BY:

TIME:,_-\;;:J-- -_ µ ~,___
llepublic ,of tb ~bilippine~
~uprem ~ourt
;ffla Ha

FR. CHRISTI~N B. BUENAF , G.R. No. 260374

FIDES M. LIM, MA. EDE~IZA .
HERNANDEZ, • CELIA LAGMA
SEVILLA, ROLAND C. VIBAL, AN
JOSEPHINE LASCANO,

Petitioners,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
FERDINAND ROMUALDEZ
MARCOS, JR., THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by the Senate President, THE .
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
represented by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives,

Respondents.

X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X

BONIFACIO PARABUAC G.R. No. 260426

ILAGAN, SATURNINO
CUNANAN OCAMPO, MARIA
CAROLINA PAGADUAN
ARAULLO, TRINIDAD
GERILLA REPUNO, JOANNA
KINTANAR CARINO, ELISA
TITA PEREZ LUBI, LIZA
LARGOZA MAZA, DANILO·
MALLARI ])ELA FUENTE,
Decision G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

CARMENCITA MENDOZA
FLORENTINO, DOROTEO
CUBACUB ABAYA, JR.,
ERLINDA NABLE SENTURIAS,
SR. ARABELLA CAMMAGAY
BALINGAO, SR. CHERRY M.
IBARDOLAZA, CSSJB, SR.
SUSAN SANTOS ESMILE, SFIC, Present:
HOMAR .RUBERT ROCA
DISTAJO, POLYNNE ESPINEDA
DIRA, JAMES CARWYN
CANDILA, and JONAS ANGELO GESMUNDO, CJ,
LOPENAABADILLA, LEONEN,
CAGUTOA,*
Petitioners, HERNANDO,
LAZARO-JAVIER,
INTING, **
- versus - ZALAMEDA,
LOPEZ, M . V.,
GAERLAN,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROSARIO,
FERDINAND ROMUALDEZ . LOPEZ, J. Y,
MARCOS, JR., THE SENATE OF J?IMAAMPAO,
THE PHILIPPINES, represented MARQUEZ,
by the Senate President, THE KHO, JR.*** _and
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SINGH,.JJ
represented by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives,

Respondents. Promulgated:

J.Il= 28, '2ff22

X ---,------ - --------- - -- ---

DEC I ION

ZALAMEDA, J.:
· On Official Leave. .
.. J. Inting too~ no part due to the prior participation of Commissioner Socorro B. Inting in the assailed
Resolutions of the Commission on E lections.
••• J. Kho, Jr. took no part due to his prior participati n as a former Com.missioner of the Corn.mission on
E lections.
 .,
Decision .) G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

After all, we must sub it to this idea, that the true

principle of a republic is, that t e people should choose whom
they please to govern them. epresentation is imperfect, in
proportion as the current of opular favor is checked. This
great source of free governme t, popular election, should be
perfectly pure, and the most unb unded liberty allowed. 1

The words of Alexander Hamilt n, in his speech before the New York
Ratifying Convention on 21 June 17 8, may have been spoken in another
country and in another century, but th same sentiments still ring true for us
today.

Even as we acknowledge th t elections are the cornerstone of

democracy, we also recognize that an · verwhelming mandate, as reflected in
the votes cast for one candidate cann , by itself, be the sole basis, nor is it
the most compelling reason, to declare· one fit for public office.

In every election, citizens put t fate of the nation on their shoulders

and carry the burden of establishing a nctioning government. The outcome
of an election, in tum, endows the elec ed officials with authority to lead.

The 31,629,783 votes, or 58. 77° o of the votes cast, do, however, lend
more gravity to the Court's exercise o its constitutional power to settle the
present ·controversy. · And in situatio s such as this case, where there is
opposition or doubt on the fitness o a candidate to run for the highest
political office in the land, it is the C urt's duty to step in and be the final
arbiter on the matter. The Court m st tread with deliberate care in its
resolution: any misstep may unravel th very expression of the people's will.
Consequently, it is in the interest of r democracy that any doubts on the
outcome of the elections be dispelled ith a proper and definitive ruling.

Thus, it is not enough for the c_ndidate to obtain the highest number
of votes, said candidate must hold the requisite qualifications and abide by
the required standards set by law to fi e for candidacy. In the same vein, to
undo an election, there must be compe ling and unequivocal evidence of the
candidate's disqualification or failure o meet the requirements for filing a
certificate of candidacy.

1
2 JOHN C. HAMI LTON, ed., THE Wo s OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 444 (I 850).
<https://books.google.com.ph/books?id=OEN.l\lIA AAcAAJ&lpg=PA444&dq=aiexander%20hamilton
%2C%20%22people%20should%20choose%20wh 1n%20they%20p!ease%20to%20govem%20them
%22&pg=PA444#v=onepage&q=alexander%20ha 1ilton,%20%22people%20should%20choose
%20whom%20they%20p1ease%20to%20govern% 0them%22&f=false> (visited 13 June 2022).
Decision G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

Upon a careful and deliberate tudy of the issues raised, the Court
resolves to dismiss the consolidat d petitions. Respondent Ferdinand
Marcos, Jr. (respondent Marcos, Jr.) p ssesses all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications to run for pre ident. Furthermore, his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) contains no false m terial representation and is, therefore,
valid.

G.R. No. 260374 is a Petition for Certiorarl2 with prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Restrainin Order (TRO) (Buenafe Petition).
Petitioners Fr. Chri•stian B. Buena , Fides M. Lim, Ma. Edeliza P.
Hernandez, Celia Lagman Sevilla, Ro ald C. Vibal, and Josephine Lascano
(petitioners Buenafe, et al.) seek to a ul and set aside the Resolution3 dated
17 January 2022 of the Commissio on Elections (COMELEC) Second
Division and the Resolution4 dated 10 ay 2022 of the COMELEC En Banc
in SPA No. 21-156 (DC) entitled, r. Christian B. Buenafe, et al. v.
Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos, Jr.

