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FIRST DIVISION

CECILIA YULO LOCSIN G.R. No. 233678

substituted by MR. LEANDRO Y.
LOCSIN, Present:
Petitioner,
GESMUNDO, CJ,
Chairperson,
HERNANDO,
- versus - ZALAMEDA,
ROSARIO, and
MARQUEZ,JJ

PUERTO GALERA RESORT

HOTEL, INC. also represented by
LUISITO B. PADILLA and
LUISITO B. PADILLA, in his own Promulgated:
capacity,
Respondents. .JUL 2 7 2022
x------------------------------------------- ------------------· j----x
V
DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 filed by petitioner

Cecilia Yulo Locsin (Cecilia), represented by Leandro Y. Locsin (Leandro),
seeking the reversal of the April 4, 2017 Decision2 and the July 20, 2017
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 105148.

' Rollo, pp. 5-39.

2 Id. at 40-57. Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon and concurred in by Associate Justices
Elihu A. Ybanez and Carmelita Salandanan Manahan.
3 Id. at 58-60.

7J
Decision 2 G.R. No. 233678

The case stemmed from a Complaint4 for actual, moral, and exemplary
damages with prayer for attorney's fees and cost of suit filed by Luisito B.
Padilla (Padilla), in his personal capacity and in behalf ofRobustiniano Quinto,
Jr. (Quinto), and respondent Puerto Galera Resort Hotel, Inc. (PGRH!) against
Cecilia, for allegedly looting and gutting the fixtures, appliances and other
movables found in a hotel complex owned by Quinto. 5

The Antecedents

The Complaint alleged that Quinto is the registered owner of a hotel

complex located in Oriental Mindoro. In 1993, Padilla, a resort manager and
developer, entered into a lease contract with Quinto over the hotel complex for
a term of 10 years. In the said contract, Padilla was given the right to introduce
improvements to the property. The contract of lease was further extended up to
2013 and authorized Padilla to construct new structures and to renovate the
premises. 6

On October 15, 2004, Padilla and Quinto executed a Memorandum of

Agreement7 (MOA) wherein they undertook to look for prospective tenants or
lessees of the hotel complex together with all its improvements; to jointly share
in the earnings to be derived from the rentals thereof, and to individually or
collectively defend, protect, or enforce their rights, title and/or interests in the
said property. 8

In May 2006, Padilla and Quinto agreed to lease the hotel complex to
Cecilia pursuant to the MOA, for a period of 10 years beginning June 1, 2006,
with a guaranteed monthly rental of P90,000.00. Cecilia paid a security deposit
of P500,000.00, and immediately took possession of the hotel complex. All keys
to the hotel complex were turned over to her. Cecilia paid monthly rentals
thereafter. 9

After one year, Quinto visited the hotel complex and to his utter shock, he
discovered that the premises was totally damaged. All the facilities, equipment,
fixtures and improvements existing prior to turnover were either removed or
damaged. The place was a total mess and in a state of ruin. Quinto immediately
informed Padilla about the damage. Padilla arrived the next day and reported
the incident to the police. According to Padilla, the estimated cost of the
damages and losses amounted to P12,500,000.00. 10

4
Id. at 46.
5
Id. at 4.
6
Id. at 4-5.
7
Id. at 376.
8 Id.
9
ld.at5.
" Id. at 6.

7..1
Decision 3 G.R. No. 233678

Initially, Padilla, through counsel, wrote letters to Cecilia to set up a

meeting with her to discuss the matter but the said letters were left unanswered.
This prompted Padilla to send a demand letter to Cecilia demanding her to pay
the amount of Pl2,500,000.00 to cover the losses and damages sustained by the
hotel complex. In response, Cecilia claimed that the contract of lease was not
yet perfected and was at best, in its preparatory stages, thus she cannot be held
liable for the said losses and damages. 11

Consequently, Padilla, in his personal capacity and in behalf of PGRHI

and Quinto, instituted the instant complaint for damages against Cecilia
pursuant to the August 28, 2007 Special Power of Attomey 12 (SPA) executed
by Quinto in his favor. Cecilia moved for the dismissal of the complaint but the
same was denied by the trial court. 13 Cecilia then filed her Answer with
Counterclaims 14 for damages and attorney's fees. She countered that there was
no perfected contract of lease to begin with, thus, complainants had no cause of
action against her. Cecilia claimed that the execution of the lease contract was
conditioned upon Quinta's timely presentation of the original title covering the
hotel complex and since Quinto failed in this aspect, the contract was not
finalized. 15

