F Y16 N AV Y P R O G R A M S

Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW)

Executive Summary
• The Navy completed Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) C-1
operational testing and declared Initial Operational Capability
(IOC) in FY16.
• DOT&E published a classified FOT&E report in early FY17.
This report indicates:
- Weapon accuracy against stationary land targets has been
maintained and moving maritime target accuracy was
demonstrated in seven developmental, integrated, and
operational free flight test events.
- JSOW C-1 Mean Flight Hours Between Operational
Mission Failure exceeded the requirement value of
95 hours.
- The Navy has reduced the complexity of the Pilot Vehicle
Interface (PVI) in the F/A-18E/F H10 software. There
remain minor PVI challenges that could prevent successful
mission execution. These challenges can be effectively
overcome with proper training prior to employment. The
Navy is addressing these challenges in F/A-18E/F H12
Operational Flight Program, scheduled for release in FY17. • AGM-154A and AGM-154C are fielded weapons and no
- In operational testing, aircrew workload to employ the longer under DOT&E oversight. AGM-154C-1 (JSOW C-1)
weapon increased due to display errors in target location adds moving maritime target capability and the two-way strike
on multiple displays and intermittent errors in the status of common weapon datalink to the baseline AGM-154C weapon.
the weapon entering the datalink and during post-launch
weapon control. The Navy implemented a fix and tested it Mission
post-IOC, eliminating these errors. • Combatant Commanders use aircraft equipped with JSOW A
• Cybersecurity testing of the JSOW C-1 was insufficient to test to conduct pre-planned attacks on soft point and area targets
the cybersecurity vulnerabilities of the weapon and support such as air defense sites, parked aircraft, airfield and port
equipment. facilities, command and control antennas, stationary light
vehicles, trucks, artillery, and refinery components.
System • Combatant Commanders use aircraft equipped with JSOW C
• The AGM-154 JSOW family uses a common and modular to conduct pre-planned attacks on point targets vulnerable to
weapon body capable of carrying various payloads. The blast and fragmentation effects and point targets vulnerable to
JSOW is a 1,000-pound class, air-to-surface glide bomb penetration such as industrial facilities, logistical systems, and
intended to provide low observable, standoff precision hardened facilities.
engagement with launch and leave capability. All variants • Combatant Commanders will use F/A-18 E/F aircraft
employ a tightly coupled GPS/Inertial Navigation System. equipped with JSOW C-1 to conduct attacks against moving
• AGM-154A (JSOW A) payload consists of 145 BLU-97/B maritime targets and aircrew will have the ability to retarget
combined effects submunitions. weapons post launch. JSOW C-1 will retain the JSOW C
• AGM-154C (JSOW C) utilizes an imaging infrared seeker legacy capability against stationary land targets.
and its payload consists of an augmenting charge and follow
through bomb that can be set to detonate both warheads Major Contractor
simultaneously or sequentially. Raytheon Company, Missile Systems – Tucson, Arizona

