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Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104109. March 15, 1995

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 104109 March 15, 1995

CONRADO MARCELO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCING CORPORATION, respondents.

RESOLUTION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

In view of the prolonged and persistent failure of Atty. Alfredo Z. Villanueva, counsel for petitioner, to comply with our Resolution
of 11 April 1994 notwithstanding the extension of his period to do so and despite his earlier incarceration by reason 1 thereof, the
Court Resolves to DENY the petition.

Atty. Villanueva has taxed the patience and forbearance of this Court. His failure, if not refusal, to submit the required reply is a
wanton disregard of our orders. His continued apathy already borders on insolence which we cannot allow to pass without the
corresponding sanction. All lawyers are expected to recognize the authority of the Supreme and Court and to obey its lawful
processes and orders2 if he has not taken this to heart he is unfit to engage in the practice of law. His failure to live up to the
duties and responsibilities of the legal profession is sufficient ground for suspension. 3

Accordingly, the Court further Resolves to SUSPEND Atty. Alfredo Z. Villanueva from the practice of law for six (6) months
effective immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution.

Corollarily, the Resolution of 26 September 1994 directed at the National Bureau of Investigation is ordered RECALLED for
having been rendered academic by the denial of the petition and the suspension of Atty. Villanueva.

Let copies of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and circulated among all the different courts throughout the
country.

SO ORDERED.
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Geeslin vs. Navarro, A.C. No. 2033, May 9, 1990, 185 SCRA 230

EN BANC

A.C. No. 2033 May 9, 1990

E. CONRAD and VIRGINIA BEWLEY GEESLIN, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent.

A.C. No. 2148 May 9, 1990

ATTY. FRANCISCO ORTIGAS, JR. and ATTY. EULOGIO R. RODRIGUEZ, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent.

Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Peña & Marcos for complainants in AC No. 2033.

Felipe C. Navarro for and in his own behalf.

PER CURIAM:

We write this finale to the dispiriting charges filed by complainants Francisco Ortigas, Jr. and Eulogio R. Rodriguez in
Administrative Case No. 2148 1 and by spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Bewley Geeslin in Administrative Case No.
2033 2 seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for malpractice and gross misconduct.

In our resolution dated May 5, 1980, issued consequent to the Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor
General submitted to this Court on April 21, 1980, we ordered the suspension of respondent Navarro from the practice of law
during the pendency of these cases. 3

The investigative phase was conducted by said office pursuant to our resolutions of February 14, 1975 and September 13, 1976
in G.R. Nos.
L- 39386 and L-39620-29, entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al." With commendable
thoroughness and attention to detail, two reports were submitted which, in order to vividly portray the scope and magnitude of
respondent's operations and how he was able to perpetrate the anomalous transactions complained of, we quote extensively
from said reports which are sustained by the evidence of record.

I. The antecedent facts on which Administrative Case No. 2148 is premised are reported by then Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, as follows:

PREPATORY STATEMENT

This unnumbered administrative case against respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (hereinafter called
respondent NAVARRO, for short) originally stemmed from the letter of a certain Angelito B. Cayanan to the
Honorable Supreme Court dated January 25, 1975 which reads as follows:

x x x           x x x          x x x

I wish to respectfully inform your good office that I bought a few lots on installment basis from
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro of Ruby Hills Subdivision as evidenced by the attached OR Nos. 0512
and 0519 and a "Contract of Sale".
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Atty. Navarro, some officials and representative of the said company claim that although there
is a pending case No. L-39386 under Decree No. 1425 on the property being sold, the case is
almost won in their favor and are just waiting for your final decision within a couple of months
or even less.

In this connection, I am respectfully writing you this letter in order to bring to your attention this
transaction and to protect my rights in the event that any unfavorable circumstances may
arise in the future.

xxx xxx xxx

Acting on the aforesaid letter, the Supreme Court, per Resolution dated February 14, 1975, referred the copy of
Mr. Cayanan's letter to the Solicitor General for "investigation of the existence of sufficient ground to proceed
with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (whose address of record is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District,
Quezon City) for suspension or removal from the office of attorney and for appropriate action." The resolution
reads as follows:

L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) The
court NOTED the letter dated January 25, 1975 of Mr. Angelito B. Cayanan with its
attachments (copy thereof has been furnished Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, counsel for
respondents) and RESOLVED to instruct the Clerk of Court to inform him of the status of the
cases at bar.

It appearing from said letter that Atty. Felipe C. Navarro has been selling the lots in litigation
herein on installment basis to the public (among them, Mr. Cayanan) as "absolute owner by
virtue of this contract of legal services in Civil Case No. 8321, etc. of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasig" (see Ruby Hills Subdivision Contract of Sale), which lots are titled in
the name of herein petitioner and not in Atty. Navarro's name and that the unwarranted claim
is made on his behalf that 'the case is almost won in their favor' (see Mr. Cayanan's letter), the
Court RESOLVED FURTHER to refer copy of Mr. Cayanan's said letter with its attachments to
the Solicitor General under Rule 139, Sections 1, 3, 4 and 5 for investigation of the existence
of sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (whose address
of record is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City) for suspension or removal from the
office of attorney and for appropriate action.

Aside from Mr. Cayanan, the Solicitor General is directed to communicate in the premises
with Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez of the law firm of Ortigas & Ortigas (with address at 10th
Floor, Ortigas Bldg. Ortigas Ave., Pasig, Rizal), who under letter of June 10, 1974 on file in
Administrative Case No. 1154 has offered to make available documents in their possession
showing other sales made by Atty. Navarro of properties titled in the name of other persons,
involving a total selling price of P75 million and down payments of almost P 0.6 million.

On April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General (now Justice of the Court of Appeals) Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. wrote
Mr. Angelito B. Cayanan asking him to submit his affidavit embodying the circumstances surrounding the
matters contained in his letter dated January 25, 1975, especially the second paragraph thereof. The letter was
sent to Mr. Cayanan by registered mail but the same was returned unserved for the reason that the addressee
had moved to another address.

On the same date, April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General Gutierrez, Jr. also wrote to Atty. Eulogio R.
Rodriguez requesting him for copies of the documents evidencing the sales made by respondent Navarro.

On February 13, 1976, this Honorable Court issued a Resolution in L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina
Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) referring the letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. dated
January 13, 1976 "for investigation of the existence of sufficient grounds for the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro for suspension or removal from office and for appropriate action" and directing "Mr. Ortigas, Jr., to
furnish the Office of the Solicitor General for the purpose with a copy of said letter and all its pertinent
attachments."

The aforementioned letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. dated January 13, 1976 reads as follows:
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x x x           x x x          x x x

Dear Justice Teehankee,

This is to apprise your Office of the latest activities of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro who has
previously been reported to the Supreme Court as selling properties titled in the name of this
Company.

We have just secured a new "subdivision plan" of Atty. Navarro showing that the lots he is
now selling to the public include those titled in the names of the heirs of the late Don Vicente
Madrigal and this Company in Quezon City. Atty. Navarro has thus expanded his activities
despite recent detention by the Military. As could be seen from the attached "plan", Navarro
claims to be the owner of that huge property (actually titled in the name of the Madrigals and
this Company) bounded by Ortigas Avenue, E. delos Santos Avenue, White Plains Road and
R. Rodriguez Avenue, comprising approximately of 260 hectares.

As reported in our previous letters to the Court, Navarro claims to be the owner of some 4,000
hectares of land in the Greater Manila Area in virtue of his handling the case of some
squatters on a 1.2-hectare lot in Mandaluyong, Rizal owned by Dona Florentina Nuguid Vda.
de Haberer. He contends that whereas his squatters-clients occupy only about a hectare, he
has become, in virtue of his contract of legal services' with them, the owner of thousands of
hectares of land as these are allegedly covered by void titles. Navarro thus started to openly
sell these properties.

Navarro's Ruby Hills and Bluehills Subdivisions, for instance, cover properties already with
buildings and other improvements. He has nevertheless been quite successful in selling
portions thereof, as when he sold lots within the De La Salle College, Wack-Wack Golf &
Country Club, ABM Sison Hospital, etc. His modus operandi is described in this Company's
letter complaint dated April 8, 1974 to Gen. Prospero Olivas, copy of which is attached hereto
for ready reference.

Navarro continues to defy the authorities, for only after a brief lull he is now again
openly selling titled properties of other persons. We have provided more than sufficient
documentary evidence to the Court and the Solicitor General and we hope that formal
administrative charges can now be filed against Navarro to prevent him from further
perpetrating a large scale fraud upon the public.

xxx xxx xxx

Thereafter, hearings were conducted on various dates.

COMPLAINANTS' EVIDENCE

The evidence for the complainants consist mainly of documents, most of which were presented in Criminal
Cases Nos. 3158 and 3159 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and in the various civil cases before the said
court involving Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. Complainants' sole witness, Reynaldo Morallos, merely
identified the various documentary exhibits presented by the complainants.

From the evidence adduced by the complainants, it appears that a certain Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer
(hereinafter called HABERER, for short) filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal twenty-two (22) cases for
recovery of possession of her 1.2 hectare property in Mandaluyong, Rizal titled in her name, and to eject the
twenty-two (22) families squatting thereat. Eleven (11) of these cases were raffled to Judge Emilio Salas, while
the other eleven (11) cases were assigned to Judge Pedro Navarro. All the twenty-two (22) defendants-
squatters were represented by respondent NAVARRO. On behalf of his clients, respondent NAVARRO
interposed as principal defense, the alleged nullity of the HABERER'S title, claiming that the mother title from
which it emanated actually originated from Decree No. 1425 issued in G.L.R.O. Record No. 917, which he
claims to be non-existent.

The two sets of cases were decided differently. In the first set of eleven (11) cases, Judge Salas rendered a
decision on August 31, 1970 sustaining the validity of the HABERER'S title and ordering the eviction of the
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defendants-squatters clients of respondent NAVARRO (Exhibit W). In finding for the plaintiff, Judge Salas
stated as follows:

After due consideration of the evidence adduced by both parties, this Court finds that most of
the documentary evidence submitted by defendants are irrelevant to the case since they
pertain to defendants claim of ownership over 10,000 hectares of land when the area of the
property subject matter of the complaint is only 12,700 square meters. This Court also
believes that the above-mentioned claims of defendants are untenable.

Plaintiffs ownership over the property in question is evidenced by the issuance in her name,
since 1929, of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that
a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein. After the expiration of the one-year period from the
issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is based, it becomes incontrovertible (see
case of Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558; Reyes & Nadres vs. Borbon & Director of
Lands, 50 Phil. 791; Manuel Sy Juco, et al. vs. Luis Francisco, 53 O.G., p. 2186, April
15,1957; Brizuela et al. vs. Ciriaco Vda. de Vargas, 53 O.G., p. 2822, May 15, 1957).

Defendants' claim that they became owners of the land in question by adverse possession is
without merit considering that title to land becomes non-prescriptible Sec. 42 of Act No. 496
provides that no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Corporation de Pp. Agustines vs.
Crisostomo, 42 Phil. 427). A title once registered cannot be defeated even by adverse, open
and notorious possession. Registered title under the Torrens System cannot be defeated by
prescription. The title, once registered, is notice to the World. All persons must take notice. No
one can plead ignorance of registration (Legarda vs. Saleeby, 3 Phil. 590, 595).

Further, defendants recognized plaintiffs ownership over the property in question when they
filed a petition with the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation wherein they sought the
latter's intervention for the acquisition of the property and for the subdividing thereof into small
lots to be sold to them at nominal cost. In said petition defendants not only named the plaintiff
as the owner of the property in question but they also indicated therein her title to the land as
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. We quote
hereunder the pertinent facts and data concerning the property in question in defendants'
petition submitted to the General Manager of the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation,
as follows:

x x x           x x x          x x x

1) Location of land: Barrio Burol, Mandaluyong, Rizal

2) Name of registered owner: Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer

3) Address of owner: 1288 Burgos St., Paco, Manila, or c/o Bausa, Ampil, & Suarez Law
Offices, Madrigal Bldg., Manila

4) Certificate of Title No. (attach photostatic copy): 15043

5) Area of land, Lot & Block & Survey Nos. 12,700 square meters(Exh G).

As regards defendants' claim that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 issued since 1929 in
the name of plaintiff is null and void, this Court is of the opinion that defendants cannot assail
the validity of said title in this proceeding, which is for recovery of possession. Any attack on
the decree of registration of title must be direct and not by collateral proceeding. The title
which may be issued in pursuance of said decree cannot be changed, altered, modified,
enlarged or diminished in a collateral proceeding (Legarda, et al. vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590). In
the case of Director of Land vs. Gan Tan, G.R. No. L-2664, May 30, 1951, our Supreme
Court, in reversing the decision of the trial court where the registered owner was considered
disqualified to acquire land under the Constitution and consequently was denied the right to
constitute his title, said: "That the disqualification raised by the Court is untenable in the light
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of the theory that a Torrens title cannot be collateraly attacked. That issue can only be raised
in an action instituted expressly for that purpose". (See also Ramon Chua Yu Sun vs. The
Hon. Ceferino de los Santos, et al., G.R. No. 4347, November 23,1951; James (sic) G.R. No.
L-4013, Dec. 29,1951; Samonte, et al. vs. Descallar et al., No. L-12964, Feb. 29,1960).

In view of the above-mentioned ruling of the Supreme Court, it is our opinion that there is no
need to discuss the merits of the reasons claimed by defendants why Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 15043 in the name of plaintiff is null and void. (Exh. W) Decision in Civil Cases Nos.
8322, 8323, 8327, 8370, 8375, 8374, 8382, 8691, 8693, 8696 & 8699, at pages 6-7; 9-10).

In the second set of eleven (11) cases, Judge Pedro Navarro decided in favor of the defendants-squatters
clients of respondent NAVARRO. In his decision dated May 26, 1971, dismissing the complaints, Judge
Navarro stated as follows:

Plaintiff claims to be the registered owner of a parcel of land containing an area of 12,000
square meters situated at the corner of A. Luna, Harapin Ang Bukas and J.C. Zuluete Streets,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, which is covered by, and more particularly described in, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal and indicated in the sketch plan
attached to the complaint as Annex A.

x x x           x x x          x x x

It likewise appears that ejectment proceedings have been filed in the Municipal Court of
Pasig, Rizal, and in the City Court of Quezon City against several persons occupying other
parcels by Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, where decisions have been rendered
in favor of said Partnership. In order to forestall executions of these decisions defendants in
said ejectment cases filed class suit before this Court by the occupants of the land which was
heard and tried before Branch XV in which the Director of Lands was impleaded as a party-
defendant. The decision of Branch XV in said class suit is made part of the evidence of these
defendants in the herein eleven cases for whatever the same may be worth as aid in the
determination of the merits of the issues raised herein.

As may be gleaned from said decision of Branch XV plaintiff therein assailed the validity of
Decree No. 1425 as null and void and or fictitious and the proceedings in GLRO Rec. No. 917
upon which the decree was based as also null and void. The Court sustained the herein
plaintiffs claim and rendered judgment declaring (1) the proceedings in GLRO Rec. No. 917
null and void; (2) the Decree No. 1425 null and void; (3) all original certificates of title issued
by virtue of and pursuant to the judgment in GLRO Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 utter
nullities; (4) all transfer certificates of title derived from the original certificates of title declared
void under No. 3 above, particularly but not exclusively, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
77652 and 77653 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and 126575 and its derivative
Transfer Certificate of 'title No. 135879 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, null and void; (5) that
the rightful owners of the litigated lands covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 77652,
77653, 126575 (or 135879) are the herein plaintiffs . . . and so forth.

The Court has read copy of this decision of our Branch XV and observed findings of facts too
ponderous to be ignored.

That case before Branch XV directly assails the nullity of the proceedings leading to the
proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 and, as an inevitable corollary, the nullity of Decree No.
1425 issue by virtue of such void proceedings as well as the original certificates of title issued
as consequence thereof.

In said proceeding before Branch XV the Court, among other things, found that while the
decision in GLRO 917 was supposedly rendered on April 25, 1905, the survey of the property
subject matter of therein application was not made until June 16 to August 16, 1906, or some
one year after the decision. It found no proof of initial hearing of the application for registration
being published as required by law without which the Land Registration Court could not have
acquired jurisdiction over the case. Said decision also made inference that since the survey of
the property was not made until a year after the rendition of the judgment the technical
descriptions appearing in the original certificates of title issued under GLRO Rec. No. 917
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Decree No. 1425, could not have been those appearing in the notice of initial hearing, if any.
Publication of accurate technical description being an essential jurisdictional requirement
which cannot be dispensed with and non-compliance with this requirement renders the
proceedings and the decision and decree and titles issued arising therefrom null and void.

The same decision of Branch XV also made its findings that James Ross who was said to
have penned the decision in GLRO Rec. No. 917, never was a judge of the Court of Land
Registration at the time the decision was supposedly rendered because the Gaceta Official for
the year 1905 does not show that James Ross was listed as Judge of the Land Registration
Court or that he was ever appointed in that capacity. Furthermore, the Court found that while
J.C. Welson was the Clerk of Court on April 26, 1905, one A.K. Jones issued the decree and
he signed it as Clerk of Court. The Court even found the supposed decision in that
proceedings missing and made its conclusion that since the decree which was supposedly
issued by a person who was not the Clerk of Court at the time and which decree did not
contain the description of the property ordered in the decision to be rendered because the
survey of the property was only made some one year later and that said decree cannot now
even be found, the decision rendered therein is void for lack of jurisdiction.

Now, as we have said, the foregoing findings of facts are too ponderous to be ignored. It is
indeed a truism that a void original certificate of title cannot be the source of a valid transfer
certificate of title and a void judgment is, in the eyes of the law, inexistent and cannot give
source to any legal right.

The evidence now shows that the plaintiffs in said Civil Case No. 7-M(10339) before Branch
XV of this Court are also the defendants in the herein eleven cases in which their properties
are also involved. Since the case before Branch XV directly assails the nullity of the
proceedings by virtue of which Decree No. 1425 and the alleged title of the plaintiff over the
parcels of land occupied by the herein eleven defendants is a derivative from such decree, it
is the considered opinion of this Court that until and unless the decision of Branch XV of this
Court is reversed or set aside by final judgment, plaintiffs prayer to order the herein eleven
defendants in these eleven cases to vacate the parcels which they occupy and on which their
respective houses are built has become premature. It goes without saying that if said decision
of Branch XV will be finally affirmed, or that the same becomes final and executory, all the
claims of rights to ownership and possession of properties embraced in the decision in GLRO
Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 shall become absolute nullities. Possessions by actual
occupants of all these properties had better be maintained until after final decision in Civil
Case No. 7-M(10339) shall have been rendered. (Exh. R, Decision in Civil Cases Nos. 8320,
8321, 8326, 8369, 8379, 8383, 8385, 8386, 8387 and 8700, at pp. 2, 5-9).

On June 21, 1971, Judge Navarro, acting on the motion filed by respondent NAVARRO, issued an order
cancelling HABERER's title over her property in question and directing the issuance of a new title in lieu thereof
in favor of respondent's clients Thus —

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaints

in the above-entitled cases (Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8329, 8376, 8379, 8383, 8386, 8685,
8687 and 8700) all with costs against the plaintiff and hereby ordering the Register of Deeds
of Rizal to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal
issued in favor of the plaintiff Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer and in view thereof issue
new certificates of title in favor of the defendants subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor
of Attorney Felipe Navarro in accordance with the terms of the "Kasunduan Hinggil sa
Serbisyo ng Abogado" which is quoted in his ex-parte motion for clarification and/or
modification of the decision.

As so modified the decision stands in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

(Exhibit S, pp. 4-5).

On July 23, 1971, HABERER filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order, and on September 15,
1972, Judge Navarro issued the following order:
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In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion to reiterate that its decision in this
case was mainly predicated on the decision of Branch XV of this Court that the certificate of
title emanating from the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were null and void and
plaintiffs title happened to be one of them. The Court opined that until said decision is
reversed the actual occupants had better be maintained in their possessions of the land.

Pursuant to the same order the motion for reconsideration and new trial was set only for
reception of alleged newly discovered evidence.

The Court now understands that the decision of Branch XV is now under review by order of
our Appellate Court.

It has also come to the understanding of the Court that the order of June 21, 1971, sought to
be reconsidered insofar as it ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043
in favor of the plaintiff, also adversely affects the interests of other persons and entities like
the Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which is not a party herein, because the
certificate of title of the plaintiff is also a derivative of GLRO 917 and Decree No. 1425 from
which Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, derives titles over wide tracts of land. Since
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, is not a party in this case whatever orders or
decisions are made in this case cannot be made to affect the said company. Decisions and
orders can only affect parties to the case.

The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the order dated June 21, 1971, must be
reconsidered on two grounds (1) because the decision of Branch XV is now being the subject
of further proceedings and (2) because it has the effect of adversely affecting the interest of
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which is not even a party herein.

WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971, is set aside. However, the decision
dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it denies the ejectment of the present occupants of the land as
stated in the decision stands.

SO ORDERED.

(Exhibit T, at pp. 2-3).

HABERER appealed from the decision of Judge Navarro while the defendants-clients of respondent
NAVARRO appealed from the decision of Judge Salas. The Navarro order of June 21, 1971 was not appealed
by respondent NAVARRO's clients.

After the rendition of the Navarro decision which made reference to the decision rendered by Judge Vivencio
Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, respondent NAVARRO published in the Manila Times
on July 4, 1971 the following:

LEGAL NOTICE TO ALL THOSE INVOLVED:

PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF LAW AS INTERPRETED BY OUR SUPREME

COURT RESPECTING A VAST TRACT OF LAND LATIFUNDIO COVERING
MANDALUYONG, SAN JUAN, PASIG, MARIKINA, AND QUEZON CITY, THE DECISION
DATED MAY 26, 1971 REITERATING AND REPEATING THE DECLARATION AND ORDER
THAT ALL ORIGINAL AND TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE DERIVED FROM
DECREE NO. 1425 ARE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO RENDERED BY THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL IN FAVOR OF THE MYRIAD CLIENTS OF THE
UNDERSIGNED HAS AUTOMATICALLY BY MERE LAPSE OF THE REGLEMENTARY
PERIOD) BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

But to every possessor in good faith there comes a time when he is considered a possessor in
bad faith. When the owner or possessor with a better right comes along, when he becomes
aware that what he had taken for granted is at least doubtful, and when he learns the grounds
in support of the adverse contention, good faith ceases. The possessor may still believe that
his right is more secure, because we resign ourselves with difficulty to the sight of our
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vanishing hopes, but when the final judgment of the court deprives him of the possession, all
illusion necessarily disappears. (Tacas vs. Robon, 53 Phil. 356, 361-362 citing Manresa and
Articles 528, 545, and 1123 of our present Civil Code).

He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted
or sown without right to indemnity (Art 449, Civil Code)

HOWEVER, IT IS NOT THE DESIRE OF THE UNDERSIGNED PREVAILING PARTY AND

SUCCESSOR BY TITLE ACQUIRED AFTER THE ACTIONS WERE BEGUN BY VIRTUE OF
HIS CONTRACT OF LEGAL SERVICES TO DEMAND FOR THE DEMOLITION OR
REMOVAL OF THE IMPROVEMENTS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE POSSESSOR IN BAD
FAITH FOR:

The Civil Code confirms certain time-honored principles of the law of property. One of those is
the principle of accession whereby the owner of property acquires not only that which it
produces but that which it united to it either naturally or artificially. Whatever is built, planted or
sown on the land of another, and the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the
owner of the land. Where however, the planter, builder or sower has acted in good faith, a
conflict of rights arises between the owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of
the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the
impracticability of creating what Manresa calls a state of "forced co-ownership" (Vol. 3, 4th
ed., p. 213), the law has provided a just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land
the option to acquire the improvements after the payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige
the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent. It is the owner
of the land who is allowed to exercise the option because his right is older and because, by
the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing." Bernardo vs.
Bataclan, 66 Phil. 598, 602; see also Filipinas Colleges, Inc. vs. Garcia Timbang, et al., 106
Phil. 247, 254).

So caveat emptor (buyers beware) of possesors in bad faith as we are ready to ask for the
execution of the decision pursuant to law and avoid a scire facias Ordinary prudence requires
that those involved may please make some kind of arrangements with the undersigned before
execution by calling through the following telephones:

x x x           x x x          x x x

BY THE WAY, YOU ARE ALL INVITED TO JOIN THEMOTORCADE OF OUR PEOPLE'S
VICTORY WHICH WILL PASS THROUGH THE PRINCIPAL STREETS OF
MANDALUYONG, SAN JUAN, PASIG, MARIKINA, AND QUEZON CITY FROM 9 A.M. TO 12
NOON TODAY, SUNDAY, JULY 4, 1971, THE MOTORCADE WILL BEGIN FROM NO. 61
AMADO T. REYES STREET, BARRIO BUROL, MANDALUYONG, RIZAL RETURNING TO
THE SAME PLACE AT NOON FOR LUNCH CELEBRATING TILL MIDNIGHT.

(Sgd.) FELIPE C. NAVARRO

Counsel for the Defense

60 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City

(Exhibit D, at pages 6-8).

Thereafter, respondent NAVARRO claimed ownership of properties originally covered by Decree 1425
including the parcels of land owned by Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership (hereinafter called ORTIGAS,
for short), and started selling them.

In view of the aforementioned publication, panic ensued among the lot buyers of ORTIGAS and among the
property owners whose titles were derived from Decree No. 1425. As a counter measure to allay the fears of
the panicky lot buyers and owners, ORTIGAS caused the publication in the Manila Times on July 19 and 17,
1971 the following:
 10

WARNING

SO THE PUBLIC MAY KNOW

In reply to numerous inquiries received by Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership with
reference to an advertisement published in the Manila Times on July 4, 1971 supposedly
affecting the validity of all original certificates of title and transfer certificates of title derived
from Decree No. 1425, Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership wishes to announce that it is
not a party to ANY case allegedly decided on May 26, 1971 by the Supreme Court or any
other court and therefore ALL ITS TITLES DERIVED FROM DECREE NO. 1425 ARE NOT IN
ANY WAY AFFECTED BY SAID DECISION.

The public is hereby requested to be wary of any person selling lands and/or rights to lands
belonging to and in the name of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership.

The public is also warned to be wary of MISLEADING adverstisements and/or persons basing
their rights to lands of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership on such "decision" of May 26,
1971 which is claimed to be "final and executory."

ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

(Exhibit D, at pages 4-5).

After the publication of the foregoing notices, respondent NAVARRO filed with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch VIII, two (2) complaints for libel against the officers of ORTIGAS and the officials of the defunct
Manila 'times. Respondent NAVARRO sought to recover in said cases damages allegedly sustained by him on
account of his failure to consummate thousands of sales by reason of the publication of the above notice. In
support of his allegation, respondent NAVARRO presented 169 deeds of sale over lots in his various
subdivisions, the locations of which overlap the properties owned by ORTIGAS (marked as Exhibit F, F-1 to F-
168 in the instant proceedings).

On December 13, 1971, Judge Benjamin H. Aquino dismissed these two cases for libel for lack of merit (Exhibit
D).

Apart from the documents pertaining to the HABERER cases and the libel cases, the complainants also
presented documents relating to Civil Case No. 7-M(10339), Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV,
entitled "Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs. Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, et al." and Civil Case No. Q-
16265, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVI, entitled "Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro."

In Civil Case No. 7-M (10339), the plaintiffs therein sought to enjoin ORTIGAS from ejecting them. Judge
Vivencio M. Ruiz decided in favor of the plaintiffs, arguing that (1) there was no publication for the Notice of
Initial Hearing set in 1905; (2) there was no survey of the property sought to be registered; (3) the judge
presiding over the defunct Court of Land Registration was fake; and (4) the Clerk of Court of the said Court was
also fake. The dispositive portion of the Ruiz decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby declares and/or orders:

1. That the proceedings in G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 917 are null and void;

2. That Decree No. 1425 is null and void and/or fictitious;

3. That all the original certificates of title issued by virtue of and pursuant to the judgments in
G.L.R.0 Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 were utter nullities;

4. That all transfer certificates of title derived from the original certificates of title declared void
under No. (3) above, particularly but not exclusively, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 77652
and 77653 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and 126575 and its derivative Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 135879 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, were and are null and void;
 11

5. That the rightfully (sic) owners of the litigated lands covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 77652, 77653, 126575 (or 135879) are the herein plaintiffs, the portions owned by them
being as indicated in Exhibit P;

6. That the defendant Partnership cease and desist from molesting the plaintiffs in the
enjoyment and peaceful possession of their respective landholdings;

7. That the Hon. Andres Siochi, as Presiding Judge, Municipal Court, Pasig, Rizal, and Hon.
Ricardo Tensuan, as Presiding Judge, Branch II, City Court of Quezon City, and the
defendant Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, their agents, representatives and any
and all persons acting in their behalves, refrain and desist absolute (sic) and perpetually from
proceeding with or taking any action on Civil Cases Nos. 1134, II 13865, II-13869, II-13877, II-
13913, and II-13921 filed by the herein defendant Partnership against some of the herein
plaintiffs;

8. That the case be dismissed as against defendant Director of Lands;

9. That the defendant Partnership pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees;

10. That the defendant Partnership pay to the plaintiffs the costs of the suit; and

Defendant Partnership's counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

(Exhibit EE at pages 5-6).

ORTIGAS appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of Appeals. On November 21, 1971, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision setting aside the decision of Judge Ruiz and ordering a new trial to enable the petitioner to
introduce newly discovered evidence. The case was then remanded to the lower Court. On November 3, 1973,
Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who took the place of Judge Ruiz who was separated from the service by the
President of the Philippines, rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant, Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership, as against the plaintiffs:

1. Dismissing the amended complaint;

2. Confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425, issued in Expediente 917 and all titles emanating therefrom;

3. Directing each of the plaintiffs to individually pay the defendant Company:

(a) P30.00 per month as rental of the premises occupied by them from the time of the filing of the complaint on
October 20, 1967, with legal rate of interest, until they surrender the possession thereof to defendant Company;

(b) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.

(4) Ordering plaintiff and their successors-in-interest, agents or any person or persons acting in their behalf,
who are found to be in possession of defendant company's land to vacate the same and remove and demolish
their improvements thereon at plaintiffs expenses;

(5) Ordering Atty. Emilio D. Castellanes to return the attorney's fees in the amount of P 1,030.00 he
prematurely collected from defendant company, with interest; and

(6) To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
 12

(Exhibit DD at pages 44-45).

The aforesaid decision was appealed. During the pendency of the approval of the record on appeal, ORTIGAS
filed a motion for immediate execution of judgment. After exchange of pleadings by the parties, the trial court
presided by Judge Alcantara granted the motion and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of
Ortigas upon filing a bond in the amount of P250,000.00. Del Rosario, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of
the aforesaid order. Despite opposition by Ortigas, Judge Florellana Castro-Bartolome, who was appointed to
Branch XV vice Judge Alcantara, granted the motion for reconsideration and set aside the order of Judge
Alcantara. Ortigas contested the order of Judge Bartolome through a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-04060.

On September 1, 1975, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision in the aforesaid case, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted. The order of the respondent Judge dated
February 25, 1975, is hereby annulled and set aside and the order of Judge Arsenio
Alcantara, granting immediate execution, is hereby revived, with instructions to the
respondent judge to fully implement the latter order, including the approval of the petitioner's
bond and the issuance of the necessary writ or writs of execution. The restraining order
issued at the inception of this action is hereby (sic) permanent.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

(Exhibit EE at pages 50-51).

This decision was the subject of a petition for review filed by respondents Del Rosario, et al., but the same was
denied. So also with the motion for reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court (Annex "A" of Exhibit FF)

In order to stop respondent NAVARRO from selling its titled properties, ORTIGAS also filed Civil Case No. Q-
16265, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVI, entitled "Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro.

