Animal Right
Animal Right
20
Animal Welfare and
Animal Rights
Clive J.C. Phillips*, Katrina Kluss**
*Centre for Animal Welfare and Ethics, School of Veterinary Science,
University of Queensland, Gatton, QLD, Australia
**TC Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
FIGURE 20.1 Growth in world meat production between 1961 and 2013 (Phillips, 2015, p. 53).
466% worldwide (Matson et al., 1997). By 1996, degradation (Herrero et al., 2009). To avoid fur-
while the rate of agricultural land expansion had ther environmental problems, the environmen-
slowed, the food yielded per area of land had sig- tal impact per unit of livestock production must
nificantly increased and had exceeded global hu- be halved (FAO, 2009).
man population growth, from 1 billion in 1800 to In addition to the development of intensive
7.4 billion in 2015 (Naylor, 1996). animal agriculture, society’s use of animals also
With increasing prosperity, demand for experienced a marked increase over time in the
animal products has increased over time areas of scientific experimentation, entertain-
(FAO, 2009). By 2050, global meat and milk pro- ment, sport, and breeding. Objectives for the
duction are expected to be 465 and 1043 mil- breeding of animals have changed to produce
lion tons respectively, from 229 and 58 million animals we consider aesthetically pleasing or
tons in 1999/2001. Growth in meat production unusual, or to manufacture breeds that produce
from 1961–2015 has been increasing at a pro- leaner meats or quicker growth to increase pro-
gressively faster rate (Fig. 20.1). As a result, duction rates; these may have poor welfare out-
farmers have been under increasing pressure to comes for the animals involved.
produce large amounts of animal products for a Nevertheless, while society has increasingly
reduced market price acceptable to the masses. exchanged the welfare of some animal species
Although livestock contributes valuable nutri- to maximize benefits to humans, other animals
ents for crops and provides critical protein and have been the subject of increased well-being
nutrients to human diets, it is also responsible and legal and societal protection. For example,
for using one-third of the global freshwater re- most countries in the developed world now
sources, one-third of global cropland for feed, have legislation in which minimum standards of
and contributes to nutrient pollution and land care are stipulated for companion animals, such
20.1 Introduction 485
as cats and dogs, and breaches of such anticru- whether or not animals without intentionality,
elty laws result in penalties, sometimes includ- such as worms and insects, only have rights as
ing custodial sentences. This promotes respect a species, not as individuals per se is a topic of
for, and protection of, the welfare of certain ongoing debate (Scruton, 1998). Species rights
domestic animals by society. However, welfare could include a right to a biodiverse genotype,
standards of domestic animals, as developed by sufficient for perpetuation of the species and a
human society, are sometimes placed secondary right to avoid genetic modification that harms
to economic considerations and market demand the ability of the species to survive or that im-
(McInerney, 2004). pinges on other rights, such as to a good stan-
While animal production has been intensi- dard of welfare. Others refute this, arguing that
fying, so too has society’s concern. This can an individual animal’s rights take precedence
be seen as an extension of our widening circle over species rights (Regan, 2004). Darwin (1859)
of compassion, which started in the Western recognized that “Man selects only for his own
world with the abolition of slavery at the end good, Nature only for that of the being which
of the 18th century, through to the recogni- she tends…. Man keeps the natives of many cli-
tion of children’s right not to be overworked mates in the same country; he seldom exercises
in the late 19th century, then championing each selected character in some peculiar and fit-
of women’s rights in the early 20th century, ting manner.”
ethnic minorities rights in the middle of that The public debate between animal welfare
century, and finally disabled and gay people’s and animal rights has become increasingly vo-
rights later in that century (Phillips, 2009). ciferous over the past few decades, particularly
This has led to the emergence of various ani- in the Western world, with many people becom-
mal advocate groups, the visions of which are ing more interested in the well-being of animals,
largely founded on jurisprudence and scientif- and our impact on them and the broader envi-
ic advancements. These groups are frequently ronment. Increasing societal concern about the
divided into two schools of thought: animal rights attributed to animals reflects both moral
welfare and animal rights. developments as a civilization and the recogni-
While at first glance, animal welfare and ani- tion that the differences between humans and
mal rights may appear to be different names for animals are that of degree, rather than of kind
largely the same cause, there is a fundamental (Francione, 2008).