During trial, Padilla presented four witnesses. Edgardo dela Cruz Santos
(Santos), the Property Development and Maintenance Head of Phoenix Omega
Development and Management Corporation (PODMC), testified that he was
tasked by Padilla to purchase the materials to be used for the renovation and
improvement of the hotel complex in 1993. Santos identified the purchase
orders and other documents related to the improvements introduced by Padilla
to the property. Padilla also took the witness stand and his testimony covered
his business relationship with Quinto, the improvements he made in the hotel
complex, and the details of the lease agreement he and Quinto entered into with
Cecilia. The third witness was Blesilda Aliman, the accounting officer of
PODMC. She attested that PODMC extended funding to PGHRI for the
renovation of the hotel complex. The fomih witness was Arsenio Tagoc
(Tagoc ), the stay-in caretaker of PGRHI. He stated that he was immediately
fired by Cecilia when she took over the hotel complex, and that he turned over
the keys to the hotel complex to Cecilia upon the instructions of Padilla. 16

Quinto was supposed to be Padilla's fifth witness. However, Quinto asked

for postponement on two occasions. On the third re-setting, Quinto manifested
that he would move for the dismissal of the case against Cecilia alleging that he
did not fully understand the contents of the August 28, 2007 SP A he
accomplished in favor of Padilla to pursue the instant case as well as his Judicial

11
ld.at6-7.
12
Id. at 377-378.
13
Id. at 46.
14 Id.
15
Id. at 7.
16
Id. at 7-8.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 233678

Affidavit 17 dated December 21, 2011, consisting of his direct testimony. In

support of his Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss, 18 Quinto executed a
Revocation 19 of the August 28, 2007 SPA and an Affidavit stating that he never
intended to authorize Padilla to file a case against Cecilia in his behalf. 20

Meanwhile, the trial continued and Cecilia presented Dominic Perez

(Perez), the accounting assistant of the law firm she engaged. Perez identified
the statements of account and receipts representing Cecilia's payments to the
law finn for the legal services it rendered pertaining to the present case. 21

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On the basis of Quinto' s revocation of the August 28, 2007 SPA, the trial
court granted Quinto's Motion to Dismiss in an Order22 dated March 4, 2013.
The trial court explained that the said revocation expressly repudiated Padilla's
authority to represent Quinto in this case. Further, the trial court held that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action as Padilla and PGRHI are not real
parties in interest who stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit. Finally, the trial court clarified that there was no perfected contract oflease
between the parties as the lease agreement failed to materialize. The
complainants moved for reconsideration but it was denied in an Order2 3 dated
April 18, 2013.

In another Order24 dated April 7, 2015, the trial court denied Cecilia's
claim for damages, but awarded attorney's fees in the amount of P500,000.00,
Pl 00,000.00 in litigation expenses and costs of suit in her favor pursuant to
Article 2208 of the Civil Code, on the ground that she was compelled to litigate
and incur expenses to protect her interests.

Aggrieved, Padilla and PGRHI appealed before the CA.

Meanwhile, Cecilia passed away. She was substituted by Leandro Locsin

(Leandro ). 25

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Decision26 dated April 4, 2017, the CA granted the appeal, thereby

reversing and setting aside the RTC Orders dated March 4, 2013 and April 18,

17
Id. at 379-393.
18
Id. at 250-256.
19
id. at 257-258.
20 Id. at 259-261.
21 id. at 9.
22 Id. at 48.
23 Id. at 65-66.
24 Id. at 67-72.
25
Id. at 15.
26 Id. at 40-57.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 233678

2013. The CA held that the agency between Quinto and Padilla is one coupled
with interest, hence, irrevocable. Accordingly, the dismissal of the complaint
was improper. In view of this, the CA ordered the remand of the case to the trial
court for further reception of respondents' evidence. The CA likewise reversed
and set aside the April 22, 2015 Order of the trial court awarding attorney's fees
and litigation expenses in favor of Cecilia for lack of actual finding of her
entitlement thereto except for the sole reason that she was compelled to litigate
to protect her interest. 27

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration28 but it was denied by the

appellate court in a Resolution29 dated July 20, 2017.

