Stop

Loss June 2022

Issue 74

Dangers of overreliance on AIS

Automatic Identification System Bridge systems today permit AIS data to be
(AIS) appeared in the early part of overlaid onto radar screens and in many
the millennium and found its way cases electronic chart displays. Successful Clay cargo concerns
rapidly onto the bridges of ships of operators use their Management of
Change Policies to manage the potential for
at Lumut
all sizes worldwide. In the earliest importation of risk with new technologies, The industry continues to note
days, AIS took the form of a stand- but it is becoming apparent that AIS-assisted instances of liquefaction of clay
alone AIS unit sited on the bridge for collisions are on the rise. cargoes (sometimes described
the reference of the watch keeping as Ball Clay) declared as Group C
officer. At that time, most ships The Club refers to a high-value collision case cargoes under the schedule in the
operated paper charts and most in which a ship proceeding along a Traffic IMSBC Code.
existing radar systems did not have Separation Scheme (TSS) was involved in
a collision with another ship which altered
a facility to integrate AIS data to Numerous cargoes are loaded from
course to cross the TSS under the apparent
their displays. direction of the local Vessel Traffic Services
Lumut in Malaysia under the Bulk
(VTS). At the time visibility was very poor. Cargo Shipping Name (BCSN) “Clay”.
The main advantage of the system was the Under the corresponding schedule
ability for vessel traffic monitoring systems Neither the VTS Controller nor the ship in the IMSBC Code, this is a Group C
to actively identify vessels within monitored crossing the TSS would appear to have cargo, a cargo which is neither liable
zones. A major benefit to the bridge user was detected the presence of the ship proceeding to liquefy (Group A) nor to possess
the ability to cross-reference a radar target by in the TSS. While the ship within the TSS was chemical hazards (Group B).
range and bearing to an AIS signal displayed broadcasting an AIS signal, it may not have
on a separate unit. been displayed accurately on the navigational In recent months, several examples
devices upon which the bridge team of the have come to light where such cargoes
Two decades later and much has changed, ship crossing the TSS were relying. If the crew have liquefied on voyages. The Club
with the rapid growth in the number of ships of the ship crossing the TSS had used the radar therefore reminds Members to be
operating integrated bridge systems. set in its intended role, the detection of the aware that such clay cargoes should be
other ship involved in the collision was entirely treated with extreme caution. Also, do
possible despite the unreliable AIS data. treat these cargoes in Lumut as Group
A cargoes which may liquefy if shipped
A lesson from this incident is to use at a moisture content in excess of its
good seamanship and “lookout” under Rule 5 transportable moisture limit.
of the COLREGS:

“Rule 5 Lookout – Every vessel shall at all

times maintain a proper lookout by sight
and hearing as well as by all available means
appropriate to the prevailing circumstances
and conditions so as to make a full appraisal
of the situation and of the risk of collision.”

Ship inspections Container ship Accident investigation

Top five negative findings deck fittings world round-up

p/2 p/3 p/4

 SHIP INSPECTION
PROGRAMME

SHIP INSPECTIONS

Top five negative findings

The Club’s Ship Inspection Department conducts approximately 250 inspections a year across
our mutual and fixed premium products. This gives us the opportunity to share some of
the most common findings so that Members are aware and can critically assess their own
operations to avoid similar issues.

1 2 3
IS THERE OBJECTIVE ARE ACCIDENTS, ARE POSITION FIXING
EVIDENCE THAT MORE INCIDENTS AND NEAR INTERVALS CLEARLY
THAN ONE POSITION FIXING MISSES INVESTIGATED DEFINED ON THE
SYSTEM IS BEING USED? SYSTEMATICALLY ON BOARD? PASSAGE PLAN?

This is the most common negative Almost exclusively there is an SMS This is often recorded on
finding in the programme and is policy in place in which management inspections where multiple
usually characterised by an entire prescribe this activity and forms findings have been noted in
reliance on GPS position fixing at upon which it should be completed. connection with passage planning
all stages of the voyage, particularly However, it is still very common to and safe navigation in general.
in regions where position fixing note that there have been supposedly Details recorded by inspectors
by radar and visual means were no incidents during the period of regularly include an excessive
entirely practical. It is clear that management worthy of the activity. interval of fixing being employed
cross-referencing satellite derived While this is possible, the longer in areas where course alterations
positions with other position fixing the time period in question the less occur more frequently than
methods is a recognised act of good likely this is to be correct and indeed the position fixing interval. In
seamanship and can draw attention the more likely the same will be addition, it is often recorded
to inaccurate GPS information or regarded as a matter of concern by that there is no provision in the
indeed inaccurately plotted GPS an ISM auditor, internal or external. passage plan for a position fixing
positions. Good corrective action Completing such exercises permits interval at each stage of the
advice consists of actions to reaffirm the fleet as a whole to learn from voyage.
the SMS procedures already in place incidents that occur on board ships.
onboard, as well as longer term Coupled with a robust system of fleet-
verification of habitual change via wide safety circular communications,
superintendent visits to ensure the a well investigated and reported near-
longevity of corrective actions taken miss can avoid a damaging incident
is worthwhile. in the future, not just on board the
ship in question but any in common
management.

Continued

 SHIP INSPECTION
PROGRAMME

4 5
ARE SAVEALLS IN IS THE [STEERING GEAR]
SATISFACTORY HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FREE
CONDITION? FROM LEAKS?