difference between the two. On the one hand, This recognition has largely been facilitated
animal welfare is based on empirical science re- by scientific advancements that have enabled
lated to an animal’s quality of life and quantity studies to be conducted, which have revealed
of experiences, which is operationalized by bio- higher levels of intelligence, problem-solving
logical measures, preference testing, and other skills, and understanding in a variety of animals
indices (Phillips, 2009). Therefore, in theory any (e.g., dogs, Colvin and Marino, 2015; calves, Da-
two people should agree on an evaluation of the ros et al., 2014).
welfare of an animal, even though in practice the The human–animal relationship is evolving
validity of different welfare assessment methods from one of pure utility to one that more read-
may mean that there is some disagreement. By ily encompasses animal welfare considerations
contrast, animal rights implies an ethical posi- and, in more recent times, one that is increas-
tion, which recognizes that nonhuman animals ingly concerned with potential rights that ought
have rights that extend beyond basic animal to be afforded to animals. The animal welfare
welfare considerations and also include some versus animal rights debate is now, more than
of the rights afforded to humans (Regan, 2004); ever, relevant to a discussion of the relationship
486 20. Animal Welfare and Animal Rights
between human society and animals, and is par- Scientists have debated whether animal welfare
ticularly important when looking to the future. refers to an animal’s ability to cope with its en-
This chapter will explore the differences be- vironment (Broom, 1986) or its feelings (Duncan
tween animal welfare and animal rights by and Fraser, 1997; Fraser et al., 1997; Mason and
analyzing both sides of the debate, and how it Veasey, 2010; Spruijt et al., 2001). This divides
differs depending upon demographics, such as people into those with a hedonistic focus, based
culture and religion. While often referred to as on animals’ feelings, and those that recognize
two opposing fields of thoughts, it is suggested a broader and more pragmatic concept of wel-
that, although there are certainly principles of fare, including an animal’s physiology, be-
difference, animal welfare and animal rights are havior, production (if kept for this purpose by
complementary movements that both drive im- humans), and even reproduction. The latter ap-
provements in the human–animal interaction. proach takes into account the long-term impact
As our understanding of animal capabilities of the environment on welfare and acknowl-
and noncapabilities continues to develop, what edges that short-term hedonistic responses may
ought to guide our attitudes, laws, and policies not be in an animal’s long-term interests. How-
toward animals? While science provides an un- ever, coping suggests that animals must only be
deniably empirical basis on which to guide hu- protected from negative experiences, whereas a
man attitudes, human moral reasoning has an recent trend has been to include positive experi-
important role to play. Therefore, a combination ences in our aims for animals. The position ad-
of morality and science is guiding human society opted has major implications for the measure-
toward a better relationship with the animals. ment of welfare; the latter, “feelings” approach,
Finally, this chapter explores how the rela- suffers from difficulty in assessment and under-
tionship between humans and animals may fur- standing from the limited but growing number
ther evolve in the future, which, it is concluded, of tools at our disposal. An environmental-
will largely be determined by the choices made based assessment, conversely, potentially re-
by society today. lates little to an animal’s welfare, as perceived
by the animal. The dichotomy is linked to an
ethical debate, the extent to which humans
20.2 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN should determine animals’ environment and
ANIMAL WELFARE AND RIGHTS how they are used. Animal rights protagonists
argue for greater agency for animals, including
20.2.1 Animal Welfare Definition and equivalent outcomes when they are used for
different purposes. We may consider the “rab-
Assessment
bit conundrum” in relation to this, that is, do
The term “welfare” derives from an Old rabbits have equivalent welfare when kept as
Norse word, velferth, meaning good travel. pets, used for meat, pelts, research, or existing
However, although the etymological derivation in the wild, and if not, do we have the right to
of welfare is clear, the concept as understood by predetermine their welfare by using them for
the majority of the public remains largely un- different purposes?
clear. It is evident that the public hold a natu- Welfare considerations are usually restricted
ralness concept of welfare in high regard; that to sentient animals, that is, those with conscious
is, what is natural is perceived as also being awareness. However, sentience is not an all-or-
good. Being close to, and respectful of, nature nothing phenomenon; rather, it is best conceptu-
may have benefited people in the past, as they alized as being on a continuum with substantial
could find food and locate a safe refuge easily. variation between and within species in terms of
20.2 Differences Between Animal Welfare and Rights 487
B O X 2 0 . 1 P R O P O S E D L E V E L S O F AWA R E N E S S ,
AS PROPOSED BY YOUNG (1994)
1. Phenomenal awareness: the experience of perceptual information for discrepancies with
seeing, hearing, touching, and so on. current plans and hypotheses.
