LAMBERTO V. TORRIJOS v.
CA +
Facts:
Wakat Diamnuan and his wife were the registered owners of one-fourth
share of a parcel of land containing an area of 39.9643 hectares situated in
Sitio Cacuban, Barrio Gumatdang, Pitogon, Benguet, covered by OCT No.
O-36, issued in their names and in the names of Kangi Erangyas, and the
heirs of Komising Tagle, who owned the remaining portions.
On May 11, 1968, Wakat Diamnuan and his wile sold their one-fourth share
in favor of petitioner Torrijos for P7,493.00. The deed of sale, however,
was refused registration because Torrijos, who produced OCT No. O-36, did
not have the copies thereof held by the other co-owners, Kangi Erangyas
and heirs of Komising Tagle.
In 1969, the entire property, together with the share of Wakat Diamnuan
and his wife, was sold to Victor de Guia for P 189,379.50. Hence, Torrijos
prosecuted Wakat Diamnuan for estafa before the Baguio Court of First
Instance, docketed as Criminal Case No. 70 entitled "People of the
Philippines versus Wika Diamnuan."
After trial, the trial Judge convicted the accused in a decision dated January
17, 1973 sentencing him to an imprisonment of 3 months of arresto mayor,
to pay a fine of P7,493.00 with subsidiary imprisonment, to indemnify
petitioner Lamberto Torrijos in the sum of P7,493.00 and to pay the costs.
The trial Judge added as the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of
the decision that "Whatever damages may have been suffered by Torrijos
before the Deed of Sale in favor of Victor de Guia was made by the accused
and his co-owners may be the subject of some other action, perhaps civil,
but not in this case."
Upon motion for reconsideration filed by complainant Torrijos, in an order
dated March 5, 1973, the trial court modified its decision by increasing the
indemnity in favor of Torrijos from P7,493.00 to P25,000.00 and the fine
from P7,493.00 to P25,000.00.
On March 7, 1973, the accused filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order of March 5, 1973, which was denied by the court a quo in an order
dated April 11, 1973. Thereafter, the accused appealed to the Court of
Appeals.
On August 5, 1973, the accused died, for which reason his counsel moved to
dismiss the appeal under paragraph 1 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides that the death of a convict extinguishes, not only the
personal penalties, but also the "pecuniary penalties" as long as the death
occurs before final judgment.
Complainant Torrijos opposed the said motion to dismiss appeal on the
ground that the term "pecuniary penalty" should not include civil liability in
favor of the offended party, which was decreed by the trial court in this
case, as the civil action therefor was not reserved, much less filed separately
from the criminal action.
The respondent Court of Appeals sustained the motion, which is shared by
the Solicitor General, and forthwith issued the challenged order dated
February 20, 1975 dismissing the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the civil liability of the accused is extinguished after his
death.
Ruling: No. despite the acquittal based on death for the crime of homicide
or physical injuries or damage to property through reckless imprudence,
notwithstanding the absence of any reservation to file a civil action, such
acquittal does not preclude the offended party from pursuing a civil action
for damages based on tort or culpa aquiliana. And the civil action based on
tort or contract need not be reserved (Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et
al., 91 Phil. 972; Dionisio, et al. vs. Alvendia, et al., 102 Phil. 443, 445-
447; Chan vs. Yatco, L-11162, April 30, 1958; Capuno vs. Pepsi Cola, 13
SCRA 658).