This negative finding is mainly This is a disturbing finding which

caused by the savealls, while in good presents itself quite commonly during
condition, being observed to have ship inspections. An accumulation of
the requisite drain plug missing. This hydraulic fluid in the steering gear
can be easily detected during weekly saveall is to some extent an indication
rounds of the deck and preparation that problems may exist and an
for the same. The purpose of investigation into the source of the
the drain plug is commonly well leak is necessary. Early detection of the
understood, but their loss can be problems that may cause such leaks
easily overlooked. are important to avoid the potential
loss of steering and subsequent
groundings or collisions.
Hydraulic fluid accumulated in steering
gear saveall

Container ship deck fittings

The Club’s Ship Inspection Program has noted in recent months an
increasing number of negative findings associated with container
ship deck fittings and their condition.

Excessive corrosion and thinning can result in a key cargo securing

system component being weakened. Container loss is a high-profile
subject and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. While there
are a number of contributing factors to a container stack collapse,
weakened deck fittings often feature in investigation reports.

The Club maintains the view that such items, being a key element of the
cargo securing system, are Class items and repairs should be made to
the satisfaction of the ship’s classification society. When making repairs,
good quality preparation and welding application are essential to the
successful installation of replacement castings.
 ACCIDENT
INVESTIGATION
WORLD ROUND-UP

In this regular column, we round

up some of the eye-catching
accident investigation reports
from around the globe:

Iron Chieftain ATSB – Australia ship’s alarm systems during the emergency Ice Rose DMAIB – Denmark
response to the fire.
On 18 June 2018, during cargo discharge On the morning of 23 September 2020,
operations while alongside at Port Kembla, The ATSB found that the risk of fire in Iron
the refrigerated general cargo ship Ice
New South Wales (NSW), a fire broke out in Chieftain’s C-Loop space was identified and Rose collided with anti-submarine ship
the internal cargo handling spaces of the self- documented by the ship’s operators, CSL 311 Kazanets of the Russian Navy in the
unloading (SUL) bulk carrier Iron Chieftain. Australia, as being unacceptable about five Sound, Denmark. The collision happened
years before the fire. This risk rating was as Ice Rose and 311 Kazanets were passing
The fire soon established itself and spread to primarily due to the absence of an effective on crossing courses while navigating
the exterior of the ship, setting the discharge means of fire detection and fire suppression in a dense fog. Due to the restricted
boom on deck alight. The ship’s crew were for the SUL system spaces. However, visibility, both ships’ navigation relied
evacuated and shore firefighting services from measures taken to address the risk were on instrumentation only. Neither of the
Fire and Rescue New South Wales (FRNSW) either inadequate or ineffective. ships identified the other ship until a few
took charge of the response to the fire. The
minutes before the collision, and neither
fire was contained and eventually extinguished The ATSB also identified that the regulatory
ship managed to avoid the collision once
about five days after it started. oversight of Iron Chieftain did not identify
the risk of collision was recognised.
any deficiencies related to the safety factors
The ship was declared a constructive total loss
identified by this investigation, or to the ship’s The investigation primarily describes the
and subsequently dispatched to be recycled.
inherent high fire safety risk and management events from the perspective of Ice Rose,
The ATSB investigation concluded that the of that risk. as DMAIB does not have jurisdiction to
fire originated in Iron Chieftain’s C-Loop space investigate warships and thus had limited
and was likely the result of a failed bearing in In addition, the ATSB identified a safety issue access to data from 311 Kazanets. DMAIB
the ship’s conveyor system which created the related to the marine firefighting capability of concludes that the collision happened as
heat necessary to ignite the rubber conveyor FRNSW as well as other safety factors related a result of the navigational practises on
belt. The ATSB also determined that the ship to the inconsistent conduct of ship’s drills and both ships on that day. On Ice Rose, several
did not have an emergency contingency plan Port Kembla’s emergency response plans. coinciding factors contributed to the bridge
for responding to fire in the ship’s SUL spaces team not recognising the risk of collision
and that there were technical failures of the Click here to view report until 311 Kazanets was at close quarters.
Those factors included bridge layout, radar
settings and the division of work within
Orange Phoenix JTSB – Japan the bridge team. Radar settings made it
difficult to distinguish 311 Kazanets from
While the cargo ship Orange Phoenix with master and 20 crew members aboard was anchored
stationary objects on the radar and was
at Wakayama Shimotsu Port, Wakayama Prefecture, a crew member fell from a lifeboat to the
not identified as a target, until there were
deck when engaging in the lifting and recovery of the ship’s freefall lifeboat during an abandon
only a few minutes left to decide on a
ship drill. The crewman sadly lost his life.
manoeuvre to avoid the collision. Due to
The investigation considered it probable that during the lifting and recovery of the lifeboat, the uncertainties about 311 Kazanets’ course
crewman lost his balance and fell to the deck because he was taking photographs at the doorway and intentions, the master hesitated to
at the stern of the lifeboat without wearing a safety harness. The hook of the release system was make a large course alteration. As neither
released from the ring of the boat davit and the lifeboat moved downward along the guide rail. It Ice Rose nor 311 Kazanets made any large
is considered probable that the hook of the release system was released from the ring of the boat course alteration, the collision was not
davit because it is likely that the “lock piece” was not hooked in the appropriate place. avoided.

Click here to view report Click here to view report

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