2. Access awareness: where stored information 4. Executive awareness: awareness of our goals
is brought to mind. and intentions.
3. Monitoring: including awareness of our own
actions and their effects, and monitoring
their sensory, perceptive, and cognitive aware- An absolute measurement of animal welfare is
ness (Piggins and Phillips, 1998; Box 20.1). not agreed by all scientists, but there has been not
Furthermore, feelings derived from conscious only extensive research recently on the key com-
awareness are transient and merely open a win- ponents just outlined for many of our managed
dow to an animal’s longer-term experiences. The species, there have also been tools developed that
relationship between short-term feelings and can provide information on an animals’ feelings
an animal’s long-term welfare is often difficult or emotions (Paul et al., 2005). Animal welfare as-
to deduce, but clearly not always positive. As sessment ideally focuses on direct measurements
examples, animals may have positive feelings made on the animals themselves, their stress lev-
toward a handler that provides sweet feed that els, for example, as indicated by heart rate or be-
tastes good, but is inappropriate for the their havior. However, although this is beneficial for
long-term nutrition, or animals may experience any scientific assessment of welfare, for practical
short-term pain, in the case of a prophylactic purposes it is sometimes too difficult, time-con-
injection for example, that delivers long-term suming, or dangerous for effective assessment in
benefit to their welfare. animal establishments. On these occasions, it is
Since the choices that animals, including hu- possible to derive some information about ani-
mans, make are not always consistent with good mal welfare from a knowledge of their environ-
welfare states (e.g., pleasurable experiences can ment. Measurements of, for example, ambient
be harmful over the long term), it can be use- temperature will provide some information on
ful to create an index of welfare on two dimen- whether animals are likely to feel too hot or cold.
sions: one that record animals’ experiences and A key concept when evaluating animal wel-
another that applies expert human opinion to fare that was initially developed in 1965 was
judge the impact on animal welfare (Gurusamy that of the “Five Freedoms” that animals should
et al., 2013). This has the disadvantage that “ex- possess (Brambell Report, 1965). These were
perts” may be individually or collectively in- later modified (Webster, 2005; Box 20.2), gaining
accurate and/or biased in their assessment of widespread acceptance in regulatory, industry,
welfare impact. Furthermore, there have been and advocacy bodies, including incorporation
numerous attempts to identify animals’ qual- into many codes of practice. Similar concepts
ity of life (Yeates and Main, 2009). This is a con- have been developed and amplified into a five-
cept borrowed from humans nearing the end of domains model (Box 20.3), which focuses on
their life for whom it is important to determine, nutrition, environment, health, and behavior,
just as it is for companion animals, the extent to as well as an overarching mental component
which care is justified. (Mellor and Beausoleil, 2015).
488 20. Animal Welfare and Animal Rights
20.2 Differences Between Animal Welfare and Rights 489
sake of man” and that any value attributed to and moral theory is, at the very least, secondary
nonhuman things is purely instrumental (Bren- to conventional human paradigms, which exist.
nan and Lo, 2011). Generally, advocates for the It is supported by the fact that in one study, one-
anthropocentric perspective find it difficult to third of university students across several disci-
comprehend why it may be wrong to inflict cru- plines reasoned according to norms (Verrinder
elty upon nonhuman things, such as animals, et al., 2016). Hence, this is one of the primary
except where it may lead to negative conse- ways in which human society continues to jus-
quences for humans. For example, Immanuel tify its attitudes toward different categories of
Kant proposed that allowing a person to inflict animals.
cruelty on an animal may encourage that per-
son to have a desensitized approach to cruelty
toward other humans (Brennan and Lo, 2011).