G.R. No. 260426 is a Petition for Certiorari5 with prayer for the
issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary njunction (Ilagan Petition). Filed by
petitioners Bonifacio Parabuac Ilagan, Saturnina Cunanan Ocampo, Maria
Carolina Pagaduan Araullo, Trinida Gerlita Repuno, Joanna Kintanar
Carino, Elisa Tita Perez Lubi, Liza argoza Maza, Danilo Mallari dela
Fuente, Carmencita Mendoza Floren ino, Doroteo Cubacub Abaya, Jr.,
Erlinda Nable Santurias, Sr. Arabella ammagay. Balingao, Sr. Cherry M.
lbardaloza, CSSJB, Sr. Susan Santos Esmile, SFIC, Bomar Rubert Roca
Distajo, Polynne Espineda Dira, Jame Carwyn Candila, and Jonas Angelo
Lopena Abadilla (petitioners Ilagan, et al.), the petition assails the
Resolution6 dated 10 February 202 of the COMELEC Former First
Division and Resolution7 dated 10 Ma 2022 of the COMELEC En Banc iri
SPA No. 21-212 (DC).

2
Rollo (G.R. No. 260374), pp. 3-71.
3
Id. at 94-125; signed by Presiding Commissioner ocorro B. Inting, Commissioner - Senior Member
Anton io T. Kho, Jr. (now a Member of this Court), nd Commissioner - Junior Member Rey E. B ulay.
Then Co mmissioner Kho, Jr. had a Separate Opinio .
4
Rollo (G.R. No. 260374), pp. 72-82; signed by Ch irman Saidamen B. Pangarungan, Commissioners
Marlon S. Casquejo, Socorro B. lnting, Aimee P. erolino, Rey E. Bulay, and Aimee S. Torrefranca-
Neri. Commissioner George Erwin M. Garcia too no part. Commissioners Casquejo and Inting had
Separate Concurring Opinions.
5
Rollo (G.R. No. 260426), pp. 3-57.
6
Id. at 198-238; signed by Presiding Commissioner Marlon S. Casquejo and Commissioner Aimee P.
Ferolino. Presiding Commissioner Casquejo had a S parate Opinion.
7
Id. at 285-299; signed by Chairman Saidamen B. angarungan, Commissioners Marlon S. Casquejo,
Socorro B. Inting, Aimee P. Ferolino, Rey E. Bulay, nd Ai mee Torrefranca-Neri. Commissioner George
Erwin M. Garcia took no part. Commissioner Casqu ·o had a Separate Concurring Opinion.
Decision 5 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

On 2 November 2021, petition rs Buenafe, et al. filed before the

COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the COC of
respondent Marcos, Jr. under Section 78, in relation to Section 74, Al1icle IX
of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 881, or he Omnibus Election Code (OEC). 8
Petitioners Buenafe, et al. identified t emselves as Filipinos of legal age,
registered voters, and officers of variou non-government organizations and
civic groups. 9 They claim that respon nt Marcos, Jr. made false material
representations under oath when he file his COC for President in the 2022
National E lections with the COMELEC 10

Subsequently, on 20 November 021, petitioners Ilagan, et al. filed

before the COMELEC a Petition for Di qualification of respondent Marcos,
Jr. under Section 12, Article I of th OEC. 11 Petitioners Ilagan, et al.
identified themselves as F ilipinos of le al age who are martial law victims
and rights advocates. 12

Petitioners Buenafe, et al. and Ila an, et al. referred to the same set of
criminal cases for the violation of the ational Internal Revenue Code of
1977, as amended (1977 NIRC), involvi g respondent Marcos, Jr. 13

On 27 June 1990, the Special Ta Audit Team (audit team) created by

then Commissioner of Internal Revenµ Jose U. Ong (Commissioner Ong)
commenced an investigation of the i temal revenue tax and estate tax
liabilities of the late President Ferdina d E. Marcos, his immediate family,.
8
Rollo (G.R. No. 260374), pp. 133-185.
9
Petitioners Buenafe, et al. identified themselves as officers of their respective organizations: (1) Fr.
Christian B. Buenafe, Co-Chairperson of the Task F rce Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP); (2) Fides
Lim, Board Chairperson of the Kapatid-Families & riends of Political Prisoners (KAPATID); (3) Ma.
Edeliza P. Hernandez, Executive Director of the Me ical Action Group, Inc. (MAG); (4) Celia Lagman
Sevilla, Secretary General of the Families of Viet" s of Involuntary Disappearance Inc. (FIND); (5)
Roland C. Vibal, Luzon Representative, Council ofl eaders of the Philippine Alliance of Human Rights
Advocates Inc. (PAHRA); and (6) Josephine Las ano, Executive Director of Balay Rehabilitation
Center, Inc. (BALAY).
10
Rollo (G.R. No. 260374), pp. 163-164.
11
Rollo (G.R. No. 260426), pp. 58-1 L7.
12
Id. at 6 I.
13
Petitioners Buenafe, et al. attached to their petition t e followi ng: (1) the 27 July 1995 Decis ion of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch J 05 ( C) in Criminal Case Nos. Q-91-24390 and Q-91-
24391, Q-92-29212 to Q-92-29217; (2) the 3 I Octo er 1997 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 18569; (3) the 31 August 2001 Entry f Judgment by this Couti in G.R. No. 148434; (4)
the 02 December 2021 Certification issued by the TC that there was no satisfaction of the decision;
and (5) the 14 December 202 1 Certification issued y the RTC that there was no record of payment.
Rollo (G.R. No. 260374), pp. 217-245.

Petitioners Ilagan, et al. attached to their petition the ollowing: (1) the 31 October 1997 Decision of the
CA in in CA-G.R. CR No. 18569 and (2) the 02 De ember 202 1 Certification issued by the RTC that
there is rio record on file of com·pliance of payment and entry in the criminal docket. Rollo (G.R. No.
260426), pp. 168-183 . .
Decision. 6 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

as well as his alleged "associates nd cronies." 14 The audit sought to

determine whether the taxpayer: (1) med income; (2) filed the required
income tax; and (3) made the corresp nding tax payment. 15 The audit team
submitted its findings to Commissione Ong, which prompted him to file a
letter complaint dated 25 July 1991 wit the Secretary of Justice. 16

In Criminal Cases Nos. Q-91-2 391, Q-92-29212, Q-92-29213, and

Q-92-29217, respondent Marcos, Jr. w s charged with violation of the 1977
NIRC for failure to file his income t x returns for the years 1982, 1983,
1984, and 1985. 17 In Criminal Cases os. Q-92-29216, Q-92-29215, Q-92-
29214, and Q-91-24390, respondent arcos, Jr. was charged with violation
of the 1977 NIRC for failure to p y income taxes due, exclusive of
surcharges and interests, in the amount of P107.80 for 1982, P3,911.00 for
1983, Pl,828.48 for 1984, andP2,656. 5 for 1985. 18

Respondent Marcos, Jr. enter d a plea of not guilty during

arraignment. 19 The eight cases were trie jointly.

