NAME: RONALD LUNASIN BAJENTING

THE CASE: People v. Marivic Genosa G.R. No. 135981 January 15, 2004.

A. The Facts of the Case

This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, the
defendant. During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but after a couple
of years, Ben changed, and the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their 1quarrels
became violent. Defendant testified that every time her husband comes home drunk, he would
provoke her and sometimes beat her.
Whenever she was beaten by her husband, she would consult medical doctors who
testified during the trial. On the night of his death, the husband, who was drunk at that time, tried
to attack the defendant but she ran into the bedroom. Again, later that evening in a fit of rage, he
threatened the defendant with a blade cutter that he kept in his wallet, as she tried to run away
from him defending herself with a metal pipe. Defendant admitted having killed the victim with
the use of a gun. Defendant invoked self-defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial,
the Regional Trial Court found defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.
On automatic review before the Supreme Court, defendant filed an URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court
allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of
his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and
finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the records of the case for
purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the
case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
The Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the defendant.
It remanded the case to the trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or
psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman syndrome” plea. Testimonies of two expert
witnesses on the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and

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admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the
records.2

B. The Issue

Upon elevation on automatic review of the Supreme Court, the pertinent legal issue raise
by the Defendant was the following: whether or not she acted in self – defense and in defense
of her fetus. Significantly, the Defendant raised the defense of Battered Woman Syndrome,
which constitutes self – defense, and prayed for the acquittal from the crime of parricide.

C. The Ruling of the Court

The Court ruled in the negative as defendant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the
“battered woman syndrome”.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any
forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something
he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women
in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered
woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find
herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in
the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle
of violence,” which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering
incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase. 3
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the
battered woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to
have characterized at least two battering episodes between the defendant and her intimate
partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have
produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and
an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the

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Genosa G.R. No. 135981 Jan. 15, 2004.
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59 Belew, Christine M. (2009) Killing One’s Abuser: Premeditation, Pathology, or Provocation?
killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave
harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter.
Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the
existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.
The defense fell short in proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering
incidents, but defendant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she
had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did defendant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to
the third phase of the cycle.
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish
the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the
context of self-defense. Settled in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is the rule that the one
who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one’s life; and the peril sought to be
avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code
provides that the following requisites of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2)
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual,
sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a
person. In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a
sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him.
She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children’s
bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even
the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that
presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were,
however, taken in favor of defendant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances --
psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of
facts.
The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery
inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon defendant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of
time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the
exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to
have naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is
present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by
prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To
appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed
from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused
might recover her normal equanimity.