kong, but they were adamant and staged a walk-out. 8

Evidence II.
In its judgment rendered on May 22, 1998,  the RTC ruled in favor of the respondent, disposing as follows:
9

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for lack of merit;

2. On the counterclaim, awarding Metrobank the amount of ₱20,000.00 as attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED. 10

The petitioners appealed, but the CA ultimately promulgated its assailed decision on December 7, 2006 affirming
the judgment of the RTC with the modification of deleting the award of attorney's fees,   to wit:
11

As to the award of attorneys fees, we agree with appellants that there is simply no factual and legal basis thereto.

Unquestionably, appellants filed the present case for the humiliation and embarrassment they suffered in Bangkok.
They instituted the complaint in their honest belief that they were entitled to damages as a result of appellee's
issuance of counterfeit dollar notes. Such being the case, they should not be made answerable to attorney's fees. It
is not good public policy to put a premium on the right to litigate where such right is exercised in good faith, albeit
erroneously.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with modification that the award of attorney's fees is deleted.

SO ORDERED.

Issues

Hence, this appeal, with the petitioners contending that the CA gravely erred in affirming the judgment of the RTC.
They insist that inasmuch as the business of banking was imbued with public interest, the respondent's failure to
exercise the degree of diligence required in handling the affairs of its clients showed that it was liable not just for
simple negligence but for misrepresentation and bad faith amounting to fraud; that the CA erred in giving weight and
relying on the news clippings allegedly showing that the "supernotes" had deceived even the U.S. Secret Service
and Central Intelligence Agency, for such news were not based on facts.  12

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is partly meritorious.

The General Banking Act of 2000 demands of banks the highest standards of integrity and performance. As such,
the banks are under obligation to treat the accounts of their depositors with meticulous care.   However, the banks'
13

compliance with this degree of diligence is to be determined in accordance with the particular circumstances of each
case.

The petitioners argue that the respondent was liable for failing to observe the diligence required from it by not doing
an act from which the material damage had resulted by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution in the performance
of its duties.   Hence, the respondent was guilty of gross negligence, misrepresentation and bad faith amounting to
14

fraud.

The petitioners' argument is unfounded.

Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of one's duties; it is a negligence characterized by the
want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is duty to act, not inadvertently but
wilfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. It
evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exe1iing any effort to avoid them.  15

Evidence II.
In order for gross negligence to exist as to warrant holding the respondent liable therefor, the petitioners must
establish that the latter did not exert any effort at all to avoid unpleasant consequences, or that it wilfully and
intentionally disregarded the proper protocols or procedure in the handling of US dollar notes and in selecting and
supervising its employees.

The CA and the RTC both found that the respondent had exercised the diligence required by law in observing the
standard operating procedure, in taking the necessary precautions for handling the US dollar bills in question, and in
selecting and supervising its employees.   Such factual findings by the trial court are entitled to great weight and
16

respect especially after being affirmed by the appellate court, and could be overturned only upon a showing of a
very good reason to warrant deviating from them.

In this connection, it is significant that the BSP certified that the falsity of the US dollar notes in question, which were
"near perfect genuine notes," could be detected only with extreme difficulty even with the exercise of due diligence.
Ms. Nanette Malabrigo, BSP's Senior Currency Analyst, testified that the subject dollar notes were "highly
deceptive" inasmuch as the paper used for them were similar to that used in the printing of the genuine notes. She
observed that the security fibers and the printing were perfect except for some microscopic defects, and that all lines
were clear, sharp and well defined.  17

Nonetheless, the petitioners contend that the respondent should be liable for moral and exemplary
damages  on account of their suffering the unfortunate experience abroad brought about by their use of the
18

fake US dollar bills withdrawn from the latter.

The contention cannot be upheld.

The relationship existing between the petitioners and the respondent that resulted from a contract of loan was that
of a creditor-debtor.   Even if the law imposed a high standard on the latter as a bank by vi1iue of the fiduciary
19

nature of its banking business, bad faith or gross negligence amounting to bad faith was absent. Hence, there
simply was no legal basis for holding the respondent liable for moral and exemplary damages. In breach of contract,
moral damages may be awarded only where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. That was not true
herein because the respondent was not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith. This is pursuant to Article
2220 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find
that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract
where defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

With the respondent having established that the characteristics of the subject dollar notes had made it difficult even
for the BSP itself as the country's own currency note expert to identify the counterfeiting with ease despite adhering
to all the properly laid out standard operating procedure and precautions in the handling of US dollar bills, holding it
liable for damages in favor of the petitioners would be highly unwarranted in the absence of proof of bad faith,
malice or fraud on its part. That it formally apologized to them and even offered to reinstate the USD$500.00 in
their account as well as to give them the all-expense-paid round trip ticket to Hong Kong as means to
assuage their inconvenience did not necessarily mean it was liable. In civil cases, an offer of compromise is
not an admission of liability, and is inadmissible as evidence against the offeror.  20

Even without taking into consideration the news clippings to the effect that the US Secret Service and Central
Intelligence Agency had themselves been deceived by the 1990 series of the US dollar notes infamously known as
the "supernotes," the record had enough to show in that regard, not the least of which was the testimony of Ms.
Malabrigo as BSP's Senior Currency Analyst about the highly deceptive nature of the subject US dollar notes and
the possibility for them to pass undetected.

Also, the petitioners' allegation of misrepresentation on the part of the respondent was factually unsupported.  They 1âwphi1

had been satisfied with the services of the respondent for about three years prior to the incident in question.  The
21

incident was but an isolated one. Under the law, moral damages for culpa contractual or breach of contract are
recoverable only if the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting
to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations.  The breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious
22

or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive.  In order to maintain their action for damages, the petitioners must establish
23

Evidence II.
that their injury resulted from a breach of duty that the respondent had owed to them, that is, there must be the
concurrence of injury caused to them as the plaintiffs and legal responsibility on the part of the respondent.
Underlying the award of damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. In this
regard, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may
be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury.   That was not so in this case.
24

It is true that the petitioners suffered embarrassment and humiliation in Bangkok. Yet, we should distinguish
between damage and injury. In The Orchard Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Yu,   the Court has fittingly pointed out the
25

distinction, viz.:

x x x Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right, damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These
situations are often called dmimum absque injuria.  26

In every situation of damnum absque injuria, therefore, the injured person alone bears the consequences because
the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act that does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. For
instance, in BP I Express Card Corporation v. Court of Appeals ,  the Court turned down the claim for damages of a
27

cardholder whose credit card had been cancelled after several defaults in payment, holding therein that there could
be damage without injury where the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty towards the plaintiff.
In such situation, the injured person alone should bear the consequences because the law afforded no remedy for
damages resulting from an act that did not

amount to a legal injury or wrong.  Indeed, the lack of malice in the conduct complained of precluded the recovery of
28

damages. 29

Here, although the petitioners suffered humiliation resulting from their unwitting use of the counterfeit US dollar bills,
the respondent, by virtue of its having observed the proper protocols and procedure in handling the US dollar bills
involved, did not violate any legal duty towards them. Being neither guilty of negligence nor remiss in its exercise of
the degree of diligence required by law or the nature of its obligation as a banking institution, the latter

was not liable for damages. Given the situation being one of damnum absque injuria, they could not be
compensated for the damage sustained.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on December 7, 2006; and ORDERS the petitioners

to pay the costs of suit.

Evidence II.
16.) A.C. No. 10555

EVELYN T. GOOPIO, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. ARIEL D. MAGLALANG, Respondent

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

This is a petition  filed by respondent Atty. Ariel D. Maglalang (Atty. Maglalang) challenging the Resolution  dated
1 2

December 14, 2012 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors (IBP Board) which imposed
upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three years and ordered the restitution of
₱400,000.00 to complainant Evelyn T. Goopio (Goopio).

The case originated from a disbarment complaint  filed by Goopio charging Atty. Maglalang with violation of Section
3

27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. - A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

In her disbarment complaint, Goopio primarily alleged that sometime in 2005, in relation to her need to resolve
property concerns with respect to 12 parcels of land located in Sagay City, Negros Occidental, she engaged the
services of Atty. Maglalang to represent her either through a court action or through extra-judicial means. Having
been employed in Switzerland at the time, she allegedly likewise executed a General Power of Attorney  on June 18,
4

2006 in favor of Atty. Maglalang, authorizing him to settle the controversy covering the properties with the
developer, including the filing of a petition for rescission of contract with damages. 
5

Goopio further alleged that Atty. Maglalang supposedly informed her that the petition for rescission was filed and
pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, and that as payment of the same, the latter requested
and received the total amount of ₱400,000.00 from her.  Goopio similarly alleged that Atty. Maglalang presented an
6

official receipt  covering the alleged deposit of the ₱400,000.00 with the court.
7 8

Goopio further contended that Atty. Maglalang rendered legal services in connection with the petition, including but
not limited to, appearances at mediations and hearings, as well as the preparation of a reply between the months of
December 2006 and April 2007, in relation to which she was supposedly billed a total of ₱114,000.00, ₱84,000.00
of which she paid in full. 9

Goopio also claimed that she subsequently discovered that no such petition was filed nor was one pending before
the RTC or any tribunal,   and that the purported inaction of Atty. Maglalang likewise resulted in the continued
10

accrual of interest payments as well as other charges on her properties.  11

She alleged that Atty. Maglalang admitted to all these when he was confronted by Goopio's representative and
niece, Milogen Canoy (Canoy), which supposedly resulted in Goopio' s revocation   of the General Power of
12

Attorney on May 17, 2007. Goopio finally alleged that through counsel, she made a formal demand   upon Atty.
13

Maglalang for restitution, which went unheeded; hence, the disbarment complaint.  14

In his verified answer,   Atty. Maglalang specifically denied Goopio's claims for being based on hearsay, untrue, and
15

without basis in fact. He submitted that contrary to Goopio's allegations, he had not met or known her in 2005 or
2006, let alone provided legal services to her as her attorney-infact or counsel, or file any petition at her behest. He
Evidence II.
specifically denied acceding to any General Power of Attorney issued in his favor, and likewise submitted that
Goopio was not in the Philippines when the document was purportedly executed. He further firmly denied receiving
₱400,000.00 from Goopio, and issuing any receipts.   He also added that he had not received any demand letter. 
16 17

Clarifying the capacity in which he knew Goopio, Atty. Maglalang explained that Ma. Cecilia Consuji (Consuji),
Goopio's sister and his client since 2006, introduced him to Goopio sometime in 2007, where an altercation ensued
between them.  18

As special and affirmative defenses, Atty. Maglalang further countered that without his knowledge and participation,
Consuji surreptitiously used his name and reputation, and manipulated the supposed "engagement" of his services
as counsel for Goopio through the execution of a falsified General Power of Attorney. Atty. Maglalang likewise
submitted that Consuji collected huge sums of money from Goopio by furtively using his computerized letterhead
and billing statements. In support of the same, he alleged that in fact, Consuji's name appeared on the annexes, but
there was no mention of her in the actual disbarment complaint for purposes of isolating her from any liability.  19

To bolster his affirmative defense that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and Goopio, Atty.
Maglalang submitted that in fact, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City had earlier dismissed two
complaints filed by Goopio against him for charges of falsification of public documents and estafa by false
pretenses,  alleging the same set of facts as narrated in the present disbarment complaint. Atty. Maglalang submits
20

that in a Resolution dated February 14, 2008, the City Prosecutor summarily dismissed the complaints for being
hearsay. 21

In a Report and Recommendation  dated August 13, 2010, IBP Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez (Commissioner
22

Fernandez) found that a lawyer-client relationship existed between complainant Goopio and Atty. Maglalang. This
was found to be sufficiently proven by the documentary evidence submitted by Goopio. Commissioner Fernandez
did not give any credence to the specific denials of Atty. Maglalang. Moreover, the IBP held that the demand letter
of Attys. Lily Uy Valencia and Ma. Aleta C. Nuñez dated June 5, 2007 sufficiently established Atty. Maglalang's
receipt of the amount of ₱400,000.00. Commissioner Fernandez held that had Atty. Maglalang found the demand
letter suspect and without basis, he should have sent a reply denying the same.  23

He recommended that Atty. Maglalang be found guilty of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, suspended from the practice of law for two years, and ordered
to return to Goopio the amount of ₱400,000.00, under pains of disbarment.  24

In a Resolution dated December 14, 2012, the IBP Board affirmed with modification the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent's violation of Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court and Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Ariel D. Maglalang is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years and Ordered to Return to complainant the
amount of Four Hundred Thousand (₱400,000.00) Pesos within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice with legal
interest reckoned from the time the demand was made. 25

Atty. Maglalang filed a motion for reconsideration  of the IBP Board's Resolution. In said motion for reconsideration,
26

Atty. Maglalang prayed for full exoneration on the ground that he was also merely a victim of the manipulations
made by his former client, Consuji, further contending that if any fault could be attributed to him, it would only be his
failure to detect and discover Consuji's deceit until it was too late. The same motion was denied in a
Resolution  dated March 22, 2014. Hence, this petition.
27

In his petition, Atty. Maglalang reiterated his defense of specific denial, and further claimed that his efforts to
locate Consuji to clarify the complaint were exerted in vain. He likewise additionally submitted that in
demonstration of his desire to have the case immediately resolved, and with no intentions of indirect
admission of guilt, he agreed to pay complainant the amount she was claiming at a rate of ₱50,000.00 per
month. 28

Evidence II.
Atty. Maglalang's forthright actions to further the resolution of this case is noted. All claims and defenses
considered, however, we cannot rule to adopt the IBP Board's findings and recommendations.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions,   and so delicately affected it is with public interest that
29

both the power and the duty are incumbent upon the State to carefully control and regulate it for the protection and
promotion of the public welfare. 30

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful compliance
with the rules of the legal profession, and regular payment of membership fees to the IBP are the conditions
required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Beyond
question, any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which
the courts and clients must repose in him, and renders him unfit to continue in the exercise of his professional
privilege.  Both disbarment and suspension demonstrably operationalize this intent to protect the courts and the
31

public from members of the bar who have become unfit and unworthy to be part of the esteemed and noble
profession.  32

However, in consideration of the gravity of the consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the
bar, we have consistently held that a lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant to satisfactorily prove the allegations in his complaint through substantial evidence.  A 33

complainant's failure to dispense the same standard of proof requires no other conclusion than that which stays the
hand of the Court from meting out a disbarment or suspension order.

Under the facts and the evidence presented, we hold that complainant Goopio failed to discharge this burden of
proof.

First. To prove their lawyer-client relationship, Goopio presented before the IBP photocopies of the General Power
of Attorney she allegedly issued in Atty. Maglalang's favor, as well as acknowledgement receipts issued by the latter
for the amounts he allegedly received. We note, however, that what were submitted into evidence were mere
photocopies, in violation of the Best Evidence Rule under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Sections 3 and 4 of Rule
130 provide:

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the
whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

Sec. 4. Original of document. –

(a) The original of a document is one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.

(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents,
all such copies are equally regarded as originals.

(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near
the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals.

Evidence II.
Although a disbarment proceeding may not be akin to a criminal prosecution, if the entire body of proof consists
mainly of the documentary evidence, and the content of which will prove either the falsity or veracity of the charge
for disbarment, then the documents themselves, as submitted into evidence, must comply with the Best Evidence
Rule, save for an established ground that would merit exception. Goopio failed to prove that the present case falls
within any of the exceptions that dispense with the requirement of presentation of an original of the documentary
evidence being presented, and hence, the general rule must apply.

The necessary import and rationale behind the requirement under the Best Evidence Rule is the avoidance of the
dangers of mistransmissions and inaccuracies of the content of the documents.  This is squarely true in the present
34

disbarment complaint, with a main charge that turns on the very accuracy, completeness, and authenticity of the
documents submitted into evidence. It is therefore non-sequitur to surmise that this crucial preference for the original
may be done away with or applied liberally in this case merely by virtue of Atty. Maglalang's failure to appear during
the second mandatory conference. No such legal license was intended either by the Rules on Evidence or the rules
of procedure applicable to a disbarment case. No such effect, therefore, may be read into the factual circumstances
of the present complaint.

The Notice of Mandatory Conference itself stated that "[n]on-appearance at the mandatory conference shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to participate in the proceedings."  At most, Atty. Maglalang's nonappearance during
35

the rescheduled mandatory conference dated March 12, 2009  merited the continuation of the proceedings ex
36

parte.  Nothing in the face of the notice provided that in case of Atty. Maglalang's nonappearance, a
37

leniency in the consideration of the evidence submitted would be in order.  Nowhere in the subsequent
38

Order of Commissioner Soriano, which remarked on the non-appearance of Atty. Maglalang in the last
mandatory conference, was there a mention of any form of preclusion on the part of Goopio to further
substantiate her documentary evidence.  Atty. Maglalang's waiver of his right to participate in the proceedings
39

did not serve as a bar for Goopio to submit into evidence the original copies of the documents upon which her
accusations stood.

Furthermore, consistent with Section 5, Rule V of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines,  Atty. Maglalang's non-appearance at the mandatory conference was deemed a
40

waiver of his right to participate in the proceedings, and his absence only rightly ushered the ex parte presentation
of Goopio's evidence. The latter's belated feigning of possession and willingness to present the original copies of the
documents were betrayed by the fact that even when she was ordered by the investigating commissioner to
produce the original of her documentary evidence, and absent any bar in the applicable Rules for presentation of
the same, she still failed to bring forth said originals.

To be sure, it is grave error to interpret that Atty. Maglalang's absence at the second mandatory conference
effectively jeopardized Goopio's opportunity to substantiate her charge through submission of proper evidence,
including the production of the original General Power of Attorney, acknowledgment receipts, and the billing
statements. Viewed in another way, this line of reasoning would mean that Atty. Maglalang's non-appearance
worked to excuse Goopio's obligation to substantiate her claim. This simply cannot be countenanced. Goopio's duty
to substantiate her charge was separate and distinct from Atty. Maglalang's interests, and therefore, the latter's
waiver would not, as in fact it did not, affect the rights and burden of proof of the former.

In fact, the transcript of the initial mandatory conference recorded the Commissioner's pointed instruction that
Goopio and counsel have the concomitant obligation to produce the originals of the exhaustive list of documents
they wish to have marked as exhibits.  The records positively adduce that the duty to produce the originals was
41

specifically imposed on the party seeking to submit the same in evidence; there was no such bar on the part of
Goopio to furnish the Commission with the originals of their documentary evidence submissions even after Atty.
Maglalang's nonappearance and waiver.

It is additionally worth noting that during the mandatory conference, counsel of Goopio signified that they did not in
fact have the original copies of the pertinent documents they were seeking to submit into evidence. In the
preliminary conference brief submitted by Goopio, she further annotated in the discussion of the documents she
wished to present that "[o]riginal copies of the foregoing documents will be presented for comparison with the
photocopies during the preliminary conference."  Despite such statement of undertaking, however, and borne of no
42

other's undoing, Goopio was never able to present the originals of either the General Power of Attorney or the
acknowledgement receipts, the authenticity of which lie at the crux of the present controversy.
Evidence II.
In our ruling in Concepcion v. Fandino, Jr.,   a disbarment case which involved as documentary evidence mere
43

photocopies of the notarized documents upon which the main allegation stood, we aptly reiterated how even in
disbarment proceedings which are sui generis in nature, the Best Evidence Rule still applies, and submission of
mere photocopies of documentary evidence is unavailing for their dearth of probative weight.

In Concepcion, the basis for the complaint for disbarment was the allegation that the lawyer therein notarized
documents without authority. Similarly involving a disbarment proceeding that centered on the authenticity of the
purported documents as proof of the violative act alleged, what we said therein is most apt and acutely instructive
for the case at bar, to wit:

A study of the document on which the complaint is anchored shows that the photocopy is not a certified true copy
neither was it testified on by any witness who is in a position to establish the authenticity of the document. Neither
was the source of the document shown for the participation of the complainant in its execution. x x x This fact gives
rise to the query, where did these documents come from, considering also the fact that respondent vehemently
denied having anything to do with it. It is worthy to note that the parties who allegedly executed said Deed of Sale
are silent regarding the incident.

xxxx

x x x We have scrutinized the records of this case, but we have failed to find a single evidence which is an
original copy. All documents on record submitted by complainant are indeed mere photocopies. In fact,
respondent has consistently objected to the admission in evidence of said documents on this ground. We cannot,
thus, find any compelling reason to set aside the investigating commissioner's findings on this point. It is well-
settled that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon complainant. x x x

xxxx

The general rule is that photocopies of documents are inadmissible. As held in Intestate Estate of the Late Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals,  such document has no probative value and is inadmissible in
44

evidence.  (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

45

In both Concepcion and the case at bar, the allegations at the core of the disbarment complaints both involve
alleged violations, the truth or falsity of which relies on a determination of the authenticity of the documents that
serve as the paper trail of said punishable acts.

In Concepcion, the basis for the disbarment depended on whether or not the lawyer therein did, in fact, notarize the
145 documents without authority,   which, if proven, would have merited the punishment prayed for. Similarly, in the
46

case at bar, the grounds for the disbarment of Atty. Maglalang centered chiefly on the truth and genuineness of the
General Power of Attorney which he supposedly signed in acceptance of the agency, and the acknowledgment
receipts which he purportedly issued as proof of receipt of payment in consideration of the lawyer-client relationship,
for proving the authenticity of said documents would have unequivocally given birth to the concomitant duty and
obligation on the part of Atty. Maglalang to file the petition on behalf of Goopio, and undertake all necessary
measures to pursue the latter's interests. Both cases are further comparable in that both sets of photocopies of
documents offered into evidence have been impugned by the lawyers therein for being false, without basis in fact,
and deployed for purposes of malice and retaliation, which in effect similarly placed the motives of the complainants
within the ambit of suspicion. Finally, in both Concepcion and the case at bar, the complainants therein failed to
submit the original of their documentary evidence, even though the same would have clearly redounded to the
serving of their interests in the case, and despite having no bar or prohibition from doing the same.

In both cases, the documentary evidence was the causal link that would chain the lawyers therein to the violations
alleged against them, and in the same manner, both central documentary evidence were gossamer thin, and have
collapsed under the probative weight that preponderance of evidence requires.

Long-standing is the rule that punitive charges standing on the truth or falsity of a purported document require no
less than the original of said records. Thus, the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary in
its nature, such as photocopies, as long as the original evidence can be had. In the absence of a clear showing that

Evidence II.
the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, the photocopy submitted, in lieu
thereof, must be disregarded, being unworthy of any probative value and being an inadmissible piece of evidence. 47

We are not unaware that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis; they involve
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers, not the trial of an action or a suit.  Being
48

neither criminal nor civil in nature, these are not intended to inflict penal or civil sanctions, but only to
answer the main question, that is whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in
the dispensation of justice.  In the present case, this main question is answerable by a determination of
49

whether the documents Goopio presented have probative value to support her charge.

The irreversible effects of imposed penalties from the same must stand on sufficiently established proof through
substantial evidence. Such quantum of proof is a burden that must be discharged by the complainant, in order for
the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers.   In the present case, substantial evidence was not established when
50

Goopio failed to comply with the Best Evidence Rule, and such failure is fatal to her cause. Such non-compliance
cannot also be perfunctorily excused or retrospectively cured through a fault or failure of the contending party to the
complaint, as the full weight of the burden of proof of her accusation descends on those very documents. Having
submitted into evidence documents that do not bear probative weight by virtue of them being mere photocopies, she
has inevitably failed to discharge the burden of proof which lies with her.

This principle further finds acute importance in cases where, as in the one at bar, the complainant's motives in
instituting the disbarment charge are not beyond suspicion,  considering Atty. Maglalang's contention that his
51

signature in the General Power of Attorney was forged.

Neither will Atty. Maglalang's offer to restitute to Goopio the monetary award pending finality of the
decision be deemed as his indirect admission of guilt. After receiving notice of the IBP Board's Resolution
suspending him from the practice of law for three years and ordering the return of the ₱400,000.00 he
allegedly received from Goopio, Atty. Maglalang filed a motion for reconsideration which mentioned his
honest desire to have the instant case resolved at the soonest possible time: 52

3. That with all due respect to the findings and recommendation of the Board of Governors, Respondent would like
to seek for reconsideration and ask for lesser penalty if not total exoneration from the sanction imposed on the
ground that he is also a victim of the manipulations made by his former client, Ma. Cecilia Consuji who happens to
be the sister of complainant, Evelyn Goopio;

xxxx

6. That Respondent is left with no other option but to face the accusation and if there is any fault that can be
attributed to him, it is his supposed failure to discover the manipulations of his former client before the
matter became worse;

7. That for lack of material time to produce necessary evidence on the validity of the Alleged General Power of
Attorney, Respondent is asking for a reconsideration for a lesser sanction of stem warning or reprimand and despite
the non-finality of the subject Resolution because of the filing of the instant Motion for Reconsideration, the
undersigned counsel will make arrangements with counsel for complainant how he will be able to restitute the
money award as soon as possible x x x as a show of his honest desire to have the instant case resolved and
as a tough learning experience to always cherish his privilege to practice law.   (Emphasis supplied.)
53

An examination of Atty. Maglalang's offer to restitute would clearly show that there was no admission of the
acts being imputed against him. His offer was made "as a show of his honest desire" to have the case
resolved immediately, and his admission, if any, was limited to his failure to immediately discover the
manipulations of complainant's sister. If anything, his earnest desire to restitute to Goopio the amount of
the monetary award only reasonably betrayed his considerateness towards someone who was similarly
deceived by Consuji, as well as his need to protect his reputation, which may be tarnished if the
proceedings were to be protracted. It would be unjust to fault Atty. Maglalang's efforts to protect his
reputation, especially in light of the verity that the success of a lawyer in his profession depends almost
entirely on his reputation, and anything which will harm his good name is to be deplored. 54

Evidence II.
Moreover, as expressed in Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, an offer of compromise in the context of civil
cases may not be taken as an admission of any liability. Demonstrably, this Court articulated the ratio behind the
inadmissibility of similar offers for compromise in Pentagon Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals,  where we
55

reasoned that since the law favors the settlement of controversies out of court, a person is entitled to "buy his or her
peace" without danger of being prejudiced in case his or her efforts fail.   Conversely, if every offer to buy peace
56

could be used as evidence against a person who presents it, many settlements would be prevented, and
unnecessary litigation would result since no prudent person would dare offer or entertain a compromise if his or her
compromise position could be exploited as a confession of weakness  or an indirect admission of guilt.
57

In legal contemplation in the context of a disbarment proceeding, any offer or attempt at a compromise by
the parties is not only inadmissible as evidence to prove guilt on the part of the offeror, but is in fact wholly
extraneous to the proceeding, which resides solely within the province of the Court's disciplinary power.
Any offer for compromise, being completely immaterial to the outcome of the disbarment complaint, may
not hold sway for or impute guilt on any of the parties involved therein.

Seen in a similar light, Atty. Maglalang's prayer for the modification of penalty and reduction of the same
may not be interpreted as an admission of guilt.  At most, in the context in which it was implored, this may
1âwphi1

be reasonably read not as a remorseful admission but a plea for compassion-a reaction that is in all
respects understandable, familiar to the common human experience, and consistent with his narration that
he was likewise a victim of fraudulent representations of Goopio's sister. Furthermore, this prayer for a
kinder regard cannot by any course limit the Court's independent disciplinary reach and consideration of
the facts and merits of this case as has been presented before it.

This degree of autonomy is in no small measure due to the fact that administrative proceedings are imbued with
public interest, public office being a public trust, and the need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in
the government, its agencies, and its instrumentalities demands that proceedings in such cases enjoy such level of
independence.  As we maintained in Reyes-Domingo v. Branch Clerk of Court,  the Court cannot be bound by any
58 59

settlement or other unilateral acts by the parties in a matter that involves its disciplinary authority; otherwise, our
disciplinary power may be put for naught.

In the case at bar, the fact that Atty. Maglalang offered to restitute to Goopio the money award in no way precludes
the Court from weighing in on the very merits of the case, and gauging them against the quantum of evidence
required. No less than the public interest in disbarment proceedings necessitates such independent, impartial, and
inclusive contemplation of the totality of evidence presented by the parties. Regrettably for the complainant in this
case, her failure to comply with the elementary Best Evidence Rule caused her probative submissions to be
weighed and found severely wanting.

As has been avowed by the Court, while we will not hesitate to mete out the appropriate disciplinary punishment
upon lawyers who fail to live up to their sworn duties, we will, on the other hand, protect them from accusations that
have failed the crucible of proof. 
60

Accordingly, all premises considered, we cannot find Atty. Maglalang guilty of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court as the case levelled against him by Goopio does not have any evidentiary leg to stand on. The
latter's allegations of misrepresentation and deceit have not been substantiated as required by the applicable
probative quantum, and her failure to present the best evidence to prove the authenticity of the subject documents
places said documents well within the ambit of doubt, on the basis of which no punitive finding may be found. The
General Power of Attorney allegedly issued in favor of Atty. Maglalang, and the acknowledgment receipts
purportedly issued by the latter as proof of payment for his legal services are the documents which constitute the
bedrock of the disbarment complaint. Goopio's failure to substantiate their authenticity with proof exposes the claims
as those that stand on shifting sand. Her documentary evidence lacked the required probative weight, and her
unproven narrative cannot be held to sustain a finding of suspension or disbarment against Atty. Maglalang. Hence,
the dismissal of the disbarment complaint is in order, without prejudice to other remedies that Goopio may avail of
for any monetary restitution due her, as the courts may deem proper.

However, we find that by his own recognition, Atty. Maglalang's "failure to discover the manipulations of his former
client before the matter became worse"  is material negligence, for which the penalty of reprimand,  under the
61 62

circumstances of the case at bar, may be consequently warranted.  Veritably, a lawyer must at all times exercise
63

Evidence II.
care and diligence in conducting the affairs of his practice, including the observation of reasonable due vigilance in
ensuring that, to the best of his knowledge, his documents and other implements are not used to further duplicitous
and fraudulent activities.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ariel D. Maglalang is hereby REPRIMANDED, but the disbarment complaint against him is

nevertheless DISMISSED for lack of merit. Let a copy of this decision be attached to his records.

Evidence II.
17.) G.R. No. L-29831 March 29, 1972

GUILLERMO VIACRUCIS, LUISA DE VIACRUCIS, CLAROS MARQUEZ, and RUSTICA AREVALO

MARQUEZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ANASTACIO ORAIS and CELESTINA MALAZARTE, respondents.

Carlos Monzon Ortega for petitioners.

Leonardo C. Dejaño for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:p

Private respondents, Anastacio Orais and his wife Celestina Malazarte brought this action, in the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, to establish their title to a land of about four (4) hectares, located in the sitio of Candilomot, barrio
of Santo Rosario, formerly Palompon, now Matag-ob Leyte, and more particularly described in the complaint —
alleging that it is part of a bigger lot sold to them, on June 8, 1936, by its registered owner, Pedro Sanchez, by virtue
of a deed of sale, copy of which was attached to said pleading, as Annex A and later marked as Exhibit B — as well
as to recover, from petitioners herein — defendants in the aforesaid court — Guillermo Viacrucis and Luisa de
Viacrucis the possession of said land and damages.

In their answer to said complaint, Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis averred that they are the owners of said 4-hectare land;
that the deed of sale, Exhibit B, in favor of Anastacio Orais, on which private respondents — plaintiffs in the court of
first instance — rely, attests merely to a simulated transaction; and that this action is barred by the statute of
limitations. Alleging that the rights of Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis had been assigned to them, Claros Marquez and his
wife Rustica Arevalo subsequently intervened in the case, reiterating, in a way, the stand taken by Mr. and Mrs.
Viacrucis although with a variation to be pointed out later on.

After appropriate proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision, in favor of the plaintiffs therein — respondent
herein — and against the defendants and the intervenors — petitioners herein — rejecting their defenses of
prescription of action and simulation of contract (Exhibit B), and declaring that the whole land conveyed thereby
belongs to Mr. and Mrs. Orais, as well as ordering Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis to vacate said land and awarding
damages to Mr. and Mrs. Orais. The dispositive part of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants and
intervenors: (1) declaring the following parcel of land to wit:

"A tract of agricultural land situated in the Sitio of Barrio of Balagtas (now Santo
Rosario), Municipality of Palompon (now Matag-ob), Province of Leyte. Bounded on
the North, by property claimed by Serapio Dicio; on the East, by property claimed by
Bartolome Asayas; on the South, by property claimed by Pablo Sanchez; on the
West by properties claimed by Borgas Merin and Canuto Loreño, containing an area
of 14 hectares, 63 ares and 03 centares, embraced and covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 243, Patent No. 7335, Bu. of Lands No. H-11803."

as the property of the plaintiffs and hereby ordering the defendants to immediately vacate the
premises; (2) to jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
for and as moral damages, plus Three Thousand Five Hundred Ten Pesos (P3,510.00) for and as
actual damages from 1947 up to 1960; plus the further sum of Two Hundred Seventy Pesos
(P270.00) annually from November 15, 1960 until the land in question shall have been delivered to
the plaintiffs and the further sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) for and as attorney's fees,
with costs against the defendants and intervenors.

Evidence II.
On appeal taken by Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis and Mr. and Mrs. Marquez, said decision, against them and in favor of
Mr. and Mrs. Orais, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with the following "modifications":

...; the portion of four (4) hectares claimed in the complaint and described in paragraph 3 thereof is
declared to belong to plaintiffs-appellees; defendants and intervenors are condemned to surrender
the same unto plaintiffs; and to account for their possession, defendants from 26 January, 1959 and
intervenors from 3 September, 1962 until the property should have been finally delivered to the
plaintiffs; costs against defendants and intervenors.

Hence the present petition, for review on certiorari, of Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis and Mr. and Mrs. Marquez, against the
Court of Appeals and Mr. and Mrs. Orais, to which petition We gave due course. Thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. Orais
moved to dismiss said petition upon the ground that the questions raised therein "are of facts and not of law and/or
too unsubstantial to require consideration" and that "the petition is prosecuted manifestly for delay." Upon
consideration of the motion and the opposition thereto of petitioners herein, the Court resolved to defer action
thereon until the case is taken up on the merits.

It appears that the land of about four (4) hectares involved in this case is part of a bigger lot of about 14.6303
hectares, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 243 (Exhibit A)  in the name of Pedro Sanchez; that, on June 8,
1

1936, Sanchez executed the deed, Exhibit B, selling said lot of 14.6303 hectares to Anastacio Orais; that said
Exhibit B was, on September 10, 1936, filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Leyte, and recorded in the
memorandum of incumbrances of Homestead OCT No. 243; that, on July 7, 1941, Sanchez executed another deed,
Exhibit 10, conveying the disputed portion, of four (4) hectares to Balentin Ruizo who, in turn, sold it, on October 10,
1945, to Guillermo Viacrucis (Exhibit II); that, on January 12, 1959, Anastacio Orais — who claimed to have made
oral demands — formally demanded from Viacrucis that he vacate said portion and surrender its possession to him
(Orais) that this demand was not heeded by Viacrucis who, instead, executed, on March 19, 1959, the deed, Exhibit
9, confirming the sale of said portion, allegedly made by him, on January 12, 1954, in favor of his brother-in-law
Claros Marquez; and that the deeds of sale, Exhibits 10, 11 and 9, in favor of Ruizo, Viacrucis and Marquez,
respectively, have not been registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Leyte.