Hence, Leandro, filed this present petition, raismg the following

assignment of errors:

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO

LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT ISSUED THE ASSAILED
DECISION AND RESOLUTION, WHICH REVERSED THE TRIAL
COURT'S ORDERS:

A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS INCORRECTLY RULED THAT THE 2007 SPA

IS IRREVOCABLE BECAUSE IT IS SUPPOSEDLY COUPLED WITH
INTEREST.

B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS' RULING THAT RESPONDENT PADILLA HAS

THE RIGHT TO PURSUE THE CASE IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY IS
CONTRARY TO LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.

c.
THE COURT OF APPEALS' RULING TO SET ASIDE THE AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES IS CONTRARY TO
LAW BECAUSE PETITIONER'S COUNTERCLAIMS FALL UNDER
SEVERAL CIRCUMSTANCES CONTEMPLATED UNDER ARTICLE 2208
OF THE CIVIL CODE. 30

Issues

The issues to be resolved are:

1. Whether the SPA or the contract of agency between Padilla and

Quinto had been effectively revoked by Quinto.

27
Id. at 56.
28 Id. at 58.
29 Id. at 58-60.
30
Id. at 18-19.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 233678

2. Whether Padilla is a real party-in-interest.

3. Whether Cecilia is entitled to attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

Our Ruling

We find no merit in the petition.

Petitioner claims that the CA erred in ruling that the August 28, 2007 SPA
of Padilla to represent Quinto in this case is irrevocable as the agency is coupled
with interest.

We do not agree.

In a contract of agency, "a person binds himself to render some service or

to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or
authority of the latter." 31

A contract of agency is generally revocable because it is a personal contract

of representation based on trust and confidence reposed by the principal on his
agent. As the power of the agent to act depends on the will and license of the
principal he or she represents, the power of the agent ceases when the will or
permission is withdrawn by the principal. Thus, generally, the agency may be
revoked by the principal at wil!. 32

However, an exception to the revocability of a contract of agency is when it

is coupled with interest, e.g., if a bilateral contract depends upon the agency, or if
it is the means of fulfilling an obligation already contracted. 33 The reason for its
irrevocability is because the agency becomes part of another obligation or
agreement. It is not solely the rights of the principal, but also that of the agent and
third persons, which are affected. Hence, the law provides that in such cases, the
agency cannot be revoked at the sole will of the principal. 34

In this case, We agree with the finding of the CA that the agency granted by
Quinto to Padilla is coupled with interest because it is the means of fulfilling an
obligation already contracted which is the MOA between Padilla and Quinto dated
October 15, 2004. In the said MOA, it was specifically stated that Padilla had
introduced "very substantial improvements" to the hotel complex during his lease
and on account of the parties' respective interests in the property, they have
stipulated on the following:

31 CIVIL CODE, Article 1868.

32 Republic v. Evangelista, 504 Phil. I 15, 121 (2005).
33 CIVIL CODE, Article I 927.
34
Repu~lic v. Evangelista, supra.
Decision 7 G.R. No. 233678

a. To look for prospective tenants/lessees acceptable to both parties on the

property for which they have both acknowledged to have respective interests;
b. To share in the earnings derived from the foregoing;
c. Parties shall individually or collectively defend, protect or enforce their
rights, title and/or interests in the said property;
d. Parties warrant free access to the property in pursuance of their visitorial
and inspection rights. 35

Pursuant to the MOA, Padilla and Quinto agreed to lease the hotel complex
to Cecilia, who in turn, paid a security deposit of PS00,000.00, took over the
possession and operations of the property and paid the monthly rentals thereafter.
However, a year after its turnover to Cecilia, the hotel complex was totally
damaged and the substantial improvements introduced by Padilla therein were
either stolen or completely destroyed. Thus, Quinto executed the August 28, 2007
SPA authorizing Padilla to perform the following acts on his behalf:

1. To exercise general supervision, management and control over my Lease

Agreement with Mrs. Cecilia Y. Locsin entered into on May 26, 2006, a copy of
which Agreement is herewith attached as Annex "A", and to act in my behalf and
with my full authority, to negotiate and deal with my Lessee, more particularly
with Mrs. Cecilia Y. Locsin for the proper implementation of the contract and
the protection ofmy rigbts as owner of the leased properties.

