G.R. No. Nos.

L-23779-80 April 29, 1977

FEDERICO QUIZON and PROFITISA QUIZON, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. JOSE L. BALTAZAR, Municipal Judge of San Fernando, Pampanga; ELIODORO
B. GUINTO, Assistant Provincial Fiscal, of Pampanga; and CECILIA SANGALANG,
Respondents.

Lorenzo P. Navarro for petitioners.

Eligio G. Lagman for respondent Cecilia Sangalang.
Eliodoro B. Guinto for and in his own behalf.

BARREDO, J.:

Petiion for certiorari and prohibition to declare null and void the orders of the Municipal
Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, issued in Criminal Cases Nos. 4203, People vs.
Federico Quizon and 4204, People vs. Profitisa Quizon, dated July 11 and August 17, 1964,
respectively, denying petitioners' motion to quash the criminal complaints against them
based on the ground of prescription of the offense of serious oral defamation of which they Overruling their motion, respondent court reasoned out thus:
were charged, and to prohibit said court from proceeding further with the said criminal
cases, except to dismiss the same. The prosecution opposed the motion to dismiss by making a computation of time as follows:
On May 11, 1964, private respondent, Cecilia Sangalang, with the assistance of Assistant
Provincial Fiscal Eliodoro B. Guinto, who had conducted the preliminary investigation, filed
with respondent court two separate criminal complaints both for serious oral defamation, the
one against petitioner Federico Quizon in Criminal Case No. 4203 and the other petitioner
Profitisa Quizon in Criminal Case No. 4204, committed, according to the said complaints on
the same day, November 11, 1963. Upon being called for arraignment, petitioner presented
a written motion to quash contending principally that the offense charged had already
prescribed as of May 9, 1964.
In support of their motion, petitioners argued that by express provision of Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code, the offense of oral defamation prescribes in six months and under the
authority of People vs. Del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67, the correct computation of said six months
for the purposes of their particular case is as follows:
A study of the provisions of the laws pertinent to the issue at bar leads one to agree with the Surely, such ratiocination is plainly erroneous. In the case of People vs. del Rosario, supra,
mode of computation submitted by the public prosecutor because Article 90 of the Revised which was properly brought to the attention of the court in petitioners' motion to quash, this
Penal Code, in providing for the prescriptive period for oral defamation, speaks of month, Court held very clearly that:
not of day, as the basic unit in reckoning the duration of the prescription, when it says that The pertinent provisions of Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:
"offenses of oral defamation ... shall prescribe in six months." Article 13 of the new Civil
Code says that "when the laws speak of ..., months, ..., it shall be understood that ... month Art. 90. Prescription of crimes. - …
... of thirty days each ... It says further that "If months are designated by their name, they The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.
shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have. Conformably to Light offenses prescribe in two months.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
these legal provisions and applying the same to the case at bar, the computation given by library
the public prosecutor appears to be correct. The month of November was designated in the
complaint so it will be given the number of days it has in the calendar which is 30 days. But Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription shall
the succeeding months of December, January, February, March and April, which are the commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
months comprised within the prescriptive period of six (6) months are nowhere specifically authorities or their agents, ...
designated by their name, consequently they should be given the 30-day period of duration
in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 13 aforesaid. It is believed, and the Court so The court a quo held that in accordance with Article 13 of the new Civil Code the "month"
holds, that this formula or mode of computation is more squarely in accordance with the one mentioned in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be one of 30 days, and since the
adopted in the case of People vs. Del Rosario (GR No. L-7234) quoted in the motion to period of prescription commences to run from the day "on which the crime is discovered by
quash. The month of May, having been designated in the complaint, was given the number the offended party," i.e., in this case on May 28, 1958 when it was committed, the two
of 31 days it has in the calendar, the succeeding month of June comprised within the months period provided for the prescription of the offense already expired when the
prescriptive period was given 30-day duration, so it resulted to be thus: information was filed, because the filing was on the 61st day. The Solicitor General in this
appeal argues that in the same manner that Article 13 of the new Civil Code is applied to
determine the length of the two months period required for the prescription of the offense, its
provision (of the said Article 13) contained in paragraph 3 which reads "In computing a
period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included" should also be applied, so
that the information should be considered as filed on the 60th day and not on the 61st day
after the offense has been committed. The resolution of the appeal involves the
determination of two legal issues, first, whether the prescriptive period should commence
from the very day on which the crime was committed, or from the day following that in which
it was committed, in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 13 of the Civil Code of
In pursuance thereto, the Supreme Court in the Del Rosario Case finally held that the filing the Philippines, Penal Code should be understood to be a month of 30 days, instead of the
of the action on July 27 was on the 60th day. civil or calendar month.
As to the first question, we note that Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the
If the formula for computation of the defense is to be followed, Article 13 in so far as a period shall commence to run from the day on which the offense is committed or
month is to be understood to be of 30 days, unless the month is designated by its name, will discovered. The title indicates that the provision merely purports to prescribe the of
be rendered nugatory, for the simple reason that there are months that have 31 days in the computing the period of prescription. In the computation of a period of time within which an
calendar to be reckoned with as they will be within the prescriptive period. The basic unit of act is to be done, the law in this jurisdiction has always directed the first day be excluded
computation used by the defense is by the day and not by the month of 30-day duration as and the last included (See section 1, Rule 28 of the Rules of Court; section 13, Rev. Adm.
provided for in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the counting of which is to be made in Code and Art. 13, Civil Code of the Philippines). And in the case of Surbano vs. Gloria, 51
relation to Article 13 of the Civil Code (new). Phil., 415, where the question involved was whether an offense had prescribed, we held
The contention of the private prosecutor no longer needs discussion in view of the that from February 18 to March 15, 1927 only a period of 25 days elapsed, because we
conclusion arrived at above. (Pp 37-40, Record.) excluded the first day (February 18) and included the last day (March 15). The above
method of computation was in force in this jurisdiction even before the advent of the
American regime (Article 7. Spanish Civil Code). It is logical to presume, therefore, that the
Legislature in enacting Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code meant or intended to mean
that in the computation of the period provided for therein, the first day is to be excluded and In the light of the foregoing pronouncements of this Court, the insistence of respondents that
the last one included, in accord with existing laws. the factual situation in this case is substantially different from the one in del Rosario is too
We find much sence in the argument of the Solicitor General, that if the Civil Code of the tenuous to merit consideration. Respondents have not shown any ponderous reason why
Philippines is to be resorted to in the interpretation of the length of the month, so should it We have to depart from the above rulings.
be resorted to in the computation of the period of prescription. Besides, Article 18 of the Indeed, it being obvious that respondent court disregarded the construction of the pertinent
Civil Code (Article 16 of the old Civil Code) expressly directs that any deficiency in any legal provisions by this Court, the charge of petitioners that it has committed grave abuse of
special law (such as the Revised Penal Code) must be supplied by its provisions. As the discretion must be sustained.
Revised Penal Code is deficient in that it does not explicitly define how the period is to be
computed, resort must be had to its Article 13, which contains in detail the manner of As to the contention of respondents that the denial of a motion to quash is not a ground for
computating a period. We find, therefore that the trial Court committed error in not excluding certiorari or prohibition, suffice it to state that to allow an accused to undergo the ordeals of
the first day in the computation of the period of prescription of the offense. trial and conviction when the information or complaint against him is patently defective or
the offense charged therein has been indisputably, shown to have already prescribed is
The other question is whether a month mentioned in Article 90 should be considered as the unfair and unjust, for which reason, procedurally, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be
calendar month and not the 30-day month. It is to be noted that no provision of the Revised plain and adequate.
Penal Code defines the length of the Month. Article 7 of the old Civil Code provided that a WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the criminal complaint in the aforementioned
month shall be understood as containing 30 days; but this concept was modified by section cases are hereby ordered dismissed. No costs.
13 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that month means the civil or
calendar month and not the regular 30-day month (Gutierrez vs. Carpio, 53 Phil., 334). With Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino, and Martin, JJ., concur.
the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), however, we have reverted Concepcion Jr., J., took no part.
to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be Martin J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
considered as the regular 30-day month (Article 13). This provision of the new Civil Code
has been intended for general application in the interpretation of the laws. As the offense
charge in the information in the case at bar took place on May 28, 1953, after the new Civil
Code had come into effect, this new provisions should apply, and in accordance therewith
the month in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be understood to mean the
regular 30-day month.
In our conclusion that the term "month" used in the Revised penal Code should be
interpreted in the sense that the new Civil Code defines the said term, we find persuasive
authority in a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain. In a case decided by it in the year
1887 (S. de 30 de Marzo de 1887), prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain, it had
declared that when the law spoke of months, it meant the natural month or the solar month,
in the absence of express provisions to the contrary. But after the promulgation of the Civil
Code of Spain, which provided in its Article 7 a general rule for the interpretation of the laws,
and with particular respect to months, that a month shall be understood as a 30-day month,
said court held that the two months period for the prescription of a light offense should be
understood to mean 60 days, a month being a 30-day month. (S. de 6 de Abril de 1895, 3
Viada, p. 45). Similarly we hold that in view of the express provisions of Article 13 of the
new Civil Code the term "month" used in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be
understood to mean the 30-day month and not the solar or civil month.
We hold, therefore, that the offense charged in the information prescribed in 60 days, said
period to be counted by excluding May 28, the commission of the offense, and we find that
when the information was filed on July 27, 1953 the offense had not yet prescribed because
July 27 is the sixtieth day from May 29. (97 Phil. 68-72.)
 EN BANC 2. ID.; ELECTIONS; COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURES; PROVIDES FOR THE
FORMAL REQUIREMENTS OF PLEADINGS FILED WITH THE COMELEC. — Formal
[G.R. No. 124893. April 18, 1997.] requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure: "Sec. 1. Filing of
Pleadings. — Every pleading, motion and other papers must be filed in ten (10) legible
LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, Petitioner, v. FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR., THE HONORABLE copies. However, when there is more than one respondent or protestee, the petitioner or
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and protestant must file additional number of copies of the petition or protest as there are
PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, Respondents. additional respondents or protestees. Sec. 2. How Filed. — The documents referred to in
the immediately preceding section must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the
Ernesto B. Asuncion for Petitioner. Commission personally, or, unless otherwise provided in these Rules, by registered mail. In
Onofre P. Tejaba for Private Respondent. the latter case, the date of mailing is the date of filing and the requirement as to the number
of copies must be complied with. Sec. 3. Form of pleadings, etc. — All pleadings allowed by
these Rules shall be printed, mimeographed or typewritten on legal size bond paper shall be
SYLLABUS in English or Filipino. . . ." Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed,
1. POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991; SEC. 532 (a), PROVIDES mimeographed or typewritten in legal size bond paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible
WHICH LAW SHALL COVER AND WHICH GOVERNING BODY SHALL, SUPERVISE THE copies. Pleadings must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC
CONDUCT OF THE SK ELECTIONS. — Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of personally, or, by registered mail.
1991 provides that the conduct of the SK elections is under the supervision of the
COMELEC and shall be governed by the Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus Election 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT SANCTION A PLEADING FILED BY FACSIMILE
Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a TRANSMISSION. — A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission
certificate of candidacy, viz; "Sec. 78, Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental
of candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in
may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of filing of the the proper position and the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile. Filing a pleading
fifteen days before election." In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, much
Procedure provides that a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy less by the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best,
for an elective office may be filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC on the ground in exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of
that the candidate has made a false material representation in his certificate. The petition determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was
may be heard and evidence received by any official designated by the COMELEC after originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.
which the case shall be decided by the COMELEC itself. Under the same Rules of
Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the 4. ID.; ID.; KATIPUNAN NG KABATAAN; SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN (SK);
COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be entertained COMPOSITION AND TERMS OF OFFICE. — The Local Government Code of 1991
by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach a decision, changed the Kabataang Barangay into the Katipunan ng Kabataan. It, however, retained the
resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to age limit of the members laid down in B.P. 337 at 15 but not more than 21 years old. The
reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are affairs of the Katipunan ng Kabataan are administered by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
resolved by the COMELEC en banc. It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that composed of a chairman and seven (7) members who are elected by the Katipunan ng
can hear and decide election cases. This is clear from Section 3 of the said Rules thus: Kabataan. The chairman automatically becomes ex-officio member of the Sanggunian
"Sec. 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions. — The Commission shall sit in two (2) Barangay. A member of the SK holds office for a term of three (3) years, unless sooner
Divisions to hear and decide protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special removed for cause, or becomes permanently incapacitated, dies or resigns from office.
cases, provisional remedies, contempt and special proceedings except in accreditation of Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to specific qualifications laid down by
citizens’ arms of the Commission. the Local Government Code of 1991.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; QUALIFICATIONS; OF MEMBERS; OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS. —
Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan 8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT MORE THAN 21 YEARS OF AGE; CONSTRUED. — The
must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months; provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the
(c) 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the day, of his election is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months
Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428 of the Code requires that nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days each.
an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a One born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be one year old on the
qualified voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one (1) 365th day after his birth — the last day of the year. The phrase "not more than 21 years of
year immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years but not more 21 years of age age" means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does
on the day of his election; (e) able to read and write; and (f) must not have been convicted not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year because that would be
of any crime involving moral turpitude. more than 21 365-days cycles. "Not more than 21 years old" is not equivalent to "less than
22 years old," contrary to petitioner’s claims. The law does not state that the candidate be
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2824 DEFINED HOW A MEMBER OF less than 22 years on election day.
THE KATIPUNAN NG KABATAAN BECOMES A QUALIFIED VOTER AND AN ELECTIVE
OFFICIAL. — For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections 424 9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE AND EXCEPTION. — The general rule is that an elective
and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in Resolution No. 2824 and defined how a official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must not be more than 21 years of age on the day of
member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan becomes a qualified voter and an elective official. A his election. The only exception is when the official reaches the age of 21 years during his
member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may be a qualified voter in the May 6, 1996 SK incumbency. Section 423 [b] of the Code allows him to serve the remaining portion of the
elections if he is: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) 15 but not more than 21 years of age on election term for which he was elected. According to Senator Pimentel, the youth leader must have
day, i.e., the voter must be born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a "been elected prior to his 21st birthday. Conversely, the SK official must not have turned 21
resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and an actual resident of the barangay at years old before his election. Reading Section 423 [b] together with Section 428 of the
least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections. A candidate for the SK must: (a) Code, the latest date at which an SK elective official turns 21 years old is on the day of his
possess the foregoing qualifications of a voter; (b) be a resident in the barangay at least one election. The maximum age of a youth official must therefore be exactly 21 years on
(1) year immediately preceding the elections; and (c) able to read and write. election day. Section 3 [b] in relation to Section 6 [a] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is
not ultra vires insofar as it fixes the maximum age of an elective SK official on the day of his
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AGE QUALIFICATIONS; DISTINGUISHED. — A closer look at the Local election.
Government Code will reveal a distinction between the maximum age of a member in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective SK official. Section 424 of the 10. ID.; ID.; AGE QUALIFICATION, A QUESTION OF ELIGIBILITY; CONSEQUENCE OF
Code sets a member’s maximum age at 21 years only. There is no further provision as to NON-COMPLIANCE; CASE AT BAR. — The ineligibility of petitioner does not entitle private
when the member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other hand, Section 428 respondent, the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes in the May, 6, 1996
provides that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old "on the day of his elections, to be declared elected. A defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the
election." The addition of the phrase "on the day of his election" is an additional office. Moreover, despite his claims, private respondent has failed to prove that the
qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or on the day electorate themselves actually knew of petitioner’s ineligibility and that they maliciously
he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must voted for her with the intention of misapplying their franchises and throwing away their votes
not be more than 21 years old on the day, of election. The distinction is understandable for the benefit of her rival candidate. Neither can this Court order that pursuant to Section
considering that the Code itself provides more qualifications for an elective SK official than 435 of the Local Government Code petitioner should be succeeded by the Sangguniang
for a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. (Of things Kabataan member who obtained the next higher number of votes in the May 6, 1996
dissimilar, the rule is dissimilar.) The courts may distinguish when there are facts and elections. Section 435 applies when a Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman "refuses to
circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification. The assume office, fails to qualify, is convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is
requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public policy and if permanently incapacitated, is removed from office, or has been absent without leave for
he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be declared ineligible. In the same vein, more than three (3) consecutive months." The question of the age qualification is a question
if the candidate is over the maximum age limit on the day of the election, he is ineligible. of eligibility. Being "eligible" means being "legally qualified; capable of being legally chosen."
The fact that the candidate was elected will not make the age requirement directory, nor will Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the
it validate his election. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure Constitution or the statutes for holding public office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds
the vice of ineligibility. enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK Chairman.
 Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event
she won in the election. The order reads as follows:
DECISION
PUNO, J.: "Acting on the Fax ‘Petition for Denial And/Or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy’ by
Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order dated May 2, 1996 of petitioner Florencio G. Sales, Jr. against Lynette G. Garvida, received on April 29, 1996, the
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc suspending her proclamation as pertinent allegations of which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
the duly elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, x x x
Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. 5. That the said respondent is disqualified to become a voter and a candidate for the SK for
the reason that she will be more than twenty-one (21) years of age on May 6, 1996; that she
The facts are undisputed. The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections nationwide was was born on June 11, 1974 as can be gleaned from her birth certificate, a copy of which is
scheduled to be held on May 6, 1996. On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for registration hereto attached and marked as Annex ‘A’;
as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui,
Ilocos Norte. The Board of Election Tellers, however, denied her application on the ground 6. That in filing her certificate of candidacy as candidate for SK of Bgy. San Lorenzo,
that petitioner, who was then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old, exceeded the age Bangui, Ilocos Norte, she made material representation which is false and as such, she is
limit for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b] of disqualified; that her certificate of candidacy should not be given due course and that said
COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.chanrobles.com : virtual lawlibrary candidacy must be cancelled;
x x x"
On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member the Commission, it appearing that the petition is meritorious, hereby DIRECTS the Board of
and Voter" with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bangui-Pagudpud-Adams-Damalneg, Election Tellers/Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, to
Ilocos Norte. In a decision dated April 18, 1996, the said court found petitioner qualified and suspend the proclamation of Lynette G. Garvida in the event she garners the highest
ordered her registration as member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. 1 The Board of number of votes for the position of Sangguniang Kabataan [sic].
Election Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. 2 The presiding
judge of the Regional Trial Court, however, inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due Meantime, petitioner is hereby required to submit immediately ten (10) copies of his petition
to his close association with petitioner. 3 and to pay the filing and legal research fees in the amount of P510.00.