Petitioners herein maintained in the court of first instance and the Court of Appeals that, although the deed of sale,
Exhibit B, in favor of Orais is earlier, by over five (5) years, than that executed, in favor of their predecessor in
interest, Balentin, Ruizo, by the original owner, Pedro Sanchez, they (petitioners) have a better right to the land in
question, said Exhibit B having been executed merely to simulate a sale, in order that Orais could "secure a loan
from a bank"; but this pretense was overruled by said courts, which, likewise, rejected petitioners' plea; of
prescription of action.

In their brief before Us, petitioners do not assail the findings of fact and the conclusions reached by the Court of
Appeals in connection with the aforementioned defenses of simulation of Exhibit B and prescription of action. They
merely contend that the Court of Appeals has erred: (1) "in confusing the doctrine of laches with estoppel" and
in considering "misrepresentation as of the essence thereof"; (2) in "confusing laches with estoppel" and "rejecting
the defense of laches in this case where all essential requisites thereof are fully met and (3) in deciding this case
in violation of sections 22, 23 and 25, Rule 130 of the New Rules of Court.

In support of the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals had disposed of their plea
of laches "without the least reference to the legal requisites of laches in relation to the uncontroverted facts of this
case," whereas, under their second assignment of error, it is urged that the essential elements of the equitable
defense of laches are present in the case at bar.

Regardless of the merits of these two (2) assignments of error, well settled is the rule that laches is a defense that
must be pleaded especially, and that, otherwise, it is deemed waived, so that it can not be set up for the first time on
appeal.

The record discloses that the defenses of laches and prescription are being raised for the first time in
this appeal. They were not invoked in the proceedings before the Hearing Officer nor later on before
Associate Commissioner Sanchez and the Workmen's Compensation Commission. As said
defenses do not affect the jurisdiction of the latter, they cannot now be entertained and must be
deemed to have been waived (Regalado vs. Visayan Shipping Company, Inc., G.R. No. L-42855,
Evidence II.
 May 21, 1939; Victorias Milling Company, Inc. vs. Compensation Commissioner, et al., G.R. No.
L-10533, May 31, 1957; Manila Yatch Club, Inc. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al.,
G.R. No. L-19258, May 31, 1963). 2

Laches not having been invoked as a defense in the court below, the same can not be gone into at
this stage of the proceedings, ...3

... Neither prescription of appellee's claim or bar of the action for recovery due to laches was averred
in appellant's defenses. Appellant cannot raise them now for the first time on appeal. Verily the
failure to raise the issue of prescription and laches, amounts to a waiver of such defenses (Sec. 10,
Rule 9; Maxilim v. Tabotabo, 9 Phil. 390; Domingo v. Osorio, 7 Phil. 405). Moreover, the right of the
appellee to file an action to recover possession based on its Torrens Title is imprescriptible and not
barred under doctrine of laches (Art. 348, Civil Code; Francisco, et al. v. Cruz, et al., 43 O.G.
5105). ...
4

Petitioners Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis, as defendants in the court of first instance, and petitioners Mr. and Mrs. Marquez
as intervenors therein, filed their respective answer and answer in intervention alleging no other defenses than that
of prescription of action and that the deed of conveyance Exhibit B merely simulated a sale. Laches was invoked by
herein petitioners for the first time in the Court of Appeals, which could not properly entertain it, said, defense having
been deemed waived in consequence of petitioner's failure to allege it in the trial court. The first and second
assignments of error are, therefore, clearly untenable.

With respect to the third assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals had erred in
considering that the failure of Orais to bring the present action earlier was mere "laziness," instead of an
omission that "may be given in evidence against him," as provided in section 22 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court and as "strongly persuasive of lack of merit" of the claim of said respondent, and that when he tried to
obtain a loan from the Philippine National Bank in 1936 and offered OCT No. 243 as collateral security, the
bank did not accept said offer upon the ground that the land in question is not his property, in reply to
which Orais said nothing, which is an admission by silence, pursuant to section 23 of the same Rule 130.
Moreover, petitioners bewail that the Court of Appeals, like the trial court, considered in favor of Orais —
allegedly in violation of section 25 of said Rule 130 — the admission of Mrs. Beatriz Costelo, to the effect
that, although the land in dispute was physically in the possession of her now deceased husband, Pelagio
Costelo, he and she recognized Orais as the owner of said land.

It should be noted, however, that said testimony of Mrs. Costelo and this recognition by the now deceased
Pelagio Castelo — which were confirmed by the public document Exh. G — constitute a declaration of Mr.
and Mrs. Castelo adverse to their interest, which is admissible in evidence, pursuant to section 32 of said
Rule 130. Petitioners have no reason whatsoever to object to the consideration in favor of Orais of said admission,
the same having been made in 1936, more than five (5) years before their (petitioners) predecessor in interest,
Balentin Ruizo, had entered into the picture, when Orais and Castelo were the only parties who had any interest in
the object of said admission. Pursuant to said legal provision, such admission "may be received in evidence,"
not only against the party who made it "or his successors in interest," but, also, "against third persons." 5

As regards the alleged failure of Orais to say anything when the bank refused to accept OCT No. 243 as collateral
for the loan applied for by Orais, upon the ground that the land covered by said certificate of title was not his
property, there is no competent evidence on whether or not Orais had said anything in response to said statement.
Moreover, OCT No. 243 was in the name of Pedro Sanchez, and no matter how real the sale by the latter to Orais
may be, the bank would not accept the land in question as security for said loan, unless and until OCT No. 243 shall
have been cancelled and a transfer certificate of title issued to Orais. This, however, could not take place before the
filing of his loan application, because the owner's duplicate of said certificate of title — admittedly delivered by
Sanchez to Orais — had been lost in the possession of the latter's counsel, to whom he (Orais) had turned it over in
connection with a given criminal case.

As regards the effect or import of the failure of Orais to file the present action until November 15, 1960, this is a
matter relevant to the issue whether the sale attested to by Exh. B is simulated, as contended by petitioners herein,
or a true and authentic sale, as Orais maintains. The decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the trial court

Evidence II.
and sustaining the claim of Orais, constitutes a finding of fact, which is final in this proceeding for review on
certiorari.  In any event, said finding is fully borne out by the record.
6

Indeed, petitioners' main argument, apart from the aforementioned inaction of Orais, is that he had never been in
possession of the land in question, and that the same had remained in the name of Pedro Sanchez for tax
purposes. It should be noted, however, that, although the disputed land was actually held by Pelagio Costelo, from
1936 to 1941, Costelo executed, on July 30, 1936, Exh. G, whereby he, in effect, acknowledged Orais as owner of
the land an Orais granted him (Costelo) the right to possess it until the year 1941. And this was confirmed by Mrs.
Costelo on the witness stand. As a consequence, Orais came to be in constructive possession of said land, from
July 30, 1936. As a matter of fact, petitioners eventually admitted that Orais had been in actual possession,
although they claim of another portion of the land covered by OCT No. 243.

Then, again, the following circumstances militate agains the simulation alleged by petitioners herein, namely:

1. Exhibit B was not only notarized on the very date of its execution. It was, also, filed, soon thereafter — or on
September 10, 1936 — with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Leyte and recorded in the memorandum of
incumbrances of Homestead OCT No. 243. It is noteworthy that according to Viacrucis' deposition,  and the
7

testimony of Calixta Suganub, widow of Balentin Ruizo, as witness for petitioners herein, Pedro Sanchez delivered
his owner's duplicate of said OCT No. 243 to Anastacio Orais, which is clearly indicative of the intent of Sanchez to
give full force and effect to said deed of sale.

Upon the other hand, Exhibits 9, 10 and 11, on which herein petitioners rely, have not been registered — either
under the provisions of the Land Registration Act or under those of Act No. 3344 — despite the provision in said
deeds to the effect that the same should be or would be registered, by agreement of the parties. Likewise significant
is a provision, in the deed Exhibit 10, in favor of Ruizo, that the land thus conveyed is part of a lot covered by a
(certificate of) title, the space intended for the number of which was left blank, and that, this notwithstanding, it was
stipulated in said instrument that it would be registered pursuant to Act No. 3344, which refers to
lands not registered under the provisions of Act No. 496. Worse still, apart from including the latter stipulation,  Mr.
8

and Mrs. Viacrucis declared in the deed, Exhibit 9, in favor of Claros Marquez, that said land is not registered under
the Land Registration Act, which is not true.

Apparently, petitioners knew they could not register Exhibits 9, 10 and 11, under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act, without their rights under said instruments becoming officially subordinated to those of Anastacio
Orais. In fact, Viacrucis stated, in his aforementioned deposition, that he had "lost no time in going to Tacloban,
Leyte, to have the Deed of Sale" — presumably Exhibit 11, in his favor — "registered with the office of the Register
of Deeds." We have every reason to believe, therefore, that petitioners had actual knowledge of the existence of
Exhibit B and of the fact that it had been filed with the office of the register of deeds, and entered in the
memorandum of incumbrances of Homestead OCT No. 243.

2. In their "Amended Answer in Intervention," dated December 10, 1962, Mr. and Mrs. Marquez admitted that
Sanchez had really made a sale in favor of Orais, although said intervenors alleged that the land thus acquired by
him was only 6.6303 hectares; but, petitioners have not even tried to explain why Exhibit B — the only deed
executed by Pedro Sanchez in favor of Anastacio Orais — conveys the entire lot of 14.6303 covered by OCT No.
243.

Petitioners make much of a deed — marked as Exhibit 4,  executed by Anastacio Orais, on May 25, 1939, whereby
9

he sold one-half (1/2) of a lot of 6.6303 hectares, covered by OCT No. 243, to Alfredo Parrilla, Pastor Zaragoza,
Pedro Gorumba and Eugenio A. Evangelista. Said Exhibit 4 does not say, however, that the land sold by Pedro
Sanchez to Anastacio Orais was limited to said area of 6.6303 hectares. What is more, it contains an indication to
the contrary, for, in describing the object of the sale, Exhibit 4 states that it is one-half (1/2) of a lot bounded on the
South by a land of Anastacio Orais. In other words, said lot of 6.6303 was not all that he owned. This might explain
why petitioners — after producing, marking and identifying Exhibit 4 — did not introduce the same in evidence,
although copy thereof is attached to the Amended Answer in Intervention of Mr. and Mrs. Claros Marquez as Annex
5.

It should be noted, also, that, at the time of the execution of said Exhibit 4, on May 25, 1939, a portion of about four
(4) hectares of the land of 14.6303 hectares sold by Sanchez to Orais, was still held by Pelagio Costelo, to
Evidence II.
guarantee the payment of a debt of Sanchez, in view of which Orais conceded — in Exhibit G — Costelo's right to
possess the land from 1936 to 1941 — evidently, so that he could apply the fruits or products thereof to the
satisfaction of his credit — and Costelo acknowledged the dominical rights of Orais.

Furthermore, it appears that on July 10, 1936, or over a month after the sale by Sanchez to Orais, a deed, Exhibit 1,
dated April 19, 1934, and bearing the signature of Sanchez, was notarized. Exhibit 1 purports to convey to one
Crecente Marquez a portion, of about four (4) hectares, of the lot covered by OCT No. 243, which portion
is not involved in the case at bar. There is evidence to the effect that Exhibit 1 was filed with the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Leyte, on August 3, 1936, and recorded in the Memorandum of the Incumbrances of OCT No.
243. This must have been made without producing the owner's duplicate of said OCT No. 243, inasmuch as the
same was in the possession of Orais, according to the above-mentioned deposition of Viacrucis, since, apparently
the execution of Exhibit B, on June 8, 1936. Under the circumstances, Orais may have felt that it was neither
necessary nor advisable to make any reference, in Exhibit 4, either to said portion of four (4) hectares, ostensibly
conveyed to Crecente Marquez by virtue of Exhibit 1, or to the similar area held by Pelagio Costelo — an aggregate
of eight (8) hectares, which, deducted from the land of 14.6303 hectares covered by OCT No. 243, left
approximately the 6.6303 hectares mentioned in said deed Exhibit 1.

3. Although the entire lot of 14.6303 hectares purchased by Orais from Sanchez, pursuant to Exhibit B, remained for
tax purposes in the latter's name, Orais paid the taxes due thereon."  10

At this juncture, it may not be amiss to advert to the fact that, since Exhibit B had filed with the office of the register
of deeds and recorded therein as above stated, Ruizo Viacrucis and Marquez are deemed to have constructive
notice of the sale in favor of Orais, apart from the circumstances — heretofore adverted to — that, since Viacrucis
had gone to said office soon after the execution in his favor, on October 10, 1945, of the deed of sale Exhibit 11 for
the purpose of registering the same, said petitioner must have had actual knowledge of the previous sale to Orais.
And this explains why, despite the fact that Viacrucis had gone to the office of the register of deeds for the
aforementioned purpose, he did not carry out the same. Viacrucis did not even try to explain why he failed to do so.

Petitioners herein, likewise, failed to explain why neither Ruizo nor Claros Marquez had filed with said office the
deeds of sale Exhibits 10 and 9 in their favor, respectively, despite the provision in both documents for the
registration thereof.

Indeed, the parties in Exh. 10 — Sanchez and Ruizo — had stipulated therein:

Que el terreno objeto de esta venta es parte del titulo No. —, del vendedor y que es nuestro deseo
sin embargo que la presente se register bajo la Ley No.
3344.  11

What is more, as witness for petitioners herein, Jose R. Pastor — the notary public who prepared Exh. 10 and
before whom it was acknowledged — testified positively that Sanchez had explicitly told him, on that occasion,
and in the presence of Ruizo, that the 4-hectare land thereby conveyed to Ruizo is covered by a certificate of title,
which was not produced then.

Likewise, the deed of sale Exh. 11, executed by Ruizo in favor of Viacrucis, provides:

That ... it is our will that this document be registered under the provisions of Act 3344.

Similarly, the deed Exh. 9, executed by Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis in favor of Claros Marquez, states:

The the above-mentioned parcel is not registered under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act nor under the Spanish Mortgage Law; and the parties hereto agree to register this
instrument in the office of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Leyte in accordance with the
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.  12

Considering that Exhibit 10 had been delivered by Ruizo to Viacrucis, who, later, turned over Exhibits 10 and 11 to
Claros Marquez, We are fully persuaded that, aware of the registered status of the land in question, petitioners
Evidence II.
herein had advisedly chosen to treat the same as an unregistered land. None of them claims to have relied upon
OCT No. 243 in the name of Pedro Sanchez. They cannot invoke, therefore, the rights of a purchaser for value in
good faith under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.

Upon the other hand, Orais had purchased said land, and taken possession thereof — at first, constructively, in
consequence of the deed of sale in his favor, incorporated in the public document, Exhibit B, and, also, of the
agreement Exh. G, between Orais and Costelo, and, then, actually, upon the expiration of Castelo's right of
possession, under said Exh. G — apart from filing said Exh. B with the office of the Register of Deeds and having it
recorded therein.

As between Pedro Sanchez, Orais and petitioners herein, the title to said land — if treated as an unregistered one
— passed, therefore, to Orais either on June 8, 1936, the date of Exhibit B, or, on July 30, 1936, the date of Exhibit
G, or, at the latest, on September 10, 1936, when Exhibit B was recorded in the office of the register of
deeds.   Accordingly, Sanchez was no longer its owner when he sold it, on July 7, 1941, to Balentin Ruizo who, as a
13

consequence, acquired no title to said land, and conveyed none, on October 10, 1945, to Viacrucis, who, in turn,
could not have transmitted any to Claros Marquez.  14

Furthermore, petitioners could not possibly have acquired title to said land, as one registered under Act No. 496,
inasmuch as the deeds of conveyance Exhibits 9, 10 and 11 in their favor and in that of their predecessor in interest,
Balentin Ruizo have not been registered, and, pursuant to the provisions of said Act, "the act of registration shall be
the operative act to convey and affect the land ...."   Neither could the petitioners have acquired title by prescription,
15

for "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession."   Hence, petitioners have given up the plea of prescription, on which they relied heavily in the
16

court of first instance and the Court of Appeals, and now merely press the defense of laches, belatedly invoked, for
the first time, in the Court of Appeals and properly rejected by the same.

In short, whether the property in question is treated as a registered land or as one not registered under the
provisions of Act No. 496, Orais has, therefore, a better right than petitioners herein, and the third assignment of
error cannot be sustained.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals should be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against
herein petitioners Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis and Mr. and Mrs. Marquez. It is so ordered.

Evidence II.
18.) G.R. No. L-68097 January 16, 1986

EDWARD A. KELLER & CO., LTD., petitioner-appellant,

vs.
COB GROUP MARKETING, INC., JOSE E. BAX, FRANCISCO C. DE CASTRO, JOHNNY DE LA FUENTE,
SERGIO C. ORDOÑEZ, TRINIDAD C. ORDOÑEZ, MAGNO C. ORDOÑEZ, ADORACION C. ORDOÑEZ, TOMAS
C. LORENZO, JR., LUIZ M. AGUILA-ADAO, MOISES P. ADAO, ASUNCION MANAHAN and INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, respondents-appellees.

Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano & Hernandez Law Office for petitioner.

Vicente G. Gregorio for private respondents.

Roberto P. Vega for respondent Asuncion Manahan.

AQUINO, C.J.:

This case is about the liability of a marketing distributor under its sales agreements with the owner of the products.
The petitioner presented its evidence before Judges Castro Bartolome and Benipayo. Respondents presented their
evidence before Judge Tamayo who decided the case.

A review of the record shows that Judge Tamayo acted under a misapprehension of facts and his findings are
contradicted by the evidence. The Appellate Court adopted the findings of Judge Tamayo. This is a case where this
Court is not bound by the factual findings of the Appellate Court. (See Director of Lands vs. Zartiga, L-46068-69,
September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 346, 355).

Edward A. Keller & Co., Ltd. appointed COB Group Marketing, Inc. as exclusive distributor of its household
products, Brite and Nuvan in Panay and Negros, as shown in the sales agreement dated March 14, 1970 (32-33
RA). Under that agreement Keller sold on credit its products to COB Group Marketing.

As security for COB Group Marketing's credit purchases up to the amount of P35,000, one Asuncion Manahan
mortgaged her land to Keller. Manahan assumed solidarily with COB Group Marketing the faithful performance of all
the terms and conditions of the sales agreement (Exh. D).

In July, 1970 the parties executed a second sales agreement whereby COB Group Marketing's territory was
extended to Northern and Southern Luzon. As security for the credit purchases up to P25,000 of COB Group
Marketing for that area, Tomas C. Lorenzo, Jr. and his father Tomas, Sr. (now deceased) executed a mortgage on
their land in Nueva Ecija. Like Manahan, the Lorenzos were solidarily liable with COB Group Marketing for its
obligations under the sales agreement (Exh. E).

The credit purchases of COB Group Marketing, which started on October 15, 1969, limited up to January 22, 1971.
On May 8, the board of directors of COB Group Marketing were apprised by Jose E. Bax the firm's president and
general manager, that the firm owed Keller about P179,000. Bax was authorized to negotiate with Keller for the
settlement of his firm's liability (Exh. 1, minutes of the meeting).

On the same day, May 8, Bax and R. Oefeli of Keller signed the conditions for the settlement of COB Group
Marketing's liability, Exhibit J, reproduced as follows:

This formalizes our conditions for the settlement of C.O.B.'s account with Edward Keller Ltd.

1. Increase of mortgaged collaterals to the full market value (estimated by Edak at P90,000.00).

Evidence II.
 2. Turn-over of receivables (estimated outstandings P70,000.00 to P80,000.00).

3. Turn-over of 4 (four) trucks for outright sale to Edak, to be credited against C.0.B.'s account.

4. Remaining 8 (eight) trucks to be assigned to Edak, C.O.B will continue operation with these 8
trucks. They win be returned to COB after settlement of full account.

5. C.O.B has to put up securities totalling P200,000.00. P100,000.00 has to be liquidated within one
year. The remaining P100,000.00 has to be settled within the second year.

6. Edak wig agree to allow C.O.B. to buy goods to the value of the difference between P200,000.00
and their outstandings, provided C.O.B. is in a position to put up securities amounting to
P200,000.00.

Discussion held on May 8, 1971.

Twelve days later, or on May 20, COB Group Marketing, through Bax executed two second chattel
mortgages over its 12 trucks (already mortgaged to Northern Motors, Inc.) as security for its obligation to
Keller amounting to P179,185.16 as of April 30, 1971 (Exh. PP and QQ). However, the second mortgages did not
become effective because the first mortgagee, Northern Motors, did not give its consent. But the second
mortgages served the purpose of being admissions of the liability COB Group Marketing to Keller.

The stockholders of COB Group Marketing, Moises P. Adao and Tomas C. Lorenzo, Jr., in a letter dated July
24, 1971 to Keller's counsel, proposed to pay Keller P5,000 on November 30, 1971 and thereafter every
thirtieth day of the month for three years until COB Group Marketing's mortgage obligation had been fully
satisfied. They also proposed to substitute the Manahan mortgage with a mortgage on Adao's lot at 72 7th Avenue,
Cubao, Quezon City (Exh. L).

These pieces of documentary evidence are sufficient to prove the liability of COB Group Marketing and to
justify the foreclosure of the two mortgages executed by Manahan and Lorenzo (Exh. D and E).

Section 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him "as admissions of a party".

The admissions of Bax are supported by the documentary evidence. It is noteworthy that all the invoices, with
delivery receipts, were presented in evidence by Keller, Exhibits KK-1 to KK-277-a and N to N-149-a, together with a
tabulation thereof, Exhibit KK, covering the period from October 15, 1969 to January 22, 1971. Victor A. Mayo,
Keller's finance manager, submitted a statement of account showing that COB Group Marketing owed Keller
P184,509.60 as of July 31, 1971 (Exh. JJ). That amount is reflected in the customer's ledger, Exhibit M.

On the other hand, Bax although not an accountant, presented his own reconciliation statements wherein he
showed that COB Group Marketing overpaid Keller P100,596.72 (Exh. 7 and 8). He claimed overpayment although
in his answer he did not allege at all that there was an overpayment to Keller.

The statement of the Appellate Court that COB Group Marketing alleged in its answer that it overpaid Keller
P100,596.72 is manifestly erroneous first, because COB Group Marketing did not file any answer, having been
declared in default, and second, because Bax and the other stockholders, who filed an answer, did not allege any
overpayment. As already stated, even before they filed their answer, Bax admitted that COB Group Marketing owed
Keller around P179,000 (Exh. 1).

Keller sued on September 16, 1971 COB Group Marketing, its stockholders and the mortgagors, Manahan and
Lorenzo.

COB Group Marketing, Trinidad C. Ordonez and Johnny de la Fuente were declared in default (290 Record on
Appeal).

Evidence II.
After trial, the lower court (1) dismissed the complaint; (2) ordered Keller to pay COB Group Marketing the sum of
P100,596.72 with 6% interest a year from August 1, 1971 until the amount is fully paid: (3) ordered Keller to pay
P100,000 as moral damages to be allocated among the stockholders of COB Group Marketing in proportion to their
unpaid capital subscriptions; (4) ordered the petitioner to pay Manahan P20,000 as moral damages; (5) ordered the
petitioner to pay P20,000 as attomey's fees to be divided among the lawyers of all the answering defendants and to
pay the costs of the suit; (6) declared void the mortgages executed by Manahan and Lorenzo and the cancellation
of the annotation of said mortgages on the Torrens titles thereof, and (7) dismissed Manahan's cross-claim for lack
of merit.

The petitioner appealed. The Appellate Court affirmed said judgment except the award of P20,000 as moral
damages which it eliminated. The petitioner appealed to this Court.

Bax and the other respondents quoted the six assignments of error made by the petitioner in the Appellate Court,
not the four assignments of error in its brief herein. Manahan did not file any appellee's brief.

We find that the lower courts erred in nullifying the admissions of liability made in 1971 by Bax as president
and general manager of COB Group Marketing and in giving credence to the alleged overpayment
computed by Bax .

The lower courts not only allowed Bax to nullify his admissions as to the liability of COB Group Marketing but they
also erroneously rendered judgment in its favor in the amount of its supposed overpayment in the sum of
P100,596.72 (Exh. 8-A), in spite of the fact that COB Group Marketing was declared in default and did not file any
counterclaim for the supposed overpayment.

The lower courts harped on Keller's alleged failure to thresh out with representatives of COB Group Marketing their
"diverse statements of credits and payments". This contention has no factual basis. In Exhibit J, quoted above, it is
stated by Bax and Keller's Oefeli that "discussion (was) held on May 8, 1971."

That means that there was a conference on the COB Group Marketing's liability. Bax in that discussion did not
present his reconciliation statements to show overpayment. His Exhibits 7 and 8 were an afterthought. He presented
them long after the case was filed. The petitioner regards them as "fabricated" (p. 28, Appellant's Brief).

Bax admitted that Keller sent his company monthly statements of accounts (20-21 tsn, September 2, 1976)
but he could not produce any formal protest against the supposed inaccuracy of the said statements (22).
He lamely explained that he would have to dig up his company's records for the formal protest (23-24). He
did not make any written demand for reconciliation of accounts (27-28).

As to the liability of the stockholders, it is settled that a stockholder is personally liable for the financial obligations of
a corporation to the extent of his unpaid subscription (Vda. de Salvatierra vs. Garlitos 103 Phil. 757, 763; 18 CJs
1311-2).

While the evidence shows that the amount due from COB Group Marketing is P184,509.60 as of July 31, 1971 or
P186,354.70 as of August 31, 1971 (Exh. JJ), the amount prayed for in Keller's complaint is P182,994.60 as of July
31, 1971 (18-19 Record on Appeal). This latter amount should be the one awarded to Keller because a judgment
entered against a party in default cannot exceed the amount prayed for (Sec. 5, Rule 18, Rules of Court).

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the trial court and the Appellate Court are reversed and set aside.

COB Group marketing, Inc. is ordered to pay Edward A. Keller & Co., Ltd. the sum of P182,994.60 with 12% interest
per annum from August 1, 1971 up to the date of payment plus P20,000 as attorney's fees.

Asuncion Manahan and Tomas C. Lorenzo, Jr. are ordered to pay solidarity with COB Group Marketing the sums of
P35,000 and P25,000, respectively.

The following respondents are solidarity liable with COB Group Marketing up to the amounts of their unpaid
subscription to be applied to the company's liability herein: Jose E. Bax P36,000; Francisco C. de Castro, P36,000;
Evidence II.
Johnny de la Fuente, P12,000; Sergio C. Ordonez, P12,000; Trinidad C. Ordonez, P3,000; Magno C. Ordonez,
P3,000; Adoracion C. Ordonez P3,000; Tomas C. Lorenzo, Jr., P3,000 and Luz M. Aguilar-Adao, P6,000.

If after ninety (90) days from notice of the finality of the judgment in this case the judgment against COB Group
Marketing has not been satisfied fully, then the mortgages executed by Manahan and Lorenzo should be foreclosed
and the proceeds of the sales applied to the obligation of COB Group Marketing. Said mortgage obligations should
bear six percent legal interest per annum after the expiration of the said 90-day period. Costs against the private
respondents.

Evidence II.
19.) G.R. No. 86220               April 20, 1990

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BONIFACIO CIOBAL Y PABRUA, EUSEBIO EBREO Y RINGOR, ESTER PAJIMOLA Y EBREO, RICARDO LIM,
RICARDO MIRANDA and EDDIE PAJIMOLA, defendants-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Guerrero-Manikan & Associates for defendants-appellants.

GANCAYCO, J.:

This is the case of six (6) employees who were each sentenced to life imprisonment for allegedly pilfering gas in the
gasoline station of their employer based on the sole uncorroborated testimony of the latter.

An information dated February 15, 1985 was filed in the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union charging
the accused of the crime of qualified theft as follows:

The undersigned Assistant Fiscal hereby accuses BONIFACIO CIOBAL y PABRUA, EUSEBIO EBREO y
RINGOR ESTER, PAJIMOLA y EBREO, RICARDO LIM, RICARDO MIRANDA, FRANCISCO ESCALA,
ZALDY CARIÑO and EDDIE PAJIMOLA, of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT, committed as follows:

That sometime in December 1980 and prior and subsequent thereto in the Municipality of San Fernando,
Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring, confederating and mutually, aiding one another, with the intent to gain and with grave
abuse of confidence and breach of trust of the confidence reposed upon them by their employer, BENJAMIN
M. GALVEZ, accused being employees and/or gasoline boys of the BEN'S PETRON Station Service Center
owned and managed by said Benjamin M. Galvez, and without the consent of the owner thereof, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away sales of gasoline in the total amount
of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE PESOS and TWENTY ONE
CENTAVOS (P118,855.21) Philippine Currency by tampering and/or adjusting the registered meter of the
gasoline pump installed at Ben's Petron Station Service Center, to the damage and prejudice of said
Benjamin M. Galvez in the aforementioned sum of money.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

Only accused Bonifacio Ciobal, Eusebio Ebreo, Ester Pajimola, Ricardo Lim, Ricardo Miranda and Eddie Pajimola
entered a plea of not guilty at the arraignment as accused Zaldy Cariño and Francisco Escala remained at large.
The trial proceeded as against them. After the prosecution rested its case the defense filed a demurrer to the
evidence but this was denied in an order December 17, 1987. Hence, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

On April 8, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the offense charged in this manner:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Bonifacio Ciobal, Eusebio Ebreo, Ester Pajimola, Ricardo Lim, Ricardo
Miranda and Eddie Pajimola guilty of the crime of qualified theft as charged in the information beyond
reasonable doubt as principals, they are hereby sentenced to suffer RECLUSION PERPETUA; to indemnify
the offended party the amount of P118,855.21 jointly and severally; and to pay the costs. Considering the
penalty imposed, let the record of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court for review.  2

On May 2, 1988, said accused filed a motion for reconsideration thereof questioning the imposition of the penalty
alleging that it should only be 12 years and 1 day to 14 years, 5 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal,. This was
denied by the trial court.
Evidence II.
On May 5, 1988, the accused filed a motion for new trial on the following grounds:

1. That errors of law or irregularities have been committed during the trial prejudicial to the substantial right
of the defendant; and

2. That new and material evidence has been discovered which the defendants could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which, if introduced and admitted, could probably
change the judgment.  3

On May 10, 1988, the accused filed a motion to admit additional evidence. On August 22, 1988, the trial court
denied the motion for new trial stating that by the demurrer to the evidence the accused is precluded from adducing
evidence even after the new trial.

On August 24, 1988, the accused moved for reconsideration of the August 22, 1988 order, and on September 26,
1988 filed a motion to avail of the new amendment to Rule 119, Section 15 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
which reads:

Sec. 15. Demurrer to evidence. — After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity
to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.

If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence on this defense. When the
accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence
and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.

After the effectivity of the aforesaid amended new rules on criminal procedure on October 1, 1988, the trial court
denied the motion on October 14, 1988 stating that the defense cannot be allowed to present its evidence after the
decision was rendered as it would in effect be granting a motion for new trial that had already been denied. A motion
for reconsideration of said order was denied on November 15, 1988. Hence, on November 17, 1988, the accused
filed a notice of appeal.

Under the 1987 Constitution, the death penalty may no longer be imposed so there is no more automatic review of a
judgment relation to capital offenses. Hence, this case is treated as an ordinary appeal.

The grounds relied upon in this appeal are —

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
QUALIFIED THEFT.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF
THE CRIME.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO AVAIL OF THE NEW AMENDMENT TO
RULE 119, SEC. 15 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER
OF OCTOBER 14, 1988 WHICH DENIED DEFENSE MOTION TO AVAIL OF THE NEW AMENDMENT. 4

The appeal is impressed with merit.

Evidence II.
The evidence for the prosecution must rise or fall on the sole testimony of the offended party Benjamin Galvez as
found by the court a quo. It is not contradicted as the accused were not allowed to present their evidence.
Nevertheless, it is uncorroborated. Moreover, coming as it is from an interested party his testimony should not be
accepted hook, line and sinker. It should be assessed with extreme care.

As culled from the appealed decision, it appears that in 1973, he started the operation of the Ben's Petron Service
Center in San Fernando, La Union as operator and manager. The appellants were his employees. Upon noticing
that he was losing money in the business, on May 27, 1981, at 4:00 o'clock in the morning, he went to the station to
ascertain why he was losing money. He ordered the cashier, appellant Eusebio Ebreo, to read the pump meter,
count the money from the sales and submit it to him. He and Ebreo computed the sales and both of their
computations showed that there was a shortage of 35.5 liters of regular gasoline. He asked Ebreo to explain the
shortage but it was appellant Ricardo Lim who replied that he saw appellant Bonifacio Ciobal place that
quantity of gasoline in two containers.

He ordered Ebreo to get the bag of Ciobal because he suspected that the payment of the missing gasoline might
have been placed in the bag. Ebreo got the bag and put it oil top of a mat and Galvez noticed that Ebreo took
something from the bag and put it under the mat. Galvez took what Ebreo placed under the mat. It turned out to be
a PCI bank book of Ciobal with a deposit of P800.00 entered on May 28, and another amount of P500.00 entered
therein thereafter. Galvez asked Ciobal where he got the money which he deposited in the bank. Instead of
answering the question, Ciobal ran away.

The following day, Galvez again went to the station at 4:00 o'clock in the morning and he found Ciobal, Ebreo and
appellant Ricardo Miranda inside the office so they were not able to run away. He investigated Ciobal and he
admitted that all of them, referring to the appellants, have been receiving their respective shares from the
money realized by them from the adjustments of the meter reading and that it was accused Francisco
Escala who had been adjusting the meter.

Galvez called for Ester Pajimola and asked her about the truth of the statement of Ciobal and Pajimola
answered that they were true. She further stated that the last adjustment of the meter was done on May 28,
1981 when accused Eddie Pajimola and accused Francisco Escala took 300 liters and that her share in the
spoils was P150. 00. She stated further that the first adjustment of the meter was done in March, 1980. She did not
have any share from the money realized from the first adjustment but she had been sharing for the last several
months, and that several adjustments of the meter reading have been done by the group.

Ebreo likewise admitted having received part of the money realized by the group from the adjustments of the
meter reading.

Because of these admissions, Galvez brought all the accused to the police station for investigation, except Zaldy
Cariño who ran away and since then had not been reporting for work anymore.

Reynaldo Dyquiangco, auditor of the gas station hired by Galvez, found out that the station had incurred a loss
totalling P118,855.21.

After the case was filed in court appellant Ester Pajimola approached Galvez and asked for forgiveness and
told him that she is willing to work in the station without any compensation in order that she will pay for her
share. Ebreo also approached Galvez and inquired why he (Galvez) was still proceeding with the case when
he and the other accused have paid P3,000.00 each to Judge Collado. Galvez told Ebreo that he never
received any amount from the amounts paid by them to Judge Collado for the settlement of the case.  5

What is the legal effect of the above admissions of appellants Bonifacio Ciobal, Eusebio Ebreo and Ester
Pajimola?

The prosecution contends that under Section 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, "the act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him." However, the defense
argues that said admission cannot be admissible in evidence against the other appellants considering the
provisions of Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides —

Evidence II.
 Admission by third party. — The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another, and proceedings against one cannot affect another, except as hereinafter provided.

Thus, the maxim res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet — A third party may not be prejudiced by the
act, declaration or omission of another.

The prosecution countered that the said admissions are admissible against the other appellants as an
admission by silence as an exception to the aforesaid Section 22 of the Rules under the next section which
provides —

Section 23. Admission by silence. — Any act or declaration made in the presence and within the observation
of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or
comment if not true, may be given in evidence against him.