2. To ask, negotiate, demand, sue for, litigate, recover, and receive all
sums of money, goods, merchandise, chattels and things of whatever nature,
from the Lessee, in exchange for damage to properties, losses of properties,
losses of future income resulting from property damages and losses of
properties, and other related losses incurred by me as the Lessor, resulting
from the unlawful acts and/or negligence of the Lessee under the Lease
Agreement.

3. To make, sign, seal, execute compromise agreements, contracts and real

property sales agreements, with the Lessee, pertaining to the properties subject
of the Lease Agreement inclusive of the land occupied by the improvements
and hotel complex. 36 (Emphasis Ours)

In accordance with this authority and to protect his and Quintas' interests
over the subject property pursuant to the October 15, 2004 MOA, Padilla filed the
instant complaint for damages against Cecilia. Indubitably, the lease agreement
over the hotel complex is the subject matter of the agency, and it is clear from the
records that Padilla has a material interest in the subject matter as he has
introduced substantial improvements therein. In view of their respective interests,
Quinto being the owner and Padilla being the author of the improvements found
in the hotel complex, both agreed to lease the property and to share in the earnings

35
Rollo, p. 376.
36
Records, p. 11.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 233678

from the lease contract entered into with Cecilia over the subject property. The
August 28, 2007 SP A, therefore, is the means of fulfilling an obligation already
contracted, which is the October 15, 2004 MOA in this case.

Petitioner avers that the subject matter of the agency is the enforcement
of the supposed rights over the inexistent lease agreement and not the hotel
complex or any improvements made therein. In short, petitioner tries to
convince Us that the "lease agreement" is separate and distinct from the hotel
complex and its improvements.

We beg to differ.

As borne out by the records, the object of the lease agreement between
Quinto and Cecilia is the hotel complex situated in Occidental Mindoro, owned
by Quinto. Even Cecilia admitted to this albeit, claiming that she merely
signified her interest to lease the subject property but no contract of lease was
ever perfected. To argue, therefore, that the subject matter of the agency is the
lease agreement and not the hotel complex and its improvements is illogical if
not preposterous. It is worth stressing that the lease agreement pertained to the
hotel complex along with the improvements made therein. Thus, the lease
agreement cannot be separated from its object. Simply put, the lease agreement
over the hotel complex and its improvements is the subject matter of the agency
granted by Quinto to Padilla. Thus, they are;not separate and distinct from each
other such that the lease agreement can stand alone without its object.

Accordingly, the CA correctly applied the 1uling of the Court in Wheelers

Club International, Inc. v. Bonifacio, Jr. 37 (Wheelers) which has the same factual
milieu with the instant case. In Wheelers, J & R Bonifacio Development
Corporation (JRBDC), as represented by the co-owners of a parcel of land subject
of the case, entered into a Lease Development Agreement (LDA) with Bonifacio
Development Associates, Inc. (BDAI). Under the LDA, BDAI was authorized to
renovate, manage, develop, and sublease the subject property.

Pursuant to the LDA, the co-owners executed a General Power of Attorney

in favor of Jaime C. Bonifacio, Sr. (Jaime), the President and Chairman of
BDAI's Board of Directors, granting him the authority to administer the
property, renovate the building, introduce improvements, and lease the property
to any person. Subsequently, BDAI renovated the property and introduced
substantial improvements thereto and eventually subleased the same to
Wheelers Club International, Inc. However, due to failure of BDAI to submit
an accounting of the income from the property, the co-owners, as directors of
JRBDC, approved a Resolution terminating the authority of Jaime to manage

37
500 Phil. 497 (2005).
Decision 9 G.R. No. 233678

and administer the property and appointed a new administrator. Jaime

questioned the termination of his authority claiming that there was no valid
reason for it.

The Court held that BDAI had an interest in the agency sufficient to
deprive the co-owners the power to revoke the agency at will. Under the LDA,
BDAI had the authority to introduce, and BDAI did introduce, improvements
on the property at its expense. The CA found that BDAI "was also the developer
of the vacant space of the parcel of land for the construction of permanent
improvements thereon at the cost ofBDAI." Thus, We held that "[a]s developer
of the permanent improvement on the Property, BDAI has an interest in the
Property that is the subject matter of the agency, assuming such agency
exists." 38 The Court then stressed that an agency coupled with interest is not
revocable at the will of the principal.

