CHAPTER 2 Arguments for the Existence of God In this chapter we shall examine the most important of the philosophical arguments offered to justify belief in the reality of God. These traditional “theistic proofs” are of great philosophical interest and have been receiving, more rather than less attention from both secular and religious writers in recent years. THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT The ontological argument for the existence of God was first developed by Anselm, one of the Christian Church’s most original thinkers and the greatest theologian ever to have been archbishop of Canterbury.' Anselm begins by concentrating the monotheistic concept of God into the formula: “a being than which nothing greater can be conceived.” It is clear that by “greater” Anselm means more perfect, rather than spatially bigger It is important to notice that the idea of the most perfect conceivable being is ise Arguments for the Existence of Coy oy of the most being that there is. The ontologica, Ate be ounded a rr enon, fr ano Nu cede ena ey at Coen bea a eg nt A ig . Consequently, mht he Ba he mont psec MSE et can even fated of acing so pret ne PN conceived. the contradiction that it is possible namely, the same being existing in reality as w' . namely, eal being mt st it a ang Anselm's own formulation of this classic piece of philosophical reasoning is found in the second chapter of the Proslogion. Ifthen sna hav which-e-gesvrcana-be toghesiais then’ one SSS that than-which-2-greater-cannot-be-thou mnt is that-than-which-a-greater-carrbe, - ah iy umpemsle, aretr ee AS t an hoe g-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be thought ests both in the mind and in Second Form of the Argument in his third chapter Ansel states the argument again, directing merely to God’s existence but to His uniquely necessary existence. oer cay that iis impossible to cncelve of God's nove defined in such away Ul ary being w acli-cstence sci). S68 The coe of th ot or nied in or byte, the twin pansies tnd ero orev ening extern exded wr avn ee oe rdered Impossible. The argument now runs as follows For something can be thought to exst that cannot be thou} tnot to exist. Hence! fut than-which-»-gresler-cannot-be-thought can be thou ht ro exist then HUE teenie reke which i abeurd 1 tan whleh-s at cant behaugh Which abe Soe ought mt est ‘seep.Asguments for the Existence of God vv Criticisms of the Argument In introducing the ontological argument, Anselm refers to the psalmist’s “fool” who says in his heart, “There is no God." Even such a person, he says, the idea of God as the greatest conceivable being; and when we unpack the implications of this idea we see that such a being must actually exist. The first important critic of the argument, Gaunilon, a monk at Marmoutiers in France and a contemporary of Anselm's, accordingly entitled his reply In Behalf of the Fool. He claims that Anselm's reasoning wauld lead to absurd conclusions if applied in other fields, and he sets up a supposedly parallel ontological argument for the most perfect island. Gaunilon spoke of the most perfect of islands rather than (as he should have done) of the most conceivable island; but his argument could be rephrased in terms of the latter idea. Given the idea of such an island, by using Anselm's principle we can argue that unless it exists in reality it cannot be the most perfect conceivable island! ‘Anselm's reply, emphasizing the uniqueness of the idea of God toshow that his ontological reasoning applies only toit, is based upon the second form of the argument. The element in the idea of God which is lacking in the notion of the most perfect island is necessary existence. An island (or any other material object) is by definition a part of the contingent world. The most perfect island, so long as it is genuinely an island—"a piece of land sur- rounded by water” and thus part of the physical globe—is by definition a dependent reality, which can without contradiction be thought not to exist; and therefore Anselm's principle does not apply to it. It applies only to the most perfect conceivable being, which is defined as having eternal and inde- pendent (ie., necessary) existence. Thus far, then, it would seem that the second form of his argument is able to withstand criticism. Can Anselm's argument in its first form, however, be defended against Gaunilon’s criticism? This depends upon whether the idea of the most perfect . conceivable island is a coherent and consistent idea. Is it possible, even in theory, to specify the characteristics of the most perfect conceivable island? This is a question for the reader to consider. A second phase of the debate was opened when René Descartes (1596- 1650), often called the father of modern philosophy, reformulated the argu- ment and thereby attracted widespread attention to it Descartes brought to the fore the point upon which most of the modem discussions of the onto- 1 and 53:1. ions, V. It is not entirely clear whether Descartes received the basic principle of his ontological argument from A\ ‘When questioned by Mersenne about the relation of his own, to Anselm's, he was content to reply, “I will look at St Anselm at the first opportunity ~ F Kemp Smith, New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes, London: Macmillan & Company Ltd., 1952, p. 204) Descartes also makes another and different attempt to prove God's existence: Discourse on Method, IV and Meditations, 111.‘Arguments for he Existence of coy 1B ion that exist logical argument have centered name pence as a characteristic a cate. He explicitly f pa ., Peeper af which by & giver +e properly open au. Te a defining oatre of xc Kind of thing includes certain Predicates, * ‘ ment cl x ind Descartes s onto ge antes the fact that its internal angles areequal > the a abe isa necessary characteristic of a triangle, 50 existence ig tower; . A triangle wit! necessary characteristic of a supremely perlect bree deri om defining properties would e ve ea diflerence is that in the case of the would Bot De ee shat any tian les exist, since existence is Not of the aaa or icangul ny. Howeves, in the case of a supremely perfect bein, oeence of ane exstence gan essential atte without whi i id be unlimitedly perfect. aoe eslan version of ihe ntological argument was later challenged a two levels by the great German philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Atone level heaccepted Descartes’s claim that the idea of existence belongs analytically to the concept of God, as the idea of having three angles belongs analytically to that of a three-sided plane figure. In each case the