Theories of

International
Relations I

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CHAPTER 3
Assoc.Prof.Dr. Elif TOPRAK

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 International Regime
Chapter 6 Theories
After completing this chapter you will be able to:

1
Learning Outcomes

Define the concept of international regimes

2 Compare realist and liberal regime theories

3 4
Discuss contemporary debates about
international regimes Explain the critiques of international regimes

Chapter Outline Key Terms

Introduction Regimes
The Concept of Regime Prisoner’s Dilemma
The Content and The Limits of Mutual Interdependence
International Regimes Hegemonic Leadership
International Regimes and Cooperation
The Critiques of International Regimes

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Theories of International Relations I

INTRODUCTION nations goes back to a couple of centuries ago. In

particular, endeavors for this purpose emphasize to
International regime theories (IRT) indicate that
form a global and international society inspired by
cooperation is possible in an environment in which
Kant and Grotius depending on ascendancy of law
there is no higher authority to enforce the nations to
cooperate. It is well known that model of prisoner’s among sovereign states.
dilemma explains why the states escape from
cooperation. Therefore, while realist approach based THE CONCEPT OF REGIME
on prisoner’s dilemma emphasizes that possible risks International regimes can be defined as explicit
and uncertainties might cause to escape/refrain from
or implicit norms, rules, principles and decision
cooperation, free rider approach also argues that the
making processes related to certain issue areas/
existence of some countries trying to employ the
subjects (Stone, 1994: 447; Conca, 1996; Krasner,
collective action without paying any cost might
1991: 1; Krasner, 1993: 1-22)
restrict the cooperation of states. However, Perritt
(1998) claims that regime theories introduce a new According to Rosecrance, regime is thought
approach indicating the possibility of cooperation as a result of consent of states and the limited
even in these circumstances. surrender for independent decision making
authority. Domestic structures are the best
Prisoner’s Dilemma examples for them whereas states are institutions
The police have arrested two suspects and are created by individuals surrendering certain powers
interrogating them in separate rooms. Each can for protecting themselves and attaining security. In
either confess, thereby implicating the other, or international regimes, in a similar manner, states
keep silent. No matter what the other suspect does, have duties and responsibilities to perform and
each can improve his own position by confessing. liabilities and obligations for those violating their
If the other confesses, then one had better do the responsibilities (Stone, 1994: 464).
same to avoid the especially harsh sentence that Conca (1996) stated that regime can be defined
awaits a recalcitrant holdout. If the other keeps in narrow and broader meanings. According to
silent, then one can obtain the favorable treatment broader definition, it is understood as patterns of
accorded a state’s witness by confessing. Thus, behaviors in international relations, whereas in
confession is the dominant strategy for each. But narrow meaning, it can be defined as conditioning
when both confess, the outcome is worse for both the behaviors of states consciously to realize
than when both keep silent. (http://www.econlib. collective goals, and can be seen as a specific version
org/library/Enc/PrisonersDilemma.html) of international institutions.

According to Keohane (1993:23), regime

theory is a theory for explaining and
understanding the international cooperation
intending the coordination and harmonization
of interest among nations. In fact, international
cooperation which means mutual harmonization
of policies benefitting to all sides are widely seen
in world politics. Even some of these cooperations
might be result of vertical imposition from top
to bottom, but most of them are like horizontal
type of cooperation as a result of mutual consent.
Hurrell (1993: 50) argues that regime theories
introduce the possibility of cooperation in an
environment of anarchy in which sovereign states
are struggling for power and interest. In fact, the
philosophical and ideational background of the
possibility and necessity of cooperation among

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International Regime Theories