On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman, SO ORDERED." 9
Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondent’s
Norte. In a letter dated April 23, 1996, respondent Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios, per votes of 76. 10 In accordance with the May 2, 1996 order or the COMELEC en banc, the
advice of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, 4 disapproved petitioner’s certificate of Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant
candidacy again due to her age. 5 Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC Regional petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.
Director Filemon A. Asperin who set aside the order of respondents and allowed petitioner
to run. 6 On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner for
the position of SK chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. 11 The
On May 2, 1996, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of her proclamation was "without prejudice to any further action by the Commission on Elections or
ineligibility and giving her 24 hours to explain why her certificate of candidacy should not be any other interested party." 12 On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the Pambayang
disapproved. 7 Earlier and without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials, private Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang
Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a "Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of the elected officials of the Pederasyon. 13
Certificate of Candidacy" against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age Petitioner raises two (2) significant issues: the first concerns the jurisdiction of the
qualification in her certificate of candidacy. The petition was sent by facsimile 8 and COMELEC en banc to act on the petition to deny or cancel her certificate of candidacy; the
registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the Commission on Elections National Office, Manila. second, the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground that she has
exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective official of the SK.
On May 2, 1996, the same day respondent Rios issued the memorandum to petitioner, the
COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of
I petitioner or protestant must file additional number of copies of the petition or protest as
Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the conduct of the SK there are additional respondents or protestees.
elections is under the supervision of the COMELEC and shall be governed by the Omnibus Sec. 2. How Filed. — The documents referred to in the immediately preceding section must
Election Code. 14 The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the Commission personally, or, unless
procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, viz: otherwise provided in these Rules, by registered mail. In the latter case, the date of mailing
is the date of filing and the requirement as to the number of copies must be complied with.
"Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified Sec. 3. Form of Pleadings, etc. — (a) All pleadings allowed by these Rules shall be printed,
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by mimeographed or typewritten on legal size bond paper and shall be in English or Filipino.
any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as x x x"
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or typewritten in legal
twenty-five days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, size bond paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must be filed directly
after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before election." with the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC personally, or, by registered mail.

In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a petition to In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only two (2) copies of the
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may be filed petition were filed with the COMELEC. 19 Also, the COMELEC en banc issued its
with the Law Department of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has made a Resolution on the basis of the petition transmitted by facsimile, not by registered mail.
false material representation in his certificate. The petition may be heard and evidence
received by any official designated by the COMELEC after which the case shall be decided A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of
by the COMELEC itself. printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and
representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. 20
Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of The current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay
candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper
may only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to position and the correct shade. 21 The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device
reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile. 22
motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division
are resolved by the COMELEC en banc. 16 It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of
that can hear and decide election cases. This is clear from Section 3 of the said Rules Procedure, much less by the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. 23 Without the
original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine
"Sec. 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions. — The Commission shall sit in two (2) and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a
Divisions to hear and decide protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special sham pleading. The uncertainty of the authenticity of a facsimile pleading should have
cases, provisional remedies, contempt and special proceedings except in accreditation of restrained the COMELEC en banc from acting on the petition and issuing the questioned
citizens’ arms of the Commission." order. The COMELEC en banc should have waited until it received the petition filed by
In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions registered mail.
upon receipt of the petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when it entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996. 18 III
To write finis to the case at bar, we shall now resolve the issue of petitioner’s age.
II The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by Presidential Decree No. 684 in 1975
The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the petition itself did not as the Kabataang Barangay, a barangay youth organization composed of all residents of the
comply with the formal requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. barangay who were at least 15 years but less than 18 years of age. 24 The Kabataang
These requirements are: Barangay sought to provide its members a medium to express their views and opinions and
participate in issues of transcendental importance. 25 Its affairs were administered by a
"Sec. 1. Filing of Pleadings. — Every pleading, motion and other papers must be filed in ten barangay youth chairman together with six barangay youth leaders who were actual
(10) legible copies. However, when there is more than one respondent or protestee, the residents of the barangay and were at least 15 years but less than 18 years of age. 26 In
1983, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, then the Local Government Code, raised the maximum "Sec. 3. Qualifications of a voter. — To be qualified to register as a voter in the SK elections,
age of the Kabataang Barangay members from "less than 18 years of age" to "not more a person must be:
than 21 years of age." chanrobles.com : virtual law library a) a citizen of the Philippines;
b) fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day that is, he
The Local Government Code of 1991 changed the Kabataang Barangay into the Katipunan must have been born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and
ng Kabataan. It, however, retained the age limit of the members laid down in B.P. 337 at 15 c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and actually residing in the barangay
but not more than 21 years old. 27 The affairs of the Katipunan ng Kabataan are wherein he proposes to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections.
administered by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) composed of a chairman and seven (7) x x x
members who are elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. 28 The chairman automatically "Sec. 6. Qualifications of elective members. — An elective official of the SK must be:
becomes ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay. 29 A member of the SK holds a) a qualified voter;
office for a term of three (3) years, unless sooner removed for cause, or becomes b) a resident in the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to the elections; and
permanently incapacitated, dies or resigns from office. 30 c) able to read and write Filipino or any Philippine language or dialect or English.

Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to specific qualifications laid down by Cases involving the eligibility or qualification of candidates shall be decided by the
the Local Government Code of 1991, city/municipal Election Officer (EO) whose decision shall be final.
"Sec. 424. Katipunan ng Kabataan. — The katipunan ng kabataan shall be composed of all A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may be a qualified voter in the May 6, 1996 SK
citizens of the Philippines actually residing in the barangay for at least six (6) months, who elections if he is: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) 15 but not-more than 21 years of age on election
are fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age, and who are duly registered day, i.e., the voter must be born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a
in the list of the sangguniang kabataan or in the official barangay list in the custody of the resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and an actual resident of the barangay at
barangay secretary." least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections. A candidate for the SK must: (a)
possess the foregoing qualifications of a voter; (b) be a resident in the barangay at least one
A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may become a candidate for the Sangguniang (1) year immediately preceding the elections; and (c) able to read and write.
Kabataan if he possesses the following qualifications:
Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications of a member and voter in
"Sec. 428. Qualifications. — An elective official of the sangguniang kabataan must be a the Katipunan ng Kabataan and a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan. Petitioner’s
citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter of the katipunan ng kabataan, a resident of the age is admittedly beyond the limit set in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.
barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to election, at least fifteen (15) years but Petitioner, however, argues that Section 3 [b] of Resolution No. 2824 is unlawful, ultra vires
not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on the day of his election, able to read and write and beyond the scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Filipino, English, or the local dialect, and must not have been convicted of any crime She contends that the Code itself does not provide that the voter must be exactly 21 years
involving moral turpitude. of age on election day. She urges that so long as she did not turn twenty-two (22) years old,
Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan she was still twenty-one years of age on election day and therefore qualified as a member
must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months; and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and as candidate for the SK elections.
(c) 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the
Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428 of the Code requires that A closer look at the Local Government Code will reveal a distinction between the maximum
an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a age of a member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective SK
qualified voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one (1) official. Section 424 of the Code sets a member’s maximum age at 21 years only. There is
year immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years but not more than 21 years of no further provision as to when the member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other
age on the day of his election; (e) able to read and write; and (f) must not have been hand, Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. "on the day of his election." The addition of the phrase "on the day of his election" is an
For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections 424 and 428 of the additional qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or
Local Government Code of 1991 in Resolution No. 2824 and defined how a member of the on the day he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official,
Katipunan ng Kabataan becomes a qualified voter and an elective official. Thus: however, must not be more than 21 years old on the day of election. The distinction is
understandable considering that the Code itself provides more qualifications for an elective
SK official than for a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio.
31 The courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the all, Kabataang Barangay leaders were already over 21 years of age by the time President
legislature intended a distinction or qualification. Aquino assumed power. 38 They were not the "youth" anymore. The Local Government
The qualification that a voter in the SK elections must not be more than 21 years of age on Code of 1991 fixed the maximum age limit at not more than 21 years 39 and the only
the day of the election is not provided in Section 424 of the Local Government Code of exception is in the second paragraph of Section 423 which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
1991. In fact the term "qualified voter" appears only in COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. 33
Since a "qualified voter" is not necessarily an elective official, then it may be assumed that a "Sec. 423. Creation and Election. — a) . . .;
"qualified voter" is a "member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan." Section 424 of the Code does
not provide that the maximum age of a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan is b) A sangguniang kabataan official who, during his term of office, shall have passed the age
determined on the day of the election. Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is of twenty-one (21) years shall be allowed to serve the remaining portion of the term for
therefore ultra vires insofar as it sets the age limit of a voter for the SK elections at exactly which he was elected.
21 years on the day of the election. The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must not be more
than 21 years of age on the day of his election. The only exception is when the official
The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency. Section 423 [b] of the Code allows him
the day of his election is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not to serve the remaining portion of the term for which he was elected. According to Senator
months nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days Pimentel, the youth leader must have "been elected prior to his 21st birthday. 40
each. 34 One born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be one year old Conversely, the SK official must not have turned 21 years old before his election. Reading
on the 365th day after his birth — the last day of the year. 35 In computing years, the first Section 423 [b] together with Section 428 of the Code, the latest date at which an SK
year is reached after completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the first day of elective official turns 21 years old is on the day of his election. The maximum age of a youth
the second 365-day cycle begins. On the 365th day of the second cycle, the person turns official must therefore be exactly 21 years on election day. Section 3 [b] in relation to
two years old. This cycle goes on and on in a lifetime. A person turns 21 years old on the Section 6 [a] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is not ultra vires insofar as it fixes the
365th day of his 21st 365-day cycle. This means on his 21st birthday, he has completed the maximum age of an elective SK official on the day of his election.
entire span of 21 365-day cycles. After this birthday, the 365-day cycle for his 22nd year
begins. The day after the 365th day is the first day of the next 365-day cycle and he turns In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996, the day she
22 years old on the 365th day. registered as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner was twenty-one (21) years
and nine (9) months old. On the day of the elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5
The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. days old. When she assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20
It means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction days old and was merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have
of a year because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. "Not more than 21 years old" qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the
is not equivalent to "less than 22 years old," contrary to petitioner’s claims. The law does not age limit for elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the Local Government Code and
state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day. Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824. She was ineligible to run as
candidate for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections.
In P.D. 684, the law that created the Kabataang Barangay, the age qualification of a The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public policy
barangay youth official was expressly stated as." . . at least fifteen years of age or over but and if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be declared ineligible. 41 In the
less than eighteen . . ." 36 This provision clearly states that the youth official must be at same vein, if the candidate is over the maximum age limit on the day of the election, he is
least 15 years old and may be 17 years and a fraction of a year but should not reach the ineligible. The fact that the candidate was elected will not make the age requirement
age of eighteen years. When the Local Government Code increased the age limit of directory, nor will it validate his election. The will of the people as expressed through the
members of the youth organization to 21 years, it did not reenact the provision in such a ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility.
way as to make the youth "at least 15 but less than 22 years old." If the intention of the The ineligibility of petitioner does not entitle private respondent, the candidate who obtained
Code’s framers was to include citizens less than 22 years old, they should have stated so the highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections, to be declared elected. A
expressly instead of leaving the matter open to confusion and doubt. defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. Moreover, despite his claims,
private respondent has failed to prove that the electorate themselves actually knew of
Former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, the sponsor and principal author of the Local petitioner’s ineligibility and that they maliciously voted for her with the intention of
Government Code of 1991 declared that one of the reasons why the Katipunan ng misapplying their franchises and throwing away their votes for the benefit of her rival
Kabataan was created and the Kabataang Barangay discontinued was because most, if not candidate.
Neither can this Court order that pursuant to Section 435 of the Local Government Code
petitioner should be succeeded by the Sangguniang Kabataan member who obtained the
next highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections. 48 Section 435 applies when a
Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman "refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, 49 is convicted
of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is removed from office, or
has been absent without leave for more than three (3) consecutive months.
The question of the age qualification is a question of eligibility. 50 Being "eligible" means
being "legally qualified; capable of being legally chosen." Ineligibility, on the other hand,
refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for
holding public office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for
succession of the SK Chairman.

To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court deems it necessary to order that
the vacancy be filled by the SK member chosen by the incumbent SK members of Barangay
San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte by simple majority from among themselves. The member
chosen shall assume the office of SK Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term, and
shall discharge the powers and duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to
said office.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is declared
ineligible for being over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of
the Sangguniang Kabataan, and is ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of the
Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Sangguniang
Kabataan member voted by simple majority by and from among the incumbent
Sangguniang Kabataan members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte shall
assume the office of Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui,
Ilocos Norte for the unexpired portion of the term.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.

 EN BANC as the regular 30-day month and not the solar or civil month," with the particularity that,
whereas the Spanish Code merely mentioned "months, days or nights," ours has added
[G.R. No. L-29131. August 27, 1969.] thereto the term "years" and explicitly ordains that "it shall be understood that years are of
three hundred sixty-five days."
NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION, plaintiff- appellant, v. MIGUEL D. TECSON,
ET AL., Defendants, MIGUEL D. TECSON, defendant-appellee, THE INSURANCE 4. SUPREME COURT; NO POWER OF LEGISLATION BY JUDICIAL DECREE. — Where,
COMMISSIONER, Petitioner. by upholding the theory of appellant, Article 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is ignored
and Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code is revived, the Court by such an
Government Corporate Counsel Leopoldo M. Abellera and Trial Atty. Antonio M. interpretation would be engaging in judicial legislation, and in effect, repealing an act of
Brillantes, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Congress. If public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised
Administrative Code, this may be done through legislative process, not by judicial decree.
Antonio T. Lacdan, for Defendant-Appellee.

The Solicitor General for Petitioner. DECISION

CONCEPCION, J.:

SYLLABUS This appeal has been certified to us by the Court of Appeals, only one question of law being
1. CIVIL LAW; PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS; ACTION FOR REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT; involved therein.
PERIOD THEREFOR. — Pursuant to Article 1144-(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a On November 14, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, in Civil
judgment "must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues," which, Case No. 20520 thereof, entitled "Price Stabilization Corporation v. Miguel D. Tecson and
in the language of Art. 1152 of the same Code "commences from the time judgment sought Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.," the dispositive part of which reads as follows.
to be revived has become final."cralaw virtua1aw library
"For the foregoing consideration, the Court decides this ease:
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESCRIBED IN INSTANT CASE. — An action for revival of judgment
which become final on December 21, 1955, was filed on December 21, 1965. The lower "(a) Ordering the defendants Miguel D. Tecson, and Alto Surety & Insurance Co. Inc. to pay
court dismissed the action on the ground of prescription, it having found that the aggregate jointly and severally plaintiff PRATRA the sum of P7,200.00 plus 7% interest from May 25,
of 10 years or 3,650 days from December 21, 1955 expired on December 19, 1965, there 1960 until the amount is fully paid, plus P500.00 for attorney’s fees, and plus costs;
being two leap years with the month of February of 29 days. HELD: The order of dismissal
should be affirmed. Art. 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines limits the computation of each "(b) Ordering defendant Miguel D. Tecson to indemnify his co-defendant Alto Surety &
"year" to 365 days. Insurance Co., Inc. on the cross-claim for all the amounts it would be made to pay in this
decision, in case defendant Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. pay the amount adjudged to
3. ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION OF MONTHS; JURISPRUDENCE. — Prior to the approval of plaintiff in this decision. From the date of such payment defendant Miguel D. Tecson would
the Civil Code of Spain, the Supreme Court thereof had held on March 30, 1887, that, when pay the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., interest at 12% per annum until Miguel D. Tecson
the law spoke of months, it meant a "natural" month or "solar" month, in the absence of has fully reimbursed plaintiff of the said amount."cralaw virtua1aw library
express provision to the contrary. Such provision was incorporated into the Civil Code of
Spain, subsequently promulgated. Hence, the same Supreme Court declared that, pursuant Copy of this decision was, on November 21, 1955, served upon the defendants in said
to Art. 7 of said Code, "whenever months . . . are referred to in the law, it shall be case. On December 21, 1965, the National Marketing Corporation, as successor to all the
understood that the months are of 30 days," not the "natural," "solar" or "calendar" months, properties, assets, rights and chooses in action of the Price Stabilization Corporation, as
unless they are "designated by name," in which case "they shall be computed by the actual plaintiff in that case and judgment creditor therein, filed, with the same court, a complaint,
number of days they have." This concept was later, modified in the Philippines, by Section docketed as Civil Case No. 63701 thereof, against the same defendants, for the revival of
13 of the Revised Administrative Code, pursuant to which, "month shall be understood to the judgment rendered in said Case No. 20520. Defendant Miguel D. Tecson moved to
refer to a calendar month." In the language of this Court, in People v. Del Rosario "with the dismiss said complaint, upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter
approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Republic Act 386) . . . we have reverted to the thereof and prescription of action. Acting upon the motion and plaintiff’s opposition thereto,
provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be considered said Court issued, on February 14, 1966, an order reading:
 "year" — as the term is used in our laws — to 365 days. Indeed, prior to the approval of the
"Defendant Miguel Tecson seeks the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of Civil Code of Spain, the Supreme Court thereof had held, on March 30, 1887, that, when the
jurisdiction and prescription. As for lack of jurisdiction, as the amount involved is less than law spoke of months, it meant a "natural" month or "solar" month, in the absence of express
P10,000 as actually these proceedings are a revival of a decision issued by this same court, provision to the contrary. Such provision was incorporated into the Civil Code of Spain,
the matter of jurisdiction must be admitted. But as for prescription. Plaintiffs admit the subsequently promulgated. Hence, the same Supreme Court declared 3 that, pursuant to
decision of this Court became final on December 21,1955. This case was filed exactly on Art. 7 of said Code," ‘whenever months . . . are referred to in the law, it shall be understood
December 21, 1965 — but more than ten years have passed a year is a period of 365 days that the months, are of 30 days", not the "natural", "solar" or "calendar" months, unless they
(Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot that 1960, 1964 were both leap years so that when this are "designated by name," in which case "they shall be computed by the actual number of
present case was filed it was filed two days too late. days they have." This concept was, later, modified in the Philippines, by Section 13 of the
Revised Administrative Code, pursuant to which, "month shall be understood to refer to a
"The complaint insofar as Miguel Tecson is concerned is, therefore, dismissed as having calendar month." 4 In the language of this Court, in People v. Del Rosario, 5 "with the
prescribed. approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Republic Act 386) . . . we have reverted to the
provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be considered
The National Marketing Corporation appealed from such order to the Court of Appeals, as the regular 30-day month . . . and not the solar or civil month," with the particularity that,
which, on March 20, 1969, certified the case to this Court, upon the ground that the only whereas the Spanish Code merely mentioned "months, days or nights," ours has added
question therein raised is one of law, namely, whether or not the present action for the thereto the term "years" and explicitly ordains that "it shall be understood that years are of
revival of a judgment is barred by the statute of limitations. three hundred sixty-five days."cralaw virtua1aw library