predicate is necessarily linked with the subject. But, Kant replied, it does not follow from this that the subject, with its predicates, actually exists. What is analytically true is that if there is a triangle. il must have three angles, and if there is any « infinit er lect being, that being must have existence. As Kant ‘says, “Tal posi a angle, ind ot To FeSas ce Miglan W belFcontradicegy be there is no self-contradiction in rejecting the triangle together with its three angles. The same holds true of the concept of an absolutely necessary being.” At adeeper level, however, Kant rejected the basic assumption upon which Descartes’s argument rested, the assumption that existence, like triangular. ity, is a predicate that something can either have or lack, and that may in some cases be analytically connected with a subject. He points out David Hume had already pointed out in a different context)’that the idea of existence does not add anything othe concept of a particular thing or kind number of dollars as a real hundred dollars. When we affirm that the dollars are real, or exist, we are saying that the concept is instantiated in the world. Thus to say of x that it exists is not to Say that in addition to its various other sis it has the attribute of existing, but is to say that there is an x in the Essentially thesame point has more recently been made by Bertrand Russell “Immanuel Kant, Crt que of Pure Renson, trans. N. Kemp 5 i J Cinmanuet Kanu . Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan & Comps! it ew York. St Martins Press, 1968). “Transcendental Pralecaen Book ICRP} "David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature Book L, Patt Il, See. vinwhere de ME RAAT Ofte peeve poets Arguments for the Existence of God w in his analysis of the word “exists.”* He has shown that although “exists” is grammatically a predicate, logically it performs a different function, which can be brought out by the following translation: “Cows exist” means “There are x’s such that ‘x is a cow’ is true.” This translation makes it clear thatto say that cows exist is not to attribute a certain quality (namely existence) to cows, but is to assert that there are objects in the world to which the description summarized in the word “cow” applies. Similarly “Unicoms do not exist” is the equivalent of “There are no x’s such that ‘x is a unicorn’ is true.” This way of construing negative existential statements—statements that deny thatsome particular kind of thing exists—avoids the ancient puzzle about the status of the “something” of which we assert that it does not exist. Since we can talk about unicorns, for example, it is easy to think that unicorns must in some sense be or subsist or, perhaps, that they inhabit a paradoxical realm of nonbeing or potential being. Russell's analysis, however, makes it clear that “unicorns do notexist” is not a statement about unicornsbutabout theconcept ordescription “unicorn” and is the assertion that this concept has noinstances. The bearing of this upon the ontological argument is evident. If existence is, as Anselm and Descartes assumed, an attribute or predicate that can be included in a definition and that, as a desirable attribute, must be included in the definition of God, then the ontological argument is valid. For it would be self-contradictory to say that the most perfect conceivable being lacks the attribute of existence. But if existence, although it appears grammatically in the role of a predicate, has the quite different logical function of asserting that a description applies to something in reality, then the ontological argument, considered as a proof of God's existence, fails. For if existence is not a predicate, it cannot be a defining predicate of God, and the question whether anything in reality corresponds to the concept of the most perfect conceivable being remains open to inquiry. A definition of God describes one’s concept of God but cannot prove the actual existence of any such being. It should be added that some theologians, most notably Karl Barth, have seen Anselm's argument not as an attempted proof of God’s existence, but as an unfolding of the significance of God's self-revelation as One whom the believer is prohibited from thinking as less than the highest conceivable reality. On this view, Anselm's argument does not seek to convert the atheist but rather to leadan already formed Christian faith into a deeper understand- ing of its object. “This aspect of the theory of descnptions 1s summarized by Russell in his Histo Western Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin Lid., 1946, and New York. Simon % Lincien, Bp. 859-60. For a more technical discussion, see his Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (1919), sp. 16. "See Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides Quarrens Intellectum, 1931 (London: Student Chnstian Movement Press Ltd. and Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, 1960). Barth's interpretation iscriticized by Etienne Gilson in “Sens et nature de l'argument de saint Anselme,” Archives d ‘histoire doctrinale et liltéraire du moyen age. 1934, pp. 231,‘Asgoment® oor . inated the philosophical coal argument has pee er ofnew discussions of it” ve it ha! The een Yo me st anpco CAL ARGUMENTS ™ ~ onstrate the reality of God was that of 2 ters five ways of ing divine Thomas fr “log re, which focuses attention Upon existence." ‘Unlike the OM} fold its inner implications, Adu proofs ie ot feature of the world around us an ere thal there from somTworid with this particular ‘characteristic Peay te eal ich we CF aire first Way a°ENCr m fact of Me aed me . the second from causation toa First Cause; the third roa Prin Being; the fourth ‘rom degrees of value osiveness in nature to change tingent being> toa Necessary te Vale ‘and the fifth from evidences of “em inas' nd third proofs. His second Aquinas's second and 1! P' bet een the. nt uperse argument is presented ‘as follows: everything that ha ns has a cause, gum rar hae 8 cae, A at be infinite or have its starting point in a first cause. ‘of causes and SO con series that m™ : possibility of an infinite regress yf n First Cause, which we call God. (His first proof, is basically similar.) as Aquinas states it lies in the difficulty (which he himself elsewhere acknowledges)” of excluding a5 impossible an yuiring no first state. However, some ‘contemporary Thomists (ie, thinkers who in general fol Jow Thomas reformulated the ent in order to avoid this difficulty.” They interpret the endless series that it excludes, not as a regress of events back in time, ‘but as an endless and therefore