To be admissible as an admission by silence the following requisites must concur as correctly stated by the
prosecution —

(a) He must have heard or observed the act or declaration of the other person;

(b) He must have had the opportunity to deny it (People v. Ranario, 49 Phil. 220);

(c) He must have understood the statement;

(d) He must have an interest to object as he would naturally have done if the statement was not true;

(e) The facts are within his knowledge; and

(f) The fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence is material to the issue. 6

Galvez had not established through his testimony that all these requisites are present. He did not state that
the other appellants were present and heard the admissions against them; that they had the opportunity to
deny the same; that they must have understood the statement; and that the facts are within their
knowledge. Indeed, even appellant Ciobal who allegedly admitted his participation denied the alleged
imputation of appellant Lim that he placed gasoline in 2 containers.   Absent such evidence an admission
7

by silence cannot be attributed to the other appellants.

The prosecution then invokes Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court regarding admission by a co-conspirator,
to wit —

Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration.

The admission referred to in the above provision refers to that made relating to the conspiracy and during
its existence. The aforesaid admissions of the appellants in this case appear to have been made after the
existence of the conspiracy. Moreover, there is no independent proof of such conspiracy other than such
admissions. Obviously, said admissions are not admissible in evidence against the other appellants.
Conspiracy has not been established.

Thus, what the prosecution appears to have established are the admissions of appellants Ciobal, Ebreo and Ester
Pajimola and that Pajimola and Ebreo offered to amicably settle the case during its pendency which may be
evidence of the guilt. Are these sufficient bases for their conviction?

There is no question that said appellants are trusted employees of Galvez in this gas station so the fiduciary
relationship between them categorizes the offense committed, if proved, to be qualified theft.  8

Evidence II.
However, the prosecution had not satisfactorily established the nature and value of the property allegedly stolen. In
the criminal complaint which was filed by the Commander of the San Fernando Police Station, the amount of the
loss alleged was only P7,246.00 while in the information the figure is P118,855.21. Galvez testified that his
investment in the business was P60,000 in 1973; and he added another P20,000 three years later, thus, an
investment in the total amount of P80,000.00; and that the losses he suffered covered from 1973 to 1981.  9

On the other hand, his auditor, Mr. Dyquiangco, estimated the loss of the inventory of the various petroleum
products to be P118,855.21 based on his affidavit dated December 18, 1981 but its admission was rejected by the
trial court as hearsay and not being the best evidence.   The documents, invoices and evidence of transactions
10

analyzed by him during the period were not presented in court as they are missing.  11

The Court reproduces with approval the observation in the appellants' brief:

Moreover, the special audit of Mr. Dyquiangco covered the period from March 1980 up to March 31, 1981
(t.s.n. p. 15, hearing on Nov. 10, 1986) but from the testimony of Benjamin Galvez, his losses covered the
period 1973 to 1981, amounting to P80,000. (t.s.n., August 8, 1986, p. 48). Again, Mr. Galvez claimed
losses in sales of gasoline but the audit report of Mr. Dyquiangco included a "combination loss of all diesel,
kerosene, gasoline in the regular, super and special gas." (t.s.n., p. 23, hearing on Nov. 10, 1986). How and
how much were the losses attributable to evaporation which is .5% of the gasoline according to Mr.
Dyquiangco (t.s.n., p. 26, hearing on Nov. 10, 1986) has not also been accounted for in the audit report,
which naturally would diminish or lessen the actual loss.

In the light of the discrepancies, inconsistencies, the inherent weaknesses and insufficiencies of the
testimonies of complainant Benjamin Galvez and accountant Reynaldo Dyquiangco, more so the rejection
by the Court of the basis of Mr. Dyquiangco's estimate of the loss (Exhibit D), we submit that the Court
gravely erred in giving full credence to the testimony of Benjamin Galvez. The Court erred in holding that the
loss sustained by Benjamin Galvez was P118,855.21 and basing upon it the penalty of reclusion
temporal imposed on all the accused.  12

The prosecution has failed to establish the loss and its correct amount which is an essential element of the offense
of qualified theft.

No doubt the prosecution was remiss in its duty to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. It
attempted to present appellant Bonifacio Ciobal as a state witness but it changed its mind.   The prosecution
13

backed out from a signal opportunity to fortify its case. As it is, the testimony of the offended party Benjamin Galvez
standing alone cannot stand scrutiny. A conviction for such a serious offense on such slender evidence should be
out of the question.

The trial court should have granted a new trial due to the irregularities in the proceedings before it, among others,
the shocking discrepancy in the amount of the loss alleged in the criminal complaint and the information, and if only
to get at the truth. He should have afforded the appellants the opportunity to present their defense despite their
apparent waiver thereof upon filing the demurrer to the evidence under the rules.  It should have applied the
14

beneficent provisions of the new amendment under Rule 119, Section 15 that if the motion for dismissal is denied,
and the accused filed the motion with express leave of court, then the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect when favorable to the accused.

The prosecution contends, however, that there was no express leave sought in this case.  The records show that
1âwphi1

after the prosecution closed its evidence, the appellants informed the court through counsel that they shall file a
demurrer to the evidence. The Court agreed to give them time to file the same. This is a substantial compliance with
the aforesaid rules.

Even the Solicitor General faults the court a quo in the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua when the term
of the minimum appropriate penalty, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, should only be within the range of
16 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months of prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal minimum, and the
maximum should be within the range of from 16 years, 5 months and 11 days to 20 years.  15

Evidence II.
One last word. Benjamin Galvez testified that appellant Ebreo told him he and the other accused paid P3,000.00
each to Judge Collado for settlement of the case but Galvez denied receiving anything from the judge. This is a
disturbing piece of information that the trial court should have looked into during the trial. The judge should have
verified the truth of the story for, if so, then it is corroborative of the testimony of the offended party. More
importantly, it was his duty to help purge the judiciary of the corrupt and misfits. The records of this Court show
Municipal Judge Francisco Collado of San Fernando, La Union was considered resigned from the service on
September 10, 1981.   As he is no longer in the service let a copy of this decision be furnished the Honorable
16

Secretary of Justice, Manila, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Metro Manila, for such appropriate action
towards the criminal investigation and/or prosecution or disbarment proceedings against said former judge.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and another judgment is hereby
rendered acquitting the accused-appellants with costs de oficio. This decision is immediately executory and the
appellants who are presently detained should be immediately released.

Evidence II.
20.) G.R. No. L-30423 November 7, 1979

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAMIRO ALEGRE y CERDONCILLO, MARIO COMAYAS y CUDILLAN, MELECIO CUDILLAN y ARCILLAS,
and JESUS MEDALLA y CUDILLAN, defendants-appellants.

ANTONIO, J.:

This is an automatic review of a decision of the court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District, Branch VII,
Pasay City finding all the accused, namely, Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio
Cudillan y Arcillas and Jesus Medalla y Cudillan, guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing them
as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Melecio Cudillan, ,Jesus Medalla, Ramiro Alegre, and Mario
Comayas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, committed with four (4)
aggravating circumstances, not offset by any mitigating circumstance, and hereby sentences all of
them to suffer the penalty of death, to be carried out pursuant to the applicable provisions of law, to
indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Adlina Sajo in the amount of P350,000.00, representing
the value of the pieces of jewelry unrecovered, to pay jointly and severally also the heirs of Adelina
Sajo the amount of P12,000.00. and to pay the costs.

With or without appeal, let this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review, pursuant to law.

During the pendency of this appeal, Melecio Cudillan died on arrival at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on August 16,
1970, and the case as against the said accused, insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, was dismissed on
August 29, 1974. This decision, therefore, is limited to appellants Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas and Jesus
Medalla.

This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo y Maravilla, Spinster, 57 years old, whose body was found in her
bathroom inside her house at the Maravilla compound, Ignacio Street, Pasay City, in the early morning of July 26,
1966. According to the Necropsy Report, she died of asphyxia by manual strangulation, and the time of her death
was placed between eighteen to twenty-two hours before 12:30 p.m. of July 26, 1966.

Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked. The drawers and several cabinets were
open, and some personal garments, hadbags and papers were scattered on the floor. No witness saw the
commission of the crime. Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in one of the rented rooms on
the ground floor of the victim's house, was taken to the Pasay City police headquarters for investigation in
connection with the case, but was later released that same day for lack of any evidence implicating him in the crime.

During the latter part of July, 1966, Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act of pawning
a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In explaining how he came into possession of the
stolen pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of Adlina Sajo. This appears
in his extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of Tacloban City on July 29, 1966 (Exhibits "F", "F-
1" and "F-2"). In this statement, which was written in the English language, Melecio Cudillan implicated a certain
"Esok" of Villalon, Calubian, Leyte; Jesus Medalla, of Villahermosa, Calubian, Leyte; Mario Cudillan, also of
Villahermosa, Calubian, Leyte; one "Danny" Fernandez, of Balaquid, Cabucgayan, Biliran Sub-province; and one
"Rammy, " another Leyteno. When brought to Metro Manila and while he was inside the Pasay City police
headquarters, Melecio Cudillan again executed an extrajudicial confession (Exhibits "A ", "A-1 " to "A-6" on July 31,
1966. This was sworn to before the Assistant City Fiscal of Pasay City on August 1, 1966. In this second statement,
he narrated in detail the participation in the commission of the crime of Jesus Medalla, "Celso" Fernandez, "Rami"
and "Mario." According to said statement, the declarant went near the cell within the Office of the Investigation
Section, Secret Service Division, and Identified Ramiro Alegre, Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas as the persons
he referred to as Jesus Medalla, "Rami" and "Mario" in his declaration. On the basis of the aforementioned
extrajudicial confession of Melecio Cudillan, an Information for Robbery with Homicide was filed by the Special

Evidence II.
Counsel of Pasay City against Celso Fernandez, alias "Esok," Jesus Medalla y Cudillan, Ramiro Alegre y
Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas, and one John Doe."

When arraigned on August 10, 1966, Mario Comayas, Melecio Cudillan, Jesus Medalla and Ramiro Alegre entered
a plea of not guilty. The prosecution presented nine (9) witnesses. None of them, however, testified on the actual
commission of the crime. The recital of facts contained in the decision under review was based principally and
mainly on the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan. Thus, the details of the planning and the execution of
the crime were taken from the "Pasay Sworn Statement" (Exhibits "A", "A-1" to "A-6"). The only evidence, therefore,
presented by the prosecution to prove the guilt of appellants are the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando
Carillo.

The testimony of Sgt. Mariano Isla of the Pasay City police is to the effect that when he was investigating Melecio
Cudillan, the latter pointed to Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas and Jesus Medalla as his companions in the
commission of the crime. According to him, said appellants "just stared at him (Melecio Cudilla) and said nothing."

Q. In what particular place in the Police Department did you have to confront the
accused Melecio Cudillan with the other suspects'?

A. In the office of the Secret Service Division.

Q. When you said there was a confrontation between the accused Melecio Cudillan
and other suspects whom do you refer to as other suspects?

A. Jesus Medalla, Celso Fernandez, Rosario Dejere and Mario. There was another
person Eduardo Comayas. He was also one of those suspects but Melecio Cudillan
failed to point to him as his companion.

Q. Who were those persons or suspects pointed to by Melecio Cudillan in the Police
Department of Pasay City as his companions?

A. To Jesus Medalla, Ramiro Alegre and Mario Comayas.

Q. When Melecio Cudilla pointed to these persons what did these three persons do?

A. They just stared at him and said nothing. (t.s.n., pp. 15-16, Hearing of October 28,
1966).

According to the trial court, had the appellants "really been innocent (they) should have protested vigorously and not
merely kept their silence."

Hernando Carillo, a detention prisoner in the Pasay City jail, declared that the three (3) appellants admitted to him
that they took part in the robbery and homicide committed in the residence of the deceased, viz.:

ATTY. DEPASUCAT:

Q. Do you know the other accused Ramiro Alegre?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If he is inside the court room, will you please point him out?

INTERPRETER:

Witness points to the fellow in the second row, fourth from the left who, upon being
asked, gave his name as Ramiro Alegre.
Evidence II.
 ATTY. DEPASUCAT:

Q. Did you have any occasion to talk to Ramiro Alegre?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where?

A. In the city jail because our cells are also near each other.

Q. And what did you and Ramiro Alegre talk about?

A. Concerning his case and he told me that he has also anticipated in the
commission of the killing of Adelina Sajo.

Q. By the way, when did you talk with Ramiro Alegre, more or less?

A. About the middle of June.

Q. And what else did Ramiro Alegre tell you, if any?

A. That he was also inside the room when they killed Adelina Sajo.

Q. Now, regarding that conversation you had with the accused Jesus Medalla, when
did that take place, more or less?

A. About that month also of June, about the middle of June.

Q. What year?

A. 1967.

Q. Do you know the other accused Mario Comayas?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why do you know him?

A. He is also one of the prisoners and our cells are near each other. Q. If he is inside
the courtroom, will you please point him out?

INTERPRETER:

Witness indicating to the fellow who gave his name as Mario

Comayas.

ATTY. DEPASUCAT:

Q. Did you have any occasion to talk with the accused Mario Comayas?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When was that, more or less?

Evidence II.
 A. In the month of June, about the middle part also of June.

Q. And what did you talk about?

A. Regarding this case of Adelina Sajo and he admitted to me that he was one of
those who planned and killed Adelina Sajo.

Q. I see! And what, else did he tell you, if any?

A. That while the killing was being perpetrated upstairs he was told to by the door.

Q. How about the other accused Melencio Cudillan, do you know him?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If he is in court, will you please point him out?

INTERPRETER:

Witness pointing to the accused who gave his name as Melecio

Cudillan.

ATTY. DEPASUCAT:

Q. Why do you know Melecio Cudillan?

A. Because he is with me in one cell.

Q. Were you able also to talk with Melecio Cudillan?

A. Most of the time because we used to talk about our case.

Q. When have you talked with Melecio Cudillan, more or less?

A. Three days after my confinement and subsequently thereafter up to about the first
week of June, 1967.

Q. And what did the accused Melecio Cudillan tell you about this case?

ATTY. RAMIREZ:

Objection, Your Honor, leading.

COURT:

Witness may answer, there is already a basis.

A. That they were the ones who planned and killed Adelina Sajo. (t.s.n., pp. 286-289,
Hearing of July 21, 1967).

However, during the trial, Melecio Cudillan repudiated both the Tacloban City and Pasay City sworn statements as
the product of compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was not assisted by counsel when he was investigated by
the police. Appellants Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas denied any involvement in the crime. They testified that at
the time of the incident in question. they were attending the internment of the deceased child of Ciriaco Abobote.

Evidence II.
According to Jesus Medalla, he and his companions left the Maravilla compound at 10:00 o'clock in the morning of
July 25, 1966 to attend the internment. 'They left the cemetery at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and proceeded
directly to his house at Leveriza Street where he stayed the whole night. Mario Comayas confirmed that he and
Jesus Medalla were at the house of Ciriaco Abobote in the morning of July 25, 1966, until after 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon when he returned to the bakery where he was employed to resume his work.

Appellant Ramiro Alegre did not testify but presented three (3) witnesses to support his defense. Thus, Urbano
Villanueva testified that he was a sub-contractor of Jose Inton for the welding project of David M. Consunji at the
Sheraton Hotel construction; that Ramiro Alegre began working at the construction as a welder on July 13, 1966,
and that from 7:00 o'clock in the morning to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Alegre worked in the project and that he
knew this because he is the foreman and timekeeper in the project. He Identified the Time Record of Ramiro Alegre
(Exhibit "1"). Rodolfo Villanueva and Romeo Origenes testified that from 7:00 o'clock in the morning up to 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon of July 25, 1966, appellant Ramiro Alegre was at the Sheraton Hotel construction at Roxas
Boulevard. Their testimony is confirmed by the Time Record of Ramiro Alegre (Exhibit "1") which contained the
number of hours he actually worked at the Sheraton Hotel construction project.

Appellants now contend that the lower court erred in utilizing the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio
Cudillan (now deceased) as evidence against herein appellants; in concluding from the alleged "Silence" of
appellants when allegedly pointed to by Melecio Cudillan as "his companions" in the commission of the
crime, an admission of guilt; and in giving undue weight and credence to the testimony of an inmate of the
Pasay City Jail that appellants admitted to him their participation in the crime.

The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan (Exhibits "A", "A- I " to "A-6" and "F", "F-1" and "F-2"), on
the basis of which the trial court was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in
question, cannot be used as evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre and
Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet"   there being no
1

independent evidence of conspiracy.   As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although
2

deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his co- accused. It is merely
hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned.   While there are recognized exceptions to this
3

rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of such exceptions.
The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would be their purported tacit admissions and/or
failure to deny their implications of the crime made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal confessions to
Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail.

II

The next question to be resolved is whether or not the silence of appellants while under police custody, in the face
of statements of Melecio Cudillan implicating them as his companions in the commission of the crime, could be
considered as tacit admission on their part of their participation therein.

The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may not
be taken as evidence against him,   and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating question.   It has also been
4 5

held that while an accused is under custody, his silence may not be taken as evidence against him as he has a right
to remain silent; his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him, otherwise, his right of
silence would be illusory.   The leading case of Miranda v. Arizona  held that the prosecution may not use at trial the
6 7

fact that an individual stood mute, or claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, in the face of an accusation
made at a police custodial interrogation. Prior to Miranda, it was the view of many authorities that a man to whom a
statement implicating him in a crime is directed may fail to reply if he is in custody under a charge of the commission
of that crime, not because he acquiesces in the truth of the statement, but because he stands on his constitutional
right to remain silent, as being the safest course for him to pursue and the best way out of his predicament.   Other
8

courts have held that the circumstance that one is under arrest by itself does not render the evidence inadmissible,
and that an accusation of a crime calls for a reply even from a person under arrest or in the custody of an officer,
where the circumstances surrounding him indicate that he is free to answer if he chooses.  9

Evidence II.
We hold that the better rule is that the silence of an accused under custody, or his failure to deny statements by
another implicating him in a crime, especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such
implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession of his participation in the commission of the
crime. Such an inference of acquiescence drawn from his silence or failure to deny the statement would appear
incompatible with the right of an accused against self-incrimination.

The right or privilege of a person accused of a crime against self- incrimination is a fundamental right. It is a
personal right of great importance and is given absolutely and unequivocably. The privilege against self-
incrimination is an important development in man's struggle for liberty. It reflects man's fundamental values and his
most noble of aspirations, the unwillingness of civilized men to subject those' suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; the fear that self-incriminating statements may be obtained by
inhumane treatment and abuses, and the respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of
each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life."  10

In the words of Chavez v. Court of Appeals:  11

... this right is 'not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the discretion of
the court;' it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right; it is
fundamental to our scheme of justice ...

Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of
his guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts
usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission
of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take
the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will.

It must be stressed here that even under a regime of martial law, the operations of our laws governing the rights of
an accused person are not open to doubt. Under the code for the administration of detainees, all officers, civilian
and military personnel are sworn to uphold the rights of detainees. Among such fundamental rights are the right
against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination, the right, when under investigation for the commission of an
offense, to remain silent, to have counsel, and to be informed of his rights; the right not to be subjected to force,
violence, threats, intimidation and degrading punishment or torture in the course of one's detention, and the
safeguard that any confession obtained in violation of the foregoing rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.   The12

1973 Constitution gives explicit constitutional sanction to the right to silence. Thus, in Section 20 of Article IV of the
Constitution, there is this categorical mandate: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in
violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."

This privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Constitution protects, therefore, the right of a person to
remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty for such
silence. 
13

This aspect of the right has been comprehensively explained by then Associate Justice Enrique M. Fernando, now
Chief justice, in Pascual Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners,   thus:
14

The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had
occasion to declare: 'The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used
as a presumption of his guilt.' Only last year, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, speaking through
Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant 'to forego
testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered
exercise of his own free, genuine will.'

Identifying the right of an accused to remain silent with right to privacy, this Court, in Pascual explained that the
privilege against self-incrimination "enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force
to surrender to its detriment."

Evidence II.
We hold, therefore, that it was error for the trial court to draw from appellants' silence while under police custody, in
the face of the incriminatory statements of Melecio Cudillan, the conclusion that the aforesaid appellants had tacitly
admitted their guilt. We hold, further, that in view of the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession of Melecio
Cudillan implicating herein appellants, the remaining evidence against them, consisting in the testimonies of Sgt.
Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo, is insufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction. Indeed, it is inherently
improbable that herein appellants would have readily confessed their participation in the commission of a heinous
crime to a casual acquaintance in a prison detention cell, considering that on the same occasion they strongly
denied any involvement in such crime before the police authorities.

WHEREFORE, the judgement appealed from is reversed, and appellants Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario
Comayas y Cudillan and Jesus Medalla y Cudillan are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime with which they are
charged. Their immediate release from detention is ordered, unless they or any one of them is otherwise held for
some other lawful cause.

Evidence II.
21.) G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and G.R. No. 119407 July 7, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GREGORIO MEJIA y VILLAFANIA, EDWIN BENITO, PEDRO PARAAN, and JOSEPH FABITO, accused-
appellants.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In the evening of 10 March 1994, along the expressway at Barangay Ventinilla, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, several
persons on board a passenger jeepney driven by Teofilo Landingin attacked the latter and a passenger, Virgilio
Catugas, thereby inflicting upon them multiple stab wounds. Landingin was pulled out from his seat and dumped on
the shoulder of the road. One of the attackers took the wheel of the jeepney and drove away. Catugas was thrown
out to the middle of the road when the jeepney started to move away. Landingin died as a consequence of the
injuries he sustained. Catugas survived.

Held to account for the above acts were Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, Joseph Fabito, Romulo
Calimquim, one alias Dennis, Alex Mamaril, one alias Mondragon, and another unidentified person. Mejia and
Benito were taken into police custody a few hours after the incident; Paraan, the following day; and Fabito, five days
after. Calimquim was found dead three days after the incident in question, while the others have remained at large.
Three separate criminal complaints for murder,  frustrated murder,  and violation of R.A. No. 6539 (Anti Carnapping
1 2

Act of 1992, as amended)  were filed against them with the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.
3

Despite service on them of subpoenas requiring submission of counter- affidavits, accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan,
and Fabito and did not submit their counter-affidavits.

On 9 May 1994, Judge Lilia C. Espanol issued an order  declaring the accused "to have waived their right to be
4

heard in preliminary investigation"; finding a prima facie case against the accused; recommending that they be
charged with and prosecuted for the crimes of murder, frustrated murder, and violation of R.A. No. 6539, as
amended; and ordering that the records of the cases be forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for
appropriate action.

After appropriate proceedings, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dagupan City three separate informations for murder, frustrated murder, and violation of the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, against the aforenamed persons. The informations were docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00617-D, 94-00619-D, and 94-00620-D, respectively. The first was later amended. The
accusatory portions of the informations read as follows:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00617-D (as amended)

That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at barangay Ventinilla, Municipality of
Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with knives with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation and taking
advantage of superior strength, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab TEOFILO LANDINGIN inflicting upon him stab
wounds which caused his instant death to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. 5

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00619-D

That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at barangay Ventinilla, Municipality of
Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
Evidence II.
 above-named accused, armed with knives and with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation, and taking
advantage of superior strength, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab VIRGILIO CATUGAS Y CASTAÑEDA inflicting upon
him multiple stab wounds, the accused having then performed all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of Murder as a consequence but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the accused and that is due to the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to said Virgilio Catugas y Castañeda which prevented his death to his damage and prejudice.

Contrary to Art. 248 in relation with Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code. 6

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00620-D

That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at barangay Ventinilla, Municipality of
Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused armed with knives by means of violence against person by stabbing to death
TEOFILO LANDINGIN, owner-driver of a passenger jeep bearing Plate No. APP-432 with marking Lovely
and thereafter with intent to gain, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and drive away said passenger jeep bearing Plate No. APP-
432 with marking Lovely owned and driven by Teofilo Landingin without the latter's consent, to the damage
and prejudice of his heirs.

Contrary to Republic Act 6539 as amended. 7

The first two were assigned to Branch 44 of the RTC of Dagupan City presided by Judge Crispin C. Laron
(hereafter, LARON court) and thereafter consolidated and jointly tried. The third was assigned to Branch 43 of the
said court presided by Judge Silverio Q. Castillo (hereafter, CASTILLO court).

At their arraignments, Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito entered a plea of innocence in each case.

I
THE CASE IN THE LARON COURT

In Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D (Murder) and Criminal Case No. 94-00619-D (Frustrated Murder) in the LARON
court, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Virgilio Catugas, policemen Dominguillo Gulen and
Bernardo Clemente, Dr. Cristito Garcia, Ma. Nora Landingin, and Dr. Roberto Valenzuela. Virgilio Catugas was
recalled as rebuttal witness. In their defense, accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito took the witness stand.
They also presented as additional witnesses Roberto Lambot, Shirley Lomboy, Conrado Benito, policeman
Bernardo Clemente, and Felicidad Fabito in their evidence in chief and Julia Paraan as sur-rebuttal witness.

The evidence for the prosecution in these cases may be summarized as follows:

At around 7:00 p.m. of 10 March 1994, Virgilio Catugas was in front of the CSI Supermarket in Dagupan City waiting
for a transportation to take him to his home at Talibaew, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Later, a passenger jeepney plying
the Dagupan City — Calasiao route and driven by Teofilo Landingin arrived. He boarded it and occupied that portion
of the passengers' seat behind the driver's seat. There were already some passengers inside the jeepney, but they
disembarked before the jeepney reached the boundary of Dagupan City and Calasiao, leaving behind Landingin,
Catugas, and two other passengers. 8

When the jeepney reached the MacArthur Highway in San Miguel, Calasiao, nine persons flagged down the jeepney
and boarded it. One of them, whom Catugas identified to be accused Edwin Benito, sat beside the driver; the rest
took the passenger seats behind the driver's seat. Catugas fully recognized Benito because there was light at the
ceiling of the jeepney and at the "signboard" portion of the jeepney and the latter sometimes turned his face toward
the back where Catugas was seated. Catugas had further observed Benito's face, ears, and eyes.  He also
9

recognized accused Mejia, Fabito, and Paraan. 10

Evidence II.
The nine passengers told Landingin that they were bound for Pangasinan Village Inn (PVI) in Bued, Calasiao. But
when they reached PVI, one of them said that his companions did not know where they were going, and informed
Landingin that he would take care of the fare upon reaching Nansangaan, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan. Upon reaching
Nansangaan, one of the nine passengers asked Landingin to drive a little farther. Later, Mejia asked Catugas
whether he was Landingin's companion; Catugas answered in the affirmative. Mejia then announced: "[T]his is a
hold-up"; while Benito said: "[N]obody will be able to be saved his life [sic]." Another companion of Mejia said:
"Proceed." All of the nine drew their daggers and stabbed Landingin and Catugas. 11

Landingin died on that same evening. Dr. Cristito Garcia, who conducted an autopsy on Landingin's cadaver, found
three stab wounds — two of which were fatal. According to him, the cause of Landingin's death was
cardiorespiratory arrest resulting from hypovolemic shock due to internal hemorrhage.  Nora Landingin, wife of
12

Teofilo Landingin, spent P1,500 daily during the wake of her husband; P12,000 for his burial; and P16,000 for the
tomb. Nora felt sad because of his death. 13

On the other hand, Catugas, who was pushed out of the jeepney and landed on the road, was brought by some
people to the Villaflor Memorial Hospital.  Dr. Roberto Valenzuela performed on Catugas exploratory laparatomy
14

debridement and found three multi-lacerations in the right upper extremities and several others on the left upper
extremities which could have been caused by bladed instruments.  Catugas survived and was confined for seven
15

days. He spent more than P50,000 for his hospitalization and medical expenses. The hospital billed him in the
amount of P44,667.25. 16

In the same evening of 10 March 1994, while Policeman Dominguillo Gulen of the Mabini Police Station, Mabini,
Pangasinan, was approaching his residence at the poblacion in Sual, Pangasinan, on board a police patrol car, he
saw six men walking in front of his house. When he stopped the car, the men ran away. He gave chase and caught
two of them, namely, accused Mejia and Benito. Gulen thought that they belonged to an "akyat-bahay gang." When
asked what they were doing, the two answered that they were not doing anything and that they were not robbers.
They told Gulen that they were from Sta. Barbara. Benito even showed his driver's license and told Gulen that he
did not commit any crime and that he was willing to go to the police station. Gulen then brought the two and turned
them over to the police station in Sual, Pangasinan. 17

Policeman Bernardo Clemente, who was the desk officer at 1:00 a.m. of 11 March 1994, entered in the police blotter
this turn-over and talked to the two. In the course of their conversation, Benito reported that they rode on a jeepney,
which was abandoned somewhere in Sual. Clemente decided to make a follow-up of this report. With Benito as their
guide, Clemente and three other policemen were able to find the jeepney with the marking LOVELY in Sitio Nipa,
Barangay Baguioen, Sual, Pangasinan. The jeepney had bloodstains on the front and back seats. They brought it to
the police station and had the matter recorded in the police blotter. Clemente then instructed the radio operator to
call the police station of Sta. Barbara and inform it of the turn-over of Mejia and Benito. At 1:45 a.m. of 11 March
1994, the PNP elements of Sta. Barbara Police Station came and received the two, as well as the passenger
jeepney.18

Also on 11 March 1994, at 12:00 noon, some concerned citizens of Sual apprehended Joseph Fabito in Sitio Looc,
Poblacion Sual, as a murder suspect. He was turned over to the Sual Police Station. After having been informed of
this arrest, the Sta. Barbara Police Station took him into its custody. These facts were entered in the Sual Police
Station blotter.
19

The accused admitted to having flagged down and boarded Landingin's jeepney that fateful evening of 10
March 1994, but denied having committed the crimes. They claimed that it was Romulo Calimquim and his
companions who killed Landingin, stabbed Catugas, and drove away the jeepney. The following is a summary
of their version of the events.

Edwin Benito, a resident of Ventinilla West, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, was the driver of the Elf truck of Lito Lomboy
of Bued, Calasiao, Pangasinan, which was used in hauling sand and gravel. His co-accused Mejia Paraan and
Fabito were his helpers.

At around 3:00 p.m. of 10 March 1994, after they completed delivering sand and gravel, the accused returned the
truck and went to the house of Fabito's brother-in-law in San Miguel, Calasiao. After two hours of waiting in vain for
the brother-in-law, Paraan suggested that they go to the house of his future brother-in-law in Bacayao Norte,
Evidence II.
Calasiao. After some snacks they proceeded to the town proper and strolled for a while. Then, Benito thought that it
was time to go home to Sta. Barbara and suggested that they should. They proceeded to a waiting shed near the
National High School to wait for a transportation for Sta. Barbara. At the waiting shed, they saw Romulo Calimquim
with three other companions, who were also waiting for a transportation for Sta. Barbara. Calimquim then flagged
down an approaching passenger jeepney. He and his companions boarded it. So did Benito and his companions.
Calimquim sat beside the driver. The rest took the back seat. 20

According to Paraan, it was Alex Mamaril, the man with a "huge body," who sat beside the driver. 21

At the junction of the roads leading to the Municipal Hall of Sta. Barbara and that leading to the national highway,
the man who sat beside the driver (Calimquim, according to Benito; Mamaril, according to Paraan) ordered the
driver to proceed to the national highway; the driver did. But after reaching the highway, in Ventinilla, Sta. Barbara,
the former ordered the latter to stop, announced that "this is a hold up," then stabbed the driver several times, pulled
his body out of the jeepney, took over the wheel, and drove the jeepney.  In the meantime, at the back seat, one of
22

the companions of Calimquim pointed a knife at Benito; while the others told Benito's companions to lie on their
belly. It was when Catugas attempted to fight back that he was stabbed.  Catugas was then thrown out of the
23

jeepney. 24

Benito and his companions were prevented by the group of Calimquim from alighting from the jeepney. Upon
reaching a mountain in Sual,
Pangasinan,   the man on the wheel ordered Benito, Mejia, Paraan, and Fabito to alight from the jeepney. The
25

group of Calimquim pointed knives   and a

26

gun   at them. Then suddenly there was a light coming from below. They ran away from the group of Calimquim. 
27 28

Benito and Mejia were together.  Later, a policeman saw them. The two told the policeman that they are not
29

"troublesome persons." The policeman brought them to the Police Station of Sual. There, Benito reported what had
happened and accompanied the policemen to the place where the jeepney in question was located.  Afterwards, the
30

two were detained at Sta. Barbara Police Station. While in detention, they were informed that Calimquim was killed
and his body was found in Alaminos. 31

Paraan lost his way. He returned to Sta. Barbara only on 14 March 1994 and went to the house of Roland, his
brother-in-law, in Bacayao Norte, to ask him to request a barangay councilman to accompany him to the police
station. It was the barangay captain who accompanied him the following day to the police station. There, the police
authorities told him that he was among the assailants of Landingin and that he was the one who stabbed Catugas in
the night of 10 March 1994 and one of the suspects in the carnapping of the jeepney of Landingin.  Paraan was
32

forthwith placed inside the jail.

Fabito stayed for awhile in the mountain. At 2:00 a.m. of 11 March 1994, he was by the seashore. He stayed there
until 6:00 a.m. and inquired from someone the location of the police station. He went to that station which happened
to be Sual Police Station. There, he narrated to the policemen what had happened. When a policeman asked him
whether he was the killer, he answered in the negative. At around 1:00 p.m., he was brought to the Sta. Barbara
Municipal Jail, where he was detained for three months. Then, he was committed to the Provincial Jail. 33

Sometime after Catugas was discharged from the hospital and was already driving a tricycle, the parents of
the accused met with him and informed him that the accused told them that they (the accused) did not
commit any wrong. Catugas answered that he had suffered several wounds and spent much for his
hospitalization and that since the accused were the ones apprehended, he would just tell a lie so he could
recover the amounts he spent. Catugas then asked P20,000 from each of the accused, or a total of P80,000,
and repeated this demand five to six times. 34

The defense, through the testimony of Policemen Bernardo Clemente, also proved that Romulo Calimquim died due
to a gunshot wound on 13 March 1994 in Barangay Paitan West, Sual, Pangasinan, as evidenced by Entry No.
4338 of Page 260 of the Police Blotter. 35

On rebuttal, Catugas insisted that it was accused Edwin Benito who stabbed Landingin and that accused
Mejia, Paraan, and Fabito were the ones who stabbed him. He further declared that it was the parents of the

Evidence II.
accused who offered to pay him, but he refused because such an offer could not "be accepted by [his]
conscience." 36

The defense then presented Julia Paraan as surrebuttal witness. She denounced as untrue the testimony on
rebuttal of Catugas that the parents of accused were the ones who offered to pay him money. Julia declared that
they visited Catugas to ask him whether it was true that their children committed the crime. On their first visit,
Catugas told them that he could not yet answer that question; but when they returned, Catugas told them that they
had to pay the aggregate sum of P80,000, or P20,000 per family of the accused. 37

The trial court gave full credit to the version of the prosecution and relied heavily on the identification of the accused
by Catugas, the absence of ulterior motive on the part of the latter, and the offer of the parents of the accused to
compromise the cases.

In its decision dated 17 November 1994,  the LARON court convicted accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito of
38

the crime of murder and of frustrated murder, with treachery as the qualifying circumstance and nighttime and band
as aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, it sentenced the first three accused to suffer the penalty of death for the
crime of murder; and ten years and one day of prision mayor to seventeen years, four months, and one day
of reclusion temporal for the crime of frustrated murder. It credited Paraan with the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, he being only seventeen years old at the time of the commission of the crimes charged;
and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for murder, and six years of prision correccional to ten years an one day
of prision mayor for frustrated murder. The Court also ordered the four accused to pay the heirs of Teofilo Landingin
the amounts of P50,000 as death indemnity; P16,000 for the cost of the tomb; and P12,000 for funeral expenses;
and to pay Catugas the amount of P44,687.25 for hospital expenses, plus costs.

