Marcos v.
COMELEC
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
(DON’T WRITE THIS)
In the 1987 CONSTITUTION Art. VI Section 6 states:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and,
on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list representatives,
a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election.
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative
of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995. The incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, herein private
respondent, Cirilo Roy Montejo, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency.
The Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered
voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the election.
The Commission on Elections found private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in meritorious;
striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy; and cancelling her original Certificate
of Candidacy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, was a resident, for election purposes, of the First
District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
HELD:
Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the
First District of Leyte.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of
political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally
emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which
imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention." Larena vs. Teves reiterated the same doctrine in a case
involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete,
Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a
profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss
of residence. So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election
law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence
without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be
deemed to continue.
In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of
persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a
domicile of choice indeed occurred.
Note: DO NOT WRITE :)
In this case, Imelda Marcos won in the elections with 70, 471 votes.
The Supreme Court SET ASIDE the commission’s resolution and directed COMELEC to proclaim her as the duly
elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