In this book, fourteen distinguished specialists On the other hand, main purpose of adopting
in international political economy thoroughly the broader definition is to indicate the regulations
explore the concept of international regimes-the related to international topics, civil societies, social
implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules, movements and global governance. The concept of
and procedures that guide international behavior. international regime, at the same time, is explaining
In the first section, the authors develop several the legitimate and accepted rule of games and
theoretical views of regimes. In the following behaviors for sovereign states in international area
section, the theories are applied to specific issues (Conca, 1996). Stein, in terms of broader meaning,
in international relations, including the General defined the concept as comprising all international
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and on relations and all international interactions for a certain
the still-enduring postwar regimes for money and topic. For example, international monetary regime is
security just seen as international relations relating to money.
“At one extreme, regimes are defined so broadly as
important to constitute either all international relations or all
international interactions within a given issue area.
In this sense, an international monetary regime is
At one extreme, regimes are defined so broadly
nothing more than all international relations involving
as to constitute either all international relations
money” (Stein, 1982: 299). Therefore, regime, at least
or all international interactions within a given
for simple meaning, refers to rules of game (game of
issue area. In this sense, an international
international politics). In broader meaning, it comprises
monetary regime is nothing more than all
all international institutions and regulations and formal
international relations involving money…
aspect of all state behaviors (Stein, 1991: 115-16).
Similarly, a conceptual definition of regimes
as, for example, “the rules of the game,” in However, it should be noted that narrow meaning is
no way limits the range of international widely used, so the writers accept the concept as a state
interactions to which it refers. We can, after all, of cooperation of nations in an anarchical international
describe even the most anarchic behavior in the structure. This doesn’t imply only the capacity to
international system as guided by the rules of influence the behaviors of states independently, but
self-interest or self-help.’ To specify the rules of also refers to decree of states to establish an institution.
the international political game is to say that Therefore, the narrow use of concept is to intend to point
anything and everything goes (Stein, 982: 299) out the willingness of states for cooperation in different
institutional environments and different conditions.

important

At the other extreme, regimes are defined as international institutions. In this sense, they equal
the formal rules of behavior specified by the charters or constitutions of such institutions, and
the study of regimes becomes the study of international organizations. This formulation reduces
the new international political economy to the old study of international organizations and
represents nothing more than an attempt to redress a tired and moribund field (Stein, 982: 300)

Further Reading

Arthur A. Stein, “Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world” International

Organization 36, 2, (Spring 1982), 299-324.

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Theories of International Relations I

Economic conditions/
Social justice
Civil society

Statehood

Civil Political
liberties participation
C CA B
Electoral regime
D E
Mutual constraints Effective
and horizontal power to govern
accountability

Figure 6.1 Regime formation in the society; Embedded democracy, liberties, economic conditions, social justice etc.
Source: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510340412331304598?journalCode=fdem20

According to Krasner, regime can be described as explicit and implicit rules, norms, principles and
decision making procedures related to a certain subject in international relations. “International regime can
be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact,
causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules
are specific prescriptions or proscrip- tions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices
for making and implementing collective choice” (Krasner, 1982: 186)

Further Reading

Stephen D. Krasner.  “Structural causes and regime consequences: Regimes as intervening variab-
les” International Organization Vol, 36, No. 2, 1982. 185-205

Keohane and Nye argue that regimes are regulations comprising of the rules, norms and procedures
influencing behaviors and results. Hedley Bull, defines the regimes as rules and institutions that regulate
behaviors of individuals and states. Krasner noted that regimes should not be seen as provisional regulations
changing according to the change of power and interest in international relations. Keohane also pointed
out that regimes should be differentiated from treaties in a certain subject. A treaty can be ad hoc in
character but also would be narrow in terms of subject matter and parties. However, regimes are not always
limited to a certain subject and not interim provision.
The purpose of regimes is to form a frame for facilitating the solution of problems through treaties.
Regimes as Jervis stated are not only making the cooperation easier in short run, but also in the long run,
providing an environment of cooperation for promoting relations. According to Krasner, regimes are
regulations resulting from voluntary cooperation of governments (Krasner, 1991: 1-3).