II
THE CASE IN THE CASTILLO COURT

In Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D (violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act) in the CASTILLO Court, the prosecution
presented as its witnesses Virgilio Catugas and Nora Landingin. The former was recalled as rebuttal witness. The
accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito took the witness stand and presented as additional witnesses Conrado
Benito and Felicidad Fabito. Their testimonies were substantially the same as those they made in the murder and
frustrated murder cases in the LARON court.

Prosecution witness Virgilio Catugas added that after Landingin was stabbed, he was thrown out of the jeepney to
the shoulder of the road and that one of the culprits took the wheel of the jeepney, started off its engine, and drove
off.  He further declared that while he was confined at the hospital, the policemen of Sta. Barbara investigated him,
39

showed him pictures of the suspects, supplied the suspect's names,  and took his statement.  After he was
40 41

discharged therefrom, he was able to talk with the father of accused Benito. He told the father of his hospitalization
expenses and asked P80,000, as a settlement of the case, to be paid by the parents of the accused on an agreed
date; but before that date came, he had already testified against the accused. 42

Prosecution witness Nora Landingin, widow of Teofilo Landingin, further testified that her husband owned the
passenger jeepney in question, as evidenced by Certificate of Registration No. 19253856,  and Official Receipt No.
43

MVRR 91354948.  The jeepney was worth P140,000.

44 45

The CASTILLO court gave full faith to the testimony of Virgilio Catugas. It debunked the version of the defense on
account of the following "inculpating evidence," which, according to it, bolstered its finding that the accused were the
authors of the crime charged:

1. Accused Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Joseph Fabito and Pedro Paraan speak of
innocence and fear for their lives during the ruthless incident, unfortunately they never
sustained any bodily injury on their bodies.

If the intention of Mok Calimquim and company is to hurt anybody, they could not have
concentrated on the persons of Teofilo Landingin and Virgilio Catugas only but they should
have also inflicted stabbing thrusts against their persons (accused).

Evidence II.
 2. They (accused) posited that for fear of their lives they did not do anything except to
passively stay at the back seat of the jeepney motionless from the place of stabbing incident
in Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan up to the mountains in Sual, Pangasinan.

Again, if one of the motives of Mok and company is to carnapp [sic] the passenger jeepney
of Teofilo Landingin then the logical conclusion that can be had in the instant situation is for
the group of Mok to liquidate the driver and all passengers for that matter, including the four
(4) accused to eliminate the presence of eyewitnesses.

Unfortunately, the four (4) accused joined the group of Mok in going to Sual, Pangasinan
without offering any slight resistance in the premises.

The natural conclusion that can be derived thereat is that, Mok and company belonged to the
group of the four (4) accused who were responsible in perpetrating the offense charged.

3. Assuming en gratia argumenti that Mok and company are the real offenders, why is it that
during the long span of travel from Sta. Barbara to Sual, they never made any attempt to
jump off the passenger jeepney; neither did they show positive signs to invite the attention of
PNP members stationed along the long route starting in Dagupan City, Binmaley, Lingayen,
Bugallon, Labrador, Pangasinan.

4. Accused Gregorio Mejia and Edwin Benito steadfastly claim innocence of the crime
charged. In fact, they averred that upon reaching Sual, Pangasinan, they reported to the
responding peace officers what happened to them and that their reports was recorded in the
Police Blotter of Sual Station.

The assertion of accused Benito and Mejia is tainted with absolute falsity and is debunked by
the entry in the Police Blotter of Sual Police Station (Exh. G); the subject certification negates
accused's statement of innocence. The subject entry which is contained in the Book of
Events of Sual Police Station belies any complaint/report made by accused Edwin
Benito/Gregorio Mejia that they were kidnapped or deprived of their liberty with the use of
guns and bladed weapons. Upon the other hand, the Certification squarely bespeaks of the
incarceration/detention of said accused (Mejia and Benito) at Sual Police Station for they
were suspected of having carnapped the passenger jeepney involved in the above case.

5. With respect to accused Joseph Fabito and Pedro Paraan, they likewise vehemently
denied the accusation lodged against them. Unfortunately, their conclusion of innocence
crumbled when they joined the group from the crime scene starting in Sta. Barbara,
Pangasinan up to their destination in Sual, Pangasinan. In fact when they reached Sual,
Pangasinan they scampered and run away to different directions to avoid apprehension.

Instead of proceeding to the Sual Police Station or making any report to the nearest
authority i.e. Barangay Captain of the place they decided to escape which they did with
impunity. The records in the Police Blotter of Sual is negatived (sic) of any entry about the
whereabouts of accused Paraan and Fabito. 46

The court then convicted accused Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, and Joseph Fabito guilty of the
violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended. It sentenced the first three accused to death; and Paraan,
to reclusion perpetua on account of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. It also ordered them to pay
the costs.

III
THE APPEALS AND ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

Evidence II.
Although review in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court is automatic pursuant to Section 22
of R.A. No. 7659,  the convicted accused filed with this Court their notices of appeal from the decision of the
47

LARON court and of the CASTILLO court on 18 November 1994 and 22 February 1995, respectively.

Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00617-D and 94-00619-D were docketed in this Court as G.R. Nos. 118940-41, and
Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D was docketed as G.R. No. 119407.

On 2 February 1996, after they filed separate Appellant's Briefs in G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and in G.R. No. 119407,
the appellants filed a motion for the consolidation of these cases, which we granted on 27 February 1996.

In their Appellant's Brief in G.R. Nos. 118940-41, the appellants impute upon the trial court the following errors: (a)
in giving full faith and credence to the unsubstantiated testimony of prosecution witness Virgilio Catugas relative to
the incident in question; (b) in holding them as the persons who stabbed the jeepney driver and Virgilio Catugas in
the evening of 10 March 1994 despite the fact that clear and convincing evidence were proffered to point at the real
culprits, Romulo Calimquim and his companions; (c) in rendering a verdict of conviction notwithstanding the failure
of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (d) in convicting them of the crimes charged
instead of the crimes homicide and frustrated homicide — on the assumption that they are guilty.

Being interrelated, the appellants discussed jointly these assigned errors. They submit that:

(1) The uncorroborated testimony of Catugas on the identification of the appellants leaves
much to be desired. He should not be believed, for he could not even remember who among
the appellants were wearing short pants, hat, and shoes at that time. If policeman Gulen
could not even identify in court appellant Mejia whom he apprehended in the evening of 10
March 1994 and brought to the Sual Police Station, it was with more reason that Catugas
could not have identified the assailants since it was nighttime. The possibility that Catugas
got confused, if not mentally and physically drained, as a result of the shocking incident is
not far-fetched. There is then a very strong and compelling reason to believe that Catugas
mistook the appellants as the real hold-uppers.

(2) Catugas told Conrado Benito and Felicidad Fabito that their children did not commit any
wrong, but Catugas "vacillated and testified falsely against accused-appellants when they
were not able to produce the amount of P20,000.00 each as earlier demanded from them."
Catuga's denial of their testimony is self-serving and cannot overcome the positive testimony
of Conrado and Felicidad.

(3) The actuations of appellants specifically that of Edwin Benito augurs well with their claim
of innocence," when they were apprehended. Benito readily showed his driver's license,
answered questions propounded by policeman Clemente, and without hesitation he helped
or guided the policemen in locating the jeepney at the place where it was abandoned. He did
not try to hide or conceal anything when he was confronted about the incident. Moreover,
when Benito and Mejia were picked up by a policeman on that fateful night, they were not
"tainted with blood."

(4) On the assumption that they are guilty they could only be liable for homicide and
frustrated homicide, since treachery was not established.

In their Appellants' Brief in G.R. No. 119407, they make the following assignment of errors: (a) the facts charged in
the information do not constitute violation of the crime of Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended; (b) The court a
quo erred in convicting them of the crime charged on the basis of surmises and conjecture; and (c) the court a
quo erred in convicting them by relying fully on the evidence of the prosecution and completely disregarding the
evidence of the defense.

As to the first, the appellants argue that intent to gain, which is an essential ingredient of the crime of carnapping,
was not proved. They claim that from the evidence adduced "it is very clear that the incident was only a hold-up and
that the jeepney was taken to Sual as escape vehicle."

Evidence II.
In support of the second and third assigned errors, which they discussed jointly, the appellants submit that:

(1) The trial court's conclusion on their culpability was based on mere surmises and
conjectures and contradicted by the evidence on the record. The fact that the group of
Calimqium did not hurt any of the four appellants and that the latter offered no resistance
does not prove appellant's membership in Calimquim's group. That they did not even jump
off the passenger jeepney or show positive signs to invite the attention of the PNP stationed
along the route from Dagupan City to Sual, it was because of fear since Calimquim's group
pointed knives at each of them and ordered them to lie down in stooping position. The
absence of conspiracy was shown by the fact that in Sual, after they were released as
hostages, they ran in separate directions and did not join the group of Calimquim.

(2) The entry in the Sual Police Station police blotter that Benito and Mejia were suspected of
having carnapped the passenger jeepney does not bind them, for it was made by a police
officer and was contrary to what they had reported.

(3) There is no basis for the conclusion that Paraan and Fabito had escaped.

(4) The trial court should not have relied on the testimony of Catugas whose identification of
the appellants was based only on the pictures and on the information of the policemen. It
was impossible for Catugas to narrate in detail the participation of each accused, considering
that the light in the jeepney was dim and his principal attention was concentrated on
defending himself.

(5) Appellant's reporting of the incident disproved their membership in the group of
Calimquim. If they were members, their natural course would have been to hide from the
authorities. Their voluntary submission to the police immediately after the incident should
have been given credence as part of the res gestae.

In the Consolidated Appellee's Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) urges us to affirm in toto the
challenged decisions for failure of the appellants to show that the trial court committed error in finding the
prosecution evidence clear, sufficient, and convincing to convict. Catugas, who made an eyewitness account, had
the opportunity to observe the appellants during the commission of the crime and had no ill-motive to implicate the
appellants falsely. As to the charge that he perjured because the appellants were not able to produce the amount of
P80,000 which he allegedly demanded from them, the same should not be believed. The truth is, it was the parents
of the appellants who approached Catugas and offered him P80,000 in order that he would not testify against the
appellants. Catugas did not accept the offer, as it was against his principles to tell a lie.

The OSG also maintains that treachery was duly proved and, hence, the trial court was correct in convicting the
appellants of murder for the death of Teofilo Landingin and frustrated murder for stabbing Virgilio Catugas. Their
conviction for violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act is also proper, since their main purpose was to get the jeepney
and they killed Landingin in order that they could get it. They presented to evidence to prove that they ran away with
the jeepney for any lawful purpose.

In their Consolidated Reply Brief, the appellants try to show that the identification made by prosecution witness
Catugas cannot be denominated as clear, positive, and convincing; for, while it may be true that he "could have
taken glimpse or glance at the faces of all the accused-appellants, this fact alone is not adequate and fell short of
the required test of 'positive identification'." They strongly suggest that Catugas had ill-motive to testify falsely
against them in that he was not paid the P80,000 he demanded.

IV
THE CRIMES COMMITTED AND THE
ISSUE OF CULPABILITY OF APPELLANTS

Before we go any further, remarks on some procedural matters are in order. The crimes charged in the informations
filed before the LARON court and CASTILLO court are irretrievably linked with or related to one another. They arose

Evidence II.
out of the same incident, are founded on the same factual milieu, and would be proved by testimonies of the same
witnesses. The three cases then should have been consolidated and jointly tried in one branch of the RTC of
Dagupan City. What were jointly tried were only the cases for murder and frustrated murder. Section 14 of Rule 119
of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 14. Consolidation of trials of related offenses. Charges for offenses founded on the same facts or
forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at the court's discretion.

The purpose or object of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression or abuse, prevent
delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial court, and save unnecessary cost or expense; in short,
the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties
litigants.  In Raymundo v. Elipe,  we held that although consolidation of several cases involving the same parties
48 49

and the same subject matter is one addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, joint hearing becomes a
matter of duty if two or more cases are tried before the same judge, or even filed with the different branches of the
same court, provided one of such cases has not been partially tried.

We are unable to understand why neither the LARON court or the CASTILLO court nor any of the parties caused, or
moved for, a consolidation of the case for violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act (which has the higher docket number)
with the cases for murder and frustrated murder in the LARON court (which have lower docket numbers). It was only
after the filing of their separate Appellant's Brief in G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and in G.R. No. 119407 that the appellants
moved to consolidate the latter with the former.

This failure to consolidate the three cases at the trial court level could contribute some difficulty in the appreciation
of the evidence. The principal witnesses of the parties testified in all the three cases. Yet, the assessment of their
testimony and credibility in the LARON court must not be influenced by their testimonies in the case before the
CASTILLO court, and vice versa. In the LARON court, prosecution witness Catugas was unclear in some details of
the incident, but clear in the CASTILLO court. Upon the other hand, there were details he disclosed in one of the
courts which were not given in the other court. The same observation may be had on the testimonies of the
appellants before both courts. As one reads the transcripts of the testimonies of these witnesses in both cases, it
would be quite difficult to avoid forming impressions in light of the totality of their testimonies in both courts. Our
minds and mental processes must be kept away from the pitfalls of such impressions, for the rules on evidence and
the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the appellants dictate that we resolve the appeals in the
cases before the LARON court and the case before the CASTILLO court solely on the basis of the evidence
presented before such courts, respectively.

The next preliminary matter to be resolved is whether the crimes of murder in Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D and
frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 94-00619-D are absorbed in the violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act in
Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D.

R.A. No. 7659 which took effect on 31 December 1993  is applicable to these cases because the crimes were
50

committed on 10 March 1994. Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act was amended by Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659
and now imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when the owner, driver, or occupant of the carnapped
motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. This
Section, as amended, reads in full as follows:

Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. — Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in
Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment
for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months,
when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by
imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the
carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon
things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant
of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof . (Emphasis supplied).

In the original Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, the last clause read as follows:

Evidence II.
 and the penalty of life imprisonment to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed in the commission of the carnapping. (emphasis supplied).

Three amendments have thus been made, viz: (1) the change of the penalty of life imprisonment to reclusion
perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of the phrase "in the commission of the carnapping" to "in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." The latter makes clear the intention of the
law to make the offense a special complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. As such, the killing (or the rape)
merely qualifies the crime of carnapping which for lack of specific nomenclature may be known as qualified
carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated form. In short, considering the phraseology of the amended Section
14,  the carnapping and the killing (or the rape) may be considered as a single or indivisible crime or a special
51

complex crime which, however, is not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.

Since Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539 uses the words "IS KILLED," no distinction must be made between homicide and
murder. Whether it is one or the other which is committed "in the course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof"
makes no difference insofar as the penalty is concerned.

It follows then that the killing of the driver, Teofilo Landingin — whether it be homicide or murder — cannot be
treated as a separate offense, but should only be considered to qualify the crime of carnapping.

Nonetheless, although there could only be one single offense of qualified carnapping or carnapping in an
aggravated form, the prosecution had still to prove the essential requisites of the homicide or murder of Landingin
and that of carnapping. This should have been another reason for the consolidation of the carnapping case in the
CASTILLO court with the cases before the LARON court.

But do the words "IS KILLED" in the last clause of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, as amended, include the crime of
frustrated murder or homicide? Put a little differently, does murder or homicide in its frustrated stage also qualify
carnapping if it is committed "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof"? The
answer must be in the negative in light of the use in said Section 14 of the words "IS KILLED". The unmistakable
import thereof is that it refers only to the consummated felony of either murder or homicide.

If attempted or frustrated murder or homicide is committed "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on
the occasion thereof," then it must be deemed to fall under the clause (of Section 14) "when the carnapping is
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person."

We shall now take up the issue of the culpability of the appellants.

The evidence adduced by the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the carnapping of Teofilo
Landingin's passenger jeepney, which is a motor vehicle under the definition in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6539.  The
52

passenger jeepney was taken, with intent of gain, from Landingin by means of violence against him which caused
his death and against a passenger, Virgilio Catugas, who suffered physical injuries.

But, has the prosecution established with moral certainty the guilt of the appellants? The LARON and the CASTILLO
courts held that it did.

Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.  To
53

overcome the presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the
prosecution.  Save in certain circumstances as where, for instance, the accused admits the commission of the acts
54

alleged to constitute a crime but interposes justifying circumstances, the burden is never shifted to the accused or
diminished by the weakness of his defense. Indeed, unless the prosecution successfully discharges that burden, the
accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf. 55

In our jurisdiction accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The freedom of the accused is forfeit only if the requisite
quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. This, of course, requires the most careful scrutiny of the
evidence for the State, both oral and documentary, independent of whatever defense is offered by the accused.
Every circumstance favoring the accused's innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof against the

Evidence II.
accused must survive the test of reason. Strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The
conscience must be satisfied that on the accused could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged.  If the
56

prosecution fails to discharge the burden, then it is not only the accused's right to be freed; it is, even more, the
court's constitutional duty to acquit him.
57

After a painstaking review of the records and the transcripts of the stenographic notes of the testimonies of
the witnesses in the cases before the LARON court and the CASTILLO court, we are not convinced with
moral certainty that the appellants committed the crimes charged. Reasonable doubt burdens our
conscience; our minds cannot rest easy on a verdict of conviction.

The prosecution had nine suspects in these cases: the four appellants and the five others, namely, Romulo
Calimquim, Alex Mamaril, a certain Dennis, a certain Mondragon, and another described as John Doe. All nine were
forthwith charged with the crimes of murder, frustrated murder, and carnapping in Criminal Cases Nos.
3310,  3313,  3311,  respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, and then in the
58 59 60

informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00617-D,  and 94-00619-D  of the LARON court and Criminal Case No. 94-
61 62

00620-D  of the CASTILLO court, respectively.

63

The theory of the appellants is that they were not members of the group of Romulo Calimquim. The prosecution has
no proof to prove otherwise; but the LARON and the CASTILLO courts, through inferences from certain facts,
concluded that the appellants were. The conclusion is rather tenuous. While the rigorous cross-examination of the
appellants in all these cases has established close relationship among the appellants by reason of their residence
and work, (Benito, as sand-and-gravel truck driver and Mejia, Fabito, and Paraan as his keepers), it miserably failed
to establish any relationship between them and the five others headed by Calimquim. What then looms large in our
minds is that the appellants and the five others happened to be passengers of Landingin's jeepney by accident, not
by design. If the appellants were with the five others until Sual, Pangasinan, it was because they were intimidated
and made to lie down on their belies inside the jeepney.

Another circumstance further proves that the appellants did not belong to the group of Calimquim. Upon arrival in
the mountains of Sual, they fled from the Calimquim group when the first opportunity to do so came. We find to be
absolutely without basis the statement of the CASTILLO court that the appellants abandoned Landingin's jeepney in
Sitio Nipa, Baquioen, Sual, Pangasinan, "upon seeing the arrival of concerned citizens and members of the Sual
Police Station; the responding peace officers effected the recovery of the subject jeepney sans the
accused/culprits." No prosecution witness so testified. In the CASTILLO court, no policeman was presented as
witness for the prosecution. The evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense reveal that after
appellants Benito and Mejia were picked up by Policeman Gulen on the latter's suspicion that they were members of
an akyat-bahay gang, they voluntarily informed the police authorities of the Sual Police Station of what happened. It
was this information that brought the policemen to where the subject jeepney was located. Benito even
accompanied the policemen. This resulted in the recovery of the jeepney by the policemen. Appellant Paraan also
presented himself later to the Police Station of Sta. Barbara. Appellant Fabito, although apprehended by concerned
citizens of the place to where he had fled, voluntarily reported what he knew to the police authorities of Sual and
Sta. Barbara.

Unfortunately, the CASTILLO court relied heavily on the entries in the police blotters of the police stations of Sual
and Sta. Barbara. The silence of the entries on what the appellants had declared in court is not conclusive evidence
that they did not report the incident to the police authorities. They had no participation in the preparation of the
entries. Entries in the police blotters should not be given undue significance or probative value, for they are normally
incomplete and inaccurate sometimes from either partial suggestion of for want of suggestion or inquiries.  The64

entries in question are sadly wanting in material particulars. At the very most, they only recorded the impression that
the appellants were "suspects."

As to the alleged participation of the appellants in the commission of the crimes, the prosecution had to rely solely
on the testimony of Virgilio Catugas. The totality of his testimony in the cases before the LARON court leaves much
to be desired. The prosecutor who conducted the direct examination was unable to propound sensible questions to
elicit clear answers bound to reconstruct faithfully the events surrounding the commission of the alleged crimes. This
deficiency thus tempted the trial judge to ask more questions. Despite the latter's participation, the testimony of
Catugas fails to convince us that the appellants indeed participated in the commission of the crimes. On cross-

Evidence II.
examination in the LARON court, Catugas categorically admitted that he did not know the names of the appellants
and that he could recognize only three of the nine accused. Thus:

ATTY. TAMINAYA:

Q Now, in paragraph 8 of your statement, you said and you mentioned the names of the
person and I will now read:

Q How about the true names of the suspect, do you know them?

A In fact I do not know, however, based on the police investigation of Sta.

Barbara PNP, they were, Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Joseph Fabito,
Pedro Paraan, Mok Calimquim, alyas Dennis, Alex Mamaril, Dennis
Abrigo alyas Mondragon and one unidentified person.

can you tell this Court why these persons were written in your statement?

A Because of the police investigation.

Q So, were it not of the police and the pictures, you were not able to identify the accused, is
that correct?

A I can recognize the others, sir.

Q How many of the nine (9) can you recognize?

A Three (3) of them, sir.

COURT:

Q What you do mean when you said that that you can recognize three (3) of them?

A I can remember those persons who sat near me.

Q Who of the four (4) accused who sitted [sic] near you?

A The one wearing red T-shirt, the second to the last of the four accused.

Q So, how were you able to identify these [sic] persons who is [sic] wearing in [sic] red T-
shirt?

A I saw his face, sir.

Q How were you able to recognize the last person (referring to Edwin Benito)?

A He was besides [sic] the driver, Sir. 65

Further indicating the uncertainty of his identification, he made the following admissions on cross-examination:

Q Now, you said you recognized the persons who sat besides [sic] the driver, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q Please point to him?

Evidence II.
 A He was wearing a dark color.

Q Was it a T-shirt or a polo shirt?

A I cannot tell, sir.

Q How about the person sitting in front of you whom you pointed to this person wearing in
red T-shirt?

A I can no longer remember, sir.

Q How about the person next to the one with red t-shirt, do you remember his shirt?

A I don't know, sir.

Q How about Gregorio Mejia, do you remember his clothes?

A I cannot remember, sir.

Q You can't remember also whether one of these accused was wearing a hat at that time?

A I cannot remember, sir.

In the case before the CASTILLO court, he declared that he was stabbed by the nine persons. Thus:

COURT:

Q Who were involved in stabbing?

A All of them, sir.

Q Who was the assailant and who was stabbed?

A The 9 persons, sir.

Q When you said 9 persons, they were the 9 persons who participated in the stabbing
incident and who were the victims?

A Me and the driver, sir.

PROS. MARATA:

Q How many times were you stabbed by the nine persons, four of whom were inside the
courtroom?

A From the scar left of my body, there are 22 stabbed wounds, sir. 66

Yet, no further questions were asked for him to convincingly show that the appellants inflicted any of the stab
wounds on his body. Further compounding the uncertainty and unreliability of Catuga's testimony, he candidly
admitted on cross-examination that only one person stabbed him. Thus:

ATTY. TAMINAYA:

Q How many times were you stabbed by them?

Evidence II.
 A Twice, sir.

Q And you cannot recognize the person who stabbed your?

A I can identify him, sir.

Q How many persons stabbed you then?

A Only one (1) person, sir. 67

Upon further questioning by the court, Catugas declared that six of the nine stabbed him:

COURT:

Q How many stab wounds did you sustain?

A More than twenty (20) stab wounds, sir.

Q A while ago you mentioned there were two (2) initial stab blows with respect to the other
stab blow who delivered this stab blow?

A His companions and also Gregorio Mejia, sir.

COURT:

Proceed.

ATTY. TAMINAYA:

Q When you said his companions and Gregorio Mejia are you referring to the five (5) other
persons as the companions of Gregorio Mejia who participated in stabbing you?

A I think it is about six (6) of them who stabbed me, sir. 68

He could not remember anymore the person who inflicted the last stab wound, and then declined to point to anyone
of the herein four appellants as the person who did it. Thus:

COURT:

Q When they stopped stabbing you they did not stab you anymore?

A They still stabbed me on my right upper arm, sir. (Witness showing his scar near the
shoulder.)

Q You said you were stabbed on your right shoulder, who stabbed you among these nine (9)
persons?

A I could not remember anymore, sir.

Q When you said you cannot remember, you cannot tell this Court whether it was one
among the four (4) accused in this case who stabbed you on your right upper arm?

A I could not point the person responsible in stabbing my shoulder because that is the last
stab wound, sir. 69

Evidence II.
It would thus be sheer speculation and conjecture to conclude from Catuga's testimony in the CASTILLO court that
the appellants had inflicted any of the stab wounds on Catugas.

Moreover, on question by the trial judge in the CASTILLO court, Catugas categorically admitted that none of the
appellants participated in the stabbing of Landingin. Thus:

COURT:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q These two persons who participated in stabbing Teofilo Landingin, can you inform the
Court if the four (4) accused now or these two persons are among the four (4) accused now?

A They are not here, sir. 70

Finally, Catugas was not entirely free from any ulterior motive in implicating the appellants. He admitted
that he demanded P80,000 from the parents of the appellants, but before they could give the money on the
agreed date, he testified against the appellants in the LARON court. The following exchanges between him and
counsel for the defense before the CASTILLO court are revealing:

ATTY. TAMINAYA:

Q After you were released from the hospital, were you able to talk with the father of Edwin
Benito?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you told them about your expenses in the hospital, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you demanded from them to pay P40,000.00 is that correct?

A I was asking P80,000.00, sir.

COURT:

Q Why were you asking the amount of P80,000.00 then?

A Because he pleaded to me, sir.

Q What you are trying to convey to the Court is that you are settling the case with
Edwin Benito the amount of P80,000.00?

A Yes, sir.

COURT:

Proceed.

ATTY. TIMANAYA:

Q And the parents of Edwin Benito cannot pay that P80,000.00 because they are poor?

Evidence II.
 A They will not pay that amount on that date, we have agreed of another date for them to
pay, sir.

COURT:

Q Did the parents of Edwin Benito made a counter offer?

A That is already their counter proposal, sir.

Q What you want to tell the Honorable Court is that you agreed to pay you P80,000.00 but
he cannot pay you at that very moment?

A Yes, sir.

COURT:

Proceed.

ATTY. TAMINAYA:

Q Did you agree for the amount of P80,000.00?

COURT:

That is the settlement money.

ATTY. TAMINAYA:

Q So, it is clear that if only they have given P80,000.00, you should not have testified in this
case?

A PROSECUTOR MARATA:

Improper, your honor.

ATTY. TAMINAYA

As follow-up question, you Honor.

COURT:

Sustained. Hypothetical.

ATTY. TAMINAYA:

Q You said that there was the agreed date, what happened on the agreed date?

A The date has not yet arrived but I have already testified, sir.

COURT:

Q When you said you have already testified, you are referring to your testimony in RTC
Branch 44?

Evidence II.
 A Yes, sir. 71

In the LARON court, efforts were made by the prosecution to cushion the impact of Catugas' demand for
payment of P80,000 in consideration of his exculpatory testimony. It wanted to prove that the parents of the
appellants were in fact the ones who proposed. But the testimony of Conrado Benito, which the prosecution
failed to satisfactorily rebut, is that the parents went to see him to verify whether their children had indeed
committed the crimes; but Catugas replied that since the appellants were the ones apprehended, he would
just pinpoint them so that he could recover what he had spent. He then demanded P80,000, which he
equally apportioned among the parents of the four appellants. Conrado Benito testified as follows:

Q What did you tell him?

A I told him that our children telling us that they did not commit any wrong and I told them to
tell the truth and we are not consenting them to whatever they have done if they done
something wrong.

Q What was the answer of Virgilio Catugas?

A He said, he suffered several wounds and that he spent so much for his hospitalization, and
he said also that they were the persons who were apprehended and so, I will just tell a lie for
the same because how could I collect for the amount I spent if I will not tell a lie?

COURT:

Q You consider Virgilio Catugas as a liar and you are not a liar?

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. TAMINAYA:

Q Can you tell this Court what did you tell him about that expenses?

A I said, "then we can at least help you", because he is saying that he suffered several
wounds.

Q How much did Virgilio Catugas tell you?

A The last time that we talked, he ask[ed] us to give P20,000.00 each.

COURT:

Q How many times did he tell your?

A For 5 to 6 times because he told us to return to him. 72

But the parents could not deliver the P20,000 each was to pay, for they could not afford it. Conrado so declared,
thus:

ATTY. TAMINAYA:

Q When Virgilio Catugas told you to give P20,000.00, can you tell this court if he made
mention to the wife of Teofilo Landingin?

A Because he is collecting from us P20,000.00, he told us that we would not tell the same to
Mrs. Landingin.
Evidence II.
 Q Were you able to give that P20,000.00?

A No sir, not even a single centavo.

Q Why?

A We cannot pay because even payment for attorney's fees, we cannot afford. 73

The LARON court gave credence to the version of the prosecution and even took the incident as offer of
compromise, which may be considered an implied admission of guilt. Said court misapplied Section 27 of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.  There is no evidence whatsoever that any of the appellants authorized his
74

parents to approach Catugas or knew the matter of payment of P80,000. Moreover, if one were to believe the
explanation of Catugas that the amount of P80,000 represented the expenses he incurred for his
hospitalization and medical bills, then the offer to reimburse it is not admissible in evidence as proof of
criminal liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 27 of Rule 130.

On the whole then we entertain, unavoidably, serious doubt on the participation of the appellants in the commission
of the crimes charged.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decisions in Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D (for Murder) and Criminal Case No. 94-
00619-D (for Frustrated Murder) of Branch 44 and in Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D (violation of Anti-Carnapping
Act of 1972) of Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City are REVERSED. Accused-appellants
Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, and Joseph Fabito are ACQUITTED on the ground that their guilt
therefor has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt or with moral certainty. Their immediate release from
detention is hereby ordered, unless other lawful and valid grounds for their further detention exist.

Evidence II.
 22.) G.R. No. 190486, November 26, 2014

STANLEY FINE FURNITURE, ELENA AND CARLOS WANG, Petitioners, v. VICTOR T. GALLANO

AND ENRIQUITO SIAREZ, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

To terminate the employment of workers simply because they asserted their legal rights by filing a
complaint is illegal.  It violates their right to security of tenure and should not be tolerated.

In this petition for review1 on certiorari filed by Elena Briones,2 we are asked to reverse the
decision3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101145.  The Court of Appeals found grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission, and reinstated the decision of
the Labor Arbiter dated August 2, 2006 finding that respondents Victor Gallano and Enriquito Siarez
were illegally dismissed.

Stanley Fine Furniture (Stanley Fine), through its owners Elena and Carlos Wang, hired respondents
Victor T. Gallano and Enriquito Siarez in 1995 as painters/carpenters.  Victor and Enriquito each
received P215.00 basic salary per day.5

On May 26, 2005, Victor and Enriquito filed a labor complaint6 for underpayment/non-payment of
salaries, wages, Emergency Cost of Living Allowance (ECOLA), and 13th month pay.  They indicated in
the complaint form that they were “still working”7 for Stanley Fine.

Victor and Enriquito filed an amended complaint8 on May 31, 2005, for actual illegal dismissal,
underpayment/non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, premium for holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, ECOLA, and Social Security System (SSS) benefit.  In the
amended complaint, Victor and Enriquito claimed that they were dismissed on May 26, 2005.9

Victor and Enriquito were allegedly scolded for filing a complaint for money claims. Later on, they
were not allowed to work.10

On the other hand, petitioner Elena Briones claimed that Victor and Enriquito were “required to
explain their absences for the month of May 2005, but they refused.”11

In the decision12 dated August 2, 2006, the Labor Arbiter found that Victor and Enriquito were
illegally dismissed.  The Labor Arbiter noted the following contradictory statements in Stanley Fine’s
position paper, thus:

Also, Stanley Fine was forced to declare them dismissed due to their failure to report back
to work for a considerable length of time and also, due to the filing of an unmeritorious
labor case against it by the two complainants. . . .

....

The main claim of the complainants is their allegation that they were dismissed. They
were NOT DISMISSED.13 (Emphasis in the original)

The Labor Arbiter resolved these contradictory statements in the following manner:

In fact, the admission that complainants were dismissed due to the filing of a case against them by
complainants is a blatant transgression of the Labor Code that no retaliatory measure shall be
Evidence II.
levelled against an employee by reason of an action commenced against an employer. This is
virtually a confession of judgment and a death [k]nell to the cause of respondents. It actually lends
credence to the fact that complainants were dismissed upon respondents’ knowledge of the complaint
before the NLRC as attested by the fact that four days after the filing of the complaint, the same was
amended to include illegal dismissal.14

The Labor Arbiter also awarded moral and exemplary damages to respondents, reasoning that:

Finding malice, and ill-will in the dismissal of complainants, which exhibits arrogance and defiance of
labor laws on the part of respondents, moral and exemplary damages for P50,000 and P30,000
respectively for each of the complainants are hereby granted.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents are hereby declared guilty of illegal dismissal. As a
consequence, they are ORDERED to reinstate complainant to their former position and pay jointly
and severally complainants’ full backwages from date of dismissal until actual reinstatement[.]15

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission reversed16 the Labor Arbiter’s decision, ruling
that the Labor Arbiter erred in considering the statement, “due to the filing of an unmeritorious labor
case,” as an admission against interest.17  The National Labor Relations Commission held that:

Contrary to the findings of the Labor Arbiter below . . . respondents-appellants’ allegations in

paragraph 5 of their position paper is not an admission that they dismissed complainants-appellees
moreso [sic], in retaliation for complainants-appellees’ filing a complaint against them. Had the Labor
Arbiter been more circumspect analyzing the facts brought before him by the herein parties
pleadings, he could have easily discerned that complainants-appellees were merely required to
explain their unauthorized absences they committed for the month of May 2005 alone. Complainants-
appellees did not deny knowledge of the memoranda issued to them on May 23, 25 and 27, 2005 for
complainant-appellee Siarez and June 1, 2005 memo for Gallano. That they simply refused receipt of
them cannot extricate themselves from its legal effects as the last of which clearly show that it was
sent to them thru the mails.

....

The same holds true with the findings of the Labor Arbiter below that respondents-appellants’
evidence, Annexes “7” to “74” “cannot be admissible in evidence” for being mere xerox copies and
“are easily subjected to interpolation and tampering.”

Suffice it to state that these pieces of evidence were adduced during the arbitral proceedings below,
where complainants-appellees were afforded the opportunity to controvert and deny its truthfulness
and veracity that complainants-appellees never objected thereto or deny its authenticity, certainly
did not render said documents tampered or interpolated.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET

ASIDE. Respondents-appellants are however ordered to reinstate complainants-appellees to their
former position without loss of seniority rights and benefits appurtenant thereto, without backwages.

