ESTOPPEL BY LACHES

[ G.R. No. 236381, August 27, 2020 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. SIXTO SUNDIAM, L & F MARKETING, INC., JOSE MA.
LOPEZ, ROSENDO D. BONDOC, AUGUSTO F. DEL ROSARIO, AND LIBERTY ENGINEERING CORPORATION,
RESPONDENTS.

In a general sense, laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. Stated differently,
it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.22 

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for
the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims, and is not a mere question of time but is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or
asserted.

The four elements of the equitable defense of laches as held by the Court in  Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho (96
Phil. 622(1955) are:

(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation of which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy;

(2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice
of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;

(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert
the right on which he bases his suit; and

(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the
suit is not held to be barred.

The scope of the application of estoppel is, however, limited by Article 1432 of the Civil Code, which
provides:

ART. 1432. The principles of estoppel are hereby adopted insofar as they are not in conflict with the
provisions of this Code, the Code of Commerce, the Rules of Court and special laws

Equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities when as in this case, the lot was already
alienated to innocent buyers for value and the government did not undertake any act to contest the title
for an unreasonable length of time.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, where the title of an innocent purchaser for value who relied on the
clean certificates of the title was sought to be cancelled and the excess land to be reverted to the
Government, we ruled that "[i]t is only fair and reasonable to apply the equitable principle of estoppel
by laches against the government to avoid an injustice to innocent purchasers for value (emphasis
supplied)."34 Citing  Republic v. Court of Appeals,  id. at 379.

[ G.R. No. 189626, August 20, 2018 ]

GREGORIO AMOGUIS TITO AMOGUIS, PETITIONERS, VS. CONCEPCION BALLADO AND MARY GRACE
BALLADO LEDESMA, AND ST. JOSEPH REALTY, LTD. RESPONDENTS.

Estoppel by laches has its origins in equity. It prevents a party from presenting his or her claim "when, by
reason of abandonment and negligence, he [or she] allowed a long time to elapse without presenting
[it]."[80] (International Banking Corp. v. Yared, 59 Phil. 72, 92 (1933) [Per J. Villareal, First Division].) It is
further elaborated by this Court in Regalado v. Go,[81] 543 Phil. 578, 598 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario,
Third Division].  thus:

Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it." [82]  Id. at 598. (Citation omitted)
In estoppel by laches, a claimant has a right that he or she could otherwise exercise if not for his or her
delay in asserting it. This delay in the exercise of the right unjustly misleads the court and the opposing
party of its waiver. Thus, to claim it belatedly given the specific circumstances of the case would be
unjust.

This Court ruled that the surety could no longer question the Court of First Instance's jurisdiction over
the subject matter due to estoppel by laches. It premised that since Manila Surety actively participated
during trial and prevailed; invoking the Court of First Instance's lack of jurisdiction was a last ditch effort
to absolve itself from the effects of an unfavorable judgment on appeal. On the 15-year delay before the
issue on jurisdiction was raised, this Court ruled that it could have and should have been raised earlier.
The surety's failure to do so was negligence on its part, "warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it." [84] Tijam set a precedent to stop
legal machinations where jurisdiction was raised at the very last minute when the parties have already
gone through long years of litigation. It was not so much an issue of time than it was an issue of fairness.
Though conferred by law, fairness and equity must temper the parties' bravado to raise jurisdiction
when they have participated in proceedings in the lower courts or when an unfavorable judgment
against them has been rendered.

The following circumstances were present in Tijam: first, there was a statutory right in favor of the
claimant. Manila Surety had the right to question the Court of First Instance's jurisdiction because it was
the inferior courts that had authority to try cases that involved the amount claimed. Second, the
statutory right was not invoked. Manila Surety participated in the trial and execution stages. It even
sought relief from the Court of Appeals without questioning the Court of First Instance's
jurisdiction. Third, an unreasonable length of time had lapsed before the claimant raised the issue of
jurisdiction. It was only after the Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of First Instance's order of
execution did Manila Surety pursue the issue of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over collections for the amount
involved was already determined by law a month before the case was filed. Fifteen years had lapsed
before the surety pointed this out. Fourth, the claimant actively participated in the case and sought
affirmative relief from the court without jurisdiction. The unreasonable length of time was, therefore,
inexcusable as the claimant was apprised of the prevailing law, as well as all stages of the proceeding.