Pursuant to Art. 1144-(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a judgment "must be brought Although some members of the Court are inclined to think that this legislation is not realistic,
within ten years-from the time the right of action accrues," which, in the language of Art. for failure to conform with ordinary experience or practice, the theory of plaintiff-appellant
1152 of the same Code, "commences from the time the judgment sought to be revived has herein cannot be upheld without ignoring, if not nullifying, Art. 13 of our Civil Code, and
become final." This, in turn, took place on December 21, 1955, or thirty (30) days from reviving Section 13 of The Revised Administrative Code, thereby engaging in judicial
notice of the judgment — which was received by the defendants herein on November 21, legislation, and, in effect, repealing an act of Congress. If public interest demands a
1955 — no appeal having been taken therefrom. 1 The issue is thus confined to the date on reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised Administrative Code, this may be done
which ten (10) years from December 21, 1955 expired. through legislative process, not by judicial decree.

Plaintiff-appellant alleges that it was December 21, 1965, but appellee Tecson maintains WHEREFORE, the order appealed from should, as it is hereby affirmed, without costs. It is
otherwise, because "when the laws speak of years . . . it shall be understood that years are so ordered.
of three hundred sixty-five days each" — according to Art. 13 of our Civil Code - and, 1960
and 1964 being leap years, the month of February in both had 29 days, so that ten (10) Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ.,
years of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3,650 days, from December 21, 1955, expired concur.
on December 19, 1965. The lower court accepted this view in its appealed order of
dismissal. Reyes, J.B.L. and Zaldivar, JJ., are on official leave abroad.

Plaintiff-appellant insists that the same "is erroneous, because a year means a calendar
year (Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws, by Crowford, p. 383) and since what is
being computed here is the number of years, a calendar year should be used as the basis
of computation. There is no question that when it is not a leap year, December 21 to
December 21 of the following year is one year. If the extra day in a leap year is not a day of
the year, because it is the 366 day, then to what year does it belong? Certainly, it must
belong to the year where it falls and, therefore, that the 366 days constitute one year." 2

The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory contravenes the explicit
provision of Art. 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, limiting the connotation of each
 THIRD DIVISION On May 31, 1991, Lolita suffered abortion, losing her three-month old baby as a result of the
assaults she suffered from petitioners and the spouses Victor Majarocon and Frejia
G. R. No. 134039 - December 21, 2004 Marajocon.
Soon, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Manila, Lolita filed a complaint for damages
HEMINA M. ONGPAUCO and DAVE ALLEN M. MAJAROCON, petitioners, vs. THE against petitioners and the spouses Victor Marajocon and Frejia Majarocon.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI, respondents.
After trial, the RTC, in a decision dated August 18, 1993,2 rendered judgment for Lolita,
thus:
DECISION
GARCIA, J.: WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants sentencing the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs
Via this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners the amount of P500,000.00 for moral damages and another P500,000.00 for exemplary
Hemina M. Ongpauco and Dave Allen M. Majarocon seek the reversal of the decision dated damages, P25,000.00 for attorney's fees plus the costs of suit.
November 14, 19971 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 44317, affirming an earlier The counterclaim of the defendants is correspondingly dismissed.
decision of the Regional Trial Court at Manila, Branch VII, in a suit for damages thereat
commenced by the herein private respondent, Lolita R. Alamayri, against, among others, SO ORDERED.
the present petitioners. Petitioners and their co-defendants elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, whereat their
appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 44317.
The factual antecedents may be stated, as follows:
Private respondent, Lolita Alamayri (Lolita, for short), owned and operated the Alamayri In the herein assailed decision dated November 14, 1997,3 the Court of Appeals, adopting
Shoppers Mart located at the groundfloor of the Ongpauco Building at 501-C Edsa corner the findings of fact of the RTC, affirmed the appealed RTC decision, viz:
Bonifacio Serrano Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, which building is owned by petitioner
Hemina Ongpauco (Hemina, for brevity) and her spouse. The Alamayri family also rented a WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
unit at the third floor of the same building, which served as their residence. Apparently, defendants-appellants.
Lolita's contract of lease expired on January 31, 1991, but she refused to vacate the leased
premises, constraining Hemina and her husband to file an ejectment suit against her before SO ORDERED.
the MeTC of Quezon City on May 6, 1991.
Hence, petitioners' present recourse.
On May 3, 1991, however, while Lolita, who was then three-month in the family way, was At the outset, we note that on page 94 of their petition, petitioners candidly admit that based
attending to her grocery store at the groundfloor of the building, Hemina molested and on the official records of the Court of Appeals, a copy of the impugned decision was
attacked her by grabbing her hair, pulling her head to and fro and banging it and her body received by their counsel on December 3, 1997. For sure, a photocopy of the Registry
against the shelves and counters of her store. Victor (a.k.a. Vicente) Majarocon, Hemina's Receipt of the Court of Appeals was even attached as Annex "G"5 to the petition. Going,
brother-in-law, at Hemina's urgings, hit Lolita's head with a piece of wood while Frejia then, by what appears on record, petitioners had only until December 18, 1997 either to
Majarocon, Hemina's twin sister, and petitioner Dave Allen Majarocon (Dave, for brevity), appeal to this Court by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 or file a motion for
the son of Victor and Frejia, held Lolita's store helpers and clerks at bay, threatening them reconsideration under Rule 52, both of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It is not disputed,
with physical harm should they interfere. however, that petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals only
on December 27, 1997, a Saturday. Expectedly, said court, in its resolution of June 3,
On May 15, 1991, Hemina went back to Lolita's grocery store and once more attacked and 1998,6 denied the motion for having been filed "nine (9) days after the reglementary period".
lambasted her with invectives. Dave was again there to prevent Lolita's store helpers and
clerks from coming to her aid and rescue. On the same breath, however, petitioners claim that their motion for reconsideration was
On May 17, 1991, while Lolita and her 3-year old daughter were away from the premises, timely filed. Speaking through counsel, they alleged that as plainly indicated in their motion,
Hemina and her brother-in-law, Victor, closed the door of Lolita's apartment unit at the third a copy of the Court of Appeals' decision "was received on December 10, 1997 by a certain
floor of the building by driving four-inch nails, thus shutting out the unit completely. Mr. Garcia, a Security Guard in the building where the undersigned counsel holds office and
delivered to the undersigned counsel on December 11, 1997 xxx".7 Upon that premise, the statutory period is mandatory and jurisdictional (Delgado vs. Republic, 164 SCRA 347;
petitioners argue that their present recourse was timely filed. Sembrano vs. Ramirez, 166 SCRA 30; PCI Bank vs. Ortiz, 150 SCRA 380; Quiqui vs.
Boncaros, 151 SCRA 416)
In her comment to the petition, private respondent contends that as between the claim of
petitioners' counsel and the records of the Court of Appeals relative to petitioners' receipt of With the recognition of the fact that the decision subject of this petition had already become
the herein assailed decision, the latter must prevail. final and executory almost exactly seven (7) years ago, it will be an exercise in futility for
For being jurisdictional, this issue must first be resolved before we even venture into the this Court to dwell upon the errors therein assigned. And this Court will never allow itself to
errors assigned in the petition. Simply put, the question is: May the assailed decision of the delay any further the realization of what has been long adjudged in favor of private
Court of Appeals still be subject to review by this Court via the instant recourse, or has it respondent.
already become final and unappealable?
But even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that this petition was seasonably filed, still,
The Court rules against petitioners. petitioners' case is doomed.
As between petitioners' bare allegation in their pleading that their counsel received the
subject decision of the Court of Appeals on December 11, 1997, and the official records of We note that the main thrust of the petition is the alleged error of the two (2) courts below in
that court, showing that a copy of the same decision was received by petitioner's counsel on their factual findings and conclusions.
December 3, 1997, there can be no doubt at all that the latter shall prevail. It is basic in the
rule of evidence that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to Let alone the circumstance that his Court is not a trier of facts, there is the rule that factual
proof.8 issues are beyond the scope of certiorari because they do not involve any jurisdictional
issue (Abig v. Constantino, 2 SCRA 299; Bay v. RTC of Zamboanga City, 191 SCRA 610).
This Court must rely only on what appears in the official records of the court. The
determination of as to when the reglementary period commence cannot be left to the True, the rule against review of factual matters thru certiorari is not cast in stone, as
parties, otherwise there will be chaos. admittedly it admits of exceptions. We have, however, meticulously examined the records
And, based on records, the 15-day period for petitioners to appeal or file a motion for before us in the light of the pleadings filed by the parties, and found no error of substance
reconsideration started to run on December 3, 1997, not December 11, 1997, as argued by committed by the Court of Appeals to warrant an overthrow of its assailed decision.
them. Consequently, upon the lapse of said period on December 18, 1997, the questioned
decision of the Court of Appeals attained finality and is no longer appealable. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for having been filed out of time
and for lack of merit.
In Nacuray vs. NLRC,9 this Court reiterated the time-honored policy that -
SO ORDERED.
Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory it
becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion Corona, J., on leave.
of fact or law, and whether made by the highest court of the land (citing Nunal v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 94005, 6 April 1993, 221 SCRA 26). The reason is grounded on the
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional
error, the judgments or orders of courts must be final at some definite date fixed by law
(citing Garbo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100474, September 10, 1993, 226 SCRA 250).

Clear it is, therefore, that this Court can longer review the challenged decision of the Court
of Appeals. This brings to mind what we have stressed in Veloria vs. Comelec:10

Since the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a
statutory privilege that must be exercised in the manner and according to procedures laid
down by law (Borre vs. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 560), and its timely perfection within
 THIRD DIVISION Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein
respondent.
G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014 The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states
that:
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD RODERIGO That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of
NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner, v. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Respondent. Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately
deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a
DECISION fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic
PERALTA, J.: abuse to the victim.

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court CONTRARY TO LAW.
seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1,
2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order
the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, against respondent. Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.
docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which
otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. respondent filed his Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was
arraigned.
The following facts are culled from the records: Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order,
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the
contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged.
blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the
instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age. On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the
issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) information do not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien, the
months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines. dispositive part of which states:
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son
in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an
more or less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case
respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo. DISMISSED.
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan,
Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional
established a business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of liberty is hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.
Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are
presently living in Cebu City. SO ORDERED.