20.2.3 Animals’ Intrinsic
Therefore, animal cruelty is wrong in an instru- or Extrinsic Value
mental, rather than intrinsic, sense. Similarly, The acceptability of the ways in which we
anthropocentrism also acknowledges the instru- manage animals cannot be evaluated solely
mentally negative impacts of anthropogenic en- from an assessment of their welfare. It must in-
vironmental devastation, in so far as the destruc- clude an assessment of whether our treatment of
tion of the environment may adversely affect the the animals is morally justifiable. A fundamental
future of humans (Brennan and Lo, 2011). Con- issue is whether animals have a moral value just
sequently, anthropocentrism allows for environ- for the benefit that they bring to other species, in
mental preservation and animal welfare to the particular humans, or whether they have moral
extent that they benefit humans. value in their own right. There is no doubt that
In recent times, pro-animal arguments have animals bring us enormous benefits; the ques-
threatened the anthropocentric perspective by tion is whether this justifies us using them with-
challenging the assumed moral superiority of out consideration of their intrinsic value. Their
humans and exploring the possibility of rational ability to suffer is important here, which relates
arguments in favor of affording intrinsic value to negative emotions. Determining this presup-
to the natural environment and its nonhuman poses that we can classify animals’ experiences,
inhabitants (Aaltola, 2010, p. 27). Theorists such and hence emotions, as positive or negative.
as Singer and Regan have driven pro-animal Emotions may be primary (e.g., anger, disgust,
arguments to the forefront of philosophical fear, and sadness), in which case it is assumed
discussion and present consistent, persuasive, that they evolved to be hard-wired, or second-
and reasoned arguments in support of assign- ary, which are more complex emotions that may
ing rights and morality to animals. Advocates be constructs of a variety of primary emotions
of the anthropocentric position have criticized (e.g., shame, guilt, and grief). While it is likely
these emerging arguments, suggesting that they that most primary emotions are felt by most cog-
fail to recognize the relevance and importance of nitively advanced animals, the extent to which
long-established, common paradigmatic ways they experience secondary, more complex, emo-
of valuing animals (Aaltola, 2010). The moral tions is uncertain.
status of animals is a product of language and One prominent theory on how to decide
“culturally constructed meanings” and therefore whether actions are morally justifiable or not
cannot be altered solely by moral analyses (Aal- suggests that we should maximize the overall
tola, 2010). As such, there is no need to provide utility of our actions, which in this case means the
further justification for anthropocentrism, as the welfare of all sentient beings. Under this concept
standard animal ethics arguments are defunct of “utilitarianism,” good outcomes should be
490 20. Animal Welfare and Animal Rights
increased and bad outcomes decreased. Thus, it social norms, and those acting on the basis of
is possible to conceive experiences as positive or universal ethical principles (Rest et al., 1999;
negative in their impact on the animal and then Verrinder and Phillips, 2014).
add them in the following way (Phillips, 2009):
W = g1G1 + g 2G 2 … gnGn − b1B1 − b 2B2 … bnBn 20.2.4 Natural Versus Legal Rights:
Should Applied Ethics Result in
where W, welfare of an animal; Gn, extent of
Legislative Recognition in Some Cases?
good experience; gn, the number of Gn good ex-
periences; Bn, extent of bad experience; bn, the Traditionally, rights discussions have been bi-
number of Bn bad experiences; and n, number 1 furcated into the categories of natural rights and
to ∞. legal rights. Natural rights are those that innately
Under utilitarian theory, the action taken exist simply as a result of a being’s natural char-
should be that which maximizes W for all stake- acteristics (Crowe and Weston-Scheuber, 2013),
holders. Critics have made objections to this even though they are still human constructs
method of evaluating animal welfare; it is not and as such subject to cultural and other influ-
clear how the extent of experiences can be quan- ences. Legal rights are those that exist under, or
tified, although some construct of behavioral by virtue of, a legal system (Wenar, 2005). There-
and physiological indicators may be considered. fore, natural rights are considered more univer-
Second, utilitarianism assumes equal consider- sal and egalitarian, while the applicability and
ation of interests between stakeholders, whereas strength of legal rights vary greatly depending
in reality we consider stakeholders that are ge- on the jurisdiction in which they apply. Over
netically closer to ourselves to be more worthy the last few decades, growing consideration has
of good welfare. Third, other things than hap- been given to whether animals, like humans,
piness may be valued, such as having a life or also possess natural rights by virtue of their na-
having knowledge, which may assist in per- ture as sentient beings (Wenar, 2005). Tom Regan
petuating life. Fourth, utilitarianism may inflict purports, in his deontological perspective, that
all the penalties on some animals, contradicting at least some animals possess moral rights that
any idea of egalitarianism. Peter Singer (1995) are objective, in the sense that they do not de-
famously included nonhuman animal species’ pend on legal recognition to exist (Regan, 2004).