eternally inconclusive "Norman Malcolm, “Anselm's Oniclogic A Poller fis, NJ. Prentice-Hall, 1963). Chat Jes Hartshorne, The! Peyecton (Lasalle, Il: Open Court Pubsening Co, 1960 Chap. 2, and a Anse i . eee Phildeophical Theology (New Yor "The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974, and New York: Oxlord University Press, 1979), Chap. 1 fn jl (Londo | Chap. 10, and God, Freedom, and : George ‘Allen — Lid., 1974, and Grand Rapids: Wm. B, Eerdmans to ng Co 578), Part a owes Agee Summa Theologict, Part |, Question 2, Art. 3. For an important ow a arguments ex Anthony Kenny, Five Ways: St. Thomas Aquinas's of Gol b idence Landon ‘Kegan Paul Ltd., 1969, and Notre Dame, Ind = ‘University of Nov ‘Aquinas, Si na, Suma Thai Fat L Question 46, Art. 2. See also Summa Contra Gentiles, Book hr ‘example, EL Mat call, He Whole (London: Longmans, Green &« Co., 1943), Chap: 5+‘Argamenta for the Existence of God 1 regress of explanations. If fact A is made intelligible by its relation to facts B, Cand D (which may be antecedent to or contemporary with A), and if each oftheseisin turn rendered intelligible by other facts, at the back of the complex there must be a reality which is self-explanatory, whose existence constitutes the ultimate explanation of the whole. If no such reality exists, the uriverse is a mere unintelligible brute fact. However, this reinterpretation still leaves the argument open to two major difficulties. First, how do we know that the universe is not “a mere unintelli- brute fact"? Apart from the emotional coloring suggested by the phrase, this is precisely what the skeptic believes it tobe; and to exclude this possibility at the outset is merely to beg the question at issue. The argument in effect ts the dilemma: either there is a First Cause or the universe is ultimately unintelligible; but it does not compel us to accept one hor of the dilemma rather than the other. Second (although there is only space to suggest this difficulty, leaving the reader to develop it), the argument still depends upon a view of causality that can be, and has been, questioned. The assumption of the reformulated argu- ment is that to indicate the causal conditions of an event is thereby to render that event intelligible. Although this assumption is true on the basis of some theories of the nature of causality, it is not true on the basis of others. For example, if (as much contemporary science assumes) causal laws state statis- tical probabilities,"* or if (as Hume argued) causal connections represent mere observed sequences,'! or are (as Kant suggested) projections of the structure of the human mind," the Thomist argument fails. ‘Aquinas's third Way, known as the argument from the contingency of the world, and often monopolizing the name the cosmological argument, runs as follows. Everything in the world about us is contingent—that is, it is true of each item that it might not have existed at all or might have existed differently. The proof of this is that there was a time when it did not exist. The existence of this printed page is contingent upon the prior activities of trees, lumber- jacks, transport workers, paper manufacturers, publishers, printers, author, and others, as well as upon the contemporary operation of a great number of chemical and physical laws; and each of these in turn depends upon other factors. Everything paints beyond itself to other things. Saint Thomas argues that if everything were contingent, there would have been a time when nothing existed. In this case, nothing could ever have come to exist, for there would have been no causal agency. Since there are things in existence, there must therefore be something that is not contingent, and this we call God. ‘Aquinas's reference to a hypothetical time when nothing existed seems to Nc£. Hans Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), Chap. 10. "Spavid Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Sec. 7. "kant, “Transcendental Analytic.” in Critique of Pure Reason.‘Arguments far the Existence of Cog AN 5 for there might be an infinity weaken ahr ree ets overage ne Gene that ng ‘oent occurs tut 1s not occupied by any of them. Howeve mod ora Thomists generally omit this phase of the argument WO i does in another book).”” If we remove the reference we haye an argument based upon te loi connection between a contingent worl inexplicable until we refer to something else outside i, wens ring In orer fr there tobe a et of interlocking Whee ig movement, there must be a spring; and in order for there to be a world of contingent realities, there must bea noncontingent ground for their existence Only a self-existent reality, containing in itself the source of its own being, can constitute an ultimate ground of the existence of anything else. Such an ultimate ground is the “necessary being” that we call God. ‘The most typical philosophical objection raised against this a recent years is that the idea of a “necessary being” is unintelligible. It is said that only propositions, not things, can be logically neces y. and that it isa misuse of language to speak of a logically necessary being. * This particular ‘objection to the cosmological argument is based upon a misapprehension, for the argument does not make use of the notion of a logically necessary being. The concept of a necessary being used in the main theological tradition (exemplified by both Anselm and Aquinas)" is not concerned with logical necessity but rather with a kind of factual necessity which, in the case of God, is virtually equivalent to ascity or self-existence. For this reason, the idea of God's necessary being should not be equated with the view that "God exists” is logically necessary truth. ‘There remains, however, an important objection to the cosmological argu- iment, parallel to one of those applying to the First-Cause argument. The force of the cosmological form of reasoning resides in the dilemma: either there is a necessary being or the universe is ultimately unintelligible. Clearly such an gta oot hovel jitranns the er tee Out, however, it represents the skeptic’s position. This inability to exclude the possibility of an unintelligible universe prevents the: from operating for the skeptic as a proof of God's existence—and the skeptic is, after all, the only person who needs such a proof. "Aquinas, Summa Conira Gentiles, Book Il, Chap. 15, Sec.6, pig foresampl}1C Sart The Ensen of God” and J.N Find “Can God's Existence Be Disproved?* in New! in Phicupical Telogy, eds. Antony lew and Alzsdalr Macityr® Soe Seana ‘and London: Student Christian Movement Press Ltd.,1955)- PB.