In sum, the interest of BDAI in the property emanated from the LDA it
entered into with JRBDC, represented by the co-owners of the property. Since
BDAI has an interest in the property consisting of the renovation and substantial
improvements it introduced to the property, the Court held that the co-owners
were not free to revoke the agency at will as it is one coupled with interest. 39

In the same vein, Quinto in this case cannot revoke at his whim and
pleasure the SPA which he had executed in favor of Padilla and duly
acknowledged before a notary public. The agency, to stress, is one coupled with
interest which is irrevocable since Padilla has a material interest in the hotel
complex having spent a substantial amount of money for its renovation and
improvement. The mutual interest of Quinto and Padilla being the owner and
developer, respectively, of the hotel complex is exactly the reason why they
entered into a MOA wherein they agreed to look for potential lessees of the
hotel complex with a view to sharing in the actual income derived therefrom.

To recapitulate, in Wheelers, the LDA entered into by JRBDC and BDAI

was considered as the bilateral contract which was dependent upon the agency,
making it one coupled with interest. In this case, the MOA between Quinto and
Padilla is the bilateral contract and the SPA is the means of fulfilling Quinta's
obligation in the October 15, 2004 MOA. Thus, We hold that the CA did not
erroneously rely on the ruling of the Court in Wheelers as the same is on all
fours with the present case.

Notably, Quinto' s denial of full understanding of the August 28, 2007 SPA
40
is suspect especially in the light of his execution of a Judicial Affidavit
confirming Padilla's allegations and attesting to the due execution of the SP A.

38
Id. at 510.
39 ld.at510-511.
40
Rollo, pp. 379-393.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 233678

To be sure, Quinto is not unlettered. As pointed out by Padilla, Quinto was a

uniformed officer who served as a military dentist for a substantial period of
time. He also owns a multi-million property and is thus well-versed in contracts
such as the subject MOA and SPA. Given this, it is puzzling why the trial court
outrightly accepted Quinta's revocation of the SPA and his Affidavit claiming
that he did not fully understand the contents of the SP A and his Judicial
Affidavit.

If it were true that Quinto never intended to authorize Padilla to file an

action for damages against Cecilia, or to represent him in a civil suit, he should
have opposed the filing thereof at the first opportunity. Instead of doing so, he
even executed a Judicial Affidavit consisting of his direct testimony wherein he
affirmed the authority of Padilla. In view of these circumstances, it appears that
Quinto's move to dismiss the complaint against Cecilia is suspicious and
doubtful.

In a further attempt to escape liabilit-;, petitioner reiterates that there was

no perfected contract of lease between Cecilia and Quinto. She claims that the
letter she sent to Quinto merely signified her family's interest to lease the hotel
complex but it never ripened into a contact. 41

A contract has three distinct stages: preparation, perfection, and

consummation. Preparation or negotiation begins when the prospective
contracting parties manifest their interest in the contract and ends at the moment
of their agreement. Perfection or birth of the contract occurs when they agree
upon the essential elements thereof. Consummation, the last stage, occurs when
the parties "fulfill or perform the terms agreed upon in the contract, culminating
in the extinguishment thereof." 42

Here, Cecilia manifested her intention to lease the hotel complex through
a letter43 dated May 26, 2006, which was accepted by Quinto and Padilla. The
parties agreed that the period of lease shall be for 10 years beginning October
2006 with a monthly rental of P90,000.00 for both the hotel and store areas. To
consummate the agreement, Cecilia admittedly deposited a down payment of
l."500,000.00. Thereafter, she took over the hotel complex, through her assistant,
as testified to by Tagoc, the stay-in caretaker of PGRHJ. 44 Cecilia also paid the
rentals for the months of October, November, and December 2006, and January
2007 as evidenced by the disbursement and check vouchers presented by
Padilla. 45 Under the circumstances, it is clear that there was a perfected contract
of lease between the parties.

