Proceedings of the Kent State University

May 4th
Philosophy Graduate Student Conference
No. 005019 (2008) | ISSN: 1546–6663

Gadamer's Hermeneutics: An Insight to

Understanding
Levente Szentkirlyi
Bowling Green State University

This author?s parents, both natives of Hungary, created a home in which the
uniqueness of their heritage and ancestry was cherished and celebrated. Their children
were taught the Hungarian language even before they learned to speak English. The family
commemorated Hungary?s Independence Day, and celebrated n?vnapokat (name?s days)
and holidays full of Hungarian customs. This author learned about his extended family and
its past, and heard stories of his parents? experiences living in the country. Through
language, family gatherings, literature, photographs, music, and foods, he became familiar
with his family?s culture and its traditions. And while it often seemed that his nationality?
which is easily apparent from his first and last name?preceded him, he grew to appreciate
this because he began to realize at a very young age the importance of embracing his
heritage, as it constitutes a great deal of who he is. But is who this author is restricted to
this history and the traditions of his immediate family that have been so prominent
throughout his life? How about that of his extended family? How is it that he has come to
be who he is? Can one ever truly understand who she is? What factors influence one?s
development and understanding of her self? What is the individual?s role in this process of
knowledge and understanding? And how does one?s history and understanding of her self
affect her perception and knowledge of the world? Such questions are provoked, and may
be addressed, by considering Hans-Georg Gadamer?s conception of the hermeneutical
circle and the hermeneutical self. This essay shall attempt to reconstruct the basic
arguments that Gadamer presents in this theory of knowledge and explain some of the
implications of his positions.

Hermeneutic philosophy?s fundamental concept is the interpretation of the

meaning of being. In essence, by giving oneself to proper methods of interpretation of
texts and traditions, an individual can come to understand and appreciate his ontology (or
reality) and his relation to others, and become exposed to the destiny and meaning of his
being. Michael Foucault was among the first to argue the limitations of reason and self-
reflection in this process of hermeneutics. He claimed that an individual is unable to know
her mind by mere reason and self-reflection; that knowledge of the self requires a range of
special interpretive disciplines and institutions, such as and especially history. Attracted
by this reasoning, Gadamer further develops this idea by asserting that a hermeneutical
individual?s self-understanding, and her understanding of others and of reality, are largely
dependent upon extensive interpretation and inquiry, which extend far beyond what can be
comprehended from reflection on immediate experiences. This interpretation and inquiry
of which he speaks ultimately leads to greater knowledge and truer understanding. As
Gadamer believes that the hermeneutical self is the direct consequence of the
hermeneutical circle (which he argues is the ontological structure, or foundation of reality,
of human beings?who are ?bound together over time and by the traditions to which they
belong?), he wants to provide a historical account that supports his theory. Thus, by
incorporating a historical model of hermeneutics, which concentrates on the interpretation
of texts and the common threads that human beings share with each other, he attempts to
show that this philosophical hermeneutics is necessary to unveil true understanding of
human existence and what exactly it means to be a human being. [1]

Gadamer?s theory of hermeneutics begins with the interpretation of texts. He

states plainly that, ?Hermeneutics must start from the position that a person seeking
to understand something has a relation to the object that comes into language in the
transmitted text and has, or acquires, a connection with the tradition out of which the
text speaks.? This relationship between the individual and the object can be
understood even as simply as one?s interest in a subject matter or in an object of
inquiry, and incorporates the former preconceptions, biases, and understanding
regarding the subject matter or object of inquiry that one may possess prior to
attempting to interpret and understand a text. Gadamer refers to such preconceptions
of, biases toward, and existing understanding of a subject matter as ?fore-
understandings,? ?fore-meanings,? or ?prejudices.? His ideas of traditions and their
implications will be addressed in greater detail further in this essay. For now, let it
suffice to understand that Gadamer believes that human beings are communally
bound to traditions, and that these traditions determine how one anticipates the
meaning of a text?thus, making the claim that interpretation is not subjective to the
individual?and ultimately dictate one?s understanding of the text. In other words,
traditions establish one?s fore-meanings, which govern how one will interpret a text
that she engages. [2]
 Gadamer believes that when a hermeneutically sensitive person approaches a text,
he expects to have his fore-understandings challenged because he realizes that everyone is
a different historical being and can conceive of the same subject differently. He elaborates
that, ?A person trying to understand a text is prepared for it to tell him something. That is
why a hermeneutically trained individual must be, from the start, sensitive to the text?s
quality of newness.? However, he clarifies that achieving this sensitivity does not entail
disregarding or suspending one?s own biases toward the matter of the object. Instead,
what is expected and necessary is for an individual to be aware of her own biases, and to
consciously and concertedly integrate these fore-meanings with her interpretation of a
text. Until this is accomplished, a text will be unable to present itself in all its ?newness.?
In other words, it will not be able to pronounce its own truth in the shadow of one?s
prejudices, and thus the potential for the individual to acquire fuller knowledge and better
understanding is undermined. [3]