The Regional Trial Court of Que on City, Branch 105 (RTC) declared
that respondent Marcos, Jr. was electe Vice-Governor, and later Governor,
of the province of !locos Norte from· 3 November 1982 up to 31 March
1986.20 On 27 July 1995, after trial, the TC ruled in this manner:

In view of the foregoing, a d after a thorough and careful

examination of the evidence presen ed, this Court believes that the
prosecution had successfully establish d the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.

However, in Criminal Cases N s. Q-92-29217, Q-92-29212, Q-92-

29213, Q-92-29216, Q-92-29215 and -92-29214, the imposable penalty
must be based on Section 73 since he violations occurred before the
e:ffectivity of PD 1994 and the form r is favorable to the accused. In
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-91-24391 an Q-91-folded page the imposable
penalty as to imprisonment must be ba ed on Section 288 per amendment
under PD 1994 which renumbered ection 73 folded page since the
violation occurred after the e:ffectivity f the Presidential Decree.

WHEREFORE, the Court fin s accused Ferdinand Romualdez

Marcos II guilty beyond reasonable d ubt [of violation of] the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as amended, and sentences him as
follows:

14
Rollo (G.R. No. 260374), pp. 2 17-2 18.
IS Id.
16 Id.
17
Id. at 2 I 7.
18
Id. We refer to the cases collectively as t he RTC Deci ion.
19 ld.
20
Id. at 2 I 9-220.
Decision G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

1. To serve imprisonment of six (6) m nths and pay a fine of P2,000.00 for
each charge in Criminal Cases Nos. -92-29213, Q-92-29212, and Q-92-
29217 for failure to file income tax r turns for the years 1982, 1983, and
1984;

2. To serve imprisonment of six (6) m nths and pay a fine of P2,000.00 for
each charge in Criminal Cases Nos. -92-29216, Q-92-29215, and Q-92-
29214 for failure to pay income taxes ortheyears 1982, 1983, and 1984;

3. To serve imprisonment of three (3) years and pay a fine of P30,000.00

in Criminal Case No. Q-91-24391 for failure to file income tax return for
the year 1985; and

4. To serve imprisonment of three (3) ears and pay a fine of P30,000.00

in Criminal Case No. Q-91-24390 fo failure to pay income tax for the
year 1985; and,

5. To pay the Bureau of Internal Rev nue the taxes due, including such
other penalties, interests, and surcharge .

SO ORDERED. 21

Respondent Marcos, Jr. proceede to appeal the RTC Decision before

the Court of Appeals (CA). In a petit on docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
18569, he questioned the RTC's findin that the failure of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) to comply with xisting laws,22 which required prior
notice to him, did not derogate the due rocess and equal protection clauses
of the Constitution.23

In a Decision dated 31 October 1 97 (CA Decision),24 the CA agreed

with respondent Marcos, Jr. that there w s insufficient notice from the BIR.
It further declared that respondent Marc s, Jr. should not have been held to
answer for the criminal charges filed against him for non-payment of
deficiency income tax liabilities. 25 On the other hand, even as the stipulation
on deficiency income taxes between th BIR and respondent Marcos, Jr.
should still be satisfied since his acquitta does not amount to extinction of
the civil liability, the surcharges shoul not be imposed because these
presuppose notice and demand. 26 Ultimat ly, respondent Marcos, Jr. was not
able to prove that the charges for non- 1ling of the required income tax
returns were incorrect. 21
21
Id. at 223-224.; penned by Judge Benedicto B: Ulep.
22
Respondent Marcos, Jr. referred to the NAT1ONAL TERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1997, Sec.
5I(b), Memorandum Circular No. 12-85, and Revenu Memorandum Orders Nos. 28-83, 38-88, and
10-89.
23
Rollo (G.R. No. 260374), p. 225.
24
Id. at 225-239; penned by Associate Justice Gloria C. Paras and concurred in by Associate Justices
Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros and Oswaldo D. Agcaoili.
25
Id. at 234-236.
26
Id. at 238.
21 Id.
Decision G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

The CA ruled thus:

WHEREFORE, the Decisio of the trial court is hereby

MODIFIED as follows:

1. ACQUITTING the accu ed-appellant of the charges for

violation of Section 50 of the NIRC r non-payment of deficiency taxes
for the taxable years 1982 to 1985 in riminal Cases Nos. Q-02-29216, Q-
92-29215, Q-92-29214, and Q-91- 4390; and FINDING him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation f Section 45 of the NIRC for failure
to file income tax returns for the taxa le years 1982 to 19 85 in Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-91-24391, Q-92-29212, -92-29213, and Q-92-29217;

2. Ordering the appellant to pa to the BIR the deficiency income

taxes with interest at the legal rate unti fully paid;

3. Ordering the appellant to ay a fine of P2,000.00 for each

charge in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-2 213, Q-92-29212 and Q-29217 for
failure to file income tax returns fort years 1982, 1983, and 1984; and
the fine of P30,000.00 in Criminal Cas No. Q-91-24391 for failure to file
income tax return for 1985, with surcha ges.

SO ORDERED. 28

Respondent Marcos, Jr. intended to appeal the CA Decision before

this Court. However, he later filed a Urgent Motion to Withdraw his
Motion for Extension of Time to File a etition for Review. 29 We granted his
motion to withdraw in a Resolution da d 08 August 2001. 30 Our Entry of
Judgment was made on 31 August 2 01. 31 The CA made an Entry of
Judgment on 10 November 1997. 32

On 02 December 2021, the RTC eleased a certification stating that

there is no record on file of respondent arcos, Jr. 's compliance of payment
or satisfaction of its Decision dated 2 July 1995 or that of the CA's
Decision dated 31 October 1997. 33 Nether was there any entry in the
criminal docket of the RTC Decision d ted 27 July 1995 as affirmed and
modified by the CA.34

Petitioners Buenafe, et al. also cit d this Court's ruling in Ferdinand

R. Marcos, 11 V. Court of Appeals. 35 In t at case, We affirmed the Decision
28
Rollo (G.R. No. 260374), pp. 238-239; penned by Asso iate Justice Gloria C. Paras and concurred in by
Associate Justices Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros and Oswa do D. Agcaoili.
29
Id. at 240.
30 Id.
31
Id. at 241.
32
ld. at 242.
33
Id. at 243.
34
Id. at 243; signed by Officer-in-Charge Rowena Sto. Toi as-Bacud.
35
339 Phil. 253 (1997) .
Decision 9 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

dated 29 November 1994 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 31363, which stated

that the deficiency income tax asse sments and estate tax assessments,
amounting . to P23,292,607,638.00, a e already final and unappealable.
Further, We held that the levy of real p operties is a tax remedy permitted by
law.