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International Regime Theories

Picture 6.1 The picture showing regime’s statement of providing unity in the world
Source: https://www.e-ir.info/2012/12/21/international-regimes-as-concept/

Puchala ve Hopkins (1991: 61-62), in their are found in areas excluding the subjects regarding
study, state that regime is a conceptual framework sovereignty of states, or subjects in which conflicts
to understand the behaviors of states and to explain are available for judiciary and authority of states,
the situation which couldn’t be explained before. In such as employing/use of sea beds, open seas and
this sense, regimes both regulate and constrain the outer space.
behaviors of states. Therefore, regimes can be both While “most structural, game-theoretic, and
reasons and results determining and influencing functional theories of regimes are state-centered,
the behaviors. In this connection, in a system presuming unified rational actors, even if the
of sovereign states, one of the basic functions of assumption is relaxed to gain explanatory leverage,
regimes is to encourage the states for cooperation cognitivists have suggested a radically different
in a certain subject. research program. Focusing on the intersubjective
meaning structures that bind actors together,
they necessarily see a looser fit between stmctural
constraints, interests, and choices. Where functional
1
theories see regimes as more or less efficient responses
Would you like to compare to fixed needs, cognitive theories see them as
international institutions and conditioned by ideology and consensual knowledge
international regimes? What and evolving as actors learn. Cognitivists argue that
is the difference between “there is no fixed ‘national interest’ and no ‘optimal
international treaties and regime. Presumably determinative “structural”
international regimes? constraints must always be understood in terms of
historically conditioned, interpretive frameworks.
This requirement promises some corrective to the
According to Young (1991: 93), regimes are spare assumptions of other theoretical approaches,
social institutions and structures created to regulate particularly by reminding us of historical context
the behaviors of states for a certain phenomenon. and the substantive issues over which conflict and
Like all other social institutions, they are supposed cooperation occur. Yet, to date, the cognitivists have
to influence and regulate the behaviors of states. not adequately resolved their relationship with the
Such kind of institutional regulations, in general, structuralist research program. The relationship

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Theories of International Relations I

between power, ideology, and knowledge is one of certain examples of these situations is to establish
the most exciting areas of theoretical debate, but regimes in the field of human rights and environment.
one strewn with basic methodological problems” However, international regimes may be formed
(Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 499) in every field of subjects of international relations
starting from security issues to environmental issues,
and might comprise all international regulations and
common standards, such as regimes related to seas,
outer spaces, straits and rivers and other waterways as
well as economic, financial and commercial subjects
or even about diplomatic behaviors. For example,
regime of straits, regime of rivers and waterways,
international trade regime, international payment
regime and international environmental regime exist
and are often used to explain the rules governing
those areas. Regime, rather, is incentive for patterns
of behaviors and common standards accepted by all
states with full consent and without questioning.
Therefore, there is no compulsion for regulations
to be bilateral or multilateral. But not all bilateral
regulations in a certain field with related parties can
be called as regimes. In order to use the concept of
regime or international regime, it should depend on
established rules, common standards and mutual
consent to form patterns of behaviors that are
implicitly or explicitly accepted by related parties.
In fact, the concept of regime would cause the
question of the limits of state sovereignty. Because
states in many subjects would face some limitations
of international regimes which constrain their
sovereign rights, so they are blurred to determine
the subjects either domestic or global in character.
International regimes are “codes of conduct”
For example, use of waters, use of natural resources,
agreed upon by states to govern their relations in
protection of wild life, animal rights, prevention
specific areas of international politics. This book
of environmental pollution are the subjects that
describes and critically examines the three most
states are not willing to share their authority, in
important theories of international regimes. Each
time some developments such as globalization,
of these theories stress a particular explanatory
economic, social and cultural interactions have
variable: realist theories emphasize state power;
caused these subjects to be international.
neoliberal theories focus on constellations of
interests; and cognitivist theories are concerned States, naturally, are eager to establish
with knowledge and ideas. international regimes in the fields out of their
authority. Therefore, most international regimes, so
far exist in all fields except state sovereignty such as
THE CONTENT AND THE common use of open seas and use of outer spaces.
LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL In some fields, states would be eager to create
REGIMES regimes to prevent the anarchy and uncertainty,
and establish an order and maintain security. Like
International regime, in the first stance, is
social contract law of John Locke and Thomas
understood to regulate the areas out of sovereign
Hobbes, states through surrendering some parts of
rights of states. But, at present, states might have to
their sovereignty have had to consent to establish
establish regimes in their domain of power. One of
global governance.