Before this interpretive process can proceed and before a text can be
understood, however, one must understand the words within the text. This is also
accomplished by the fore-meanings one has. These prejudices are necessary to
identify and determine, for example, a text?s topic and what the text wants to
accomplish. Gadamer states that we project our fore-understandings to confront the
text before us as we read; and throughout the interpretative process, an individual?s
fore-understandings will prove to be supported, unchallenged, or contradicted. If
challenged, a hermeneutical individual will determine whether the contradiction
warrants the complete abandonment of her fore-meanings in question and whether
the understanding offered in the text should be adopted, or she will refine her fore-
understandings with the knowledge she discovers within the text. As a consequence
of this process, we are left to believe that some of our fore-understandings are
arbitrary. However, in anticipation of this, Gadamer warns against directly
approaching a text by relying solely on the fore-meanings at once available to the
interpreter. As he trusts that, ?Understanding achieves its full potentiality only when
the fore-meanings that it uses are not arbitrary,? a hermeneutically sensitive
interpreter should ??examine explicitly the legitimacy (that is, the origin and
validity) of the fore-meanings present within him?? when engaging a text.
Additionally, Gadamer emphasizes that individuals must strive to remain open to the
meanings of other persons and of texts; and that this openness requires objective
evaluation and interpretation of other meanings in relation to the entirety of one?s
understandings?or in other words, in relation to her reality. He claims that after
certain prejudices are confirmed, adjusted, or abandoned, the interpretive process
starts over again. The crucial point to remember is that since the hermeneutical circle
is perpetual, achieving true understanding of a text is never possible. Rather, every
occasion that a hermeneutical individual engages herself with a text (new or
familiar), she can only gain new and different interpretations of the text?each new
interpretation bridging a new horizon of knowledge (a concept which will be
addressed further in the essay). One can never fully understand a text, or achieve
true understanding for that matter, for this would mean that the individual has
forgotten the cycle.

As implicitly stated above, there are some issues concerning the

interpretation of texts, including the origin and legitimacy of fore-understandings,
the open-mindedness and objectivity of the interpreter, and the subjectivity of
language. The first shall be explained in greater breadth shortly. The second has been
adequately addressed. In regard to the latter, Gadamer elaborates that since our
ordinary use of language?and its most basic structure of individual words?comes
naturally to most human beings, it is used without conscious realization. Thus,
words are often used without consideration of their meanings, contexts,
connotations, implications, etcetera. He continues to explain that one person?s
understanding of a word may well be quite different from that of another?s, and that
one may intend something entirely different than the meaning that one?s words may
explain. ?When we try to understand a text,? states he, ?we do not try to recapture the
author?s attitude of mind but?we try to recapture the perspective within which he
has formed his views.? What Gadamer means by this is that when a hermeneutical
individual approaches a text, she attempts to objectively comprehend what the
author is stating. Moreover, if one truly wishes to understand an author?s text, she
will strive not only to comprehend the author?s perspectives, but also to make the
author?s arguments even more coherent. What is most significant about language,
written or oral, is that it brings out the presuppositions of meaning?which is crucial
to the hermeneutical process?and offers an avenue to the reflection upon ends and
the projection of ends into the future, thus enabling an individual to incorporate
future generations into his conception of the human community, an element of
Gadamer?s argument that will prove to create significant implications.

With the foundation of this hermeneutical process constructed, Gadamer

concisely presents and clarifies a series of requisites to prove that the hermeneutical
circle is the ontological structure of human being?which, if satisfied, he believes
should stand as testimony to the integrity of his argument, and would also prove that
the self is indeed hermeneutical. To reveal that the hermeneutical circle is the
ontological structure of human being, he believes it must be determined that human
beings exist only by acting on belief in the authority of their traditions. Gadamer
argues that it can be shown that human beings exist only by acting on belief in the
authority of their traditions by proving that one?s understanding of her self and her
reality are predominantly determined by the influence of her beliefs based on the
authority of traditions?or legitimate prejudices?rather than by rational argument. It is
necessary here to note that this account of Gadamer?s perspective of prejudices
requires the renouncing of prejudice against prejudice and entails proving that fore-
understandings can be legitimate despite the absence of rational argument. If these
criteria can be satisfied, Gadamer asserts that the hermeneutical circle is a historical
circle and the basis of human being??the structure of the essentially historical
understanding of an essentially historical being.? [4]