The COMEL~ Resolutions

In SPA No. 21 -156 (DC), petitio ers Buenafe, et al. argued before the
COMELEC that respondent Marc s, Jr. committed false material
representation when he stated in his OC that he is eligible to run for
President. 36 They maintained that resp ndent Marcos, Jr. 's prior conviction
carries with it the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from
holding any public office, to vote, and t participate in any election. 37

The COMELEC Second Divisi n issued Summons with Notice of

Preliminary Conference dated 11 Nov ber 2021 and directed respondent
Marcos, Jr. to file a verified Answer w'thin a non-extendible period of five
days from receipt. 38 He filed a Motion £ r Extension of Time to File Answer
on 16 November 2021., which the CO LEC Second Division granted on
18 November 2021. The Answer wa filed on 19 November 2021 and
39

included a prayer for Face-to-Face Or 1 Arguments.40 On the same date,

petitioners Buenafe, et al. moved · t reconsider the Order dated 18
November 2021 and insisted that the eriod to file an Answer was non-
extendible.41 Citing its authority to susp nd the reglementary periods in the·
interest of justice, the COMELEC S cond Division denied petitioners
Buenafe, et al. 's motion for reconsiderati

Prior to the preliminary conferenc scheduled on 26 November 2021,

petitioners Buenafe, et al. filed the follo ing: ( 1) Request for the Issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum on 19 Nov ber 2021; (2) Compliance Ex
Abundanti Ad Cautelam with Ex Part Urgent Motion for Issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum on 23 November 2021; (3) Summary of Documents,
also on 23 November 2021; and (4) Bi 1 of Exceptions on 24 November
2021.43

36
Rollo (G.R. No. 260374), pp 133-185.
i, Id.
38
Id. at 246-248.
39
Id. at 249-251 , 248-259.
40
Id. at 306-31 2.
41
Id. at 260-269.
42
Id. at 276-278.
43
Id. at 279-305.
Decision 1 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

Both petitioners Buenafe, et al. and respondent Marcos, Jr. appeared

through counsel.during the prelimina conference on 26 November 2021. 44
Neither party offered any stipulation o facts. 45 In his Memorandum dated 17
December 2021, respondent Marcos, J. objected to petitioners Buenafe, et
al. 's marking of exhibits. 46

In its Order dated 13 Decem er 2021,47 the COMELEC Second

Division denied the following: (1) pef ioners Buenafe, et al. 's Request for
the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecu and Urgent Motion for Issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum; and (2) respon ent Marcos, Jr. 's Prayer for Face-to-
Face Oral Arguments.

Both parties submitted their Me oranda on 20 December 2021. 48 In

its Resolution dated 17 January 2022, 9 the COMELEC Second Division
denied the petition for lack of merit. It considered the issue of whether
respondent Marcos, Jr. 's COC should be denied due course or canceled
under Section 78 of the OEC on the g ound that it contains false material
representations. 50 It went on to discus the merits of the case even as it
declared that the petition should bE? ummarily dismissed for invoking
grounds of disqualification in a petition or cancellation and/or denial of due
course of a COC. 51

The COMELEC Second Division ruled that respondent Marcos, Jr. 's
material representations are not false, i. . , that he is eligible for the position
of President and that he is not perpetuall disqualified from public office. 52 It
underscored that the CA Decision did n t mete out the penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public of ce. 53 · It also found, as a matter of
judicial notice, that respondent Marcos Jr. ceased to be a public officer
when he and his family were forced to 1 ave the Philippines on 25 February
· 1986.54 The penalty of perpetual disqua ification from public office under
Section 286 of Presidential Decree No. D) 1994, which amended Section
286(c) of the 1977 NIRC, thus cannot ap ly to respondent Marcos, Jr. since
he was already a private individual whe he failed to file his 1985 income
tax return. 55 The COMELEC Secon Division also concluded that

44
Id. at 98.
45 Id.
46 ld.
47
Id. at 348-352; signed by Presiding CommissiQner Soc rro B. Inting.
48
Id. at 99.
49
Id. at 94-1 25.
50
ld. at 99.
51
Id. at I 02.
52
ld. at105-ll4.
53 Id.
54
Id. at 110-I 11.
55 Id.
Decision 1 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

respondent Marcos, Jr. had no intenti n to deceive the electorate about his
qualifications for public office. 56

The COMELEC Second Divisio reiterated this Court's declaration in

Republic v. Ferdinand Marcos II and elda R. Marcos 57 that failure to file
an income tax return is not a crime in olving moral turpitude. 58 Moreover,
failure to file income tax returns is not t x evasion. 59

Commissioner (now a Member o this Court) Antonio T. Kho, Jr. filed

a Separate Opinion60 where he agre d with most of the points of the
Resolution. However, he opined that, like its usage in the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), the penalty of perpetual d squalification in the 1977 NIRC is a
principal penalty, which must be exp essly specified in the judgment of
conviction. Thus, he concluded that the is no legal justification to deny due
course to or cancel respondent arcos, Jr. 's COC because his
representations are not false.

On 20 January 2022, petitioners Buenafe, et al. filed a Motion for

Partial Reconsideration with the COME EC En Banc. 61 Respondent Marcos,
Jr. filed a Motion for Leave to file omment/Opposition with attached
Comment/Opposition on 25 January 202 62

In a Resolution dated 10 May 202 ,63 the COMELEC En Banc denied

petitioners Buenafe, et al. 's Mot_ion for artial Reconsideration and affirmed
the Resolution dated 17 January 2022 o the COMELEC Second Division. It
held that the Motion for Partial Reconsi eration failed to raise new matters
or issues that warrant the reversal of the uestioned Resolution.