preferences in a utilitarian equation, which, if In other words, at least some, if not all, catego-
they are given equal consideration to humans, ries of animals possess natural rights, simply
has dire consequences for using animals for con- as a result of their existence as sentient beings.
sumption and research since the number of hu- Animal rights may be pursued rapidly, by those
man beneficiaries is much fewer than the non- advocating abolition of harmful animal use by
human animals supporting them. humans (abolitionists), or gradually, by those
It is doubtful whether any of us evaluate mor- who seek incremental change in achieving the
al actions in this way in practice, but it is more same (protectionists).
probable that we learn to make instinctive deci- The majority of theoretical debate, which dis-
sions based on a framework of this nature. Ac- cusses what rights may be attributed to what be-
tions taken stem from our moral sensitivity, mo- ings, largely focuses upon the moral status of the
tivation, judgment, and character (Rest, 1994). respective beings and the grounds of, or justifi-
People fall broadly into three categories when cations for, that moral status. A being has mor-
deciding whether to take moral action: those al status if its interests matter in a moral sense
acting from a perspective of personal gain and “for that being’s own sake, such that it can be
interest, those acting according to the law and wronged” (DeGrazia, 1996). For example, it may
20.2 Differences Between Animal Welfare and Rights 491
be argued that an animal possesses moral status a horse. However, people’s opinion is almost cer-
if its suffering may be perceived as “somewhat tainly influenced by the fact that we derive com-
morally bad, on account of this animal itself and panionship from cats and horses, whereas rats
regardless of the consequences for other beings” and fish are considered less sentient because they
(DeGrazia, 1996). Furthermore, “acting unjus- are either pests or animals that are objectified be-
tifiably against [an animal’s] interests is not cause we want to eat them.
only wrong, but wrongs the animal” (DeGra- When the science of, for example, farm ani-
zia, 1996). Accordingly, other beings, both hu- mals’ sentience is measured against that of
man and animal, owe it to this animal to refrain household pets, it is clear that the former pos-
from acting in such a way that may infringe its sess similar levels of intelligence and pain per-
interests. ception when compared to the latter. However,
Theories of moral status are often argued to when one considers the legal protections in
exist in degrees, ranging from no-moral status place and the common societal opinions held
to full moral status (DeGrazia, 1996). No-moral about the two categories of animals, it is evident
status refers to objects or beings that have no that companions are protected to a much greater
moral interests that matter to the individual, degree than farm animals. As such, it appears
that is, it cannot be wronged, while full moral that more than sentience and theoretical moral-
status is reserved for those deserving the highest ity guides the relationship between humans and
degree of morality, on the grounds of their animals. One of the primary considerations in
interests (DeGrazia, 1996; Jaworska and Tannen- affording animal welfare, and perhaps animal
baum, 2013). As such, it is widely accepted on rights, is that of utility to human society. Where
the grounds of their respective interests that a a greater benefit is bestowed on the human race
cognitively unimpaired adult human possesses by consuming an animal, it is easier to provide
full moral status while an object such as a rock that animal with a level of welfare only so far
may be considered to possess no moral status. as it produces a premium food product, and ex-
Animals too must be viewed as the experienc- clude it from any discussion of animal rights.
ing subjects of a life, with inherent value of their This notion is equally applicable to some wild
own (Regan, 2004), since the ability to experi- animals and endangered species, whom humans
ence similar needs and desires should be valued feel an obligation to protect, and sometimes an
(Gruen, 2014). innate need to preserve elements of the natural
The idea of measuring morality on a contin- world as we deem fit. In particular, animals that
uum is similar to the concept of an awareness we perceive as having high levels of human-
spectrum (Box 20.1), which includes the various like intelligence, such as apes and dolphins, will
levels of sentience animals are presumed to pos- more likely be recipients of basic animal rights
sess. While most would expect animals with high in the future. Animals have the level of intelli-
levels of sentience would also possess high moral gence that is needed for their survival in their
status, by virtue of their similarity to humans, ecosystem; hence, this speciesist approach is to
this relationship is not always logical. The public be discouraged.