Before it is appropriate to discuss the first point of Gadamer?s requisites (which is

concerned with proving that human beings exist only by acting on beliefs in the
authority of their traditions), it is necessary to consider the second requisite of his
theory?thus, returning to the aforementioned issue concerned with the origin and
legitimacy of fore-understandings in regard to the interpretation of texts?and show
that legitimate understanding of one?s self and one?s world is disclosed primarily by
the legitimate prejudices an individual has. In other words, upon establishing that
legitimate prejudices do in fact exist, it is necessary to prove that understanding is
primarily achieved by the influence of beliefs that are based upon these prejudices
rather than by rational argument. Enlightenment thinkers are among those in strong
opposition to this perspective. By attempting to explain the world in terms of
rational argument, they claim that the human mind is able to come to know itself
through reason and self-reflection on experiences alone, and thus contend that there
is no need for further disciplines. Consequently, they also maintain that an individual
should conduct a constant struggle against the influences of prejudices since
prejudices are composed of unfounded beliefs. As such, they assert that prejudices
cannot enter into knowledge because knowledge requires reason, which is the only
legitimate foundation for true understanding and knowledge.

While confronting such challenges to his theory, and the matter of the
legitimacy of prejudices, Gadamer first distinguishes between acting on two
different types of beliefs: those based on authority and those based on tradition.
When an individual acts on his beliefs on the basis of an authority, in essence, he
concedes that that authority has greater understanding than he. Authority figures can
be thought of as any individuals with considerable knowledge of and/or extensive
experience with particular subject matters or objects of inquiry. For example, when
one is ill and visits the hospital, she tends to put faith in and give particular
consideration to the doctor?s assessment of the ailment and his remedy because the
doctor is a professional?an authority in this sense?and it is understood that he has
greater knowledge of the workings of the human body than those lacking his
authority. When a person does not employ the knowledge and experience of an
authority to guide his actions, he will act on his beliefs in the authority of traditions?
which, for Gadamer, are the most prevalent and significant forms of prejudice. For
example, a young political activist may be motivated to petition a proposed piece of
legislation or organize a public demonstration and may reason to do so because of
her conceptions of freedom based on the social, political, cultural, economic, and so
forth traditions of her society. Correspondingly, one may reason not to physically
harm another based on the moral norms that he acknowledges and with which he
complies?which, similarly, are based on the traditions of his society. But based on
such beliefs, what makes prejudices legitimate? [5]

In the former case, there are those who consider that acting on beliefs based
on authority is illegitimate because it is not rational or reflective since it implies not
questioning the respective authority and the reasons for requiring certain forms of
behavior over others. And while insisting that this is merely blind belief and thus
contrary to reason, this perspective makes the allegation that acting on beliefs on the
basis of authority is a form of subjection and imposes a hindrance on personal
freedom. However, as Gadamer maintains, since acting on beliefs based on authority
rests on the recognition that an authority has superior knowledge, it is reasonable to
rely on such an authority?s knowledge, experience, and perspective to influence
one?s actions. He continues to explain that the decision to base one?s action on
authority involves reason to make a conscious and free judgment and that, ?
Authority in this sense, properly understood, has nothing to do with blind obedience
to a command.? He does caution that individuals should not accept traditional
authority as such for the basis of belief, however. For to do so, would be to build a
life on the basis of prejudice, which Gadamer insists is merely a matter of illusion,
not knowledge. He concludes that the only appropriate basis for knowledge and
belief is one?s own reason, and to do otherwise would be to allow one?s beliefs to
be erected on prejudice. While at first glance this may seem contradictory to his
previous explanations, Gadamer simply wishes to make the distinction between
incorporating such legitimate prejudices into the way one lives his life versus
allowing one?s self to be over-influenced by prejudices that are accepted without
adequate and necessary reflection and reasoning. So this is not to say that when one?
s actions are influenced by these prejudices that his decisions are not determined by
his reasoning. Rather, his reasoning is guided by his legitimate prejudices. [6]
 Similarly to acting on the basis of authority, some argue that basing actions on the
authority of traditions is also illegitimate because in promoting compliance with norms of
appropriate behavior, traditions simply condition individuals not to question the reasons
for requiring certain forms of conduct over others. Gadamer refutes this reasoning by
explaining that traditions are constant and inescapable elements not only of freedom, but
also of free self-determination. Since the authority of tradition is nameless, that is no one
passing on knowledge can be the same that is looked to for justification of the acceptance
of that knowledge, no person can be identified as having the necessary justification for
accepting an authority of tradition. Nevertheless, one?s basing her belief in tradition is
neither contrary to freedom nor reason because, however subtle this form of reasoning
may be, one chooses whether or not to preserve a tradition. Gadamer believes that, ?Even
the most genuine and solid tradition does not persist by nature because of the inertia of
what once existed.? Hence, since every tradition must be ?affirmed, embraced, and
cultivated? by individuals if it is able to persist through generations, the preservation of
traditions is a direct act of reason and, thus, legitimizes the influence of such prejudices.