Commissioners Socorro B. Inting (Commissioner Inting) and Marlon

S. Casquejo (Commissioner Casquejo) ote Separate Concurring Opinions.
Commissioner Inting emphasized that pe itioners Buenafe, et al. deliberately
misquoted the applicable _law, noting that the penalty of imposing both a fine
and imprisonment only became mandat ry on 11 December 1998 with the.
passage of Republic Act No. (RA) 8424 or the 1997 NIRC. Therefore, the
CA cannot apply the penalty of im risonment without violating the
constitutional proscription on ex post fact laws. 64

56
Id. at 114-116.
57
612 Phil. 355 (2009).
58
Ro/lo(G.R.No.260374),pp. 117-123.
H Id. .
60
Id. atl 26-132.
61
Id. at 191-216.
62
Ld. at 76.
63
Id. at 72-82.
64
Id. at 83-87.
Decision 1' G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

On the other hand, Commiss oner Casquejo maintained that the

COMELEC does not have jurisdictio to determine whether the judgment
handed down by a court of law on a ax-related case is void. As such, the
COMELEC does not have the power o review nor amend decisions of the
CA.6s

Meanwhile, in the Resolutio 66 dated 10 February 2022, the

COMELEC Former First Division res lved the Petition for Disqualification
filed by petitioners Ilagan, et al., dock ted as SPA No. 21 -212 (DC), as well
as the two other Petitions for Disquali cation, that of Akbayan, et. al in SPA
No. 21-232 (DC), and of Abubakar · gelen (Mangelen) in SPA No. 21-
233.

Petitioners Ilagan, et al. arg ed that the penalty of perpetual

disqualification from public office s ould rightfully be imposed upon
respondent Marcos, Jr. since he was a public official when he violated the
1977 NIRC. 67 Further assailing the vali ity of the CA Decision, they insisted
that the unlawful deletion of the pe alty of imprisonment rendered the
judgment void and produced no leg 1 effect. 68 They also alleged that
respondent Marcos, Jr. 's conviction a ounts to moral turpitude. 69 Finally,
petitioners Ilagan, et al. asserted that respondent Marcos, Jr. made false
material representation when he stated n Item No. 22 of his COC that "he
has not been found liable for an offens which carries with it the accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification to old public office, which has become
final and executory." 70

The COMELEC Former First .D vision issued the following on 20

December 202 1: (1) Notices and Su mons with Notice of Preliminary
Conference and requested the City Elec ion Officer of 1st District of Pasay
City and Election Officer of Batac, Ilo os Norte to serve the Summons to
respondent Marcos, Jr.; and (2) Notice nd Order to inform the counsel of
petitioners Ilagan, et al. to submit th requisite proof of service. 71 The
following day, Notices and Summons w re personally served to respondent
Marcos, Jr. at his address in Pasay City. 72

The parties marked their documen ary exhibits during the preliminary
conference on 07 January 2022. 73 They were then directed to submit their

61
Id. at 88-93.
66
Rollo (G.R. No. 260426), pp. 198-238.
67
Id. at 204-207.
6s Id.
69 ld.
70
Id. at 207.
71
Id. at 209.
72
Id.
71
fd.at214-215.
Decision l G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

memoranda within forty-eight (48) hours.74 Petitioners Ilagan, et al.

submitted via email their Memoranda n 09 January 2022. 75

At the . scheduled preliminary conference on 06 January 2022,

respondent Marcos; Jr. manifested tha he would not be able to personally
appear before the COMELEC. 76 He sta d that he was in mandatory isolation
after being in close contact with an ind· idual who tested positive for Covid-
19.77 He confirmed this by submittin a medical certificate issued by his·
attending physician. 78

On 11 January 2022, petitioners lagan, et al. filed an Opposition with

Manifestation and Motion for Leave of Com1 to Admit Attached Opposition
with Manifestation. 79 They alleged hat the documents submitted by
respondent Marcos, Jr. should be st ·cken off the records because his
Memorandum lacked a formal offer o evidence. 80 Respondent Marcos, Jr.
submitted a Consolidated Formal Offer [Evidence on 13 January 2021. 81

The COMELEC Former First ivision considered the· following

issues whether respondent Marcos, Jr.: ( 1) is perpetually disqualified from
running for public office; (2) has bee sentenced by final judgment to a
penalty of more than eighteen mont s of imprisonment; (3) has been
convicted by final judgment of a crime · volving moral turpitude; and (4) is
qualified to be elected President of the·P ilippines.82

In a Resolution dated 10 Febru ry 2022, 83 the COMELEC Former

First Division dismissed all three petitio s for lack of merit.

First, the COMELEC Former Fir t Division held that the failure to
file income tax . returns was not or· inally penalized with perpetual
disqualification under the 1977 NIRC. 84 It came into force only upon the
effectivity of its amending law, Preside tial Decree No. (PD) 1994, on O1
January 1986. 85 Moreover, the penalty of perpetual disqualification was
never imposed by the RTC nor by the A. 86 It is a principal penalty, not
merely .accessory, .for violation of the 19 7 NIRC. 87 Thus, the imposition of
74
Id. at 2 16-2 17.
15 Cd.
76
ld. at2 13-214.
77
Id.
7s ld.
79
Id . at 2 16.
80 ld.
Bl Id.
82
Id. at 2 1-7.
83
Id. at l 98-23 8.
84
ld. at 217-222.
s5 Id.
B6 ld.·
s1 Id.
Decision G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

that particular penalty should be incl ed in the dispositive portion of the

decision.88

Second, respondent Marcos, Jr. as not penalized with imprisonment

of more than eighteen months. 89 The C MELEC First Division stressed that
the CA correctly removed the penalty of imprisonment meted by the RTC
and imposed only a fine of P2,000.00 for each charge of failure to file an
income tax return. It held that such odification is best left to the sound
discretion of the CA and is not with n the power of the COMELEC to
review. 90

an
Third, failure to file income t X return is not a crime that involves
moral turpitude. It is not inherent! wrong in the absence of a law
91

punishing it. 92 There is no fraud involve as it is a mere omission on the part

of the taxpayer. 93 Failure to file an inc me tax return is not a fonn of tax
evasion. 94 The COMELEC Former Fir t Division · found no evidence that
respondent Marcos, Jr. voluntarily an intentionally violated the law.95 It
noted the BIR certification that stated th compliance by respondent Marcos,
Jr. with the CA Decision_and the payme t of deficiency taxes and fines. 96

Fourth, respondent Marcos, Jr. is qualified to be elected as President

of the Philippines. 97 His sentence to pay fines does not fall under any of the
instances when a person may be dis ualified to hold public office as
provided in Section 12 of the OEC,, amely: (1) declared by competent
authority insane or . incompetent; (2) sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or fo any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than ei hteen months; or (3) sentenced by
final judgment for a crime involving mo 1turpitude. 98

Commissioner Casquejo wrote Separate Concurring Opinion, 99

underscoring petitioners' lack of standin to question the CA's judgment. He
further averred that the COMELEC ·11 not exercise its jurisdiction to
modify a decision that has long been fi al. 10° Commissioner Casquejo also
asserted that the amendment introduced y Section 252( c) of the 1997 NIRC