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International Regime Theories

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES AND COOPERATION

Increasing the interaction and mutual interdependence among states leads them to find collective solution
for common problems. These developments necessitated to surrender the sovereignty rights to a certain extent,
and to find unilateral solution for problems. But these
important
regulations are realized by states and don’t eliminate their
sovereignty. Therefore, this could be assessed even as a
system transformation, but the anarchy would persist and International regimes reduce uncertainties and
not be removed necessarily, since the higher authority is provide a reference for which behaviors are false
not established yet (Conca, 1996). or right. In other words, regimes facilitate the
All international institutions cannot be assumed as identification of violations of rules in social,
international regimes. In general, international regimes political and security related fields. Moreover,
are sub section of international institutions. In that they also reduce the cost of common effort for
sense, international institutions are codified by states those responding to such violations (Perritt,
and would represent the limits of their authority and 1998). According to Krasner (1991: 12),
power, and only accept the states as legitimate parties regimes make it easier to reach an agreement for
for these regulations as well as accepting the territoriality parties, since it increases the communication
of states and the need to behave collectively for finding among sides and influence the quality and
solutions to the common problems (Conca, 1996). quantity of knowledge in a positive manner.

Source: https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/our-work/subjects/international-cooperation_en

In other words, IRT would be needed to reduce uncertainties in certain fields that states cannot
control by unilateral initiatives. For example in international economic relations, some regimes are related
to overcome incomplete competition and to reduce market uncertainties.
International regimes, at the same time, reduce and even prevent the unfair applications stemming
from uncertainties and gaps in certain fields. As well, in the areas where regimes don’t exist, states intend
to resolve the problem through power relations, and consequently weak and small countries have some
disadvantages. On the other hand, if there is a regime in any field, this reduces the probability of conflict and
provides the maintenance of the security and stability. The possibility of international collective response
may deter the states that tend to violate the existing regimes. According to Perritt, the main reason of the

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Theories of International Relations I

violation deterrence effect of regimes which might On the other hand, Robert Keohane challenges
cause collective response is that these regulations those people criticizing the applicability of regime
and rules are in general adopted by public opinions theories for stability and order due to the reality of
and those states willing to violate rules are even prisoner’s dilemma as an obstacle of cooperation.
objected by their own people (Perritt, 1998). According to him, they ignore a reality that if
reiterating the prisoner’s dilemma, rational option
for all sides in the long run is to make cooperation.
But, such models depending on rational choice
based on national interest which may only be
applied to closed circuit relations cannot be applied
without reservation to IR in which negotiation and
interaction exist because increasing the interaction
in IR would increase the probability of cooperation
among nations. In conclusion, opportunity
of negotiation is an important factor to form
international regime (Perritt, 1998).
Axelrod and Keohane argue that regimes would
encourage and institutionalize the mutuality in IR.
Principle of reciprocity would refrain the states
to defect from cooperation and increase the cost
of defection for states. Moreover, conditioned
cooperation (if game is reiterated, players would
be encouraged to cooperate in order to escape
from the probable cost) in the model of prisoner’s
dilemma might be effective to encourage states
to establish regimes. Meetings frequently done
between states to boost the cooperation would
be main imperative for realization of conditioned
cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma. Finally, they
note that main reasons behind the establishment
of a state by individuals to solve their common
problems (according to Hobbes) would be similar
important
for states to solve coordination problem in the same
manner for establishing regimes. However, while
International regimes are systems of norms realists insist that a hegemonic power is necessary
and rules agreed upon by states to govern their for enforcing states to cooperate and that this
behavior in specific political contexts or ‘issue cooperation may not continue in post hegemonic
areas’ be it trade policy, proliferation of trade era, liberals focus that this cooperation would be
policy, proliferation of nuclear weapons, or the persisting even after hegemony ended through
control of transboundary air pollution in some institutions. This is why cooperation, according
region of the world. In a competitive international to Keohane, should be thought with institutions
society increasingly facing with issues that in the post hegemonic era (Grieco, 1995:158;
transcend the physical and political limits of Keohane, 1984: 31-32).
individual states, they are an outstanding example
of international governance, and central to any
analysis of world politics. (https://ezyreading-s.
cf/general/read-regime-theory-and-international-
relations-by-volker-rittberger-peter-mayer-pdf.
html)

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International Regime Theories

rights and rules. Convergent expectations may or

may not be tied to explicit agreements—they might,
in fact, arise in a milieu characterized by substantial
conflict”. (Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 496)