‘Arguments for the Existence of God 2 ~ Today there is an important neo-Thomist group of thinkers who hold that there are valid forms of the cosmological argument; some of the most impor- tant writings from this point of view are listed in footnote 20. THE DESIGN (OR TELEOLOGICAL) ARGUMENT This has always been the most popular of the theistic arguments, tending to evoke spontaneous assent in simple and sophisticated alike. The argument occurs in philosophical literature from Plato's Timaeus onward. (It appears again as the last of Saint Thomas's five Ways.) In modem times one of the most famous expositions of the argument from, or to, design is that of William Paley (1743-1805) in his Natural Theology: or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity Collected from the Appearances of Nature (1802)2" The argument is still in active commission, especially in more conservative theological circles. Paley’s analogy of the watch conveys the essence of the argument. Suppose that while walking in a desert place I see a rock lying on the ground and ask myself how this object came to exist. I can properly attribute its presence to chance, meaning in this case the operation of such natural forces as wind, rain, heat, frost, and volcanic action. However, if! see a watch lying on the ground, I cannot reasonably account for it in a similar way. A watch consists of a complex arrangement of wheels, cogs, axles, springs, and balances, all oper- ating accurately together to provide a regular measurement of the lapse of time. It would be utterly implausible to attribute the formation and assem- bling of these metal parts into a functioning machine to the chance operation of such factors as wind and rain. We are obliged to postulate an intelligent mind which is responsible for the phenomenon. Paley adds certain comments that are important for his analogy between the watch and the world. First, it would not weaken our inference if we had never seen a watch before (as we have never seen a world other than this one) and therefore did not know from direct observation that watches are products of human intelligence. Second, it would not invalidate our inference from the watch to the watchmaker if we found that the mechanism did not. always work *Mascall,E.L., He Who ls, Austin Farrer, Finite and Infinite, 2nd ed. (London: Dacre Press, 1960) Foran inieresting recent presentation of the First Cause argument, appealing to current scientific cosmology, see William Lane Craig, The Kaldm Cosmological Argument (London: Macmillan and Company Ltd. and New York: Bares &e Noble, 1979). For general treatments of cosmological arguments, see William Rowe, The ical Argument (Princeton, N.): Princeton University Press, 1975) and William Lane Craig, The rical Argument from Plato to Leibniz (London: ‘Macmillan and New York: Barnes & Noble, 1980). *Paley’s book is available in an abridged version, ed. Frederick Ferré, in the Library of Liberal ‘Arts, 1962. "ror example, Robert ED. Clark, The Universe—Plan or Acciden!? (Philadelphia: Muhlenburg Press, 1961).ate for the Existence of Gog th the mechanism of the sometimes appear tobe the case with A anid, Perit oud still be obliged to postulate 8 ua hanism, and as Paley argues that the i 0s cori the planets in the Solar manifestly designed, 26 any wnt Tee eee the seasons and the complex system and, on earth, the regular procession oF Ast val peed Siructure and mutual adaptation of the parts of & ving organism 4 design. In a human brain, forexample, thousands of millions of cells function or in a coordinated system, The eye is a superb movie one wn self-adjusting lenses, a high degree ‘of accuracy, color sensiti “4 the capacity to operate continuously for many hours at a time. Can such complex and efficient mechanisms have come about by chance, as a stone might be formed by the random operation of natural forces? . Paley (in this respect typical of a great deal of religious apologetics in the eighteenth century) develops a long cumulative argument drawing upon virtually all the sciences of his day. As examples of divine arrangement he points to the characteristics and instincts of animals, which enable them to survive (for example, the suitability of a bird's wings to the air and of a fish's fins to the water). He is impressed by the way the alternation of day and night conveniently enables animals to sleep after a period of activity. We may conclude with an example offered by a more recent writer, who refers to the ozone layer in the atmosphere, which filters out enough of the burmni ultraviolet rays of the sun to make life as we know it possible on the earth's surface. He writes: ‘The Ozone gas layer is a mighty proof of the Creator’s forethought. Could anyone possibly attribute this device to a chance evolutionary proces? A val which prevent death to every living thing, just the right death to every living tng gst ight thickness, and exactly the correct defense. ‘The classic critique of the design argument occurs in David Hume's Dit logues Concerning Natural Religion. Hume's book was published in 1773. twenty-three years earlier than Paley’s; but Paley took no apparent account ol Hume's citcsms—by no a the only example of lack of communicatiot between theologians and their philosophical cri *s mai Derween theologians an Philosophical critics! Three of Hume's mait 1. He points out that any universe is bound tohave the i designed. For there could notbe a universe at alliny Wad erence adapted to one another toa considerable degree. There could not, for be birds that grew wings but, like fish, were unable to live in the air. TY tac Brown, Footprints of Gad (Findlay 7, Ohio: Fundamental’ lume, Dialogues Concerning Netural Religion, Part VIN. Truth Publishers, 1943), p. WE‘Angoments forthe Existence of God of any kind of life ina relatively fixed environment presupposes order and adaptation, and this can always be thought of as a deliberate product of design. The question is, however, whether this order could have come about otherwise than by conscious planning, As an alternative, Hume the Epicurean hypothesis. The universe consists of a finite number of particles in random motion. In unlimited time these go through every combination that is possible to them. If one of these combinations constitutes stable order (whether temporary or permanent), this order willin due course be realized and may be the orderly cosmos in which we now find ourselves. This hypothesis provides a maximally simple model for & naturalistic anation of the orderly character of the world. It can be revised and extended in the light of the special sciences. The Darwinian theory of natural selection, for