88 ld.
89
Id. at 223-227.
90
ld.
91
ld. at 227-235.
92 ld.
93 fd.
94
Id.
9s Id.
96 Id.
9
' Id. at 235-237.
9s Id.
99
Id. at 240-250.
ioo Id.
Decision 1 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

shall not be retroactively applied to espondent Marcos, Jr. Finally, non-

filing of income tax returns does not eq ate to moral turpitude. 101

Petitioners Ilagan, et al., along ith the two other sets of petitioners,
filed their respective motions for recon ideration. 102

In its Resolution dated ·l O Ma 2022, 103 the COMELEC En Banc

denied the motions for reconsideration filed by petitioners Ilagan, et al., as
well as those filed by Akbayan, et al., and Mangelen. The COMELEC En
Banc held that all three motions fail d to raise new matters that would
warrant a reversal of the COMELEC F ·mer First Division's Resolution. 104

Commissioner Casquejo agai wrote a Separate Concurring

5
Opinion, t0 asserting that respondent M rcos, Jr. met the requirements for a
candidate for President. Hence, there w s no reason to disqualify respondent.
Marcos, Jr. 106 He likewise reminded the public that the COMELEC will not
be used to declare as void a judgment th t has long attained finality. 107

The Elections and th Present Petitions

The National Elections proceede on 09 May 2022, as scheduled.

Respondent Marcos, Jr. garnered 31,62 ,783 votes, or 58.77% of the votes
cast. ios

The Buenafe Petition, which also sought the issuance of a TRO to

enjoin Congress from canvassing the otes cast for President and from
proclaiming respondent Marcos, Jr. as the duly elected President of the
Philippines, was filed on 18 May 2022 109 Respondent Marcos, Jr. filed a
Manifestation to the Buenafe Petition t e next day where he argued that
canvassing of both Houses is mandatory. 1 0

101 Id.
102
Id. at 251-279.
103
Id. at 285-299.
104 Id.
105
Id. at 300-3 11 .
106 Id.
101 Id.
108
Rollo (G.R. No. 260374), pp. 66 1-662.
109
Id. at 3.
110
Id. at 496-50 I.
Decision .l G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

This Court required respondent arcos, Jr. to file his Comment to the
Buenafe Petition on 19 May 2022. 11 1 The Comment was filed on 31 May
2022, 112 or before the deadline on 03 Ju e 2022.

In the meantime, Congress c nvened as the National Board of

Canvassers (NBOC) in a joint sessi n on 24 May 2022.113 Respondent
Marcos, Jr. was proclaimed as the wi ing presidential candidate on 25 May
2022. 114

The Ilagan Petition was also 1led on 18 May 2022. 115 However,
petitioners Ilagan, et al. were further r quired by this Court to comply with
certain procedural requirements. In n Order dated 30 May 2022, We
ordered the following to submit thei respective comments: COMELEC;
respondent Marcos, Jr.; Senate of the P "lippines, represented by the Senate
President; and House of Representativ s, represented by the Speaker of the
House. 116 The Court further directed t e consolidation of the Buenafe and
Ilagan Petitions. 11 7

Respondent Marcos, Jr. filed his omment on the Buenafe Petition on

19 May 2022. 118 Subsequently, he ma ifested that he was adopting said
Comment to the Ilagan Petition ins far as the arguments therein are
applicable, averring thus:

xxxx
5. The Buenafe Petition is a• P tition to Cancel or to Deny Due
Course [Respondent Marcos, Jr. 's] Cert ficate of Candidacy .under Section
78 of the OEC while the Ilagan Petitio is a Petition for Disqualification
under Section 12. While there are stark differences between these two (2)
kinds of election cases, viz, they have d fferent grounds, different periods,
and different effects, both the Buenafe nd Ilagan Petitions are based on
the Court of Appeals Decision in Peopl of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand
R. Marcos, Jr., CA-G.R. CR No. 18569, ctober 31, 1997. 11 9

Issue

Petitioners Buenafe, et al. raise the following issues:

111
fd.at478-480.
112
Id. at 526-576.
113
fd. at 655 .
114 Id.
115
Rollo (G.R. No. 26042.6 ), p. 3.
116
Id. at 323-325.
111 Id.
118
Rollo (G.R. No. 260374);- Pl'.'· 5·26-576.
11 9
Id. at 830.
Decision 1 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

I. Whether the COMELEC co mitted grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lac).<. or excess of jurisdi tion in refusing to cancel the subject
COC of Respondent Marcos, Jr. and r ling that:

A. The Petition to Cancel OC should be summarily dismissed

for allegedly combining · rounds for disqualification and
cancellation of COC, suppose ly in violation of the COMELEC
Rules.

B. Respondent Marcos, Jr. s material representations, i.e., that

he is eligible for the position o President and that he has not been
convicted of a crime punish d with the penalty of perpetual
disqualification from public of ce, are not false;

C. The accessory penalty f Perpetual Disqualification is not

deemed imposed by operation flaw in the judgment of conviction
ofrespondent Marcos, Jr.;

D. Respondent Marcos, Jr. status as a public officer at the

time of the commission of the ffense he was convicted of is not a
conclusive and incontrovertible act, [and]

E. Respondent Marcos, Jr. did not deliberately attempt to

mislead, misinform, or deceive t e electorate.

II. Whether the subject COC of spondent Marcos, Jr. should be

cancelled and the respondent declared s not having been a candidate in
the 2022 National Elections.120

Meanwhile, petitioners Ilagan, et al. make the following assignment

of errors:

[The] COMELEC (En Banc) a ted without or in excess of its

jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of disc tion amoW1ting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in denying the motion for reconsideration and affirming the
COMELEC (Former First Division) Res lution:

A. xxx in ruling that petitioners faile to raise new matters that would
warrant the reversal of the COMELEC ( ormer First Division) Resolution.

B. xxx in ruling that petitioners f. led to raise issues and provide

grounds to prove that the evidence is ins fficient to justify the COMELEC
(Former First Division) Resolution.

C. xxx in ruling that the petitioners ailed to raise issues and provide
grounds to prove that the COMELEC (F rmer First Division) Resolution
is contrary to law:

1. Respondent convicted cand date Marcos, Jr. was perpetually

disqualified from running for publi office.
120
Id. at 33.
Decision 1 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

2. Respondent convicted andidate Marcos, Jr. was meted a

penalty of imprisonment of m re than eighteen (18) months or for
a crime involving moral turpit de.