On December 16, 1972, Judge Sergio A.F. Apostol rendered a decision in favor of Ortigas as follows:

x x x           x x x          x x x

It having been found that defendant was guilty of bad faith and fraud in claiming and selling
plaintiff's land, plaintiff is entitled to attomey's fees. This court finds the amount of attorney's
fees in the sum of P50,000.00 to be fair and reasonable considering the extent and value of
the property involved and the nature of the case.

Defendant, in his answer and motion to dismiss, alleged that as a result of the issuance of the
restraining order, he suffered damages in the amount of Pl,000,000.00 daily.

Firstly, the same was not raised as a counterclaim. Therefore, this court can only treat it as an
affirmative defense.

Secondly, no evidence was submitted to prove this claim of damages. Under the same
authorities cited in support of the denial of plaintiffs claim for damages, therefore, he has
failed to establish what damages he had suffered.

Lastly, the court has found that plaintiff is entitled to the injunction prayed for. It follows,
therefore, that the issuance of the restraining order was proper and, hence, can not be the
basis for a claim for damages.

This court cannot help but end this decision with a note of admonition and hope. The people
who will ultimately suffer the most from defendant's acts in question are his buyers, who in all
 13

probability are middle class people who themselves wanted to make money out of the
apparent sad predicament that defendant had brought upon the plaintiff. It is the fervent hope
of this court, therefore, that with the advent of the NEW SOCIETY defendant will turn a new
page and make a fresh start in life.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Upholding the validity and indefeasibility of plaintiffs Transfer Certificates of Title over the
land in question;

2. As a consequence thereof, forever enjoining and barring the defendant, his successors-in-
interest, assigns, agents or any person or persons acting for or in his behalf, from selling and
advertising, verbally, or in writing, the sale of the lands in question and from asserting any
claim or dominion or possession whatsoever on or over the said property, directly or indirectly,
adverse to the plaintiff; and

3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 plus cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.

(Exhibit II-I-a, at pages 409-411 of Exhibit II).

The afore-quoted decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. L-53125-R.

On December 13, 1978, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision in the aforesaid case affirming the
decision of Judge Apostol.

Respondent NAVARRO elevated the case to this Honorable Tribunal (G.R. No. L-50156). Again, his petition
was denied for lack of merit. His subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied. Consequently, the
issue brought forth in the sala of Judge Apostol has now been laid to rest.

EVIDENCE FOR THE RESPONDENT

Respondent NAVARRO presented both testimonial and documentary evidence. His testimonial evidence
consist of his testimony and those of Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez, one of the complainants; and Arsenio de
Guzman, Chief of Section of the Bureau of Lands. His documentary evidence consist of Exhibits 1 to 13,
inclusive.

On direct examination, respondent NAVARRO testified that the present charges are the same as the charges
in administrative Case No. 1154, entitled, "In Re: Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, respondent", which was referred to
the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. He further declared that this Honorable Court deferred
action on the said administrative case until such time that G.R. Nos. L-42699-42709, the heirs of the late
Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al. is terminated. Respondent's direct testimony
dwelt only on these two matters and on the identification of his Exhibits 1 to 9.

On cross-examination, respondent NAVARRO testified that he is the counsel for the defendants in the twenty-
two (22) cases before Judge Pedro Navarro and Judge Emilio Salas of the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that
he became the owner of the lands not occupied by his clients by virtue of his contract of legal services signed
by them (pp. 76-78, t.s.n., July 7, 1977; pp. 7-10, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977). Said contract for legal services, which
appears on pages 224-232 of Exhibit "1", reads as follows:

KASUNDUAN HINGGIL SA SERBISYO NG ABOGADO SA MGA KINAUUKULAN NA ANG

MGA BAGAY NA ITO AY MALAMAN AT MAKARATING

Itong kasulatan na ito ay nagpapatibay at nagbibigay-bisa hinggil sa serbisyo ni Atty. Felipe C.

Navarro tungkol sa aming karapatan sa lupaing nasasakop ng diumanoy Kautusan-Blg. 1425
(Decree No. 1425) sa diumanoy Usapin Blg. 699, 875, 917, aip (Cases Nos. 699, 875, 917,
etc.) sa dating Hukuman ng Pagpapatala ng Lupain defunct Court of Land Registration) na
ang nasabing diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 na siyang pinagbatayan ng ipinapatalang
 14

gawagawang dalawanput anim (26) ng mga Original Certificates of Title ng Register of Deeds
ng Pasig at nagbunga ito ng maraming Transfer Certificates of Title na sa kasalukuyan iginigiit
ng mga mayhawak ngunit yan ay wala namang bisa at katuturan (Viz., City of Manila vs. Lack,
19 Phil. 324, 340) dahil sa kapaltosan ng nasabing diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 na sa
mula't sapul magpahanggang ngayon sa kasalukuyan ay iginigiit sa mga nakalagda sa ibaba
ng kasunduang ito kasama na rin ang mga dati at ibang mga kliyente ni Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro na ngayon ay siyang nararapat maging kalahok sa animnapung usapin na sa
kasalukuyang hawak ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (Civil Cases Nos. 8322, etc. of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branches I, II, and VI contesting the genuineness and due execution of
Decree No. 1425 of the defunct Court of Land Registration) upang mabigyan ang mga
nakalagda sa ibaba ng mga kanikaniyang katibayan o kung sila man ay mayhawak ng titulo
na sakup ng diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 ay babagohin iyan o mapapalitan ng maybisa
galing sa Hukuman upang matahimik at mapayapa ang dahilan paninirahan kanilang mula't
sapul ay kanila nang pinamamayanan sa buong kaalaman ng sambayanan at walang
paglilihim ng kanilang mapayapang pagmamay-ari ng mga lupain na sa mula't sapul ay
pinaninirahan ng mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito at ng kanilang ninuno o
nagpamana (predecessors-in-interest) na siyang mga pangyayari ay sapat na upang
maigawad ang mabisang titulo sapagkat ang nasabing lupain kailanmay di naging pambayan
kungdi pribado o di kaya'y sariling pag-aari ng nakalagdang may-ari sa ibaba ng kasunduang
ito, dahil sa mga nabanggit ng mga pangyayari na 'natamo sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay-
bisa ng batas di lamang ng karapatan sa pag-aangkin ng lupain kungdi maging ang
karapatang ipinagkaloob sa kanila ng pamahalaan ay nagsasaad na ang aktuwal na
pagkakaloob sa kanila ng pamahalaan ng titulo ay di na kinakailangan upang ang nasabing
karapatan ay di kilanlin o pagtibayin ng Hukuman (Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48
Phil. 242; Director of Lands vs. Abaldonado CA-G.R. No. 177-R, Jan. 12, 1948, 45 Off. Gaz
2188). Ngunit sa dahilang mayroon huwad na titulo ang mga nag-aangkin ng mga lupain at
nararapat iharap sa Hukuman ang bagay na ito upang ang Hukuman magpatibay at
magbigay-bisa ng mga titulo sa mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito ayon sa Section
10 ng Rule 39 ng Rules of Court. Sapagkat ang pamumusisyon sa isang bagay ang batayang
di mapagtatalunan hinggil sa kalaunan ng pagmamay-ari nito ng makalipas ang mahabang
panahong takda ng batas, maging ito man ay walang karampatang titulo o mabuting hangarin
ay nagpapahina at sumisira sa saklaw-bisa at halaga ng pinakamahusay na titulo na maaring
nasa bagay na iyon na pinanghahawakan ng taong hindi nagmamay-ari. Bunga nito, ang
pamumusisyon ng mahigit sa tatlumpung (30) taon na tinatamasa ng isang tao bilang may-ari
kahit na walang karampatang titulo o mabuting hangarin ay gumaganap ng sapat na titulo
upang makuha ang pag-aari ng lupaing tangan sapagkat ang lampas-bisa o ang panahong
itinakda ng batas sa pamamagitan ng pamumusisyon ng mahigit na tatlumpung (30) taon ay
tiyakang hadlang na maging ang pinakamahusay na titulo na kinikilala ng batas ay hindi
makatitinag o makapangingibabaw (Kincaid vs. Cabututan, 35 Phil. 383).' Hindi maaring
sabihin o ipagmalakdan ng mga nangamkam na sa pamamagitan ng kanilang huwad na titulo
ay naangkin na nila ang lupain o di kayay gawing batayan ang kanilang huwad na titulo upang
masabing sila ay nagmamay-ari ng lupa. Hindi ito maaring maganap sapagkat ang krimen at
panlilinlang ay hindi maaring maging batayan ng panimula ng ay isang tunay at mabisang
titulo kahit na ipinagbili at nabili sa isang mabuti ang hangarin ng bumili ng karampatang
halaga ng lupain (Levin vs. Bass, 91 Phil. 419, 439). Dahil sa itinuring ng batas na sila ay
'constructive trustees, lamang kaya hindi maganap ang lampas-bisa (Gayondato vs.
Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, 49 Phil. 244-249). Subali't dahilan sa ilang katiwalian ng
katotohanan na di nabatid ng mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito na di-umano'y
siyang naganap na pangyayari ngunit ang tunay na katotohanan ay di naman ito naganap at
naliligaw sa paniniwalang nararapat silang nagbayad ng rentas o alkila at ang ilan ay binili
ang lupain gayong ang katotohanan ay sila ang nararapat at tunay na may-ari sa di-umano'y
Kautusan Blg. 1425 (Decree No. 1425) ng defunct Court of Land Registration na nagbunga ng
gawa-gawang titulo na sumasakop sa buong kalawakan ng humigit kumulang ng 4,000
hectares na samakatuwid ay apatnapung (40) milyong metro kuwadrado ng lupaing ngayon
ay matatagpuan sa buong bayan ng Mandaluyong, ang buong bayan ng San Juan sapagkat
sakop ito noon ng bayan San Felipe Neri ayon sa Act No. 942, ang bahagi ng Punta sa
Maynila sapagkat sakop ito noon ng Mandaluyong na ngayon, kalahati ng bayan ng Pasig,
kalahati ng bayang Mariquina, at kalahati ng Lungsod ng Quezon sapagka't pinilas lamang ito
buhat sa bayan ng Mariquina, Pasig, San Juan at Mandaluyong sa pamamagitan ng
Commonwealth Act No. 502 na pinagtibay noong Oktubre 12, 1939 at sang-ayon sa mga
paglalarawan ng di-umano'y pagsusukat o survey nagsimula sa Maytunas creek patungong
ilog ng San Juan patungong dakong ibaba ng agos ng ilog ng San Juan hanggang sa
bahaging matatagpuan ang ilog ng Pasig sa Punta, Maynila at lumilisya sa patungong itaas
 15

ng agos ng ilog Pasig na nababanggit ang sapa ng Buayang Bato sa Namayan, Mandaluyong
pagkatapos ay pabalik sa ilog Pasig sa dakong pataas ng agos ng ilog hanggang sa ilog ng
Mariquina at pagsunod sa dakong pataas ng agos ng ilog ng Mariquina hanggang sa sapa ng
Pinagpatayang Buaya at lumalakdaw hanggang sa pinagmulan ng sapa ng Diliman na
umaagos ng pababa patungong ilog ng San Juan at pabalik sa sapa ng Maytunas na ang
nasabing baybay-sukat o survey sa abot makakaya ng sino mang may sapat ng kakayahang
agrimensor (surveyor) ay di makabuo ng ni isa man lamang maramihang-gilid na hugis o anyo
(polygon).

Dahilan sa mga nabanggit na pangyayari, ang mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng Kasunduang ito ay
sumasang-ayon na kasunduin ang paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro ng No. 66 Azucena,
Roxas District, Quezon City upang gumawa ng karampatang hakbang sa Hukuman ng Unang
Dulungan ng Rizal pati Quezon City hanggang sa Corte Suprema kung kinakailangan at
gawin ang anumang paraang isinasaisip niyang tumpak at nararapat gawin sang-ayon sa
batas upang matamo ng mga makalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito ang kani-kaniyang titulo
ayon sa paraang minamarapat ng batas at kaming mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang
ito ay nagkakaloob ng buong kapangyarihan kay Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ilagay sa kanyang
pangalan at kung sa kanino man niya naising ipagkaloob ang ibang bahagi ng lupain na
aming minana o pinagsundan (predecessors-in-interest) nguni't ipinaubaya na namin kay Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro bilang bahagi ng buong kabayaran ng kanyang serbisyo at karapatang
maangkin niya sangayon sa mga inilalahad ng kasunduang ito maliban na lamang doon sa
bahagi ng lupaing nais naming mapatituluhan sa ilalim ng aming kani-kaniyang pangalan at
sumasangayon kami sa pagbabayad ng karampatang halaga sa paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro nang naayon sa isinasaad ng kasunduang ito. Na sa bawa't kilos na magaganap sa
pagpapatitulo ng aming mga ariarian ang mamamahala sa mga gastos o kabayaran ay si
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ang ibig sabihin na mula sa pagpapasukat (survey) ng mga ari-
arian hanggang sa pagbibigay ng mga plano ng mga sukat upang mapagtibay ito ng
Kagawaran ng Lupain (Bureau of Lands), paghahanda at pagnonotaryo ng mga affidavit' ng
pagmay-ari, pagkuha ng mga katibayan ng pagkamayari, bayad sa pagpasok sa husgado
(filing fees), pagpapatala (registration), paggawa ng mga kasulatan (documentation), pagsalin
ng mga rekord (transcripts), pagpapatunay (certifications) at iba pang mga kinakailangang
bayaran at pagkagastuhan ay nasa kalayaan na ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na pagpasiyahan
ng naaayon sa kaniyang sariling kagustuhan na ang nilalayon sa bandang huli at ang tunay
na hangarin ay ang mapatituluhan ng ayon sa batas ang aming kani-kaniyang mga lupain sa
aming kani-kaniyang pangalan na sa pamamagitan ng mga tungkuling iniatang namin kay
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro sa pamamagitan ng kasunduang ito, sumasang-ayon kami at
natatalian o nabibigkisan ng kasunduang ito na magbayad ng halagang Dalawampu't Limang
Piso (P25.00) sa bawat metro kuwadrado ng lupaing matitituluhan sa aming pangalan bilang
kabayaran sa serbisyo o paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro; ang halagang Sampung Piso
(P10.00) sa bawat metro kuwadrado ay aming magiging paunang-bayad upang ang
proyektong ito ay mapanimulan kaagad sa lalong madaling panahon at ang matitirang dapat
bayarang halaga na Labing-limang Piso (P15.00) bawa't metro kuwadrado ay aming
babayaran kapag naipagkaloob na ang titulo ng lupa sa amin sa kasunduang kapag buhat sa
isang taon mula sa petsang ipinagkaloob ang titulo ng lupa ay hindi kami nakababayad ng
buo sa halagang natitira o balanse na Labing-limang Piso (P15.00) sa bawat metro
kuwadrado, ang titulo ng lupain ay mapupunta sa pangalan ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro nguni't
ang kasunduang ito na isang taong pagbibigay-palugit ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro upang siya
ay mabigyan ng kabuuang kabayaran sa kanyang mga paglilingkod sa usaping ito at
sumasang-ayon si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na kami ay pahintulutang isangla ang aming mga
ari-ariang may karampatang titulo na di huwad at pinagtibay ng batas sa alinmang bangko
upang ito ang magsilbing bayad sa mga paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro sa usaping ito
at iyon lamang ang natatanging sandali o panahong kami ay mawawalan na ng obligasyon o
tungkuling bayaran ang Dalawampu't Limang Piso (P25.00) sa bawat metro kuwadrado ng
lupaing ikinasundo namin ang serbisyo ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro upang matituluhan nang
naayon sa batas. Sumasang-ayon din si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ang sinuman sa aming
nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito na hindi kayang magbayad ng paunang-halaga na
Sampung Piso (P10.00) sa bawa't metro kuwadrado ay bibigyan ng karampatang magbayad
ng makahalintulad na halaga sa bawa't buwan sa loob ng sampu (10) o dalawampung (20)
taon sang-ayon sa mga hinihingi ng pangyayari, ang titulo ng lupain ay ipagkakaloob lamang
sa nagnanais umangkin nito kung mababayaran na ang kabuuan ng paglilingkod ni Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro kasama na ang "legal interest" at ang amortization nito ngunit kinakailangan
magbigay sila ng paunang bayad na Limangpung Piso (P50.00) upang panimulan ang
pagbabayad buwan-buwan (monthly installment condition) at magiging mabisa lamang ito
 16

kung matutupad ng buong katapatan ang pagbabayad ng hulugang buwan-buwan (monthly

installment) na maaring magbuhat sa halagang Limang Piso (P5.00) hanggang Limangpung
Piso (P50.00) sa bawat buwan nang naayon sa laki o kalawakan ng lupaing nararapat na
mapasa-amin ayon sa batas. Sa dahilang ang buhay ng tao ay walang katiyakang magtatagal
na habang panahon ay isinasalin namin ang aming mga karapatan at tungkulin sa aming
tagapagmana lamang at gayon din si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na maaring manahin ang
kanyang karapatan sa kasunduang ito sa mga tagapagmana lamang niya upang itaguyod nila
ang paglilingkod sa anumang paraan ayon sa batas.

SA KATUNAYAN AT KATIBAYAN NG LAHAT NG NABANGGIT NA KASUNDUANG ITO

ay lumalagda kami sa kasunduang ito na aming tutuparin ang lahat ng isinasaad sa

kasunduang ito na sinasang-ayunan din ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na kanyang tuparin ang
kanyang tungkulin bilang manananggol na tutulong sa amin upang kami ay mapagkalooban
ng Hukuman ng titulo sa aming kani-kaniyang lupain ng naayon sa batas at siyang isinasaad
din ng kasunduang ito at kasama ng paglagda ng aming mga pangalan na siyang nais
naming pangalang lumitaw sa titulo, ang aming kani-kaniyang tirahan, kalawakan ng lupain,
paraang pagbabayad at petsa na kami'y lumagda sa kasunduang ito bilang pagpapatunay sa
aming taos-pusong pagsang-ayon at hangarin tumupad sa lahat ng napapaloob sa
KASULATANG ITO.

In the course of the proceedings, respondent NAVARRO admitted that he has sold, and is still selling,
properties covered by Torrens titles in the names of ORTIGAS & CO., Madrigal, and others, but he claims that
the titles of said parties are null and void because they emanated from Decree No. 1425; that he has no title
over the properties sold by him except the contract of legal services which his clients allegedly signed; that he
has no approved plans for the various subdivisions allegedly owned by him; that he has not obtained any
certificate of registration or license to sell from the National Housing Authority; that he has not declared for
taxation purposes the thousands of hectares of prime lands in Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Quezon City
and Marikina, allegedly owned by him; and that he has not filed any case directly attacking the title of
ORTIGAS and others (pp. 7-33, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977; Exhibit J).

Respondent NAVARRO also admits that he is the defendant in the "25-Billion-peso-case" before Judge Sergio
Apostol, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs. Felipe C.
Navarro's Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City"; that said case covers lands in
Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Marikina and Quezon City including those involved in the present case (pp. 8-
21, t.s.n., July 7, 1977; Exhibits F, F-I to F-168).

Despite the decision of Judge Apostol upholding the validity of the Ortigas Transfer Certificate of Title and
enjoining respondent NAVARRO from selling lots covered by said title, NAVARRO still continued selling
properties covered by the injunction claiming that the said decision is ineffectual because the same has been
appealed. (pp. 33-34, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977). 4

On the basis of the foregoing report, the Solicitor General filed a complaint with Francisco Ortigas, Jr. as complainant, praying
that respondent Navarro be disbarred, that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys, and that his certificate of admission to
the bar be recalled.

On May 23, 1980, respondent Navarro filed his answer with prayer to lift the order of suspension. 5 Complainant Ortigas, Jr. filed
an opposition to said motion to lift suspension .6 Respondent Navarro reiterated his plea in his manifestation dated August 8,
1980. 7 In a resolution dated September 2, 1980, this Court denied the motion to lift the order of suspension. 8

On October 29, 1980, respondent Navarro filed an urgent ex parte motion praying for the lifting of the order of
suspension 9 which was denied by this Court on November 13, 1980. 10 He reiterated his prayer in another motion filed on
January 5, 1981 11 but the same was likewise denied in our resolution of January 22, 1981. 12

II. Administrative Case No. 2033 arose from a letter-complaint, dated March 13, 1979, filed by the spouses E. Conrad and
Virginia Geeslin with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, charging respondent Navarro with deceit, malpractice and gross
misconduct in office, and blatant violation of the Attorney's Oath. Said letter was thereafter referred to this Court by Integrated
Bar of the Philippines President (now Chief Justice) Marcelo B. Fernan for appropriate action. 13
 17

Pursuant to our resolution of June 4, 1979, 14 respondent Navarro filed his answer with motion to dismiss on June 29,
1979. 15 The corresponding
reply 16 and rejoinder 17 were subsequently filed. In a resolution of this Court dated October 1, 1985, the case was referred to the
Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 18

On August 28, 1989, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its report, with the following findings and recommendation:

CHARGES

In their Complaint dated March 13, 1979, complainants charged respondent with deceit, malpractice and gross
conduct in office, and blatant violation of the Attorney's Oath, for having deliberately misrepresented the facts
and the law while acting as counsel for the defendants in the following civil cases:

a. His insistence that our clients are no longer owners of the land subject of the cases mentioned above; he
falsely alleged that to his personal knowledge the title to the land is in the name of one Leopoldo Cojuangco.
This false allegation was made despite the final decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVII, in
Civil Case No. Q-18221 entitled "E Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin vs. Leopoldo Cojuangco, et al." (1) declaring
the transfer of the lot to Leopoldo Cojuangco was fraudulent and had been effected thru falsification; and, (2)
ordering the cancellation of the title issued to Cojuangco and the reversion of the title to our clients. Copies of
the Complaint and the Decision in said case are hereto attached as Annexes "B" and "C", respectively.

b. Mr. Navarro persisted and still persists in representing that our clients' title was rendered null and void by
virtue of the expiration of the Parity Amendment and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Quasha
vs. Republic, 46 SCRA 160. Our clients' title to the aforesaid property was acquired by hereditary succession
from the late Dr. Luther Bewley who acquired said land in 1925. The ownership therefore of our clients is
protected both under the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. Any lawyer, even a law student, knows that the Parity
Amendment and the decision in the Quasha case, supra, covers cases where property was acquired by virtue
of the Parity Amendment. Mr. Navarro is either guilty of abysmal ignorance of the law or of complete and
unabashed contempt for facts, the law of the land and for the Courts.

c. Mr. Navarro persists in misrepresenting to the Court that the title covering the land subject of the above
cases had been declared null and void in the "final and executory"  decision of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch II. He deliberately omits to give the title of the case and its docket number for the obvious and
malicious reason that the case he relies upon (Heirs of Nuguid vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 42699-42709) is
still pending resolution before the Supreme Court and hence cannot be "final and executory."

d. He misrepresents to the Court that the land subject of the cases heretofore enumerated is not within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Quezon City Court and hence the court has no jurisdiction. Further, that title thereto
having described the land to be part of the Municipality of San Juan del Monte, is void. He cannot disclaim
knowledge however of the fact that the area in the vicinity of Santolan Road in Quezon City was originally part
of the Municipality of San Juan del Monte territory of Quezon City when the latter was created on 14 June
1950. In the light of this fact, Mr. Navarro's representation is false and malicious.

e. Mr. Navarro has shown a complete and total disregard for basic norms of honesty and decency in that
having prejudiced the interest of his clients because of his gross neglect to appeal in a timely manner from the
decision of the court and having adopted the wrong remedy, in complete ignorance of the law, he had
influenced his clients into commencing a case before the Tanod Bayan against the Presiding Judge of the City
Court of Quezon City, Branch 1, and Hon. Minerva Genovea The case is obviously calculated to harrass and
coerce the Honorable Presiding Judge. Mr. Navarro's conduct speaks ill of his respect for the law and the
courts.

f. The penchant of Mr. Navarro to misrepresent and deceive did not stop before the City Court of Quezon City.
He continues to do so in the petition he filed before the Honorable Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No.
S.P. 08928 entitled "Adolfo Corpus, et al. 'vs. Hon. Minerva Genovea et al." Copies of the Petition and the
undersigned attorney's Comments thereto are hereto attached as Annexes "D" and "E", respectively. (pp. 2-4,
Record)

RESPONDENTS ANSWER

In his Answer dated June 29, 1979, respondent averred:

 18

1. From the face of the Resolution itself showing that the undersigned respondent was never furnished with a
copy of the complaint, it can be gathered therefrom that the complaint is clearly intended to prevent the
undersigned respondent to proceed in defending his clients' cause in CA-G.R. No. SP-08928 (Adolfo M.
Corpuz, et al. vs. Hon. Minerva C. Genovea, the Spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia Bewley Geeslin, et
al.) still pending at this writing before the Court of Appeals. To allow complainants to harass respondent while
the case (is) still pending in our courts of justice is an act in contempt of court for which complainants and their
counsel is (sic) liable.

2. Undersigned respondent as counsel for the defendants Adolfo Corpuz, et al. gave his entire devotion to the
interest of his clients, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from his clients, save by the rules of law,
legally applied; for his clients are entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized
by law as was done by the undersigned respondent in the ejectment case filed by the complainants Conrad E.
Geeslin and Virginia B. Geeslin against the several clients of the undersigned. (pp. 42-43, Record)

After complainants filed a Reply dated July 17, 1979 pointing out that respondent's Answer does not deny any
of the six (6) counts of charges specified in the Complaint, respondent filed a Rejoinder dated September 7,
1979, wherein he averred:

1. The complainants alien spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia B. Geeslin who are citizens of the United
States of America held TCT No. 153657 which was cancelled on December 31, 1970 by TCT No. 180231
issued in the name of Leopoldo A. Cojuangco both of which TCTs are described to be located at Santolan
Road, Municipality of San Juan, Province of Rizal, (now part of Metro-Manila) filed ejectment proceedings
before the City Court of Quezon City against my clients Victorino Manaois and Adolfo Corpuz and twenty
others in Civil Case Nos. I-29872 to I-29931 which later were elevated to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
SP-08928 entitled Adolfo M. Corpuz, et al.  vs. Hon. Minerva C. Genovea the Spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and
Virginia Bewley Geeslin, et al.

2. Undersigned respondent being retained as counsel for the defendants Victorino Manaois and Adolfo Corpuz
and the twenty (20) other defendants did his bounden duty in defense of their rights and exerted his utmost
learning and ability within what the law allows that at this stage, the controversy is still under litigation before
the courts as stated above.

3. Under the foregoing circumstances, the administrative action must have been resorted to by the
complainants at the instigation of their counsel who failed in wanting to defeat the defendants of their God-
given rights to the land in litigation that there can be no other conclusion left but that the administrative
complaint against the respondent is 'pure' harassment. (pp. 53-54, Record)

FINDINGS

When the case was set for hearing by the Office of the Solicitor General, the parties agreed that there is no
dispute as to the fact of the case. Hence, they were granted a period of thirty (30) days within which to file their
respective memoranda, if they so desire, after which the case will be considered submitted for resolution.

Since respondent did not deny the allegations of the Complaint, and in fact admitted during the hearing of the
case set by the Office of the Solicitor General that there is no dispute as to the facts of this case, it follows that
the specifications of the charges against him, which are duly supported by documents, are deemed sufficiently
proven.

The only justification invoked by respondent is that he "gave his entire devotion to the interest of his clients"
and that he "did his bounden duty in defense of their rights and exerted his utmost learning and ability.

Consequently, respondent is deemed to have committed the misrepresentations specified by complainants, as

quoted above.

RECOMMENDATION

Respondent was also charged in Administrative Case No. 2148 entitled Ortigas vs. Navarro and has been
suspended from the practice of law since May 5, 1980. His suspension is still in effect.
 19

The acts complained of in the present case also warrant the suspension of respondent from the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro be likewise suspended
from the practice of law.

Makati, for Manila, August 17, 1989. 19

No justiciable issue was raised in Administrative Case No. 2033 as respondent Navarro failed to deny the material allegations in
the complaint of the spouses E. Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin.

The two main issues raised by the Solicitor General in Administrative Case No. 2148 are:

1. Whether or not respondent Navarro sold properties titled in the names of other persons without the consent of the latter; and

2. If in the affirmative, whether or not such acts constitute sufficient grounds for suspension or disbarment.

Respondent reiterated in his answer that the transfer certificates of title of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership and
Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer were declared null and void in the decision dated March 31, 1970 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) entitled "Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs. Ortigas & Co., Ltd.
Partnership, et al.," and in the order dated June 21, 1971 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Cases Nos.
8320, 8321, 8326, 8369, 8376, 8379, 8383, 8685, 8686 and 8700 entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Federico
Martinez, et al." Respondent likewise reiterated his claim of ownership over all parcels of land (including those of Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer) covered by Decree No. 1425, G.L.R.O. Record No. 917,
which was declared null and void in the decision dated March 31, 1970 of Branch XV of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal. 20 Furthermore, he asserts ownership over the subject properties as payment for his legal services rendered in the
ejectment cases filed against his clients in Branches I and II of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal.

1. To clarify, Civil Case No. 7-M(10339)filed before Branch XV of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal directly assailed the
nullity of the proceedings in G.L.R.O. Record No. 917 by virtue of which Decree No. 1425 was issued, as well as the original
certificates of title issued as a consequence thereof. These original certificates of title include the properties belonging to Ortigas
& Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. On March 31, 1970, Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz then
presiding over said Branch XV rendered a decision declaring Decree No. 1425, as well as the original certificates of title issued
pursuant thereto, null and void. Ortigas appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of Appeals which set the same aside and
remanded the case to Branch XV for new trial. On November 3, 1973, Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who replaced Judge Ruiz,
rendered a decision confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425 and all titles emanating therefrom. The said decision was
pending appeal with the Court of Appeals when the investigation of respondent by the Solicitor General was conducted.

We take judicial notice of the fact that on December 29, 1983, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming in toto  the
November 3, 1973 decision of Judge Alcantara, which became final and executory on May 25, 1984 insofar as plaintiffs-
appellants Pascual Santos, et al. are concerned. The plaintiffs-appellants Pedro del Rosario, et al. appealed to the Supreme
Court in a petition for review on certiorari which was, however, denied on February 18, 1985. The denial became final and
executory on April 10, 1985. Thereafter, the records of the case were remanded to Branch XV of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal for execution.

The records further show that the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) became the basis of the
decision rendered by Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II on May 21, 1971 which dismissed the complaint for ejectment filed by
Haberer against the clients of respondent Navarro. However, Judge Navarro in his decision categorically stated that "it is the
considered opinion of this court that until and unless the decision of Branch XV of this court is reversed or set aside by final
judgment, plaintiffs prayer to order the herein eleven defendants in these eleven cases to vacate the parcels which they occupy
and on which their respective houses are built has become premature." This condition was reiterated in Judge Navarro's order of
September 15, 1972 wherein he stated that:

In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion to reiterate that its decision in this case was mainly
predicated on the decision of Branch XV of this Court that the certificate of title emanating from the proceedings
in GLRO Record No. 917 were null and void and plaintiffs title happened to be one of them. The Court opined
that until said decision is reversed the actual occupants had better be maintained in their possessions of the
land. 21

However, to repeat, the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV was set aside by the Court of Appeals which remanded the case
for new trial and another one was rendered, this time by a different judge on November 3, 1973 upholding the validity of Decree
 20

No. 1425 and all titles issued as a consequence thereof. Respondent cannot feign ignorance of the November 3, 1973 decision,
which superseded the March 31, 1970 decision, for the simple reason that it was his clients who appealed the former decision to
the Court of Appeals. In spite thereof and indicative of his bad faith, he stubbornly continues to invoke the decision of March 31,
1970 as the source of his alleged ownership rights over the Ortigas properties.