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph obligation to support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so
E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which “equally applies to all persons in the
petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s
submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a nationality.”24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus: mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact
and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in law.” (Emphasis supplied)
the memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since
the accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to give support to his child. Consequently, he cannot value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and
be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The
conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support to his resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent to circumstances.29
give such support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no prima facie case exists
against the accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed. Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response
thereto concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts,
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. i.e., whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for
SO ORDERED. his unjustified failure to do so.

Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26 It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law
concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues: punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties.
The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive
Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases.
Philippine law; and Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA would only
waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case, considerations
Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice should prevail over the
unjustified failure to support his minor child.27 observance of the hierarchy of courts.

At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless,
despite the fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with we do not fully agree with petitioner’s contentions.
the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,28 which lays down the
instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is
Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit: imperative that the legal obligation to support exists.

x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation
with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was to support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce
one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from
questions of law. complying with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.

In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis
the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby presented by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial
judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not
jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by obligated to petitioner for any financial support.33
the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. “The first mode of appeal is taken to the
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is
New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since the same as our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands
Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant
insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of
support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and
duties.36 Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera',45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a
foreign land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. nationality principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by
Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the respondent does not completely show that he is not liable to give support to his son after the
RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the
he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his child is
so.37 specifically stated,46 which was not disputed by respondent.

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that – We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent
states that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability, in light of the ruling in Bank of
Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:
are governed by their personal law, i.e., the laws of the nation to which they belong even
when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39 In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly
pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not
son under Article 195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant find applicability.
obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support
petitioner’s son altogether. Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established
public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case
has the burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
matter of provision of and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never upon in a foreign country.
proved the same.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during
or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent —
already enunciated that: If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one
or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not others.
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
proved. 43 injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important
function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.48
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s (i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her
obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of
still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children.51
be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to considered an act of violence against women and children.
support his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of
be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that:“[p]enal laws and those
her marital duties and obligations. It held: of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine
territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations.” On
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just . Petitioner should not be obliged to live herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served. (Emphasis added)50 Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that
there is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under liability has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of
Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support to R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:
petitioner’s son, to wit:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
against women and their children is committed through any of the following
acts:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a
xxxx continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the
crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which
the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s
or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or child calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth
her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other and falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to
harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.
This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect
of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and
September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby
xxxx REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally proceedings based on the merits of the case.
due her or her family , or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial
support; SO ORDERED.