3. Failure to file income ax returns for four (4) consecutive

years is inherently wrong and onstitutes moral turpitude. 121

Respondent Marcos, Jr., for his p rt, asserts the following:

Issu s

1. Whether .the Supreme Cowt st 11 has jrnisdiction to rule upon the

eligibility of [respondent Marcos, Jr.].

2. Whether the temporary restrain g order sought for by petitioners

[Buenafe, et al.] shall be issued.

3. Whether the [COMELEC] co

·tted grave abuse of discretion in
ruling that [respondent Marcos, Jr. did not commit any material
misrepresentation in his COC.

Argum nts

I. The "Petition" must be dismiss d for lack of jurisdiction. At this

point, it is only the Presidential Elector 1 Tribunal which may inquire into
the eligibility of [respondent].-

II. The Honorable Court is without urisdiction to issue the temporary

restraining order ("TRO'') and/or t:nj in and restrain Congress from
canvassing the votes cast for [respond 1t]. In addition, the request for a
temporary restraining order has be~ome oot. ·

III. As~µming with.out conc.eding t at the Supreme Court still has

jurisdiction, the Petition must still be dis issed· for lack of merit.

a. The Decision of the CO. 1ELEC Second Division and the

COMELEC . En Banc 011 th absence of any false material
representation in the COC o [respondent] is a finding that is
entitled to great weight and m st be accorded full respect.

h.. [The] COMELEC corre ly ruled that the petition for

cancellation was subject to SU mary dismissal.

c. [Respondent Marcos, Jr.] di.d not commit any material

misrepresentation in his COC.

1. None of
the grou .els alleged by Petitioners is
MATER1AL.

121
Rolla (0 .R. Ne,. 7.60426), pp )5-16.
4
Decision G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

2. [Respondent] did ot commit any false representation

in his COC beca e the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification w never imposed against him.

1. Section 25 (c) of the 1977 National Internal

Revenue C de, as amended, is not ipso facto
imposed up n the mere fact of conviction.

11. Jalosjos, Jr. . COMELECfinds no application in

the case at b

111. The Court o Appeals did not impose the penalty

of perpetual disqualification against [respondent
Marcos, Jr.J;

1v. [Petitioner B enafe, et al. 's] claim that the status

of [responde t Marcos, Jr.] as a public officer at
the time of e commission of the offense is a
"conclusive nd incontrovertible fact" is bereft
of basis.

3. [Respondent Marcos, r.] had no intention to mislead,

misinform, and deceive he electorate. 122

The COMELEC, meanwhile, a ues for the dismissal of both the

Buenafe and Ilagan Petitions. We identi the grounds it raised as follows:

[For both Buenafe and Ilagan Petitions

I. The petition does not present actual case or controversy since it

has been rendered moot and acade ic by the proclamation made by
Congress acting as NBO.C that xxx r pondent [Marcos, Jr.] is the duly
elected President of the Philippines. 12}

II. In any event, the petition rais s the matter of xxx respondent
[Marcos, Jr. 's] qualifications which no falls under the jurisdiction of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal. 124

III. xxx Respondent [Marcos, Jr.] is eligible candidate, and his COC
is valid. Therefore, the candidate with the next highest number of votes
cannot be proclaimed as President. 125

[For the Buenafe Petition]

IV. Even assuming that the Honora le Court has jurisdiction over the
instant case, the COMELEC did not c mmit grave abuse of discretion
an1ounting to lack or excess of juri diction in issuing the assailed
resolutions.
122
Rollo (G.R. No. 260374), pp. 540-542.
123
COMELEC's Comment (G.R. No. 260374), p. 9; (G. No. 260426), p. I 0.
124 Id.
125
COMELEC's Comment (G.R. No. 260374), p. 11 ; (G . . No. 260426), p. 11
Decision 2 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

A. The petition failed to impute ave abuse of discretion on the part

of the COMELEC, thus, the Honorao e Court should uphold the decision
of the administrative body created by the Constitution with the expertise,
specialized skills, and knowledge on t e issue.

B. The petition for cancellation COC filed before the COMELEC

included grounds for disqualificatio of a candidate, in violation of
Section 1, Rule 23 of the COMELEC ules of Procedure.

C. xxx Respondent (Marcos, Jr. 's act of signing and subscribing to

the COC that he is eligible for offi e under Item 11 thereof does not
constitute material misrepresentation o his eligibility.

D. xxx Respondent [Marcos, Jr. s] checking of the "No" box in

question no. 22 in the COC do s not constitute false material
representation as he was never convict d of an offense which imposed the
penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office.

E. The accessory penalty of perpet al disqualification was not deemed

imposed by operation of law in th judgment of conviction of xxx
[respondent Marcos, Jr.]

1. Perpetual disqualification di not attach as an accessory penalty

considering that the prmc1 al penalty of imprisonment was
deleted by the CA.

11. The failure to file an ITR do s not amount to a crime involving

moral turpitude which c -ries the penalty of perpetual
disq ualification.

m. xxx respondent [Marcos, Jr. ] status as a public officer at the

time of the commission oft e offense is not a conclusive and
incontrovertible fact. 126

[For the Ilagan Petition]

V. The COMELEC did not commit rave abuse of discretion.

A. The evidence of xxx respondent Marcos, Jr.] is sufficient to justify

the Resolution of the COMELEC Form r First Division.

B. The Honorable Court should sustain the decision of the

administrative body with the presumed xpertise in the laws it is entrusted
to enforce.

C. The conviction of xxx responde t [Marcos, Jr.] for failure to file

his [income tax returns] did not disqua ify him from holding any public
office.

D. xxx [R]espondent [Marcos, Jr. 1s qualified to be elected as

President of the Philippines.
126
COMELEC's Comment (G.R. No. 260374), pp. 9-11.
Decision 21 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

i. The CA Decision is ot void and has already attained

finality.

ii. xxx [R]espondent [Mar os, Jr.] has been sentenced by final
judgment to a p~nalty of more than 18 months of
imprisonment.

iii. xxx [R]espondent [Mar os, Jr.] has not been sentenced by
final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.

VI. Petitioners [Ilagan, et al.] are not entitled to the issuance of a

TRO/Writ of Preliminary Injunction. 127

The Senate filed a Manifestation 1 8 in lieu of Comment. It stated that

the Senate and the House of Representat ves have duly approved to proclaim
· respondent Marcos, Jr. as.the duly electe President of the Philippines.