recognize that sentience declines in approximate-
ly the following order: human infant > chim-
20.2.5 Virtue Ethics
panzee > dolphin > cat > horse > cattle
> pig > rat > chicken > octopus > fish (Phillips We suggested earlier that people solve ethi-
et al., 2012). Yet there is no anatomical or physio- cal dilemmas in their own mind by one of three
logical reason to suspect that a rat is any less sen- main schemas: (1) reasoning from a perspective
tient than a cat, or that a fish is less sentient than of personal gain, (2) according to the law, or
492 20. Animal Welfare and Animal Rights
(3) using universal principles. Universal prin- 20.2.6 A Life Worth Living
ciples suggest a high level of virtue, as most or a Good Life?
religious and other moral guidance organiza-
tions advocate similar virtues, such as doing no One endpoint that humans should aspire to if
harm to living beings, do as you would be done they want to utilize animals for their benefit is to
by, and belief in the importance of community. make a decision on the quality of animals’ lives,
Unlike utilitarian or deontological frameworks, both because it is good for them and because ani-
deciding how to treat animals on the basis of mals have interests that people should respect.
the type of person that you would like to be has According to recent debate, this may include
few of the problems of how to evaluate harm whether animals’ lives are worth living (Mel-
and benefit or who or what deserves moral con- lor, 2016). However, given that most animals are
sideration. For example, aspiring to be a good genetically programmed through a long process
person by treating animals well is something of evolution to have reproduction not happiness,
advocated in all the major religions; in a world interpreted hedonistically, as their major goal
with declining religious influence (in much of in living, it is possible that many animals could
the Western world at least), pursuit of virtue have a life that was worth living (in that they
ethics is an important replacement for con- fulfilled this objective), but not a good (or pre-
ventional religious instruction. If people can sumably happy) life. Bekoff makes this distinc-
be persuaded to develop character traits over tion and advocates a compassionate conserva-
a long period of time that are relatively stable tion approach (Bekoff, 2016). Mellor postulates a
and benign to other living beings, this ap- graded scale of quality of life that includes lives
proach suggests that moral education can play worth living and recognizes that lives worth liv-
a major role in improving animal welfare. If the ing are not necessarily good (Table 20.1). There
reward is intrinsic benefit to humans that act is a danger that we accept that animals’ lives are
virtuously to animals, that is, look after animals worth living, without considering whether it is
well because it is good for you, this would still morally acceptable to keep animals. This con-
be an acceptable way to advocate better welfare cept suffers from some of the same deficiencies
for animals. as utilitarianism, for example, who decides, what
TABLE 20.1 A Quality of Life Scale Where the Different Categories Are Defined in Terms of the Relative Balance of
Positive and Negative Experiences Animals May Have
Category Description
A good life The balance of salient positive and negative experiences is strongly positive. Achieved by
full compliance with best practice advice well above the minimum requirements of codes
of practice or welfare
A life worth living The balance of salient positive and negative experiences is favorable, but less so. Achieved
by full compliance with the minimum requirements of code of practice or welfare that
include elements that promote some positive experiences.
Point of balance The neutral point where salient positive and negative experiences are equally balanced.
A life worth avoiding The balance of salient positive and negative experiences is unfavorable, but can be
remedied rapidly by veterinary treatment or a change in husbandry practices.
A life not worth living The balance of salient positive and negative experiences is strongly negative and cannot be
remedied rapidly so that euthanasia is the only humane alternative.
Adapted from Mellor, D.J., 2016. Updating animal welfare thinking: moving beyond the “Five Freedoms” towards “A Life Worth Living.” Animals 6, 21.
20.2 Differences Between Animal Welfare and Rights 493
is the currency, and deontological theory, for ex- been developed to objectively determine moral
ample, how do we compare the moral value of sensitivity and reasoning method in relation to
diverse animal species? However, by analogy the animal ethics issues (Verrinder et al., 2016 and
existence of pain in animals was the subject of Verrinder and Phillips, 2014, respectively). In the
much cynicism just 20 years ago, and it may not test, people read about an ethical dilemma sur-
be long before we one day have better methods rounding animals, such as whether to euthanize
of evaluating animals’ quality of life. unwanted pets, and then a number of carefully
It is clear from the discussion that there are constructed questions are posed, which dem-
many ways of addressing moral issues. If all pro- onstrate reasoning based on personal interest,
duced equally valid outcomes, we might adopt maintaining norms or universal principles. The
a pluralist or moral relativist approach of accept- respondents are asked which questions are most
ing that there are many theories that differ from important to them in solving the dilemma, from
our own personal moral norms and these may be which it can be deduced exactly how they are
equally valid in their context. However, clearly reasoning morally.