An additional concern with one?s acting on the basis of tradition regards the
validity of morals based on traditions. For, what happens when immoral behavior survives
through generations? What if, for example, a child is brought up believing that stealing or
slavery is moral and bases her actions on such beliefs? While contemplating this problem
(yet, not offering a concrete solution to it), Gadamer claims that when actions based on
rational argument and tradition come into conflict with each other, eventually one will
have to choose between reason and the truth of a tradition. Ultimately, he believes that
individuals will trust tradition more than reason. Having confirmed that legitimate
prejudices do exist, although they have the potential to communicate to one truth and to
help an individual in new ways to achieve better understanding, there still remains the
concern of discerning between legitimate and illegitimate prejudices. [7]

In order to better develop and clarify his position regarding this distinction of
prejudices, Gadamer introduces here notions of temporal distance, horizons of
knowledge, and effective historical consciousness. In regard to the first, he explains
that fore-meanings in the mind of a hermeneutical interpreter are not at her free
disposal. Thus, claiming that individuals, prior to their engagements of texts, are
unable to distinguish between the productive prejudices?that is, those that allow for
understanding?and the misguided fore-meanings that impede understanding and lead
to misunderstandings. Instead, Gadamer believes that this differentiation is made
during the actual processes of interpretation and understanding. This is a strong and
an innovative claim for him to make because, unlike former hermeneutic theories, it
implies that hermeneutics must place temporal distance into its direct sphere of
focus and consider its significance for understanding. [8]
 It is temporal distance which allows one to make the distinctions between
and discriminate against legitimate (or true) and illegitimate (or false) prejudices of
a tradition and time period. Consequently, it is necessary for traditions and their
respective prejudices of the past to be evaluated and compared to those of present-
day, requiring that hermeneutically sensitive individuals incorporate a historical
consciousness into their pursuits of knowledge and understanding?an idea which
shall be elaborated shortly. Temporal distance makes one cognizant of the prejudices
that govern her own understanding and allows her to isolate a text as the meaning of
another and value it on its own. This makes it possible for the text?s true meaning to
be revealed fully. Moreover, as there simply exists too large an array of events and
consequences to consider when one is immersed in the time, temporality also
produces a self-contained context in which relative consequences and events are
clear to judge. This critique and the passing of time allows for better interpretation
and truer understanding of prejudices, as it filters out and, thus, eliminates
illegitimate prejudices and understandings. In addition to making it possible for
erroneous prejudices to die away, temporality also causes true prejudices that create
genuine understanding to surface clearly as such; and as a result, the legitimacy of
certain prejudices emerges. However, one must be hermeneutically sensitive for this
continuous shedding of illegitimate prejudices to occur. And yet, regardless of how
effectively one may and the extent to which one does shed illegitimate and gain
legitimate prejudices, as has been stated previously, discovering true meaning can
never be fully accomplished since Gadamer?s process of hermeneutics is infinitely
perpetual. As he explains, ?Not only are fresh sources of error constantly excluded,
so that the true meaning has filtered out of it all kinds of things that obscure it, but
there emerge continually new sources of understanding, which reveal unsuspected
elements of meaning.? [9]

In arguing that the separation of productive and hindering prejudices in fact

must and does take place during the process of understanding a text, Gadamer
implies that the contexts, environments, ideas, traditions, and languages of the time
from which the text speaks must be taken into account when striving to interpret the
text; that engaging and interpreting a text (and consequently coming to better
understand the traditions of the time from which the text speaks), thus, is no longer
merely about acquiring new and more proper interpretations and prejudices and
shedding misguided and unconducive ones. This notion is one of the unique
perspectives in Gadamer?s hermeneutical theory that requires individuals?in order to
understand what the author intended to say in her texts?to bring the author?s words
and meanings to the foreground, and not only to become familiar with the realities
about which the text speaks, but also to understand the grammatical rules, stylistic
devices, etcetera upon which the text is based. For, as Gadamer exclaims, as soon as
one acknowledges that her perspectives are different from those of an author and the
meanings of previous texts, it becomes necessary to undertake a ?unique effort to
avoid misunderstanding the meaning of the old texts and yet to comprehend them in
their persuasive force?[because] the description of the inner structure and coherence
of a given text and the mere repetition of what the author says is not yet real
understanding.? [10]

Secondly, Gadamer expresses limits on what can be understood and

experienced in any given finite present moment. He claims that every finite present
(or given hermeneutical situation) represents a particular vantage point that limits
one?s possibility of vision (or understanding). Therefore, an essential aspect in
regard to this idea of a restrictive situation is the idea of a horizon?a conception he
believes is necessary to understand understanding. A horizon is the range of
understanding that includes everything that can be comprehended from a particular
position of knowledge and experience. Horizons are intricately related to one?s
prejudices and are constantly evolving simultaneously with and correspondingly to
the changes in one?s fore-meanings and understanding. Achieving new horizons is
what makes it possible for one to escape these restrictive hermeneutical situations
and gain truer understanding. ?The concept of the horizon suggests itself because it
expresses the wide, superior vision that the person who is seeking to understand
must have. To acquire a horizon means that one learns to look beyond what is close
at hand?not in order to look away from it, but to see it better within a larger whole
and in truer proportion.? Accordingly, for an individual to have a horizon means that
she is able to understand more than what can possibly be comprehended from
reflection on immediate and contemporary experiences. Moreover, she will know the
relative significance of everything within the horizon she acquires. It should be noted
that escaping, or working out of, a hermeneutical situation requires an individual to
achieve the proper horizon in relation to the tradition that she encounters. In other
words, the right horizon in any given situation is that which can adequately and
appropriately address the questions that are evoked by the specific tradition involved
with the particular hermeneutical situation. [11]