Picture 6.2 Robert O. Keohane: Professor of

International Affairs, Princeton University. He is the author
of After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World
Political Economy (1984) and Power and Governance in a
Partially Globalized World (2002). He is co-author (with
Joseph S. Nye, Jr.) of Power and Interdependence (third
edition 2001), and (with Gary King and Sidney Verba)
of Designing Social Inquiry (1994). He has served as the
editor of the journal International Organization and as
president of the International Studies Association and the
American Political Science Association.
Source: https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles

Keohane elaborating the concepts of hegemony

and cooperation in the study titled as “After
Hegemony”, stated that hegemonic leader would Picture 6.3 Robert Keohane After Hegemony:
assist to establishing order. As well, he noted Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy
that hegemony and cooperation would not be (Princeton Classic Editions, 1984)
opposite concepts since most of the international
cooperation was raised in post-Second World War This book is a comprehensive study of cooperation
era, in which American hegemonic leadership was among the advanced capitalist countries. Can
an issue. Therefore, Keohane adopts the significant cooperation persist without the dominance of a single
role of hegemony for establishing and creating the power such as the United States after World War II? To
international regimes. But Keohane interestingly answer this pressing question, Robert Keohane analyzes
opposed the argument that international regimes the institutions, or “international regimes,” through
and cooperation would not be created or continued which cooperation has taken place in the world political
in post hegemonic era. Keohane, in his study, argues economy and describes the evolution of these regimes as
that cooperation would be possible even in the lack American hegemony has eroded. Refuting the idea that
of a hegemonic power in case there are international
the decline of hegemony makes cooperation impossible,
regimes that assist to establish cooperation (Keohane,
he views international regimes not as weak substitutes
1984: 49-50) In other words, “regimes are examples of
for world government but as devices for facilitating
cooperative behavior, and facilitate cooperation, but
cooperation can take place in the absence of established decentralized cooperation among egoistic actors. In the
regimes. Regimes aid the “institutionalization” preface, the author addresses the issue of cooperation
of portions of international life by regularizing after the end of the Soviet empire and with the renewed
expectations, but some international institutions such dominance of the United States in security matters as
as the balance of power are not bound to explicit well as recent scholarship on cooperation.

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Theories of International Relations I

In fact, Keohane pointed out that cooperation To sum up, IRT is a theory to explain the peace
is mostly needed if there is inconsistency or and cooperation among nations. As it is known,
conflict between interests of states, otherwise there peace and order can only be explained by realist
would not be need to cooperate since states would writers through the concepts of national interest
pursue their similar policies in the same manner. and selfish interest, but functional theories
Naturally, international regimes in this sense not explain it through the benefits of international
only encourage cooperation, but also reduce the organizations. On the other hand, according to
tensions and conflicts between states (Keohane, liberals, peace and order can only be achieved by
1984: 50-55). the increase in the number of democratic states.

LIBERAL AND REALIST APPROACHES TO REGIMES

Common assumptions
1 States operate in an anarchic international system.
2 States are rational and unitary actors.
3 States are the units responsible for establishing regimes.
4 Regimes are established on the basis of cooperation in the international system.
S Regimes promote international order.

Liberal institutionalists
1 Regimes enable states to collaborate.
2 Regimes promote the common good.
3 Regimes flourish best when promoted and maintained by a benign hegemon.
4 Regimes promote globalization and a liberal world order.

Realists
1 Regimes enable states to coordinate.
2 Regimes generate differential benefits for states.
3 Power is the central feature of regime formation and survival.
4 The nature of world order depends on the underlying principles and norms of
regimes.
Source: Little, 2014: 290

One of the basic presumptions of regime theories is that regulations in all fields among states would
provide peace and security. But, in this sense, there are some concerns and critiques that states would
be reluctant for restricting their sovereignty, or the regulations would rather reflect the interests of great
powers. According to Haas (1991: 23-24), regimes are products of efforts to conciliate the conflicting
interests, and also consequences of developments through which mutual interdependencies would increase
the cost for conflicting relations among nations. Oran Young stated, in similar notion, that regimes are the
product of mutual interdependencies.