Calimlim v. Hon. Ramirez[85] 204 Phil. 25 (1982) [Per J. Vasquez, First Division]. unequivocally ruled that it
is only when the exceptional instances in Tijam are present should estoppel by laches apply over
delayed claims

Calimlim clarified the additional requirement that for estoppel by laches to be appreciated against a
claim for jurisdiction, there must be an ostensible showing that the claimant had "knowledge or
consciousness of the facts upon which it is based."

G.R. No. 167988             February 6, 2007

MA. CONCEPCION L. REGALADO, Petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO S. GO, Respondent

Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."43 Oca v. Court of
Appeals, 428 Phil. 696, 702 (2002).

The ruling in People v. Regalario44 G.R. No. 174483, March 31, 2009 that was based on the
landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy 45 Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 22 Phil. 29
(1968). on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by
laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu
is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly
present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption
that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it
INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE

November 22, 2017

G.R. No. 222031

EMILIO CALMA, Petitioner
vs.
ATTY. JOSE M. LACHICA, JR. , Respondent
*

The Torrens system was adopted to "obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to
rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring
further."  Leong, et al. v. See, 749 Phil. 314, 323 (2014).From this sprung the doctrinal rule that
36

every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title
issued therefor and is in no way obliged to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the
property.  Locsin v. Hizon, et al., 743 Phil. 420, 429-430 (2014) To be sure, this Court is not
37

unaware of the recognized exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1.) when the party has actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make further
inquiry; (2.) when the buyer has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor;  Id. at
38

430.or (3.) when the buyer/mortgagee is a bank or an institution of similar nature as they are

enjoined to exert a. higher degree of diligence, care, and prudence than individuals in handling real
estate transactions. Arguelles, et al. v. Malarayat Rural Bank, Inc., 730 Phil. 226, 237 (2014).
39

Complementing this doctrinal rule is the concept of an innocent purchaser for value, which refers to
someone who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or
interest in it, and who pays in full and fair the price at the time of the purchase or without receiving
any notice of another person's claim. Leong, et al. v. See, supra note 36, at 324-325.
40

Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree Effective June 11,
41

1978. recognizes innocent purchasers for value and their right to rely on a clean title:

Section 44. Statutory liens affecting title. - Every registered owner receiving certificate of title in
pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a
certificate of title for value and good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except
those noted in said certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting,
namely:

First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and Constitution of the Philippines
which are not by law required to appear of record in the Registry of Deeds in order to be valid
against subsequent purchasers or encumbrances of record.

Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two years immediately preceding the
acquisition of any right over the land by an innocent purchaser for value, without prejudice to the
right of the government to collect taxes payable before that period from the delinquent taxpayer
alone.
Third. Any public highway or private way established or recognized by law, or any government
irrigation canal or lateral thereof, if the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such
highway or irrigation canal or lateral thereof have been determined.

Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use thereof by virtue of, or pursuant to,
Presidential Decree No. 27 or any other law or regulations on agrarian reform. (emphasis supplied)

………………………………………..
As the fact that petitioner is an innocent purchaser for value had been established, the validity and
efficacy of the registration, as well as the cancellation, of respondent's adverse claim is immaterial in
this case. What matters is that the petitioner had no knowledge of any defect in the title of the
property that he was going to purchase and that the same was clean and free of any lien and
encumbrance on its face by virtue of the entry on the cancellation of adverse claim therein. Thus,
petitioner may safely rely on the correctness of the entries in the title.