Since hermeneutical individuals continually must test and modify their

prejudices, the horizons of their present are also constantly undergoing adjustments
and being newly formed. Thus, no horizon can ever be restricted to any single
standpoint of knowledge and experience, which makes the idea of a closed horizon a
complete abstraction for Gadamer. Analogous to the inherent communal nature of
human beings, a horizon is never simply a horizon, as it is always interrelated to and
interacting with other horizons. As he explains, ?The historical movement of human
life consists in the fact that it is never utterly bound to any one standpoint, and hence
can never have a truly closed horizon. The horizon is rather, something into which
we move and that moves with us.? Moreover, as this aforementioned testing of
prejudices that form one?s horizons of his present involve encounters with the past
and the understanding of the traditions from which an individual comes, horizons of
the present cannot be established without the past. [12]

With each new inquiry and successful interpretation of a text?each new achievement
of greater knowledge?a hermeneutical individual bridges or fuses a new horizon.
Gadamer believes that this fusion of horizons approaches objectivity, for as greater
numbers of horizons are fused between individuals, fewer and fewer points of
disagreements exist. In other words, as fewer numbers of conflicting prejudices
subsist, truer understanding can be achieved. For example, when a hermeneutically
sensitive individual reads and interprets this essay, she will gain a new interpretation
of Gadamer?s hermeneutical theory?more specifically, this author?s interpretation of
Gadamer?s writings. When she accomplishes this task, she can be said to have fused
her previous horizon regarding this subject matter with this author?s, and, thus, has
achieved a truer or more comprehensive understanding of Gadamer?s hermeneutics.
It should be noted that the elimination of points of disagreements of which Gadamer
writes does not entail one?s accepting and conforming to the different interpretations
of subject matters and objects of inquiry that she encounters. A hermeneutically
sensitive individual can achieve greater knowledge and truer understanding even
when she does not agree with the perspectives of the individual whose texts she
interprets. What is significant is that an individual come to understand and appreciate
as many different perspectives and interpretations as possible in order to more fully
comprehend a subject matter or object of inquiry. However, the notion of fusing of
horizons carries greater importance than one?s coming to better understand and
appreciate a text, an author?s perspective, or a subject matter. Rather, for Gadamer,
the fusing of horizons is the objective of the entire hermeneutical process, and it
implies achieving not only greater knowledge of one?s self and one?s reality, but
also understanding of one?s relation to his human community and what exactly it
means to be a human being.

Thirdly, as stated above, one?s present horizons cannot be formed without

the past; thus, requiring that a hermeneutical individual achieve what Gadamer
refers to and has been previously noted as a historical consciousness. This means
that a hermeneutical individual must not only be able to view his present in such a
way that recognizes the influence that the past has had and does have on the present,
but also be able to view the past as its own unique entity, separate of its connection
to the present. To explain in another fashion, a truly historical consciousness sees
itself as the creation of the past, but neglects to focus on, and directly incorporate
into its pursuits of understanding, immediate experiences and concerns of the
present. Instead, by realizing and valuing the significance of the past?s own
meanings, a truly historical consciousness can understand and appreciate the past?s
meanings unrelated to and isolated from the present. Gadamer concedes that, ?We are
always affected, in hope and fear, by what is nearest to us, and hence approach,
under its influence, the testimony of the past.? However and consequently, he urges
that individuals who pursue achievements of greater knowledge and truer
understanding concertedly avoid impetuously assimilating the past to their presents
and their expectations of meaning. Only when this objective interpretation of the
horizons of the past is accomplished will an individual be able to discern and
understand the past?s own meanings and acquire a true (or effective) historical
consciousness. [13]