SO ORDERED.18

Victor and Enriquito filed a motion for reconsideration,19 which the National Labor Relations
Commission denied in the resolution20 dated August 15, 2007.

Thus, Victor and Enriquito filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.  Generally,
petitions for certiorari are limited to the determination and correction of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.  However, the Court of Appeals reviewed the findings of
facts and of law of the labor tribunals, considering that the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor
Evidence II.
Relations Commission had different findings.21

The Court of Appeals found that Stanley Fine failed to show any valid cause for Victor and Enriquito’s
termination and to comply with the two-notice rule.22  Also, the Court of Appeals noted that Stanley
Fine’s statements — that it was “forced to declare them dismissed”23 due to their absences and “due
to the filing of an unmeritorious labor case against it by the two complainants”24 — were admissions
against interest and binding upon Stanley Fine.  Thus:

An admission against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in
dispute since no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration is true. Thus, an
admission against interest binds the person who makes the same, and absent any showing that this
was made thru palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can offset it.25

The Court of Appeals also held that the immediate amendment of Victor and Enriquito’s complaint
negated their alleged abandonment.26

With regard to the National Labor Relations Commission’s deletion of the monetary award, the Court
of Appeals ruled that:

Notably, private respondents’ claim of payment is again belied by their own admission in their
position paper that they failed to pay petitioners their ECOLA and to ask for exemption from payment
of said benefits to their employees. In any event, private respondents’ allegation of payment of
money claims is not supported by substantial evidence. The Labor Arbiter found that the documents
presented by private respondents were mere photocopies, with no appropriate signatures of
petitioners and could be easily subjected to interpolation and tampering.27

The Court of Appeals, thus, granted the petition, set aside the resolutions of the National Labor
Relations Commission, and reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter.28  The dispositive portion of
its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions dated June 18, 2007 and August 15, 2007 of public
respondent NLRC are set aside and the Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated August 2, 2006 is reinstated.

SO ORDERED.29

Stanley Fine filed a motion for reconsideration,30 which the Court of Appeals denied in the
resolution31 dated November 27, 2009.

On December 21, 2009, Stanley Fine, Elena, and Carlos Wang filed a motion for extension of time to
file petition for review on certiorari.32

On January 21, 2010, Elena Briones filed a petition for review.33  Elena alleged that she is the
“registered owner/proprietress of the business operation doing business under the name and style
‘Stanley Fine Furniture.’”34  She argued that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Victor and
Enriquito were illegally dismissed considering that she issued several memoranda to them, but they
refused to accept the memoranda and explain their absences.35  As to the statement, “due to the
filing of an unmeritorious labor case,”36 it was error on the part of her former counsel
which should not bind her.37  Further, the monetary claims should not have been awarded because
these were based on the allegations in the complaint form,38 whereas Elena presented documentary
evidence to show that Victor and Enriquito’s money claims had been paid.  They never rebutted her
documentary evidence.39  As to the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees,
Victor and Enriquito did not present any evidence to support their claim, thus, it was error for the
Court of Appeals to have reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s decision.40

In compliance with this court’s resolution41 dated February 17, 2010, Victor and Enriquito filed their

Evidence II.
comment42 and argued that the petition should be denied because Elena “is neither the respondent,
party in interest or representatives as parties.”43  With regard to Victor’s two absences and
Enriquito’s five absences, these should not be interpreted as refusal to go back to work tantamount
to abandonment.44  Considering that Elena’s arguments had been passed upon by the labor tribunals
and the Court of Appeals, this petition should be denied.45

Elena filed her reply46 and posited that she has legal standing to file the petition for review because
she is the owner/proprietress of Stanley Fine.47  In addition, she argued that Victor and Enriquito
knew that she, Elena, is the real party-in-interest because during the pendency of the labor case, she
filed an ex-parte manifestation, attaching her Department of Trade and Industry certificate of
registration of business name,48 showing that the registration is under her maiden name, Elena Y.
Briones.  As per the Department of Trade and Industry’s certification,49 Stanley Fine is a sole
proprietorship owned by “Elena Briones Yam-Wang.”

Thus, this court is asked to resolve procedural and substantive issues in this petition as follows:

1. Whether Elena Briones has standing to file this petition for review on certiorari;

2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Victor Gallano and Enriquito Siarez were
illegally dismissed;

3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it agreed with the Labor Arbiter that the
statement, “filing of an unmeritorious labor case,” is an admission against interest
and binding against Stanley Fine Furniture; and

4. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in awarding the monetary claims and damages to Victor
Gallano and Enriquito Siarez, considering that they did not produce evidence to support their
claims.

I.

Petitioner Elena Briones has

standing to file this case

On this issue, petitioners claimed that Elena Briones is not the real party-in-interest; hence, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is final and executory since the petition for review was not properly
filed.50

In her reply, Elena argued that she is the sole proprietor of Stanley Fine, a fact known to
respondents.51  As the sole proprietor, she has standing to file this petition.52

Respondents cannot deny Elena Briones’ standing to file this petition considering that in their
amended complaint filed before the Labor Arbiter, they wrote “Stanley Fine
Furniture, Elina [sic] Briones Wang as owner  and Carlos Wang” as their employers.53

Also, respondents did not refute Elena’s allegation that Stanley Fine is a sole proprietorship. 
In Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc. v. Win Multi-Rich Builders, Inc., 54 this court stated that:

A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from the
personality of the owner of the enterprise. The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole
proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit by a single individual and
requires its proprietor or owner to secure licenses and permits, register its business name, and pay
taxes to the national government. The law does not vest a separate legal personality on the sole
proprietorship or empower it to file or defend an action in court.55 (Emphasis supplied)
Evidence II.
Thus, Stanley Fine, being a sole proprietorship, does not have a personality separate and distinct
from its owner, Elena Briones. Elena, being the proprietress of Stanley Fine, can be considered as a
real party-in-interest and has standing to file this petition for review.

II.

Review of procedural parameters

In her petition for review, Elena raised the following issues: (a) whether “the filing of an
Establishment Termination Report”56 is an act of dismissal; (b) whether counsel’s allegation that an
employee was dismissed due to the filing of an “unmeritorious” case against the employer is
binding;57 (c) whether a Labor Arbiter can award monetary claims based on the allegations in the
complaint form;58 and (d) whether the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees is
proper even without supporting evidence.59

In a Rule 45 petition for review of a Court of Appeals decision rendered under Rule 65, this court is
guided by the following rules:

[I]n a Rule 45 review (of the CA decision rendered under Rule 65), the question of law that confronts
the Court is the legal correctness of the CA decision – i.e., whether the CA correctly determined the
presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, and not on the basis
of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. . . .

Specifically, in reviewing a CA labor ruling under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court’s review is
limited to:

(1) Ascertaining the correctness of the CA’s decision in finding the presence or absence of a grave
abuse of discretion. This is done by examining, on the basis of the parties’ presentations, whether
the CA correctly determined that at the NLRC level, all the adduced pieces of evidence were
considered; no evidence which should not have been considered was considered; and the evidence
presented supports the NLRC findings; and

(2) Deciding any other jurisdictional error that attended the CA’s interpretation or application of the
law.60 (Citation omitted)

Thus, the proper issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined the presence
of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission.

III.

There was no just cause in the

dismissal of respondents

The Court of Appeals found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations
Commission when it reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.  The Court of Appeals held that
respondents were illegally dismissed because no valid cause for dismissal was shown.  Also, there
was no compliance with the two-notice requirement.61

Elena admitted that no notices of dismissal were issued to respondents.  However, memoranda were
given to respondents, requiring them to explain their absences.  She claimed that the notices to
explain disprove respondents’ allegation that there was intent to dismiss them.62

Grounds for termination of employment are provided under the Labor Code.63  Just causes for
termination of an employee are provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code:

Evidence II.
ARTICLE 282. Termination by employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the
following causes:

(a)  Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer
or representative in connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c)  Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and

(e)  Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

Although abandonment of work is not included in the enumeration, this court has held that
“abandonment is a form of neglect of duty.”64  To prove abandonment, two elements must concur:

1. Failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and
2. A clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship.65

In Hodieng Concrete Products v. Emilia,66 this court held that:

Absence must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply
does not want to work anymore. And the burden of proof to show that there was unjustified refusal
to go back to work rests on the employer.67

The Court of Appeals ruled that the alleged abandonment of work is negated by the immediate filing
of the complaint for illegal dismissal on May 31, 2005.68  The Court of Appeals further stated that:

Long standing is the rule that the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal negates the allegation of
abandonment. Human experience dictates that no employee in his right mind would go through the
trouble of filing a case unless the employer had indeed terminated the services of the employee.69

In this case, Elena failed to pinpoint the overt acts of respondents that show they had abandoned
their work.  There was a mere allegation that she was “forced to declare them dismissed due to their
failure to report back to work for a considerable length of time” but no evidence to prove the intent
to abandon work.70  It is the burden of the employer to prove that the employee was not dismissed
or, if dismissed, that such dismissal was not illegal.71  Unfortunately for Elena, she failed to do so.

IV.

Generally, errors of counsel bind the client

Elena’s position paper states the following:

5. Also, Stanley Fine was forced to declare them dismissed due to their failure to report
back to work for a considerable length of time and also, due to the filing of an
unmeritorious labor case against it by the two complainants. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

....

8. The main claim of the complainants is their allegation that they were dismissed. They were NOT
Evidence II.
DISMISSED . Management was [sic] has only instructed them to submit a written explanation for
their absence before they would be allowed back to work. . . .72 (Underscoring in the original)

Elena argued that the use of the word “unmeritorious” should not be taken against her
because it is commonly used in pleadings.  Also, the use of the word “unmeritorious” came
from her previous counsel.73  In an effort to persuade this court, Elena further argued in
her reply that the statement “unmeritorious case” was a mistake committed by her former
counsel which should not bind her, considering its grave consequence.74

On the other hand, respondents alleged in their position paper75 that they were requesting from their
employer an increase in pay to comply with the minimum wage law.76  However, they were
reprimanded and were told “not to work anymore.”77

Respondents filed a reply78 to Elena’s position paper and argued that:

6. The words “Nag complain pa kayo sa Labor ha, tanggal na kayo” were clear, unequivocal and
categorical. These circumstances were sufficient to create the impression in the mind of complainants
– and correctly so – that their services were being terminated. The acts of respondents were
indicative of their intention to dismiss complainants from their employment.79

On this issue, the National Labor Relations Commission held that the phrase, “filing of an
unmeritorious labor complaint,”80 if read together with the other allegations in Elena’s position paper,
would show that respondents were not dismissed but simply required to explain their absences.81

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Labor Arbiter that Elena’s statement is an
admission against interest and binding upon her.  The Court of Appeals explained that:

An admission against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of
the facts in dispute since no man would declare anything against himself unless such
declaration is true. Thus, an admission against interest binds the person who makes the
same, and absent any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake, no amount of
rationalization can offset it.82

The general rule is that errors of counsel bind the client.  The reason behind this rule was discussed
in Building Care Corporation v. Macaraeg:83

It is however, an oft-repeated ruling that the negligence and mistakes of counsel bind the
client. A departure from this rule would bring about never-ending suits, so long as lawyers
could allege their own fault or negligence to support the client’s case and obtain remedies
and reliefs already lost by operation of law. The only exception would be, where the
lawyer’s gross negligence would result in the grave injustice of depriving his client of the
due process of law.84 (Citations omitted)

There is not an iota of proof that the lawyer committed gross negligence in this case.  That
counsel did not reflect his client’s true intentions is a bare allegation.  It is not a mere
afterthought meant to escape liability for such illegal act. Elena’s counsel reflected the
true reason for dismissing respondents.  Both position papers state that Elena dismissed
respondents because of the filing of a labor complaint.  Thus, the Court of Appeals did not
err in affirming the Labor Arbiter’s ruling that the statement, “unmeritorious labor
complaint,” is an admission against interest.

V.

Non-compliance with procedural

due process supports the finding of

Evidence II.
illegal dismissal

Assuming that the statement, “filing of an unmeritorious labor case,” is not an admission against
interest, still, the Court of Appeals did not err in reinstating the Labor Arbiter’s decision.  Elena
admitted85 that no notices of dismissal were issued.

Elena pointed out that there is no evidence showing that at the time she sent the memoranda, she
already knew of the complaint for money claims filed by respondents.86  The allegation that she told
respondents “Nag complain pa kayo sa Labor ha, sige tanggal na kayo”87 is hearsay and
inadmissible.88

In cases of termination of employment, Article 277(b) of the Labor Code provides that:

ARTICLE 277. Miscellaneous provisions. –

....

(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected
against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of
notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is
sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and
shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated
pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment.  Any decision taken by the
employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his
dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. 
The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the
employer[.]

Book VI, Rule I, Section 2(d) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code further provides:

Section 2. Security of tenure. . . .

....

(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be
substantially observed:

For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Code:

(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and
giving said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side.

(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if
he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence, or rebut the
evidence presented against him.

(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon due consideration of
all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.

King of Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac 89 extensively discussed the two-notice requirement and the
procedure that must be observed in cases of termination, thus:

(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or
grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity

Evidence II.
to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period. “Reasonable opportunity” under the
Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to
enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed as a period of at least
five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an opportunity to study the
accusation against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on
the defenses they will raise against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to
intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of
the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general
description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which
company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged
against the employees.

(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct
a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and
clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses;
and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the management. During the hearing or
conference, the employees are given the chance to defend themselves personally, with the
assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing could
be used by the parties as an opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.

(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the
employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the
charge against the employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been established to
justify the severance of their employment.90 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)

Elena presented photocopies of the memoranda to prove that notices to explain were sent to
respondents.  These photocopies were not considered by the Labor Arbiter, on the ground that they
had no probative value.  Elena argued that even if the annexes were mere photocopies, they formed
part of the position paper, which is a verified pleading under oath.91  Elena also cited Lee v. Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 8592 where this court allegedly ruled that photocopies of
documents attached to a verified motion, which have not been controverted, are admissible.93

In Lee v. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85, this court stated the following:

Before we discuss the substance of private respondent’s motion, we note that attached to it were
mere photocopies of the supporting documents and not “certified true copies of documents or papers
involved therein” as required by the Rules of Court. However, given that the motion was verified and
petitioners, who were given a chance to oppose or comment on it, made no objection thereto, we
brush aside the defect in form and proceed to discuss the merits of the motion.94 (Citation omitted)

A review of the decision in Lee v. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85 shows that the case
involved an omnibus motion to cite Jose C. Lee and the other parties in indirect contempt, and to
impose disciplinary sanctions or disbar Jose C. Lee’s counsel.95  The statement cited by Elena is not
the controlling doctrine in that case. In addition, it appears that this court brushed aside “the defect
in form” in the exercise of its discretion and, thus, it should not be taken as the controlling doctrine. 
Hence, no error can be attributed to the Court of Appeals when it agreed with the Labor Arbiter’s
ruling that the photocopies of the memoranda have no probative value since they are mere
photocopies.96

Even if this court considers Annexes 1 to 5,97 these pieces of evidence would not save Elena’s cause.
Annexes 1 to 3 are the memoranda issued to Enriquito with a notation that he refused to sign. Annex
2 is dated May 25, 2005, but the date when Enriquito allegedly refused to sign is not indicated.98 
Annex 3 is dated May 23, 2005, but again, the memorandum does not show when it was served upon
Enriquito and the date he refused to sign.99  It is quite possible that these memoranda were
antedated.
Evidence II.
Annex 4 is dated June 1, 2005 and was sent to Enriquito Siarez via registered mail.100  Annex 5 is the
memorandum issued to Victor Gallano and is likewise dated June 1, 2005.101  Respondents were
allegedly dismissed on May 26, 2005;102 hence, Annex 1 dated May 27, 2005,103 Annex 4 dated June
1, 2005, and Annex 5 also dated June 1, 2005, were issued as a mere afterthought.

VI.

The Court of Appeals did not err in

awarding money claims and damages

With regard to the award of money claims,104 Elena likewise argues that the Labor Arbiter erred in not
admitting Annexes 7 to 74, citing Lee v. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85.  On this
matter, the Court of Appeals quoted the Labor Arbiter’s decision, stating that:

With respect to Annexes 7 to 74 to prove compliance of labor standards, the same cannot be
admissible in evidence because they are mere Xerox copies which are easily subjected to
interpolation and tampering.

Besides, Annex 69 which purports to be payment of 13th month pay for 2004 of complainant Gallano
but no amount is indicated. Again, Annex 71 states 13th month pay for P4,500.00 for complainant
Gallano yet there is no signature of Gallano acknowledging receipt thereof. If one document is
tainted with fraud, all other Xerox documents are fraudulent.105

In their comment, respondents argued that Elena’s claim of payment is refuted by her own admission
that she did not pay respondents’ ECOLA and she even asked for exemption from paying them.106

The Court of Appeals found that, indeed, Elena admitted that respondents were not paid their ECOLA
and that she asked for exemption from doing so.107  In addition, Elena’s allegations of payment of the
other monetary claims, such as 13th month pay, holiday pay, and premium for holiday pay, were not
supported by substantial evidence.108

A review of the records reveals that even if the Court of Appeals considered the vouchers marked as
Annexes 7 to 74 and submitted by Elena, these would only disprove her claim of payment.

Annexes 7 to 74109 are vouchers showing payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay, and service
incentive leave pay to respondents.  However, not all vouchers were signed by them.  Further, in
some of the vouchers, the amount given to respondents was not written.  Hence, these vouchers do
not prove Elena’s claim of payment.

As to the award of money claims, including moral and exemplary damages, Elena argued that
respondents did not present evidence to prove their entitlement to damages.110

Considering the circumstances surrounding respondents’ dismissal, the Court of Appeals did not err in
upholding the Labor Arbiter’s award of moral and exemplary damages.  Indeed, there was malice
when, as a retaliatory measure, petitioners dismissed respondents because they filed a labor
complaint.  Further, Elena violated respondents’ rights to substantive and procedural due process
when she failed to issue notices to explain and notices of termination.

Gone are the days when workers were reduced to mendicant despondency by their employers. 
Within our legal order, workers have legal rights and procedures to claim these rights.  The only way
for employers to avoid legal action from their workers is to give them what they may be due in law
and as human beings.  Businesses thrive through the acumen of their owners and entrepreneurs. 
But, none of them will exist without the outcome of the sacrifices and toil of their workers.  Our
economy thrives through this partnership based upon mutual respect.  At the very least, these are
Evidence II.
the values which are congealed in our present laws.

Apparently, in this case, the owners forgot that labor is not merely a factor of production.  It is a
human product no matter how modest it may seem to them.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals’ decision dated July 28, 2009, and its
resolution dated November 27, 2009, reinstating the Labor Arbiter’s decision dated August 2, 2006,
are hereby AFFIRMED.

Evidence II.
23.) G.R. No. 214406

BP OIL AND CHEMICALS INTERNATIONAL PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner

vs.
TOTAL DISTRIBUTION & LOGISTIC SYSTEMS, INC., Respondents

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, dated November 10, 2014 of petitioner BP
Oil and Chemicals International Philippines, Inc. (BP Oil) that seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision  dated
1

April 30, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which, in turn, reversed and set aside the Decision  dated January 21,
2

2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 148, Makati City, in a case for a collection of sum of money.

The antecedent facts follow.

A Complaint for Sum of Money was filed by petitioner BP Oil against respondent Total Distribution & Logistic
Systems, Inc. (TDLSI) on April 15, 2002, seeking to recover the sum of ₱36,440,351.79 representing the total value
of the moneys, stock and accounts receivables that TDLSI has allegedly refused to return to BP Oil.

The allegations of the parties, as summarized by the RTC, are as follows:

According to the allegations in the complaint, the defendant entered into an Agency Agreement (the Agreement)
with BP Singapore on September 30, 1997, whereby it was given the right to act as the exclusive agent of the latter
for the sales and distribution of its industrial lubricants in the Philippines. The agency was for a period of five years
from 1997 to 2002. In return, the defendant was supposed to meet the target sales volume set by BP Singapore for
each year of the Agreement. As agreed in the Supplemental Agreement they executed on January 6, 1998, the
defendant was supposed to deposit the proceeds of the sales it made to a depositary account that the defendant will
open for the purpose. On April 27, 1998, BP Singapore assigned its rights under the Agreement to the plaintiff
effective March 1, 1998.

When the defendant did not meet its target sales volume for the first year of the Agreement, the plaintiff informed the
defendant that it was going to appoint other distributors to sell the BP's industrial lubricant products in the
Philippines. The defendant did not object to the plan of the plaintiff but asked for ₱10,000,000.00 as compensation
for the expenses. The plaintiff did not agree to the demand made by the defendant.

On August 19, 1999, the defendant through its lawyer, wrote the plaintiff a letter where it demanded that it be paid
damages in the amount of ₱40,000,000.00 and announced that it was withholding remittance of the sales until it
was paid by the plaintiff. On September 1, 1999, the plaintiff wrote the defendant back to give notice that it was
terminating the Agreement unless the defendant rectified the breaches it committed within a period of 30 days. The
plaintiff also demanded that the defendant pay the plaintiff its outstanding obligations and return the unsold stock in
its possession.

On October 11, 1999, the plaintiff gave the defendant formal notice of [sic] that it was terminating the Agreement
after it did not hear from the defendant. The plaintiff would find out that the defendant had filed a request for
arbitration with the Philippine Dispute Resolution Center, Inc. (PDRCI).

On October 9, 2000, the plaintiff, through Mr. Lau Hock Lee, sent the defendant another letter to reiterate its
demand for the defendant to return the unremitted collections and stocks in its possession.

On April 30, 2001, the defendant, through Mr. Miguel G. de Asis, its Chief Finance Officer, wrote the plaintiff a
letter admitting that as of the said date, it had in its possession collections against sales in the amount of
₱27,261,305.75, receivables in the amount of ₱8,767,656.26 and stocks valued at ₱1,155,000.00.

Evidence II.
On July 9, 2001, the law firm of Siguion Reyna Montecillo & Ongsiako sent the defendant a formal demand letter for
the payment of the total amount of ₱36,440,351.79 representing the total amount of the collections, receivables and
stocks that defendant should have returned to the plaintiff as of May 31, 2001. The amount was based on a
summary of account prepared by Ms. Aurora B. Osanna, plaintiffs Business Development Supervisor.

On April 15, 2002, the plaintiff filed the instant complaint for collection against the defendant. The defendant initially
filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground for [sic] lack of cause of action because of the existence of an
arbitration agreement, as well as a previously filed arbitration proceeding between the parties. This Court denied the
defendant's Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit in its Order dated February 21, 2003. The Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the defendant was likewise denied by this Court on April 30, 2003. The Defendant went up to the Court of
Appeals to question the denial of its Motion to Dismiss via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.

On June 9, 2003, the Defendant filed its Answer Ad Cautelam with Compulsory Counterclaim Ad Cautelam.

In its answer, the defendant alleged that it was appointed as the exclusive agent of the plaintiff to sell BP brand
industrial lubricants in the Philippines. The agency was to last for five years from signing of the Agreement, or until
September 29, 2001. As the exclusive agent of BP products, the defendant was tasked to promote, market,
distribute and sell the BP products supplied the plaintiff.

The defendant further alleged that it did not fail to meet the sales target for Year I. Delays on the part of the plaintiff
in shipping the products moved the commencement of the Agreement from January 1997 to August 1997, making
the stipulated sales target no longer applicable.

On June 8, 1999, the plaintiff unexpectedly informed the defendant of its intention to assume more control of
Philippine operations, including the appointment of a full-time representative in the Philippines and new distributors.
No reason was given for this policy change.

Although the defendant pointed out to the plaintiff that the appointment of a new distributor would violate the Agency
Agreement, the plaintiff ignored the defendant's protests and affirmed that it would proceed with taking over control
of the distribution in the Philippines of BP products and with appointing additional distributors.

While business proceeded, the defendant's counsel, Atty. Eugeniano E. Perez III, sent the plaintiff a letter dated
August 19, 1999 pointing out, among others, that: a) The plaintiffs plan to take over the lubricant business and
appoint other distributors was in breach of the Agency Agreement; b) the defendant incurred losses because of the
plaintiffs non-compliance with the Agreement and lack of support; and c) the defendant would be carrying on the
business would be withholding any funds to be collected pending compliance with the demand.

Instead of heeding the consequences of its proposed illegal acts, the plaintiffs took steps to take over the
distribution of BP Products in the Philippines and to appoint new agents for this purpose. Even before the
termination of the Agreement, the plaintiff cut off the supply of BP products to the defendant, and even tried to sell
directly to the defendant's customers, without the defendant's knowledge. To protect its rights, and pursuant to the
arbitration clause under the Agreement, the defendant filed a Request for Arbitration before the Philippine Dispute
Resolution Center, Inc. (PDRCI) on 5 October 1999.

By way of affirmative defenses, the defendant argued that: 1.) it has the right to retain in pledge objects subject of
the agency until it is indemnified by the plaintiff for the damages it suffered under Article 1914 in relation to Articles
1912 and 1913 of the Civil Code; 2.) the complaint is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action for being
prematurely filed and/or litis pendencia because the issue in the case is already a sub-issue in the arbitration
proceedings; and 3.) the action should be stayed in accordance with Republic Act No. 876.

On March 21, 2004, the Court of Appeals came out with its Decision affirming this Court's denial of the defendant's
Motion to Dismiss after the defendant filed it Answer Ad Cautelam. The Court of Appeals also denied the
defendant's Motion for Reconsideration on August 16, 2004. The Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining this
Court attained finality with the denial by the Supreme Court on November 10, 2004 of the Petition for Review
on Certiorari filed by the defendant as well as its Motion for Reconsideration from the said denial.

Evidence II.
In light of the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the defendant lost its right to invoke the pendency of
the arbitration proceedings as part of its affirmative defenses. The defendant is therefore left with only one
affirmative defense to the complaint of the plaintiff, and this is the right of retention given to an agent under Article
1912, 1913 and 1914 of the Civil Code.

This makes the issue to be resolved by this Court uncomplicated: 1) whether the plaintiff has the right to collect the
amount of ₱36,440,35 l. 79 from the defendant together with legal interest computed from September 1, 1999,
attorney's fees and costs of suit; and 2) whether the defendant is justified in retaining the amounts and stocks in its
possession by virtue of the aforementioned provisions of the Civil Code on agency. 3

In its Decision dated January 21, 2011, the RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, granting the claim of the plaintiff and directing
the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of:

(1) Thirty-Six Million Nine Hundred Forty-Three Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Nine Pesos and Thirteen
Centavos (₱36,943,829.13) for the value of the stocks and the moneys received and retained by the defendant in its
possession pursuant to the Agreement with legal interest computed at 6% per annum from July 19, 2001 up to the
finality of this decision and at 12% per annum from finality of this decision up to the date of payment.

(2) Attorney's fees in the amount of One Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱1,500,000.00) and costs of suit
amounting to Four Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Pesos (₱439,840.00).

SO ORDERED. 4

After the respondent elevated the case to the CA, the latter court reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC
and found in favor of the respondent in its Decision dated April 30, 2014, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated January 21, 2011 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 148 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant complaint is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. 5

The CA ruled, among others, that the admission made by respondent in Exhibit "J ," that it was withholding
moneys, receivables and stocks respectively valued at ₱27,261,305.75, ₱8,767,656.26 and ₱1,155,000.00
from petitioner, has no evidentiary weight, thus, petitioner was not able to preponderantly establish its
claim.

Hence, the present petition where petitioner states the following grounds:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN RENDERING ITS DECISION AS WELL
AS IN DENYING BP OIL'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.SPECIFICALLY:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT TDLSI HAS MADE A JUDICIAL ADMISSION THAT IT
HAS POSSESSION OF THE STOCKS, MONEYS AND RECEIVABLES THAT BP OIL SEEKS TO RECOVER IN
THE COMPLAINT BELOW, CONSIDERING THAT:

a. EXHIBIT "J' QUALIFIES AS AN ACTIONABLE DOCUMENT WHOSE AUTHENTICITY AND DUE EXECUTION
WERE DEEMED ADMITTED BY TDLSI FOLLOWING ITS FAIL URE TO SPECIFICALLY DENY THE SAME
UNDER OATH IN ITS ANSWER.

Evidence II.
b. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER EXHIBIT "J" MAY BE CONSIDERED AS AN ACTIONABLE DOCUMENT, THE
FACT REMAINS THAT TD LSI HAD ACTUALLY ADMITTED PREPARING AND SENDING THE SAME TO BP
OIL IN ITS ANSWER.

i. NO RESERVATION WAS EVER MADE BY TD LSI REGARDING THE AUTHENTICITY OF ITS CONTENTS AND
NO WITNESS WAS EVER PRESENTED BY TDLSI TO DISOWN ITS DUE EXECUTION.

ii. ASIDE FROM BEING SELF-SERVING, THE ANSWER TO WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES GIVEN BY TDLSI'S
MR. MIGUEL DE ASIS AND CITED IN THE DECISION AS A BASIS TO NEGATE TDLSI'S ADMISSION OF
EXHIBIT "J" WAS NEVER OFFERED IN EVIDENCE. THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD NOT HAVE EVEN
CONSIDERED THE SAME IN RENDERING ITS DECISION.

c. THE RIGHT OF RETENTION INVOKED BY TDLSI IN ITS ANSWER CARRIES WITH IT THE ADMISSION: (i)
THAT BP OIL IS ENTITLED TO THE STOCKS, MONEYS AND RECEIVABLES SUBJECT OF THE COMPLAINT
BELOW, AND (ii) THAT TDLSI IS WITHHOLDING THE SAME FROM BP OIL.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT WITH OR WITHOUT EXHIBIT "J," BP
OIL HAS MET THE QUANTUM OF PROOF REQUIRED BY LAW TO PROVE ITS CLAIM.

a. CIVIL CASES ONLY REQUIRE A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE AND BP OIL HAS DISCHARGED ITS
BURDEN OF MEETING THIS STANDARD OF PROOF.

b. THE REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO GIVE WEIGHT TO SOME OF THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED
BY BP OIL HAS NO LEGAL BASIS.

c. THE DENIAL OF TDLSI'S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT BP OIL HAS MADE OUT A PRIMA F
ACIE CASE IN SUPPORT OF ITS CLAIMS AGAINST TDLSI AND TDLSI'S FAILURE TO CONTROVERT THIS
PRIMA F ACIE CASE JUSTIFIES A RULING IN FAVOR OF BP OIL.

According to petitioner, Exhibit "J" qualifies as an actionable document whose authenticity and due
execution were deemed admitted by respondent or TDLSI following its failure to specifically deny the same
under oath. Petitioner insists that it has met the quantum of proof required by law.

In its Comment dated March 24, 2015, respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that Exhibit "J" is not an
actionable document and cannot be considered a judicial admission on its part.

The petition is devoid of any merit.

The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45.  This court is
6

not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate courts are "final,
binding[,] or conclusive on the parties and upon this [c]ourt"  when supported by substantial evidence.  Factual
7 8

findings of the appellate courts will not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to this court. 9

This Court's Decision in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court distinguished questions of law from questions of
10

fact:

As distinguished from a question of law - which exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts" - "there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the
falsehood of alleged facts;" or when the "query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering
mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to
each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation." 11

Seeking recourse from this court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 bears significantly on the
manner by which this court shall treat findings of fact and evidentiary matters. As a general rule, it becomes
Evidence II.
improper for this court to consider factual issues: the findings of fact of the trial court, as affirmed on appeal by the
Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this court. "The reason behind the rule is that [this] Court is not a trier of facts
and it is not its duty to review, evaluate, and weigh the probative value of the evidence adduced before the lower
courts." 12

However, these rules do admit exceptions.  Over time, the exceptions to these rules have expanded. At present,
13

there are 10 recognized exceptions that were first listed in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.: 14

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4)
When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When
the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and is contradicted by the evidence on record. 15

A close reading of the present petition shows that what this Court is being asked to resolve is, what should prevail -
the findings of facts of the RTC or the findings of facts of the CA on the alleged misapprehension of facts of the
RTC. The findings of facts of both Courts are obviously conflicting, hence, the need for this Court to rule on the
present petition.

On the issue of whether Exhibit "J" is an actionable document, the CA ruled:

Here, plaintiff-appellee relies heavily on its Exhibit "J", defendant-appellant's purported letter dated April 30, 2001,
which it alleged to be an "actionable document" which defendant-appellant failed to deny under oath. It does
amounts to a judicial admission on the part of defendant-appellant that it has possession of its stocks,
moneys and receivables belonging to plaintiff-appellee.

x x xx

Here, the purported April 30, 2001 letter is not an actionable document per se. The present complaint is an action
for collection of sum of money arising from the termination of the Agency Agreement between the parties. Plaintiff-
appellee's cause of action is primarily based on the alleged non-payment of outstanding debts of defendant-
appellant as well as the unremitted collections/payments and unsold stocks, despite demand. In other words,
plaintiff-appellee's cause of action is not based solely on the April 30, 2001 letter allegedly stating the "present value
of stocks, collections and accounts receivables" of defendant-appellant. Clearly, said document is not an actionable
document contemplated in Section 7, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Court but is merely evidentiary in nature. As such,
there was no need for defendant-appellant to deny its genuineness and due execution under oath. We thus cannot
sustain plaintiff-appellee' s contention that the aforesaid Exhibit "J" amounted to a judicial admission because it's
due execution and authenticity was never denied under oath by defendant appellant.

Verily, an admission is any statement of fact made by a party against its interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for
which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him. To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve
matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be
adverse to the admitter' s interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.

In this case, the alluded Exhibit "J" was introduced in evidence by plaintiff-appellee alleging in its Complaint that:

"18. Under date of 30 April 2001, TDLSI wrote BP Oil a letter admitting that the following stocks, collections and
accounts receivable were still in their possession as of even date:

Amount collected against sales ₱27,261,305.75

Accounts Receivable 8,767,656.26

Evidence II.
 Estimated Value of Stocks 1,155,000.00

A copy of the 30 April 2001 letter of TDLSI is hereto attached as Annex "J" and made an integral part hereof."

In its Answer Ad Cautelam with Compulsory Counterclaim Ad Cautelam, defendant-appellant TDLSI averred, viz.:

"17. Paragraph 18 is admitted, with qualification [that] TDLSI's letter dated 30 April 2001 was prepared and sent to
BP Oil solely on the latter's representations that the figures were being sought only to negotiate a settlement of the
parties' dispute and end the pending arbitration. Instead, in shocking bad faith, BP Oil refused to settle and made
TDLSI's letter the basis of the instant Complaint."

Hence, while defendant-appellant admitted said Exhibit "J'', it nevertheless qualified and limited said admission to,
merely, the existence thereof. In fact, in its Comment to Plaintiff's Exhibits, defendant clearly stated:

"(9) EXH. "J" - only the existence of the letter sent by Defendant to Plaintiff dated April 30, 2001, signed by Miguel
de Asis and addressed to Hok Lee Hau, is admitted. The contents as well as the factual basis thereof, are not
admitted. Besides, the circumstances leading to the sending of this letter were thoroughly explained by Miguel de
Asis in his answer to Plaintiffs written interrogatories."

x x xx

Evidently, the afore-quoted letter does not, in any way, categorically declare that the figures stated therein are "still
in [the] possession of' or, in the hands of, defendant-appellant TDLSI. The "present value" of the accounts
receivables, collections and stocks is one thing, the "value in possession or on hand" of said accounts is another.