41
Id. at 22-24.
42 Rockland Construction Company, Inc. v. Mid-Pasig land Development Corporation, 567 Phil. 565, 570
(2008).
43 Records, p. 168.
44
Rollo, p. 8.
45 Id. at 359.
Decision 11 G.R. No. 233678

We note that Cecilia's defense is anchored mainly on the alleged

inexistence of the contract of lease. She maintains that the contract of lease was
never perfected. Surprisingly, she never denied nor rebutted Padilla's
contentions that she paid a security deposit and thereafter immediately took
possession and control of the hotel complex, and that she paid the monthly
rentals for four months. Neither did she refute Padilla's allegation that she
abandoned the hotel complex in a state of destruction. If it were true that the
lease agreement did not materialize, she could have easily denied entering the
premises and damaging the structures and fixtures situated therein. A perusal of
her pleadings, however, reveals that no such denial was ever made, making her
claim highly suspect.

On the second issue, petitioner claims that Padilla has no right to pursue
the case in his personal capacity because he is not a real party-in-interest. 46

This argument fails to persuade.

Under Our rules of procedure, interest means material interest, that is, an
interest in issue to be affected by the judgment, while a real party-in-interest is
the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit. 47 In this case, it was established that Padilla introduced
improvements in the property, (i.e., a new conference and convention building,
additional guest rooms, a restaurant and bar, a music and function room, a scuba
dive shop, a view deck, a swimming pool, a poolside bar and restaurant, a game
room, a bigger office and lounge, a tock room and a laundry building, a new
building with nine bedrooms, two-16 cubic meters concrete water tanks, a
concrete fence, and a power house with a 187 KVA generator). 48 Certainly, with
the huge amount of money he spent therefor, Padilla stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the instant case as well as the orders and decisions
in the proceedings a quo.

Admittedly, the October 15, 2004 MOA categorically states that Padilla
introduced "very substantial improvements" to the hotel complex, thus, he has
everything to lose when Cecilia abandoned the property in a state of ruin.
Significantly, Quinto and Padilla also agreed to individually or collectively
49
defend, protect or enforce their rights, title and/or interests in the said property.
Thus, We hold that Padilla has adequate and legitimate interest to pursue the
present case to finality.

46 id. at 25-29.
47 Bacaling v. Muya, 430 Phil. 531, 542-543 (2002).
48
Rollo, p. 382.
49 Id. at 376. October 15, 2004 MOA.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 233678

Additionally, inasmuch as the August 28, 2007 SP A is one coupled with

interest, We rule that Padilla possesses material interest to prosecute the instant
petition with or without the desired cooperation of Quinto. Hence, it was error
on the part of the trial court to dismiss the complaint on the basis of Quinto' s
revocation of the SP A.

On the third issue, petitioner avers that the CA incorrectly set aside the
award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses for failure of the trial court to
explicitly state the reasons for the award. He argues that the basis for the award
is the unfounded suit filed by respondents which compelled her to litigate and
to incur expenses to protect her interest.

We do not agree.

It bears stressing that when Padilla filed the complaint for damages against
Cecilia, he was merely exercising his right to litigate based on his material
interest over the hotel complex having introduced very substantial
improvements therein. With the MOA and SPA executed in his favor, he had
factual and legal bases to back up his claim and thus, the suit was not unfounded
as claimed by petitioner. Besides, there was no showing that Padilla filed the
case in bad faith. Accordingly, attorney's fees and litigation expenses should
not have been awarded.

Time and again, it has been held that the power of the court to award
attorney's fees under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable
justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons,
or to incur expenses to protect his rights, attorney's fees may not be awarded
where no sufficient showing of bad faith in a party's persistence in a case other
than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause. 50 In the extant
case, even the trial court found that not only did petitioner fail to satisfy her
claim for damages. She also failed to show that the complaint was tainted with
fraud, malice or was filed in bad faith.

All told, We find no reversible error committed by the appellate court in

rendering the assailed April 4, 2017 Decision and the July 20, 2017 Resolution
in CA-G.R. CV No. 105148.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The April 4, 2017

Decision and the July 20, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 105148 are AFFIRMED.

50 Cabrera v. Baguio, G.R. No. 247238, March 4, 2020.

7.,
Decision 13 G.R. No. 233678

SO ORDERED.

0
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

R I C ~ROSARIO
Ass ciate Justice

~~
J ~ A S P. MARQUEZ
Associate Justice
Decision 14 G.R. No. 233678

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.