example, presents a more concrete account of the apparently character of animal bodies. According to Darwin's theory, there are inevery generation small random variations between individuals, and species are relatively well adapted to their environment for the simple reason that the Jess well-adapted individuals have perished in the continual competition to survive and so have not perpetuated their kind. The “struggle for survival,” operating as a constant pressure toward more perfect adaptation, lies behind the evolution of life into increasingly complex forms, culminating in homo sapiens. To refer back to the ozone layer, the reason animal life on earth isso marvelously sheltered by this filtering arrangement is not that God first created the animals and then put the ozone layer in place to protect them, but rather that the ozone layer was there first, and only those forms of life capable of existing in the precise level of ultraviolet radiation that penetrates this layer have developed on earth. 2. Theanalogy between the world and a human artifact, such as a watch or ahouse, is rather weak.» The universe is not particularly like a vast machine. One could equally plausibly liken it to a great inert animal such as a crusta- cean, or to a vegetable. In this case the design argument fails, for whether crustaceans and vegetables are or are not consciously designed is precisely the question at issue. Only if the world is shown to be rather strikingly analogous toa human artifact, which we know to be designed, is there any basis for the inference to an intelligent Designer. 3. Even if we could validly infer a divine Designer of the world, we would still not be entitled to postulate the infinitely wise, good, and powerful God of the Judaic-Christian tradition”* From a given effect we can only infer a cause sufficient to produce that effect; therefore, from a finite world we can never infer an infinite creator. To use an illustration of Hume's, if can see one side of a pair of scales and can observe that ten ounces is outweighed by "Dialogues, Parts VI, VIL Dialogues, Part V. CI. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Sec. XI, para. 105.‘Asguments for the Existence of c, % something on the other side, I have good evidence that the unseen objey weighs more than ten ounces; however, I cannot infer from this that it weigh, 4 hundred ounces, still less that it is infinitely heavy. On the same principiy the appearances of nature do not entitle us to affirm the existence of one Goq rather than many, since the world is full of diversity; nor of a wholly goad Gog since there is evil as well as good in the world; nor, for the same reason, of, wise God or an unlimitedly powerful one. that the design argumen, perfectly It has, therefore, seemed to most considered as a proof of the existence of God, is fatally weakened by Hume; qriticisms.— 230 _Thinking through philosophy entirely of a pack of cards being repeatedly shuMed and dealt, Throughout the fim Xt only happens very rarely that the deal separates the pack perfectly into reed and black piles. Even more rarely does this occur twice in succession. And only once in ten million years does it happen three times running. If all you see is the seument of the film in which this happens you will assume it could not be a chance occurrence, But If you see that segment in context ~ that is, as a tiny fraction of a very reat whole - then you will readity accept the possibility that it came about by chance, We have considered in some detail three arguments for the existence of « God: the ontological argument, the cosmological argument and the argument from design, These are by no means the only ones that philosophers have put forward, Immanue| Kant developed an ‘argument from morality’ Our lives have a moral dimenston, he argued; we have a sense of duty, sometimes feel guilty, and cannot aval id applying moral concepts to people and their actions. And this fact is significant, for it ‘only Makes sense if there is something like a God, That is, unless there is something more than the reality described by natural science, our moral notions can have no objective grounding, in which case our moral life rests on an illusion. William James argued that mystical experiences, which are both more common and more consistent than is often recognized, should be taken seriously as indications that some such reality does indeed exist - something beyond what we encounter in everyday experience, beyond the reach of scientific abservation. and Measurement, but somehow holding the answer to our deepest questions about truth, meaning and value. These are just two of the ‘many arguments that have been. Proposed in addition 1 those discussed above. Nevertheless, the three we have examined are by far the most widely discussed in the history of philosophy. How persuasive they arc Is something the reader must judge for him or herself, TSEC) Perhaps it is easier to disprove rather than prove the existence of Gad. Isn't the fact that there is so much suffering in the world good evidence that God does nat exist? ‘Without question, the existence of suffering poses a serious problem to anyone who wishes to defend the traditional Judaeo-Christian ‘conception of God. To many it has seemed to be an insuperable objection - hence Stendhal's quip: ‘God's only excuse 's that he doesn’t exist’ Although the problem is often called ‘the problem of evil’ a better label is the problem of suffering, “Evil' can be used in a general sense to refer ‘0 anything that Is harmful, but its more common and specific meaning is that of moral depravity; an evil person is one who intentionally prefers the bad to the good. The existence of this sort of evil certainly represents. a difficulty for some religious outlooks. (If God created the world, is he not ultimately responsible for the presence of evil in it?) But the occurrence of Dhysical pain or emotional distress, which in - waitales non egg ten ‘% cases neither afMicts nor is caused by th by those "more obvioUS GiTiculty for the traditional “ann Moralyderaed pou Fecogntion of the problem of sufering goes bay ote ation of this problem in the Book of Job fein ical times; indeed the snd inven ever produced. 