G.R. No. 158682            January 31, 2005

SPOUSES BIENVENIDO R. MACADANGDANG and VIRGINIA C. MACADANGDANG, petitioners

vs.
SPOUSES RAMON MARTINEZ and GLORIA F. MARTINEZ,

The phrase "innocent purchaser for value" is deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee or
other (beneficiary of an) encumbrance for value.10  Sec. 32 Presidential Decree 1529.An innocent
purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person
has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of
such purchase or before he has notice of the claim of another person.11  Hemedes v. Court of
Appeals, 374 Phil. 692 (1999) citing Legarda v. Court of Appeals, et al., 345 Phil. 889 (1997).As a
general rule, where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when the land is sold, the
vendee for value has the right to rely on what appears on the face of the title and is not obligated to
look beyond what appears on the face of the certificate of title of the vendor. As an exception, the
vendee is required to make the necessary inquiries if there is anything in the certificate of title which
raises any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property. 12 Heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao, Sr. v. Court
of Appeals, 351 Phil. 823 (1998), citing Pino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94114, 19 June 1991,
198 SCRA 434, citing Centeno v. Court of Appeals, No. L-40105, 11 November 1985, 139 SCRA
545. Otherwise, his mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his willful disregard of the
possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor’s title will not make him an innocent purchaser
for value if it afterwards develops that the title is in fact defective, and it appears that he had such
notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution
which may reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like situation. 13 Leung Yee v. Strong
Machinery, Co., 37 Phil. 644 (1918).

Where innocent third persons rely on the lack of defect of a certificate of title and acquire rights over
the property, the Court cannot disregard such rights. Otherwise, public confidence in the certificate
of title and ultimately, in the entire Torrens system will be impaired, for every one dealing with
registered property will have to inquire at every instance whether the title has been regularly or
irregularly issued.14  Hemedes v. Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 692 (1999).

[ G.R. No. 236381, August 27, 2020 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. SIXTO SUNDIAM, L & F MARKETING,

INC., JOSE MA. LOPEZ, ROSENDO D. BONDOC, AUGUSTO F. DEL ROSARIO, AND LIBERTY
ENGINEERING CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

Republic v. Court of Appeals is reinforced by our ruling in Republic v. Umali,35 where, in a reversion

case, we held that even if the original grantee of a patent and title has obtained the same through
fraud, reversion will no longer prosper as the land had become private land and the fraudulent
acquisition cannot affect the titles of innocent purchasers for value.36

From the foregoing, it thus is clear that only innocent purchasers for value (IPV) are afforded the
right to raise the equitable principle of estoppel by laches in their defense against the government to
avoid injustice to them.

However, it should be noted that the party who claims the status of an IPV has the burden of proving
such assertion, and the invocation of the ordinary presumption of good faith, i.e., that everyone is
presumed to act in good faith,37 is not enough.38 To be sure, proof of good faith is, as it should be,
required of the party asserting it. Stated differently, the party who seeks the protection of the Torrens
system has the obligation to prove his good faith as a purchaser for value. This requirement should
be applied without exception because only the IPV is insulated from any fraud perpetrated upon the
registered owner which results in the latter being divested of his title (i.e., he loses ownership) to the
contested property and recognizing the same in the name of the IPV.

INTEGRITY OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT

G.R. No. 162333             December 23, 2008

BIENVENIDO C. TEOCO and JUAN C. TEOCO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, respondent.pub

There are generally three reasons for the necessity of the presentation of public documents. First,
public documents are prima facie evidence of the facts stated in them, as provided for in Section 23,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence. – Documents consisting of entries in public records

made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts
 therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the
fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter. (Underscoring supplied)

Second, the presentation of a public document dispenses with the need to prove a document’s due
execution and authenticity, which is required under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court for
the admissibility of private documents offered as authentic:

SEC. 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
(Underscoring supplied)

In the presentation of public documents as evidence, on the other hand, due execution and
authenticity are already presumed:

SEC. 23. Public documents are evidence. – Documents consisting of entries in public

records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of
the fact which gave rise to their execution  and of the date of the latter. (Underscoring
supplied)

SEC. 30. Proof of notarial documents. – Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and
certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the
certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument
or document involved. (Underscoring supplied)

Third, the law may require that certain transactions appear in public instruments, such as Articles
1358 and 1625 of the Civil Code, which respectively provide:

Art. 1358. The following must appear in a public document:

(1) Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or
extinguishment of real rights over immovable property; sales of real property or of an interest
therein governed by Articles 1403, No. 2, and 1405;

(2) The cession, repudiation or renunciation of hereditary rights or of those of the conjugal
partnership of gains;

(3) The power to administer property, or any other power which has for its object an act
appearing or which should appear in a public document, or should prejudice a third person;

(4) The cession of actions or rights proceeding from an act appearing in a public document.