2. In the order of June 21, 1971, Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15043 issued in the name of Haberer and the issuance of new titles in the name of the defendants, subject to the lien for
attorney's fees in favor of respondent pursuant to the terms of the contract for his legal services. However, the same judge
issued an amendatory order dated September 15, 1972, which provides in part that:

It has also come to the understanding of the Court that the order of June 21, 1971, sought to be reconsidered
insofar as it ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in favor of the plaintiff, also
adversely affects the interests of other persons and entities like the Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership,
which is not a party herein, because the certificate of title of the plaintiff is also a derivative of GLRO 917 and
Decree No. 1425 from which Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, derives titles over wide tracts of land.
Since Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, is not a party in this case whatever orders of decisions are
made in this case cannot be made to affect the said company. Decisions and orders can only affect parties to
the case.

The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the order dated June 21, 1971, must be reconsidered on two
grounds (1) because the decision of Branch XV is now being the subject of further proceedings and (2)
because it has the effect of adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which is
not even a party herein.

WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971, is set aside. However, the decision dated May 26,
1971, insofar as it denies the ejectment of the present occupants of the land as stated in the decision stands.
(Emphasis supplied) 22

It is apparent, therefore, that since the order of June 21, 1971, was set aside, the inescapable conclusion is that Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15043 stands and remains in the name of Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. Consequently, the
defendants therein never acquired title to the property covered by the title of Haberer. And, since respondent Navarro merely
derives his supposed title to the properties as a mere transferee, with more reason can he not validly become the owner of the
above properties.

3. Respondent intransigently relies on his contract for legal services executed with his clients, the defendants in the Haberer
case, as another basis of his claim of ownership over the entire property covered by Decree No. 1425. It must be noted that the
said contract was executed pursuant to the ejectment cases filed against respondent Navarro's clients which involve only the
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 containing an aggregate area of 12,700 square meters, more or less.
It appears that the defendants assigned rights to respondent Navarro over properties which they did not actually occupy and
which virtually extended to all the properties covered by titles issued under Decree No. 1425. As correctly observed by the
Solicitor General, said defendants have not presented any document evidencing their ownership of the parcels of land they
assigned to their lawyer.

From the foregoing considerations, it is incontrovertible that respondent's pretended ownership rights over the parcels of land
covered by Decree No. 1425 have no bases whatsoever, either in fact or in law, and it is an assault on credulity to assume that
he was not aware of the vacuity of his pretensions and misrepresentations.

In resolving this disbarment case, we must perforce initially focus on the degree of integrity and respectability required and
expected of the law profession. There is no denying that membership in the legal profession is achieved only after a long and
laborious study. By years of patience, zeal and ability the attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and his family.
This is not to say, however, that the emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social prestige and
intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the same by reason of the fact that everyone is deemed an officer
of the court. 23

The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been judiciously stated by Chief Justice Marshall of the United
States Supreme Court in this wise:

On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and the prosperity of his life may
depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the
other hand, it is extremely desirable that the respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony
 21

with the bench should be preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion, ought to be
exercised with great moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised. 24

In a number of cases, we have repeatedly explained and stressed that the purpose of disbarment is not meant as a punishment
to deprive an attorney of a means of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of
the officers of the court and to ensure the proper administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important
function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 25 Its objectives
are to compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with his client and to remove from the profession a person whose
misconduct has proven him unfit for the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney. 26

As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges until the contrary is proved, and that, as an
officer of the court, he has performed his duty in accordance with his oath. 27 Therefore, in disbarment proceedings, the burden
of proof rests upon the complainant 28, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must
be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. 29

We have painstakingly scrutinized and evaluated the records of these two administrative cases and we cannot but find that
strong and unassailable evidence exist to render it our irremissible duty to impose the ultimate sanction of disbarment on
respondent.

Respondent's defense is anchored primarily on the contract for legal services, executed by his clients whom he represented in
the twenty-two ejectment cases filed before Branches I and II of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, and quoted in full in
the earlier part of this discussion.

It is extremely relevant to note that both of the aforesaid two branches of the trial court made no finding as to the validity of the
claim of ownership favorable to the defendants therein. On the contrary, Judge Salas of Branch I found for the plaintiff and
ordered the defendants, clients of respondent, to vacate the premises.

In the case before Judge Navarro of Branch II, the complaint was dismissed merely on the ground that "since the evidence is
uncontroverted that the defendants in all these eleven cases have been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of their
respective parcels dating back since their predecessors in interest, their possession must be maintained and respected. 30

Thereafter, on June 21, 1971, the aforesaid judgment of dismissal dated May 26, 1971 was modified, and the Register of Deeds
was thereafter ordered to cancel the transfer certificate of title issued in favor of plaintiff and to issue new titles in the name of
defendants subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of herein respondent in accordance with the contract for legal services
hereinbefore discussed.

Eventually, however, this subsequent order was reconsidered and set aside in the order of September 15, 1972, "because it has
the effect of adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership, which is not even a party herein," but it reinstated
the decision of May 26, 1971 insofar as it denied the ejectment of the present occupants.

As earlier noted, there is nothing in the records to show that the defendants in the ejectment cases were declared the true
owners of the land subject of said cases. Only the fact of possession was ruled upon, and what the courts recognized was
merely the defendants' right of possession. They, therefore, never become the owners of the subject lots in any sense of the
word in the absence of any declaration to that effect, by reason of which they could not have legally transmitted any ownership
rights or interests to herein respondent. Furthermore, we have seen that any further claim of ownership on their part was finally
settled by the order of September 15, 1972, setting aside the order of June 21, 1971, wherein the trial court correctly held that
the earlier order unjustifiedly affected adversely the rights of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership. In addition, said court
specifically excluded the title of said partnership from the effects of its decision.

Pursuant to the provisions of the contract of legal services, the defendants-clients agreed to convey to respondent whatever
properties may be adjudicated in their favor in the event of their failure to pay the attorney's fees agreed upon. As hereinbefore
stated, there was nothing awarded to the said defendants except the right to possess for the nonce the lots they were
occupying, nothing more. That respondent acquired no better right than the defendants from whom he supposedly derived his
claim is further confirmed in the order of Judge Navarro, dated June 21, 1971, denying the issuance of new certificates of title to
herein respondent who, to further stress the obvious, was not even a party but only a lawyer of the defendants therein. It follows
that his act of selling the Ortigas properties is patently and indisputably illegal.

Respondent admits that he has no Torrens title but insists on the puerile theory that his title is his contract of legal
services. 31 Considering that the effectivity of the provisions of that contract is squarely premised on the award of said properties
to the therein defendants, and since there was no such adjudication, respondent's pretense is unmasked as an unmitigated
 22

deception. Furthermore, it will be recalled that the land involved in the two ejectment cases consists of only 1.2 hectares
whereas respondent is claiming ownership over thousands of hectares of land, the sheer absurdity of which he could not be
unaware.

Respondent further admits that he has been and is continuously selling, up to the present, the entirety of the land covered by
Decree No. 1425 32 pursuant to the decision of Branch XV of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, dated March 31, 1970,
declaring the said decree null and void as well as the titles derived therefrom.

It must nonetheless be remembered that the decision of Judge Navarro recognizing the defendants' right of possession is
subject to the final outcome of the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV which nullified Decree No. 1425. The latter decision, at
the time the decision of Judge Navarro was rendered, was pending appeal. This is precisely the reason why Judge Navarro had
to amend his decision a third time by setting aside the order of registration of the land in the name of the defendants. He could
not properly rule on the ownership rights of defendants therein pending a final determination of the validity of said decree, which
thus prompted him to find merely on the fact of possession. Besides, a mere declaration of nullity cannot, per se  justify the
performance of any act of ownership over lands titled in the name of other persons pursuant to said decree. To cap it all, as
earlier discussed, that decision dated March 31, 1970 has been reversed and set aside, and a new one entered confirming the
validity of Decree No. 1425, which latter decision has long become final and executory.

In Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas and Co., Ltd. Partnership vs. Navarro," herein respondent was enjoined from selling,
offering for sale and advertising properties of the plaintiff therein. We have seen that a decision was subsequently rendered
therein on December 16, 1972 by Branch XVI of the Court of First Instance of Rizal upholding the validity of the transfer
certificates of title issued in the name of Ortigas and Co., Limited Partnership which became final and executory after
respondent's petition for review was denied by this Court. However, respondent continued to sell properties belonging to Ortigas
in blatant disregard of said decision. This was categorically admitted by respondent himself during the investigation conducted
by the Solicitor
General. 33

Respondent avers that the said decision cannot be enforced during the pendency of the appeal therefrom. Even if this were true,
the fact that respondent was enjoined by the court from selling portions of the Ortigas properties is compelling reason enough for
him to desist from continuing with his illegal transactions.

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General:

Respondent Navarro knew that the decision of Judge Vivencio Ruiz declaring as null and void certificates of
titles emanating from Decree No. 1425 was reversed and set aside. He knew that Judge Pedro Navarro of the
Rizal Court of First Instance exempted Ortigas & Company from the effects of his decision. He also knew that
Judge Sergio Apostol of the Rizal Court of First Instance in Quezon City had upheld the validity of the
certificates of title of Ortigas & Company. Despite all these pronouncements and his awareness thereof,
respondent NAVARRO still continued to sell properties titled in the name of Ortigas & Company and the
Madrigals. 34

Lastly, the motion to dismiss filed by respondent should be, as it is hereby, denied for lack of merit. Respondent inexplicably
posits that the charges against him should be dismissed on the ground that his suspension was automatically lifted by virtue of
our resolution, dated June 30, 1980, which merely reads:

The manifestation of counsel for respondent stating among other things that the complaint against respondent
could not prosper if respondent's manifestation dated March 3, 1980 in G.R. No. L-42699-42709 and his
request for certification by the Chief Justice to the effect that the petition in G.R. Nos. L-42699-42709 is
deemed dismissed pursuant to Sec. 11(2) of Art. X of the Constitution are granted, are NOTED.

There is absolutely nothing in the resolution to support respondent's typical distortion of facts. On the contrary, our resolutions
dated September 2, 1980, November 8, 1980, and January 22, 1981 repeatedly denied respondent's motions for the lifting of his
suspension.

It further bears mention at this juncture that despite the suspension of respondent Navarro from the practice of law, he continues
to do so in clear violation and open defiance of the original resolution of suspension and the aforestated resolutions reiterating
and maintaining the same. Thus, the records of this Court disclose that in G.R. No. L-78103, entitled "Jose de Leon, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.," a Second Division case filed on April 25, 1987, counsel for private respondents therein questioned
herein respondent Navarro's personality to intervene in the case since he was under suspension, to which respondent Navarro
rejoined by insisting that his suspension had allegedly been lifted already. In G.R. No. 85973, entitled "Hilario Abalos vs. Court of
 23

Appeals, et al.," the petition wherein was filed on December 2, 1988 and assigned to the First Division, respondent Navarro also
appeared as counsel for therein petitioner. Said petition was denied since the same was prepared, signed and verified by
respondent Navarro, a suspended member of the Philippine Bar. Over his expostulation that his suspension had already been
lifted, the Court directed the Bar Confidant to take appropriate action to enforce the same. Again, in G.R. No. 90873, entitled
"Matilde Cabugwang et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," the Second Division, in a resolution dated January 31, 1990, imposed a
fine of P1,000.00 upon said respondent for appearing therein as counsel for petitioner which fine he paid on February 5, 1990.

In at least three (3) other cases in the Second Division, respondent Navarro appeared before the Court as counsel for petitioners
therein, viz: (1) G.R. No. L-74792 (Lorenzo Valdez, et al., vs Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.), filed on June 11, 1986 and
decided on December 7, 1986; (2) G.R. No.
L-76589 (Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.), filed on November 28, 1986 and decided on May 4,1987;
and (3) G.R. No. 81482 (Ricardo Rasalan vs. Flaviano Pascua, et al.), filed on January 30, 1988 and decided on February 15,
1988. The rollos in said cases show that he also appeared as counsel for the petitioners in the Court of Appeals, but since the
lower courts' original records were not forwarded to this Court, said rollos do not reflect whether he also appeared before the
different courts a quo.

Such acts of respondent are evidential of flouting resistance to lawful orders of constituted authority and illustrate his incorrigible
despiciency for an attorney's duty to society. Verily, respondent has proven himself unworthy of the trust and confidence
reposed in him by law and by this Court, through his deliberate rejection of his oath as an officer of the court.

WHEREFORE, respondent Felipe C. Navarro is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on
the personal records of respondent. This resolution is immediately executory.

People vs. Tuanda 181 SCRA 692, A.M. No. 3360, January Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after
30, 1990 their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the
drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of
funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor,
respondent made no arrangements with the bank
concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and
EN BANC made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.

A.M. No. 3360               January 30, 1990 Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against
respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a) one
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and
vs. (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent. respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360
and 85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court
rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which:

(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa;

and
PER CURIAM:

(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22

In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989,
in all three (3) cases, and sentenced respondent to
respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar,
pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary
asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals
indemnify the complainant in the amount of
dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.
P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 8538359;
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one
to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in
Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total
case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the
stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis,
amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and
with the condition that the respondent would turn over the
sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez
on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in
1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of case of insolvency, and to indemnify the complainant in the
jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and
issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 to pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February
1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check
dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00.
 24

On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law
05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but, in imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda.
addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of]
of law. The pertinent portion of the decision read as follows: which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude." We
should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal
For reasons above stated and finding the evidence offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public
sufficient to sustain the conviction, the judgment is order. In Lozano v. Martinez,2 the Court explained the
hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification. nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the
following terms:
It appearing from the records that the accused Fe
Tuanda is a member of the Bar, and the offense x x x           x x x          x x x
for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral
turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended from The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg.
the practice of law and shall not practice her 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
profession until further action from the Supreme check or a check that is dishonored upon its
Court, in accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of presentation for payment. . . .  The thrust of the law
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the
decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court making of worthless checks and putting them in
as required by Section 29 of the same Rule. circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on
the public interest, the practice is prescribed by the
SO ORDERED. 1 law. The law punishes the act not as an offense
against property but an offense against public
order.
On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal
with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a
Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's x x x           x x x          x x x
Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice of
Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." The effects of the issuance of a worthless check
On 1 February 1989, respondent filed with this Court a transcends the private interests of the parties
Notice of Appeal. directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large. The mischief it
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder,
noted without action respondent's Notice of Appeal and but also an injury to the public. The harmful
declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October practice of putting valueless commercial papers in
1988 had become final and executory upon expiration of circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well
the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16 pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure
December 1988. In that Resolution, the Court found that the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare
respondent had lost her right to appeal by certiorari when of society and the public interest. 3(Italics supplied)
she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of
filing a petition for review on certiorari under Section 1, Rule Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the
45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary practice of law because she had been convicted of crimes
period. involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension,
respondent states: Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by
Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the
that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a bar may be removed or suspended from his office
harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating the as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit,
lower court's penalty of fine considering that malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
accused-appellant's action on the case during the office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
trial on the merits at the lower court has always conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is for any violation of the oath which he is required to
innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee. disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
that, she had not violated her oath as a member of the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics
checks which bounced, she did not intend to cause damage supplied)
to complainant Ms. Marquez.
 25

Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of

Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court
of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may [ Administrative Case No. 195, January 31, 1958 ]
suspend an attorney from practice for any of the
causes named in the last preceding section, and
after such suspension such attorney shall not IN RE: ATTORNEY JESUS T. QUIAMBAO, RESPONDENT.
practice his profession until further action of the
DECISION
Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics supplied)
PADILLA, J.:
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was
convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's On 17 May 1954 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under CA-GR No. 11104-R, Pedro R. Peralta, plaintiff-appellee vs.
both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Jesus T. Quiambao, defendant-appellant, affirming that of the
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as Court of First Instance of Rizal (case No. 1783) and transmitted
in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate the record of the case to this Court for whatever action it may
to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it deem proper to take against Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao for
certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of having committed acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.
a person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v.
Decena, 4 this Court stressed that: It appears that sometime in January 1949 Manuel Quiambao,
an agent of the Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance
Company offered for sale to Pedro R. Peralta a parcel of land
the nature of the office of an attorney at law
located in barrio Moriones, Tarlac, Tarlac, containing an area
requires that she shall be a person of good moral of 44 hectares for P15,000. Peralta accepted the offer, and on
character.1âwphi1 This qualification is not only a 7 February 1949 he opened a checking account with the Tarlac
condition precedent to an admission to the practice branch of the Philippines National Bank by depositing therewith
of law; its continued possession is also essential the sum of P11,000. With a check of P11,000 drawn upon the
for remaining in the practice of law.  5 bank in Manila, Peralta and Manuel Quiambao proceeded to
Manila and contacted Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao, brother of
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion Manuel, at his house to seek his help in the purchase of the
to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain parcel of land. On 9 February Peralta and the two brothers
suspended from the practice of law until further orders from cashed the check at the bank in Escolta and repaired to the
this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to law office of Honesto K. Bausa, attorney for the Yek Tong Lin
the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Fire & Marine Insurance Company, at the Regina building,
Philippines and spread on the record of respondent. where upon reaching the door Peralta handed to Attorney
Jesus T. Quiambao the sum of P11,000. Attorney Quiambao
went inside the office of Attorney Bausa, where he stayed for
about an hour, leaving Peralta at the door waiting for him. As
he emerged from the law office, Attorney Quiambao told
Peralta to wait for a while because "they will place your name
in the title," and later on executed a document (Exhibit A),
acknowledging receipt from Peralta of the sum of P12,000 to
be kept by the former as attorney-in-fact of the latter pending
issuance of the title to the parcel of land. The receipt
acknowledges the sum of P12,000, because Peralta had given
Attorney Quiambao the sum of P1,000 as earnest money.
Days passed and as Peralta did not receive the title to the
parcel of land, he went to the office of the Yek Tong Lin Fire &
Marine Insurance Company to inquire whether the title to the
parcel of land had already been issued in his name and there
he learned from the bookkeeper of the company that the title
had not yet been issued in his name. He then demanded the
return of the sum of P12,000 from Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao
but the later failed to return it to him.

Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao does not deny having received

the sum of P12,000 from Peralta, but claims that the same had
been returned to him by installments through his brother
Manuel Quiambao, who was Peralta's friend, and in whose
house Peralta and his family lived; that he gave Attorney
Bausa the sum of P500 as earnest money when they went to
see him; that the balance of P12,000 was left in his custody;
that Peralta was authorized to take possession of the property
and make improvements on it pending actual transfer to him;
n re Quiambao, 102 SCRA 940 that the balance of P12,500 was left in his (Attorney
Quiambao's) custody was withdrawn from him by his brother
 26

Manuel by authority of Peralta; that the first withdrawal in the

sum of P3,000 was made sometime in the first week of March (Sgd.) Pedro Peralta
1949, the second in the sum of P4,000 in April 1949, the third The Court of Appeals is of the opinion that Attorney Jesus T.
in the sum of P3,000 or P2,000 on or about the 24th of May, Quiambao engineered the whole scheme to induce, through
1949, and the last for the balance of the sum, paid by his wife, his brother Manuel, Pedro R. Peralta to purchase the parcel of
sometime in June 1949; that he and his wife did not ask any land in question, knowing fully well that it was not for sale
receipt for all the withdrawals; that all these sums were spent because the Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Company
to build an earth dam in the parcel of land, to hire a bulldozer, was just a mortgagee and not in a position to sell it. In that way
to buy seedlings, and to construct houses for 28 tenants, he succeeded in taking from Peralta the sum of P12,000 which
except the sum of P4,000, withdrawn by Manuel Quiambao by he appropriated for his own use and benefit; that he
way of loan from Peralta, which the former promised to pay to fraudulently and maliciously induced Peralta to sign the
the latter as soon as he would secure a loan from the document marked Exhibit 1, thereby relieving him from the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation; that, on 10 March 1950, a obligation of paying the said sum to Peralta and at the same
document (Exhibit 1) was signed by Jesus T. Quiambao, Pedro time caused the latter to execute another document marked
R. Peralta and Manuel Quiambao reciting, among others, that Exhibit 2 where Peralta undertook to collect from Manuel
the sum of P12,000 in the custody of Attorney Quiambao was Quiambao the whole sum of P12,000.
periodically withdrawn from him by Manuel Quiambao at the
behest and/or with the knowledge and consent of Pedro R. The respondent attorney was required by this Court to answer
Peralta; and that on that same day Pedro R. Peralta executed the charges against him. In his answer he set up the same
another document (Exhibit 2) releasing Attorney Jesus T. defenses he had set up in case No. 1783 of the Court of First
Quiambao from liability for the sum of P12,000 entrusted to Instance of Rizal and CA-GR No. 11104-R of the Court of
him. It recites- Appeals which were overruled by the two Courts.
To Whom It May Concern:
By his acts the respondent has shown that he is unworthy to
This is to certify that I should collect the sum of TWELVE continue as a member of the Bar. He is, therefore, disbarred
THOUSAND PESOS, (P12,000.00) from Mr. Manuel from the practice of law.
Quiambao, from the proceeds of the sale of his property, as
satisfaction of the money receipted by Mr. Jesus T. Quiambao
and withdrawn from him with my knowledge and consent.

This is made in order to secure the realization of said sum from

Mr. Manuel Quiambao exclusively.

Manila, March 10, 1950.

In Re Basa 41 Phil 275, December 7, 1920

EN BANC

December 7, 1920

In re CARLOS S. BASA

Pedro Guevara for respondent.

Attorney-General Feria for the Government.

MALCOLM, J.:

The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the disbarment of Attorney Carlos S. Basa.

Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California and the Philippine Islands. Recently he
was charged in the Court of Fist Instance of the city of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent, was found guilt in a
decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. del Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period
of two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment
handed down by the second division of the Supreme Court.  1
 27

The Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that "A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office of
lawyer by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude . . ." The sole question presented,
therefore, is whether the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by article 446 of the Penal Code, involves moral
turpitude.

"Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."
(Bouvier's Law Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.) Although no decision can be found which has decided the exact question,
it cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this character involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that it is
against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct. (In re Hopkins [1909], 54 Wash., 569; Pollard vs. Lyon [1875], 91
U.S., 225; 5 Ops. Atty.-Gen. P. I., 46, 185; decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 30, 1876 and June 15, 1895.)

When we come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken by the court, we do so regretfully and
reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the
other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in order that so promising a career may not be
utterly ruined.

It is the order of the court that beginning with the day when Carlos S. Basa shall be discharged from prison, he be suspended
from his office of lawyer for one year. So ordered.lawphi1.net

Al C. Argosino B.M. No. 712, July 13, 1995 (246 SCRA 14) Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe
physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing"
conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr.
Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea
EN BANC bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such
bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide
through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by
  the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each
of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995 suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND
OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues
C. ARGOSINO, petitioner. filed an application for probation with the lower court. The
application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18
RESOLUTION June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T.
Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years,
counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation
officer assigned to supervise him.

FELICIANO, J.:
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed
a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was
Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this
with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He
one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of
 28

passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed attorney at law is a sworn officer of the
to take the lawyer's oath of office. Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to
aid the administration of justice. . . .
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this
Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and xxx xxx xxx4
to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge
Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re
virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis
probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months 359, 210 NW 710:
from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him
probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino
has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his It can also be truthfully said that there
Petition for Admission to the Bar. exists nowhere greater temptations to
deviate from the straight and narrow path
than in the multiplicity of circumstances
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or that arise in the practice of profession. For
constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands these reasons the wisdom of requiring an
it. Rather, it is a high  personal privilege limited to citizens applicant for admission to the bar to
of good moral character, with special educational possess a high moral standard therefore
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2 The becomes clearly apparent, and the board
essentiality of good moral character in those who would be of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is
lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we required to cause a minute examination to
quote with approval and which we regard as having be made of the moral standard of each
persuasive effect: candidate for admission to practice. . . . It
needs no further argument, therefore, to
In Re Farmer: 3 arrive at the conclusion that the highest
degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to
xxx xxx xxx the moral character of a candidate who
presents himself for admission to the
bar. The evil must, if possible, be
This "upright character" prescribed by the successfully met at its very source, and
statute, as a condition precedent to the prevented, for, after a lawyer has once
applicant's right to receive a license to been admitted, and has pursued his
practice law in North Carolina, and of profession, and has established himself
which he must, in addition to other therein, a far more difficult situation is
requisites, satisfy the court, includes all presented to the court when proceedings
the elements necessary to make up such are instituted for disbarment and for the
a character. It is something more than an recalling and annulment of his license.
absence of bad character. It is the good
name which the applicant has acquired, or
should have acquired, through association In Re Keenan:6
with his fellows. It means that he must
have conducted himself as a man of The right to practice law is not one of the
upright character ordinarily would, or inherent rights of every citizen, as in the
should, or does. Such character right to carry on an ordinary trade or
expresses itself, not in negatives nor in business. It is a peculiar privilege granted
following the line of least resistance, but and continued only to those who
quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant demonstrate special fitness in intellectual
thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do attainment and in moral character. All may
the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . . aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis,
but not all will attain it. Elaborate
xxx xxx xxx machinery has been set up to test
applicants by standards fair to all and to
separate the fit from the unfit. Only those
And we may pause to say that this who pass the test are allowed to enter the
requirement of the statute is eminently profession, and only those who maintain
proper. Consider for a moment the duties the standards are allowed to remain in it.
of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor,
and his advice comes home, in its ultimate
effect, to every man's fireside. Vast Re Rouss:7
interests are committed to his care; he is
the recipient of unbounded trust and Membership in the bar is a privilege
confidence; he deals with is client's burdened with conditions, and a fair
property, reputation, his life, his all. An private and professional character is one
 29

of them; to refuse admission to an Snap, instead of a Davis,

unworthy applicant is not to punish him for a Smith or a Ruffin.9
past offense: an examination into
character, like the examination into All aspects of moral character and behavior may be
learning, is merely a test of fitness. inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the
Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8 properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for
disbarment:
Attorney's are licensed because of their
learning and ability, so that they may not Re Stepsay: 10
only protect the rights and interests of their
clients, but be able to assist court in the The inquiry as to the moral character of an
trial of the cause. Yet what protection to attorney in a proceeding for his admission
clients or assistance to courts could such to practice is broader in scope than in a
agents give? They are required to be of disbarment proceeding.
good moral character, so that the agents
and officers of the court, which they
are, may not bring discredit upon the due Re Wells: 11
administration of the law, and it is of the
highest possible consequence that both . . . that an applicant's contention that
those who have not such qualifications in upon application for admission to the
the first instance, or who, having had California Bar the court cannot reject him
them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be for want of good moral character unless it
permitted to appear in courts to aid in the appears that he has been guilty of acts
administration of justice. which would be cause for his disbarment
or suspension, could not be
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its
moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as scope than that in a disbarment
the general public and the proper administration of justice proceeding, and the court may
are concerned, than the possession of legal learning: receive any evidence which tends to show
the applicant's character as respects
honesty, integrity, and general
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. morality,  and may no doubt refuse
635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 admission upon proofs that might not
Ann./Cas. 187): establish his guilt of any of the acts
declared to be causes for disbarment.
The public policy of our
state has always been to The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by
admit no person to the those who would seek admission to the bar must of
practice of the law unless necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct
he covered an upright expected from members of the general public. There is a
moral character. The very real need to prevent a general perception that entry
possession of this by the into the legal profession is open to individuals with
attorney is more inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a
important, if anything, to perception would signal the progressive destruction of our
the public and to the people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal
proper administration of system as we know it.12
justice than legal
learning. Legal learning
may be acquired in after Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing"
years, but if the applicant activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of
passes the threshold of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely
the bar with a bad moral accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical
character the chances injuries which proximately led to the death of the
are that his character will unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious
remain bad, and that he character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such
will become a disgrace injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to
instead of an ornament discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being
to his great calling  — a of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the
curse instead of a benefit fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of
to his community  — a them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and
Quirk, a Gammon or a kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation
in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted
 30

upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that

moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which
makes impossible a finding that the participant was then
possessed of good moral character.

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial

court has expired, the Court is prepared to consider de
novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has
purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character
referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a
requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not
only at the time of application for permission to take the bar
examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of
application for admission to the bar and to take the
attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its Castaneda vs. Ago, G.R. No. L-28546, July 30, 1975 (65
examination and consideration, evidence that he may be SCRA 521)
now regarded as complying with the requirement of good
moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to
the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn
certifications from responsible members of the community
FIRST DIVISION
who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually
known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered  
by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he
has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975
student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS
submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different HENSON, petitioners,
person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to vs.
the ancient and learned profession of the law. PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this
Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners.
and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof,
brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten
(10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be Jose M. Luison for respondents.
furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of
Raul Camaligan.

CASTRO, J.:

The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been

commuting to this Court for more than a decade.

In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas

Henson filed a replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the Court
of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries
(civil case 27251). In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor
of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the machineries or
pay definite sums of money. Ago appealed, and on June
30, 1961 this Court, in Ago vs. Castañeda, L-14066,
affirmed the judgment. After remand, the trial court issued
on August 25, 1961 a writ of execution for the sum of
P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of execution but his
motion was denied, and levy was made on Ago's house and
lots located in Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised
them for auction sale on October 25, 1961. Ago moved to
stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. On January
 31

31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L- While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of
19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to the restraining order was being fought in the Quezon City
obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
from enforcing the writ of execution "to save his family with this Court under date of May 26, 1966, docketed as L-
house and lot;" his motions were denied, and the sheriff 26116, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
sold the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest the sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession. This Court
bidders, the petitioners Castañeda and Henson. Ago failed found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in a minute
to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the resolution on June 3, 1966; reconsideration was denied on
final deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castañeda and July 18, 1966. The respondents then filed on August 2,
Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of First Instance 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
of Manila  issued a writ of possession to the properties. Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying for the same
preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals also dismissed
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his the petition. The respondents then appealed to this Court
wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff, filed a complaint in (L-27140).1äwphï1.ñët  We dismissed the petition in a
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q- minute resolution on February 8, 1967.
7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the
obligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment was The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of
rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal Appeals where they filed another petition for certiorari  and
obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R).
conjugal residential house and lots which were levied upon The said court gave due course to the petition and granted
and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for the preliminary injunction. After hearing, it rendered decision,
satisfaction of the judgment. They alleged in their complaint the dispositive portion of which reads:
that wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit, that
the judgment was rendered and the writ of execution was WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary
issued only against husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes injunction from enforcement of the writ of
was not a party to her husband's venture in the logging possession on and ejectment from the
business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and one-half share in the properties involved
which did not benefit the conjugal partnership. belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June
15, 1967 is made permanent pending
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex decision on the merits in Civil Case No. Q-
parte writ of preliminary injunction restraining the 7986 and ordering respondent Court to
petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-
City, from registering the latter's final deed of sale, from 7986 on the merits without unnecessary
cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing delay. No pronouncement as to costs.
new ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of
possession. A situation thus arose where what Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castañeda
the Manila court had ordered to be done, the Quezon and Henson filed the present petition for review of the
City court countermanded. On November 1, 1965, however, aforesaid decision.
the latter court lifted the preliminary injunction it had
previously issued, and the Register of deeds of Quezon
City cancelled the respondents' certificates of title and 1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not
issued new ones in favor of the petitioners. But interfere with the orders of a co-equal court can apply in the
enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted case at bar. The Court of First Instance of Manila, which
as the Quezon City court again issued a temporary issued the writ of possession, ultimately was not interfered
restraining order which it later lifted but then re-restored. On with by its co-equal court, the Court of First Instance of
May 3, 1967 the court finally, and for the third time, lifted Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had
the restraining order. previously issued against the enforcement of the Manila
court's writ of possession; it is the Court of Appeals that
enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.