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International Regime Theories

However, the background of efforts for regime if cost exceeds the benefits, then they would be
formation goes back to old times. According to reluctant to form regimes. For this reason, states
Haas, process in this subject followed a parallel should be persuaded and convinced for having
development to the development of knowledge common interests.
and consciousness of humankind. Therefore, any In fact, states would hesitate to form regime in
documentary study on the development of regimes the field of their sovereignty, because regime would
would mean the same as examining of the historical limit the sovereign rights of states in those areas in
development of cooperation. favor of international inspection and sharing their
Another important reason that leads to powers with other states. In particular, states would
the formation of regimes is the multiplicity of not be willing to share their power about legitimate
interests of states as mentioned above. Therefore, use of power for internal issues. So they don’t prefer
if states don’t have common interests and/or states to establish common regimes in these domestic
prefer the unilateral initiatives, then international issues if they do not perceive a real threat to their
regime would be impossible. For this reason, the rights inside the country. States are reluctant to form
areas of regime formation are probably either the international regimes, not only to maintain internal
areas (which are) out of authority of states, or the integrity, but also to stay as independent entities.
areas that unilateral regulations aren’t preferred by However, according to Zacher, since states might
states. For example, since the states don’t prefer the not have control in certain fields anyway and have
unilateral regulations that might cause confusion, to accept foreign involvement, they might prefer to
regulations regarding the seas would be needed. form international regimes in their own domain in
Similarly, civil aviation or use of outer space would order to escape/refrain from uncontrolled foreign
not be allowed to unilateral regulations of states. interference (Zacher, 1992: 123).

Please elaborate the realist and liberal

approaches to cooperation under the
condition of international anarchy and
the difference between approaches to
international regime.

However, regulations related to international

markets are different from the situations stated
above because in this area, the states rarely have
common interest. In contrast, unilateral initiatives
of states don’t create any cost for them; even provide
some flexibility. It would provide exporting or
importing countries to differentiate the prices for
different markets. However, international payment
regime is much proper for the former example Picture 6.4 Mark Zacher: with PhD from Columbia
(Zacher, 1992: 120). University, joined the Department of Political Science
in 1966.  He was hired to teach cooperation through
On the other hand, regimes formed between
international institutions and regimes.   Zacher’s first
great powers would be stronger than those formed
book, an analysis of “Dag Hammarskjold” UN Secretary-
between weak states. As well, powerful states and
coalitions that have vigorous competition cannot Generalship, In ensuing years, he authored and co-
establish effective regimes. Therefore if states have authored five more books, many book chapters, and
less competition and strong common interest, this numerous articles.  Some of them became classics and
would lead to powerful regimes. are often cited in the contemporary IR literature

At the same time, as noted earlier, since states Source: https://politics.ubc.ca/mark-zacher-

would try to reduce costs by establishing regimes, distinguished-visitor-program/

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Theories of International Relations I