all do not produce equivalent outcomes for ani- Students can be educated to adopt reason-
mals, even when we relate these to the animals’ ing for ethical dilemmas based on universal
interests, rather than their actual circumstances. principles, and this is especially important for
For example, it is illogical to provide the same those involved in working with animals, such
feed to farm animals as humans, when they have as veterinary students (Verrinder and Phil-
different digestive systems. Cattle and sheep lips, 2014, 2015). Veterinarians have multiple re-
that digest feed in a rumen need more fibrous sponsibilities, including to their family, their pro-
feed than humans, who digest it initially in their fession, society, the environment, and not least,
stomach. Thus, using our own personal norm is the animals within their care. These overlap and
not an appropriate method to determine how to cannot be considered in isolation (Preston, 2001).
feed livestock. However, we can aim to satisfy Desirable outcomes for animals and others with
their interests to a common standard by provid- interests are generally acknowledged to include
ing adequate nutrients to ensure normal growth seeking a good outcome (beneficence), causing
patterns. It is therefore acceptable to advocate no harm (nonmaleficence), respect for auton-
that some methods of addressing moral issues omy, and justice (using principles of fairness)
are better than others. It is hard to discover how (Table 20.2; Mepham, 2008, p. 47). A common
people reason morally, but tests have recently framework for the evaluation of outcomes of
TABLE 20.2 An Ethical Matrix to Describe the Outcomes for the Principal Interested Parties (Animals, Consumers,
and Producers), From the Perspective of Utilitarianism, Autonomy, and Justice as Fairness, When
Considering Whether It Is Ethical to Inject Dairy Cows Daily With a Synthetic Hormone That
Stimulates Them to Produce More Milk (Mepham, 2008)
Parties to problem
Utilitarianism Welfare of cow Availability of safe food Producer income and working
conditions
Autonomy Behavioral freedom Freedom of choice (food labeling?) Freedom of choice to adopt or
not adopt certain practices
Fairness or justice Equal consideration of interests? Universally affordable food? Fair trade?
494 20. Animal Welfare and Animal Rights
action on animal ethics issues is an ethical matrix these influences will enable education to be tar-
(Mepham, 2008, p. 54), in which the key princi- geted where needed, trade in animals between
ples of utilitarianism, autonomy, and justice as diverse cultures to be facilitated, and multicul-
fairness are considered for the major stakehold- tural societies to exist in greater harmony.
ers in a decision-making process. The ethical ma- A Eurasian survey of university students
trix does not arrive at a conclusion, but it does found that culture, as determined by the
assist the process by being able to visualize the students’ nationality, had a major influence
impact on all parties. Not all parties have equal (Phillips et al., 2012). Students in southern Euro-
interests and not all principles have equal mean- pean countries had the most benign attitudes to
ing to the interested parties. To obtain a decision, the welfare and rights of animals, and those in a
a different model is necessary, such as the ethical limited number of Asian countries the least. The
decision-making model developed by Preston latter appeared at least partly explicable by the
(2001, p. 78). Focusing on respect for life, justice low income of students in Asia, which focuses
as fairness, and integrity principles, Preston ad- attention to the welfare of humans, rather than
vocates initially analyzing these three basic con- animals. The key religious teachings of the ma-
cepts from the perspectives of the stakeholders. jor faiths indicate that there are also significant
Then he recommends considering possible deci- differences between Christians/Muslims/Jews,
sions from a number of different perspectives: who believe that God put animals on the earth
what if the decision was universalized, how is for the benefit of humans, who therefore have
the social good served, how does the decision dominion over them, and Hindus/Buddhists,
relate to the type of person I ought to be, do any who believe that deeds in the current life will
factors warrant greater priority, and finally, is be reflected in their rebirth, which may be as an
the decision feasible. animal. The latter belief engenders a great re-
spect for animals, which in the case of Hindus is
reflected in their reverence for animals, particu-
20.3 DIFFERENCES IN
larly the cow. Because cow slaughter is illegiti-
PEOPLE’S MORAL BEHAVIOR
mate in Hindu society, surplus animals are of-
TOWARD ANIMALS
fered shelter in gaushallas, which are supported
by philanthropy and the Indian government.