2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al.,1 where the wife

was a party in one case and the husband was a party in
another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was
upheld, the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly
bound by the replevin judgment against her husband for
which their conjugal properties would be answerable. The
case invoked is not at par with the present case.
In Comilang the actions were admittedly instituted for the
protection of the common interest of the spouses; in the
present case, the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership
benefited from the husband's business venture.
 32

3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court (a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to
of Appeals held that a writ of possession may not issue until and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties
the claim of a third person to half-interest in the property is involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This half-share is
adversely determined, the said appellate court assuming not in esse, but is merely an inchoate interest, a mere
that Lourdes Yu Ago was a "stranger" or a "third-party" to expectancy, constituting neither legal nor equitable estate,
her husband. The assumption is of course obviously wrong, and will ripen into title when only upon liquidation and
for, besides living with her husband Pastor, she does not settlement there appears to be assets of the
claim ignorance of his business that failed, of the relevant community.3 The decision sets at naught the well-settled
cases in which he got embroiled, and of the auction sale rule that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in
made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties. Even then, esse and which may never arise.4
the ruling in Omnas  is not that a writ of possession may not
issue until the claim of a third person is adversely (b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the
determined, but that the writ of possession being a impossibility, of its enforcement. The Ago spouses
complement of the writ of execution, a judge with admittedly live together in the same house5 which is
jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue conjugal property. By the Manila court's writ of possession
the former, unless in the interval between the judicial sale Pastor could be ousted from the house, but the decision
and the issuance of the writ of possession, the rights of under review would prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. Now,
third parties to the property sold have supervened. The which part of the house would be vacated by Pastor and
ruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the present case, which part would Lourdes continue to stay in? The
for, here, there has been no change in the ownership of the absurdity does not stop here; the decision would actually
properties or of any interest therein from the time the writ of separate husband and wife, prevent them from living
execution was issued up to the time writ of possession was together, and in effect divide their conjugal properties
issued, and even up to the present. during coverture and before the dissolution of the conjugal
union.
4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge
Lourdes P. San Diego) that it is much too late in the day for 6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint
the respondents Agos to raise the question that part of the for the annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986),
property is unleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long
Ago, considering that (1) a wife is normally privy to her denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must
husband's activities; (2) the levy was made and the now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos, abetted by their
properties advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies and
in the very properties in question; (4) her husband had prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of
moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the properties were sold the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners.
at auction in 1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted to The respondents, with the assistance of counsel,
obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist
enforcing the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff executed the execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from
deed of final sale on April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed to one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court).
redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that the conjugal
properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his
family house and lot" in his efforts to prevent execution; and We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their
(9) it was only on May 2, 1964 when he and his wife filed counsel who,
the complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the
issue that the wife's share in the properties cannot be levied far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for
upon on the ground that she was not a party to the logging those who seek justice, have tried to use
business and not a party to the replevin suit. The spouses them to subvert the very ends of justice.6
Ago had every opportunity to raise the issue in the various
proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did not; laches Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and
now effectively bars them from raising it. his exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison
has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord
neglect, for an unreasonable and and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality
unexplained length of time, to do that in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the
which, by exercising due diligence, could primacy of truth and moral justice.
or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right A counsel's assertiveness in espousing
within a reasonable time, warranting a with candour and honesty his client's
presumption that the party entitled to cause must be encouraged and is to be
assert it either has abandoned it or commended; what we do not and cannot
declined to assert it.2 countenance is a lawyer's insistence
despite the patent futility of his client's
5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers position, as in the case at bar.
from two fatal infirmities.
 33

It is the duty of a counsel to advise his Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on
client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies January 5, 1959 the Castañedas and the sheriff, pursuant
and vagaries of the law, on the merit or to an alias writ of seizure, seized and took possession of
lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his certain machineries, depriving the Agos of the use thereof,
client's cause is defenseless, then it is his to their damage in the sum of P256,000 up to May 5, 1964.
bounden duty to advise the latter to This second cause of action fails to state a valid cause of
acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse action for it fails to allege that the order of seizure is invalid
the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist or illegal.
the whims and caprices of his client, and
temper his clients propensity to litigate. A It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale
lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of of the conjugal properties was irregular, illegal and unlawful
justice is superior to his duty to his client; because the sheriff did not require the Castañeda spouses
its primacy is indisputable.7 to pay or liquidate the sum of P141,750 (the amount for
which they bought the properties at the auction sale)
7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the despite the fact that there was annotated at the back of the
courts for purposes other than to seek justice, and in order certificates of title a mortgage of P75,000 in favor of the
to obviate further delay in the disposition of the case below Philippine National Bank; moreover, the sheriff sold the
which might again come up to the appellate courts but only properties for P141,750 despite the pendency of L-19718
to fail in the end, we have motu proprio examined the where Pastor Ago contested the amount of P99,877.08 out
record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present of the judgment value of P172,923.37 in civil case 27251;
case). We find that and because of said acts, the Agos suffered P174,877.08 in
damages.
(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11
years ago) but trial on the merits has not even started; Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no
obligation to require payment of the purchase price in the
(b) after the defendants Castañedas had filed their answer auction sale because "when the purchaser is the judgment
with a counterclaim, the plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental creditor, and no third-party claim has been filed, he need
complaint where they impleaded new parties-defendants; not pay the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the
amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules of Court)
(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the
Agos filed a motion to admit an amended supplemental The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern
complaint, which impleads an additional new party- of the vendees Castañedas but did not affect the sheriff's
defendant (no action has yet been taken on this motion); sale; the cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to
the Agoo.
(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted
supplemental complaint; and Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of
P99,877.08 out of the amount of the judgment was
dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966.
(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April
20, 1974, grants an extension to the suspension of time to
file answer. (Expediente, p. 815) This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid
cause of action and is moreover barred by prior judgment.
We also find that the alleged causes of action in the
complaint, supplemental complaint and amended The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages
supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the reasons allegedly suffered by the Agos on account of the acts
hereunder stated. The Complaint complained of in the preceding causes of action. As the
fourth cause of action derives its life from the preceding
causes of action, which, as shown, are baseless, the said
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff fourth cause of action must necessarily fail.
levied upon conjugal properties of the spouses Ago despite
the fact that the judgment to be satisfied was personal only
to Pastor Ago, and the business venture that he entered The Counterclaim
into, which resulted in the replevin suit, did not redound to
the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The issue here, As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castañedas aver
which is whether or not the wife's inchoate share in the that the action was unfounded and as a consequence of its
conjugal property is leviable, is the same issue that we filing they were compelled to retain the services of counsel
have already resolved, as barred by laches, in striking down for not less than P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a
the decision of the Court of Appeals granting preliminary preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of titles and
injunction, the dispositive portion of which was herein- possession of the properties to the Castañedas, they were
before quoted. This ruling applies as well to the first cause unlawfully deprived of the use of the properties from April
of action of the complaint. 17, 1964, the value of such deprived use being 20%
annually of their actual value; and that the filing of the
 34

unfounded action besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary For the same reason, the same holding applies to the
worth of which is for the court to assess. remaining cause of action in the supplemental complaint
and the amended supplemental complaint.
The Supplemental Complaint
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the under review is set aside. Civil case Q-7986 of the Court of
filing of the complaint, the defendants, taking advantage of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without
the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, in conspiracy prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim in a
and with gross bad faith and evident intent to cause new and independent action. Treble costs are assessed
damage to the plaintiffs, caused the registration of the against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago,
sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause more damage, the which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison.
defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the Let a copy of this decision be made a part of the personal
parcels of land in question; that the purchasers acquired the file of Atty. Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court.
properties in bad faith; that the defendants mortgaged the
two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation while the defendants' lawyer and his wife also
mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal
Commercial Bank; and that the bank also acted in bad faith.

The second cause of action  consists of an allegation of

additional damages caused by the defendants' bad faith in
entering into the aforesaid agreements and transactions.

The Amended Supplemental Complaint

The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action

of the supplemental complaint, which is, the inclusion of a
paragraph averring that, still to cause damage and
prejudice to the plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad
faith sold the two parcels of land they had previously bought
to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith, while
Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold
the two other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy
Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in bad faith and with
knowledge that the properties are the subject of a pending
litigation.

Discussion on The Causes of Action

of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
Obusan vs. Obusan, Adm. Case No. 1392, April 02, 1984
Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first
cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the
amended supplemental complaint, the validity of the cause
of action would depend upon the validity of the first cause of
action of the original complaint, for, the Agos would suffer EN BANC
no transgression upon their rights of ownership and
possession of the properties by reason of the agreements Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984
subsequently entered into by the Castañedas and their
lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale are valid. The reverse is PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant,
also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the vs.
ground that the conjugal properties could not be levied GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent.
upon, then the transactions would perhaps prejudice the
Agos, but, we have already indicated that the issue in the
first cause of action of the original complaint is barred by Roger Castuciano for complainant.
laches, and it must therefore follow that the first cause of
action of the supplemental complaint and the amended Roemo J. Callejo for respondent.
supplemental complaint is also barred.

AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
 35

This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and
against her husband Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. on the the plumber. He claims that they were paid witnesses. He
ground of adultery or grossly immoral conduct. He was declared that he did not live with Natividad. He resided with
admitted to the bar in 1968. his sister at Cypress Village, San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City.
In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the
Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation, he became On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to
acquainted with Natividad Estabillo who represented to him leave the conjugal home because he could not endure the
that she was a widow. They had carnal relations. He begot nagging of his wife, their violent quarrels, her absences
with her a son who was born on November 27, 1972. He from the conjugal home (she allegedly went to Baguio,
was named John Obusan (Exh. D). Generoso came to Luneta and San Andres Street) and her interference with
know that Natividad's marriage to Tony Garcia was his professional obligations.
subsisting or undissolved.
The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor
Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, General. He filed a complaint for disbarment against the
1972, Generoso, 33, married Preciosa, 37, in a civil respondent. Obusan did not answer the complaint. He
ceremony. The marriage was ratified in a religious waived the presentation of additional evidence. His lawyer
ceremony held on December 30,1972 (Exh. C and C-1) did not file any memorandum.

The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo After an examination of the record, we find that the
Street, Tondo, Manila for more than one year. In the complainant has sustained the burden of proof. She has
evening of April 13, 1974, when his wife was out of the proven his abandonment of her and his adulterous relations
house, lawyer Obusan asked permission from his mother- with a married woman separated from her own husband.
in-law to leave the house and take a vacation in his
hometown, Daet, Camarines Norte. Since then, he has Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his
never returned to the conjugal abode. wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct.
Abandoning one's wife and resuming carnal relations with a
Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After former paramour, a married woman, fails within "that
much patient investigation and surveillance, she discovered conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which
that he was living and cohabiting with Natividad in an shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
apartment located at 85-A Felix Manalo Street, Cubao, respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959;
Quezon City. He had brought his car to that place. Arciga vs. Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14,
1981, 106 SCRA 591).
The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and
wife was corroborated by Linda Delfin, their housemaid in Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his
1974; Remedios Bernal, a laundress, and Ernesto Bernal, a lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had
plumber, their neighbors staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street. borne him a child. He failed to maintain the highest degree
The three executed the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and F, of morality expected and required of a member of the bar
which were confirmed by their testimonies. (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768).

Romegil Q. Magana, a pook  leader, testified that Obusan WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is
introduced himself as the head of the family (25-30 tsn Nov. stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
26, 1976). His name is at the head of the barangay list
(Exh. E, G and H). Nieves Cacnio the owner of the SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
apartment, came to know Obusan as Mr. Estabillo. She
Identified five photographs, Exhibits I to I-D where
respondent Obusan appeared as the man wearing
eyeglasses.
Canon 2. A lawyer shall make his legal services
available in an efficient and convenient manner
Respondent's defense was that his relationship with compatible with the independence, integrity and
Natividad was terminated when he married Preciosa. He effectiveness of the profession.
admitted that from time to time he went to 85-A Felix
Manalo Street but only for the purpose of giving financial Cases:
assistance to his son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer Rogelio Panotes,
the ninong of Jun-Jun, corroborated respondent's
testimony. Director of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot, 74 SCRA 579, March
20, 1944
 36

EN BANC merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not

a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession
A.C. No. L-1117             March 20, 1944 who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a
member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with
THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant, mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled
vs. the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent. advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must
Feria for complainant. be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27,
Francisco Claravall for respondent. Code of Ethics.)

OZAETA, J.: In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was

suspended from the practice of law for the period of one
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with month for advertising his services and soliciting work from
malpractice for having published an advertisement in the the public by writing circular letters. That case, however,
Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows: was more serious than this because there the solicitations
were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and
Marriage insistent.

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to
annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so
and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is,
Consultation on any matter free for the poor. reprimanded.
Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied

having published the said advertisement; but subsequently,
thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication
and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of the Court,
promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in
the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of
the law profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the
said advertisement was published only once in
the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by
reason thereof.

Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for
decision.

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a

flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from
the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides
among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a

Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic Inc, Bar Matter 553, June 17, 1993

EN BANC
 37

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same
tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg.,
UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to
Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-
7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member
of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is
not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services,
the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly decided by the United States
Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
 38

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers'
Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas
(FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar
associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with
appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic,
Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder
excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by
them on the issues involved in this bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal
support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially
without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to
layman in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies like birth,
marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign
visas, constitutes practice of law?

xxx xxx xxx

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign citations.
Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused
by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal
clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain
respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4

xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is being
operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements in question
give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so,
as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very name being
used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering
of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems.
More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present case, appears
with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members
of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and
name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may
still remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.
 39

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by it, or
whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes
unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent
would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that
legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public
order and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant to inform the
general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce,
and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign
divorce is recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman entered
into accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life.  It is the foundation
of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix
the property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that
Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply
going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of
Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects
in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the
Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to
address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special
contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes
marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to
encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a
marriage license.

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above impressions
one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion
example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being
encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine
courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not constitute legal
services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only
logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are
encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the
public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

 40

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent
should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very
least, from offering such services to the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering, storage and
retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit
the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such
business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to
prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in other
fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field
cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the
legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a
lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any
form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the
public. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead
ensuring prevention of illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such
services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering
technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between
which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made available exclusively to
members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of the factual
considerations involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright, such as
acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal
and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information
regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not
authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which
course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible
sanctions for illegal practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a
clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services.

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent
himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any
adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to
be advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the
corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support services to
lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to
the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated services
fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For
respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own
commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law
belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal
 41

services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their
legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin,
Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be
evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device
by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal
services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance
for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have
been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the
members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons
and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all
who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to
persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the
persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate
officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal support
services" to answers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its
Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as
enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of
court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law,
particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption;
Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the
Philippines and such other related laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles and
procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal training,
knowledge and experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely
and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7

4. U.P.  Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to the protection
of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged
in the practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year
bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer
qualified to practice law.
 42

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice, there
are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with
the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or
standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this
Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those
who may be dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be brought about
by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of
Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being
advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect
the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such
services. 8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression that
information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions,
declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to
them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It
gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are
lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are
involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority stockholder,
Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the
aforementioned "Starweek" article."9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain which, as
provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of
lawyers in this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in
bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage
which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and
pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are
solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of
contracting marriage is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to
advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their
particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one
(cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended
so that such act could become justifiable.

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are
possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret marriage here,
when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none,
except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is
deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done
(and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by
circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from
the Bar. 10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

 43

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy firms or travel
agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that
the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves
knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is

familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of
conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law,
and his use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend,
do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men know the law,
but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . .
. . Our knowledge of the law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when
we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and
laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular
business or profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning,
building and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans
and specification in harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by
the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he
recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In
my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
information, and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise
him and the architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an architect who
performed this function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved
for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by
lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is
not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations experts are the officers and
business agents of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate
employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in
employee matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in
such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like
the defendants have the same service that the larger employers get from their own
specialized staff.

The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which
appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The court should be very cautious
about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of conducting business is
unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain function
have no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by
the graduates in their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any particular
client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as
to the law defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to
his employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the
practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts
are along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which he
must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the
architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does not
transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of
his work, he performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he
would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees'
wills.
 44

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the adjustment
of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent
particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept
the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an
exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales are
negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed
right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the
dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a
lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men
grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant
should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not
presented by the proofs.

Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the
federal government, especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board.
An agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by the
Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before such agency. The State of New
Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid representation before
the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board
give to a party the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules
and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney,
and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do
whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood,
53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge
of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility succintly
states the rule of conduct:

Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of
law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.

1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition).
Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with
a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that
described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then
what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such
services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas
(See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The
business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on
the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals
may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
 45

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text which
purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles
or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem
does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the
text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the
unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted texts.
Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a
particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to
the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR
SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and
does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or
readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport to give
personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a
particular situation — in their publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not
constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the
statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against defendant
maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation,
annulment or separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law
or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant
having an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against
his having any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully
support, however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant
gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular problems which
might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause
of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary
documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law,
particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to
specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment
of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270
[1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not
controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute
practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary
for the judicious disposition of this case.

xxx xxx xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong
notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages
(See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is not
necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal
support services", and not legal services, are available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper determination of the
issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial
construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of
the term, some of which we now take into account.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training
and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally,
to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of
legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional activity:
legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents
 46

requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals
which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper
interpretation and enforcement of law. 14

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers with
clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case
in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct
with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and
receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to determine
whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve
the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St.
23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations
as to their right under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending
or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by
law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for
the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice
of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation
to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the
order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that
part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and
skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc.
[R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
 47

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the
case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said
proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and
lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern
information technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings
prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case;
fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or
non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or employment
records or certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving
information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption
laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not
involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for
the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in
dispensing or administering legal services. 20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow, such as
the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of
research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such
function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws
on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look
for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called
paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of
action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as
the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The
Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and
operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of
the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as
complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like
doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation
and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a
battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward specialization, it
caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing the problem. That's
what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they
observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been
categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic
disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be
taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these
matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's
just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
 48

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich relative
who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer
you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in
order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in
taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich
relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court,
and gather evidence to support the case. 21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is
engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the
statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main
purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal
services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly
beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot
be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance
with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. The
doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to,
the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members
of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to
practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the
courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights
claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification
for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but
in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over
whom the judicial department can exercise little control.27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an
occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but
be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities there
which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the
"paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general
public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for
the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants.
There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National
Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As
pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of
another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations
granting permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person
who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one
of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to
practice law in the state. 32
 49

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer
in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of
the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to
indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of
their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the
ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The
prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that
the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper
advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides
among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or
skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and
his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering
them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible,
even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of
Ethics.).

We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient
service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a
normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda. 40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the
rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad
categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct
imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a
statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees
and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;
membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the
fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of
clients regularly represented." 42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a
paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not
properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may
a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to
deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name
of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
 50

being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory
but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which
even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the
same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification
relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved
in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a
statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of
the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former
Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in
the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is
implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being
invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise,
the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the
public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to
these characteristics of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of
the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this
point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that
level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to
the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in
allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is
the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby
reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with
more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was
created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it
is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of
course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present
state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This
interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals
supposedly rendering the alleged support services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General who
can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant
of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to
the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or
causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as
Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed
by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
 51

MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you

of the approaching date for our induction into office
as member of the Provincial Board, that is on the
16th of next month. Before my induction into office
I should be very glad to hear your suggestions or
recommendations for the good of the province in
general and for your barrio in particular. You can
come to my house at any time here in Echague, to
submit to me any kind of suggestion or
recommendation as you may desire.
I also inform you that despite my membership in
the Board I will have my residence here in
Echague. I will attend the session of the Board of
Ilagan, but will come back home on the following
day here in Echague to live and serve with you as
a lawyer and notary public. Despite my election as
member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise my
legal profession as a lawyer and notary public. In
case you cannot see me at home on any week
day, I assure you that you can always find me
Canon 3. A lawyer in making known his legal there on every Sunday. I also inform you that I will
services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and receive any work regarding preparations of
objective information or statement of facts. documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be
sworn to before me as notary public even on
Cases: Sundays.
In re Tagorda 53 Phil 37 I would like you all to be informed of this matter for
the reason that some people are in the belief that
my residence as member of the Board will be in
Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified to
EN BANC exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary
March 23, 1929 public. Such is not the case and I would make it
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA, clear that I am free to exercise my profession as
Duran & Lim for respondent. formerly and that I will have my residence here in
Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for Echague.
the Government. I would request you kind favor to transmit this
MALCOLM, J.: information to your barrio people in any of your
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and meetings or social gatherings so that they may be
a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that informed of my desire to live and to serve with you
previous to the last general elections he made use of a card in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the
written in Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads people in your locality have not as yet contracted
as follows: the services of other lawyers in connection with the
LUIS B. TAGORDA registration of their land titles, I would be willing to
Attorney handle the work in court and would charge only
Notary Public three pesos for every registration.
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER Yours respectfully,
Province of Isabela (Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for you Attorney
a deed of sale for the purchase of land as required Notary Public.
by the cadastral office; can renew lost documents The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down
of your animals; can make your application and the applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of the Code of
final requisites for your homestead; and can Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to
execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can disbarments of members of the bar. In 1919 at the
help you collect your loans although long overdue, instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said codal
as well as any complaint for or against you. Come section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end
or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law
offers free consultation, and is willing to help and for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
serve the poor.) agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a The statute as amended conforms in principle to the
letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the American
municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar
reads as follows: Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of
ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928 Ethics provide:
 52

27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for
The most worthy and effective advertisement to do so would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman
possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625; People vs. Mac
with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)
well-merited reputation for professional capacity It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the
and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is
be the outcome of character and conduct. The destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the
publication or circulation of ordinary simple standards of that profession. It works against the
business cards, being a matter of personal taste or confidence of the community in the integrity of the members
local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to
not per se improper. But solicitation of business by strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.
circulars or advertisements, or by personal The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground
communications or interview not warranted by for disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly
personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally understood.
unprofessional to procure business by indirection Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to
through touters of any kind, whether allied real the admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted of
estate firms or trust companies advertising to having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those
secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering canons. Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the court is
retainers in exchange for executorships or to fix upon the action which should here be taken. The
trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the
advertisement for business by furnishing or representative of the Attorney-General in the oral
inspiring newspaper comments concerning the presentation of the case, suggests that the respondent be
manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the only reprimanded. We think that our action should go
interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of
position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the this character of which unfortunately the respondent's is
traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, only one. The commission of offenses of this nature would
and are intolerable. amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the
THROUGH AGENTS. — It is unprofessional for a respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was
lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth
except in rare cases where ties of blood, and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to
relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. commit a similar mistake in the future. A modest period of
Stirring up strife and litigation is not only suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring
unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. attorney. But it should be distinctly understood that this
It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other result is reached in view of the considerations which have
causes of action and inform thereof in order to the influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this particular
employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by instance and should, therefore, not be taken as indicating
seeking out those with claims for personal injuries that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be
or those having any other grounds of action in dealt with by disbarment.
order to secure them as clients, or to employ In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment
agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or of the court is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and
reward directly or indirectly, those who bring or is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-
influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929,
to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials,
physicians, hospital attaches or others who may
succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested
friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick
and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his
professional services. A duty to the public and to
the profession devolves upon every member of the
bar having knowledge of such practices upon the
part of any practitioner immediately to inform
thereof to the end that the offender may be
disbarred.
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits
and quarrels between individuals was a crime at the
common law, and one of the penalties for this offense when
committed by an attorney was disbarment. Statutes
intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a
number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar
itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason Pangan vs. Ramos 93 SCRA 87
behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The
law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not
 53

SECOND DIVISION WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent

A.M. No. 1053 September 7, 1979 Dionisio D. Ramos is severely REPRIMANDED and warned
SANTA PANGAN, complainant that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant his
vs. suspencion or disbarment from the practice of law.
ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent, It appearing that the hearing of this case has been unduly
RESOLUTION delayed, the Investigator of this Court is directed forthwith
  to proceed with the hearing to terminate it as soon as
ANTONIO, J.: possible. The request of complainant to appear in the afore-
This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa mentioned hearing, assisted by her counsel, Atty. Jose U.
Pangan, to cite respondent Dionisio Ramos for contempt. It Lontoc, is hereby granted.
appears from the record that on September 7, 1978 and SO ORDERED
March 13, 1979, the hearings in this administrative case
were postponed on the basis of respondent's motions for
postponement. These motions were predicated on
respondent's allegations that on said dates he had a case
set for hearing before Branch VII, Court of First Instance of
Manila, entitled People v. Marieta M. Isip (Criminal Case
No. 35906). Upon verification, the attorney of record of the
accused in said case is one "Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306
Dona Salud Bldg., Dasmarinas Manila." Respondent admits
that he used the name of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" before said
court in connection with Criminal Case No. 35906, but
avers that he had a right to do so because in his Birth
Certificate (Annex "A"), his name is "Pedro Dionisio
Ramos", and -his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen
Dayaw, and that the D.D. in "Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but an
abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw his other given name and
maternal surname.
This explanation of respondent is untenable. The name
appearing in the "Roll of Attorneys" is "Dionisio D. Ramos".
The attorney's roll or register is the official record containing
the names and signatures of those who are authorized to
practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other
than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his
practice of law.
The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that
he will do no falsehood". As an officer in the temple of
justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of
"truthfulness, candor and frankness". 1 Indeed, candor and
frankness should characterize the conduct of the lawyer at
every stage. This has to be so because the court has the
right to rely upon him in ascertaining the truth. In
representing himself to the court as "Pedro D.D. Ramos"
instead of "Dionisio D. Ramos", respondent has violated his
solemn oath.
The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the
purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such B.R. Sebastian Enterprise Inc. vs. Court of Appeals 206
means as are consistent with truth and honor cannot be
SCRA 28
overempahisized. These injunctions circumscribe the
general duty of entire devotion of the attorney to the client.
As stated in a case, his I nigh vocation is to correctly inform
the court upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid
it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He THIRD DIVISION
violates Ms oath of office ,when he resorts to deception or  
permits his client to do so." 2 G.R. No. L-41862 February 7, 1992
In using the name of' Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the courts B. R. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,
instead of the name by which he was authorized to practice vs.
law - Dionisio D. Ramos - respondent in effect resorted to HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EULOGIO B. REYES,
deception. The demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with NICANOR G. SALAYSAY, in his capacity as Provincial
the courts. The circumstance that this is his first aberration Sheriff of Rizal, and ANTONIO MARINAS, in his
in this regard precludes Us from imposing a more severe capacity as Deputy Sheriff, respondents.
penalty. Benito P. Fabie for petitioner.
Ildefonso de Guzman-Mendiola for private respondents.
 54

Appellant's Brief but failed to submit it through oversight

DAVIDE, JR., J.: and inadvertence, had also left the firm.
This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer In its Resolution of 9 October 1974, respondent Court
for preliminary injunction, to review the Resolution dated 10 denied the motion for reconsideration, stating that:
November 1975 of respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.- Upon consideration of the motion of
G.R. No. 53546-R denying petitioner's motion to reinstate counsel for defendant-appellant, praying,
its appeal, earlier dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's on the grounds therein stated, that the
Brief. resolution of September 9, 1974,
The material operative facts of this case, as gathered from dismissing the appeal, be set aside, and
the pleadings of the parties, are not disputed. that appellant be granted a reasonable
Eulogio B. Reyes, now deceased, filed an action for period of time within which to file its brief:
damages with the then Court of First Instance (now considering that six (6) months had
Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, against elapsed since the expiration of the original
the Director of Public Works, the Republic of the Philippines period and more than two and one-half (2-
and petitioner herein, B. R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. The ½) months since counsel received copy of
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 757-R. 1 the resolution requiring him to show cause
On 7 May 1973, the trial court rendered a decision finding why the appeal should not be dismissed
petitioner liable for damages but absolving the other for failure to file brief; Motion Denied. 8
defendants. 2 No action having been taken by petitioner from the above
Petitioner, thru its counsel, the law firm of Baizas, Alberto Resolution within the period to file a petition for review, the
and Associates, timely appealed the adverse decision to same became final and executory, and the records of the
the respondent Court of Appeals, which docketed the case case were remanded to the court of origin for execution.
as C.A.-G.R. No. 53546-R. 3 The trial court issued a writ of execution on 21 October
During the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff-appellee 1975. 9 Pursuant thereto, respondent Provincial Sheriff and
therein, Eulogio B. Reyes, died. Upon prior leave of the Deputy Sheriff attached petitioner's Hough Pay Loader with
respondent Court, he was substituted by his heirs — Hercules Diesel Engine and issued on 5 November 1975 a
Enrique N. Reyes, Felicisima R. Natividad, Donna Marie N. Notice of Sheriff's Sale, scheduling for Friday, 14 November
Reyes and Renne Marie N. Ryes — who are now the 1975 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the auction sale
private respondents in this present petition. thereof. 10
On 19 February 1974, petitioner, thru its then counsel of On 6 November 1975, petitioner filed with respondent Court
record, received notice to file Appellant's Brief within 45 a Motion to Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for Issuance of a
days from receipt thereof. It had, therefore, until 5 April Writ of Preliminary Injunction 11 dated 5 November 1975,
1974 within which to comply. and containing the following allegations:
Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief; thus, on 9 July 1. That late as it may be, this Honorable
1974, respondent Court issued a Resolution requiring said Court has the inherent power to modify
counsel to show cause why the appeal should not be and set aside its processes, in the interest
dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief within the of justice, especially so in this case when
reglementary period. 4 A copy of this Resolution was the case was dismissed on account of the
received by counsel for petitioner on 17 July 1974. 5 untimely death of Atty. Crispin D. Baizas,
As the latter failed to comply with the above Resolution, counsel of BRSEI (B.R. Sebastian
respondent Court, on 9 September 1974, issued another Enterprises, Inc.).
Resolution this time dismissing petitioner's appeal: 2. That to dismiss the case for failure to
It appearing that counsel for defendant- file the appellant's brief owing to the
appellant failed to show cause why the untimely death of the late Atty. Crispin D.
appeal should not be dismissed (for failure Baizas would be tantamount to denying
to file the appellant's brief within the BRSEI its (sic) day in court, and is,
reglementary period which expired on April therefore, a clear and unmistakable denial
5, 1974) within the period of 10 days fixed of due process on the part of BRSEI.
in the resolution of July 9, 1974, copy of 3. That to reinstate BRSEI's appeal would
which was received by said counsel on not impair the rights of the parties, since
July 17, 1974; . . . 6 all that BRSEI is asking for, is a day in
On 28 September 1974, petitioner, this time thru the court to be heard on appeal in order to
BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, filed a motion for have the unfair, unjust and unlawful
reconsideration 7 of the resolution dismissing its appeal decision, set aside and reversed.
alleging that as a result of the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas, The respondent Court denied the said motion in its
senior partner in the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & Resolution of 10 November 1975: 12
ASSOCIATES, the affairs of the said firm are still being . . . it appearing that appellant was
settled between Atty. Jose Baizas (son of Crispin Baizas) represented by the law firm of Baizas,
and Atty. Ruby Alberto, the latter having established her Alberto & Associates, and while Atty.
own law office; furthermore, Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu, the Baizas died on January 16, 1974, his law
lawyer who handled this case in the trial court and who is firm was not dissolved since it received the
believed to have also attended to the preparation of the notice to file brief on February 19, 1974,
and the copy of the Resolution of July 9,
 55