40D, according 1 the story, ig One Ot the most profound an who, through no fault of his own and with God's Fut ree and prosperous, pasecession of terrible aflicons including pain, disease, en ee st joss of his farnily. Although at first he responds to his iden aa andthe tard gave, and the Lord hath taken away; blessed be the name oe Le ly = ‘the eventually driven In his anguish to question and protest agains the nd ~ he i gut after God appears in response to his challenge, and thro ways of God, unanswerable questions makes Joh realize ugh a series of the limitatic understanding, he’stops up his mouth’, resolved never ieee 1s to doubt God's wisdom or justice. actin tbe pesmi ‘The Book of Job presents the issue with great literary and dramatic skill. But we do not need to go to literature to be impressed by the depth of the problem: the tally news will suffice. Each year, millions of people suffer in a variety of ways from a variety of causes, Famine, disease, war, poverty, injustice, neglect, abuse, crime, and natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods and droughts result in death, injury, pain and distress for huge numbers of people. The question obviously arises: What kind of God would allow all this to happen? That people (and other animals, for that matter) really do suffer is surely an incontrovertible fact: a datum that can be neither ignored or denied. If God is omniscient he must be aware of this. Ihe is omnipotent then presumably he could prevent it if he so desired. And if he is omnibenevolent and morally perfect he Would. presumably want to prevent it is a strange kind of love that swout wok wis to alleviate the suffering - in some cases the tal afonling, wrbcani sulfering - of the beloved, And it isa strange kind of Justice that metes ‘oa “ be a perfectly indiscriminate manner The problem for misery in what appears to be a P schitan ea of God (+ how 10 anyone who accepts the traditional Judaco: Feconcile these four staterients: * There is widespread suffering, * God is omnipatent. © God is omniscient. * God is morally perfect gute abe has a simple explanation obvious isms peem F085 Tale re mae - there is no forthe evatence of suring: UBIEASM OTE egy happening and Ine ho prevent fous believers: whose beings are not powerful enougt wor ise rebel oe vnadco-chvisian do $0. ‘ other force that is trying 1° © acanily from since they did not fers sig for instance, conception of the avi or te ancien! nt ‘or morally perfect. And conception, It did not a fo be cither consider the Olympian_, 232 Thinking through philosophy modem monotheists can easily evade the problem by the simple ex denying one or more of the relevant attributes to God. They can say, : that God is not all-powerful, so although he knows about our suffering and Sieve, for us, he cannot lessen it any more than he already does, For the orthodox believer, however the problem is @ pressing one. Because history of Westen philosophy is entwined with Christianity there have been many attempts to slve it. Any such attempr is known as a theodicy, since i Uicaly defends the idea that, appearances notwithstanding. God is just. The wont ‘theoicy' is derive from the Greek tems for a yod (theos) and justice (dike) Here we will look at three main lines of argument. Pedient of for instay the Theodicy 1: it doesn't really hurt In Humes Dislgues concerning Naural Religion, Ceanthes advances avery sine theodicy: The only method of supporting divine benevolence ... isto deny absolutely the misery and wickedness of man. ... Health is more common than sickness: pleasure than pain: happiness than misery; and for one vexation we meet with, we attain, upon computation hundred enjoyments. Im other words, we do not suffer really - at least not very much. The obvious objection to this argument is that the description of the human Condition it offers is Matly contradicted by many people's experience. In addition, the Philosophical Problem of evil does not go away if it turns out that there are fewer evils than we supposed. Any evil, any suffering, poses a challenge to the believer and calls for some kind of theodicy. ‘A more sophisticated attempt to deny the reali St Augustine (354-430). He argued that the existence; rather, sight: sickness is Everything created explicitly affirms. and God cannot sophisticated, but ity of suffering was put forward by evils of the world have no positive they are privations. For example, blindness is the absence of the absence of health; poverty is the absence of wealth, by God is good, just as the account of creation in Genesis But since evils are merely privations they have no real existence be held responsible for them. This argument may be more i also looks suspiciously like a piece of sophistry, The question asked: Why couldn't God, if he is omnipotent, make Theodicy 2; it's our own fault Stated crudely, this theodicy says that human beings are responsible for their sufferings. Because God m fade us in his own image and intended us to live on a eePhilosophy of religion 233 jane than all other creatures, he endowed us with free will. This j wih! essing: it allows our lives to have moral significance ana ‘ant 7 ithe an comes at a price. Since we are not morally perfect, + But the pies and si choices. WE sometimes make mistakes and must then suffer thecone make fe Genin ts simplest and most tral sense this explanation of ne worlds oan _. early inadequate. For one thing, a good deal of human suffering is caused b yal disasters, not by people making poor choices. For another thing cm cebere the suffering is caused by human actions, the people who suffer are often the ones who are misusing their freedom; rather, they are the victims of what thers dO. Consider rape victims, for instance, or the People targeted by jtioners of ethnic cleansing. Of course, we could interpret suffering as just ishment for earlier wrongs committed. But this interpretation seems neither plausible nor fair when the individuals who suffer are youn praiseworthy people. One way of trying to meet these objections is to extend the concept of moral responsibility so that every individual can be held responsible for whatever happens to them. The idea that prosperity must, at some level, be a reward for virtue while suffering must be a punishment for some kind of failing goes back a Jong way. We find it, for instance, in the reasoning offered by Job's comforters, his three companions who insist that Job’s misfortunes must be in some sense deserved (Who ever perished, being innocent?" asks Eliphaz). It appears in another form in the Hindu notion of karma, according to which there are hidden laws that ensure good deeds will have good consequences for the agent and bad deeds will lead to bad consequences. This may not be apparent in this life, but over many reincamations the law will make itself felt. Pethaps the most radical extension of the concept of responsibility, however, is the doctrine of original sin developed by Christian theologians like Augustine. According to this doctrine, no human being is ever perfectly innocent. A mythological explanation of this idea has it that when Adam and Eve disobeyed God in the garden of Eden they rendered not only themselves guilty but all their descendants too, the ‘sins of the fathers’ being passed on to later generations. A more abstract version holds that it is simply part of the human condition to be in some way contaminated with sin; this is part and parcel of having a physical body and a partially animal nature. In cither case, though, the conclusion to be drawn is that since every human being is sinful, no suffering is ever entirely undeserved. On the contrary, as Hamlet puts it: “Treat each man after his deserts and who shall ‘scape whipping?’ This view was taken to an extreme by the Calvinists, who held that God would be perfectly justified in condemning every human being to an €temnity of torment; the fact that a few were saved from this fate was testament not to their virtue but to God’s benevolence. | However, all these attempts to justify sufering by seing i as in some seist Acserved suer from the same defect. They all rest on cacal presuppositions Ht ™ost people not already committed to the religious outlooks they suppo 1 children or morallyfind unacceptable. The a priori assumption made by Job's comforters _ 4, suffering is always a justified punishment ~ ts just that: an assumption, and 9 most dubious one. There seems to be plenty of evidence against it, and In the case gf young children lt seems to make little sense. To meet these objections, we cn introduce the idea of karma or the doctrine of original sin. But both these rest on specific metaphysical beliefs for which we have little evidential support ang which, in addition, give rise to theoretical difficulties of their own. What docs it mean, for instance, to say that a person was another person or animal in a previous life? And how can a newly born child be held responsible for the actions of his or her ancestors? Unless these difficulties can be met, the theodicies that view human beings as somehow responsible for their sufferings cannot be sustained. Theodicy 3: it’s good for us! This line of argument alsa comes in more than one flavour. What has been called the ‘cosmic harmony’ defence calls attention to the fact that our perspective on the universe is extremely limited. If, however, we could see the big picture the way God sees it, then we would understand how what we call cvil plays an important and valuable role in the great scheme of things. To complain about these so called evils is to be like children who complain about the rain that prevents them from playing, not recognizing how valuable it is in other respects. To wish that life were full of pleasures and completely free from pain is as misquided as wishing that we could have only days and no nights, forgetting that we are part of an ecosystem that requires the alternation of day and night. This way of dealing with the problem approaches the outlook characteristic of Taoism, an ancient Chinese philosophy, which views the light and the dark, the negative and the positive, as equally essential to a basically harmonious universe in which they balance each other out. ‘The idea that our perspective on the world is necessarily partial and limited is undeniably true. It follows that our understanding of particular things or events. and how they relate to the whole is also bound to be imperfect. Moreover, to be reminded of this is surely healthy. In the Book of Job, God himself responds to Job's complaints by providing just such a reminder: Where was thou when | laid the foundations of the carth? / declare if thou hast understanding. Who hast laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest? / or who hath stretched the Hine upon it? God's magnificent catalogue of things that the creator alone could possibly understand is sufficient to silence Job. But as has often been pointed out, God does not actually give a straightforward answer to the question: Why do innocent or virtuous human beings like Job suffer? Claiming that even apparently undeserved suffering is necessary, even if we cannot grasp how or why this is so, is all very well. ‘Bur the suffering remains real and undeserved, and must therefore be viewed as a"lon 235 iredcemable imperfection in the world God has g, ae in Fyodor Dostocvsky's novel The Brothers free, STE In a fakes this point with great force. He relay mazov, es Wan Karam, who, because he threw a stone at the local lander dost a SUe-yeur-od bey in front of his mother, was made to run before a pack of de ‘8S Stripped naked ani, him down and savaged him to death. In Wan’s view, noqhes, t? MCHY chased redeem this Kind of suffering: and any God who choge sie C2" ST lusty or contains such suffering cannot be considered m, Sreate a world th orally perfect, that forcefully Fesurrect the initial dilemma: cither God is, neg nen MeS SHsh tis innocent suffering from the world, in which case he is not a of ‘climinating eliminate it but chooses not to, in which case he cannot be me or he could How might one try to deal wih this diemma whit hating se conception of God? One way would be to deny that God's omnipotence ina be can eliminate innocent suffering, This is a diMeult argumeny sar sth been made, notably by C. S. Lewis. Another, perhaps more protising wen in deny that God's willingness to let us suffer implies that he ic not entirely essa che theodicy has been defended by the contemporary philosopher Joty Hick, drawing inspiration from an early Christian theologian, Irenaeus (130-203). According to not to create a world in which everyone is hap intention was, rather, to create individuals endo of realizing themselves as moral beings. A world containing such beings has more value than a world in which everyone simply basks in easy, innocent contentmeni, But to achieve self-realization as a moral being is necessarily a process in which one must make difficult choices, learn from one’s mistakes, overcome difficulties, struggle with adversity, and, on occasion, suffer. To be sure, God could have made us so that we always make the right decisions; but then we would not really be exercising free choices, and the moral selves we cultivate through aur choices and experiences would not be our own achievement. On this view, to argue that if God loved us he would never let us. suffer is like arguing that parents, if they love their child, should try to ensure that the child's desires are never frustrated. Obviously, being a good or loving parent docs sot mean that one always tries (o minimize a child's sufferings. Wise, loving ori regularly refuse to let their kids watch too much TV or eat too many see im par they consistently and systematically deprive their children of certain pl ensures They also allow their children to learn some things through bitter Siete Soe ther ap nds eee i thiny Sune Wises ae ae vedo, mol virtue and ae = * r the child's point of view, the actions of the a oie ie oF she caHfol cTuel. But this view is false, and the child only understand the broader perspective of the parent. 