An effective historical consciousness essentially is an awareness of a

hermeneutical situation. Recall that a hermeneutical situation refers to any finite
present and represents a particular vantage point that hinders the possibility of
understanding. To become cognizant of a restrictive hermeneutical situation is not an
endeavor of great ease. As Gadamer explains, ?The very idea of a [hermeneutic]
situation means that we are not standing outside it and hence are unable to have any
objective knowledge of it. We are always within the situation, and to throw light on it
is a task that is never entirely complete.? Adequate and effective reflection of the
past is essential to enable one to recognize his given hermeneutical situation and
offers the potential to acquire greater and truer knowledge of the situation. Still, its
complete understanding is never possible, as Gadamer?s theory of hermeneutics,
once again, is infinitely perpetual. He asserts that this is not due to any lack of
effective historical reflection. Instead, since Gadamer believes that the human society
is a collective entity that is characterized by its shared history, the inability of
achieving complete understanding is the consequence of this historical nature and
existence of human being. When a hermeneutical individual achieves a historical
consciousness and places it within historical horizons?in other words, isolates events
and meanings of the past and comes to understand them objectively?she does not
disconnect her self, her present, or her own past from the foreign realms of history.
Rather, these worlds are always connected, and ??together they constitute the one
great horizon that moves from within and, beyond the frontiers of the present,
embraces the historical depths of our self-consciousness. It is, in fact, a single
horizon that embraces everything contained in historical consciousness.? Moreover,
one?s own past and the other past toward which his historical consciousness is
directed help shape this evolving horizon out of which Gadamer believes ?human
life always lives.? [14]

In summary, Gadamer asserts that prejudices are legitimated insofar as they have an
effective history, which means that they are legitimate only as long as temporal
distance continues to support extensions of the horizons of one?s understanding and
critically challenges and progressively exposes one?s illegitimate prejudices.
Effective history entails openness to different possibilities, reflection on experiences,
and accounting for historical thinking?s own historicality?put another way,
objectively coming to understand a particular matter of object as a counterpart of
itself. History is not meant to be understood, nor should one attempt to understand it,
as a system of facts. It becomes effective only once it is objectively interpreted so
that an encountered tradition may appropriately speak to one?s own concerns and
experiences. As Gadamer states, ?A true historical object is not an object at all, but
the unity of one and the other, a relationship in which exist both the reality of history
and the reality of historical understanding. A proper hermeneutics would have to
demonstrate the effectivity of history within understanding itself.? [15]

Having confirmed that legitimate prejudices do in fact exist despite the

absence of rational argument, let us return to the initial requisite of Gadamer?s
theory: proving that the hermeneutical circle is the ontological structure of human
being by determining that human beings exist only by acting on beliefs in the
authority of their traditions. Recall that Gadamer argues that it can be shown that
human beings exist only by acting on beliefs in the authority of their traditions by
proving that one?s understanding of her self and her reality are predominantly
determined by the influence of her beliefs based on legitimate prejudices rather than
by rational argument. We have exhausted the idea that human beings are inescapably
and communally bound to and set within various traditions, and that these traditions
directly and significantly influence not only the outcome of every interpretive
endeavor a hermeneutically sensitive individual undertakes, but also determines
one?s understanding of his self, reality, relation to other human beings, and what
exactly human existence means. However, to further instill these ideas, Gadamer
asserts that since the society of human beings cannot be thought of in terms of
individuals who associate with one another, it should rather be thought of as a
collective entity characterized by its history; that people are only what they are in
virtue of sharing traditions; and that ?the prejudices of the individual?constitute the
historical reality of his being.? [16]

While he certainly believes that rational argument has its place and
significance in the hermeneutical process, Gadamer contends that it is less
influential than an individual?s commitment to and trust in her traditions. Let us
remember that he stresses that when actions based on rational argument and tradition
come into conflict with each other, an individual will have to choose between reason
and the truth of a tradition, and will ultimately trust tradition more than reason.
Furthermore, he believes that the role of rational argument is limited to providing an
individual with an avenue to reflect on, reason, and justify which prejudices she will
adopt and incorporate into her life, and enables her to evaluate the legitimacy of
those prejudices. As has been previously explained, in regard to acting on beliefs
based on authority, one will use her reasoning to recognize the superior knowledge
of an authority and make a conscious and free judgment to decide to base her actions
on that authority. Similarly, when one bases his actions on traditions, he will utilize
his reasoning to consider and freely choose whether or not to ?affirm, embrace, and
cultivate??and, thus, preserve?specific traditions evoked by particular situations.

To further substantiate his perspective that individuals act solely on beliefs

based on tradition, or legitimate prejudices, Gadamer claims that a perfect or ideal
knowledge?that is, one in which all beliefs are justified and founded on rational
argument without any appeal to prejudice?is unrealistic and implausible to even try
to approach. As he believes that, ?the human intellect is too weak to manage without
prejudices,? that human beings are strictly constituted by their traditions and the
shared history to which they belong, and that all understanding inevitably involves
some prejudice, he explains that our history closes us in in such a way that to shed
prejudices or to even approach this, one would have to escape history. And while he
maintains that an individual can extend herself to a degree, Gadamer does not
believe that it would be possible for a person to escape her history and its entailing
limitations on her points of view. Legitimate prejudices, thus, make understanding
and knowledge possible and should be welcomed. For, without them, Gadamer
believes that we could not understand a thing. [17]