1974, requiring appellant to show cause in denying petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal,
why the appeal should not be dismissed previously dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief.
was received by the law firm on July 17, Petitioner, in its Memorandum, extensively expounds on
1974 and no cause was shown; . . . respondent Court's authority to reinstate dismissed appeals
Hence, on 13 November 1975, petitioner filed the original and cites as basis thereof the decision of this Court in Heirs
petition 13 in this case against the Court of Appeals, Eulogio of Clemente Celestino vs. Court of Appeals, et
B. Reyes, Nicanor G. Salaysay, as Provincial Sheriff of al.,  28 Indeed, in said case, this Court affirmed the resolution
Rizal, and Antonio Marinas, as Deputy Sheriff. The petition of the Court of Appeals — reinstating an appeal after being
likewise prayed for the issuance of a Temporary dismissed for failure by the appellants therein to file their
Restraining Order. brief, and after entry of judgment and remand of the records
In the Resolution of 13 November 1975, this Court required to the lower court — and cancelled the entry of judgment,
respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days requiring the lower court to return the records to the Court
from receipt thereof, and issued a Temporary Restraining of Appeals and admit appellant's brief. Said case, however,
Order. 14 had a peculiar or singular factual situation" which prompted
On 12 January 1976, respondents filed a Partial Comment the Court of Appeals to grant the relief and which this Court
on the Petition with a Motion to Suspend the found sufficient to justify such action. As this Court, through
Proceedings 15 on the ground that respondent Eulogio B. Associate Justice Ramon Aquino, said:
Reyes is already dead and his lawful heirs had already We are of the opinion that under the
been ordered substituted for him during the pendency of the peculiar or singular factual situation in this
appeal before the respondent Court of Appeals. case and to forestall a miscarriage of
In the Resolution of 21 January 1976, this Court ordered justice the resolution of the Court of
petitioner to amend its petition within then (10) days from Appeals reinstating the appeal should be
receipt of notice, and suspended the filing of respondents' upheld.
Comment until after the amendment is presented and That Court dismissed the appeal of the
admitted. 16 Pagtakhans in the mistaken belief that
In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on 9 February 1976 they had abandoned it because they
a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Petition to which it allegedly failed to give to their counsel the
attached the said Amended Petition. 17 The amendment money needed for paying the cost of
consists in the substitution of Eulogio B. Reyes with his printing their brief.
heirs. But presumably the Appellate Court
This Court admitted the Amended Petition 18 and required realized later that fraud might have been
the respondents to file their Comment within ten (10) days practised on appellants Pagtakhans since
from notice thereof, which they complied with on 5 April their oppositions were not included in the
1976. 19 Petitioner filed its Reply to the Comment on 29 record on appeal. In (sic) sensed that
April 1976. 20 there was some irregularity in the
In the Resolution of 12 May 1976, this Court denied the actuations of their lawyer and that Court
petition for lack of merit: 21 (sic) itself had been misled into dismissing
L-41862 (B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. the appeal.
vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.). — Counsel for the Pagtakhans could have
Considering the allegations, issues and furnished them with copies of his motions
arguments adduced in the amended for extension of time to file brief so that
petition for review on certiorari of the they would have known that the Court of
decision of the Court of Appeals, Appeals had been apprised of their
respondents' comment thereon, as well as alleged failure to defray the cost of printing
petitioner's reply to said comment, the their brief and they could have articulated
Court Resolved to DENY the petition for their reaction directly to the Court. Counsel
lack of merit. could have moved in the Appellate Court
However, on 31 May 1976, petitioner filed a motion for its that he be allowed to withdraw from the
reconsideration 22 claiming that since it was deprived of the case or that the Pagtakhans be required to
right to appeal without fault on its part, the petition should manifest whether they were still desirous
be given due course. of prosecuting their appeal or wanted a
Respondents submitted on 22 July 1976 their mimeographed brief to be filed for them
Comment 23 to said Motion for Reconsideration. (See People vs. Cawili, L-30543, August
On 10 September 1976, this Court resolved to 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 728). Since counsel
reconsider 24 its Resolution of 12 May 1976 and required did none of those things, his
both parties to submit simultaneously their respective representation that the appellants had
Memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice thereof. evinced lack of interest in pursuing their
Petitioner submitted its Memorandum on 5 November appeal is difficult to believe.
1976 25 while respondents submitted theirs on 22 November If the appellate court has not yet lost its
1976. 26 On 29 November 1976, this Court deemed the jurisdiction, it may exercise its discretion in
present case submitted for decision. 27 reinstating an appeal, having in mind the
The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not the circumstances obtaining in each case and
respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion the demands of substantial justice (Alquiza
 56

vs. Alquiza, L-23342, February 10, 1968, thus pursued for petitioner by the law firm
22 SCRA 494, 66 O.G. 276; C. Vda. de "Baizas, Alberto & Associates."
Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 62 Phil. 275; On January 16, 1974, Atty. Crispin D.
Chavez vs. Ganzon, 108 Phil. 6). Baizas died as a result of a brief heart
But even if it has already lost jurisdiction attack. In consequence (sic) of his death,
over the appeal by reason of the remand the law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates"
of the record to the lower court, it, was in a terribly confused state of affairs.
nevertheless, has the inherent right to In effect, said law firm was dissolved. Atty.
recall the remittitur or the remand of the Ruby Alberto formed her own law office
record to the lower court if it had rendered and other associates left the dissolved law
a decision or issued a resolution which firms (sic) joining other offices or putting
was induced by fraud practised upon it. up their own. Atty. Jose Baizas, son of
Such a right is not affected by the statutory deceased Crispin D. Baizas, took over the
provision that after the record has been management of why may have been left of
remanded, the appellate court has no his father's office, it appearing that some,
further jurisdiction over the appeal (5 Am if not many, cases of the defunct office
Jur. 2nd 433 citing Lovett vs. State, 29 Fla. were taken over by the associates who left
384, 11 So. 176; 84 ALR 595; State vs. the firm upon its dissolution.
Ramirez, 34 Idaho 623, 203 Pac. 279). But, none of the former partners and
In the instant case, no fraud is involved; what obtain is associates/assistants of the dissolved law
simple negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel, which firm filed the required appellant's brief for
is neither excusable nor unavoidable. Petitioner thus failed herein petitioner in its appealed case
to demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant a favorable before the respondent Court of Appeals.
action on its plea. No notice was served upon petitioner by
As held in Chavez, et al. vs. Ganzon, et al.,  29 and any of the surviving associates of the
reiterated in Negros Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of defunct law firm that its appellant's brief
Appeals,  30 We said: was due for filing or that the law office had
Granting that the power or discretion to been dissolved and that the law office had
reinstate an appeal that had been been dissolved and that none of the
dismissed is included in or implied from lawyers herein formerly connected desired
the power or discretion to dismiss an to handle the appealed case of petitioner. .
appeal, still such power or discretion must ..
be exercised upon a showing of good and The circumstances that the law firm
sufficient cause, in like manner as the "Baizas, Alberto & Associates" was
power or discretion vested in the appellate dissolved and that none of the associates
court to allow extensions of time for the took over petitioner's case, and no notice
filing of briefs. There must be such a of such state of affairs was given to
showing which would call for, prompt and petitioner who could have engaged the
justify its exercise (sic). Otherwise, it services of another lawyer to prosecute its
cannot and must not be upheld. appeal before respondent Court,
To justify its failure to file the Appellant's Brief, petitioner constitutes (sic) an UNAVOIDABLE
relies mainly on the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas and the CASUALTY that entitles petitioner to the
supposed confusion it brought to the firm of BAIZAS, relief prayed for. On the other hand, the
ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES. It says: 31 non-dissolution of said law firm "Baizas,
Petitioner, thru its president Bernardo R. Alberto & Associates" will not defeat
Sebastian, engaged the services of Atty. petitioner's claim for relief since, in such
Crispin D. Baizas to handle its defense in event, the said firm had ABANDONED
Civil Case No. 757-R; however, it appears petitioner's cause, which act constitutes
that Atty. Baizas entered petitioner's case fraud and/or reckless inattention the result
as a case to be handled by his law firm of which is deprivation of petitioner's day
operating under the name and style in court. In the abovementioned Yuseco
"Crispin D. Baizas & Associates." Hence, case, this Honorable Court had
the Answer to the complaint, Answer to emphatically and forcefully declared that it
Cross-Claim, and Answer to Fourth-party will always be disposed to grant relief to
Complaint filed for petitioner in said case, parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud,
evince that the law firm "Crispin D. Baizas reckless inattention and downright
& Associates" represents petitioner in the incompetence of lawyers, which has the
action. consequence of depriving their day (sic) in
After rendition of the assailed Decision of court.
the trial court, petitioner's counsel appears We find no merit in petitioner's contentions. Petitioner's
to have changed its firm name to "Baizas, counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO &
Alberto & Associates." The appeal was ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence,
 57

the death of the latter did not extinguish the lawyer-client intended for them, so that they will always
relationship between said firm and petitioner. be informed of the status of their cases.
In Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,  32 the appeal Their Court has also often repeated that
filed by the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES the negligence of clerks which adversely
on behalf of respondent therein was dismissed for failure to affect the cases handled by lawyers, is
comply with the requisites enumerated in the Rules of binding upon the latter.
Court; the excuse presented by said counsel was also the Compounding such negligence is the failure of the BAIZAS
death of Atty. Crispin Baizas. This Court held therein that: LAW OFFICE, which filed on 28 September 1974 the
The death of Attorney Baizas was not a motion for reconsider the Resolution of 9 September 1974,
valid excuse on the part of his associates to take any further appropriate action after the respondent
for not attending to Alvendia's appeal, Court denied said motion on 9 October 1974. The
supposing arguendo  that his office was appearance of said counsel is presumed to be duly
solely entrusted with the task of authorized by petitioner. The latter has neither assailed nor
representing Alvendia in the Court of questioned such appearance.
Appeals. Attorney Espiritu (not Attorney The rule is settled that negligence of counsel binds the
Baizas) was the one actually collaborating client. 33
with Viola in handling Alvendia's case. He Moreover, petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it
did not file a formal appearance in the failed to make inquiries from counsel regarding its case. As
Court of Appeals. pointed out by respondents, the president of petitioner
Undoubtedly, there was inexcusable negligence on the part corporation claims to be the intimate friend of Atty. Crispin
of petitioner's counsel in failing to file the Appellant's Brief. Baizas; hence, the death of the latter must have been
As revealed by the records, petitioner's counsel, the known to the former. 34 This fact should have made
BAIZAS ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES law firm, received the petitioner more vigilant with respect to the case at bar.
notice to file Brief on 19 February 1974. It failed to do so Petitioner failed to act with prudence and diligence, thus, its
within the 45 days granted to it. Said law firm also received plea that they were not accorded the right to procedural due
a copy of the respondent Court's Resolution of 9 July 1974 process cannot elicit either approval or sympathy. 35
requiring it to show cause why the appeal should not be Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there was failure to
dismissed for failure to file the Brief within the reglementary show a good and sufficient cause which would justify the
period. Petitioner chose not to comply with it, thus reinstatement of petitioner's appeal. Respondent Court of
compelling the respondent Court to issue on 9 September Appeals did not them commit any grave abuse of discretion
1974 a Resolution dismissing the appeal, a copy of which when it denied petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal.
the former also received. Then, on 28 September 1974, the WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
BAIZAS LAW OFFICE moved for reconsideration of the temporary restraining order issued in this case is lifted.
said Resolution which respondent Court denied in its Costs against petitioner.
Resolution of 9 October 1974. Nothing more was heard IT SO ORDERED.
from petitioner until after a year when, on 6 November
1975, it filed the instant petition in reaction to the issuance
of a writ of execution by the trial court following receipt of
the records for the respondent Court.
The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the
death of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a valid justification for its
failure to file the Brief. With Baizas' death, the responsibility
of Atty. Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as
counsel remained until withdrawal by the former of their
appearance in the manner provided by the Rules of Court.
This is so because it was the law firm which handled the
case for petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts.
That Atty. Espiritu, an associate who was designated to
handle the case, later left the office after the death of Atty.
Baizas is of no moment since others in the firm could have
replaced him.. Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the
law firm should have re-assigned the case to another
associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the
manner provided by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner
could contract the services of a new lawyer.
In the Negros Stevedoring  case, supra., this Court held:
The negligence committed in the case at
bar cannot be considered excusable, nor
(sic) is it unavoidable. Time and again the
Court has admonished law firms to adopt
a system of distributing pleadings and
notices, whereby lawyers working therein
receive promptly notices and pleadings Antonio vs. Court of Appeals 153 SCRA 592
 58

Not satisfied therewith, the petitioners appealed to the

respondent Regional Trial Court which, on August 20, 1985,
FIRST DIVISION rendered a decision affirming in toto the judgment of the
G.R. No. 77656 August 31, 1987 Metropolitan Trial Court.
ROBERTO ANTONIO, DIONISIO BENSION, CONRADA The petitioners then filed a petition for review on certiorari
CHAN, MARINO CUMLAT, VICENTE DIMACUHA, with the respondent Court of Appeals. This case was
PROCOPIO ESPEJON, RODRIGO FORBES, MANITO docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 07828.
FUENTES, ET AL., petitioners, On December 5, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals
vs. rendered a decision dismissing the petitioner for review.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL Later an entry of judgment dated February 3, 1987, was
ELEVENTH DIVISION, HON. ANTONIA C. MACANDOG, duly certified thereupon by the Clerk of Court attesting to
in her capacity as then presiding judge of the Regional the fact that the judgment became final and executory as of
Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch CXX and ALICIA January 22, 1987. The records of the case were
BILAN, respondents. consequently, remanded to the respondent Regional Trial
Court on February 11, 1987.
GANCAYCO, J: On February 23, 1987, the petitioners, through their new
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus with a prayer counsel, filed an "Appearance And Motion For Leave To
for a writ of preliminary injunction. It seeks to annul the Admit Motion For Reconsideration, together with the Motion
Resolution of the Court of Appeals 1 promulgated on March For Reconsideration With Prayer For Issuance Of
10, 1987 which denied the admission of the petitioners' Temporary Restraining Order," with the respondent Court of
Motion for Reconsideration of the decision 2 earlier Appeals. They moved that the respondent Court of Appeals
rendered. Also, it prays that a writ of preliminary injunction admit their motion for reconsideration, which was obviously
be immediately issued to restrain the respondent Regional filed beyond the reglementary period for filing the same,
Trial Court in Caloocan City, Branch CXX, from alleging that their counsel of record abandoned them and
implementing its Order dated March 6, 1987, which issued migrated to the United States without at least informing
a writ of execution in accordance with the Court of Appeals them that a decision was rendered against them.
decision on the case, thereby asking that said court be The petitioners' motion was denied by the respondent Court
directed to defer or stay the execution pending the of Appeals in the Resolution dated March 10, 1987, now put
resolution of this petition and an annulment case allegedly in issue. It is hereunder reproduced, thus:
appealed with the Court of Appeals. Now before this Court is an Appearance
The petitioners are lessees of an apartment building located and Motion for Leave to Admit Motion for
in No. 121, 2nd Street, 9th Avenue, Caloocan City. This Reconsideration' filed by petitioners in the
property was foreclosed by the Government Service above-entitled case on February 23, 1987
Insurance System (GSIS) after its original owner failed to on the ground that their former counsel
pay back his loan. Atty. Funelas had abandoned the case
After due notice to the petitioners and all others concerned, and is now abroad, together with the
the property was sold to the private respondent at a public corresponding Motion For Reconsideration
bidding held on July 29, 1982. It appears, petitioners With Prayer for Issuance of Temporary
deliberately did not participate in the said bidding because Restraining Order.
they believed that, as tenants therein, they have priority in Considering that the decision sought to be
law to acquire the property. Their thinking was that their reconsidered dated December 5, 1986
participation would be deemed a waiver of their right to had become final, entry of judgment
question the act of the GSIS in selling the property and having been issued on February 3, 1987
would adversely affect their offer to buy the same. and the records remanded to the court a
The award or sale of the property to the private respondent quo on February 11, 1987, for which
was duly approved by the GSIS Board of Trustees in its reason the said decision has become final
Resolution No. 772 adopted on August 20, 1982. It was and this Court has become bereft of
then certified that the possession and administration of the jurisdiction to act thereupon, the
property had been transferred to the private respondent A abovementioned Motions are
conditional deed of sale was executed in favor of private hereby noted. Parenthetically, and merely
respondent by the GSIS stating that for all intents and for purposes of record, it is observed that
purposes, the private respondent is the owner of the counsel of record of petitioners is the law
property. office Funelas, Perez and Associates and
The GSIS advised the petitioners that they should now pay not Atty. Funelas alone. Therefore, the fact
their rent and arrearages to the private respondent. But that Atty. Funelas has abandoned the
despite repeated written demands, the petitioners failed and case and is now abroad is not a valid
refused to settle their accounts. ground for the late filing of the motion for
After a barangay conciliation proceeding proved futile, the reconsideration. 3
private respondent filed a complaint for ejectment against Earlier, on March 6, 1987, the respondent Regional Trial
the petitioners with the Metropolitan Trial Court in that Court issued an order 4 for a writ of execution to be issued
locality. Said court rendered judgment on January 8, 1985, against the petitioners for the enforcement of the decision in
ordering the petitioners to vacate the premises occupied by CA-G.R. No. 07828.
them and to pay certain amounts as damages.
 59

Henceforth, the petitioners, believing that they were affidavit has no evidentiary value. It was executed and
deprived of their day in court when the respondent Court of submitted after the questioned resolution was already
Appeals denied their motion for reconsideration, instituted promulgated. Hence, it could not have affected or
this petition. influenced the adjudication of the said resolution.
As their initial argument in this petition and as contained in It is safe to presume that a law firm which registered and
their "Appearance And Motion For Leave To Admit Motion represented itself as such, with at least two named
For Reconsideration," the petitioners maintain that they partners, is composed of at least two lawyers. And if it is
were deprived of their day in court-equivalent to a denial of true that this law office was earlier dissolved, the winding up
due process of law-when their motion for reconsideration process is presumed to have been performed in a regular
was refused due course by the respondent Court of manner, with all the obligations properly accounted for.
Appeals. They alleged that their counsel at that time, Atty. Very concrete evidence must be presented in order that
Pitty A. Funelas, virtually abandoned them by leaving these presumptions may be rebutted.
abroad without at least notifying them. So when the Court of At most, the affidavit must be classified as a mere
Appeals decision was rendered and a copy was sent to afterthought and a futile attempt to contradict the findings of
Atty. Funelas, no notice thereof was ever received by the the respondent Court of Appeals.
petitioners. The petitioners only had knowledge of the Recently, this Court laid down a ruling that is applicable to
judgment against them after it was eventually entered in the this case. It reads:
Book of Entries Of Judgments for being final and executory. When a party appears by attorney in an
A certain Romeo S. Obligar, representing himself as the action or proceeding all court, all notices
former messenger of Atty. Funelas, executed an affidavit on required to be given therein must be given
February 19, 1987 stating among others that while getting to their attorney and not to the client.
the mails from the Post Office last January 6, 1987, for his Hence, a notice given to the client and not
new employer, he received the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. to his attorney is not a notice in law.
07828; that since the records of that case was with Atty. The rule in this jurisdiction is that the client
Funelas, he was not able to contact the petitioners herein; is bound by the negligence or failings of
and that he forgot all about said decision until a secretary counsel. It is the duty of an attorney to
informed him that the petitioners were verifying the said himself and to his clients to invariably
case when they happened to visit the office of his new adopt a system whereby he can be sure of
employer. receiving promptly all judicial notices
We agree with the Court of Appeals in denying the during his absence from his address of
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. It is well-settled that record. The attorney must so arrange
after the lapse of fifteen (1 5) days from notice of judgment, matters that communications sent by mail
the same becomes final and the Court of Appeals loses, addressed to his office or residence, may
jurisdiction over the case. And the subsequent filing of a reach him promptly. ... 7
motion for reconsideration cannot disturb the finality of the In the motion for reconsideration, the sole issue presented
judgment nor restore jurisdiction which had already been for reconsideration was a mere amplification of one
lost. 5 The court a quo cannot decide the case anew. argument already passed upon by the respondent Court of
decision rendered anew notwithstanding the finality of the Appeals in its decision.
original one is null and void. 6 On January 18, 1983 before the ejectment case was
In this case, the messenger, Mr. Obligar, received a copy of instituted, the petitioners filed a complaint in the then Court
the decision on January 6, 1987. This decision became final of First Instance to annul the award in a public auction of
and executory on January 22, 1987. Thus, the motion for the leased premises by the GSIS to the private respondent
reconsideration filed by the petitioners on February 23, for they claimed that as tenants therein, they have the
1987, could not be acted upon on the merits and could only priority in law over the same. The court, in a decision
be noted by the respondent Court of Appeals. It was rendered on January 28, 1985, dismissed the case for lack
properly denied. of a cause of action. Now, this case is allegedly pending
The negligence attributed by the petitioners to their then appeal in the Court of Appeals.
counsel, Atty. Funelas, is not excusable. Clear and as it can The issue, thus, advanced in the motion for reconsideration
be seen from the pleadings filed that the petitioners' is whether the pendency of an annulment case of an award
counsel of record is the law office of Funelas Perez and in public auction is prejudicial to an ejectment suit as to
Associates and not Atty. Funelas alone. Atty. Funelas warrant the suspension of the latter proceeding.
signed the documents in his capacity as the representative We quote with approval the holding of the respondent Court
of the said law firm. The respondent Court of Appeals made of Appeals on this matter, thus:
this same observation in its questioned resolution. The pendency of an action for title filed by
In an attempt to belie the preceding observation, the the defendants (now petitioners) with the
petitioners submitted to this Court another affidavit Regional Trial Court does not have the
executed by Mr. Obligar dated March 17, 1987. This effect of removing the ejectment case from
affidavit stated that the law firm of Funelas, Perez and the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Associates was actually composed of only Atty. Funelas; Court. The rule is well- settled that an
that Atty. Perez was only a partner in name, never handled action for ownership or annulment of title
any case of the law office, and did not actually report in said is not a bar to an action for forcible entry
office; that there were no associates of Atty. Funelas; and and detainer (Alviar, et al. vs. Pampolina,
that said law firm was dissolved in August, 1986. This et al., 84 Phil. 45, at p. 47; Padilla vs. de
 60

Jesus, et al., 95 Phil. 688, at p. 691;

Aguilar vs. Cabrera, et al., 74 Phil. 658, at
p. 868.) 8
In an ejectment case, the issue is possession, while in an
annulment case the issue is ownership. 9 Therefore, an
ejectment case can very well proceed independently of an
annulment case. The only recognized exception to the
preceding doctrine is the situation wherein the question of
possession is so intertwined with the question of ownership
to the effect that the question of possession cannot be
resolved without resolving the question of ownership. This
case at bar does not fall within the exception. Accordingly,
the petitioners' position that this ejectment proceeding
should be suspended in deference to an annulment
proceeding presently pending in another forum must
necessarily be rejected.
The order of the respondent Regional Trial Court for the
issuance of a writ of execution was because the decision in
the ejectment case had already become final and
executory. Its implementation cannot be stayed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and Canon 5. A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal
mandamus with preliminary injunction is hereby development; participate in continuing legal education
DISMISSED for lack of merit. With costs against petitioners. programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in
This is immediately executory. law schools as well as in the practical training of law
students and assist in disseminating information
regarding the law and jurisprudence.

Cases:
In re: Integration of the Bar of the Philippines 49 SCRA 22

EN BANC
 
January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR
OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar
Integration1 submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972,
with the "earnest recommendation" — on the basis of the
said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative
Case No. 5262 of the Court, and "consistently with the views
and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of
Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide
sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" — that "this
Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar
as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation
of an appropriate Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court
to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due
hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and
practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar
associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as
well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded
before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted, 3 and
all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written
memoranda.4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed
significant developments relative to the matter of the
integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
 61

In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of
grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar all persons whose names appear in the
integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or
Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of Unified Bar) perforce must include all
unifying the Philippine Bar. lawyers.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 Complete unification is not possible unless
entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the it is decreed by an entity with power to do
Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The so: the State. Bar integration, therefore,
measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on signifies the setting up by Government
September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as authority of a national organization of the
Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows: legal profession based on the recognition
SECTION 1. Within two years from the of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
approval of this Act, the Supreme Court Designed to improve the position of the
may adopt rules of court to effect the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the
integration of the Philippine Bar under Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion
such conditions as it shall see fit in order among lawyers, and ensures, through their
to raise the standards of the legal own organized action and participation,
profession, improve the administration of the promotion of the objectives of the legal
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its profession, pursuant to the principle of
public responsibility more effectively. maximum Bar autonomy with minimum
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand supervision and regulation by the
pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any Supreme Court.
funds in the National Treasury not The purposes of an integrated Bar, in
otherwise appropriated, to carry out the general, are:
purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such (1) Assist in the administration of justice;
sums as may be necessary for the same (2) Foster and maintain on the part of its
purpose shall be included in the annual members high ideals of integrity, learning,
appropriations for the Supreme Court. professional competence, public service
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its and conduct;
approval. (3) Safeguard the professional interests of
The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on its members;
the constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all (4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of
necessary factual data bearing on the advisability cordiality and brotherhood;
(practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also (5) Provide a forum for the discussion of
embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading,
comments and observations of the rank and file of the practice and procedure, and the relations
Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as of the Bar to the Bench and to the public,
well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the and publish information relating thereto;
Commission and presented to them by that body in a (6) Encourage and foster legal education;
national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well (7) Promote a continuing program of legal
as ample material upon which the Court may decide research in substantive and adjective law,
whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time. and make reports and recommendations
The following are the pertinent issues: thereon; and
(1) Does the Court have the power to (8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public
integrate the Philippine Bar? responsibility effectively.
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be Integration of the Bar will, among other
constitutional? things, make it possible for the legal
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration profession to:
of the Bar at this time? (1) Render more effective assistance in
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a maintaining the Rule of Law;
statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It will suffice, (2) Protect lawyers and litigants against
for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the the abuse of tyrannical judges and
Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of prosecuting officers;
its Report, thus: (3) Discharge, fully and properly, its
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the responsibility in the disciplining and/or
official unification of the entire lawyer removal of incompetent and unworthy
population of the Philippines. This judges and prosecuting officers;
requires membership and financial (4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally
support (in reasonable amount) of every cannot defend itself except within its own
attorney as conditions sine qua non to the forum, from the assaults that politics and
practice of law and the retention of his self-interest may level at it, and assist it to
name in the Roll of Attorneys of the maintain its integrity, impartiality and
Supreme Court. independence;
 62

(5) Have an effective voice in the selection issue, the Courts have upheld their
of judges and prosecuting officers; constitutionality.
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of The judicial pronouncements support this
law, and break up any monopoly of local reasoning:
practice maintained through influence or — Courts have inherent power to
position; supervise and regulate the practice of law.
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of — The practice of law is not a vested right
disabled and deceased lawyers; but a privilege; a privilege, moreover,
(8) Provide placement services, and clothed with public interest, because a
establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer owes duties not only to his client,
lawyer reference services throughout the but also to his brethren in the profession,
country so that the poor may not lack to the courts, and to the nation; and takes
competent legal service; part in one of the most important functions
(9) Distribute educational and of the State, the administration of justice,
informational materials that are difficult to as an officer of the court.
obtain in many of our provinces; — Because the practice of law is privilege
(10) Devise and maintain a program of clothed with public interest, it is far and
continuing legal education for practising just that the exercise of that privilege be
attorneys in order to elevate the standards regulated to assure compliance with the
of the profession throughout the country; lawyer's public responsibilities.
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and — These public responsibilities can best
promulgate minimum fees schedules; be discharged through collective action;
(12) Create law centers and establish law but there can be no collective action
libraries for legal research; without an organized body; no organized
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the body can operate effectively without
people on their legal rights and incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and
obligations, on the importance of just that all attorneys be required to
preventive legal advice, and on the contribute to the support of such organized
functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; body; and, given existing Bar conditions,
and the most efficient means of doing so is by
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and integrating the Bar through a rule of court
meaningful country-wide involvement of that requires all lawyers to pay annual
the lawyer population in the solution of the dues to the Integrated Bar.
multifarious problems that afflict the 1. Freedom of Association.
nation. To compel a lawyer to be a member of an
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrated Bar is not violative of his
integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, constitutional freedom to associate (or the
under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to corollary right not to associate).
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and Integration does not make a lawyer a
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of member of any group of which he is not
law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of already a member. He became a member
the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing of the Bar when he passed the Bar
that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect examinations. All that integration actually
the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 does is to provide an official national
neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's organization for the well-defined but
inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the unorganized and incohesive group of
integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more which every lawyer is already a member.
specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, Bar integration does not compel the lawyer
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to to associate with anyone. He is free to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively." attend or not attend the meetings of his
Resolution of the second issue — whether the unification of Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
the Bar would be constitutional — hinges on the effects of vote in its elections as he chooses. The
Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of body compulsion to which he is subjected
freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the is the payment of annual dues.
nature of the dues exacted from him. Otherwise stated, membership in the
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay
discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration dues in reasonable amount. The issue
pages 44 to 49 of its Report: therefore, is a question of compelled
Constitutionality of Bar Integration financial support of group activities, not
Judicial Pronouncements. involuntary membership in any other
In all cases where the validity of Bar aspect.
integration measures has been put in The greater part of Unified Bar activities
serves the function of elevating the
 63

educational and ethical standards of the "free speech" issue. Even the income tax
Bar to the end of improving the quality of would be suspect. The objection would
the legal service available to the people. carry us to lengths that have never been
The Supreme Court, in order to further the dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if
State's legitimate interest in elevating the his liberties were to be thus extended,
quality of professional services, may might refuse to contribute taxes in
require that the cost of improving the furtherance of war or of any other end
profession in this fashion be shared by the condemned by his conscience as
subjects and beneficiaries of the irreligious or immoral. The right of private
regulatory program — the lawyers. judgment has never yet been exalted
Assuming that Bar integration does above the powers and the compulsion of
compel a lawyer to be a member of the the agencies of Government.
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is 4. Fair to All Lawyers.
justified as an exercise of the police power Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers
of the State. The legal profession has long already practising because although the
been regarded as a proper subject of requirement to pay annual dues is a new
legislative regulation and control. regulation, it will give the members of the
Moreover, the inherent power of the Bar a new system which they hitherto
Supreme Court to regulate the Bar have not had and through which, by
includes the authority to integrate the Bar. proper work, they will receive benefits they
2. Regulatory Fee. have not heretofore enjoyed, and
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid discharge their public responsibilities in a
by the members does not mean that the more effective manner than they have
Court levies a tax. been able to do in the past. Because the
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise
an exaction for regulation, while the of regulatory power by the Court, because
purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court it will apply equally to all lawyers, young
has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it and old, at the time Bar integration takes
follows that as an incident to regulation, it effect, and because it is a new regulation
may impose a membership fee for that in exchange for new benefits, it is not
purpose. It would not be possible to push retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not
through an Integrated Bar program without unfair.
means to defray the concomitant To resolve the third and final issue — whether the Court
expenses. The doctrine of implied powers should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time —
necessarily includes the power to impose requires a careful overview of the practicability and
such an exaction. necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of
The only limitation upon the State's power Bar integration.
to regulate the Bar is that the regulation In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and
does not impose an unconstitutional the United States, Bar integration has yielded the following
burden. The public interest promoted by benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the
the integration of the Bar far outweighs the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3)
inconsequential inconvenience to a better and more meaningful participation of the individual
member that might result from his required lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar
payment of annual dues. facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized
3. Freedom of Speech. practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership campaigns;
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more
voice his views on any subject in any cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective
manner he wishes, even though such discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to
views be opposed to positions taken by its members, to the courts, and to the public. No less than
the Unified Bar. these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar.
due to promote measures to which said Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in
member is opposed, would not nullify or the event of integration, Government authority will dominate
adversely affect his freedom of speech. the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism
Since a State may constitutionally will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be
condition the right to practice law upon possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and
membership in the Integrated Bar, it is politics will intrude into its affairs.
difficult to understand why it should It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils
become unconstitutional for the Bar to use prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed to
the member's dues to fulfill the very materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience
purposes for which it was established. in England, Canada and the United States. In all the
The objection would make every jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none
Governmental exaction the material of a of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand,
 64

it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged

professional consciousness, energized the Bar's
responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the
administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar
integration? The official statistics compiled by the
Commission on Bar integration show that in the national
poll recently conducted by the Commission in the matter of
the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090
lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in
their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted
in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent)
voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-
commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar
association and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines
have submitted resolutions and other expressions of
unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration,
while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group
has expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the
13,802 individual lawyers who cast their  plebiscite
ballots on the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by
the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor
thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or
2.06 per cent) are non-committal. 5 All these clearly indicate
an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at
this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing
conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm.
Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass
of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the
Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary
conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative
means to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in
it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby
ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in
accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on
January 16, 1973.