9 —— PY and contented all the time. His wed with free will who are capable—_= hheodicy, then, instead of seeing our world as a vale of Pah totes view it as a ‘vale of soul-making’ (to use John a ae sufferings we experience and observe help build character ty vl us with opportunites for spiritual growth and for the exercise of visu such as fortitude and compassion. AS a justification of God's ways, this a teary: Keats, % PProach, to be one of more plausible options for those holding traditional seems ae Judacy. Christian beliefs. Nevertheless, like most other tieodicie, it is highly SPECUlative, To explain certain phenomena it offers an account of God's plan for human bein an acount that seems tobe arived at by a combination of traditional retigiggs ideas and speculative inferences and analogies. However, this objection will not trouble theologians and religious believers. whose religious commitment already indicate a willingness to speculate about things that lic beyond expericnee. Harder to deal with are the problems posed by Ivan Karamazov’s account of the six-year-old boy who was thrown to the dogs. How could the terrible fear and excruciating death of this child in any way help build his moral character? For thay to be posible we would not only have to posit a life after this one; we Would ales have to assume that inthis future life moral development was still possible. This ig not usualy part of the traditional view of the aftertife in Judaism, Christianity o7 Islam. The supposition also takes us even further along the path of unconstrained speculation. One could, of course, argue that the boy's sufferings heiped the ‘moral development of other people: the landowner might experience remorse: onlookers might have their capacity for compassion extended; the boy's mother might be better able to empathize with another person's grief and to cope with adversity in the future. But then it is hard to see how God can keep his reputation for justice intact. In effect, the boy is being used as a means to promote the moral welfare of others. Ubimately, even the ‘vale of soul-making’ theodicy leaves many questions ‘unanswered. Why is it that some people have such easy lives while others suffer so terribly? sit really necessary for there to be so much suffering in the world? Couldn't human beings exercise Free will and live morally rich lives in a world where there was less misery? The theodicy in question may offer a decent explanation for why we do not live in a vale of contentment; but it does not explain why God could ‘not eliminate what appears to be gratuitous suffering and still achieve his ends. Of course, the believer can always fall back on that old saw, ‘God moves in mysterious ways’ And in fact most theodicies, when pressed, do tend to fall back to this last line of defence. They set about trying to understand and explain why an Omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God would allow us to suffer. Couched in these terms, the problem is general ~ Why is there suffering? - rather than specific ~ Why is this six-year-old thrown to the dogs? And the explanations offered also Operate at & high level of generality, appealing to notions like the unreality of evil, onginal sin, cosmic harmony or the need for ‘saul-making, Such ideas offer blanket solutions. But for that very reason there are many ‘pecille cases of individual suffering that they do not seem able to explain ot iu tt anewPhilosophy ot religion a7 that since our understanding is finite We cannot hope to fathom on {0 the idea motives completely. To the critic of religion, however, hig wet Pens and suppose @ scientist were to advance a general hypothesis in ovis 4 cop om, various phenomena, but was then confronted bya Very lange Tinks 10 explain coumter-instances ~ specific cases that the hypothesis of ap that actually called it into question. Would we allow the scientist one for and anomalies by saying that the universe is mysterious and cannot ef with these ty the human rind? Or would we say that such a al 'y understoog abandonment of the attempt to use reason 10 understand the a the In the same way, any move by theologians to invake the rssoiten unfathomability of God, especially when this Comes at the point whee ho argument is under the greatest stress, leaves them Vulnerable to the charge ‘i they are not genuinely willing to subject their views 19 Tational criticism. When the going gets tough, they abandon reason and appeal to faith, ECU OMEN ee cl. Why should believers be answerable 10 the tt Isn't religious faith, by its very nature, ribunal of reason anyway? ‘essentially non-rational? This is the view of the great Danish thinker Séren Kierkegaard, himself a deeply Committed Christian. He argued that the whole point about a religion like Christianity is that it contradicts reason and therefore requires faith. After all, if it were perfectly sensible everyone would accept it and there would be no particular merit in having faith. But this is very much a modem view. Eartier philosophers Usually saw the relation between faith and reason rather differently. Descartes, for instance, argued that reason can provide a solid foundation for faith, Aquinas held that faith supplements reason, enabling us to embrace religious doctrines that lie beyond rational proof and that must therefore be the subject of revelation (for example, the mystery of the trinity). And Hegel viewed faith and reason as complementary, providing two routes to the same underlying truth. Clearly, the relation between reason and faith is a complex issue. Let us start by clarifying what we mean by “faith: The concept of faith s clearly different from the concept of knowledge, If] sy | "know something hat ims that the belief in question is true. But if | say | have ‘faith’ that ipeia ie Case, there is no such implication. Faith, unlike knowledge, - ay wet difference has nothing to do with how certain | am about an "t tai tid wt Religious believers can be every bit as certain about the as more to d0 Scientists are about the truth of their observations. Lees ee etic that the With the grounds for holding the beliefs in question Compare 18 TU arth is round with the belief that there is an afterlife.