All other contracts where the amount involved exceeds five hundred pesos must appear in
writing, even a private one. But sales of goods, chattels or things in action are governed by
Articles 1403, No. 2, and 1405.
 Art. 1625. An assignment of a credit, right or action shall produce no effect as against third
person, unless it appears in a public instrument, or the instrument is recorded in the Registry
of Property in case the assignment involves real property. (Underscoring supplied)

G.R. No. 170071               July 16, 2012

HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA namely: RUBY B. OCHOA, MICAELA B. OCHOA and
JOMAR B. OCHOA, Petitioners,
vs.
G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 170125

G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA namely: RUBY B. OCHOA, MICAELA B. OCHOA and
JOMAR B. OCHOA, Respondents.

It is true that before a private document offered as authentic be received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must first be proved. However, it must be remembered that this
15 

requirement of authentication only pertains to private documents and "does not apply to public
documents, these being admissible without further proof of their due execution or
genuineness. Two reasons may be advanced in support of this rule, namely: said documents
have been executed in the proper registry and are presumed to be valid and genuine until the
contrary is shown by clear and convincing proof; and, second, because public documents are
authenticated by the official signature and seals which they bear and of which seals, courts may take
judicial notice." FRANCISCO, RICARDO, J., Basic Evidence, 1992 Ed., p. 274.Hence, in a case,
16 

the Court held that in the presentation of public documents as evidence, due execution and
authenticity thereof are already presumed. Teoco v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R.
17

No. 162333, December 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 82, 97

The subject USAID Certification is a public document, hence, does not require authentication.

It therefore becomes necessary to first ascertain whether the subject USAID Certification is a private
or public document before this Court can rule upon the correctness of its admission and consequent
use as basis for the award of loss of income in these cases.

Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court classifies documents as either public or private, viz:

Sec. 19. Classes of Documents – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are
either public or private.

Public documents are:

 (a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and (c)
Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.

All other writings are private. (Emphasis supplied.)

TAX DECLARATION AND LAND POSSESSION AS PROOF OF OWNERSHIP

In Cequeṅa and Lirio vs. Bolante (GR 137944, April 6, 2000), regarding possession. Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban stated:

“Tax receipts and declarations are prima facie proofs of ownership or possession of the property for
which such taxes have been paid. Coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, they may
become the basis of a claim for ownership. By acquisitive prescription, possession in the concept of
owner — public, adverse, peaceful and uninterrupted — may be converted to ownership. On the other
hand, mere possession and occupation of land cannot ripen into ownership.”

Palali vs. Awisan (GR 158385, Feb. 12, 2010), where the Supreme Court, through Associate Justice
Mariano del Castillo, stated:

“Thus, respondent having failed to prove possession, her claim rests solely on her tax declaration. But
tax declarations, by themselves, are not conclusive evidence of ownership of real property. In the
absence of actual, public, and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not
prove ownership. Respondent’s tax declaration, therefore, cannot serve as basis to oust petitioner who
has been in possession (by himself and his predecessors) of the subject property since before the war.

All told, we hold that as between the petitioner and the respondent, it is the petitioner who has
the better claim or title to the subject property. While the respondent merely relied on her tax
declaration, petitioner was able to prove actual possession of the subject property coupled with
his tax declaration. We have ruled in several cases that possession, when coupled with a tax
declaration, is a weighty evidence of ownership. (Cequeña v. Bolante, supra; Llanes v. Republic,
G.R. No. 177947, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 258, 271; Heirs of Arzadon-Crisologo v. Rañon,
G.R. No. 171068, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 391, 410.) It certainly is more weighty and
preponderant than a tax declaration alone.”
The preponderance of evidence is therefore clearly in favor of petitioner, particularly
considering that, as the actual possessor under claim of ownership, he enjoys the presumption
of ownership.40 (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 757, 771 (2002).)
Moreover, settled is the principle that a party seeking to recover real property must rely on the
strength of her case rather than on the weakness of the defense.41 The burden of proof rests
on the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. For he who relies upon the existence of a
fact should be called upon to prove that fact. Having failed to discharge her burden to prove
her affirmative allegations, we find that the trial court rightfully dismissed respondent’s
complaint.