Sans the above-discussed Exhibit "J", therefore, this Court is not convinced that plaintiff-appellee BP Oil was able to
preponderantly establish its claim against defendant-appellant TDLSI in the amount of ₱36,440,351.79 for the value
of the moneys, stock and accounts receivables which the latter allegedly refused to deliver to the former. As aptly
argued by defendant-appellant TDLSI, the purported Acknowledgment Receipts and Delivery Receipts presented by
plaintiffappellee BP Oil the purpose of which is "to prove that TD LSI, through its General manager, Mr. Ivor
Williams, acknowledged receipt and delivery of the stocks" are totally baseless since the same were never signed
as having been "received by" said Mr. Ivor Williams. Hence, without the latter's signature, the purpose for which said
documents were offered becomes nil.

The above findings of the CA are partially correct.

Exhibit "J" reads as follows:

Mr. Lau,

Some considerable time has passed since either party had the opportunity to review their respective position (sic)
on the disagreement between us. It was pleasing to note that a discussion has now started between us again and
you give the impression that a settlement is a better solution for both parties than to continue through the legal
route.

The present value of stocks, collections and accounts receivable was requested. As of today, we can state the
following:

Amount Collected against Sales ₱27,261,305.75

Accounts receivables ₱8,767,656.26

Estimated Value of Stocks ₱1,155,000.00

Evidence II.
Please note that the stock value is estimated because the drums are no longer sealable due to their condition.
However, this is not significant in number.

To the mind of the Court, Exh. "J" is not an actionable document but is an evidence that may be admissible
and; hence, need not be denied under oath. Sections 7 and 8 of the 1997 Rules of Court provide:

Section 7. Action or defense based on document. - Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written
instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the
original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the
pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading.

Section 8. How to contest such documents. - When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument,
copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding Section, the genuineness and due
execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denied
them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts, but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse
party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the
original instrument is refused.

A document, therefore, is actionable when an action or defense is grounded upon such written instrument or
document. The complaint filed by petitioner is an action for collection of sum of money arising from the termination
of the Agency Agreement with TDLSI. The CA, therefore, was correct when it stated that petitioner's cause of action
is primarily based on the alleged non-payment of outstanding debts of respondent as well as the unremitted
collections/payments and unsold stocks, despite demand. Thus, petitioner's cause of action is not based solely
on the April 30, 2001 letter allegedly stating the "present value of stocks, collections and accounts
receivables" of TDLSI. Noteworthy is the denial of respondent TDLSI' s Demurrer to Evidence by the RTC because
it clearly discussed petitioner's cause of action and the sufficiency of the evidence it presented, thus:

Upon consideration of the pleadings and arguments filed by the parties, the Court is convinced to DENY the
demurrer.

The record shows that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that will preponderantly establish its claim against
the defendant. Among the evidence presented which might prove the claim or right to relief of the plaintiff against
the defendant include (I) the purchase orders of TDLSI's third party customers; (2) original approved copies of the
requests for approval sent by TDLSI to BP Oil from May 21, 1998 to August 14, 1999; (3)TDLSI invoices covering
the products subject of the purchase orders and requests for approval; and (4) The sales invoices issued by BP Oil
to TDLSI to its customers.

The aforesaid evidence presented was to the mind of the Court contain pertinent facts and such evidence
will prove that the plaintiff has a cause of action against the defendant. As correctly pointed out by the plaintiff,
TDLSI cannot premise its demurrer on any supposed lack of proof of delivery by BP Oil of certain moneys and
receivables. The allegations in the complaint, as well as the evidence presented by BP Oil, establish that generated
as they were by the sales made by TDLSI, the moneys and receivables have always been in TDLSI's possession
and it is the obligation of the latter to deliver them to BP Oil.

The Court is of the view that the better way to weigh and decide this case based on merits is for the defendant to
present its own evidence to refute the plaintiff's allegations. It is better that the defendant be given a day in court to
prove its defenses in a full-blown trial.

The Court cannot just dismiss the case on the ground that upon the facts and law presented by the plaintiff
it was not able to show a right to relief when in fact the evidence presented, testimonial and documentary,
show otherwise and its claim appears to be meritorious. To ensure that justice would be served and that the
case be decided on its real merits upon a careful review and appreciation of facts and evidence presented it would
be best that defendant should instead present its own defenses in a formal trial and not just to dismiss the case
allegedly in the absence of clear proof that plaintiff has no right to the reliefs prayed for.

Evidence II.
Moreover, the Court noted that this case has been prolonged for so long and this Court can no longer allow any
more delay to this case. 1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Demurrer to Evidence is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 16

It is basic that whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it because a mere allegation is not evidence.  In 17

civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on either side.  The
18

RTC's denial of TDLSI's Demurrer to Evidence shows and proves that petitioner had indeed laid a prima facie case
in support of its claim. Having been ruled that petitioner's claim is meritorious, the burden of proof, therefore, was
shifted to TDLSI to controvert petitioner's prima facie case.

The CA, however, ruled that while TDLSI admitted Exhibit "J", it nevertheless qualified and limited said admission to,
merely, the existence thereof, thus, without Exhibit "J" the same court was not convinced that petitioner was able to
preponderantly establish its claim against TDLSI in the amount of ₱36,440,351.79 for the value of the moneys, stock
and accounts receivables which TDLSI allegedly refused to deliver to petitioner. This is erroneous. The fact is,
TDLSI indeed admitted the existence of Exhibit "J." Thus, Exhibit "J" can be considered as an admission
against interest. Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity
with or identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is
available as a witness.  An admission against interest is the best evidence that affords the greatest certainty of the
19

facts in dispute, based on the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself unless such
declaration is true.  It is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it does
20

not.  No doubt, admissions against interest may be refuted by the declarant.  In this case, however, respondent
21 22

failed to refute the contents of Exhibit "J."

Be that as it may, the qualification made by respondent in the admission of Exhibit "J" is immaterial as the contents
thereof were merely corroborative of the other pieces of evidence presented by petitioner and that respondent failed
in its defense, to present evidence to defeat the claim of petitioner. As aptly ruled by the RTC:

After going over the allegations and the evidence presented by the parties, the Court finds as it did in its Order
denying the Demurrer to Evidence of the defendant that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that will
preponderantly establish its claim against the defendant. The Court notes that apart from not presenting any
evidence in support of its defense, the defendant did not really put up any serious defense to defeat the
claim of the plaintiff, and its only remaining defense consisting of the right of retention given to agents
under Articles 1912, 1913 and 1914 of the Civil Code, even if proven to exist, will not negate the finding that
the plaintiff is entitled to the value of the moneys and stocks in the defendant's possession.

To the mind of the court, the evidence presented by the plaintiff, unrebutted by any evidence on the part of
the defendant and even aided by the admissions made by the defendant in its letter dated April 30, 2001 to
the plaintiff (Exhibit "J"), proves that the plaintiff has a cause of action for the payment of the amount of
Thirty-Six Million Nine Hundred Forty-Three Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Nine Pesos and Thirteen
Centavos (₱36,943,829.13) for the value of the stocks and the moneys received and retained by the
defendant in its possession pursuant to the Agreement with legal interest computed at 6% per annum from
July 19, 2001, when formal demand (Exhibit "L") was made by the plaintiff for the liquidatedamount of
₱36,943,829.13, up to the finality of this decision up to the date of payment thereof.

Considering that the plaintiff was compelled to engage in litigation for almost 10 years, it must also be indemnified
for the costs of suit corresponding to filing fees in the amount of ₱429,840.00 and attorney's fees equivalent to
₱1,500,000.00. 23

Section 1,  Rule 133 of the Rules of Court mandates that in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
24

establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. By preponderance of evidence, according to Raymundo v.

Lunaria,  [means] that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. It refers to the
25

weight, credit and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with
the term "greater weight of evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

Evidence II.
Upon close analysis, therefore, this Court is inclined to believe the findings of the RTC that petitioner was able to
prove its case by a preponderance of evidence and that respondent failed to disprove petitioner's claim. As such,
the CA gravely erred in reversing the decision of the RTC.

A modification, however, must be made as to the rate of interest applied by the RTC. The RTC ordered the
respondent to pay the amount adjudged "with legal interest computed at 6% per annum from July 19, 2001 up to the
finality of the decision and at 12% per annum from finality of the decision up to the date of payment." Now, the
interest imposed should be 12% per annum from July 19, 2001 until June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from
July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction per decision of this Court in Secretary of the Department of Public Works and
Highways, et al. v. Spouses Heracleo and Ramona Tecson  which set forth the following guidelines:
26

In summary, the interest rates applicable to loans and forbearance of money, in the absence of an express contract
as to such rate of interest, for the period of 1940 to present are as follows:

Law, Rule and Regulations, Date of Effectivity Interest Rate

BSP Issuances

Act No. 2655 May 1, 1916 6%

CB Circular No. 416 July 29, 1974 12%

CB Circular No. 905 December 22, 1982 12%

CB Circular No. 799 July 1, 2013 6%

It is important to note, however, that interest shall be compounded at the time judicial demand is made pursuant to
Article 2212  of the Civil Code of the Philippines, and sustained in Eastern Shipping Lines v. Court of Appeals,  then
27 28

later on in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,  save for the reduction of interest rate to 6% for loans or forbearance of money,
29

thus:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of
money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due
shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest
shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to
the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code. 30

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated November 10, 2014
of BP Oil and Chemicals International Philippines, Inc. is GRANTED. Consequently, the Decision dated April 30,
2014 of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision dated January 21, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 148, Makati City is AFFIRMED and REINSTATED, with the MODIFICATION that the
interest imposed should be 12% per annum from July 19, 2001 until June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July 1,
2013 until fully paid.

Evidence II.
 24.) G.R. No. 216491, August 23, 2017

THE HEIRS OF PETER DONTON, THROUGH THEIR LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE, FELIPE G.

CAPULONG, Petitioners, v. DUANE STIER AND EMILY MAGGAY, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated June 13, 2014 and the
Resolution3 dated January 21, 2015 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 97138,
which affirmed the Decision4 dated December 14, 2009 and the Order5 dated May 4, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215 (RTC) dismissing the complaint for annulment of title
and reconveyance of property with damages originally filed by now-deceased6 Peter Donton
(Donton), the predecessor of herein petitioners Heirs of Peter Donton (petitioners), for insufficiency
of evidence.

The Facts

The subject matter of this case is a parcel of land with improvements located at No. 33, Don Jose
Street, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City, consisting of 553.60 square meters,7 more or less (subject
property). It was previously covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-1374808 of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City under the name of Donton until its registration in the names of
respondents Duane Stier (Stier) and Emily Maggay (Maggay; collectively, respondents) under TCT
No. N-225996.9

Sometime in June 2001, while Donton was in the United States, he discovered that herein
respondents took possession and control of the subject property, as well as the management of his
business operating thereat.10 Donton's lawyers in the Philippines made demands upon respondents to
vacate the subject property and to cease and desist from operating his business, but to no
avail.11 Thus, Donton was forced to return to the Philippines, where he learned that respondents,
through alleged fraudulent means, were able to transfer the ownership of the subject property in
their names.12 Accordingly, his title, TCT No. N-137480, had been cancelled and a new one, TCT No.
N-225996, had been issued in respondents' names.

Hence, he filed the instant complaint13 for annulment of title and reconveyance of property with
damages against respondents and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, alleging that the signature
on the Deed of Absolute Sale14 dated July 16, 2001, by virtue of which he purportedly sold the
subject property to respondents, was a forgery.15 He denied signing or executing the document in
favor of respondents, especially considering that on the date of its purported execution, i.e., July 16,
2001, he was allegedly still in the United States, having departed from the Philippines on June 27,
2001 and returned only on August 30, 2001.16 He averred that respondents conspired with the
employees of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City to defraud him, and that Stier is an American
citizen and a non-resident alien who is, therefore, not allowed by law to own any real property in the
Philippines.17 Accordingly, he prayed that TCT No. N-225996 in respondents' names be annulled and
cancelled; that a new title be issued in his name as the rightful owner of the subject property; and
that respondents be ordered to pay him P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, P200,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P200,000.00 as attorney's fees, and P200,000.00 as litigation expenses.18

In their Answer with Counterclaim,19 respondents claimed that the subject property had been lawfully
transferred to them, asserting that on September 11, 1995, Donton executed an Occupancy
Agreement20 whereby he acknowledged that Stier had been residing thereat since January 5, 1995;
that Stier had extended a loan to him in the amount of P3,000,000.00 on July 5, 1997, secured by a
mortgage over the subject property and its improvements; and that until full payment thereof,
Evidence II.
Donton allowed Stier to occupy the same. Respondents likewise claimed that Donton executed a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated September 11, 1995 in favor of Stier, giving him full authority
to sell, mortgage, or lease the subject property.21 Unfortunately, Donton failed to pay his obligation
to Stier; thus, they initially executed a "unilateral contract of sale"22 dated June 25, 2001 over the
subject property. Eventually, however, they executed the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 16, 2001.
As such, respondents argued that Donton cannot feign ignorance of the sale of the subject property
to them. By way of counterclaim, respondents prayed for the awards of moral damages in the
amount of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00, and P400,000.00 as
attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.23

During trial, Donton presented the findings of Rosario C. Perez (Perez), Document Examiner II of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, who, after comparing the alleged
signature of Donton on the Deed of Absolute Sale to his standard ones,24 found "significant
divergences in the manner of execution, line quality, stroke structure, and other individual
handwriting characteristics" between them, and concluded that they were not written by one and the
same person.25 Perez herself testified on the results of her examination.

In an Order26 dated February 9, 2004, the RTC allowed the substitution of petitioners as plaintiffs
after Donton passed away on November 22, 2003.

On the other hand, respondents waived27 their right to present their evidence.

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision28 dated December 14, 2009, the RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence,29 finding that the Deed of Absolute Sale, being a public and notarial
document, enjoys the presumption of regularity, and thus cannot be simply defeated by Danton's
bare allegation of forgery of his signature thereon.30

Likewise, the RTC refused to give probative weight to the expert testimony offered by Perez after the
latter admitted that she conducted the examination of the sample signatures not by virtue of a court
order, but at the instance of Donton and the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG).31 She also admitted that she did not know the source of the documents procured by the
CIDG that she used in her examination. On this score, the RTC held that the forensic examination
and testimony of Perez were self-serving,32 further explaining that it was not bound to accept the
findings of a handwriting expert.33 Therefore, the same cannot be used to invalidate the Deed of
Absolute Sale and the title issued to respondents.

Petitioners moved34 to set aside the RTC Decision, which the RTC treated as a motion for
reconsideration and which it subsequently denied in an Order35 dated May 4, 2011. In denying
petitioners' motion, the RTC reiterated the disquisitions in its Decision and added that petitioners
failed to prove that Stier is an American citizen.36 It explained that the only evidence that petitioners
presented was a Certification37 from the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) certifying that one Duane Otto
Stier, an American citizen, visited the Philippines on September 2, 2001 and left on October 6, 2001.
As such, the RTC reasoned that the same was not sufficient to prove Stier's citizenship; at most, it
merely proved the alleged travel of the latter.38 Similarly, petitioners failed to show that Stier is
married, as alleged in the complaint. With respect to petitioners' contention that Maggay had no
capacity to acquire real property, the RTC found the same to be bereft of probative value, being
merely an opinion.39 Finally, the allegation that Donton was in the United States from June 27, 2001
until August 30, 2001, and therefore not in the Philippines on July 16, 2001 at the time of the
execution of the sale lost its credibility in the face of his admission that he was in the Philippines in
the last week of July 2001.40

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed41 to the CA.

Evidence II.
 The CA Ruling

In a Decision42 dated June 13, 2014, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the assailed RTC
Decision and Order, finding that petitioners failed to substantiate their allegation that Donton's
signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged.43 It held that the aforesaid document was
notarized and therefore enjoys the presumption of validity, which can only be overturned by clear
and convincing evidence.44 Further, upon examination of Donton's passport stamps, which petitioners
offered in evidence to prove that Donton could not have signed the Deed of Absolute Sale on July 16,
2001, the CA held that although he departed from the Philippines on June 27, 2001, there was no
entry stamp of his admittance to the United States sometime between said date and August 30,
2001, the date of his return to the Philippines.45

As regards the findings and testimony of Perez, the CA held that "[n]otwithstanding Perez's expert
testimony that the questioned signature and the standard signatures [of Donton] were not signed by
the same person,"46 the RTC was correct in declaring her testimony as self-serving. It considered that
Perez did not know the source of the documents, and that it was the CIDG that provided her with
Donton's standard signatures. She admitted that she had no actual knowledge of whether the
documents given to her for examination came from Donton, and that she merely proceeded to
examine them without verifying the source.47 Thus, the source of the documents being unverified, it
cannot be concluded that the signatures thereon are the genuine signatures of Donton.

Finally, the CA sustained the RTC in ruling that petitioners failed to substantiate their allegation that
Stier is an American citizen and married, and that Maggay had no capacity to purchase real property.
On this score, the CA quoted with approval the RTC's findings that the BOI-issued Certification
procured and presented in evidence by petitioners was insufficient to prove Stier's alleged American
citizenship, and that there was dearth of evidence to further prove their allegation that he is married,
or that Maggay had no capacity to purchase real property.48

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration49 was denied in a Resolution50 dated January 21, 2015; hence,
this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's consideration is whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioners failed
to discharge the burden of proof required to be entitled to the reliefs prayed for in this case, namely,
the annulment of title and reconveyance of property with damages.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

At the outset, the Court deems it necessary to underscore that a reexamination of factual findings
cannot be done acting on a petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts
but reviews only questions of law.51 Thus, in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law
may generally be put into issue.

This rule, however, admits of exceptions, such as when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record and when the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.52 Finding a confluence of
certain exceptions in this case, the general rule that only legal issues may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court does not apply, and the Court retains the
authority to pass upon the evidence presented and draw conclusions therefrom.53

In civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a
Evidence II.
preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater
weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." It is a phrase which, in the last
analysis, means probability of the truth, or evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.54

The main thrust of petitioners' contention in this case is that Donton's signature on the Deed of
Absolute Sale is a forgery. They maintain that it was not possible for him to have signed the said
document considering that he was not in the Philippines on July 16, 2001, the date of execution and
notarization thereof, he being in the United States at the time. To bolster this argument, they offered
in evidence, among others, the immigration stamps on Donton's passport,55 showing that the latter
departed from the Philippines on June 20, 2001 and returned on August 30, 2001.

However, as the courts a quo have aptly opined, the foregoing immigration stamps are insufficient to
prove that Donton was physically absent from the country to have been able to appear before the
notary public on July 16, 2001, the date of the acknowledgment of the Deed of Absolute Sale. It is
well to point out, as the RTC did, that petitioners failed to prove Donton's arrival or entry in the
United States, where he alleged to have gone, and his departure therefrom to return to the
Philippines on August 30, 2001. Without evidence of such admittance to and departure from the
United States between June 27, 2001 and August 30, 2001, the Court cannot discount the possibility
that Donton may have returned to the Philippines anytime between those dates to execute the Deed
of Absolute Sale. This is especially so in light of his own admission in the complaint that he returned
to the Philippines "sometime in the last week of July 2001"56 allegedly to ascertain the truth and
veracity of the information he received that the subject property had been transferred to
respondents. These inconsistencies heavily militate against him, effectively tainting his credibility as
a witness and rendering doubtful the veracity of his testimony.

Furthermore, forgery, as a rule, cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence, and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery - in this case,
petitioners. The fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between the alleged forged
signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized to
have been forged.57 Pertinently, Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. - The handwriting of a person may be proved
by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person
write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged,
and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the
handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered,
or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (Emphasis supplied)
In Gepulle-Garbo v. Spouses Garabato,58 the Court explained the factors involved in the examination
and comparison of handwritings in this wise: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x [T]he authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general
characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards
spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that may
be found between the questioned signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the question of
the former's authenticity. The result of examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit
of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that
must be taken into consideration. The position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which the
paper where the questioned signature is written is placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and
the kind of pen and/or paper used, play an important role on the general appearance of the
signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct
or circumstantial competent evidence on the character of a questioned handwriting, much weight
should not be given to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between that questioned
handwriting and an authentic one.59

Evidence II.
To prove forgery, petitioners offered in evidence the findings and testimony given by expert witness
Perez, who declared that she found "significant divergences in the manner of execution, line quality,
stroke structure and other individual handwriting characteristics" between the signature that appears
on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the standard signatures of Donton, thereby concluding that they
were not written by one and the same person.60 On cross-examination, however, Perez admitted that
she had no actual knowledge of the source of the specimen signatures given to her for examination,
as it was the CIDG personnel who provided her with the same.61 Thus, as the CA correctly observed,
Perez's findings deserve little or no probative weight at all, considering that the signatures which she
used for comparison came from an unverified source. Perforce, petitioners are left with no conclusive
evidence to prove their allegation that Donton's signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged.

It bears stressing that the opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the court,
the expert's function being to place before the court data upon which the court can form its own
opinion. This principle holds true especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity
or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimens of the questioned
signatures with those of the currently existing ones. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on
the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent examination
of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.62

In fine, the Court, therefore, upholds the findings of the courts a quo in this respect.

Be that as it may, the Court, however, differs from the findings of the courts a quo with respect to
Stier's citizenship. More than the Certification63 issued by the BOI, which clearly states that Stier is
an American citizen, the records contain other documents validating the information. For instance, in
paragraph 164 of respondents' Answer with Counterclaim,65 they admitted paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of
the Complaint insofar as their personal circumstances are concerned, and paragraph 2 of the
Complaint states: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

"2. Defendant DUANE STIER is of legal age, married, an American citizen, a non-resident

alien with postal address at Blk. 5, Lot 27, A, B, Phase 1, St. Michael Home Subd., Binangonan,
Rizal; x x x"66 (Emphases supplied)
Similarly, one of the attachments to the Manifestation67 filed by respondents before the RTC is an
Affidavit68 executed by Stier himself, stating:

"I, DUANE STIER, of legal age, married, American citizen x x x"69 (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing statements made by Stier are admissions against interest and are therefore binding
upon him. An admission against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of
the facts in dispute since no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration is
true. Thus, an admission against interest binds the person who makes the same, and absent any
showing that this was made through palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can offset
it,70 especially so in this case where respondents failed to present even one piece of evidence in their
defense.71

Hence, the courts a quo erred in ruling that Stier's American citizenship was not established in this
case, effectively rendering the sale of the subject property as to him void ab initio, in light of the
clear proscription under Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution against foreigners acquiring real
property in the Philippines, to wit: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.
Thus, lands of the public domain, which include private lands, may be transferred or conveyed only
to individuals or entities qualified to acquire or hold private lands or lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
domain as well as private lands.72

Evidence II.
In light of the foregoing, even if petitioners failed to prove that Donton's signature on the Deed of
Absolute Sale was a forgery, the sale of the subject property to Stier is in violation of the
Constitution; hence, null and void ab initio. A contract that violates the Constitution and the law is
null and void and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at
all.73 Furthermore, Stier is barred from recovering any amount that he paid for the subject property,
the action being proscribed by the Constitution.74

Nevertheless, considering that petitioners failed to prove their allegation that Maggay, the other
vendee, had no capacity to purchase the subject property, the sale to her remains valid but only up
to the extent of her undivided one-half share therein.75 Meanwhile, the other undivided one-half
share, which pertained to Stier, shall revert to Donton, the original owner, for being the subject of a
transaction void ab initio. Consequently, the Deed of Absolute Sale, together with TCT No. N-225996
issued in respondents' favor, must be annulled only insofar as Stier is concerned, without prejudice,
however, to the rights of any subsequent purchasers for value of the subject property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated June 13, 2014 and the
Resolution dated January 21, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97138, which affirmed
the dismissal of the complaint filed by petitioners on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a NEW ONE is entered: (1) annulling the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated July 16, 2001 insofar as respondent Duane Stier is concerned; (2) annulling Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-225996 insofar as respondent Duane Stier is concerned; and (3) directing
the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City to issue a new title in the name of Peter Donton and Emily
Maggay, all without prejudice to the rights of any subsequent purchasers for value of the subject
property.

Evidence II.
 25.) G.R. No. 217611, March 27, 2019

ROGELIO LOGROSA, PETITIONER, v. SPOUSES CLEOFE AND CESAR AZARES, SPOUSES

ABUNDIO, JR. AND ANTONIETA TORRES, SPOUSES NELSON SALA AND ARLENE ANG, AND
SPOUSES BONIFACIO, JR., AND WELHELMINA BARUIZ, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by petitioner Rogelio Logrosa (petitioner Logrosa) against respondents Spouses Cleofe Azares
(Cleofe) and Cesar Azares (Cesar) (collectively, respondents Sps. Azares), Spouses Abundio Torres,
Jr. (Abundio) and Antonieta Dumagan Torres (Antonieta) (collectively, respondents Sps. Torres),
Spouses Nelson Sala (Nelson) and Arlene Ang (Arlene) (collectively, respondents Sps. Sala), and
Spouses Bonifacio Baruiz, Jr. (Bonifacio) and Welhelmina Baruiz (Welhelmina) (collectively,
respondents Sps. Baruiz), assailing the Decision2 dated July 30, 2014 (assailed Decision) and
Resolution3 dated February 26, 2015 (assailed Resolution) promulgated by the Court of Appeals -
Cagayan de Oro City (CA), Special Twenty-First Division and Former Special Twenty-First Division,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 02878-MIN.

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

As narrated by the CA in its assailed Decision, and as culled from the records of the case, the
essential facts and antecedent proceedings of the instant case are as follows:
The facts, as summarized by the [Regional Trial Court of Tagum City, Davao del Norte, Branch 30
(RTC)], are as follows:
In his verified complaint [for partition filed before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 4026,
petitioner Logrosa] alleged that he, together with the [respondents] are co-owners of eight (8)
parcels of lands [(subject properties)], all situated in [the] Municipality of Tagum (now Tagum City),
Davao del Norte, and more particularly described under the following Transfer Certificates of Titles
(TCT), to wit: TCT No. T-52508,4 TCT No. T-52509,5 TCT No. T-52510,6 TCT No. T-52511,7 TCT No. T-
52512,8 TCT No. T-52513,9 TCT No. T-52514,10 and TCT No. T-52515.11 [The aforementioned TCTs all
indicate that petitioner Logrosa, together with the respondents, are co-owners of the subject
properties.]

[Petitioner Logrosa alleged that in 1987, the original owner of the subject properties, one Benjamin
A. Gonzales (Gonzales), sold the subject properties collectively to petitioner Logrosa and the other
respondents. The records show that a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale12 dated April 14, 1987 was
executed by the parties, bearing the signatures of Gonzales, petitioner Logrosa, respondents Cleofe,
Nelson, Bonifacio, and Abundio.]13

[Petitioner Logrosa likewise] claimed that the aforementioned titles were issued to the parties herein
on May 19, 1987, hence the co-ownership over the aforementioned properties had already existed
for more than ten (10) years, without the parties having entered into [any] subsequent agreement to
keep the above-said properties undivided. He anchored his complaint on Article 494 of the New Civil
Code of the Philippines which provides:
"No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand a[t] any
time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. [x x x]"

Evidence II.
Summoned to plead, only [respondents Sps. Azares] filed their Answer to the complaint, and
opposed [petitioner Logrosa's] prayer for partition.

[Respondents Sps. Torres], as well as [respondent Welhelmina], respectively filed a manifestation

and declared that they are not filing an answer to the complaint and that they interpose no objection
to the partition of the properties subject of this case. On the other hand, [respondents Sps. Sala] did
not file any answer.

Answering [respondents Sps. Azares] contended that while it may be true that [petitioner Logrosa's]
name appeared in the titles of the properties aforementioned, however, they belied [petitioner
Logrosa's] claim that he is a co-owner of the same, as he never contributed as to its acquisition and
never contributed for their maintenance, much less paid the taxes due thereon.

Answering [respondents Sps. Azares] further alleged that sometime in 1985, [petitioner Logrosa],
being their cousin, used to work for them as their trusted laborer together with the other
[respondents] at their gold mining tunnel in Mt. Diwata, Diwalwal, Monkayo. [Petitioner Logrosa],
being young and inadequately schooled, was sent to school at the expense of the answering
[respondents Sps. Azares]. They also allowed [petitioner Logrosa] to construct his house at Nova
Tierra, Lanang, Davao City upon condition that [petitioner Logrosa] would pay and reimburse them
for all his expenses thereto when [petitioner Logrosa's] finances allow.

Sometime in 1986, answering [respondents Sps. Azares] purchased all the properties subject of this
case to provide one place for all the parties herein to live near each other for easy access and mutual
security. [Petitioner Logrosa] and the other [respondents] have not contributed to their acquisition.
As time went by, [petitioner Logrosa] and the other [respondents] turned hostile against the
answering [respondents Sps. Azares].

During trial, [petitioner Logrosa] testified in court to support his claim. He likewise presented to the
witness stand [respondent Antonieta] to identify the document in connection with the acquisition of
the aforementioned properties.

Answering [respondents Sps. Azares] presented only one (1) witness, in the person of [respondent]
Cesar Azares who debunked the claims of [petitioner Logrosa], asserting that he did not make
[petitioner Logrosa] and the other [respondents] as co-owners of the properties subject of this case.
[Respondent Cesar] further claimed that [petitioner Logrosa] as well as the other [respondents] had
no capacity to acquire the said properties way back to the time the properties were purchased as
they were only his employees in his mining business in Mt. Diwata, Diwalwal, Monkayo.
After trial, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit [in its Decision14 dated February 27,
2012.]

Hence, [petitioner Logrosa appealed the RTC's Decision before the CA, alleging, in the main, that the
RTC erred in holding that there is no co-ownership that exists between petitioner Logrosa and
respondents Sps. Azares.]15
The Ruling of the CA

In its assailed Decision, the CA denied petitioner Logrosa's appeal. The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision of the CA reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated February 27,
2012 of the Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 30, Tagum City, Davao del Norte, in
Civil Case No. 4026, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.16
In the assailed Decision, the CA held that "after a careful scrutiny of the records, the [CA] finds that
the evidence adduced by [petitioner Logrosa] were insufficient to warrant a positive finding of co-
ownership."17
Evidence II.
Petitioner Logrosa filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 dated August 22, 2014, which was denied by
the CA in its assailed Resolution dated February 26, 2015.

Hence, the instant Petition.

Respondents Sps. Azares filed their Comment19 dated July 17, 2017, to which petitioner Logrosa
responded with a Reply20 dated November 29, 2017.

Issue

The central question to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA was correct in upholding the
RTC's Decision dated February 27, 2012, which dismissed petitioner Logrosa's complaint for partition
because of its finding that the latter is not a co-owner and is a mere trustee of the subject properties.

The Court's Ruling

The instant Petition is meritorious.

After a careful review of the records of the instant case, the Court finds that the evidence on record
sufficiently substantiates petitioner Logrosa's claim that he is a co-owner of the subject properties.

The Court notes that petitioner Logrosa does not rely merely on his own testimony to prove that he is
a co-owner of the subject properties. No one disputes the fact that there are eight certificates of
title, i.e., TCT No. T-52508,21 TCT No. T-52509,22 TCT No. T-52510,23 TCT No. T-52511,24 TCT No. T-
52512,25 TCT No. T-52513,26 TCT No. T-52514,27 and TCT No. T-52515,28all of which clearly and
unequivocally identify petitioner Logrosa as one of the co-owners of the subject
properties.

It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of

an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein.29 It becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land. Such
principle of indefeasibility has long been well-settled in this jurisdiction and it is only when the
acquisition of the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that the doctrine finds no application.30 In
the instant case, there is no accusation whatsoever that petitioner Logrosa was included as co-owner
in the TCTs through means of fraud or bad faith.

Aside from the foregoing, it is also not disputed by any party that a duly notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale dated April 14, 1987 was executed by all the parties, wherein it clearly states
without ambiguity that one of the vendees of the subject properties is petitioner Logrosa. It must be
stressed that respondents Sps. Azares do not deny whatsoever that petitioner Logrosa is a co-vendee
under the Deed of Absolute Sale. In fact, respondent Cleofe was even a co-signatory of the said Deed
of Absolute Sale, evidencing her assent and consent to petitioner Logrosa's status as a co-vendee of
the subject properties.

The Court has previously held that a document evidencing a sale transaction, such as a deed of sale,
which is duly notarized is considered a public document and therefore enjoys the presumption of
validity as to its authenticity and due execution.31 Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court likewise
state that public documents are prima facie evidence of the fact which gave rise to their execution.

Moreover, as held in Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago,32 one's assertion of ownership is further

strengthened and buttressed by the fact of possession, i.e., by building and occupying a house on the
subject lot, coupled with the lack of opposition of such possession on the part of the other
parties.33 In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner Logrosa possesses a portion of the
subject property with no opposition by the other parties, aside from respondents Sps. Azares, who
Evidence II.
disclaimed petitioner Logrosa's status as co-owner only after more than two decades since the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, and only as a mere reaction to the Complaint for
Partition filed by petitioner Logrosa.

Hence, with the strong legal presumption created by the eight certificates of title and duly notarized
Deed of Absolute Sale that petitioner Logrosa is a co-buyer and co-owner of the subject properties,
the burden to prove otherwise was shifted to respondents Sps. Azares.

From the evidence on record, the Court finds that respondents Sps. Azares have not successfully
hurdled this burden.

To controvert the strong legal presumption in favor of petitioner Logrosa's co-ownership over the
subject properties, respondents Sps. Azares can only muster the sole testimony of respondent Cesar.
A solitary, self-serving testimony cannot successfully overturn petitioner Logrosa's prima facie status
as co-owner brought about by the execution of a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale and the issuance of
the certificates of title.

It is the main contention of respondents Sps. Azares that despite the inclusion in the documents of
title of petitioner Logrosa and the other parties, i.e., respondents Sps. Torres, Sala, and Baruiz, the
latter are only co-owners on paper and that respondents Sps. Azares are the sole buyers of the
subject properties. According to respondents Sps. Azares, the sole reason why they included the
other parties in the documents of title is "to provide one place for all the parties herein to live near
each other for easy access and mutual security."34

First and foremost, respondent Cesar's testimony is self-serving. The self-serving testimony of a
party to an instrument cannot be given more weight and reliability than the contents of such
instrument, especially if such instrument enjoys presumptive weight.35

Further, the Court finds respondents Sps. Azares' theory perplexing and contrary to ordinary human
experience. Assuming arguendo that respondents Sps. Azares are indeed the true sole owners of the
subject properties, there was absolutely no need for them to include the other parties in the
documents of title if only to allow the latter to stay within the premises of the subject properties.

In other words, if respondents Sps. Azares' mere motivation was to provide one place for all of the
parties to live near each other, respondents Sps. Azares could have easily achieved such objective
without including the parties in the sale transaction. The inclusion of persons in a deed of sale and a
certificate of title is by no means a prerequisite to allow such persons to occupy such property.

Hence, no one in his right mind would include non-buyers or non-owners in a notarized deed of
absolute sale and in indefeasible certificates of title if he truly believes that he is the sole owner of
the property. Bearing in mind the strong presumption created by public documents such as a
notarized instrument and certificates of title, if respondents Sps. Azares really believed that they are
the sole owners of the subject properties, one would expect that they would, at the very least,
execute another document evidencing their true agreement as a precautionary measure. But no such
precautionary measure was employed by respondents Sps. Azares to protect their supposed right as
sole owners of the subject properties.