Despite the existing commonality or univer-
Such a model for animal caring contrasts mark-
salism in people’s attitudes to animals, many
edly with those operating in Western society, in
factors are recognized to have an influence on
which domesticated animals are destroyed when
these attitudes, including culture, religion, and
they no longer provide benefit to humans. Simi-
gender. A benign attitude to animals is also
larly, in Southeast Asia, Hindus and Buddhists
linked to attitudes toward other important
are less accepting of killing injured animals or
world issues, such as women’s rights and racial
healthy pets than Muslims (Ling et al., 2016).
equality (Sinclair and Phillips, 2017).
20.4 The Future of Animal Welfare and Rights 495
and men show similar attachment to pets, but in an attempt to meet the growing demand. In
women are much more likely to be involved in China and major exporting countries, such as
animal protection and less likely to be involved Brazil, growth in chicken meat exports has been
in perpetrating animal cruelty, including bestial- exponential since the late 1990s (Phillips, 2015,
ity (Herzog, 2007). In terms of action to improve p. xvii). There are now approximately 20 billion
the welfare of animals, women are more likely to chickens produced globally to meet the needs
be members of an animal advocacy organization of humans for meat and eggs (FAOSTAT, 2016),
(Phillips and Izmirli, 2012). However, although almost three for every person on the planet,
women are more likely than men to avoid eat- and most are kept in intensive production sys-
ing meat, this is more likely to be because of tems. This trend is repeated, although not quite
perceived health benefits, rather than for animal so dramatically, for the other major meat- and
ethics reasons (Phillips et al., 2010). milk-producing animals: cattle and pigs. Fur-
thermore, as there is growing reliance on chick-
20.3.3 Experience With Animals ens for meat production, at the expense of the
larger animals, cattle and pigs, this means that
Adults that have kept pets in childhood have more sentient beings are used to produce a giv-
more positive attitudes toward pet animals later en quantity of meat. Taken together, the increase
(Paul and Serpell, 1993), suggesting that such in the number of food-producing animals and
people have learnt how to respect and look af- the intensity of their management, the focus on
ter animals in childhood. This positive attitude small animals, and the transition of production
generalizes to nonpet animals and even hu- from developed to developing countries, mean
mans. Furthermore, a love of animals and exten- that there is a rapidly increasing number of
sive experience with them, particularly pets, are food-producing animals experiencing poor wel-
the main factors influencing students to want to fare globally. As food-producing animals make
become veterinarians (Izmirli et al., 2014; Ser- up by far the majority of animals that we man-
pell, 2005). Taken more generally, experience age globally, approximately 90% (Phillips, 2009,
with animals can be taken to include education p. 152), it is evident that our negative impact on
in animal management. One of the disadvan- animals’ welfare globally is increasing. This, to-
tages of considering virtue ethics to provide the gether with the inefficiency of resource use, is
best moral imperative regarding how we should likely to cause humans to increasingly question
approach animal ethics is that some people have the use of scarce feed, water, and land resources
the advantage of having received a virtuous for this purpose, particularly in the light of con-
education in how to manage animals, whereas tinued human population increases and food
others have not. Acknowledging the merit of shortages (FAO et al., 2014).
pursuing virtue ethics must include recognition By reflecting on past human societies and ani-
of a person’s lack of direction, or opportunity, to mals, it is evident that our relationship with ani-
pursue these ideals in the past. mals has evolved from one of necessity, to one
that comprises a lesser degree of dependency,
20.4 THE FUTURE OF ANIMAL but greater intensity of production. While the fu-
WELFARE AND RIGHTS ture of society is unpredictable, one certainty is
that, should this intensive production continue
The growth in affluence and an associated de- to grow at the rapid rate at which it has devel-
mand for animal products has been particularly oped over the last century, the sustainability of
rapid in Asia over the last 30 years. This has led the human–animal relationship and the broader
to many developing countries there adopting environment is likely to be at risk. It may well
intensive poultry and pig production systems be that, in the absence of intervening action,
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