xxxx Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Mendoza,*and Reyes, JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION Angelita bought a lot in Muntinlupa on which they had a house built in 1993. She also put up
a commercial building – which earned rentals – on another lot in Muntinlupa, which she and
G.R. No. 202039, August 14, 2019 her first husband, Reynaldo, previously bought together. The rest of Angelita's savings from
Germany went into putting up a school with her other family members and relatives.
ANGELITA SIMUNDAC-KEPPEL, PETITIONER, v. GEORG KEPPEL, RESPONDENT.
Angelita earned a considerable income from her business ventures, which she shared with
DECISION Georg. However, Angelita stopped giving Georg money in 1994 when she discovered that
BERSAMIN, C.J.: Georg was having extramarital affairs.
The courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws. To have evidentiary weight in a judicial Claiming that Georg was beating her up, Angelita and her two children left their home in
proceeding, the foreign laws should be alleged and proved like any other material fact. March 1996. Being the registered owner of their family home, Angelita sold the same to her
This Case sister. Despite said sale, Georg refused to vacate the house.
By this appeal, the petitioner assails the decision promulgated on September 26, 20111 by
the Court of Appeals (CA) that reversed the judgment rendered on June 21, 20062 by the On 26 March 1996, Angelita filed the instant petition for annulment of marriage on the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City in Civil Case No. 96-048. ground of Georg's alleged psychological incapacity. Georg opposed the petition, insisting
that the court should only issue a decree of legal separation with the consequent division of
Antecedents their properties and determination of Liselotte's custody. Angelita countered that there were
As summarized by the CA, the factual antecedents are as follows: no properties to divide between them because all the real properties that she acquired in the
In November 1972, petitioner Angelita Simundac Keppel (Angelita) left the Philippines to Philippines belong solely to her as a consequence of the agreement for complete separation
work in Germany as a nurse. In the hospital where Angelita worked, she met Reynaldo of property that they previously executed in Germany in 1991.
Macaraig (Reynaldo), also a nurse and fellow Filipino who had become a naturalized During trial, Angelita presented evidence of Georg's psychological incapacity through
German citizen. They fell in love and got married in Germany on 12 June 1976. Angelita medical reports and the like, as well as the contract for separation of property. On the other
and Reynaldo's union produced a son. hand, Georg presented evidence of the properties that they acquired during their marriage
After a few years of marriage, Angelita became attracted to another German nurse and that he thinks should be divided equally between them.
co-employee, Georg Keppel (Georg). Like Angelita, Georg was married to a Filipina nurse, Judgment of the RTC
with whom he had two children. Eventually, the attraction between Angelita and Georg On June 21, 2006, the RTC rendered judgment declaring the marriage of Angelita and
developed into an intimate affair. Not long after that, Reynaldo discovered Angelita's Georg null and void, to wit:
infidelity and they separated.
In the meantime, in February 1986, Angelita became a naturalized German citizen. Angelita WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
and her son left Germany to go home to the Philippines, where they planned to start over. a)[T]he marriage between spouses ANGELITA SIMUNDAC and GEORG KEPPEL which
While in the Philippines, Angelita continued communicating with Georg through letters and was solemnized on August 30, 1988 in Dulsburg, Germany, is hereby declared as null and
telephone calls. In July 1987, Georg's wife divorced him, and so Georg felt free to come to void in view of the psychological incapacity of defendant to perform the essential marital
the Philippines to meet Angelita's family in September 1987. obligations;
b)[A]ll the real and personal properties including the businesses subject of the instant suit is
In December 1987, Angelita returned to Germany to file divorce proceedings against (sic) hereby declared as forming part of the paraphernal property of petitioner;
Reynaldo, and she obtained the divorce decree she sought in June 1988. Shortly thereafter, c)[T]he spouses are directed to equally support their minor child Lisselotte Angela Keppel;
Angelita and Georg got married in Germany on 30 August 1988. On 21 November 1989, d)[T]he custody of the minor child is hereby declared as belonging to herein petitioner, the
Angelita gave birth in Germany to a daughter, whom they named Liselotte. mother, without prejudice to the visitorial rights accorded by law to defendant, unless the
said minor child chooses her father's custody, herein defendant.
In 1991, Angelita and Georg entered into an agreement for the complete separation of their SO ORDERED.
properties. At that time, Georg resigned from his job. To make matters worse, Georg was
diagnosed with early multiple sclerosis and could not work. Since Angelita's income was The RTC found both of the parties psychologically incapacitated but considered Georg's
barely enough to support them all, they decided to return and settle permanently in the incapacity to be more severe on the basis of the clinical finding that he had manifested an
Philippines in 1992. anti-social or psychopathic type of personality that translated to the symptomatic tendency
to deceive and injure Angelita. The RTC declared that as to the properties of the parties to
be distributed after the dissolution of the marriage, the business and personal properties The appeal fails to impress.
should be allocated to Angelita pursuant to the "Matrimony Property Agreement;" and that I.
the lands should exclusively belong to Angelita inasmuch as Georg, being a German citizen, Under the Nationality Principle, the petitioner
was absolutely prohibited from owning lands pursuant to Section 7, Article XVII of the cannot invoke Article 36 of the Family Code
Constitution. unless there is a German law that allows her to do so
A fundamental and obvious defect of Angelita's petition for annulment of marriage is that it
Decision of the CA seeks a relief improper under Philippine law in light of both Georg and Angelita being
On September 26, 2011, the CA promulgated its decision on appeal, reversing the RTC's German citizens, not Filipinos, at the time of the filing thereof. Based on the Nationality
findings, and thereby dismissing the complaint, disposing thusly: Principle, which is followed in this jurisdiction, and pursuant to which laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated 21 June 2006, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad,7 it was the pertinent German law that
Muntinlupa City in Civil Case No. 96-048 for Annulment of Marriage and Custody of Minor governed. In short, Philippine law finds no application herein as far as the family rights and
Child is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except for the trial court's declaration that all obligations of the parties who are foreign nationals are concerned
properties acquired in the Philippines by Angelita Simundac Keppel belong to her alone. In Morisono v. Morisono,8 we summarized the treatment of foreign divorce judgments in this
The complaint is DISMISSED. jurisdiction, thus:
SO ORDERED. The rules on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction can be summed up as follows: first,
Philippine laws do not provide for absolute divorce, and hence, the courts cannot grant the
The CA observed that Angelita did not prove the allegations in her complaint because she same; second, consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code, the marital bond
did not present the original of her divorce decree from Reynaldo Macaraig, her first spouse; between two (2) Filipino citizens cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained
that she did not also prove the German law that capacitated her to marry Georg; that in the abroad; third, an absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple who are both aliens may be
eyes of the court, therefore, there could be no annulment of the marriage between Angelita recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws;
and Georg to speak of because under Philippine law, Angelita had remained married to and fourth, in mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to
Reynaldo; that Angelita's evidence was insufficient to prove that either of the parties herein contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by
had been psychologically incapacitated to comply with essential marital obligations the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. [Bold underscoring supplied for
inasmuch as anti-social behavior did not equate to psychological incapacity; and that the emphasis.Accordingly, the petition for annulment initiated by Angelita fails scrutiny through
properties of the couple exclusively belonged to Angelita because Georg could not own the lens of the Nationality Principle.
lands in the Philippines. Firstly, what governs the marriage of the parties is German, not Philippine, law, and this
rendered it incumbent upon Angelita to allege and prove the applicable German law. We
Issues reiterate that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws; hence, the existence and
In this appeal, Angelita posits that the CA erred in not declaring her marriage with Georg contents of such laws are regarded as questions of fact, and, as such, must be alleged and
null and void inasmuch as Georg was suffering from psychological incapacity that rendered proved like any other disputed fact.9 Proof of the relevant German law may consist of any of
him incapable to fulfill his essential marital obligations as borne out by the medical findings; the following, namely: (1) official publications of the law; or (2) copy attested to by the officer
that being then a German citizen, she need not prove the dissolution of her marriage with having legal custody of the foreign law. If the official record is not kept in the Philippines, the
Reynaldo, or the validity of her marriage with Georg because Philippine law did not apply in copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
both instances; and that as alleged in her petition she had recently re-acquired her Filipino officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
citizenship. kept; and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.10 Angelita did not comply with the
Georg counters that the evidence presented was not sufficient basis to conclude that he requirements for pleading and proof of the relevant German law.
was psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations; and that the
prohibition against land ownership by aliens did not apply because the bulk of the properties And, secondly, Angelita overlooked that German and Philippine laws on annulment of
of the spouses consisted of personal properties that were not covered by the Constitutional marriage might not be the same. In other words, the remedy of annulment of the marriage
prohibition. due to psychological incapacity afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code might not be
Did the CA err in sustaining the validity of the marriage of the parties? Are the lower courts available for her. In the absence of a showing of her right to this remedy in accordance with
correct in awarding all the properties of the spouses in favor of Angelita? German law, therefore, the petition should be dismissed.
Ruling of the Court
II. application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
Assuming the remedy was proper, the petitioner did not cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
prove the respondent's psychological incapacity explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
Even if we were now to adhere to the concept of processual presumption,11 and assume psychologists.
that the German law was similar to the Philippine law as to allow the action under Article 36 (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
of the Family Code to be brought by one against the other party herein, we would still affirm marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
the CA's dismissal of the petition brought under Article 36 of the Family Code. their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
Notable from the RTC's disquisition is the fact that the psychiatrists found that both parties illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
had suffered from anti-social behavior that became the basis for the trial court's conclusion (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
that they had been both psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential martial Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
obligations. Therein lay the reason why we must affirm the CA. necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity
Jurisprudentially speaking, psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
obligations or ill will. The disorder consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood
psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse did not meet his or her responsibility and changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
incapable of doing so because of some psychological illness. less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
Psychological incapacity is unlike any other disorder that would invalidate a marriage. It adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
should refer to a mental incapacity that causes a party to be incognitive of the basic marital from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 the Court issued the following guidelines for the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit: must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt decision.
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its Here, however, the petitioner presented no evidence to show that the anti-social behavior
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws manifested by both parties had been grave, and had existed at the time of the celebration of
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an the marriage as to render the parties incapable of performing all the essential marital
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees obligations provided by law. As the records bear out, the medical experts merely concluded
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the that the behavior was grave enough as to incapacitate the parties from the performance of
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. their essential marital relationship because the parties exhibited symptoms of an anti-social
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and personality disorder. Also, the incapacity was not established to have existed at the time of
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. the celebration of the marriage. In short, the conclusion about the parties being
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically psychologically incapacitated was not founded on sufficient evidence.
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be III.
psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be Former Filipinos have the limited right to own
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was public agricultural lands in the Philippines
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the We next deal with the ownership of lands by aliens.
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption Properties accumulated by a married couple may either be real or personal. While the RTC
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the awarded herein all personal properties in favor of Angelita pursuant to the "Matrimonial
Property Agreement" executed in Germany, it ignored that such agreement was governed of the privilege herein granted: Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area
by the national law of the contracting parties; and that the forms and solemnities of acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
contracts, wills, and other public instruments should be governed by the laws of the country In case the transferee already owns urban or rural land for business or other purposes, he
in which they are executed. shall still be entitled to be a transferee of additional urban or rural land for business or other
Angelita did not allege and prove the German law that allowed her to enter into and adopt purposes which when added to those already owned by him shall not exceed the maximum
the regime of complete separation of property through the "Matrimonial Property areas herein authorized.
Agreement." In the absence of such allegation and proof, the German law was presumed to A transferee under this Act may acquire not more than two (2) lots which should be situated
be the same as that of the Philippines. in different municipalities or cities anywhere in the Philippines: Provided, That the total land
In this connection, we further point out Article 77 of the Family Code declares that marriage area thereof shall not exceed five thousand (5,000) square meters in the case of urban land
settlements and any modification thereof shall be made in writing and signed by the parties or three (3) hectares in the case of rural land for use by him for business or other purposes.
prior to the celebration of the marriage. Assuming that the relevant German law was similar A transferee who has already acquired urban land shall be disqualified from acquiring rural
to the Philippine law, the "Matrimonial Property Agreement," being entered into by the land area and vice versa.
parties in 1991, or a few years after the celebration of their marriage on August 30, 1988, As the foregoing indicates, Angelita did not have any unlimited right to own lands. On the
could not be enforced for being in contravention of a mandatory law. other hand, the records were not clear on whether or not she had owned real property as
allowed by law. It was imperative for the lower courts to determine so. Hence, remand for
Also, with the parties being married on August 30, 1988, the provisions of the Family Code further proceedings is called for.
should govern. Pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code, the property relations between the It is true that Angelita stated in her petition that she had meanwhile re-acquired Filipino
spouses were governed by the absolute community of property. This would then entitle citizenship.17 This statement remained unsubstantiated, but the impact thereof would be far
Georg to half of the personal properties of the community property. reaching if the statement was true, for there would then be no need to determine whether or
As to the real properties of the parties, several factual considerations were apparently not Angelita had complied with Section 5 of R.A. No. 8179. Thus, the remand of the case
overlooked, or were not established. will enable the parties to adduce evidence on this aspect of the case, particularly to provide
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that: "Save in cases of hereditary factual basis to determine whether or not Angelita had validly re-acquired her Filipino
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, citizenship; and, if she had, to ascertain what would be the extent of her ownership of the
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." It real assets pertaining to the marriage. If the remand should establish that she had remained
seems clear, however, that the lower courts were too quick to pronounce that Georg, being a foreigner, it must next be determined whether or not she complied with the limits defined
a German citizen, was automatically disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines. or set by R.A. No. 8179 regarding her land ownership. The trial court shall award her the
Without disputing the inherent validity of the pronouncement, we nonetheless opine that the real property that complied with the limits of the law, and inform the Office of the Solicitor
lower courts missed to take note of the fact that Angelita, in view of her having admitted that General for purposes of a proper disposition of any excess land whose ownership violated
she herself had been a German citizen, suffered the same disqualification as Georg. the law.
Consequently, the lower courts' pronouncement awarding all real properties in favor of
Angelita could be devoid of legal basis as to her. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the
decision promulgated on September 26, 2011 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
At best, an alien could have enjoyed a limited right to own lands. Section 8, Article XII of the 89297 subject to the MODIFICATION that the personal properties of the parties are to be
Constitution provides: "Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a equally divided between them; and REMANDS the case to the court of origin for the
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a determination of the issues deriving from the petitioner's re-acquisition of her Filipino
transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law." Section 5 of Republic Act citizenship as far as the ownership of the land pertaining to the parties is concerned
No. 8179 (An Act Amending the Foreign Investments Act of 1991) also states: consistent with this decision.
Sec. 10. Other Rights of Natural Born Citizen Pursuant to the Provisions of Article XII,
Section 8 of the Constitution. — Any natural born citizen who has lost his Philippine No pronouncement on costs of suit.
citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may
be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of five thousand (5,000) square SO ORDERED.
meters in the case of urban land or three (3) hectares in the case of rural land to be used by
him for business or other purposes. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza, Gesmundo, and Carandang, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument that the divorce decree
Manila obtained by respondent is void. Thus, the divorce decree is no bar to the trial court’s
exercise of jurisdiction over the case.
SECOND DIVISION In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration, holding that unlike in
the case of respondent, the divorce decree is binding on petitioner under the laws of his
G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010 nationality.
HERALD BLACK DACASIN, Petitioner,
vs. Hence, this petition.
SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN, Respondent. Petitioner submits the following alternative theories for the validity of the Agreement to
justify its enforcement by the trial court: (1) the Agreement novated the valid divorce decree,
DECISION modifying the terms of child custody from sole (maternal) to joint;8 or (2) the Agreement is
CARPIO, J.: independent of the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
The Case
For review1 is a dismissal of a suit to enforce a post-foreign divorce child custody The Issue
agreement for lack of jurisdiction. The question is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit
and enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties’ child.
The Facts
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo The Ruling of the Court
Dacasin (respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to enforce the Agreement
daughter, Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and which is void. However, factual and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of
obtained from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a petitioner’s suit and call for the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie’s
divorce decree against petitioner.3 In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of custody.
petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained
jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes. Regional Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdiction
to Enforce Contracts
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement4 Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial
) for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil
to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.9 An action for specific performance, such as
Illinois court an order "relinquishing" jurisdiction to Philippine courts. petitioner’s suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 actions.10 Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.
(trial court) to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement,
respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie. Indeed, the trial court’s refusal to entertain petitioner’s suit was grounded not on its lack of
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois court’s divorce decree stripped it of
because of the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree. jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was "jurisdiction x
x x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of [its] Judgment for
The Ruling of the Trial Court Dissolution."11 Petitioner’s suit seeks the enforcement not of the "various provisions" of the
In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court sustained respondent’s motion and divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that: (1) it is precluded from lies beyond the zone of the Illinois court’s so-called "retained jurisdiction."
taking cognizance over the suit considering the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to
enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to Petitioner’s Suit Lacks Cause of Action
respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the "nationality rule" The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the Agreement which is
prevailing in this jurisdiction;5 and (3) the Agreement is void for contravening Article 2035, contrary to law.
paragraph 5 of the Civil Code6 prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction.7
In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of agreement subject
to the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or It could very well be that Article 213’s bias favoring one separated parent (mother) over the
public policy.12 Otherwise, the contract is denied legal existence, deemed "inexistent and other (father) encourages paternal neglect, presumes incapacity for joint parental custody,
void from the beginning."13 For lack of relevant stipulation in the Agreement, these and robs the parents of custodial options, or hijacks decision-making between the separated
other ancillary Philippine substantive law serve as default parameters to test the validity of parents.25 However, these are objections which question the law’s wisdom not its validity or
the Agreement’s joint child custody stipulations. uniform enforceability. The forum to air and remedy these grievances is the legislature, not
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts are this Court. At any rate, the rule’s seeming harshness or undesirability is tempered by
undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under seven years old (having been born on 21 September ancillary agreements the separated parents may wish to enter such as granting the father
1995); and (2) petitioner and respondent were no longer married under the laws of the visitation and other privileges. These arrangements are not inconsistent with the regime of
United States because of the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law on child custody sole maternal custody under the second paragraph of Article 213 which merely grants to the
for spouses separated in fact or in law15 (under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the mother final authority on the care and custody of the minor under seven years of age, in
Family Code) is also undisputed: "no child under seven years of age shall be separated case of disagreements.
from the mother x x x."16 (This statutory awarding of sole parental custody17 to the mother
is mandatory,18 grounded on sound policy consideration,19 subject only to a narrow Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph of Article 213 is limited
exception not alleged to obtain here.20 ) Clearly then, the Agreement’s object to establish a in duration, lasting only until the child’s seventh year. From the eighth year until the child’s
post-divorce joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their child under emancipation, the law gives the separated parents freedom, subject to the usual contractual
seven years old contravenes Philippine law. limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly, even supposing that
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been petitioner and respondent are not barred from entering into the Agreement for the joint
repudiated by the mother when she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The custody of Stephanie, respondent repudiated the Agreement by asserting sole custody over
Agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law Stephanie. Respondent’s act effectively brought the parties back to ambit of the default
provides for joint parental authority when spouses live together.21 However, upon custodial regime in the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code vesting on
separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is below respondent sole custody of Stephanie.
seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint
custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or divorced spouses. Simply Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree’s alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois
put, for a child within this age bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), the law decides court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the
for the separated or divorced parents how best to take care of the child and that is to give divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse26 - to support the Agreement’s enforceability.
custody to the separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away the The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is
provision in the Family Code on the maternal custody of children below seven years hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo27 settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a
anymore than they can privately agree that a mother who is unemployed, immoral, Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad.28 There, we dismissed the alien
habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will have sole divorcee’s Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and
custody of a child under seven as these are reasons deemed compelling to preclude the rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid
application of the exclusive maternal custody regime under the second paragraph of Article in this jurisdiction in this wise:
213.
It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code applies There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
only to judicial custodial agreements based on its text that "No child under seven years of United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
otherwise." To limit this provision’s enforceability to court sanctioned agreements while Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
placing private agreements beyond its reach is to sanction a double standard in custody jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
regulation of children under seven years old of separated parents. This effectively
empowers separated parents, by the simple expedient of avoiding the courts, to subvert a It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
legislative policy vesting to the separated mother sole custody of her children under seven Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
years of age "to avoid a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her."23 considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
This ignores the legislative basis that "[n]o man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
who is deprived of her child of tender age. according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
xxxx
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to Associate Justice
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s JOSE P. PEREZ
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not Associate Justice
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property. (Emphasis supplied) ATTE STATI O N

We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera29 to dismiss criminal complaints for I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
adultery filed by the alien divorcee (who obtained the foreign divorce decree) against his the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
former Filipino spouse because he no longer qualified as "offended spouse" entitled to file
the complaints under Philippine procedural rules. Thus, it should be clear by now that a ANTONIO T. CARPIO
foreign divorce decree carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction Associate Justice
as it does in the jurisdiction of the alien’s nationality, irrespective of who obtained the Chairperson
divorce.
C E RTI F I CATI O N
The Facts of the Case and Nature of Proceeding Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Justify Remand Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioner’s suit, the logical end to its lack of cause of consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
action, we remand the case for the trial court to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody. Division.
Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus removing the case outside of the ambit of the
mandatory maternal custody regime under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of the REYNATO S. PUNO
default standard on child custody proceedings – the best interest of the child.30 As the Chief Justice
question of custody is already before the trial court and the child’s parents, by executing the
Agreement, initially showed inclination to share custody, it is in the interest of swift and
efficient rendition of justice to allow the parties to take advantage of the court’s jurisdiction,
submit evidence on the custodial arrangement best serving Stephanie’s interest, and let the
trial court render judgment. This disposition is consistent with the settled doctrine that in
child custody proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve the child’s best interest.31

WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60. The case is REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this ruling.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 FIRST DIVISION and was witnessed by Paula’s father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by
Notary Public Pedro Osabel.
G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000 Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was
vs. represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents. November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San
Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of
DECISION divorce.
PARDO, J. On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
The Case On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.13 Apparently, Alicia had
The case raises a conflict of laws issue. no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals1 modifying that of not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.
the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City2 declaring respondent Alicia From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.15 Their
F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as co-owners of whatever property she and twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed
the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo") may have acquired Llorente.
during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife. On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by
Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses
The Facts Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.3 "(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the
"Paula") were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines personal properties and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing therein;
Sur. "(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F.
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties
stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur. whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at Barangay
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay
of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua,
Southern District of New York. Camarines Sur;
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted "(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my
an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines.7 He children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real
discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal,
Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate Philippines;
and the line for the father’s name was left blank. "(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other
drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among
United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily themselves;
maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in "(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will
accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the
their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not order of age, if of age;
prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to "(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served
separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula (sic) without bond;
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods,
heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me; chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the the possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all
Llorente’s Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or
Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and required by this court; to render a true and just account of her administration to the court
bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament."17 within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court and to perform all
orders of this court by her to be performed.
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a
petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved "On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be
that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. granted.
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator
Lorenzo was still alive. "SO ORDERED."
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted
to probate. decision.
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition22 for letters of modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children "legitimate
administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him.29 Amending its
Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate
marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free
children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property. portion of the estate.
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due the decision of the trial court in this wise:
course to Paula’s petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "Bicol Star". "WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus: that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have
"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he
contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being "SO ORDERED."
so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration
Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially of the decision.
said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under
Art. 739 (1). On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so
declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as The Issue
void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised,36 the
properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial
all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
remaining free portion in equal shares.
"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, The Applicable Law
Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor
upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already
the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal,
(4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed. especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law. Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
The Civil Code clearly provides: Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country they are valid according to their national law.
where it is situated. Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,41 that once proven
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose lose her right to inherit" from him.
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found." (emphasis ours) country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
proved. For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the reversed.43 We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife
foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of
where the case was "referred back" to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the
Philippine law. determination of the trial court.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven,
in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that Validity of the Will
"American law follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when The Civil Code provides:
determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will.38
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
First, there is no such thing as one American law.1ªwph!1 The "national law" indicated in governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such "When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine
union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can laws shall be observed in their execution." (underscoring ours)
therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident.39 The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her
Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he
required by New York State law. was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and
legal capacity."
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best
favor of Alice, who in the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in
will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing. accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact,
the will was duly probated.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of
whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs
of the Civil Code of the Philippines. may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to
the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional
rights to the decedent's national law.45

Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R.
SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N.
Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego,
made final on December 4, 1952.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the
intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional
rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all
deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of
Court.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
 action.16 Respondent Union Bank likewise filed a motion to dismiss while respondent PSB
SECOND DIVISION filed an answer.

G.R. No. 217365, August 14, 2019 On March 11, 2014, petitioners filed an amended complaint in view of the sale of the Bel Air
Property to Sefuel Siy Yap.
HEIRS OF SATRAMDAS V. SADHWANI AND KISHNIBAI S. SADHWANI,
REPRESENTED BY RAMCHAND S. SADHWANI AND RAJAN S. SADHWANI, In the Assailed Resolution, the RTC granted respondents' motions to dismiss on the
PETITIONERS, v. GOP S. SADHWANI AND KANTA G. SADHWANI, UNION BANK OF grounds of lack of legal capacity to sue, failure to state a cause of action, and lack of cause
THE PHILIPPINES, PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF of action.
MAKATI, RESPONDENTS The RTC held, among others, that based on the death certificates attached to the
Complaint, the Sps. Sadhwani were Indian nationals.20 Hence, the Sps. Sadhwani were
DECISION prohibited under Article XII, Section 721 of the 1987 Constitution from owning the subject
CAGUIOA, J.: properties or transmitting any rights over the same to their children upon their deaths.22 A
perusal of the Assailed Resolution suggests that the Complaint was dismissed for failure to
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court state a cause of action as petitioners premised their action for reconveyance on their
assailing the January 6, 20152 (Assailed Resolution) and March 18, 20153 Resolutions of purported rights as heirs of their parents.
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 59, which granted respondents'
motions to dismiss on the grounds of lack of legal capacity to sue, failure to plead a cause Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC in its March 18,
of action, and lack of cause of action. 2015 Order.
Petitioners thus filed the instant Petition25 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules),
The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings alleging, among others, that the RTC erred in holding: 1) that petitioners failed to plead a
The instant dispute involves conflicting claims of ownership over: 1) a parcel of land located cause of action;26 2) that petitioners had no personality to sue;27 and 3) that petitioners
at 58 Aries St., Bel Air, Makati (Bel Air Property), and 2) condominium unit 602-A at the Ritz lacked a cause of action.28 Contrary to the findings of the RTC, petitioners now claim that
Tower, Ayala Avenue, Makati City (Ritz Condominium Unit) (together, subject properties).5 they are asserting rights as beneficiaries of the resulting trust to the proceeds from the sale
The subject properties were allegedly purchased by the Spouses Satramdas and Kishnibai of the subject properties.
Sadhwani6 (Sps. Sadhwani) and the titles thereof were allegedly placed in the name of their
son, herein respondent Gop S. Sadhwani (respondent Gop), in trust for his parents and In their Comment,30 respondents Gop and Kanta argue that: 1) the Petition should be
siblings. dismissed for being the wrong mode of appeal considering that questions of fact were
On November 13, 2013, the other legitimate children of the Sps. Sadhwani (petitioners) filed raised;31 2) the Complaint failed to state a cause of action;32 3) petitioners have no
a Complaint for Reconveyance, Partition, Accounting, Declaration of Nullity of Documents, personality to sue; 4) petitioners cannot deviate from their theory of the case in the
Injunction and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction & Complaint; and 5) Republic Act No. (RA) 4726 prohibits aliens from owning condominium
Temporary Restraining Order8 (Complaint) against their brother Gop, his wife Kanta units.
(respondent Kanta), Union Bank of the Philippines (respondent Union Bank), Philippine Respondent Union Bank likewise claims34 that: 1) the Petition failed to conform to the
Savings Bank (respondent PSB), and the Register of Deeds of Makati City, praying that they requirements of Rule 45 for it was not based on questions of law;35 2) in resolving a Motion
likewise be declared lawful owners of the subject properties as heirs and legitimate children to Dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, the RTC may consider the documents
of the Sps. Sadhwani,9 in accordance with a purported express trust10 agreement and the attached to the complaint;36 3) petitioners have no personality to sue;37 4) the implied trust
provisions of the Civil Code on succession.11 Respondents Union Bank and PSB were was a circumvention of the constitutional prohibition on acquisition by foreigners of private
impleaded because respondent Gop purportedly obtained various loans secured by real land;38 and 5) it should be dropped as a respondent as the real estate mortgage constituted
estate mortgages over the subject property. in its favor has been extinguished.
Respondent PSB similarly argues40 that petitioners have no personality and legal capacity
On November 27, 2013, respondents Gop and Kanta, filed a motion to dismiss,13 alleging, to sue.41 As the Sps. Sadhwani were forbidden to own the subject properties, petitioners
among others, that: 1) the action had prescribed and was unenforceable;14 2) that may not invoke any interest over the same as heirs of said spouses.
petitioners had no capacity to sue;15 and that 3) the complaint failed to state a cause of
Issue (i)That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the
The issues pending before the Court may be summarized as follows: 1) whether petitioners statute of frauds; and
availed of the correct remedy to challenge the dismissal of the Complaint; and 2) whether (j)That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.
the Complaint was correctly dismissed. Section 5 of the same Rule, recites the effect of a dismissal under Sections 1(f), (h), and (i),
thereof, thus:
The Court's Ruling SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal. — Subject to the right of appeal, an order granting a motion to
The Petition lacks merit. dismiss based on paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the
Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy and disregarded the hierarchy of courts same action or claim.
Rule 41, Section 1 expressly states that no appeal may be taken from an order dismissing Briefly stated, dismissals that are based on the following grounds, to wit: (1) that the cause
an action without prejudice.43 In such cases, the remedy available to the aggrieved party is of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; (2) that the claim or
to file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.44 In demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise
Strongworld Construction Corp. v. Perello,45 the Court explained: extinguished; and (3) that the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under
[W]ith the advent of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, an order of dismissal the provisions of the statute of frauds, bar the refiling of the same action or claim. Logically,
without prejudice is no longer appealable, as expressly provided by Section 1(h), Rule 41 the nature of the dismissal founded on any of the preceding grounds is "with prejudice"
thereof. In Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation v. Philippine because the dismissal prevents the refiling of the same action or claim. Ergo, dismissals
Infrastructures, Inc., this Court had the opportunity to resolve whether an order dismissing a based on the rest of the grounds enumerated are without prejudice because they do not
petition without prejudice should be appealed by way of ordinary appeal, petition for review preclude the refiling of the same action.
on certiorari or a petition for certiorari. The Court said that, indeed, prior to the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, an order dismissing an action may be appealed by ordinary Verily, the dismissal of petitioners' Complaint by the court a quo was not based on any of
appeal. Verily, Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure recites the the grounds specified in Section 5, Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure;
instances when appeal may not be taken, specifically, in case of an order dismissing an rather, it was grounded on what was encapsulated in Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the 1997
action without prejudice, in which case, the remedy available to the aggrieved party is Rule Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. As the trial court ratiocinated in its 9 January 1998 Order,
65. the Complaint is not prosecuted by the proper party in interest. Considering the heretofore
discussion, we can say that the order of dismissal was based on the ground that the
xxxx Complaint states no cause of action. For this reason, the dismissal of petitioners' Complaint
We distinguish a dismissal with prejudice from a dismissal without prejudice. The former cannot be said to be a dismissal with prejudice which bars the refiling of the same action.46
disallows and bars the refiling of the complaint; whereas, the same cannot be said of a (Underscoring supplied)
dismissal without prejudice. Likewise, where the law permits, a dismissal with prejudice is A perusal of the Assailed Resolution unequivocally shows that the action was dismissed
subject to the right of appeal. without prejudice. Although respondents claimed in their motions to dismiss that the action
xxxx had prescribed and was unenforceable47 under Rule 16, Sections 1(f) and l(i) respectively,
Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure enumerates the grounds the RTC's dismissal was premised on the finding that petitioners were suing as heirs of the
for which a Motion to Dismiss may be filed, viz.: Sps. Sadhwani who, being Indian nationals, were prohibited from owning the subject
SECTION 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or properties and therefore could not transmit rights over the same through succession.48 In
pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following other words, the dismissal was based on Rule 16, Section 1(g), i.e., that the Complaint
grounds: states no cause of action.
(a)That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
(b)That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim; As the dismissal was without prejudice (not having been premised on Sections 1(f), (h) or (i)
(c)That venue is improperly laid; of Rule 16), the remedy of appeal was not available. Instead, petitioners should have simply
(d)That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue; refiled the complaint.
(e)That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; Notably, the RTC also grounded the dismissal on petitioners' alleged lack of cause of
(f)That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; action.49 In Westmont Bank v. Funai Phils., Corp.,50 the Court distinguished failure to state
(g)That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; a cause of action and lack of cause of action in this wise:
(h)That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived,
abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;
"Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to dismiss xxxx
a particular action. The former refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, (g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; x x x
while the latter to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Dismissal for failure to The case of Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited v. Catalan laid down the
state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of the proceedings through a test to determine the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, to wit:
motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, while dismissal for lack of cause of
action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges
stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff." facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the court render
a valid judgment upon the facts alleged therein? The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the
Considering that, in this case, no stipulations, admissions, or evidence have yet been veracity of the material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis
presented, it is perceptibly impossible to assess the insufficiency of the factual basis on on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that
which Sheriff Cachero asserts his cause of action. Hence, the ground of lack of cause of may be presented by the defendants.
action could not have been the basis for the dismissal of this action.51
By filing a Motion to Dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material
As applied to the instant case, lack of cause of action could not have been the basis for the allegations of the ultimate facts contained in the plaintiffs complaint. When a motion to
dismissal of the instant action considering that no stipulations, admissions or evidence have dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling thereon should, as a
yet been presented. The RTC's inaccurate pronouncement, however, should have been rule, be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint.54 (Underscoring supplied)
challenged through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari and not through an appeal, as expressly Based on the foregoing, the Court agrees with the RTC that petitioners failed to state a
provided in Rule 41, Section 1. Moreover, the challenge should have been brought to the cause of action because they premised their claim of ownership over the subject properties
Court of Appeals instead of filing the same directly with the Court, in accordance with the as heirs of the Sps. Sadhwani who were unquestionably Indian nationals.55
rule on hierarchy of courts.52
In Matthews v. Taylor56 (Matthews) the Court exhaustively explained the constitutional
In view of the foregoing, the instant Petition must be dismissed as petitioners availed prohibition against foreign ownership of public and private lands, viz.:
themselves of the wrong remedy and violated the hierarchy of courts.
The complaint failed to state a cause of action. Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
In Philippine National Bank v. Spouses Rivera,53 the Court explained: Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure defines a cause of action as the lands of the public domain.
act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. Its elements are as follows:
1)A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of
created; the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision, they are also
2)An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of this constitutional provision
and is the conservation of the national patrimony. Our fundamental law cannot be any clearer.
3)Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or The right to acquire lands of the public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.
may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
xxxx In Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, cited in Muller v. Muller, we had the occasion to explain
If the allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of the above elements, the the constitutional prohibition:
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a Under Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of
cause of action which is the proper remedy under Section 1 (g) of Rule 16 of the Revised public agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands,
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides: their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving
agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino
Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to
pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following prevent this result that Section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
grounds:
Section 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be that when the spouses acquired the Antipolo property, he had it titled in the name of the
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to petitioner because of said prohibition. Hence, we denied his attempt at subsequently
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. asserting a right to the said property in the form of a claim for reimbursement. Neither did
the Court declare that an implied trust was created by operation of law in view of petitioner's
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural marriage to respondent. We said that to rule otherwise would permit circumvention of the
resources may leak into [aliens'] hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation constitutional prohibition.
of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their
becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens x x x. In Frenzel v. Catito, petitioner, an Australian citizen, was married to Teresita Santos; while
xxxx respondent, a Filipina, was married to Klaus Muller. Petitioner and respondent met and later
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or cohabited in a common-law relationship, during which petitioner acquired real properties;
lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and and since he was disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines, respondent's name
possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and appeared as the vendee in the deeds of sale. When their relationship turned sour, petitioner
whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any filed an action for the recovery of the real properties registered in the name of respondent,
area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health claiming that he was the real owner. Again, as in the other cases, the Court refused to
and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses declare petitioner as the owner mainly because of the constitutional prohibition. The Court
and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General's added that being a party to an illegal contract, he could not come to court and ask to have
Brief, p. 6) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or property by knowingly
question. engaging in an illegal contract may not maintain an action for his losses.