Before it is possible to give adequate consideration to Gadamer?s theory of

hermeneutics, it is necessary to examine some of the possible and most contentious
implications of his positions. First, in emphasizing the importance of the idea of
community, his theory argues that human beings are separable, but not distinct
individuals; that their identities are bound up essentially with the identity of other
persons through traditions that constitute them as belonging to a shared history.
Moreover, Gadamer?s theory claims that we must bring future generations into our
conception of human community; that we need common ends (which should be
pursued collectively); and that one?s goals should be to better the human
community, its understanding, and the understanding of traditions. Further discussion
of this implication should be prefaced with the fact that Gadamer does not consider
himself a utilitarian, nor does he believe that this aspect of his theory requires or can
be solved by a utilitarian concept. He believes that we do not think in terms of
solidarity anymore?though, it is difficult for this author to identify a time in which
human beings ever have?and that other than, perhaps, ecological crises and growing
issues related to the increasing interdependence in international economy, the good
for all is not taken into consideration. If Gadamer?s reasoning is accepted, significant
entailments for social and moral philosophy are created. As these concerns are too
numerous and complex to appropriately address for the purposes of this essay, let is
suffice to realize that Gadamer?s ideas that a society is not made up of individuals
who associate themselves with one another through contracts and conventions, and
that the common good(s) of the community should take precedence over all
individual ambitions and desires, contradict not only rights-based principles of
moral philosophies, but also social contract and convention- and rights-based
political theories; and create serious issues regarding individual rights, systems of
justice and distribution, and the legitimacy and extent of justifiable state control and
intervention.

Secondly, Gadamer?s theory of hermeneutics requires the moving away from

scientific reasoning. He argues that science and scientific reasoning has taken over
the pursuit of questions once undertaken by philosophy?more specifically, questions
concerning practical reasoning. He believes that this has estranged humans from their
historical being because humans have transposed practical consciousness into
technical expertise that is based on scientific knowledge. Gadamer explains that
scientific reasoning seeks to control phenomena, such as causal relations, and
provide rational reasoning for their occurrences, and that science claims that it can
provide an adequate account for practical reasoning. However, he asserts that
practical reasoning is concerned with the ends one should pursue and the means by
which an individual pursues them. And since science is unable to accomplish the
self-reflection (which philosophy can) that is necessary to determine the ends one
should pursue, its reasoning is inadequate. Gadamer argues that one can account for
the right ends only by properly coming to know himself by way of hermeneutics?in
other words, by taking into account his history and traditions.

Thirdly, and in relation to the first implication, his theory entails that
practical reasoning must take priority over personal interests. Practical reasoning
provides an individual with a model of a whole range of phenomena in which she
has to avoid and renounce her personal interests. To reason practically, believes
Gadamer, the common good?in broad variety of ways?must be taken into
consideration. The end, or ultimate, goal should be the good for the world; the good
of all human beings (including future generations), as individuals belong to
something larger and greater than themselves. Consequently, by adopting and
incorporating his theory of the hermeneutical circle, an individual weighs possible
choices in regard to the outcomes of those choices. Gadamer explains that there is a
dialectical and an analytical element to the choices that one makes. The dialectical
element involves balancing the good?or in other words, bringing about the greatest
good?and implies harmonizing the goods involved (for which, the analytic step is
necessary). The analytical element requires considering what would be involved in
realizing the particular goods in question. While this approach may seem to some as
a form of utilitarianism, Gadamer argues it is not, since utilitarianism presupposes
that each human being is a separate and individual actor in a larger community.
Therefore, its calculation will not work because the common good is not considered
over the individual interests of the majority.

In addition to the aforementioned Enlightenment thinkers? objection to

Gadamer?s hermeneutics, there exist other arguments that deserve explanation. There
are those who doubt Gadamer?s theory of hermeneutics on the grounds that the
hermeneutical circle is simply a vicious circle. They offer a claim that attempts to
question the soundness of the theory by charging that in order to come to know a
text, one must already have understood the text that she engages. And that if this is
the case, how can a hermeneutically sensitive individual strive to further understand
a text if she already knows it? Gadamer does not believe that this counter is adequate
to refute his thinking, as it presupposes the existence of absolute knowledge and
understanding, which he clearly admits is not possible. As he elaborates, what his
theory claims, rather, is that the hermeneutical circle allows for an individual to
acquire new and different interpretations of the texts that she engages, and in doing
so can progress toward fuller, or a more comprehensive, knowledge and
understanding.

Another opposition to Gadamer?s hermeneutical theory suggests that history

is constituted by power relations rather than by traditions. Furthermore, such thinkers
claim that power distorts the potential for communication and creates conflicts, as
this hindrance to communication results in disagreements of understanding and
ideology. In response, Gadamer explains that he simply disagrees with the initial
contention that history is not constituted by shared traditions. And in regard to the
concern of power?s distortion of communication, he defends his theory by insisting
that ideology is just another form of prejudice, and to deal with prejudice one need
not to resort to revolution. Instead, by confronting conflict with the hermeneutical
circle and incorporating traditions to address disagreements of understanding,
Gadamer believes that human beings can come to communicate more effectively
with one another and bring about necessary social change.