Likewise striking is the nonchalant and unassertive attitude adopted by respondents Sps. Azares in
claiming sole ownership of the subject properties. To reiterate, it took respondents Sps. Azares more
than two decades from the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and issuance of the certificates of
title to assert their sole ownership. Not only that, such assertion was only a reaction to the Complaint
for Partition filed by petitioner Logrosa.

Simply stated, the Court is convinced that the actuations and demeanor of respondents Sps. Azares
are wholly inconsistent with their contention that they are the sole owners of the subject properties.
Evidence II.
With respect to the tax declarations presented by respondents Sps. Azares, jurisprudence holds that
tax declarations and tax receipts as evidence of ownership cannot prevail over a certificate of title
which, to reiterate, is an incontrovertible proof of ownership.36 Hence, in order for respondents Sps.
Azares' tax declarations to successfully overturn the strong presumption of petitioner Logrosa's co-
ownership, it was incumbent upon respondents Sps. Azares to fortify their position with other
supporting evidence. As stated above, respondents Sps. Azares were not able to do so.

Moreover, the Court takes notice of petitioner Logrosa's unrebutted allegation that the tax payments
made by respondents Sps. Azares were only made in 2010, which was already after the filing of the
Complaint for Partition in 2009. In addition, it is likewise unrebutted by respondents Sps. Azares that
respondent Abundio, who testified under oath in open court, paid for the real property taxes covering
the subject properties for at least two years. Respondent Abundio was able to submit before the RTC
an official receipt of his tax payment; a tax declaration issued in the name of respondents Cleofe,
Abundio, and Nelson, and petitioner Logrosa; and Owner's Duplicate Copies of TCT Nos. T-52510 and
T-52508 registered in the name of the abovementioned parties.37 This demolishes respondents Sps.
Azares' assertion that they exclusively paid the real property taxes covering the subject properties
and that their payment of real property taxes is sufficient proof of their sole ownership over the
subject properties.

Lastly, both the RTC and CA put much emphasis on respondents Sps. Azares' contention that
petitioner Logrosa has no capacity to purchase the subject properties on account of the latter's status
as a lowly employee of respondents Sps. Azares.

The Court finds the lower courts' heavy reliance on petitioner Logrosa's supposed incapacity to
purchase the subject properties misplaced; it made a mountain out of a molehill.

Assuming for argument's sake that petitioner Logrosa did not contribute in the payment of the
purchase price of the subject properties, it does not necessarily mean that he could not become a co-
owner of the subject properties who can compel partition.

A person may exercise the right to compel the partition of real estate if he/she sets forth in his/her
complaint the nature and extent of his title and subsequently proves the same.38 The law does not
make a distinction as to how the co-owner derived his/her title, may it be through gratuity or
through onerous consideration. In other words, a person who derived his title and was granted co-
ownership rights through gratuity may compel partition.

Respondents Sps. Azares maintain that there was no gratuitous granting of title and co-ownership
rights to petitioner Logrosa and that they only intended to designate petitioner Logrosa as a mere
trustee of the subject properties. However, to reiterate, this self-serving testimony of respondents
Sps. Azares based on their mere say-so cannot stand, vis-a-vis the strong legal presumption created
by the certificates of title and the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale that petitioner Logrosa is a co-
owner of the subject property.

As a rule, the burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its existence, and
such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its elements. While
implied trusts may be proved by oral evidence, the evidence must be trustworthy and received by
the courts with extreme caution, and should not be made to rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite
declarations. Trustworthy evidence is required because oral evidence can easily be fabricated.39

To the contrary, as pointed out by petitioner Logrosa, the testimony of respondent Cesar actually
lends credence to petitioner Logrosa's claim that respondent Cesar really intended to designate the
former, together with the other respondents, as co-owners of the subject properties.

During the trial, when he was asked why he did not require petitioner Logrosa and the other parties
Evidence II.
to execute a document acknowledging his status as sole owner of the subject properties, respondent
Cesar explained that there was no need to do so because "we previously agreed x x x with each
other that whatever they would decide to till the land in that particular area that would be given to
them. x x x I have my intention to give that house constructed to them then, I will give that
particular land to them."40

With this clear admission against interest on the part of respondents Sps. Azares that there was
indeed an intention on their part to make petitioner Logrosa and the other respondents as co-owners
of the subject properties, the Court cannot subscribe to the CA's view that there is insufficiency of
evidence confirming petitioner Logrosa's status as co-owner of the subject properties.

As a parting note, while it is true that the Court has previously held that the mere issuance of the
certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the registrant may
only be a trustee,41 to controvert the legal presumption brought about by the execution and issuance
of public documents pointing to the existence of co-ownership, the opposing party must carry and
satisfy the burden of proving with clear, convincing and persuasive evidence to repudiate the co-
ownership. In this case, the Court finds that respondents Sps. Azares failed to fulfill such burden.

WHEREFORE, premised considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated
July 30,2014 and Resolution dated February 26, 2015 promulgated by the Court of Appeals -
Cagayan de Oro City, Special Twenty-First Division and Former Special Twenty-First Division,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 02878-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Accordingly, the Decision dated February 27, 2012 promulgated by Regional Trial Court of Tagum
City, Davao del Norte, Branch 30 in Civil Case No. 4026 is likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court is DIRECTED to issue an Order under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court for the
partition of the subject properties.

Evidence II.
26.) Serrano v Sps. De Guzman (SEE PDF)

Evidence II.
27.)

Evidence II.
 X.) [ G.R. No. 208162, January 07, 2020 ]

DEVIE ANN ISAGA FUERTES, PETITIONER, VS. THE SENATE OF PHILIPPINES, HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES, THE OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ), DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT (DILG), DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG), OFFICE OF
THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF TAYABAS CITY (QUEZON PROVINCE), THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH
30, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (RTC) OF LUCENA CITY, AND HEIRS OF CHESTER PAOLO ABRACIA,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Section 14 , paragraph 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law,1 which provides that an accused's presence during a hazing
is prima facie evidence of his or her participation, does not violate the constitutional presumption of innocence. This
disputable presumption is also not a bill of attainder.

This Court resolves a Petition for Certiorari seeking to declare unconstitutional Sections 5 and 14 of the Anti-Hazing
Law— specifically, paragraph 4 of Section 14. The paragraph provides that one's presence during the hazing
is prima facie evidence of participation as a principal, unless proven to have prevented or to have promptly reported
the punishable acts to law enforcement authorities if they can, without peril to their person or their family.

Devie Ann Isaga Fuertes (Fuertes) is among the 46 accused in Criminal Case No. 2008-895, pending before Branch
30 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City. She and her co-accused had been charged with violating the Anti-
Hazing Law, or Republic Act No. 8049, for the death of Chester Paolo Abracia (Abracia) due to injuries he allegedly
sustained during the initiation rites of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. Fuertes is a member of the fraternity's sister
sorority, Tau Gamma Sigma, and was allegedly present at the premises during the initiation rites.

Abracia died on or about August 2, 2008 in Tayabas City, Quezon. An Information was filed on October 20, 2008,
charging the 46 members of Tau Gamma Phi and Tau Gamma Sigma for violation of Republic Act No. 8049.

The pertinent portion of the Information read: 

That on or about the 2nd day of August 2008, at Barangay Mate, in the City of Tayabas, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all active members of
Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity and Tau Gamma Sigma Sorority, acting conspiracy with one another, without prior
written notice to the proper school authorities of Manuel S. Enverga University Foundation, Inc. (MSEUF) made
seven (7) days prior to aforementioned date and in the absence of the school's assigned representatives during the
initiation perform and conduct initiation rite on the person of neophyte and herein deceased victim Chester Paolo
Abracia as a prerequisite for his admission into membership in the said fraternity by hazing accomplished through
subjection to physical suffering or injury, to wit: by successively hitting his body, using paddle and fist blows, thereby
[inflicting] upon him contusion and abrasion located on his chest, abdomen, leg and thigh which resulted to cardio-
respiratory arrest secondary to pulmonary embolism and acute myocardial infarction which is the direct and
immediate cause of his death thereafter.  

That the hazing was committed in the property of Lamberto Villarion O. Pandy situated at Barangay Mate, Tayabas
City, a place outside the school premises of Manuel S. Enverga University Foundation, Inc. (MSEUF).  

That accused Lamberto Villarion O. Pandy, as owner of the place where the hazing was conducted, acted as
accomplice by cooperating in the execution of the offense by failing to take action to prevent the same from
happening despite actual knowledge that it will be conducted therein.

CONTRARY TO LAW. Tayabas City for Lucena City, Philippines, October 20, 2008.6

Evidence II.
Fuertes, a member of Tau Gamma Sigma Sorority, admitted that she was at the premises during the initiation rites.
She was then 17 years old and was a student of Manuel S. Enverga University Foundation.  

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2008-895, and was initially pending with Branch 54 of the Regional
Trial Court of Lucena City. The case was transferred to Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City,
pursuant to A.M. No. 10-7-224-RTC issued by this Court in July 2010.8

On August 1, 2013, Fuertes filed a Petition for Certiorari before this Court, raising the sole issue of the
unconstitutionality of Sections 3 and 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law. At the time, she had not yet been arraigned and was
at large.10  

Petitioner claims that Sections 3 and 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law are unconstitutional, as they would allow for
the conviction of persons for a crime committed by others, in violation of the res inter alios acta rule. She
also argues that these provisions violate Article III, Sections 1 and 19 of the Constitution for constituting a cruel and
unusual punishment, as she was charged as a principal, and penalized with reclusion perpetua, for a non-bailable
offense.

On August 6, 2013, this Court issued a Resolution requiring respondents to comment on the Petition.

On November 5, 2013, public respondents filed their Comment, arguing that the Petition was procedurally and
substantially erroneous, for a multitude of reasons.

First, since petitioner assails the constitutionality of law provisions, public respondents argue that her Petition is one
of declaratory relief, over which this Court has no original jurisdiction Further, they argue that declaratory relief is not
the proper remedy, as there had already been a breach of the Anti-Hazing Law.

Second, public respondents claim that petitioner is not entitled to equitable relief, as she has come to com 1with
unclean hands, having evaded arrest for five (5) years since being charged. They claim that, while government
resources are directed for her arrest, she has remained a fugitive from justice, able to exercise her civil rights. They
pointed out that on September 6, 2010, she obtained a Philippine passport from the Philippine Embassy in Brunei,
and a postal identification card in Pasay in May 2013.19  She also verified the Petition before Atty. Manny V.
Gragasin at the Quezon City Hall. Her counsel, Atty. Vicente D. Millora, appears to be in constant contact with her,
but has not facilitated her surrender to the authorities.

Third, public respondents argue that even if the Rules of Court were applied liberally, petitioner has still failed to
overturn the presumption of constitutionality of Sections 3 and 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law. They claim that the
presumption in Section 4— that the presence of persons during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation,
unless they prevented the commission of the punishable acts—is consistent with Sections 1, 14, and 19 of the
Constitution.2 They argue that several penal laws allow for prima facie evidence, all of which do not preclude the
constitutional presumption of innocence. They also point out that this Court itself recognizes disputable
presumptions, as in Rules of Court, Rule 131, Section 3.

Moreover, public respondents claim that certain laws, such as the Revised Penal Code, Article 275, penalize
presence and inaction. They cited People v. Mingoa24 and Bautista v. Court of Appeals.25 in which this Court
upheld disputable presumptions in criminal law.  

Fourth, public respondents argue that there is no violation of the res inter alios acta rule, because under the
assailed law, there must still be a finding of actual participation before a person may be held criminally
liable.

Fifth, public respondents claim that the penalty of reclusion perpetua that will be imposed is not cruel and unusual
punishment. They argue that; consistent with Furman v. Georgia 28 and Perez v. People,29 penalties such as life
imprisonment and even death may be imposed to discourage crimes harmful to public interest.30 As for the Anti-
Hazing Law itself, reclusion perpetua is only imposable on the actual participants in the hazing, and only when the
hazing results in death, rape, sodomy, or mutilation.31  

Evidence II.
Sixth, public respondents argue that the provision on prima facie evidence in the Anti-Hazing Law is a legislative
decision that this Court must respect in view of the doctrine of separation of powers.32 They raise that the
presumption was put in place in view of the legislative policy to discourage fraternities, sororities, organizations, or
associations from making hazing a requirement for admission.33  

Finally, public respondents argue that petitioner's minority and right to bail are matters better left to the judgment of
the trial court.34

On November 19, 2013, this Court issued a Resolution35 noting the Comment, and requiring petitioner to file a
Reply.  

On January 8, 2014, Fuertes filed her Reply36 to the Comment. On January 21, 2014, this Court issued a
Resolution37 noting the Reply. This Court also gave due course to the Petition, treated the Comment as Answer,
and required the parties to submit their memoranda.  

On April 21, 2014, public respondents filed a Manifestation,38 praying that their Comment be considered their
Memorandum.  

On April 23, 2014, petitioner filed her Memorandum,39 arguing that while the Information charges all members of
Tau Gamma Phi and Tau Gamma Sigma as principals and conspirators for Abracia's death, it failed to allege that all
the accused actually participated in the hazing.40  

She insists that Sections 3 and 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law violate Sections 1, 14, and 22 of the Constitution.
She claims that the Anti-Hazing Law presumes that there is a conspiracy to commit murder or homicide.
Further, the Anti-Hazing Law treats persons as principals or co-conspirators simply because of their
presence at an initiation rite, or while they are an active member of the fraternity or sorority, even if one did
not know, or actually participate, in the act that caused the crime charged. She argues that she and other
members of Tau Gamma Sigma should not have been charged, there being no showing that they knew, or
actually participated in the hazing which led to the death of Abracia.

Petitioner argues that conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and a mere presumption cannot be the
basis to file an information for murder.  

She likewise claims that Sections 3 and 4 are a bill of attainder — a legislative act declaring persons guilty of a
crime without judicial trial— because they treat members of a particular group as principals or co-conspirators, even
if they have no actual knowledge or participation in the act. She argues that in imposing these provisions, Congress
has arrogated judicial power upon itself, since the determination of the degree of participation in a crime is a judicial,
and not legislative, function. 

Finally, petitioner argues that the procedural errors assigned by public respondent deserve scant consideration, and
that this Court should set aside technical defects when there is a violation of the Constitution.  

On June 3, 2014, this Court issued a Resolution noting public respondents' Manifestation and petitioner's
Memorandum.  

In 2018, the Anti-Hazing Law was amended by Republic Act No. 11053. The law now prohibits all forms of hazing in
"fraternities, sororities, and organizations in schools, including citizens' military training and citizens' army training[,]"
as well as "all other fraternities, sororities, and organizations that are not school-based, such as community-based
and other similar fraternities, sororities, and organizations." Among the changes were the renumbering of Sections 3
and 4 to Sections 5 and 14, respectively, and their amendments. Section 5 of the Anti-Hazing Law now reads: 

SECTION 5. Monitoring of Initiation Rites. - The head of the school or an authorized representative must assign at
least two (2) representatives of the school to be present during the initiation. It is the duty of the school
representatives to see to it that no hazing is conducted during the initiation rites, and to document the entire
proceedings. Thereafter, said representatives who were present during the initiation shall make a report of the
initiation rites to the appropriate officials of the school regarding the conduct of the said initiation : Provided, That if
Evidence II.
hazing is still committed despite their presence, no liability shall attach to them unless it is proven that they failed to
perform an overt act to prevent or stop the commission thereof.

The pertinent paragraph of Section 14 was amended to include the additional defense of prompt reporting
of the hazing to law enforcement authorities:  

The presence of any person, even if such person is not a member of the fraternity, sorority, or organization,
during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation therein as a principal unless such person or
persons prevented the commission of the acts punishable herein or promptly reported the same to the law
enforcement authorities  if they can do so without peril to their person or their family. (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, under Section 14, when death occurs during the hazing, the penalty imposed on principals who
participated in it was increased from just reclusion perpetua to reclusion perpetua and a P3-million fine.  

Accordingly, this Court required the parties to move in the premises as to whether the law's passage affects this
case.  

To public respondents, the passage of Republic Act No. 11053 did not render this case moot. They point out that
petitioner did not raise issues on the penalty imposed or the defenses that may be presented, only the prima
facie presumption in Section 14.

Moreover, petitioners claim that, while the additional imposable fine is disadvantageous to petitioner, she may avail
of the second defense provided in the amendment, which benefits her. They add that the additional penalty cannot
retroactively apply to petitioner since it will disadvantage her. Further, they submit that since Republic Act No. 11053
retains the prima facie presumption, petitioner may still incur criminal liability. As such, this case still presents a
justiciable controversy.53  

As of June 25, 2019, petitioner has been detained at the San Pedro City.

The primary issue to be resolved by this Court is whether or not Sections 5 and 14 of the Anti-Hazing Law
should be declared unconstitutional.  

This Court, however, must first rule upon whether or not the Petition is a proper remedy, and whether or not bringing
the Petition directly before this Court was a proper recourse.  

  I 

A requirement for the exercise of this Court's power of judicial review is that the case must be ripe for adjudication: 

Petitioners must, thus, comply with the requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review: (1) there must be
an actual case or justiciable controversy before this Court; (2) the question before this Court must be ripe for
adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must be a proper party; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case.55 (Citation omitted)

An issue is ripe for adjudication when an assailed act has already been accomplished or performed by a branch of
government. Moreover, the challenged act must have directly adversely affected the party challenging it.
In Philconsa v. Philippine Government : 56

For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that an act had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch of government before a court may interfere, and the petitioner must allege the existence
of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. Petitioner must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained
of.57 (Citations omitted)

Evidence II.
When matters are still pending or yet to be resolved by some other competent court or body, then those matters are
not yet ripe for this Court's adjudication.58 This is especially true when there are facts that are actively controverted
or disputed.59  

Here, petitioner argues that she should not have been charged with violating the Anti-Hazing Law as she allegedly
did not have either actual knowledge or participation in the initiation rites of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. She
claims that she was "merely walking around the premises with her fellow sisters in the Sorority "60 and "was
completely unaware "61 that Abracia was being hazed then.  

That petitioner did not actually know about or participate in the hazing is a matter of defense and must be proved by
presentation of evidence during trial. To determine at this stage, where a trial has yet to be conducted, whether
petitioner was correctly charged would be to demand that this Court hypothetically admit the truth of her claims. As
the criminal case is still ongoing, it would be premature to resolve the factual issues petitioner raises. This Court
cannot preempt the trial court's determination on the truth or falsity of petitioner's claims.  

II

 Petitioner's direct resort to this Court, when there is a perfectly competent trial court before which she may raise her
constitutional question, abrogates the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.  

"The doctrine of hierarchy of courts ensures judicial efficiency at all levels of courts." 62 In Aala v. Uy.63

The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is a practical judicial policy designed to restrain parties from directly resorting to
this Court when relief may be obtained before the lower courts. The logic behind this policy is grounded on the need
to prevent " inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction," as well as to prevent the congestion of the Court's dockets. Hence, for this Court to
be able to "satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter [,] " it must remain as a
"court of last resort." This can be achieved by relieving the Court of the "task of dealing with causes in the first
instance."

As expressly provided in the Constitution, this Court has original jurisdiction "over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus." However, this Court has emphasized
in People  v. Cuaresma that the power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus does not exclusively
pertain to this Court. Rather, it is shared with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts. Nevertheless, "this
concurrence of jurisdiction " does not give parties unfettered discretion as to the choice of forum. The doctrine on
hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate venue where petitions for extraordinary writs should be filed.
Parties cannot randomly select the court or forum to which their actions will be directed.

There is another reason why this Court enjoins strict adherence to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. As explained
in Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, "[t]he doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts
was created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and
efficient manner."  

....

Consequently, this Court will not entertain direct resort to it when relief can be obtained in the lower Courts. This
holds especially true when questions of fact are raised. Unlike this Court, trial courts and the Court of Appeals are
better equipped to resolve questions of fact. They are in the best position to deal with causes in the first instance 64

A motion to quash an information may be filed at any time before a plea is entered by the accused.65 The accused
may move to quash an information on constitutional grounds,66 based on the theory that there can be no crime if
there is no law, the law being invalid (nullum crimen sine lege). Indeed, among the prayers in the Petition is for this
Court to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 2008-895: 

IT IS MOST RESPECTFULLY PRAYED THAT IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO DECLARE THE INFORMATION DATED
OCTOBER 20, 2008 IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2008-895 BEFORE BRANCH 30, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
Evidence II.
LUCENA CITY, IN SO FAR AS PETITIONER AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE TAU GAMMA SIGMA SORORITY,
ARE CONCERNED.67

Evidently, petitioner herself recognizes that the issue of the constitutionality of the Anti-Hazing Law's provisions is
not incompatible with the quashal of the Information. Aside from her bare invocation that her substantive rights are
being derogated, petitioner fails to explain the necessity and urgency of her direct resort to this Court.  

In her Memorandum, petitioner points out that the Information fails to charge her and her fellow sorority members
with actual participation in the alleged crime:  

The Information in Criminal Case No. 2008-895, above quoted immediately charged all the Members of Tau Gamma
Phi fraternity and Tau Gamma Sigma Sorority as principals/conspirators for the death of a neophyte who 3 days
after the initiation rites in question, resulting allegedly from the hazing by a member or members of the fraternity as
quoted above.

The Information did not allege that all of the 46 accused actually participated in the hazing that later allegedly
resulted in the death of neophyte Chester Paolo Abracia a few days after; it merely stated that the 46 accused are
"all active members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity and Tau Gamma Sigma Sorority, acting in conspiracy with one
another".68

This claim is precisely what is addressed in a motion to quash. As correctly pointed out by public respondents, the
issues of petitioner's minority and right to bail should be raised in the trial court as well.  

To justify the filing of this Petition before this Court absent any intermediary decision, resolution, or order by any
lower court, petitioner argues that this Court is "the final arbiter whether or not a law violates the Constitution ,
particularly the rights of citizens under the Bill of Rights."69  

Indeed, this Court is the final arbiter of the constitutionality of any law-but we are not the sole and exclusive forum
before which constitutional questions may be posed.70 We are the court of last resort, not the first.  

Regional trial courts, including the one before which Criminal Case No. 2008-895 is pending, are vested with judicial
power, which embraces the power to determine if a law breaches the Constitution. In Garcia v. Drilon:71

It is settled that [Regional Trial Courts] have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, "this authority
being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by
the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law." The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. We said in J.M. Tuason
and Co., Inc. v. CA that, "[p]lainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in
cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior
courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue.'m (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

Notably, at the time the Petition was filed before this Court, petitioner admitted that she was "at large "73 and had
not refuted public respondents' claim that she had been a fugitive from justice, having evaded arrest from
200874 until the time she was finally detained. The failure to avail of the proper remedies in the proper forum lies
with her.  

Nonetheless, regardless of petitioner's remedial errors, this Court acknowledges that the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts is not ironclad, especially when pressing constitutional matters are at stake. In Diocese of Bacolod v.
Commission on Elections: 75

Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has "full discretionary power to take
cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari ... filed directly with it for exceptionally
compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition." As
correctly pointed out by petitioners, we have provided exceptions to this doctrine:  

Evidence II.
First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be
addressed at the most immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes availing of the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition to assail the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and executive branches of the government. 

 . . . .

A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In these cases, the imminence
and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence. The doctrine
relating to constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents courts from the paralysis of procedural
niceties when clearly faced with the need for substantial protection.  

Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no jurisprudence yet
exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter. In Government of the United States v. Purganan, this court took
cognizance of the case as a matter of first impression that may guide the lower courts:

In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem
it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which
there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.  

....

Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court. In Drilon v. Lim, this court held that: 

... it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court
in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and
with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its discussion 76

Here, there is transcendental interest in determining whether a penal statute with grave consequences to the life
and liberty of those charged under it is consistent with our constitutional principles. In the interest of judicial
economy, this Court shall resolve this case on the merits.  

III

While petitioner purports to assail the constitutionality of both Sections 5 and 4 of the Anti-Hazing law, all her
arguments are focused on paragraph 4 of Section 14. In her Petition, she states:

It is most respectfully submitted that the provision of RA No. 8049 in so far as it penalizes a mere member not of the
fraternity or sorority, who was merely present on the occasion of the so-called initiation rites but had not witnessed,
much less participated in any wrong doing, is presumed/considered as principal, for whatever acts committed by any
member or members, considered as "hazing" punishable sections 3 and 4 of the law, RA 8049, and is
presumed/considered to have failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring, as in this case, where
petitioner under the circumstances, was immediately indicted as principal for the acts of people albeit members of a
fraternity, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and non-bailable[.]79

The pertinent portion of Section 14 provides:

The presence of any person , even if such person is not a member of the fraternity, sorority, or organization,
during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation therein as a principal unless such person or
persons prevented the commission of the acts punishable herein or promptly reported the same to the law
enforcement authorities if they can do so without peril to their person or their family.

This Court has upheld the constitutionality of disputable presumptions in criminal laws.8 The constitutional
presumption of innocence is not violated when there is a logical connection between the fact proved and the
ultimate fact presumed.81 When such prima facie evidence is unexplained or not contradicted by the accused, the
conviction founded on such evidence will be valid.82 However, the prosecution must still prove the guilt of the

Evidence II.
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The existence of a disputable presumption does not preclude the presentation
of contrary evidence. 

In People v. Mingoa,85 this Court passed upon the constitutionality of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. It
provides that a public officer's failure "to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer," is prima facie evidence that such missing funds or
property were put to personal use.  Upholding Article 217's constitutionality, this Court declared:

The contention that this legal provision violates the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed i1mocent until
the contrary is proved cannot be sustained. The question of the constitutionality of the statute not having been
raised in the court below, it may not be considered for the first time on appeal. (Robb vs. People, 68 Phil., 320.)

In any event, the validity of statutes establishing presumptions in criminal cases is now a settled matter, Cooley, in
his work on constitutional limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, pp. 639-641, says that "there is no constitutional objection to the
passage of a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded
upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such
presumption of innocence." In line with this view, it is generally held in the United States that the legislature may
enact that when certain facts have been proved they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the
accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be a rational connection between the facts proved and the
ultimate fact presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary
because of lack of connection between the two in common experience.86

In People v. Baludda, this Court affirmed the constitutionality of the disputable presumption that the finding of a
dangerous drug in the accused's house or premises, absent a satisfactory explanation, amounts to knowledge
or animus possidendi:

Under the Rules of Evidence, it is disputably presumed that things which a person possesses or over which he
exercises acts of ownership, are owned by him. In U.S. vs. Bandoc, the Court ruled that the finding of a dangerous
drug in the house or within the premises of the house of the accused is prima facie evidence of knowledge
or animus possidendi and is enough to convict in the absence of a satisfactory explanation. The constitutional
presumption of innocence will not apply as long as there is some logical c01mection between the fact proved and
the ultimate fact presumed, and the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to
be a purely arbitrary mandate. The burden of evidence is thus shifted on the possessor of the dangerous drug to
explain absence of animus possidendi.88 (Citations omitted)

In Dizon-Pamintuan v. People,89 Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1612, which provides that the mere
possession of stolen goods is prima facie evidence of fencing, was found valid:  

Since Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides that "[m]ere possession of any good, article, item, object, or
anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing," it
follows that the petitioner is presumed to have knowledge of the fact that the items found in her possession were the
proceeds of robbery or theft. The presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from
the established fact of her possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. This presumption does not
offend the presumption ofim1ocence enshrined in the fundamental law. In the early case of United States vs.
Luling, this Court held:

It has been frequently decided, in case of statutory crimes, that no constitutional provision is violated by a statute
providing that proof by the state of some material fact or facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that
then the burden is shifted to the defendant for the purpose of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are
committed without unlawful intention. (Commonwealth vs. Minor, 88 Ky., 422.) 

In some of the States, as well as in England, there exist what are known as common law offenses. In the Philippine
Islands no act is a crime unless it is made so by statute. The state having the right to declare what acts are criminal,
within certain well defined limitations, has a right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime , as well as what
act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then to
put upon the defendant the burden o f showing that such act or acts are innocent and are not committed with any
criminal intent or intention.90 (Citations omitted)
Evidence II.
In fact, the constitutionality of Section 14, paragraph 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law has already been discussed—and
upheld—by this Court. In Dungo v. People, this Court acknowledged that the secrecy and concealment in initiation
rites, and the culture of silence within many organizations, would make the prosecution of perpetrators under the
Anti-Hazing Law difficult: 

Secrecy and silence are common characterizations of the dynamics of hazing. To require the prosecutor to indicate
every step of the planned initiation rite in the information at the inception of the criminal case, when details of the
clandestine hazing are almost nil, would be an arduous task, if not downright impossible. The law does not require
the impossible (lex non cognit ad impossibilia).

....

Needless to state, the crime of hazing is shrouded in secrecy. Fraternities and sororities, especially the Greek
organizations, are secretive in nature and their members are reluctant to give any information regarding initiation
rites. The silence is only broken after someone has been injured so severely that medical attention is required. It is
only at this point that the secret is revealed and the activities become public. Bearing in mind the concealment of
hazing, it is only logical and proper for the prosecution to resort to the presentation of circumstantial evidence to
prove it. (Citations omitted)

Because of this, this Court held that the provision that presence during a hazing is prima facie evidence of
participation in it relates to the conspiracy in the crime:

The Court does not categorically agree that, under R.A. No. 8049, the prosecution need not prove conspiracy.
Jurisprudence dictates that conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive
evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in
itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to
constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view
to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.  

R.A. No. 8049, nevertheless, presents a novel provision that introduces a disputable presumption of actual
participation; and which modifies the concept of conspiracy. Section 4, paragraph 6 thereof provides that the
presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation as principal, unless he prevented
the commission of the punishable acts. This provision is unique because a disputable presumption arises from the
mere presence of the offender during the hazing, which can be rebutted by proving that the accused took steps to
prevent the commission of the hazing.  

The petitioners attempted to attack the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049 before the CA, but did
not succeed. "[A] finding of prima facie evidence ... does not shatter the presumptive innocence the
accused enjoys because, before prima facie evidence arises, certain facts have still to be proved; the trial
court cannot depend alone on such evidence, because precisely, it is merely prima facie. It must still satisfy that the
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Neither can it rely on the weak defense the latter
may adduce."  

Penal laws which feature prima facie evidence by disputable presumptions against the offenders are not new, and
can be observed in the following: (1) the possession of drug paraphernalia gives rise to prima facie evidence of the
use of dangerous drug; (2) the dishonor of the check for insufficient funds is prima facie evidence of knowledge of
such insufficiency of funds or credit; and (3) the possession of any good which has been the subject of robbery or
thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.  

Verily, the disputable presumption under R.A. No. 8049 can be related to the conspiracy in the crime of hazing. The
common design of offenders is to haze the victim. Some of the overt acts that could be committed by the offenders
would be to (1) plan the hazing activity as a requirement of the victim's initiation to the fraternity; (2) induce the
victim to attend the hazing; and (3) actually participate in the infliction of physical injuries.

....

Evidence II.
Hence, generally, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy.
Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of the offenders in the criminal conspiracy can be
proven by the prima facie evidence due to their presence during the hazing, unless they prevented the
commission of the acts therein. (Citations omitted )

Here, petitioner fails to show that a logical relation between the fact proved-presence of a person during the
hazing— and the ultimate fact presumed—their participation in the hazing as a principal—is lacking. Neither
has it been shown how Section 14 of the Anti-Hazing Law does away with the requirement that the
prosecution must prove the participation of the accused in the hazing beyond reasonable doubt.

On the contrary, the study of human behavior has shown that being surrounded by people who approve or
encourage one's conduct impairs otherwise independent judgment, be it in the form of peer pressure, herd
mentality, or the bystander effect.  

The term "groupthink" was coined by American psychologist Irving L. Janis to describe the phenomenon of
"mental deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment that results from group
pressures. "94 He observed:

Groups, like individuals, have shortcomings. Groups can bring out the worst as well as the best in man. Nietzsche
went so far as to say that madness is the exception in individuals but the rule in groups. A considerable amount of
social science shows that in circumstances of extreme crisis, group contagion occasionally gives rise to collective
panic, violent acts of scapegoating, and other forms of what could be called group madness.95

The failure of individuals in a group to intervene allows evil acts to persist, as explained by Philip Zimbardo, the
American psychologist behind the controversial Stanford Prison Experiment:96

In situations where evil is being practiced, there are perpetrators, victims, and survivors. However, there are often
observers of the ongoing activities or people who know what is going on and do not intervene to help or to challenge
the evil and thereby enable evil to persist by their inaction.  

It is the good cops who never oppose the brutality of their buddies beating up minorities on the streets or in the back
room of the station house. It was the good bishops and cardinals who covered over the sins of their predatory parish
priests because of their overriding concern for the image of the Catholic Church. They knew what was wrong and
did nothing to really confront that evil, thereby enabling these pederasts to continue sinning for years on end (at the
ultimate cost to the Church of billions in reparations and many disillusioned followers).  

Similarly, it was the good workers at Enron, WorldCom, Arthur Andersen, and hosts of similarly corrupt corporations
who looked the other way when the books were being cooked. Moreover, as I noted earlier, in the Stanford Prison
Experiment it was the good guards who never intervened on behalf of the suffering prisoners to get the bad guards
to lighten up, thereby implicitly condoning their continually escalating abuse. It was I, who saw these evils and
limited only physical violence by the guards as my intervention while allowing psychological violence to fill our
dungeon prison. By trapping myself in the conflicting roles of researcher and prison superintendent, I too was
overwhelmed with their dual demands, which dimmed my focus on the suffering taking place before my eyes. I too
was thus guilty of the evil of inaction. (Citation omitted )

Through their express and implicit sanction, observers of hazing aggravate the abuses perpetuated upon
neophytes. As an American fraternity member explained, hazing is "almost like performance art" where the
so called audience plays as much of a role as the neophytes at the center of the initiation rites. Hazing
derives its effectiveness from the humiliation it achieves. Humiliation requires an audience. The audience
provides the provocation, goading the actors to escalate borderline conduct toward more extreme behavior
that would otherwise be intolerable. In situations like this, presence is participation.  

As described by a victim of hazing in the United States:

Nuwer: Is this theater or sadism?  

Evidence II.
Pledge: It was a lot of theater. In hindsight, every time I talked to him outside the room [where the hazing took place]
, I always thought he was kind of scared of me. I was 21, just actually four months younger than he was . . . but
some of the mystique he had wasn't there when we weren't in the room.  

Nuwer: He was like an actor getting ready to come onstage . . . or an athlete before a ballgame?  

Pledge: Definitely. I was told that before he came downstairs he would be in his room drinking or whatever, and a lot
of the brothers would come in to fire him up. They'd get him all riled up, saying we weren't respecting the house.
They would just provoke him, or maybe they'd just get him angry, or a little drunk. He'd come in and, like I said, he'd
be this different person.... They were getting him hyped up, jacked up, ready to go.99

Thus, those group members who do not actually perform the hazing ritual, but who by their presence incite
or exacerbate the violence being committed, may be principals either by inducement or by indispensable
cooperation.100  

Moreover, petitioner's claim that Section 14 of the Anti-Hazing Law violates the rule on res inter alios
acta lacks merit. Res inter alios acta provides that a party's rights generally cannot be prejudiced by
another's act, declaration, or omission.101 However, in a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all,
rendering all conspirators as co-principals "regardless of the extent and character of their
participation[.]"102 Under Rule 130, Section 30 of the Rules of Court, an exception to the res inter alios
acta rule is an admission by a conspirator relating to the conspiracy:  

SECTION 30. Admission by  conspirator. - The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy
and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration.