The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private Finally, in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court, petitioner (an American citizen) and
lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. There is no rule Criselda Cheesman acquired a parcel of land that was later registered in the latter's name.
more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to Criselda subsequently sold the land to a third person without the knowledge of the
circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through another. In a long line of cases, we petitioner. The petitioner then sought the nullification of the sale as he did not give his
have settled issues that directly or indirectly involve the above constitutional provision. We consent thereto. The Court held that assuming that it was his (petitioner's) intention that the
had cases where aliens wanted that a particular property be declared as part of their lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the
father's estate; that they be reimbursed the funds used in purchasing a property titled in the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land,
name of another; that an implied trust be declared in their (aliens') favor; and that a contract vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; thus, the sale as to him
of sale be nullified for their lack of consent. was null and void.

In Ting Ho, Jr. v. Teng Gui, Felix Ting Ho, a Chinese citizen, acquired a parcel of land, In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we find and so hold that Benjamin has no right to
together with the improvements thereon. Upon his death, his heirs (the petitioners therein) nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is
claimed the properties as part of the estate of their deceased father, and sought the partition absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering
of said properties among themselves. We, however, excluded the land and improvements that Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property,
thereon from the estate of Felix Ting Ho, precisely because he never became the owner she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin's claim that
thereof in light of the above-mentioned constitutional prohibition. he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it
was illegal no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can
In Muller v. Muller, petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the
were married in Germany. During the subsistence of their marriage, respondent purchased conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or
a parcel of land in Antipolo City and constructed a house thereon. The Antipolo property personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the
was registered in the name of the petitioner. They eventually separated, prompting the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of
respondent to file a petition for separation of property. Specifically, respondent prayed for conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the
reimbursement of the funds he paid for the acquisition of said property. In deciding the case constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the
in favor of the petitioner, the Court held that respondent was aware that as an alien, he was alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a
prohibited from owning a parcel of land situated in the Philippines. He had, in fact, declared
decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not 30. Plaintiffs have acquired legal and equitable titles or interest in the two real properties
permit him to have.57 (Underscoring supplied) subject of this complaint on account that as heirs they are entitled to equal share to the
In sum, aliens are absolutely prohibited from acquiring public or private lands in the properties of their parents.61 (Underscoring supplied)
Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions58 In Ang v. So.,59 the Court Although petitioners inconsistently claimed that the supposed express trust was likewise
further stated that "[t]he prohibition against aliens owning lands in the Philippines is subject constituted for their benefit, the relief prayed for unmistakably showed that petitioners
only to limited constitutional exceptions, and not even an implied trust can be permitted on anchored their purported rights over the subject properties on the laws of succession, viz.:
equity considerations." PRAYER

After a judicious examination of the allegations in the complaint, the Court finds that WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after due hearing
petitioners failed to sufficiently allege the basis for their purported right over the subject judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, as follows:
properties. Since the Sps. Sadhwani were prohibited from owning land in the instant case,
they were likewise prohibited from transmitting any right over the same through succession. a) Declaring Plaintiffs as lawful and true owners of the [subject properties], and approving
The complaint, however, was replete with allegations that the Sps. Sadhwani were the true the distribution in equal shares of the shares of the heirs on the properties abovementioned
owners of the subject properties and that petitioners were suing respondent Gop, as heirs of in accordance with the trust agreement and the provision of the Civil Code on succession in
their parents. Relevant portions of the complaint stated: favor of: RAMCHAND S. SADHWANI, DRUPATI P. SADHWANI-MIRPURI, HARESH S.
SADHWANI, GOP S. SADHWANI, RAJAN S. SADHWANI, as heir[s] being the legitimate
5. Plaintiffs and Defendant Gop upon the death of their parents inherited and became the children of deceased SATRAMDAS V. SADHWANI AND KISHNIBAI SADHWANI.62
lawful and absolute owners of [the subject properties] x x x. (Underscoring supplied)
xxxx
10. Before the purchase of the said properties, Plaintiffs and Defendant with their parents The allegations in petitioners' amended complaint are even more telling:
[the Sps. Sadhwani,] agreed that the house and lot located at #58 Aries St., Bel Air II
Village, Makati City shall be devoted solely as [the Sps. Sadhwani's] residence while the 7. The subject properties x x x were merely placed in trust in the name of Gop Sadhwani.
condominium unit shall be rented and the monthly rentals collected for their benefits during Upon the death of Satramdas and Kishnibai S. Sadhwani, ownership of these properties
their [lifetime]. However, the titles shall be [registered] in the name of Defendant Gop in was automatically transmitted to the Heirs of Spouses Sadhwani.
trust, with the understanding that upon their death, said properties shall be sold and the xxxx
proceeds thereof distributed among all their siblings in equal parts. 37. Worse, Defendants Gop and Kanta Sadhwani illegally sold the Bel Air Property (TCT
No. 120446) to defendant Sefuel T. Siy Yap for the outrageous amount of
11. Defendant Gop obligated himself that even if the titles of properties are [registered] in Php20,000,000.00. The sale is void ab initio because the Bel Air Property was titled in the
his name, he hold[s] them in trust for his parents and his brothers and sisters benefits (sic) name of Gop married to Kanta Sadhwani by virtue of a legal trust reposed unto them by the
during his parents lifetime until their death where it will be sold and the proceeds thereof late ["Sps. Sadhwani] who were the actual and beneficial owners of the subject properties
divided equally among all the siblings. as it was they who funded the purchase of said properties.63 (Underscoring supplied)
xxxx
13. Defendant Gop after the sale of said properties never exercised any attributes of It is undisputed that the Sps. Sadhwani were Indian nationals. Hence, they were absolutely
ownership over the same, for he recognized that he is holding the properties only in name disqualified: 1) from owning lands in the Philippines, whether actually or beneficially, or 2)
for the benefit of his trustors who since 1983 until their deaths were in actual and physical from transmitting any right64 over the same to herein petitioners by succession. As
possession of the properties in the concept of owners. x x x petitioners claim ownership over the Bel Air Property as purported heirs of their parents,
xxxx they failed to sufficiently allege the first element of a cause of action, i.e., a "right in favor of
18. Defendant Gop, sometime in November 2006, without the knowledge and consent of his the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created."65 Even
parents' (trustors', true owner of the properties) and in bad faith, maliciously and fraudulently assuming therefore that respondent Gop committed the acts or omissions complained of,
filed a petition for replacement of a los[t] duplicate owner certificate of title x x x and los[t] said acts could not be considered a violation of a right which, as alleged in the complaint,
certificate of Condominium title x x x. did not exist.
xxx
Although the absolute prohibition against foreign ownership of lands does not necessarily
apply to foreign ownership of condominium units, the Court finds that petitioners likewise WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated January 6, 2015 and
failed to state a cause of action over the Ritz Condominium Unit. March 18, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 59 in Civil Case No.
13-1320 are hereby AFFIRMED.
As already discussed, petitioners premised their alleged right over the subject properties as
heirs of the Sps. Sadhwani under the Civil Code. Under Philippine law, however, SO ORDERED.
successional rights are governed by the national law of the decedent. Article 16 of the Civil
Code pertinently provides: J. Reyes, Jr., Lazaro-Javier, and Zalameda, JJ., concur.
Carpio (Chairperson), J., on official leave.
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is stipulated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (Underscoring supplied)

As the Sps. Sadhwani were Indian nationals, the laws of succession under the Civil Code
do not apply. Therefore, the complaint should have alleged, at the very least, that petitioners
were legal heirs of their parents and were entitled to inherit the Ritz Condominium Unit
under the laws of the Republic of India. In view of the foregoing provision, the Court holds
that petitioner cannot sidestep their burden of sufficiently pleading and eventually proving a
cause of action under foreign law even when claiming under Philippine law may be more
favorable or expedient. As they failed to sufficiently allege the basis for their right under the
national law of their parents, petitioners failed to state a cause of action over the
condominium unit.

To reiterate, "[t]he elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the
complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded."66 The complaint
miserably failed this test. Even assuming that the facts alleged in the complaint (and
amended complaint) were true, petitioners would not be entitled to the reliefs demanded
because: 1) petitioners premised their right over the subject properties as heirs of aliens
who may not own land or transmit rights over the same by succession, and 2) petitioners
failed to allege that they were in fact heirs of the Sps. Sadhwani under the laws of the
Republic of India. In other words, the allegations of the complaint failed to sufficiently state
the concurrence of the three elements for a cause of action, particularly, the legal right to
the relief demanded. In view of the foregoing, the complaint must be dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action.

In any event, the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action under Rule
16, Section 1(g) is a dismissal without prejudice. Hence, petitioners are not barred from
refiling the same. Having passed upon the propriety of the dismissal, the Court finds no
more reason to rule upon the other issues raised in the Petition.