In contrast to the presumptions that regimes Moreover, these international regimes would
would limit or reduce the autonomy of states, reduce the confusions about who are responsible
security regime through eliminating the and have the power to rule. In particular regimes
uncertainties and security dilemma would related to issues like use of the seas and space
increase state’s room to maneuver in certain would be important advantages for states and
areas even such as security issues. Similarly in other economic actors. Even more, these common
the field of transportation and communication, regulatory frameworks at the same time may reduce
regimes would provide the opportunity to use their the costs for states. For example some unilateral
autonomy and power (independently) without any regulations of states in certain areas like territorial
considerations. States don’t leave their autonomy water, national air space not only increase the cost
in internal waters, territorial waters and national but also cause some confusions. Yet, regulations
air space, but certain developments for civil or regimes in those areas like in open seas and
transportation would facilitate the processes for
international air spaces would eliminate the
the states without limiting their power. Likewise,
confusion of authority, and reduce the cost of air
in economic issues like payment regimes, price
transportation. Therefore, these regimes, instead of
regulations, sharing international markets would
only increase their freedom or income, and provide limiting, increase the autonomy for states (Zacher,
an opportunity to control international market 1992: 128; Stone, 1994: 463).
rather than limiting their autonomy. Recently, some International regimes at the same time would
regulations and regimes concerning market share play an important role to eliminate the obstacles
and pricing in the communication sector would for access to markets. Even in the conditions of
provide some advantages for states, since they liberal foreign trade regimes, states try to eliminate
determine their rights and liabilities (Zacher, 1992: difficulties which are imposed by some others
126). In addition to eliminating market defections to access to the internal markets through some
and irregularities, international regulations would unilateral measures related to invisible barriers
increase the economic productivity, because because states have tendencies to apply such
such uncertainties might cause violations and barriers and protectionist behaviours to close
differentiation of goods, consequently which would their domestic markets to foreign competition.
cause decrease of productivity (Zacher, 1992: 126). Therefore, economic regimes aren’t as strong as
regimes in security issues (Zacher, 1992: 130)
However, it can be stated that in certain
conditions, states would not need to form a regime
to coordinate their cooperation or eliminate the
conflicts:
Firstly, states wouldn’t need to form a regime,
if they have opportunity to behave unilaterally
without jeopardizing the interests of others.
Secondly, if states having common interest
could behave in the same manner, they don’t need
an international regime.
Finally, if the best strategy of one state is the
better of the worst strategy of the others, then
states would not need to establish a regime to act
in the same way.
Regime theories that are influenced by
neorealist and neoliberal theories to a certain
Picture 6.5 Mark W. Zacher, Brent A. Sutton
extent accept the state as the basic actor of IR. But
Governing Global Networks: International Regimes
liberal approach to anarchy is slightly different
for Transportation and Communications. Cambridge:
from that of realism. Realists who are adopting
Cambridge University Press, 1996
the assumptions of uncertainty and prisoner’s

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International Regime Theories

dilemma assume that these mutual suspicion and In addition, contrary to regime theories,
non-confidence of states would feed and sustain functional theories ignore the power relations
the process. Therefore, international regimes among the states, and numerous initiatives for
would eliminate these uncertainties and feed the cooperation would reflect the interest of powerful
confidence instead of non-confidence. states instead of weak and small states. Moreover,
Stone argues that regime theories are constructed
on the theory of hegemony that refer to asymmetric
relations among states, and therefore it derived from
3
the American hegemony that began after Second
What are benefits of World War. As it is known, hegemonic theory
international regimes? assumes that hegemonic power is an important
Please explain the dynamics catalyzer to form regimes leading to institutional
encouraging states to form cooperation. Hegemonic power would gain more
regimes. benefit than it suffers. Besides, the benefit of
hegemonic power exceeds the lack of hegemony
and it cannot be compared. At the same time,
Stone noted that regime theories use some concepts
THE CRITIQUES OF of the realist theory. For example, the presence of
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES hegemonic power reduce the security concerns,
Theory of International regimes has been and lead the states to think directly to increase their
criticized in different aspects, some of these absolute gains instead of relative gains. Moreover,
critiques are acceptance of the states as basic actors regimes in terms of determining the rights and
and ignorance of the non-state actors. While the liabilities, responsibilities and rights, encourage the
advocators of regime theories reply that even these states to act together; through increasing the use of
actors might be influential in political process, institutions and cooperation among states, which
in final stage the states do make the decision as in turn, would reduce the costs of bargaining, and
a dominant actor in IR, which are determined finally assist states to understand the intentions and
through power relations. Some critics of the theory choices of each other. Therefore it would reduce
claim that regime theory can only be applied to the effects of anarchy and uncertainty hindering
liberal states. But the defenders of this theory further cooperation among states (Stone, 1994:
respond that all states, more or less at least for 454-55)
some issues, would need a regime in IR. As noted
earlier, increasing economic welfare and security
concerns would enforce the states to sacrifice
some of their powers emanating from sovereignty
(Zacher, 1992: 133).
Responding to some other critics about
assumptions of international regime theories
set forth by functional theories, they claim that
functional theories are related to mutual interest
but the regime theories are related to common
interests. On the other hand, functional theories
are intending to explain the relations between
certain states in certain areas, in contrast regime
theories are related to all community of states.
Besides, functional theories are not explaining
clearly where, why and when states cooperate
(Zacher, 1992: 134).

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