De Roy vs. Court of Appeals 157 SCRA 757

THIRD DIVISION
 65

G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988 be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners, Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate
vs. Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which
BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the
BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and extension requested. (at p. 212)
LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents. Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the
RESOLUTION intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August
  26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went
CORTES, J.: further to restate and clarify the modes and periods of
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null appeal.
and void two (2) resolutions of the Special First Division of Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824,
the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the prospective
Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The application of said rule, and explained the operation of the
first resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied grace period, to wit:
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for In other words, there is a one-month grace
reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the period from the promulgation on May 30,
decision in said case had become final; and the second 1986 of the Court's Resolution in the
Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June
motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time. 30, 1986, within which the rule barring
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition extensions of time to file motions for new
outright for not being verified as required by Rule 65 section trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not
1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition strictly enforceable.
did not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural and Since petitioners herein filed their motion
substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it. for extension on February 27, 1986, it is
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a still within the grace period, which expired
burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and on June 30, 1986, and may still be
destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of allowed.
private respondents, resulting in injuries to private This grace period was also applied in Mission v.
respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28,
Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for
wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more
foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June
Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the
Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross grace period. Considering the length of time from the
negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987,
toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their
August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion
petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the for reconsideration within the reglementary period.
last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in
petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the
motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by case at bar owing to the non-publication of
the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time
1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was
September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law
of October 27, 1987. requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a
grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty
for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast
directed entry of judgment and denied their motion for of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues
reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in
in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s)
August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports
for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals
for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial
SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190
rule, to wit: of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting
Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the
for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may lack of necessary repairs.
 66

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that

private respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the
accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the
tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence
should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear
chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is
inapplicable to this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved
to DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.

Canon 6. These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their tasks.

Cases:
Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. CA and PPA G.R. No. 130068 October 1, 1998

EN BANC
 
G.R. No. 130068 October 1, 1998
 67

FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 130150 October, 1998
MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY and FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
These consolidated petitions for review on certiorari seek in unison to annul and set aside the decision 1 of respondent Court of
Appeals of November 15, 1996 and its resolution 2 dated July 31, 1997 in CA-G.R. CV No. 24072, entitled "Philippine
Ports Authority, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. Far Eastern Shipping Company, Senen C. Gavino and Manila Pilots' Association,
Defendants-Appellants," which affirmed with modification the judgment of the trial court holding the defendants-
appellants therein solidarily liable for damages in favor of herein private respondent.
There is no dispute about the facts as found by the appellate court,
thus —
. . . On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the USSR, owned and operated
by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC for brevity's sake), arrived at the Port of Manila from
Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of
the Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the
Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel. Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned
by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA for brevity's sake) to conduct docking maneuvers for
the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No. 4.
Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the
master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the
particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and
proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking
maneuvers.
When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from
the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the
pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the
bow. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as
expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. A
brief conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew members. When Gavino inquired what was all
the commotion about, Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it.
After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana,
who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov
likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before
the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the
apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The vessel sustained damage too, (Exhibit
"7-Far Eastern Shipping). Kavankov filed his sea protest (Exhibit "1-Vessel"). Gavino submitted his
report to the Chief Pilot (Exhibit "1-Pilot") who referred the report to the Philippine Ports Authority
(Exhibit 2-Pilot"). Abellana likewise submitted his report of the incident (Exhibit "B").
Per contract and supplemental contract of the Philippine Ports Authority and the contractor for the
rehabilitation of the damaged pier, the same cost the Philippine Ports Authority the amount of
P1,126,132.25 (Exhibits "D" and "E").3
On January 10, 1983, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA, for brevity), through the Solicitor General, filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 39, a complaint for a sum of money against Far Eastern Shipping Co., Capt.
Senen C. Gavino and the Manila Pilots' Association, docketed as Civil Case No. 83-14958, 4 praying that the defendants
therein be held jointly and severally liable to pay the plaintiff actual and exemplary damages plus costs of suit. In a
decision dated August 1, 1985, the trial court ordered the defendants therein jointly and severally to pay the PPA the
amount of P1,053,300.00 representing actual damages and the costs of suit. 5
The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals and raised the following issues: (1) Is the pilot of a commercial
vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the damage caused by the vessel to the pier, at the port of
destination, for his negligence? and (2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is caused by the
concurrent negligence of the master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage?
As stated at the outset, respondent appellate court affirmed the findings of the court  a quo  except that if found no
employer-employee relationship existing between herein private respondents Manila Pilots' Association (MPA, for
short) and Capt. Gavino.6 This being so, it ruled instead that the liability of MPA is anchored, not on Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, but on the provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65, 7 and accordingly modified said decision
of the trial court by holding MPA, along with its co-defendants therein, still solidarily liable to PPA but entitled MPA to
reimbursement from Capt. Gavino for such amount of the adjudged pecuniary liability in excess of the amount
 68

equivalent to seventy-five percent (75%) of its prescribed reserve

fund. 8
Neither Far Eastern Shipping Co. (briefly, FESC) nor MPA was happy with the decision of the Court of Appeals and both
of them elevated their respective plaints to us via separate petitions for review on certiorari.
In G. R. No. 130068, which was assigned to the Second Division of this Court, FESC imputed that the Court of Appeals
seriously erred:
1. in not holding Senen C. Gavino and the Manila Pilots' Association as the parties solely responsible
for the resulting damages sustained by the pier deliberately ignoring the established jurisprudence on
the matter;
2. in holding that the master had not exercised the required diligence demanded from him by the
circumstances at the time the incident happened;
3. in affirming the amount of damages sustained by the respondent Philippine Ports Authority despite a
strong and convincing evidence that the amount is clearly exorbitant and unreasonable;
4. in not awarding any amount of counterclaim prayed for by the petitioner in its answer; and
5. in not granting herein petitioner's claim against pilot Senen C. Gavino and Manila Pilots' Association
in the event that it be held
liable. 9
Petitioner asserts that since the MV PAVLODAR was under compulsory pilotage at the time of the incident, it was the
compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino, who was in command and had complete control in the navigation and docking of the
vessel. It is the pilot who supersedes the master for the time being in the command and navigation of a ship and his
orders must be obeyed in all respects connected with her navigation. Consequently, he was solely responsible for the
damage caused upon the pier apron, and not the owners of the vessel. It claims that the master of the boat did not
commit any act of negligence when he failed to countermand or overrule the orders of the pilot because he did not see
any justifiable reason to do so. In other words, the master cannot be faulted for relying absolutely on the competence
of the compulsory pilot. If the master does not observe that a compulsory pilot is incompetent or physically
incapacitated, the master is justified in relying on the pilot. 10
Respondent PPA, in its comment, predictably in full agreement with the ruling of respondent court on the solidary
liability of FESC, MPA and Capt. Gavino, stresses the concurrent negligence of Capt. Gavino, the harbor pilot, and
Capt. Viktor Kabankov, * shipmaster of MV Pavlodar, as the basis of their solidary liability for damages sustained by
PPA. It posits that the vessel was being piloted by Capt. Gavino with Capt. Kabankov beside him all the while on the
bridge of the vessel, as the former took over the helm of MV Pavlodar when it rammed and damaged the apron of the
pier of Berth No. 4 of the Manila International Port. Their concurrent negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of the collision between the vessel and the pier — Capt. Gavino, for his negligence in the conduct of docking
maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel; and Capt. Kabankov, for failing to countermand the orders of the harbor
pilot and to take over and steer the vessel himself in the face of imminent danger, as well as for merely relying on Capt.
Gavino during the berthing procedure. 11
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 130150, originally assigned to the Court's First Division and later transferred to the Third
Division. MPA, now as petitioner in this case, avers that respondent court's errors consisted in disregarding and
misinterpreting Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 which limits the liability of MPA. Said pilots' association
asseverates that it should not be held solidarily liable with Capt. Gavino who, as held by respondent court is only a
member, not an employee, thereof. There being no employer-employee relationship, neither can MPA be held liable for
any vicarious liability for the respective exercise of profession by its members nor be considered a joint tortfeasor as
to be held jointly and severally liable. 12 It further argues that there was erroneous reliance on Customs Administrative
Order No. 15-65 and the constitution and by-laws of MPA, instead of the provisions of the Civil Code on damages
which, being a substantive law, is higher in category than the aforesaid constitution and by-laws of a professional
organization or an administrative order which bears no provision classifying the nature of the liability of MPA for the
negligence its member pilots. 13
As for Capt. Gavino, counsel for MPA states that the former had retired from active pilotage services since July 28,
1994 and has ceased to be a member of petitioner pilots' association. He is not joined as a petitioner in this case since
his whereabouts are unknown. 14
FESC's comment thereto relied on the competence of the Court of Appeals in construing provisions of law or
administrative orders as bases for ascertaining the liability of MPA, and expressed full accord with the appellate court's
holding of solidary liability among itself, MPA and Capt. Gavino. It further avers that the disputed provisions of
Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 clearly established MPA's solidary liability. 15
On the other hand, public respondent PPA, likewise through representations by the Solicitor General, assumes the
same supportive stance it took in G.R. No. 130068 in declaring its total accord with the ruling of the Court of Appeals
that MPA is solidarily liable with Capt. Gavino and FESC for damages, and in its application to the fullest extent of the
provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 in relation to MPA's constitution and by-laws which spell out the
conditions of and govern their respective liabilities. These provisions are clear and unambiguous as regards MPA's
liability without need for interpretation or construction. Although Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 is a mere
regulation issued by an administrative agency pursuant to delegated legislative authority to fix details to implement the
law, it is legally binding and has the same statutory force as any valid statute. 16
Upon motion 17 by FESC dated April 24, 1998 in G.R. No. 130150, said case was consolidated with G.R. No. 130068. 18
 69

Prefatorily, on matters of compliance with procedural requirements, it must be mentioned that the conduct of the
respective counsel for FESC and PPA leaves much to be desired, to the displeasure and disappointment of this Court.
Sec. 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 19 incorporates the former Circular No. 28-91 which provided for
what has come to be known as the certification against forum shopping as an additional requisite for petitions filed
with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, aside from the other requirements contained in pertinent provisions
of the Rules of Court therefor, with the end in view of preventing the filing of multiple complaints involving the same
issues in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof or any other tribunal or agency.
More particularly, the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42 provides:
x x x           x x x          x x x
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under oath that he has not
theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or
proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action
or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different
divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid
courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. (Emphasis ours.)
For petitions for review filed before the Supreme Court, Section 4(e), Rule 45 specifically requires that such
petition shall contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of Section
2, Rule 42.
The records show that the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario through its associate, Atty. Herbert A. Tria, is the
counsel of record for FESC in both G.R. No. 130068 and G.R. No. 130150.
G.R. No. 130068, which is assigned to the Court's Second Division, commenced with the filing by FESC through
counsel on August 22, 1997 of a verified motion for extension of time to file its petition for thirty (30) days from August
28, 1997 or until September 27, 1997. 20 Said motion contained the following certification against forum
shopping 21 signed by Atty. Herbert A. Tria as affiant:
CERTIFICATION
AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING
I/we hereby certify that I/we have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same
issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; that to the best of
my own knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; that if I/we should thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency, I/we undertake to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to this Honorable
Court.
This motion having been granted, FESC subsequently filed its petition on September 26, 1997, this time bearing
a "verification and certification against forum-shopping" executed by one Teodoro P. Lopez on September 24,
1997, 22 to wit:
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION
AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING
in compliance with Section 4(e), Rule 45 in relation
to Section 2, Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
I, Teodoro P. Lopez, of legal age, after being duly sworn, depose and state:
1. That I am the Manager, Claims Department of Filsov Shipping Company, the local agent of petitioner
in this case.
2. That I have caused the preparation of this Petition for Review on  Certiorari.
3. That I have read the same and the allegations therein contained are true and correct based on the
records of this case.
4. That I certify that petitioner has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same
issues in the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, that to the best of my
own knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals
or any other tribunal or agency, that if I should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has
been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency, I undertake to report the fact within five (5) days therefrom to this Honorable Court. (Italics
supplied for emphasis.)
Reviewing the records, we find that the petition filed by MPA in G.R. No. 130150 then pending with the Third Division
was duly filed on August 29, 1997 with a copy thereof furnished on the same date by registered mail to counsel for
FESC. 23 Counsel of record for MPA. Atty. Jesus P. Amparo, in his verification accompanying said petition dutifully
revealed to the Court that —
x x x           x x x          x x x
3. Petitioner has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in this
Honorable Court, the Court of Appeals or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency, but to the best of his knowledge, there is an action or proceeding pending in this Honorable
Court, entitled Far Eastern Shipping Co., Petitioner, vs. Philippine Ports Authority and Court of Appeals
 70

with a Motion for Extension of time to file Petition For Review by Certiorari filed sometime on August
18, 1987. If undersigned counsel will come to know of any other pending action or claim filed or
pending he undertakes to report such fact within five (5) days to this Honorable Court. 24 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Inasmuch as MPA's petition in G.R. No. 130150 was posted by registered mail on August 29, 1997 and taking judicial
notice of the average period of time it takes local mail to reach its destination, by reasonable estimation it would be fair
to conclude that when FESC filed its petition in G.R. No. 130068 on September 26, 1997, it would already have received
a copy of the former and would then have knowledge of the pendency of the other petition initially filed with the First
Division. It was therefore incumbent upon FESC to inform the Court of that fact through its certification against forum
shopping. For failure to make such disclosure, it would appear that the aforequoted certification accompanying the
petition in G.R. No. 130068 is defective and could have been a ground for dismissal thereof.
Even assuming that FESC had not yet received its copy of MPA's petition at the time it filed its own petition and
executed said certification, its signatory did state "that if I should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding
has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency, I
undertake to report the fact within five (5) days therefrom to this Honorable Court." 25 Scouring the records page by
page in this case, we find that no manifestation concordant with such undertaking was then or at any other time
thereafter ever filed by FESC nor was there any attempt to bring such matter to the attention of the Court. Moreover, it
cannot feign non-knowledge of the existence of such other petition because FESC itself filed the motion for
consolidation in G.R. No. 130150 of these two cases on April 24, 1998.
It is disturbing to note that counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario, displays an unprofessional
tendency of taking the Rules for granted, in this instance exemplified by its pro forma compliance therewith but
apparently without full comprehension of and with less than faithful commitment to its undertakings to this Court in the
interest of just, speedy and orderly administration of court proceedings.
As between the lawyer and the courts, a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. 26 He is an officer of
the court exercising a privilege which is indispensable in the administration of justice. 27 Candidness, especially
towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only
complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. 28 Candor in all dealings is the very essence of
honorable membership in the legal profession. 29 More specifically, a lawyer is obliged to observe the rules of
procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. 30 It behooves a lawyer, therefore, to exert every effort
and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. 31 Being an officer of the court, a
lawyer has a responsibility in the proper administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance
its ends — the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of
final judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid any unethical or
improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.32
Sad to say, the members of said law firm sorely failed to observe their duties as responsible members of the Bar. Their
actuations are indicative of their predisposition to take lightly the avowed duties of officers of the Court to promote
respect for law and for legal processes. 33 We cannot allow this state of things to pass judicial muster.
In view of the fact that at around the time these petitions were commenced, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure had just
taken effect, the Court treated infractions of the new Rules then with relative liberality in evaluating full compliance
therewith. Nevertheless, it would do well to remind all concerned that the penal provisions of Circular No. 28-91 which
remain operative provides,  inter alia:
3. Penalties. —
x x x           x x x          x x x
(c) The submission of a false certification under Par. 2 of the Circular shall likewise constitute
contempt of court, without prejudice to the filing of criminal action against the guilty party. The lawyer
may also be subjected to disciplinary proceedings.
It must be stressed that the certification against forum shopping ordained under the Rules is to be executed by
the petitioner, and not by counsel. Obviously it is the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional
services have been retained for a particular case, who is in the best position to know whether he or it actually filed or
caused the filing of a petition in that case. Hence, a certification against forum shopping by counsel is a defective
certification. It is clearly equivalent to non-compliance with the requirement under Section 2, Rule 42 in relation to
Section 4, Rule 45, and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of the petition.
Hence, the initial certification appended to the motion for extension of time to file petition in G.R. No. 130068 executed
in behalf of FESC by Atty. Tria is procedurally deficient. But considering that it was a superfluity at that stage of the
proceeding, it being unnecessary to file such a certification with a mere motion for extension, we shall disregard such
error. Besides, the certification subsequently executed by Teodoro P. Lopez in behalf of FESC cures that defect to a
certain extent, despite the inaccuracies earlier pointed out. In the same vein, we shall consider the verification signed
in behalf of MPA by its counsel, Atty. Amparo, in G.R. No. 130150 as substantial compliance inasmuch as it served the
purpose of the Rules of informing the Court of the pendency of another action or proceeding involving the same
issues.
It bears stressing that procedural rules are instruments in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They
should be used to achieve such end and not to derail it. 34
 71

Counsel for PPA did not make matters any better. Despite the fact that, save for the Solicitor General at the time, the
same legal team of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG, for short) composed of Assistant Solicitor General Roman
G. Del Rosario and Solicitor Luis F. Simon, with the addition of Assistant Solicitor General Pio C. Guerrero very much
later in the proceedings, represented PPA throughout the appellate proceedings in both G.R. No. 130068 and G.R. No.
130150 and was presumably fully acquainted with the facts and issues of the case, it took the OSG an inordinately and
almost unreasonably long period of time to file its comment, thus unduly delaying the resolution of these cases. It took
several changes of leadership in the OSG — from Silvestre H. Bello III to Romeo C. dela Cruz and, finally, Ricardo P.
Galvez — before the comment in behalf of PPA was finally filed.
In G.R. No. 130068, it took eight (8) motions for extension of time totaling 210 days, a warning that no further
extensions shall be granted, and personal service on the Solicitor General himself of the resolution requiring the filing
of such comment before the OSG indulged the Court with the long required comment on July 10, 1998. 35 This, despite
the fact that said office was required to file its comment way back on November 12, 1997. 36 A closer scrutiny of the
records likewise indicates that petitoner FESC was not even furnished a copy of said comment as required by Section
5, Rule 42. Instead, a copy thereof was inadvertently furnished to MPA which, from the point of view of G.R. No. 130068,
was a non-party. 37 The OSG fared slightly better in G.R. No. 130150 in that it took only six (6) extensions, or a total of
180 days, before the comment was finally filed. 38 And while it properly furnished petitioner MPA with a copy of its
comment, it would have been more desirable and expedient in this case to have furnished its therein co-respondent
FESC with a copy thereof, if only as a matter of professional courtesy. 39
This undeniably dilatory disinclination of the OSG to seasonably file required pleadings constitutes deplorable
disservice to the tax-paying public and can only be categorized as censurable inefficiency on the part of the
government law office. This is most certainly professionally unbecoming of the OSG.
Another thing that baffles the Court is why the OSG did not take the inititive of filing a motion for consolidation in either
G.R. No. 130068 or G.R. No. 130150, considering its familiarity with the background of the case and if only to make its
job easier by having to prepare and file only one comment. It could not have been unaware of the pendency of one or
the other petition because, being counsel for respondent in both cases, petitioner is required to furnish it with a copy
of the petition under pain of dismissal of the petition for failure otherwise. 40
Besides, in G.R. 130068, it prefaces its discussions thus —
Incidentally, the Manila Pilots' Association (MPA), one of the defendants-appellants in the case before
the respondent Court of Appeals, has taken a separate appeal from the said decision to this Honorable
Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 130150 and entitled "Manila Pilots' Association, Petitioner,
versus Philippine Ports Authority and Far Eastern Shipping Co., Respondents." 41
Similarly, in G.R. No. 130150, it states —
Incidentally, respondent Far Eastern Shipping Co. (FESC) had also taken an appeal from the said
decision to this Honorable Court, docketed as G.R. No. 130068, entitled "Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs.
Court of Appeals and Philippine Ports Authority." 42
We find here a lackadaisical attitude and complacency on the part of the OSG in the handling of its cases and an
almost reflexive propensity to move for countless extensions, as if to test the patience of the Court, before favoring it
with the timely submission of required pleadings.
It must be emphasized that the Court can resolve cases only as fast as the respective parties in a case file the
necessary pleadings. The OSG, by needlessly extending the pendency of these cases through its numerous motions
for extension, came very close to exhausting this Court's forbearance and has regrettably fallen short of its duties as
the People's Tribune.
The OSG is reminded that just like other members of the Bar, the canons under the Code of Professional Responsibility
apply with equal force on lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. 43 These ethical duties
are rendered even more exacting as to them because, as government counsel, they have the added duty to abide by
the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics in public service. 44 Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the
OSG, as part of the government bureaucracy, to perform and discharge its duties with the highest degree of
professionalism, intelligence and skill 45 and to extend prompt, courteous and adequate service to the public. 46
Now, on the merits of the case. After a judicious examination of the records of this case, the pleadings filed, and the
evidence presented by the parties in the two petitions, we find no cogent reason to reverse and set aside the
questioned decision. While not entirely a case of first impression, we shall discuss the issues seriatim and,
correlatively by way of a judicial once-over, inasmuch as the matters raised in both petitions beg for validation and
updating of well-worn maritime jurisprudence. Thereby, we shall write  finis to the endless finger-pointing in this
shipping mishap which has been stretched beyond the limits of judicial tolerance.
The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is under compulsory pilotage pursuant to Section 8,
Article III of Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 03-85, 47 which provides that:
Sec. 8. Compulsor Pilotage Service. — For entering a harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing through
rivers or straits within a pilotage district, as well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf, or
shifting from one berth or another, every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under
compulsory pilotage. . . .
In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties and responsibilities of the compulsory pilot and the master have
been specified by the same regulation in this wise:
 72

Sec. 11. Control of vessels and liability for damage. — On compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor
Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life
and property at ports due to his negligence or fault. He can only be absolved from liability if the
accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided he has exercised prudence and
extra diligence to prevent or minimize damage.
The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can
countermand or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on beard. In such event, any
damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the
Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without
prejudice to recourse against said Master.
Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be determined by competent
authority in appropriate proceedings in the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
Sec. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilots' Association. — The duties and responsibilities
of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows:
x x x           x x x          x x x
f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes his work as a
pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed safely; Provided, however, that his responsibility
shall cease at the moment the Master neglects or refuses to carry out hisorder.
Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 issued twenty years earlier likewise provided in Chapter I thereof for the
responsibilities of pilots:
Par. XXXIX. — A Pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes
control thereof until he leaves it anchored free from shoal: Provided, That his responsibility shall cease
at the moment the master neglects or refuses to carry out his instructions.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Par. XLIV. — Pilots shall properly and safely secure or anchor vessels under their control when
requested to do so by the master of such vessels.
I. G.R. No. 130068
Petitioner FESC faults the respondent court with serious error in not holding MPA and Capt. Gavino solely responsible
for the damages cause to the pier. It avers that since the vessel was under compulsory pilotage at the time with Capt.
Gavino in command and having exclusive control of the vessel during the docking maneuvers, then the latter should
be responsible for damages caused to the pier. 48 It likewise holds the appellate court in error for holding that the
master of the ship, Capt. Kabankov, did not exercise the required diligence demanded by the circumstances. 49
We start our discussion of the successive issues bearing in mind the evidentiary rule in American jurisprudence that
there is a presumption of fault against a moving vessel that strikes a stationary object such as a dock or navigational
aid. In admiralty, this presumption does more than merely require the ship to go forward and produce some evidence
on the presumptive matter. The moving vessel must show that it was without fault or that the collision was occasioned
by the fault of the stationary object or was the result of inevitable accident. It has been held that such vessel must
exhaust every reasonable possibility which the circumstances admit and show that in each, they did all that reasonable
care required. 50 In the absence of sufficient proof in rebuttal, the presumption of fault attaches to a moving vessel
which collides with a fixed object and makes a  prima facie case of fault against the vessel. 51 Logic and experience
support this presumption:
The common sense behind the rule makes the burden a heavy one. Such accidents simply do not
occur in the ordinary course of things unless the vessel has been mismanaged in some way. It is nor
sufficient for the respondent to produce witnesses who testify that as soon as the danger became
apparent everything possible was done to avoid an accident. The question remains, How then did the
collision occur? The answer must be either that, in spite of the testimony of the witnesses, what was
done was too little or too late or, if not, then the vessel was at fault for being in a position in which an
unavoidable collision would occur. 52
The task, therefore, in these cases is to pinpoint who was negligent — the master of the ship, the harbor pilot
or both.
A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in certain
waters. In a broad sense, the term "pilot" includes both (1) those whose duty it is to guide vessels into or out of ports,
or in particular waters and (2) those entrusted with the navigation of vessels on the high seas. 53 However, the term
"pilot" is more generally understood as a person taken on board at a particular place for the purpose of conducting a
ship through a river, road or channel, or from a port. 54
Under English and American authorities, generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the
command and navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation. He
becomes the master  pro hac vice  and should give all directions as to speed, course, stopping and reversing
anchoring, towing and the like. And when a licensed pilot is employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his
duty to insist on having effective control of the vessel, or to decline to act as pilot. Under certain systems of foreign
law, the pilot does not take entire charge of the vessel, but is deemed merely the adviser of the master, who retains
command and control of the navigation even in localities where pilotage is compulsory. 55
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It is quite common for states and localities to provide for compulsory pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted
requiring vessels approaching their ports, with certain exceptions, to take on board pilots duly licensed under local
law. The purpose of these laws is to create a body of seamen thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to pilot vessels
seeking to enter or depart, and thus protect life and property from the dangers of navigation. 56
In line with such established doctrines, Chapter II of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 prescribes the rules for
compulsory pilotage in the covered pilotage districts, among which is the Manila Pilotage District,
viz. —
PARAGRAPH I. — Pilotage for entering a harbor and anchoring thereat, as well as docking and
undocking in any pier or shifting from one berth to another shall be compulsory, except Government
vessels and vessels of foreign governments entitled to courtesy, and other vessels engaged solely in
river or harbor work, or in a daily ferry service between ports which shall be exempt from compulsory
pilotage provisions of these regulations: provided, however, that compulsory pilotage shall not apply
in pilotage districts whose optional pilotage is allowed under these regulations.
Pursuant thereto, Capt. Gavino was assigned to pilot MV Pavlodar into Berth 4 of the Manila International Port. Upon
assuming such office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally accepted high standards of care and
diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular
waters over which his license extends superior to and more to be trusted than that of the master. 57 A pilot 57 should
have a thorough knowledge of general and local regulations and physical conditions affecting the vessel in his charge
and the waters for which he is licensed, such as a particular harbor or river.
He is not held to the highest possible degree of skill and care, but must have and exercise the ordinary skill and care
demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown by an expert in his profession. Under extraordinary
circumstancesm, a pilot must exercise extraordinary care. 58
In Atlee vs. The Northwesrern Union Packet Company. 59 Mr. Justice Miller spelled out in great detail the duties of a
pilot:
. . . (T)he pilot of a river steamer, like the harbor pilot, is selected for his personal knowledge of the
topography through which he steers his vessel. In the long course of a thousand miles in one of these
rivers, he must be familiar with the appearance of the shore on each side of the river as he goes along.
Its banks, towns, its landings, its houses and trees, are all landmarks by which he steers his vessel.
The compass is of little use to him. He must know where the navigable channel is, in its relation to all
these external objects, especially in the night. He must also be familiar with all dangers that are
permanently located in the course of the river, as sand-bars, snags, sunken rocks or trees or
abandoned vessels orbarges. All this he must know and remember and avoid. To do this, he must be
constantly informed of the changes in the current of the river, of the sand-bars newly made,of logs or
snags, or other objects newly presented, against which his vessel might be injured.
x x x           x x x          x x x
It may be said that this is exacting a very high order of ability in a pilot. But when we consider the value
of the lives and property committed to their control, for in this they are absolute masters, the high
compensation they receive, the care which Congress has taken to secure by rigid and frequent
examinations and renewal of licenses, this very class of skill, we do not think we fix the standard too
high.
Tested thereby, we affirm respondent court's finding that Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to such strict standard of
care and diligence required of pilots in the performance of their duties. Witness this testimony of Capt. Gavino:
Court: You have testified before that the reason why the vessel bumped the pier was
because the anchor was not released immediately or as soon as you have given the
order. Do you remember having srated that?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q And you gave this order to the captain of the vessel?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q By that testimony, you are leading the Court to understand that if that anchor was
released immediately at the time you gave the order, the incident would not have
happened. Is that correct?
A Yes, sir, but actually it was only a presumption on my part because there was a
commotion between the officers who are in charge of the dropping of the anchor and
the captain. I could not understand their language, it was in Russian, so I presumed the
anchor was not dropped on time.
Q So, you are not sure whether it was really dropped on time or not?
A I am not sure, your Honor.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q You are not even sure what could have caused the incident. What factor could have
caused the incident?
A Well, in this case now, because either the anchor was not dropped on time or the
anchor did not hold, that was the cause of the incident, your Honor. 60
 74