As noted in Dungo, hazing often involves a conspiracy among those involved, be it in the planning stage, the
inducement of the victim, or in the participation in the actual initiation rites. The rule on res inter alios acta, then,
does not apply.  

IV

Petitioner further claims that the Anti-Hazing Law imposes cruel and unusual punishments on those charged under
it, as the offense is punishable with reclusion perpetua, a non-bailable offense.104 She also argues that Sections 5
and 14 of the Anti-Hazing Law are a bill of attainder for immediately punishing members of a particular group as
principals or co-conspirators, regardless of actual knowledge or participation in the crime.105  Both these arguments
are without merit.  

An effective and appropriate analysis of constitutional provisions requires a holistic approach.106 It starts with the
text itself, which, whenever possible, must be given their ordinary meaning, consistent with the basic principle
of verba legis.107 The constitutional provisions must be understood as being parts of a greater whole:  

Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its relation with the whole of the Constitution. A
constitutional provision is but a constituent of a greater whole. It is the framework of the Constitution that animates
each of its components through the dynamism of these components' interrelations. What is called into operation is
the entire document, not simply a peripheral item. The Constitution should, therefore, be appreciated and read as a
singular, whole unit - ut magis valeat quam pereat. Each provision must be understood and effected in a way that
gives life to all that the Constitution contains, from its foundational principles to its finest fixings.108 (Citations
omitted)

The history of a constitutional provision may also be a source of guidance in its interpretation. Comparing the
present wording of the text with its prior counterparts, both as to form and substance, may illuminate on the meaning
of the provision.109  

Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides:  

Evidence II.
SECTION 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

The prohibition against the infliction of cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment in the Philippines traces its roots to
U.S. President William McKinley's Instructions to the Philippine Commission in 1900. There, the prohibition against
"cruel and unusual punishment" was first imposed:

Upon every division and branch of the government of the Philippines, therefore, must be imposed these inviolable
rules:  

. . .that excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted[.]110 (Emphasis supplied )

This phrase has appeared in every fundamental law adopted since, with nearly consistent wording. It was upon the
enactment of the 1987 Constitution that the wording of the provision was changed from "unusual" to "degrading or
inhuman."  

This constitutional prohibition had generally been aimed at the "form or character of the punishment rather than its
severity in respect of duration or amount,"111 such as "those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning
at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like."112   It is thus directed against "extreme corporeal
or psychological punishment that strips the individual of [their] humanity."113  

In line with this, this Court has found that the penalty of life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua does not violate the
prohibition.114 Even the death penalty in itself was not considered cruel, degrading, or inhuman.115

Nonetheless, this Court has found that penalties like fines or imprisonment may be cruel, degrading, or inhuman
when they are "flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock
the moral sense of the community."116 However, if the severe penalty has a legitimate purpose, then the
punishment is proportionate and the prohibition is not violated.  

In Spouses Lim v.People,117 the penalty of reclusion perpetua on a person who committed estafa by means of a
bouncing check worth P365,750.00 was found consistent with the intent of Presidential Decree No. 818. The penalty
did not violate Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution, this Court found:

Petitioners contend that, inasmuch as the amount of the subject check is P365,750, they can be penalized with
reclusion perpetua or 30 years of imprisonment. This penalty, according to petitioners, is too severe and
disproportionate to the crime they committed and infringes on the express mandate of Article III, Section 19 of the
Constitution which prohibits the infliction of cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.  

Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading or disproportionate to the nature of
the offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as
to shock the moral sense of the community. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion or
severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. Based on this principle, the Court has consistently
overruled contentions of the defense that the penalty of fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is
cruel and degrading.  

In People vs. Tongko, this Court held that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is generally aimed
at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of its duration or amount, and applies to
punishments which never existed in America or which public sentiment regards as cruel or obsolete.  This refers, for
instance, to those inflicted at the whipping post or in the pillory, to burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel,
disemboweling and the like. The fact that the penalty is severe provides insufficient basis to declare a law
unconstitutional and does not, by that circumstance alone, make it cruel and inhuman.

...

Evidence II.
. . .The primary purpose of PD 818 is emphatically and categorically stated in the following: 

WHEREAS, reports received of late indicate an upsurge of estafa (swindling) cases committed by means of
bouncing checks;

WHEREAS, if  not checked at once, these criminal acts would erode the people's confidence in the use of
negotiable instruments as a medium of commercial transaction and consequently result in the retardation of trade
and commerce and the undermining of the banking system of the country;

WHEREAS, it is vitally necessary to arrest and curb the rise in this kind of estafa cases by increasing the existing
penalties provided therefor

Clearly, the increase in the penalty, far from being cruel and degrading, was motivated by a laudable purpose,
namely, to effectuate the repression of an evil that undermines the country's commercial and economic growth, and
to serve as a necessary precaution to deter people from issuing bouncing checks. The fact that PD 818 did not
increase the amounts corresponding to the new penalties only proves that the amount is immaterial and
inconsequential. What the law sought to avert was the proliferation of estafa cases committed by means of bouncing
checks. Taking into account the salutary purpose for which said law was decreed, we conclude that PD 818 does
not violate Section 19 of Article III of the Constitution.118 (Citations omitted )

The intent of the Anti-Hazing Law is to deter members of a fraternity, sorority, organization, or association from
making hazing a requirement for admission. By making the conduct of initiation rites that cause physical and
psychological harm malum prohibitum, the law rejects the defense that one's desire to belong to a group gives that
group the license to injure, or even cause the person's death:  

The public outrage over the death of Leonardo "Lem1y" Villa — the victim in this case — on 10 February 1991 led to
a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing. Due in large part to the brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda
Villa, groups were organized, condemning his senseless and tragic death. This widespread condemnation prompted
Congress to enact a special law, which became effective in 1995, that would criminalize hazing. The intent of the
law was to discourage members from making hazing a requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity, organization,
or association. Moreover, the law was meant to counteract the exculpatory implications of "consent" and " initial
innocent act" in the conduct of initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala
prohibita.119 (Citations omitted)

Petitioner here fails to show how the penalties imposed under the Anti Hazing Law would be cruel, degrading, or
inhuman punishment, when they are similar to those imposed for the same offenses under the Revised Penal Code,
albeit a degree higher.120 To emphasize, the Anti-Hazing Law aims to prevent organizations from making hazing a
requirement for admission.121  The increased penalties imposed on those who participate in hazing is the country's
response to a reprehensible phenomenon that persists in schools and institutions.122 The Anti-Hazing Law seeks to
punish the conspiracy of silence and secrecy, tantamount to impunity, that would otherwise shroud the crime$
committed.123  

In fact, the amendments on the imposable penalties introduced by Republic Act No. 11053 bolster the State's
interest in prohibiting hazing. As noted by public respondents, a P3-million fine shall be imposed in addition to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for those who actually planned or participated in the hazing if it results in death, rape,
sodomy, or mutilation. Further, Republic Act No. 11053 put in place imposable penalties on certain members,
officers, and alumni of the organization involved in the hazing, and prescribes the administrative sanctions, if
applicable.124 The concealment of the offense or obstruction of the investigation is also penalized.125  

Notably, Section 14 (c) of Republic Act No. 11053 imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
and a P1-million fine on all persons present in the conduct of the hazing. This new penalty affirms the law's policy to
suppress the escalation and encouragement of hazing, and to severely punish bystanders and watchers of the
reprehensible acts committed.  

In People v. Feliciano, Jr.: 126

Evidence II.
The prosecution of fraternity-related violence, however, is harder than the prosecution of ordinary crimes. Most of
the time, the evidence is merely circumstantial. The reason is obvious: loyalty to the fraternity dictates that brods do
not turn on their brods. A crime can go unprosecuted for as long as the brotherhood remains silent

Perhaps the best person to explain fraternity culture is one of its own.  

Raymund Narag was among those charged in this case but was eventually acquitted by the trial court. In 2009, he
wrote a blog entry outlining the culture and practices of a fraternity, referring to the fraternity system as "a big black
hole that sucks these young promising men to their graves." This, of course, is merely his personal opinion on the
matter. However, it is illuminating to see a glimpse of how a fraternity member views his disillusionment of an
organization with which he voluntarily associated. In particular, he writes that:  

The fraternities anchor their strength on secrecy. Like the Sicilian code of omerta, fraternity members are bound to
keep the secrets from the non-members. They have codes and symbols the frat members alone can understand.
They know if there are problems in campus by mere signs posted in conspicuous places. They have a different
set [sic] of communicating, like inverting the spelling of words, so that ordinary conversations cannot be decoded by
non-members.  

It takes a lot of acculturation in order for frat members to imbibe the code of silence. The members have to be a
mainstay of the tambayan to know the latest developments about new members and the activities of other frats.
Secrets are even denied to some members who are not really in to [sic] the system. They have to earn a reputation
to be part of the inner sanctum. It is a form of giving premium to become the "true blue member".  

The code of silence reinforces the feeling of elitism. The fraternities are worlds of their own. They are sovereign in
their existence. They have their own myths, conceptualization of themselves and worldviews. Save perhaps to their
alumni association, they do not recognize any authority aside from the head of the fraternity.  

 The secrecy that surrounds the traditions and practices of a fraternity becomes problematic on an evidentiary level
as there are no set standards from which a fraternity-related crime could be measured. In People v. Gilbert
Peralta, this Court could not consider a fraternity member's testimony biased without any prior testimony on
fraternity behavior:  

Esguerra testified that as a fraternity brother he would do anything and everything for the victim. A witness may be
said to be biased when his relation to the cause or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or
give false color or pervert the truth, or to state what is false. To impeach a biased witness, the counsel must lay the
proper foundation of the bias by asking the witness the facts constituting the bias. In the case at bar, there was no
proper impeachment by bias of the three (3) prosecution witnesses. Esguerra's testimony that he would do anything
for his fellow brothers was too broad and general so as to constitute a motive to lie before the trial court. Counsel for
the defense failed to propound questions regarding the tenets of the fraternity that espouse absolute fealty of the
members to each other. The question was phrased so as to ask only for Esguerra's personal conviction....  

 The inherent difficulty in the prosecution of fraternity-related violence forces the judiciary to be more exacting in
examining all the evidence on hand, with due regard to the peculiarities of the circumstances.127 (Citations omitted)

Moreover, contrary to petitioner's assertion, the Anti-Hazing Law is not a bill of attainder.  

Bills of attainder are prohibited under A11icle III, Section 22 of the Constitution, which states: 

SECTION 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

A bill of attainder is rooted in the historical practice of the English Parliament to declare certain persons—such as
traitors—attainted, or stained, and that the corruption of their blood extended to their heirs, who would not be
allowed to inherit from the "source" of the corruption. These attainted persons and their kin were usually so declared
without the benefit of judicial process.128

Evidence II.
In modern times, a bill of attainder is generally understood as a legislative act which inflicts punishment on
individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial.129 The earliest form of prohibition against the
enactment of bills of attainder was introduced in the Malolos Constitution:130

ARTICLE 14. No Filipino can be prosecuted or sentenced except by the judge or court that, by virtue of the laws
previous to the crime, has been given jurisdiction, and in the mam1er that these laws prescribe.

A bill of attainder encroaches on the courts' power to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused and to impose
the corresponding penalty, violating the doctrine of separation of powers.131  

For a law to be considered a bill of attainder, it must be shown to contain all of the following: "a specification of
certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of
judicial trial."132 The most essential of these elements is the complete exclusion of the courts from the
determination of guilt and imposable penalty.133  

 In People v. Ferrer,134 this Court delved into the question of whether the Anti-Subversion Act, which declared
illegal the Communist Party of the Philippines and any other organizations that constitute an "organized conspiracy
to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a
totalitarian regime and place the Government under the control and domination of an alien power[,]"135 was a bill of
attainder.  

This Court found that the law was, in fact, not. It noted that the Anti Subversion Act would be a bill of attainder only if
it had made it unnecessary for members of the Communist Party to have to be charged in court.136  Moreover,
even if the Anti-Subversion Act specifically named the Communist Party, it would be insufficient to declare the law a
bill of attainder:

Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to render it a
bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or employees of securities underwriting firms from serving as officers
or employees of national banks on the basis of a legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be subject to
the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy, has been declared not to be a bill of
attainder. Similarly, a statute requiring every secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at least twenty to
register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of such society which fails to register or remains a
member thereof, was declared valid even if in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku
Klux Klan.  

In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace Act, requiring labor unions to file with the
Department of Labor affidavits of union officers "to the effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and
that they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any
illegal or unconstitutional method," was upheld by this Court.  

Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in
such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder . It is upon this
ground that statutes which disqualified those who had taken part in the rebellion against the Government of the
United States during the Civil War from holding office, or from exercising their profession, or which prohibited the
payment of further compensation to individuals named in the Act on the basis of a finding that they had engaged in
subversive activities, or which made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or
employee of a labor union, have been invalidated as bills of attainder.  

But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially
noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make such
determination.137 (Citations omitted)

Similarly, in Bataan Shipyard  &  Engineering Company, Inc. v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government,138 Executive Orders No. 1 and 2, which created the Presidential Commission on Good Government,
were also found not to be bills of attainder. This Court declared that the finding of guilt must still be made by a court,
namely, the Sandiganbayan:

Evidence II.
In the first place, nothing in the executive orders can be reasonably construed as a determination or declaration of
guilt. On the contrary, the executive orders, inclusive of Executive Order No. 14, make it perfectly clear that any
judgment of guilt in the amassing or acquisition of "ill-gotten wealth" is to be handed down by a judicial tribunal, in
this case, the Sandiganbayan, upon complaint filed and prosecuted by the PCGG. In the second place, no
punishment is inflicted by the executive orders, as the merest glance at their provisions will immediately make
apparent. In no sense, therefore, may the executive orders be regarded as a bill of attainder.139

Here, the mere filing of an Information against petitioner and her fellow sorority members is not a finding of their guilt
of the crime charged. Contrary to her claim, petitioner is not being charged merely because she is a member of the
Tau Gamma Sigma Sorority, but because she is allegedly a principal by direct participation in the hazing that led to
Abracia's death. As stated, these are matters for the trial court to decide. The prosecution must still prove these
offense, and the accused's participation in it, beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner, in turn, may present her
defenses to the allegations.  

Parenthetically, the amendments in Republic Act No. 11053 may be applied retroactively in cases like petitioner's
where the hazing resulted in death, contrary to the position taken by public respondents. Previously, should an
accused fail to overturn the prima facie presumption, they would be charged as principals, with a corresponding
penalty of reclusion perpetua when the hazing resulted in death. Now, Section 14(c) imposes the lower penalty for
one's presence during the hazing-reclusion temporal in its maximum period with a P1-million fine. As the penalty is
not reclusion perpetua, the accused may also benefit from the application of Republic Act No. 4103, as amended,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Legislative acts are presumed constitutional.140 To be declared unconstitutional, a statute or any of its provisions
must be shown to have clearly and unmistakably breached the Constitution.141 Petitioner has failed to discharge
her burden of overcoming the presumption of the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Anti-Hazing Law.  

Those who object to, intervene against, or attempt to stop the despicable or inhumane traditions or rituals of an
organization or institution may be branded as duwag, nakakahiya, walang pakisama, traydor. Section 14, paragraph
4 of the Anti-Hazing Law turns cowardice into virtue, shame into strength, and disobedience into heroism. More than
that, this serves as a grave warning that failing to act—knowing fully well that others are being traumatized, injured,
maimed, or killed—does not make a person only an observer or witness. It makes them a perpetrator.  

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.  

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation and the Director General
of the Philippine National Police. Both are DIRECTED to cause the immediate arrest of those accused in Criminal
Case No. 2008-895 who are still at large, and to inform this Court of their compliance within ten (10) days from
notice. The trial judge is likewise DIRECTED to issue such other and further orders to take all the accused into
custody and to hasten the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 2008-895. This Decision shall be immediately
executory.  

Evidence II.
 X.) 2 G.R. No. 216064, November 07, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTONIO DACANAY Y

TUMALABCAB, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

This is an Appeal1 filed under Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Rules of Court from the Decision dated
April 2, 20142 (questioned Decision) of the Court of Appeals, Tenth (10th) Division (CA), in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 05083, which affirmed the Judgment dated June 21, 20113 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 7 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 07-257131.

In an Information filed with the RTC, accused-appellant Antonio4 T. Dacanay (Antonio) was charged
with the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended,5 the
accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about October 06, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to
kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence
upon the person of one NORMA DACANAY y ERO, his wife, by then and there stabbing her body with
an ice pick several times, thereby inflicting upon her mortal stab wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of her death thereafter.

Contrary to law.6

The antecedent facts, as summarized by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, follow.

On October 6, 2007, Norma E. Dacanay (Norma), the wife of Antonio, was found lifeless with several
puncture wounds on the bathroom floor of their home by their son, Quinn, who was then coming
home from school.7 Quinn likewise observed that the rest of the house was in disarray, with the
clothes and things of Norma scattered on the floor, as if suggesting that a robbery had just taken
place.8 At that time, Antonio had already left for work after having allegedly left the house at around
six in the morning.9

Quinn then rushed to the house of his aunt, one Beth Bautista, to tell her about the fate of Norma,
and then proceeded to the workplace of Antonio,10 which was only ten (10) minutes away from their
house.11

Thereafter, both Quinn and Antonio proceeded back to their house and were met by some police
officers who were then already conducting an investigation on the incident.12

Antonio was then interviewed by PO3 Jay Santos (PO3 Santos), during which interview, Antonio
informed PO3 Santos that One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) in cash and pieces of jewelry
were missing.13 Antonio alluded to a certain "Miller" as an alleged "lover" of Norma who may have
perpetrated the crime.14 However, after further investigation, the identity of "Miller" was never
ascertained, as none of Norma's friends knew of any such person.15

After PO3 Santos's inspection of the crime scene, Antonio was invited to the precinct to formalize his
statement, to which the latter declined, as he still had to take care of the funeral arrangements of
Norma.16 While Antonio promised to proceed to the police station on the following day, he never
made good on such promise.17

Evidence II.
On October 8, 2007, PO3 Santos went to Antonio's workplace at PHIMCO Industries, Inc. (PHIMCO)
in Punta, Sta. Ana, Manila, to once again invite Antonio to the precinct.18 Antonio acceded to such
request and, after fetching Quinn from school, they all proceeded to the police station.19 When they
arrived at the precinct, Barangay Kagawad Antonio I. Nastor, Jr. and some members of the media
were present.20

While at the precinct, Barangay Kagawad Antonio I. Nastor, Jr. informed PO3 Santos that Antonio
was already willing to confess to killing Norma.21 Accordingly, PO3 Santos proceeded to contact a
lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office.22 In the meantime, PO3 Santos apprised Antonio of his
constitutional rights, including the right to remain silent. 23 However, as determined by
both the RTC and the CA, despite having been apprised of his rights, Antonio nonetheless
confessed to the crime before the media representatives, who separately interviewed him
without PO3 Santos, viz:

Per [Antonio]'s account, around 4:00 in the morning, he and his wife had a fight pertaining to the
unaccounted amount of P100,000.00. With extreme anger, he stabbed his wife several times.
Thereafter, he threw all the pieces of evidence to the river. [Antonio] further declared that he set up
the first floor of their house by placing a pitcher of juice, a half-empty glass of juice and cigarette on
top of the table, to make it appear that someone else went to their house and robbed the place. He
also confessed that he took the missing pieces of jewelry and placed them inside his locker at
PHIMCO. He allegedly admitted the killing of his wife as his conscience has been bothering him. x x
x24

Insofar as accused's confession was heard, media men Nestor Etolle from the Philippine Star and Jun
Adsuara from Tanod (Bantay ng Bayan) alleged, in the same tenor, that when it was reported that
the case has (sic) been solved, they each went, at different time intervals, to the detention cell of the
Manila Police District to interview the suspect. Accused, however, remained consistent in admitting
that he was the one who killed his wife x x x. He was alleged to have said that he has been bothered
by his conscience that was why he admitted to the killing. x x x25 (Citations omitted)

Notably, the reporters, Jun Adsuara and Nestor Etoile, were presented by the prosecution during
trial, wherein both testified that Antonio voluntarily admitted his complicity in the crime without any
intimidation or coercion exerted on his person.26 As a result of the interview, a news article entitled
"Mister timbog sa pagpatay sa asawa" was published in the October 10, 2007 issue of Tanod Diyaryo
Bayan.27

Moreover, it was later confirmed by PO3 Santos during a follow-up operation that the missing jewelry
(e.g., a pair of gold earrings, a necklace with a cross pendant, a necklace with an oval pendant) were
indeed stored in Antonio's locker at PIDMCO, consistent with the latter's extrajudicial confession
before the press.28 Likewise, based on a medico-legal report prepared by Dr. Romeo Tagala Salen of
the Manila Police District, the cause of Norma's death was due to multiple puncture wounds on the
body, and that the weapon used could have been a round instrument (e.g., an ice pick).29

For his defense, as summarized by the RTC, Antonio interposed the twin defenses of alibi and denial,
claiming coercion and intimidation on the part of the police officers involved in the investigation of
the crime, to wit:

At the police station, accused was subjected to investigation. His son was directed to stay far from
where he was positioned. Moments later, accused felt that the investigating police were not satisfied
with his answer for which reason he was isolated in another room. There were at least three (3)
policemen. He also saw PO2 Jaime Gonzales, being the companion of PO3 Jay Santos during the time
of his arrest. It was at this instance where he was boxed on the side as they cursed him and pointed
a gun at him. The police wanted him to admit that he was the one who killed his wife. Accused felt
that he was shaking all over. Accused was then moved back to where his son was confined. He saw

Evidence II.
the policemen strip his son of his clothes as son cried, "Papa, help me!" His son was then brought to
the same room where he was earlier isolated x x x. Accused could only beg, "Maawa kayo sa amin!
Ako na lang ang saktan n yo, huwag na lang anak ko" x x x.

xxxx

Accused thereafter denied having talked to a kagawad about being responsible for the killing of his
wife. He insisted that he was detained for a crime he did not commit. He alluded that he was
transferred to a place in V. Mapa, Sta. Mesa, at around mid-morning in a service vehicle where his
arresting officers were wearing civilian clothes. He was asked if he had money. Since he claimed not
to have any, he heard the police say, "nag-aaksaya lang tayo ng panahon dito" x x x.

It was then that accused was again transferred, this time, to PHIMCO premises. His handcuff was
removed by PO2 Jaime Gonzales. Accused asked the guard for permission to enter. Accused was
asked to lead them to the production area where he worked and showed them the chemicals he used
for mixing x x x. Accused next denied that jewelries (sic) were retrieved from his locker at PHIMCO.
He alleged, however, that he was shown jewelries (sic) which were taken from the pocket of PO2
Jaime Gonzales but he averred that he did not recognize them. However, he was directed to place his
hand in his locker where a photo was taken x x x. They went back to the police headquarters and
was warned to keep mum about their trip to Quintos. He was also warned that media people will be
taking his video x x x.

Accused drifted to sleep but as soon as he woke up, he was told that he will be interviewed by the
media. He remembered answering their questions but denied having given any detail about the
killing of his wife x x x. The policemen behind him struck him in the head and admonished him why
he was not answering. He was asked by PO3 Jay Santos to sign a paper until PO3 Santos himself
withdrew it x x x.

Later, he was subjected to inquest proceedings. He chose not to tell the investigating prosecutor of
his ordeal since he did not want a repeat of his experience at the police precinct. He alleged that he
felt afraid since PO3 Santos threatened him and poked a gun at him x x x.

Accused denied having killed his wife, alleging that she was alive the morning he left for work x x x.
He alluded to the fact that his wife was engaged in lending money, proof of which was a blue ledger
she always kept for accounting x x x.30 (Citations omitted)

Upon arraignment, Antonio entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged.31 Trial on the merits
then ensued and by Order dated April 5, 2011 of the RTC, the case was submitted for judgment.32

Ruling of the RTC

In its Judgment dated June 21, 2011,33 the RTC gave weight to the extrajudicial confession of
Antonio and found him guilty of the crime of Parricide, the dispositive portion of which stated:

WHEREFORE, for the death of his wife, Norma Dacanay y Ero, this Court finds accused ANTONIO
DACANAY y TUMALABCAB GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide defined and
penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

The preventive imprisonment already served by the accused shall be CREDITED to the service of his
sentence pursuant to Article 29 of the same Code, as amended.

SO ORDERED.34

Evidence II.
Aggrieved, Antonio timely filed a Notice of Appeal dated June 30, 2011,35 elevating the case to the
CA.

Ruling of the CA

In the questioned Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC  in toto and dismissed the appeal for lack of
merit, on the ground that Antonio failed to overcome the presumption of voluntariness attended by
his extrajudicial confession, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant APPEAL is hereby DISMISSED for LACK OF

MERIT and the Judgment dated June 21, 2011 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7,
Manila in Criminal Case No. 07-257131 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.36

On April 24, 2014, Antonio filed a Notice of Appeal of even date with the CA.37 Hence, the instant
Appeal.

In a Resolution dated March 23, 2015,38 the Court instructed the parties to file their respective
Supplemental briefs, if they so desired. In lieu of Supplemental Briefs, the parties filed Manifestations
respectively dated May 15, 201539 and May 22, 2015,40 informing the Court that they were adopting
their previous Briefs submitted to the CA.

Issue

The sole issue for our resolution is whether the CA, in affirming the RTC, erred in finding Antonio
guilty of the crime of Parricide on the basis of his extrajudicial confession.

The Court's Ruling

In his Appeal, Antonio insists that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible on the ground
that it was given under a "coercive physical or psychological atmosphere". 41 To support his
claim, Antonio underscores the fact that he was inside a detention cell with two (2) or
three (3) other detainees when he allegedly confessed to the crime before the media.42

We are not persuaded.

At the outset, we note that Antonio had already admitted in his Appellant's Brief that he was not
under custodial investigation at the time he gave his extrajudicial confession:

Although he was not under custodial investigation, note must be taken that Antonio Dacanay was
inside a detention cell with two (2) or three (3) other detainees when he allegedly confessed before
the media.43

xxxx

Lastly, although confession before the media does not form part of custodial investigation, Antonio
Dacanay should have been informed about the consequences of his (sic) when he decided to confess
his alleged guilt.44

Hence, Antonio's reliance on constitutional safeguards is misplaced as much as it is unfounded. We

need not belabor this point.

Evidence II.
At this juncture, it bears stressing that during the separate occasions that Antonio was interviewed
by the news reporters, there was no indication of the presence of any police officers within the
proximity who could have possibly exerted undue pressure or influence. As recounted by both
reporters during their testimonies, Antonio voluntarily narrated how he perpetrated the crime in a
candid and straightforward manner, "with no trace of fear, intimidation or coercion in him".45 We
quote with approval the following observations by the RTC in its Decision dated June 21, 2011:

Insofar as accused's confession was heard, media men Nestor Etolle from the Philippine Star and Jun
Adsuara from Tanod (Bantay ng Bayan) alleged, in the same tenor, that when it was reported that
the case has (sic) been solved, they each went, at different time intervals, to the detention
cell of the Manila Police District to interview the suspect. Accused, however, remained
consistent in admitting that he was the one who killed his wife (TSN dated November 17,
2008, p. 7; TSN dated November 26, 2008, pp. 4-5).46

xxxx

The audacity displayed by the accused in admitting the killing of his wife slowly ebbed away as time
passed by. Initially moved by a moral will since his conscience could no longer contain it, accused's
admission to the crime was unfortunately perpetuated by media men who published articles on his
resigned fate. In the October 10, 2007 article of Jun Asuadra in the Tanod Diyaryo ng Bayan,
accused was even quoted to have said, "Hindi ako nagsisisi na pinatay ko ang aking asawa" (Exhibits
"E" to "E-2") x x x.47

xxxx

Despite such caveat admonished by the Supreme Court, it is found that accused's media
confession in this case reels (sic) with the spontaneity of his admission for which reason
he should be made responsible for the culpable act of having stabbed his wife 26 repeated
times. Clearly, it was the dictates of his conscience which made accused reveal his inner demons.

Nestor Etolle was particularly certain that accused talked in a candid and straightforward
manner with no trace of fear, intimidation or coercion in him x x x. As an indication that
accused was moved by his inner will, his revelations spilled more than what was necessary. Accused
rather bared the essential details of the crime - from the marital squabble over the missing
P100,000.00 to the fact that he threw away the ice-pick but after attempting to frame up evidence
by staging the presence of cigarette butts and a glass of juice on the kitchen table. These are
damning statements; yet, the purity of such revelations could have only come from the
tormented mind of the accused. Indeed, only torment could wash the soul of its
impurities.48 (Emphasis supplied)

Meanwhile, in the questioned Decision, the CA further observed:

When the accused was interviewed on separate occasions by Nestor Etolle of Philippine Star and Juan
Adsuara of Tanod Diyaryo ng Bayan, the media men where (sic) outside the detention cell. In both
instances, there was no indication of any presence of police officers within the proximity of the
accused who can possibly exert undue pressure or influence.

Necessarily, while accused was physically restrained by the cold bars of steel, he was at liberty to
remain mute. Yet, he opted to respond to inquiries from the media, and in the process, he practically
threw caution to the wind and spilled the beans, so to speak, when he conceded the killing of his wife
and recognized his culpability therefor. As observed by both reporters, accused-appellant voluntarily
narrated how he perpetrated the crime.49

Evidence II.
On this score, our pronouncements in People v. Andan50 are instructive. In said case, we held that a
confession made before news reporters, absent any showing of undue influence from the police
authorities, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for the crime confessed to by the accused:

Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from
the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed
appellant. They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were
there to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an
interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission before
interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did appellant protest his
innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the
details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his confessions
to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive
atmosphere in the interview of appellant by the news reporters.

We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12
(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with
the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the
relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily
addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without
need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that
government has the duty to protect. x x x51 (Emphasis supplied)

The fact that the extrajudicial confession was made by Antonio while inside a detention
cell does not by itself render such confession inadmissible, contrary to what Antonio would
like this Court to believe. In People v. Domantay,52 where the accused was also interviewed while
inside a jail cell, this Court held that such circumstance alone does not taint the extrajudicial
confession of the accused, especially since the same was given freely and spontaneously:

Accused-appellant claims, however, that the atmosphere in the jail when he was
interviewed was "tense and intimidating" and was similar to that which prevails in a
custodial investigation. We are not persuaded. Accused-appellant was interviewed while
he was inside his cell. The interviewer stayed outside the cell and the only person besides him was
an uncle of the victim. Accused-appellant could have refused to be interviewed, but instead, he
agreed. He answered questions freely and spontaneously. According to Celso Manuel, he said he was
willing to accept the consequences of his act.

Celso Manuel admitted that there were indeed some police officers around because about
two to three meters from the jail were the police station and the radio room. We do not
think the presence of the police officers exerted any undue pressure or influence on
accused-appellant and coerced him into giving his confession.

Accused-appellant contends that "it is...not altogether improbable for the police investigators to ask
the police reporter (Manuel) to try to elicit some incriminating information from the accused." This is
pure conjecture. Although he testified that he had interviewed inmates before, there is no evidence
to show that Celso was a police beat reporter. Even assuming that he was, it has not been shown
that, in conducting the interview in question, his purpose was to elicit incriminating information from
accused-appellant. To the contrary, the media are known to take an opposite stance against the
government by exposing official wrongdoings.

Indeed, there is no showing that the radio reporter was acting for the police or that the interview was
conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that accused-appellant confessed to the killing
out of fear. x x x53 (Emphasis supplied)

Evidence II.
Following this Court's ruling in People v. Jerez,54 the details surrounding the commission of the
crime, which could be supplied only by the accused, and the spontaneity and coherence
exhibited by him during his interviews, belie any insinuation of duress that would render
his confession inadmissible.

Notably, while Antonio's testimony is replete with imputations of violence and coercion, no
other evidence was presented to buttress these desperate claims. Neither was there any
indication that Antonio instituted corresponding criminal or administrative actions against
the police officers allegedly responsible. It is well-settled that where the accused fails to
present evidence of compulsion; where he did not institute any criminal or administrative
action against his supposed intimidators for maltreatment; and where no physical
evidence of violence was presented, all these will be considered as factors indicating
voluntariness.55

In fact, what is glaring from the evidence is the deafening silence of Antonio's son, Quinn, with
respect to the violence and coercion allegedly inflicted on his person and that of his father's. Indeed,
were the allegations of Antonio even faintly true, Quinn would have testified to such fact while on the
witness stand. Instead, despite numerous opportunities to do so, Antonio's claims were left
uncorroborated, as aptly pointed out by the RTC:

The only person who could have corroborated accused's allusion to coercion and intimidation was his
own son, Quinn Anthony. However, when Quinn Anthony took the witness stand, he merely referred
to the arrest of his father. He alleged that he did not even ask his father the reason for his arrest and
right there and then, simply told him to take care of himself (TSN dated June 2, 2008, p. 11).

Perceptively, if any of such coercion or intimidation occurred, 18-year old Quinn Anthony would have
been naturally goaded to reveal them. He already lost his mother. The fear of losing his father, if
unjustly castigated, would have made him corroborate his father's story. But none absolutely came
on the witness stand. There is thus a nagging suspicion that accused's account of coercion and
intimidation may have been twisted after all.56

All told, absent any independent evidence of coercion or violence to corroborate Antonio's bare
assertions, no other conclusion can be drawn other than the fact that his statements were made
freely and spontaneously, unblemished by any coercion or intimidation.

Under Article 246 of the RPC, the crime of Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate
spouse of the accused.57 Undoubtedly, all elements are present in this case.

To begin with, the fact that Norma was the spouse of Antonio was sufficiently proven by the
prosecution through their Marriage Contract.58

Next, as a rule, an extrajudicial confession, where admissible, must be corroborated by evidence

of corpus delicti in order to sustain a finding of guilt.59 In this connection, extrajudicial confessions
are presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved.60

Hence, as extensively discussed above, considering that Antonio failed to rebut such presumption of
voluntariness regarding the authorship of the crime, coupled with the fact of death of his wife,
Norma, we find Antonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Parricide.

As a final note, worth reiterating is the general rule that factual findings of the trial court, especially
when affirmed by the CA, deserve great weight and respect and should not be disturbed on appeal,
unless these are facts of weight and substance that were overlooked or misinterpreted and would
Evidence II.
materially affect the disposition of the case.61 Moreover, in assessing the credibility of the competing
testimonies of witnesses, the Court defers to the findings of the trial court, in light of the unique
opportunity afforded them to observe the witnesses and to ascertain and measure their sincerity,
spontaneity, as well as their demeanor and behavior in court.62

In addition, the Court finds sufficient basis to award damages to the heirs of Norma, notwithstanding
the lack of such grant by the RTC and CA. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for
review on any question including one not raised by the parties.63 In this case, the crime of Parricide
was committed absent any modifying circumstances that would affect the imposable penalty. Hence,
following our ruling in People v. Jugueta,64 we hereby grant an award for civil indemnity and moral
and exemplary damages in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) each.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
April 2, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05083, finding accused-appellant Antonio
T. Dacanay GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, ordering him to pay
the heirs of Norma E. Dacanay, Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity,
Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages, and Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) as exemplary damages. All monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

Evidence II.