Activity
• The Navy concluded operational testing and declared IOC of and environmental limitations as well as a problem with the
the JSOW C-1 in June 2016. computer system used to collect the data, many of the planned
• The Navy completed 166 captive flight test (CFT) runs target runs in the approved operational test plan design of
versus stationary land targets and 160 CFT runs versus experiments were not accomplished adequately to fully assess
mobile maritime targets. However, due to range, target,
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weapon accuracy. The computer system that was used to to assess all aspects of JSOW C-1 effectiveness and
collect and store the data was unable to produce complete data survivability.
files for a substantial number of runs against both land and - Weapon accuracy against stationary land targets has been
maritime targets. The end-game portions of many runs were maintained and moving maritime target accuracy was
missing, resulting in incomplete data files that allowed for the demonstrated in seven developmental, integrated, and
collection of reliability data but not weapon accuracy. The operational free flight test events. .Although the data
Navy, through follow-on analysis of captive carry test seeker collected was adequate to demonstrate overall weapon
video, was able to assess weapon seeker tracking, but not accuracy, it was not adequate to test all the factor effects
miss-distance data, for many of the CFT runs. specified in the approved operational test plan. The
• The Navy, through follow-on analysis of captive carry test additional analysis conducted by the Navy on captive carry
seeker video, was able to assess attack success, but not miss- test, while unable to gather miss-distance data, was useful
distance data, on an additional 37 maritime target runs. in assessing weapon performance and likelihood of attack
• In operational testing, the Navy successfully completed one success.
free flight test event versus a stationary land target on October - JSOW C-1 Mean Flight Hours Between Operational
21, 2015, and one free flight test versus a mobile maritime Mission Failure exceeded the requirement value of 95
target on January 26, 2016. hours.
• The Navy unsuccessfully attempted a free flight test versus a - The Navy has reduced the complexity of the PVI in
mobile maritime target on February 9, 2016. the F/A-18E/F H10 software. There remain minor PVI
- This shot was designed to be a long-range Advanced challenges that could prevent successful mission execution.
Targeting Forward Looking Infrared (AT-FLIR) targeting These challenges can be effectively overcome with proper
pod cued shot with handover to a second aircraft for training prior to employment. The Navy has further
weapon control. Due to range weather limitations, the reduced these challenges in F/A-18E/F H12 software,
aircraft providing initial target location and in-flight scheduled for release in FY17.
target updates to the missile was artificially close to the - In operational testing, aircrew workload to employ the
target and passed a very small target location error to the weapon increased due to display errors in target location on
missile to define its search area for the target. However, multiple displays, a persistent incorrect advisory of missing
this aircraft also had an unknown AT-FLIR boresight cryptographic key data, and intermittent errors in the status
error, which resulted in a large error in target location. of the weapon entering the datalink and during post launch
This combination resulted in the target being outside of weapon control. The Navy implemented a fix to the Joint
the missile’s search area and a weapon miss. Due to this Tactical Information Distribution Network Library after
combination of errors, this event was considered a no-test. the completion of operational testing. This fix was tested
- A previous captive carry rehearsal of this event on the during Harpoon II+ testing and in Exercise Valiant Shield
same sortie, with the aircraft at range providing the initial with the JSOW; these errors are no longer present.
target location as designed, and without these errors, was • Cybersecurity testing of the JSOW C-1 was insufficient to
assessed as successful. fully test the cyber vulnerabilities of the weapon and support
• The Navy completed carrier suitability testing in February equipment.
2016, with 10 catapults and 10 arrestments with aircraft
carrying two weapons. The weapons were tested for Recommendations
functionality with no discoveries after this testing. • Status of Previous Recommendations. The Navy has partially
• Post-IOC, the Navy operational units conducted a live fire addressed the previous recommendations. The Navy has
Fleet Exercise, Valiant Shield 16, where seven JSOWC-1 demonstrated a reduction in software-driven failures during the
weapons were successfully employed against a former Oliver extended integrated testing phase. While it has significantly
Hazard Perry class frigate. All weapons dropped impacted the reduced the complex PVI, its plan will not fully address this
ship and achieved high order detonation. issue until the F/A-18E/F H12 software release, scheduled for
• The Navy conducted cybersecurity testing in April 2016, in FY17.
accordance with the DOT&E-approved Test and Evaluation • FY16 Recommendations. The Navy should:
Master Plan and operational test plan – except it did not 1. Continue to reduce the PVI complexity between the JSOW
conduct a complete threat representative Adversarial C-1 and the F/A-18E/F to permit successful mission
Assessment versus JSOW employment. execution.
2. Conduct a more complete Cooperative Vulnerability and
Assessment Penetration Assessment to identify all JSOW and supporting
• DOT&E published a classified FOT&E report in early FY17. equipment vulnerabilities and a threat-representative
This report indicates: Adversarial Assessment, as required by the approved
- Significant amounts of unrecoverable data from operational test plan.
captive carry runs, a no-test live fire event, and limited
cybersecurity testing resulted in limited information

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