It is disconcertingly riddled with too much incertitude and manifests a seeming indifference for the possibly injurious
consequences his commands as pilot may have. Prudence required that he, as pilot, should have made sure that his
directions were promptly and strictly followed. As correctly noted by the trial court —
Moreover, assuming that he did indeed give the command to drop the anchor on time, as pilot he
should have seen to it that the order was carried out, and he could have done this in a number of ways,
one of which was to inspect the bow of the vessel where the anchor mechanism was installed. Of
course, Captain Gavino makes reference to a commotion among the crew members which supposedly
caused the delay in the execution of the command. This account was reflected in the pilot's report
prepared four hours later, but Capt. Kavankov, while not admitting whether or not such a commotion
occurred, maintained that the command to drop anchor was followed "immediately and precisely."
Hence, the Court cannot give much weight or consideration to this portion of Gavino's testimony." 61
An act may be negligent if it is done without the competence that a reasonable person in the position of the actor
would recognize as necessary to prevent it from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to another. 62 Those who
undertake any work calling for special skills are required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do but also
possess a standard minimum of special knowledge and ability. 63
Every man who offers his services to another, and is employed, assumes to exercise in the employment such skills he
possesses, with a reasonable degree of diligence. In all these employments where peculiar skill is requisite, if one
offers his services he is understood as holding himself out to the public as possessing the degree of skill commonly
possessed by others in the same employment, and if his pretensions are unfounded he commits a species of fraud on
every man who employs him in reliance on his public profession. 64
Furthermore, there is an obligation on all persons to take the care which, under ordinary circumstances of the case, a
reasonable and prudent man would take, and the omission of that care constitutes negligence. 65 Generally, the degree
of care required is graduated according to the danger a person or property attendant upon the activity which the actor
pursues or the instrumentality which he uses. The greater the danger the greater the degree of care required. What is
ordinary under extraordinary of conditions is dictated by those conditions; extraordinary risk demands extraordinary
care. Similarly, the more imminent the danger, the higher the degree of care. 66
We give our imprimatur to the bases for the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Capt. Gavino was indeed negligent
in the performance of his duties:
x x x           x x x          x x x
. . . As can be gleaned from the logbook, Gavino ordered the left anchor and two (2) shackles dropped
at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. He ordered the engines of the vessel stopped at 8:31 o'clock. By
then,Gavino must have realized that the anchor did not hit a hard object and was not clawed so as to
reduce the momentum of the vessel. In point of fact, the vessel continued travelling towards the pier at
the same speed. Gavino failed to react, At 8:32 o'clock, the two (2) tugboats began to push the stern
part of the vessel from the port side bur the momentum of the vessel was not contained. Still, Gavino
did not react. He did not even order the other anchor and two (2) more shackles dropped to arrest the
momentum of the vessel. Neither did he order full-astern. It was only at 8:34 o'clock, or four (4)
minutes, after the anchor was dropped that Gavino reacted. But his reaction was even (haphazard)
because instead of arresting fully the momentum of the vessel with the help of the tugboats, Gavino
ordered merely "half-astern". It took Gavino another minute to order a "full-astern". By then, it was too
late. The vessel's momentum could no longer be arrested and, barely a minute thereafter, the bow of
the vessel hit the apron of the pier. Patently, Gavino miscalculated. He failed to react and undertake
adequate measures to arrest fully the momentum of the vessel after the anchor failed to claw to the
seabed. When he reacted, the same was even (haphazard). Gavino failed to reckon the bulk of the
vessel, its size and its cargo. He erroneously believed that only one (1) anchor would suffice and even
when the anchor failed to claw into the seabed or against a hard object in the seabed, Gavino failed to
order the other anchor dropped immediately. His claim that the anchor was dropped when the vessel
was only 1,000 feet from the pier is but a belated attempt to extricate himself from the quagmire of his
own insouciance and negligence. In sum, then, Appellants' claim that the incident was caused by
"force majeure" is barren of factual basis.
x x x           x x x          x x x
The harbor pilots are especially trained for this job. In the Philippines, one may not be a harbor pilot
unless he passed the required examination and training conducted then by the Bureau of Custom,
under Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65, now under the Philippine Ports Authority under PPA
Administrative Order 63-85, Paragraph XXXIX of the Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 provides
that "the pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of the vessel from the time he assumes control
thereof, until he leaves it anchored free from shoal: Provided, that his responsibility shall cease at
the.moment the master neglects or refuse(s) to carry out his instructions." The overall direction
regarding the procedure for docking and undocking the vessel emanates from the harbor pilot. In the
present recourse, Gavino failed to live up to his responsibilities and exercise reasonable care or that
degree of care required by the exigencies of the occasion. Failure on his part to exercise the degree of
care demanded by the circumstances is negligence (Reese versus Philadelphia & RR Co. 239 US 363,
60 L ed. 384, 57 Am Jur, 2d page 418). 67
 75

This affirms the findings of the trial court regarding Capt. Gavino's negligence:
This discussion should not however, divert the court from the fact that negligence in manuevering the
vessel must be attributed to Capt. Senen Gavino. He was an experienced pilot and by this time should
have long familiarized himself with the depth of the port and the distance he could keep between the
vessel and port in order to berth safely. 68
The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less responsible for the allision. His
unconcerned lethargy as master of the ship in the face of troublous exigence constitutes negligence.
While it is indubitable that in exercising his functions a pilot is in sole command of the ship 69 and supersedes the
master for the time being in the command and navigation of a ship and that he becomes master  pro hac vice of a
vessel piloted by him, 70 there is overwhelming authority to the effect that the master does not surrender his vessel to
the pilot and the pilot is not the master. The master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding the presence of a
pilot. There are occasions when the master may and should interfere and even displace the pilot, as when the pilot is
obviously incompetent or intoxicated and the circumstances may require the master to displace a compulsory pilot
because of incompetency or physical incapacity. If, however, the master does nor observe that a compulsory pilot is
incompetent or physically incapacitated, the master is justified in relying on the pilot, but not blindly. 71
The master is not wholly absolved from his duties while a pilot is on board his vessel, and may advise with or offer
suggestions to him. He is still in command of the vessel, except so far as her navigation is concerned, and must cause
the ordinary work of the vessel to be properly carried on and the usual precaution taken. Thus, in particular, he is
bound to see that there is sufficient watch on deck, and that the men are attentive to their duties, also that engines are
stopped, towlines cast off, and the anchors clear and ready to go at the pilot's order. 72
A perusal of Capt. Kabankov's testimony makes it apparent that he was remiss in the discharge of his duties as master
of the ship, leaving the entire docking procedure up to the pilot, instead of maintaining watchful vigilance over this
risky maneuver:
Q Will you please tell us whether you have the right to intervene in docking of your ship
in the harbor?
A No sir, I have no right to intervene in time of docking, only in case there is imminent
danger to the vessel and to the pier.
Q Did you ever intervene during the time that your ship was being docked by Capt.
Gavino?
A No sir, I did not intervene at the time when the pilot was docking my ship.
Q Up to the time it was actually docked at the pier, is that correct?
A No sir, I did not intervene up to the very moment when the vessel was docked.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Atty. Del Rosario (to the witness)
Q Mr. Witness, what happened, if any, or was there anything unusual that happened
during the docking?
A Yes sir, our ship touched ihe pier and the pier was damaged.
Court (to the witness)
Q When you said touched the pier, are you leading the court to understand that your
ship bumped the pier?
A I believe that my vessel only touched the pier but the impact was very weak.
Q Do you know whether the pier was damaged as a result of that slight or weak
impact?
A Yes sir, after the pier was damaged.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q Being most concerned with the safety of your vessel, in the maneuvering of your
vessel to the port, did you observe anything irregular in the maneuvering by Capt.
Gavino at the time he was trying to cause the vessel to be docked at the pier?
A You mean the action of Capt. Gavino or his condition?
Court:
Q Not the actuation that conform to the safety maneuver of the ship to the harbor?
A No sir, it was a usual docking.
Q By that statement of yours, you are leading the court to understand that there was
nothing irregular in the docking of the ship?
A Yes sir, during the initial period of the docking, there was nothing unusual that
happened.
Q What about in the last portion of the docking of the ship, was there anything unusual
or abnormal that happened?
A None Your Honor, I believe that Capt. Gavino thought that the anchor could keep or
hold the vessel.
Q You want us to understand, Mr. Witness, that the dropping of the anchor of the
vessel was nor timely?
 76

A I don't know the depth of this port but I think, if the anchor was dropped earlier and
with more shackles, there could not have been an incident.
Q So you could not precisely tell the court that the dropping of the anchor was timery
because you are not well aware of the seabed, is that correct?
A Yes sir, that is right.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q Alright, Capt. Kavankov, did you come to know later whether the anchor held its
ground so much so that the vessel could not travel?
A It is difficult for me to say definitely. I believe that the anchor did not hold the ship.
Q You mean you don't know whether the anchor blades stuck to the ground to stop the
ship from further moving?
A Yes sir, it is possible.
Q What is possible?
A I think, the 2 shackles were not enough to hold the vessel.
Q Did you know that the 2 shackles were dropped?
A Yes sir, I knew that.
Q If you knew that the shackles were not enough to hold the ship, did you not make any
protest to the pilot?
A No sir, after the incident, that was my assumption.
Q Did you come to know later whether that presumption is correct?
A I still don't know the ground in the harbor or the depths.
Q So from the beginning, you were not competent whether the 2 shackles were also
dropped to hold the ship?
A No sir, at the beginning, I did not doubt it because I believe Capt. Gavino to be an
experienced pilot and he should be more aware as to the depths of the harbor and the
ground and I was confident in his actions.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Solicitor Abad (to the witness)
Q Now, you were standing with the pilot on the bridge of the vessel before the inicident
happened, were you not?
A Yes sir, all the time, I was standing with the pilot.
Q And so whatever the pilot saw, you could also see from that point of view?
A That is right.
Q Whatever the piler can read from the panel of the bridge, you also could read, is that
correct?
A What is the meaning of panel?
Q All indications necessary for men on the bridge to be informed of the movements of
the ship?
A That is right.
Q And whatever sound the captain . . . Capt. Gavino would hear from the bridge, you
could also hear?
A That is right.
Q Now, you said that when the command to lower the anchor was given, it was obeyed,
is that right?
A This command was executed by the third mate and boatswain.
Court (to the witness)
Q Mr. Witness, earlier in today's hearing, you said that you did not intervene with the
duties of the pilot and that, in your opinion, you can only intervene if the ship is placed
in imminent danger, is that correct?
A That is right, I did say that.
Q In your observation before the incident actually happened, did you observe whether
or not the ship, before the actual incident, the ship was placed in imminent danger?
A No sir, I did not observe.
Q By that answer, are you leading the court to understand that because you did not
intervene and because you believed that it was your duty to intervene when the vessel
is placed in imminent danger to which you did not observe any imminent danger
thereof, you have not intervened in any manner to the command of the pilot?
A That is right, sir.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q Assuminp that you disagreed with the pilot regarding the step being taken by the
pilot in maneuvering the vessel, whose command will prevail, in case of imminent
danger to the vessel?
 77

A I did nor consider the situation as having an imminent danger. I believed that the
vessel will dock alongside the pier.
Q You want us to understand that you did not see an imminent danger to your ship, is
that what you mean?
A Yes sir, up to the very last moment, I believed that there was no imminent danger.
Q Because of that, did you ever intervene in the command of the pilot?
A Yes sir, I did not intervene because I believed that the command of the pilot to be
correct.
Solicitor Abad (to the witness)
Q As a captain of M/V Pavlodar, you consider docking maneuvers a serious matter, is it
not?
A Yes sir, that is right.
Q Since it affects not only the safety of the port or pier, but also the safety of the vessel
and the cargo, is it not?
A That is right.
Q So that, I assume that you were watching Capt. Gavino very closely at the time he
was making his commands?
A I was close to him, I was hearing his command and being executed.
Q And that you were also alert for any possible mistakes he might commit in the
maneuvering of the vessel?
A Yes sir, that is right.
Q But at no time during the maneuver did you issue order contrary to the orders Capt.
Gavino made?
A No sir.
Q So that you were in full accord with all of Capt. Gavino's orders?
A Yes sir.
Q Because, otherwise, you would have issued order that would supersede his own
order?
A In that case, I should t,ke him away from his command or remove the command from
him.
Court (to the witness)
Q You were in full accord with the steps being taken by Capt. Gavino because you
relied on his knowledge, on his familiarity of the seabed and shoals and other
surroundings or conditions under the sea, is that correct?
A Yes sir, that is right.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Solicitor Abad (to the witness)
Q And so after the anchors were ordered dropped and they did not take hold of the
seabed, you were alerted that there was danger already on hand?
A No sir, there was no imminent danger to the vessel.
Q Do you mean to tell us that even if the anchor was supposed to take hold of the
bottom and it did not, there was no danger to the ship?
A Yes sir, because the anchor dragged on the ground later.
Q And after a few moments when the anchor should have taken hold the seabed bur
not done (sic), as you expected, you already were alerted that there was danger to the
ship, is that correct?
A Yes sir, I was alerted but there was no danger.
Q And you were alerted that somebody was wrong?
A Yes sir, I was alerted.
Q And this alert vou assumed was the ordinary alertness that you have for normal
docking?
A Yes sir, I mean that it was usual condition of any man in time of docking to be alert.
Q And that is the same alertness when the anchor did not hold onto the ground, is that
correct?
A Yes sir, me and Capt. Gavino (thought) that the anchor will hold the ground.
Q Since, as you said that you agreed all the while with the orders of Capt. Gavino, you
also therefore agreed with him in his failure to take necessary precaution against the
eventuality that the anchor will not hold as expected?
Atty. Del Rosario:
May I ask that the question . . .
Solicitor Abad:
Never mind, I will reform the question.
x x x           x x x          x x x
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Solicitor Abad (to the witness)

Q Is it not a fact that the vessel bumped the pier?
A That is right, it bumped the pier.
Q For the main reason that the anchor of the vessel did not hold the ground as
expected?
A Yes sir, that is my opinion. 73
Further, on redirect examination, Capt. Kabankov fortified his apathetic assessment of the situation:
Q Now, after the anchor was dropped, was there any point in time that you felt that the
vessel was in imminent danger.
A No, at that time, the vessel was not in imminent, danger, sir. 74
This cavalier appraisal of the event by Capt. Kabankov is disturbingly antipodal to Capt. Gavino's anxious assessment
of the situation:
Q When a pilot is on board a vessel, it is the piler's command which should be followed
at that moment until the vessel is, or goes to port or reaches port?
A Yes, your Honor, but it does not take away from the Captain his prerogative to
countermand the pilot.
Q In what way?
A In any case, which he thinks the pilot is not maneuvering correctly, the Captain
always has the prerogative to countermand the pilot's order.
Q But insofar as competence, efficiency and functional knowledee of the seabed which
are vital or decisive in the safety (sic) bringing of a vessel to the port, he is not
competent?
A Yes, your Honor. That is why they hire a pilot in an advisory capacity, but still, the
safety of the vessel rest(s) upon the Captain, the Master of the vessel.
Q In this case, there was not a disagreement between you and the Captain of the vessel
in the bringing of the vessel to port?
A No, your Honor.
Court:
May proceed.
Atty. Catris:
In fact, the Master of the vessel testified here that he was all along in conformity with
the orders you, gave to him, and, as matter of fact, as he said, he obeyed all your
orders. Can you tell, if in the course of giving such normal orders for the saf(e) docking
of the MV Pavlodar, do you remember of any instance that the Master of the vessel did
not obey your command for the safety docking of the MV Pavlodar?
Atty. del Rosario:
Already answered, he already said yes sir.
Court:
Yes, he has just answered yes sir to the Court that there was no disagreement insofar
as the bringing of the vessel safely to the port.
Atty. Catris:
But in this instance of docking of the MV Pavlodar, do you remember of a time during
the course of the docking that the MV Pavlodar was in imminent danger of bumping the
pier?
A When we were about more than one thousand meters from the pier, I think, the
anchor was not holding, so I immediately ordered to push the bow at a fourth quarter,
at the back of the vessel in order to swing the bow away from the pier and at the same
time, I ordered for a full astern of the engine. 75
These conflicting reactions can only imply, at the very least, unmindful disregard or, worse, neglectful
relinquishment of duty by the shipmaster, tantamount to negligence.
The findings of the trial court on this aspect is noteworthy:
For, while the pilot Gavino may indeed have been charged with the task of docking the vessel in the
berthing space, it is undisputed that the master of the vessel had the corresponding duty to
countermand any of the orders made by the pilot, and even maneuver the vessel himself, in case of
imminent danger to the vessel and the port.
In fact, in his testimony, Capt. Kavankov admitted that all throughour the man(eu)vering procedures he
did not notice anything was going wrong, and even observed that the order given to drop the anchor
was done at the proper time. He even ventured the opinion that the accident occurred because the
anchor failed to take hold but that this did not alarm him because.there was still time to drop a second
anchor.
Under normal circumstances, the abovementioned facts would have caused the master of a vessel to
take charge of the situation and see to the man(eu)vering of the vessel himself. Instead, Capt.
 79

Kavankov chose to rely blindly upon his pilot, who by this time was proven ill-equipped to cope with
the situation.
x x x           x x x          x x x
It is apparent that Gavino was negligent but Far Eastern's employee Capt. Kavankov was no lesss
responsible for as master of the vessel he stood by the pilot during the man(eu)vering procedures and
was privy to every move the latter made, as well as the vessel's response to each of the commands.
His choice to rely blindly upon the pilot's skills, to the point that despite being appraised of a notice of
alert he continued to relinquish control of the vessel to Gavino, shows indubitably that he was not
performing his duties with the diligence required of him and therefore may be charged with negligence
along with defend;int Gavino. 76
As correctly affirmed by the Court of Appeals —
We are in full accord with the findings and disquisitions of the Court a quo.
In the present recourse, Captain Viktor Kavankov had been a mariner for thirty-two years before the
incident. When Gavino was (in) the command of the vessel, Kavankov was beside Gavino, relaying the
commands or orders of Gavino to the crewmembers-officers of the vessel concerned. He was thus fully
aware of the docking maneuvers and procedure Gavino undertook to dock the vessel. Irrefragably,
Kavankov was fully aware of the bulk and size of the vessel and its cargo as well as the weight of the
vessel. Kavankov categorically admitted that, when the anchor and two (2) shackles were dropped to
the sea floor, the claws of the anchor did not hitch on to any hard object in the seabed. The momentum
of the vessel was not arrested. The use of the two (2) tugboats was insufficient. The momentum of the
vessel, although a little bit arrested, continued (sic) the vessel going straightforward with its bow
towards the port (Exhibit "A-1 ). There was thus a need for the vessel to move "full-astern" and to drop
the other anchor with another shackle or two (2), for the vessel to avoid hitting the pier. Kavankov
refused to act even as Gavino failed to act. Even as Gavino gave mere "half-astern" order, Kavankov
supinely stood by. The vessel was already about twenty (20) meters away from the pier when Gavino
gave the "full-astern" order. Even then, Kavankov did nothing to prevent the vessel from hitting the pier
simply because he relied on the competence and plan of Gavino. While the "full-astern'' maneuver
momentarily arrested the momentum of the vessel, it was, by then, too late. All along, Kavankov stood
supinely beside Gavino, doing nothing but relay the commands of Gavino. Inscrutably, then, Kavankov
was negligent.
x x x           x x x          x x x
The stark incompetence of Kavankov is competent evidence to prove the unseaworthiness of the
vessel. It has been held that the incompetence of the navigator, the master of the vessel or its crew
makes the vessel unseaworthy (Tug Ocean Prince versus United States of America, 584 F. 2nd, page
1151). Hence, the Appellant FESC is likewise liable for the damage sustained by the Appellee. 77
We find strong and well-reasoned support in time-tested American maritime jurisprudence, on which much of our laws
and jurisprudence on the matter are based, for the conclusions of the Court of Appeals adjudging both Capt. Gavino
and Capt. Kabankov negligent.
As early as 1869, the U.S. Supreme Court declared, through Mr. Justice Swayne, in The Steamship China vs.
Walsh, 78 that it is the duty of the master to interfere in cases of the pilot's intoxication or manifest incapacity, in cases
of danger which he does not foresee, and in all cases of great necessity. The master has the same power to displace
the pilot that he has to remove any subordinate officer of the vessel, at his discretion.
In 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court, this time through Mr. Justice Brown, emphatically ruled that:
Nor are rye satisfied with the conduct of the master in leaving the pilot in sole charge of the vessel.
While the pilot doubtless supersedes the master for the time being in the command and navigation of
the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation, the master is not
wholly absolved from his duties while the pilot is on board, and may advise with him, and even
displace him in case he is intoxicated or manifestly incompetent. He is still in command of the vessel,
except so far as her navigation is concerned, and bound to see that there is a sufficient watch on deck,
and that the men are attentive to their duties.
. . . (N)orwithstanding the pilot has charge, it is the duty of the master to prevent accident, and not to
abandon the vessel entirely to the pilot; but that there are certain duties he has to discharge
(notwithstanding there is a pilot on board) for the benefit of the owners. . . . that in well conducted
ships the master does not regard the presence of a duly licensed pilot in compulsory pilot waters as
freeing him from every, obligation to attend to the safety of the vessel; but that, while the master sees
that his officers and crew duly attend to the pilot's orders, he himself is bound to keep a vigilant eye on
the navigation of the vessel, and, when exceptional circumstances exist, not only to urge upon the
pilot to use every precaution, but to insist upon such being taken. 79 (Italics for emphasis.)
In Jure vs. United Fruit Co., 80 which, like the present petitions, involved compulsory pilotage, with a similar scenario
where at and prior to the time of injury, the vessel was in the charge of a pilot with the master on the bridge of the
vessel beside said pilot, the court therein ruled:
The authority of the master of a vessel is not in complete abeyance while a pilot, who is required by law
to be accepted, is in discharge of his functions. . . . It is the duty of the master to interfere in cases of
 80

the pilot's intoxication or manifest incapacity, in cases of danger which he does not foresee, and in all
cases of great necessity. The master has the same power to displace the pilot that he has to remove
any subordinate officer of the vessel. He may exercise it, or not, according to his discretion. There was
evidence to support findings that piaintiff's injury was due to the negligent operation of the Atenas, and
that the master of that vessel was negligent in failing to take action to avoid endangering a vessel
situated as the City of Canton was and persons or property thereon.
A phase of the evidence furnished support for the inferences . . . that he negligently failed to suggest to
the pilot the danger which was disclosed, and means of avoiding such danger; and that the master's
negligence in failing to give timelt admonition to the pilot proximately contributed to the injury
complained of. We are of opinion that the evidence mentioned tended to prove conduct of the pilot,
known to the master, giving rise to a case of danger or great necessity, calling for the intervention of
the master. A master of a vessel is not without fault in acquiescing in canduct of a pilot which involves
apparent and avoidable danger, whether such danger is to the vessel upon which the pilot is, or to
another vessel, or persons or property thereon or on shore. (Emphasis ours.)
Still in another case involving a nearly identical setting, the captain of a vessel alongside the compulsory pilot was
deemed to be negligent, since, in the words of the court, "he was in a position to exercise his superior authority if he
had deemed the speed excessive on the occasion in question. I think it was clearly negligent of him not to have
recognized the danger to any craft moored at Gravell Dock and that he should have directed the pilot to reduce his
speed as required by the local governmental regulations. His failure amounted to negligence and renders the
respondent liable." 81 (Emphasis supplied.) Though a compulsory pilot might be regarded as an independent
contractor, he is at all times subject to the ultimate control of the ship's master. 82
In sum, where a compulsory pilot is in charge of a ship, the master being required to permit him to navigate it, if the
master observes that the pilot is incompetent or physically incapable, then it is the dury of the master to refuse to
permit the pilot to act. But if no such reasons are present, then the master is justified in relying upon the pilot, but not
blindly. Under the circumstances of this case, if a situation arose where the master, exercising that reasonable
vigilance which the master of a ship should exercise, observed, or should have observed, that the pilot was so
navigating the vessel that she was going, or was likely to go, into danger, and there was in the exercise of reasonable
care and vigilance an opportunity for the master to intervene so as to save the ship from danger, the master should
have acted accordingly. 83 The master of a vessel must exercise a degree of vigilance commensurate with the
circumstances. 84
Inasmuch as the matter of negligence is a question of fact, 85 we defer to the findings of the trial court, especially as
this is affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 86 But even beyond that, our own evaluation is that Capt. Kabankov's shared
liability is due mainly to the fact that he failed to act when the perilous situation should have spurred him into quick
and decisive action as master of the ship. In the face of imminent or actual danger, he did not have to wait for the
happenstance to occur before countermanding or overruling the pilot. By his own admission, Capt. Kabankov
concurred with Capt. Gavino's decisions, and this is precisely the reason why he decided not to countermand any of
the latter's orders. Inasmuch as both lower courts found Capt. Gavino negligent, by expressing full agreement
therewith Capt. Kabankov was just as negligent as Capt. Gavino.
In general, a pilot is personally liable for damages caused by his own negligence or default to the owners of the vessel,
and to third parties for damages sustained in a collision. Such negligence of the pilot in the performance of duty
constitutes a maritime tort. 87 At common law, a shipowner is not liable for injuries inflicted exclusively by the
negligence of a pilot accepted by a vessel compulsorily. 88 The exemption from liability for such negligence shall apply
if the pilot is actually in charge and solely in fault. Since, a pilot is responsible only for his own personal negligence, he
cannot be held accountable for damages proximately caused by the default of others, 89 or, if there be anything which
concurred with the fault of the pilot in producing the accident, the vessel master and owners are liable.
Since the colliding vessel is  prima facie responsible, the burden of proof is upon the party claiming benefit of the
exemption from liability. It must be shown affirmatively that the pilot was at fault, and that there was no fault on the part
of the officers or crew, which might have been conducive to the damage. The fact that the law compelled the master to
take the pilot does not exonerate the vessel from liability. The parties who suffer are entitled to have their remedy
against the vessel that occasioned the damage, and are not under necessity to look to the pilot from whom redress is
not always had for compensation. The owners of the vessel are responsible to the injured party for the acts of the pilot,
and they must be left to recover the amount as well as they can against him. It cannot be maintained that the
circumstance of having a pilot on board, and acting in conformity to his directions operate as a discharge of
responsibility of the owners. 90 Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owner
are liable for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of the vessel.
Where the pilot of a vessel is not a compulsory one in the sense that the owner or master of the vessel are bound to
accept him, but is employed voluntarily, the owners of the vessel are, all the more, liable for his negligent act. 91
In the United States, the owners of a vessel are not personally liable for the negligent acts of a compulsory pilot, but by
admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a compulsory pilot is imputable to the vessel and it may be held liable
therefor in rem. Where, however, by the provisions of the statute the pilot is compulsory only in the sense that his fee
must be paid, and is not in compulsory charge of the vessel, there is no exemption from liability. Even though the pilot
is compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole cause of the injury, but the negligence of the master or crew
contributed thereto, the owners are liable. 92 But the liability of the ship in rem does not release the pilot from the
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consequences of his own negligence. 93 The rationale for this rule is that the master is not entirely absolved of
responsibility with respect to navigation when a compulsory pilot is in charge. 94
By way of validation and in light of the aforecited guidepost rulings in American maritime cases, we declare that our
rulings during the early years of this century in City of Manila vs. Gambe, 95 China Navigation Co., Ltd. vs.
Vidal, 96 and Yap Tica & Co. vs. Anderson, et al. 97 have withstood the proverbial test of time and remain good and
relevant case law to this day.
City of Manila stands for the doctrine that the pilot who was in command and complete control of a vessel, and not the
owners, must be held responsible for an accident which was solely the result of the mistake of the pilot in not giving
proper orders, and which did not result from the failure of the owners to equip the vessel with the most modern and
improved machinery. In China Navigation Co., the pilot deviated from the ordinary and safe course, without heeding the
warnings of the ship captain. It was this careless deviation that caused the vessel to collide with a pinnacle rock which,
though uncharted, was known to pilots and local navigators. Obviously, the captain was blameless. It was the
negligence of the pilot alone which was the proximate cause of the collision. The Court could not but then rule that —
The pilot in the case at bar having deviated from the usual and ordinary course followed by navigators
in passing through the strait in question, without a substantial reason, was guilty of negligence, and
that negligence having been the proximate cause of the damages, he is liable for such damages as
usually and naturally flow therefrom. . . .
. . . (T)he defendant should have known of the existence and location of the rock upon which the vessel
struck while under his control and management. . . . .
Consistent with the pronouncements in these two earlier cases, but on a slightly different tack, the Court in Yap Tico &
Co. exonerated the pilot from liability for the accident where the orders of the pilot in the handling of the ship were
disregarded by the officers and crew of the ship. According to the Court, a pilot is ". . . responsible for a full knowledge
of the channel and the navigation only so far as he can accomplish it through the officers and crew of the ship, and I
don't see chat he can be held responsible for damage when the evidence shows, as it does in this case, that the
officers and crew of the ship failed to obey his orders." Nonetheless, it is possible for a compulsory pilot and the
master of the vessel to be concurrently negligent and thus share the blame for the resulting damage as joint
tortfeasors, 98 but only under the circumstances obtaining in and demonstrated by the instant petitions.
It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an
injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than piaintiff's, is the
proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved
from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person
charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and
that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the
injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other
concurrent rortfeasor. 99 Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery
may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear
that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's
negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each
wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. 100
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total
damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury.
Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are
solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 101 of the Civil Code. 102
As for the amount of damages awarded by the trial court, we find the same to be reasonable. The testimony of Mr.
Pascual Barral, witness for PPA, on cross and redirect examination, appears to be grounded on practical
considerations:
Q So that the cost of the two additional piles as well as the (two) square meters is
already included in this P1,300,999.77.
A Yes sir, everything. It is (the) final cost already.
Q For the eight piles.
A Including the reduced areas and other reductions.
Q (A)nd the two square meters.
A Yes sir.
Q In other words, this P1,300,999.77 does not represent only for the six piles that was
damaged as well as the corresponding two piles.
A The area was corresponding, was increased by almost two in the actual payment.
That was why the contract was decreased, the real amount was P1,124,627.40 and the
final one is P1,300,999.77.
Q Yes, but that P1,300,999.77 included the additional two new posts.
A It was increased.
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Q Why was it increased?