The French philosopher, Jacques Derrida, has criticized Gadamer?s theory on the
basis of its improper and impossible goal of understanding and closure of meaning.
However, while Gadamer does have the ultimate goal of closure of meaning?that is, the
merging of horizons and the dissolution of alternative and conflicting perspectives, or in
other words, the achievement of true understanding?he admits that this ideal and perfect
limit is not realistically possible. Nonetheless, it offers reason and possibility for
individuals to improve their understanding and uncover the deceptions of their selves,
realities, and society. Additionally, Derrida argues that Gadamer?s hermeneutical circle is
lacking because Gadamer believes that there are certain texts?identified and specific to
seek?to be found and interpreted; texts to question existing preconceptions. However,
Derrida believes that there is no proof or certainty of where to begin the interpretative
process.

Despite the potential shortcomings of his theory and the implications for
which he may not be able to fully provide solutions, Gadamer concludes that his
proposal is a viable one and should be seriously considered. ?The [hermeneutical]
circle,? he states, ?describes understanding as the interplay of the movement of
tradition and the movement of the interpreter. The anticipation of meaning that
governs our understanding of a text, is not an act of subjectivity, but proceeds from
the communality that binds us to the tradition. But this is contained in our relation to
the tradition, in the constant process of education. Tradition is not simply a
precondition into which we come, but we produce it ourselves, inasmuch as we
understand, and participate in the evolution of tradition and hence further determine
it ourselves. Thus, the circle of understanding is not a methodological circle, but
describes an ontological structural element in understanding.? While Gadamer?s
perspective that human beings are intimately related to and influenced by the
traditions of their shared history is quite compelling and certainly has its truth, it is
 this author?s contention that the identities of individuals are not solely determined
by their shared histories. This author?s strongest reservation with Gadamer?s theory
of hermeneutics is this lack of adequate focus on the individual in the society to
which he belongs. It is difficult for this author to forfeit the importance and idea of
individualism and seems unacceptable to allow the common goods of the
community to supersede the interests?and, thus, potentially threaten the rights?of its
individuals. However, regardless of one?s attitudes toward and endorsement of his
theory, Gadamer should be duly credited for provoking a great deal of genuine
thought regarding understanding of knowledge, the human self and its reality, and
the common misconceptions and deceptions of understanding that human beings
misguidedly harbor. In the spirit of Gadamer?s thinking, this author leaves his
readers with the responsibility to objectively read, interpret, question, re-read, and
re-interpret writings on this subject matter (especially Gadamer?s own), and
determine for themselves the soundness of this theory of hermeneutics. Even further,
in consideration of and appeal to the broader scope which motivated Gadamer?s
thinking, this author encourages his readers to nurture a mature and necessary open-
minded attitude; to approach all matters with a healthy degree of doubt and scrutiny;
to question even themselves and what they perceive to believe and understand; and
to take the initiative to thoroughly investigate these queries?if for no other reason
than to gain a new and richer appreciation for their existence. [18]

[1]Donald Callen, Gadamer?s Argument of the Hermeneutical Self Handout (October 13,
2004), P1.

[2]Hans-Georg Gadamer, Reason In the Age of Science (Massachusetts Institute of

Technology Press, 1981), P261-262.

[3] Gadamer?s Reason In the Age of Science, P238.

[4] Callen?s Gadamer?s Argument of the Hermeneutical Self Handout, P1.

[5] Gadamer?s Reason In the Age of Science, P248, 250.

[6] Gadamer?s Reason In the Age of Science, P248.

[7] Gadamer?s Reason In the Age of Science, P250.

Callen?s Gadamer?s Argument of the Hermeneutical Self Handout, P1.

[8] Gadamer?s Reason In the Age of Science, P263.

[9] Gadamer?s Reason In the Age of Science, P265-66.

[10] Gadamer?s Reason In the Age of Science, P98, 245.

[11] Gadamer?s Reason In the Age of Science, P269, 272.

[12] Gadamer?s Reason In the Age of Science, P271, 273.

[13] Gadamer?s Reason In the Age of Science, P272-73.

[14] Gadamer?s Reason In the Age of Science, P269, 271.

[15] Gadamer?s Reason In the Age of Science, P267.

[16] Gadamer?s Reason In the Age of Science, P242, 245-46.

[17] Gadamer?s Reason In the Age of Science, P239-40.

[18] Gadamer?s Reason In the Age of Science, 261.

§§§
Proceedings of the Kent State University
May 4th Philosophy Graduate Student Conference
No. 005019 (2008)

http://philosophy.kent.edu/journal/

© 2008 Levente Szentkirlyi

© 2008 Kent State University Department of Philosophy