A The original was 48 and the actual was 46.
Q Now, the damage was somewhere in 1980. It took place in 1980 and you started the
repair and reconstruction in 1982, that took almost two years?
A Yes sir.
Q May it not happen that by natural factors, the existing damage in 1980 was
aggravated for the 2 year period that the damage portion was not repaired?
A I don't think so because that area was at once marked and no vehicles can park, it
was closed.
Q Even if or even natural elements cannot affect the damage?
A Cannot, sir.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q You said in the cross-examination that there were six piles damaged by the accident,
but that in the reconstruction of the pier, PPA drove and constructed 8 piles. Will you
explain to us why there was change in the number of piles from the original number?
A In piers where the piles are withdrawn or pulled out, you cannot re-drive or drive
piles at the same point. You have to redesign the driving of the piles. We cannot drive
the piles at the same point where the piles are broken or damaged or pulled out. We
have to redesign, and you will note that in the reconstruction, we redesigned such that
it necessitated 8 plies.
Q Why not, why could you not drive the same number of piles and on the same spot?
A The original location was already disturbed. We cannot get required bearing capacity.
The area is already disturbed.
Q Nonetheless, if you drove the original number of piles, six, on different places, would
not that have sustained the same load?
A It will not suffice, sir. 103
We quote the findings of the lower court with approval.
With regards to the amount of damages that is to be awarded to plaintiff, the Court finds that the
amount of P1,053,300.00 is justified. Firstly, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur best expounded upon in
the landmark case of Republic vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corp. (21 SCRA 279) establishes the presumption
that in the ordinary course of events the ramming of the dock would not have occurred if proper care
was used.
Secondly, the various estimates and plans justify the cost of the port construction price. The new
structure constructed not only replaced the damaged one but was built of stronger materials to
forestall the possibility of any similar accidents in the future.
The Court inevitably finds that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of P1,053,300.00 which represents
actual damages caused by the damage to Berth 4 of the Manila International Port. Co-defendants Far
Eastern Shipping, Capt. Senen Gavino and Manila Pilots Association are solidariiy liable to pay this
amount to plaintiff. 104
The Solicitor General rightly commented that the adjudicated amount of damages represents the proportional
cost of repair and rehabilitation of the damaged section of the pier. 105
Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners are liable for all damages
caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the owners
or those in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages caused
to persons or property by reason of her negligent management or navigation. 106
FESC's imputation of PPA's failure to provide a safe and reliable berthing place is obtuse, not only because it appears
to be a mere afterthought, being tardily raised only in this petition, but also because there is no allegation or evidence
on record about Berth No. 4 being unsafe and unreliable, although perhaps it is a modest pier by international
standards. There was, therefore, no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in dismissing FESC's counterclaim.
II. G.R. No. 130150
This consolidated case treats on whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding MPA jointly and solidarily liable with its
member pilot. Capt. Gavino, in the absence of employer-employee relationship and in applying Customs Administrative
Order No. 15-65, as basis for the adjudged solidary liability of MPA and Capt. Gavino.
The pertinent provisions in Chapter I of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 are:
PAR. XXVII. — In all pilotage districts where pilotage is compulsory, there shall be created and
maintained by the pilots or pilots' association, in the manner hereinafter prescribed, a reserve fund
equal to P1,000.00 for each pilot thereof for the purpose of paying claims for damages to vessels or
property caused through acts or omissions of its members while rendered in compulsory pilotage
service. In Manila, the reserve fund shall be P2,000.00 for each pilot.
PAR. XXVIII. — A pilots' association shall not be liable under these regulations for damage to any
vessel, or other property, resulting from acts of a member of an association in the actual performance
of his duty for a greater amount than seventy-five per centum (75%) of its prescribed reserve fund; it
 83

being understood that if the association is held liable for an amount greater than the amount above-
stated, the excess shall be paid by the personal funds of the member concerned.
PAR. XXXI. — If a payment is made from the reserve fund of an association on account of damages
caused by a member thereof, and he shall have been found at fault, such member shall reimburse the
association in the amount so paid as soon as practicable; and for this purpose, not less than twenty-
five per centum of his dividends shall be retained each month until the full amount has been returned
to the reserve fund.
PAR. XXXIV. — Nothing in these regulations shall relieve any pilots' association or members thereof,
individually or collectively, from civil responsibility for damages to life or property resulting from the
acts of members in the performance of their duties.
Correlatively, the relevant provisions of PPA Administrative Order No. 03-85, which timery amended this applicable
maritime regulation, state:
Art. IV
Sec. 17. Pilots' Association — The Pilots in a Pilotage District shall organize themselves into a Pilots'
Association or firm, the members of which shall promulgate their own By-Laws not in conflict with the
rules and regulations promulgated by the Authority. These By-Laws shall be submitted not later than
one (1) month after the organization of the Pilots' Association for approval by the General Manager of
the Authority. Subsequent amendments thereto shall likewise be submitted for approval.
Sec. 25. Indemnity Insurance and Reserve Fund —
a) Each Pilots' Association shall collectively insure its membership at
the rate of P50,000.00 each member to cover in whole or in part any
liability arising from any accident resulting in damage to vessel(s), port
facilities and other properties and/or injury to persons or death which
any member may have caused in the course of his performance of
pilotage duties. . . . .
b) The Pilotage Association shall likewise set up and maintain a
reserve fund which shall answer for any part of the liability referred to
in the immediately preceding paragraph which is left unsatisfied by the
insurance proceeds, in the following manner:
1) Each pilot in the Association shall contribute from
his own account an amount of P4,000.00 (P6,000.00 in
the Manila Pilotage District) to the reserve fund. This
fund shall not be considered part of the capital of the
Association nor charged as an expense thereof.
2) Seventy-five percent (75 %) of the reserve fund shall
be set aside for use in the payment of damages
referred to above incurred in the actual performance of
pilots' duties and the excess shall be paid from the
personal funds of the member concerned.
x x x           x x x          x x x
5) If payment is made from the reserve fund of an
Association on account of damage caused by a
member thereof who is found at fault, he shall
reimburse the Association in the amount so paid as
soon as practicable; and for this purpose, not less than
twenty-five percentum (25 %) of his dividend shall be
retained each month until the full amount has been
returned to the reserve fund. Thereafter, the pilot
involved shall be entitled to his full dividend.
6) When the reimbursement has been completed as
prescribed in the preceding paragraph, the ten
percentum (10%) and the interest withheld from the
shares of the other pilots in accordance with paragraph
(4) hereof shall be returned to them.
c) Liability of Pilots' Association — Nothing in these regulations shall
relieve any Pilots' Association or members thereof, individually or
collectively, from any civil, administrative and/or criminal responsibility
for damages to life or property resulting from the individual acts of its
members as well as those of the Association's employees and crew in
the performance of their duties.
The Court of Appeals, while affirming the trial court's finding of solidary liability on the part of FESC, MPA and Capt.
Gavino, correctly based MPA' s liability not on the concept of employer-employee relationship between Capt. Gavino
and itself, but on the provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65:
 84

The Appellant MPA avers that, contrary to the findings and disquisitions of the Court a quo, the
Appellant Gavino was not and has never been an employee of the MPA but was only a member thereof.
The Court a quo, it is noteworthy, did not state the factual basis on which it anchored its finding that
Gavino was the employee of MPA. We are in accord with MPA's pose. Case law teaches Us that, for an
employer-employee relationship to exist, the confluence of the following elements must be established:
(1) selection and engagement of employees; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; (4)
the employer's power to control the employees with respect to the means and method by which the
work is to be performed (Ruga versus NLRC, 181 SCRA 266).
x x x           x x x          x x x
The liability of MPA for damages is not anchored on Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as erroneously
found and declared by the Court a quo but under the provisions of Customs Administrative Order No.
15-65, supra, in tandem with the by-laws of the MPA. 107
There being no employer-employee relationship, clearly Article 2180 108 of the Civil Code is inapplicable since there is
no vicarious liability of an employer to speak of. It is so stated in American law, as follows:
The well established rule is that pilot associations are immune to vicarious liability for the tort of their
members. They are not the employer of their members and exercise no control over them once they
take the helm of the vessel. They are also not partnerships because the members do not function as
agents for the association or for each other. Pilots' associations are also not liable for negligently
assuring the competence of their members because as professional associations they made no
guarantee of the professional conduct of their members to the general public. 109
Where under local statutes and regulations, pilot associations lack the necessary legal incidents of responsibility, they
have been held not liable for damages caused by the default of a member pilot. 110 Whether or not the members of a
pilots' association are in legal effect a copartnership depends wholly on the powers and duties of the members in
relation to one another under the provisions of the governing statutes and regulations. The relation of a pilot to his
association is not that of a servant to the master, but of an associate assisting and participating in a common purpose.
Ultimately, the rights and liabilities between a pilots' association and an individual member depend largely upon the
constitution, articles or by-laws of the association, subject to appropriate government regulations. 111
No reliance can be placed by MPA on the cited American rulings as to immunity from liability of a pilots' association in
ljght of existing positive regulation under Philippine law. The Court of Appeals properly applied the clear and
unequivocal provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65. In doing so, it was just being consistent with its
finding of the non-existence of employer-employee relationship between MPA and Capt. Gavino which precludes the
application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
True. Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 does not categorically characterize or label MPA's liability as solidary in
nature. Nevertheless, a careful reading and proper analysis of the correlated provisions lead to the conclusion that
MPA is solidarily liable for the negligence of its member pilots, without prejudice to subsequent reimbursement from
the pilot at fault.
Art. 1207 of the Civil Code provides that there is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when
the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity. Plainly, Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65, which as an
implementing rule has the force and effect of law, can validly provide for solidary liability.We note the Solicitor
General's comment hereon, to wit:
. . . Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 may be a mere rule and regulation issued by an
administrative agency pursuant to a delegated authority to fix "the details" in the execution or
enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. Nonetheless, said administrative order, which adds to
the procedural or enforcing provisions of substantive law, is legally binding and receives the same
statutory force upon going into effect. In that sense, it has equal, not lower, statutory force and effect
as a regular statute passed by the legislature. 112
MPA's prayer for modification of the appellate court's decision under review by exculpating petitioner MPA "from
liability beyond seventy-five percent (75 %) of Reserve Fund" is unnecessary because the liability of MPA under Par.
XXVIII of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 is in fact limited to seventy-five percent (75 %) of its prescribed
reserve fund, any amount of liability beyond that being for the personal account of the erring pilot and subject to
reimbursement in case of a finding of fault by the member concerned. This is clarified by the Solicitor General:
Moreover, contrary to petitioner's pretensions, the provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-
65 do not limit the liability of petitioner as a pilots' association to an absurdly small amount of seventy-
five per centum (75 %) of the member pilots' contribution of P2,000.00 to the reserve fund. The law
speaks of the entire reserve fund required to be maintained by the pilots' association to answer (for)
whatever liability arising from the tortious act of its members. And even if the association is held liable
for an amount greater than the reserve fund, the association may not resist the liability by claiming to
be liable only up to seventy-five per centum (75 %) of the reserve fund because in such instance it has

the right to be reimbursed by the offending member pilot for the excess. 113
WHEREFORE, in view of all of the foregoing, the consolidated petitions for review are DENIED and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
Counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario, specifically its associate, Atty. Herbert A. Tria,
 85

is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts of heedless disregard of its undertakings
under the Rules shall be dealt with more severely.
The original members of the legal team of the Office of the Solicitor General assigned to this case, namely, Assistant
Solicitor General Roman G. Del Rosario and Solicitor Luis F. Simon, are ADMONISHED and WARNED that a repetition
of the same or similar acts of unduly delaying proceedings due to delayed filing of required pleadings shall also be
dealt with more stringently.

The Solicitor Genral is DIRECTED to look into the circumstances of this case and to adopt provident measures to avoid
a repetition of this incident and which would ensure prompt compliance with orders of this Court regarding the timely
filing of requisite pleadings, in the interest of just, speedy and orderly administration of justice.

Let copies of this decision be spread upon the personal records of the lawyers named herein in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

Gonzales-Austria et al., vs. Abaya 176 SCRA 634 1. Estafa through falsification of public or
official documents, by verifying official
hours rendered by one employee in the
A.M. No. R-705-RTJ August 23, 1989 person of Miss Anabelle Cardenas who
never reported for duty from August 1983
LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA, LEONILA FUERTES and to May 1984 by encashing and receiving
EDGARDO SERVANDO, complainants, salaries of said Miss Cardenas through
vs. forgery of payee's signature in the treasury
JUDGE EMMANUEL M. ABAYA, RTC, Br. 51, Puerto warrants, thus deceiving the government
Princess City and ANNA BELLE and defrauding the Government treasury
CARDENAS, respondents. of a big amount of money;

A.M. No. R-698-P August 23, 1989 2. Gross dishonesty and corruption by
soliciting, demanding, receiving bribed
JUDGE EMMANUEL M. ABAYA, complainant, (sic) money in exchange for favorable
vs. resolutions and decisions from different
LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA, Branch Clerk of Court, litigants in Branch 52, where said Judge
RTC, Br. 52, Puerto Princess City, respondent. was temporarily assigned from November
1984 to April 1986 and of which one of the
undersigned complainant (sic), LIGAYA
A.M. No. 2909 August 23, 1989
GONZALES-AUSTRIA is the Branch Clerk
of Court;
JUDGE EMMANUEL M. ABAYA, complainant,
vs.
3. Illegal exaction of portion of the salaries
LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA, Branch Clerk of Court,
of his subordinate Edgardo Servando as
RTC, Br. 52, Puerto Princess City, respondent.
part and condition of his continued
employment in Branch 51, where Judge
Abaya is the presiding judge.,

FERNAN, C.J.: Judge Abaya denied all these charges in his comment

dated August 29, 1986, filed in compliance with the Court
In a complaint under oath dated July 21, 1986, docketed as Resolution of August 12, 1986. He asserted that these
Adm. Matter No. R-705-RTJ, Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria, charges were concocted in retaliation against the
then Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court administrative complaint docketed as Adm. Matter No. 698-
(RTC), Branch 52, Puerto Princess City 1 Mrs. Leonila P he earlier filed on July 18,1986 against one of his
Fuertes and Mr. Edgardo Servando charged Judge accusers, Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria for dishonesty and
Emmanuel M. Abaya, then Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch grave misconduct in having forged his signature in a
51, Puerto Princess City 2 with: probation order in Criminal Case No. 4995 of the RTC,
Branch 52, Puerto Princess, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Leonardo Cruz," for attempted murder. Adm.
Matter No. 698-P was followed by a petition dated August
 86

5,1986 docketed as Adm. Case No. 2909 for the Both Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas vehemently
disbarment of Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria based on the denied the charges, countering that the latter worked as
same alleged offense. stenographic reporter from August 1983 to May 31, 1984.

After Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria had filed her comment We find the charges against Judge Abaya and Annabelle
on the charges against her, the Court resolved to Cardenas to be supported by substantial evidence.
consolidate these related cases. Especially damaging to the pretensions of the respondents
that Annabelle Cardenas rendered service as stenographic
On October 28, 1986, the Court granted the motion of the reporter during the period under consideration are the
complainants in Adm. Matter No. R-705-RTJ to amend their school records of the Holy Trinity College, showing that
complaint by including Annabelle Cardenas as defendant in Annabelle Cardenas was attending school in the first
the charge of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents. semester of school year 1983-1984 from 2:00 P.M. to 8:15
It was averred therein that the initial exclusion was due to P.M.5 While she claimed to have been permitted by her
oversight and that it was never intended to exclude her as a teacher to attend her typing and stenography classes after
co-principal. office hours, the school records reveal that she has other
subjects such as Business Organization and Management
(3 units), Ten Commandments (3 units), Sining ng
By resolution of December 11, 1986, the cases were Pakikipagtalastas (3 units) and Accounting for Single
referred to Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera for Proprietorship (3 units), her attendance in which can be
investigation, report and recommendation. Based on the safely concluded from the passing grades she received in
evidence presented by the parties, Justice Herrera finds the said subjects. Equally damaging to respondents' assertion
respondents guilty of the charges against them and thereby are the Daily Time Records of Princess Tours 6 showing
recommends: that Annabelle Cardenas acted as tourist guide on 43
working days when she was supposedly rendering service
1. The FORFEITURE of retirement as stenographic reporter. Her explanation that her name
benefits of Judge Abaya except earned was placed on the daily time record as team leader,
leave credits; although she did not actually conduct the tours reflected
therein is too shallow to merit belief.
2. The REMOVAL of Annabelle Cardenas
from office as Court Stenographer; It is indeed quite intriguing that during the ten-month period
under consideration, the court calendar for Branch 51 never
3. A one-year SUSPENSION from office once carried Annabelle Cardenas' name to signify her
as Attorney of Atty. Ligaya G. Austria in attendance at a court session. Moreover, she could not
AC-2909.4 produce any single order, transcript or official stenographic
notes that had been taken by her in any case, civil or
We now consider these well-thought out recommendations. criminal. All she presented were so-called practice notes.

I. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER NO. R- Judge Abaya stated in his comment that it was Annabelle
705-RTJ: Cardenas who was collecting her salary "without
intervention from your respondent.7 It was however proved
that Judge Abaya collected Annabelle Cardenas' salaries
a. Estafa thru Falsification of Public or Official Documents on several occasions, as in fact, said Annabelle Cardenas
by Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas.— The gravamen even executed a special power of attorney in his favor
of this charge is that Annabelle Cardenas who was authorizing him not only to collect the treasury warrants but
appointed as Stenographic Reporter of Branch 51, RTC, to endorse and negotiate them as well. 8 Be that as it may,
Palawan in August 1983 upon the recommendation of we find the evidence insufficient on the one hand to
Judge Abaya as Presiding Judge therein, was a ghost overthrow the explanation of respondents that Judge Abaya
employee from August 1983 to May 1984 as she never collected Annabelle Cardenas' salaries in Manila so that he
reported for work during said period, being then employed could bring the same to Candon, Ilocos Sur for delivery to
at Princess Tours Rafols Hotel as a tourist guide. her mother, who is a good friend of the Judge; and on the
Notwithstanding, with her knowledge and consent, Judge other hand to support complainants' theory that Judge
Abaya verified as true and correct her daily time records as Abaya appropriated the money for himself.
stenographic reporter purportedly showing that she
rendered service and incurred no absences or tardiness
from August 9 to September 30, 1983 and rendered service b. Charges of Gross Dishonesty and Corruption by
for the period from October 1, 1983 to May 31, 1984 and Soliciting, Demanding and Receiving Bribe Money against
was granted leave of absence from March 14 to 30, 1984 Judge Abaya. — The act complained of was allegedly
and from April 23 to 27, 1984. Thus, she was paid her committed by Judge Abaya while temporarily assigned to
salaries corresponding to the periods allegedly worked. Branch 52, RTC Palawan vice Judge Jose G. Genilo Jr.,
Some of the Treasury Warrants covering her salaries were, who was temporarily assigned to Batangas City. It must be
according to complainants, encashed by Judge Abaya by recalled that complainant Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria
forging Annabelle Cardenas' signature. was then Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 52.
 87

It was alleged that Judge Abaya denied the application for Judge Abaya was asking P5,000.00 from her so that the
bail of the accused in Criminal Case No. 5304 entitled bail application of the accused would be denied. While he
"People vs. Henry Arias and Fernando Oniot for murder, in advised her to file a complaint against Judge Abaya, he
consideration of the sum of P 2,000.00 given by Mrs. was informed later on that Mrs. Fuertes gave Judge Abaya
Leonila Fuertes, complainant and mother of the victim in the not the amount being asked, but only about P1,200.00. 11
aforesaid case.
Likewise submitted in evidence by the complainants were
Mrs. Leonila Fuertes, a school teacher, testified that she the entries in Mrs. Fuertes' diary, thus:
went to Branch 52 at about 5:00 P.M. on August 13, 1985 in
response to a telephone call from court stenographer Nelly August 13, 1985 called by Judge Abaya to
Vicente that Judge Abaya wanted to see her personally. see him after office hours. He asked me
Nelly Vicente referred her to Carmencita P. Baloco, the for my case was 50-50.12
officer-in-charge who then called Judge Abaya from the
other branch. Judge Abaya directed her to the adjoining
courtroom where he told her, "Ang kaso ninyo ay medyo August 15, I went to town to see Baby
tagilid, 50-50 dahil walang eyewitness." (Your case is shaky Francisco, gave P2,000 and I brought the
with only a 50-50 chance of winning because there is no money to Judge. 13
eyewitness.) She retorted that there was an eyewitness but
the Judge insisted that there was none because the July 2, 1986 Judge Abaya with companion
supposed eyewitness had his back turned when her son Rufo Gonzales and Celia Fernandez.
was stabbed. Nonetheless, the Judge assured her that he Purpose they convinced me to sign my
would be able to do something about it ("Ngunit lahat ay name in the affidavit stating that I will deny
magagawan ko ng paraan dahil ako ang nakakaalam sa the previous affidavit I made stated that
mga decision dito").lâwphî1.ñèt  When Mrs. Fuertes asked Judge asked from me certain amount and
the Judge what he wanted, he told her that he has a his request was granted. But I did not sign
problem. "Kailangan ko ng pera Limang Libo at Ide-deny ko and asked me to see him in town at the
ang bail na mga acusado" (I need Five Thousand Pesos residence of Menchie his niece personally
and I will deny bail to the accused). Mrs. Fuertes expressed nakiusap kay Baby upang mai-deny ang
puzzlement on why she had to give money when she was affidavit ko through Atty. Austria ay
the aggrieved party, but the Judge cut her off by saying he nakiusap pa rin. He is talking care Nanette
needed the money badly before he leaves for Manila. Mrs. na idinay ko. 13-A
Fuertes answered that she would have to consult her
brothers-in-law about the matter. The Judge told her to see Judge Abaya denied the solicitation as well as the receipt of
him at his house at 7:00 o'clock in the evening. money from Mrs. Fuertes. He alleged that the bail
application of the accused in Criminal Case No. 5304 was
Mrs. Fuertes consulted her brothers-in-law as well as the denied, not because of any outside interference, but
then prosecuting fiscal, now Judge Angel R. Miclat about because the evidence of guilt was strong. He surmised that
the matter. Although they were all against the Idea of her Mrs. Fuertes and Nelly Vicente had been pressured by Atty.
acceding to the Judge's demand, she delivered the amount Ligaya Gonzales-Austria into testifying against him out of
of Pl,200.00 to Judge Abaya on August 15,1985 in his sheer vindictiveness and that Mrs. Fuertes might have been
chambers, telling him that was all she could afford. Judge blaming him for the delay in the resolution of the criminal
Abaya looked dissatisfied but said "Never mind" and that he case against her son's alleged killers.
would just contact her at the next trial for the final
judgment. 9 We quote with approval Justice Herrera's perceptive
reasons for giving full faith and credence to Mrs. Fuertes'
Roselyn Teologo, stenographic reporter of Branch 52 testimony:
corroborated that portion of Mrs. Fuertes' testimony relating
to the phone call of Nelly Vicente to Mrs. Fuertes, the We find no improper motive as to why Mrs.
latter's arrival on August 13, 1985 at Branch 52 and Mrs. Fuertes, a school teacher, would impute
Fuertes having been closeted with Judge Abaya inside the such a serious offense against a judge
courtroom for about 20 minutes. She further testified that unless it be the truth. Mrs. Fuertes is not a
Carmen Baloco who eavesdropped on the Judge and Mrs. disgruntled litigant. Judge Abaya having
Fuertes' conversation remarked, "Grabe ito, nanghihingi ng denied the petition for bail of the
pera." (This is terrible, he is asking money.) She added that suspected killer of Mrs, Fuertes' son, she
when Judge Abaya emerged from the courtroom, he should, under normal circumstances be
instructed her not to tell anybody that Mrs. Fuertes had grateful to the Judge. Yet she charged him
been there.10 with a serious offense, and travelled all the
way from Palawan to Manila to testify
Additional corroborative evidence was given by Judge against the Judge. Under the
Angel R. Miclat, then acting City Fiscal for Puerto Princess circumstances, We cannot accept Judge
City handling Criminal Case No. 5304. He testified that Mrs. Abaya's contention that Mrs. Fuertes
Fuertes came to him in August of 1986 to inform him that perjured herself just to accommodate the
 88

vengeanceful ire of Atty. Austria against While the investigating officer, Justice Herrera observed
Judge Abaya. That would be contrary to that both Servando and Jamora "testified in a natural and
the ordinary prompting of men. straightforward, albeit in an angry manner without
attempting to conceal their contempt for Judge Abaya, 17 he
Upon the other hand, the testimony of Mrs. concluded that "the evidence in this regard would be unable
Fuertes is too rich in details brought out on to withstand judicial scrutiny for want of ample
cross-examination which cannot simply be corroboration. It would simply be the word of one against a
swept aside as mere fabrications. They judge. 18
find support in collateral but highly
significant circumstances pointed to by We are in accord with this observation, for indeed, the
Mrs. Teologo, such as (1) the visible charge if true is so demeaning to an RTC judge that it
presence of Mrs. Fuertes in the courtroom requires more than a bare allegation to sustain it. In this
in conference with Judge Abaya at 5:00 regard, we give respondent Judge the benefit of the doubt.
o'clock in the afternoon of August 15,
(should be 13) 1985; and (2) the highly In summation, we find Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya guilty of
credible testimony of Judge Miclat on the grave and serious misconduct affecting Ms integrity and
report made to him by Mrs. Fuertes, as moral character which would have warranted his dismissal
then acting City Fiscal, on the solicitation from the service had his resignation not been accepted.
of Judge Abaya. It certainly cannot be said
that Mrs. Fuertes merely concocted her
story at the time regarding the solicitation The office of a judge exists for one solemn end — to
of Judge Abaya in connection with the promote justice by administering it fairly and impartially. In
pending case of the suspected killers of regarding justice as a commodity to be sold at a price,
her son. There was absolutely no motive Judge Abaya betrayed the very essence of magistracy. In
for her to do So.14 complicity with Annabelle Cardenas, he likewise abused the
trust and confidence of the people, shortchanging them of
services undoubtedly vital to the speedy administration of
c. Charge of illegal Exaction against Judge Abaya. — It is justice.
alleged that Judge Abaya exacted portions of the salaries of
two (2) employees in Branch 51 of the Palawan RTC as a
condition for their continued employment. Edgardo The judge is the visible representation of the law and of
Servando, one of the complainants herein, and who was justice. From him, the people draw their will and awareness
appointed stenographer on September 3, 1984 upon the to obey the law. 19 For him then to transgress the highest
recommendation of Judge Abaya, declared that such ideals of justice and public service for personal gain is
recommendation was made in consideration of his indeed a demoralizing example constituting a valid cause
agreement to give Judge Abaya Pl,000.00 from his initial for disenchantment and loss of confidence in the judiciary
salary and thereafter a monthly amount of P400.00, which as well as in the civil service system.
undertaking he complied with. However, in December when
the Judge before leaving for Manila for the Christmas By these acts, Judge Abaya has demonstrated his unfitness
vacation asked him for Pl,000.00 from as fringe benefits, and unworthiness of the honor and requisites attached to
medical allowance and year-end bonus, he was unable to his office. As he had previously resigned, we hereby order
comply as he did not then have cash, the payment of said the forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except earned leave
benefits having been in checks. A week later, he received a credits, as recommended by the investigating officer Justice
notice of termination effective at the close of business hours Herrera.
on December 31, 1984 from the Supreme Court upon the
recommendation of Judge Abaya.15 We further mete out to Annabelle Cardenas in
consequence of her grave misconduct as above-described
Nilo Jamora, a former stenographer of Branch 51 testified the penalty of removal from office as Court Stenographer
that since his employment in said Branch, Judge Abaya had with prejudice to her re-appointment to the Judiciary.
been exacting from him P350.00 every payday, which
exaction ceased only in March 1986 when Atty. Ligaya II. A.M. No. R-698-P and Adm. Case No. 2909
Gonzales-Austria filed her charges against Judge Abaya.
He further stated that when he refused to retract his The complaints for dishonesty and grave misconduct in
charges against Judge Abaya before the Sangguniang A.M. No. R-698-P and for disbarment in Adm. Case No.
Panlalawigan despite the Judge's offer of money, the latter 2909 against Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria, then Clerk of
demoted him to process server.16 Court of Branch 52, RTC Palawan, stem from her act of
having allegedly forged the signature of Judge Abaya in a
Judge Abaya likewise denied this charge, labelling the probation order dated April 22, 1986 in Criminal Case No.
same as sheer vindictiveness due to Servando's 4999 of said court entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
termination and Jamora's demotion, fanned by Atty. Leonardo Cruz" for attempted homicide.
Austria's proddings. He insists that the personnel action
taken on Servando and Jamora was due to their Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria admits to having signed the
inefficiency. probation order and of having promulgated it, but explains
 89

that these were done with the knowledge and consent of have probably released the order with the
Judge Abaya, who had asked her to prepare orders and statement that it is upon orders of the
decisions in Branch 52 to ease his load of presiding over judge or by authority of the judge but she
two (2) branches. She adverts to Judge Abaya's order of could not under any circumstance make it
November 4, 1985 which granted accused Leonardo Cruz' appear as she did in this case that the
motion for reconsideration of the order denying probation. Judge signed the order when in fact he did
This order, which carried certain conditions, set the not. The duties of the clerk of court in the
promulgation of the probation order on January 16, 1986 at absence of any express direction of the
8:00 o'clock in the morning. In the meantime, Judge Abaya Judge is well defined under Section 5,
requested Atty. Austria to prepare the probation order with Rule 136 of the Rules of Court which
the day and month in blank for the signature of the Judge. reads:

On January 16,1986, Judge Abaya was absent so the Sec. 5. Duties of the Clerk in the absence
promulgation was reset to April 16, 1986. On the latter date, or by direction of the judge. — In the
the provincial warden failed to bring the accused to court, absence of the judge, the clerk may
hence the promulgation of the probation order was again perform all the duties of the judge in
reset to June 3, 1986, with Judge Abaya allegedly giving receiving applications, petitions,
instructions before he left for Manila to promulgate said inventories, reports, and the issuance of
order even in his absence should the probationer Leonardo all orders and notices that follow as a
Cruz arrive in court. matter of course under these rules, and
may also, when directed so to do by the
On April 21, 1986, Leonardo Cruz came and begged that judge, receive the accounts of executors,
the probation order be promulgated the following day, April administrators, guardians, trustees, and
22, 1986 as he had to leave for Coron in the same receivers, and all evidence relating to
pumpboat that brought him to Puerto Princess and he had them, or to the settlement of the estates of
no money to sustain him up to the time the Judge arrives deceased persons, or to guardianship,
from Manila. As requested, the promulgation was set on trusteeships, or receiverships, and
April 22, 1986, only for Atty. Austria to discover that Judge forthwith transmit such reports, accounts,
Abaya had neglected to sign the probation order. In view of and evidence to the judge, together with
the predicament of Leonardo Cruz and the authority his findings in relation to the same, if the
granted to her by Judge Abaya, Atty. Austria signed Judge judge shall direct him to make findings and
Abaya's name to the probation order and promulgated it. include the same in his report.

Atty. Austria justifies her action under the theory of agency Signing orders in the name of, and
(Art. 1881 of the Civil Code) 20 in that having been granted simulating the signature of the judge is not
full authority to promulgate the probation order, she one of them.
necessarily had the authority to sign the Judge's name if the
need arose. She further maintains that as Judge Abaya Atty. Austria's theory of agency that she
never complained about the alleged forgery, he is deemed lawfully acted as agent of the Judge is
to have ratified it and is now estopped from questioning her wholly devoid of merit. The judicial power
authority. Lastly, she compares the probation order to a writ vested in a judge and its exercise is strictly
of execution which is usually done by the Clerk of Court. 21 personal to the Judge because of, and by
reason of his highest qualification, and can
Respondent's arguments are quite novel but unpersuasive. never be the subject of agency. That
As thoroughly explained by Justice Herrera: would not only be contrary to law, but also
subversive of public order and public
policy. Nor could her void act in signing
.....her explanation that she is the one the name of the judge be validly ratified by
preparing decisions and orders in Branch the latter. Judge Abaya himself is bereft of
52 with the knowledge and consent of any power to authorize the clerk of court to
Judge Abaya during the time that the latter sign his name in his official capacity in a
was acting as Presiding Judge of said matter pending adjudication before him.
branch and that she was directed to The issuance of the order in question is
promulgate the probation order in favor of strictly judicial and is exclusively vested in
Leonardo Cruz only to discover that the the judge which is beyond his authority to
judge overlooked to sign the order, even if delegate. 22
true, is not a valid justification for her to
simulate the signature of Judge Abaya in
the probation order. This is patently illegal. Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government
As a lawyer and branch clerk of court, she office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
ought to know that under no misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government
circumstances is her act of signing the official. 23 However, if that misconduct as a government
name of the judge permissible. She could official is of such a character as to affect his qualification
 90

as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be

disciplined as a member of the bar on such ground. 24

We find Atty. Austria's misconduct as Branch Clerk of Court

to affect her qualification as a member of tile Bar, for
precisely as a lawyer, she ought to have known the illegality
of the act complained of.

WHEREFORE, finding the respondents Judge Emmanuel

M. Abaya, Annabelle Cardenas and Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-
Austria guilty as charged, except that of illegal exaction
against Judge Abaya, the Court hereby orders:

1. In Adm. Matter No. R-705-RTJ, the FORFEITURE of the

retirement benefits of Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya, except
his earned leave credits; and the DISMISSAL from office of
Annabelle Cardenas as Stenographic Reporter with
prejudice to her reappointment to the Judiciary; and,

2. In Adm. Matter No. R-698-P and Adm. Case No. 2909,

the resignation of Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria as Branch
Clerk of Court IS ACCEPTED as of December 31, 1987
and any and all benefits accruing during her government
service are declared forfeited, except her earned leave
credits. Her SUSPENSION as a member of the Bar for a
period of one year from the finality of this decision is further
decreed.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Ombudsman

for the filing of appropriate criminal charges against
respondents if warranted.

Copies of this resolution shall be attached to the

respondents' respective personal records.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,

Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Griñ;o-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.