The House of Representatives, o the other hand, filed an Opposition

Ad Cautelam 129 in lieu of Comment. It rgues that this Court does not have
jurisdiction to enjoin or restrain Congre s in its functions as the NBOC for
the positions of the President and Vice resident. Even assuming arguendo
that this Court has the jurisdiction or au hority to issue the TRO prayed for
in the Buenafe Petition, the acts sought t be enjoined are fait accompli.

Ruling of th Court

The consolidated petitions are D SMISSED. The Court holds that

respondent Marcos, Jr. is qualified to ru for President, and that his COC is
valid.

This Court is well-aware of its sin ular responsibility. This is not the
first time that We are asked to decide w ether a candidate for President is
qualified after elections have been condu ted, votes have been counted, and
winners have been proclaimed. There is recedent to declare this case moot
had respondent Marcos, Jr. not garnered t e highest number of votes. 130

In the cases where the qualificatio s of a presidential candidate were

questioned, the issues sought to be d termined involved questions on

127
COMELEC's Comment (G.R. No. 260426), pp. I 0-1 1.
128
Rollo (G.R. No. 260374), pp. 582-59 1.
129
Id. at 637-649. .
13 0
See Pormento v. Estrada, 643 Phil. 735 (2010).
Decision 22 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

citizenship, 131 and both citizenship a d residency. 132 These issues were
definitively decided before the conduct f the elections.

The cases involving the winners of the two highest positions in the
Executive branch that were decided aft the conduct of the elections did not
question the qualifications of the .c and"dates or the validity of their COCs.
All of these cases were election protest , 133 adjudicated by this Court acting
as the Presidential El~cto~al Tribunal (PET), where the second placers
questioned the number of votes •Of the roclaimed winners and sought to be
proclaimed in their stead.

This Court, in all the cases involving controversies over the

candidacies or election of the Presid nt or Vice-President, has always
asserted its jurisdiction to decide the cases brought before it under the
authority vested upon it by the Constit tion. We take the same stance here
and decide on the issues raised in the pre ent Petitions.

We deem it necessary to state at e outset that the qualifications for

the candidates for President are not li nited to those enumerated in the
Constitution. Section 2, Article VII of th 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. No person may be electe President unless he, is a natural-

born citizen of the Philippines, a register d voter, able to read and write, at
least forty years of age on the day of t 1e election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immedi tely preceding such election.

Additionally, a candidate for Presi ent may also find his or her COC
canceled under grounds found in statut s such as the OEC. Specifically,
Section 69 of the OEC has laid down the requirements to weed out nuisance
candidates for elective positions, includin those for President. 134 It reads:

Sec. 69. Nuisance candidates. - The Commission may motu

proprio or upon a verified petition of interested party, refuse to give
due course to or cancel a certificate of c didacy if it is shown that said
certificate has been filed to put the lection process in mockery or
disrepute or to cause confusion among t e voters by the similarity of the
names of the registered candidates or by ther circumstances or acts which
clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for

131
Tecson v. COMELEC, 468 Phil. 42 1 (2004).
132
Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, 782 Phil. 292 (20 16).
133
Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, PET Case No. 00 I, 13 February 1996, 323 Phil. 665 (1996); Poe v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, PET Case No. 02, 29 March 2005 494 Phil. 137 (2005); Legarda v. De Castro.
PET Case No. 003, l8 January 2008, 566 Phil. 123 ( 008); Roxas v. Binay, PET Case No. 004, 16
August 2016, 793 Phil. 9 (2016); Marcos, Jr: v. Robredo PET Case No. 005, 15 October 20 19.
134
This Court decreed Eddie Conde Gil (Gil v. COMELE , G. R. No. 162885, 27 April 2004), Rizalito Y.
David (David v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 22 1768, 12 Janu ry 20 l6), Simeon de Castro (De Castro, Jr. v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 22 1979, 02 February 20 1602 Feb uary 20 16), and Rev. Elly Velez Lao Pamatong
(Pamatong v. COMELEC, 470 Phil. 7 l 1 (2004)) as nuisa ce candidates fo r President.
Decision 23 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

the office for which the ce1tificate of candidacy has been filed and thus
prevent a faithful determination of the t ue will of the electorate.

I. A petition to deny due course r to

cancel a COC is distinct fro a
petition for disqualification

We acknowledge that there are distinctions between the remedies

sought by the petitioners in these cons lidated cases. The present petitions
stem from two cases before the COMEL C: (1) SPA Case N o. 21 -156 (DC),
filed by petitioners Buenafe, et al., whi h sought to deny due course to or
cancel respondent Marcos, Jr.'s COC; d (2) SPA No. 2 1-212 (DC), filed
by petitioners Ilagan, et al., which soug t to disqualify respondent Marcos,
Jr. as a candidate for President.

A petition to deny due course t or cancel COC 1s governed by

Section 78 in relation to Section 74, of th OEC, to wit:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due c urse to or cancel a certificate of

candidacy. - A verified petition seekin to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed y the person exclusively on the
ground that any material representati n contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The etition may be filed at any time
nQt later than twenty-five days from the ime of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election.

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate o candidacy. - The certificate of

candidacy shall state that the person fili g it is announcing his candidacy
for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for
Member of the Batasang Pambans , the province, including its
component cities, highly urbanized city o district or sector which he seeks
to represent; the political paity to which he belongs; civil status; his date
of bi1th; residence; his post office addr ss for all election purposes; his
profession or occupation; that he will su port and defend the Constitution
of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that
he will obey the laws, legal orders, and ecrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not ape manent resident or immigrant to
a foreign country; that the obligation i1 posed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the
facts stated in the certificate of candid cy are true to the best of his
knowledge. xxx (Emphases supplied.)
Decision 2 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

On the other hand, a petitio for disqualification may be filed

pursuant to Sections 12 or 68 of the 0 C. 135 The provisions under the OEC
state, in relevant part:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - 1y person who has been declared by

competent authority insane or incomp tent, or has been sentenced by final
judgment for subversion, insurrectio1 , rebellion or for any offense for
which he has been sentenced to a pena ty of more than eighteen months or
for a crime involving moral turpit e, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any office, unle s he has been given plenary pardon
or granted amnesty.

These disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be

deemed removed upon the declaratio by competent authority that said
insanity or incompetence had been re oved or after the expiration of a
period of five years from his service f sentence, unless within the same
period he again becomes disqualified.

XXX

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - A y candidate who, in an action or

protest in which he is a party is declar d by final decision of a competent
court guilty of, or found by the Commi sion of having (a) given money or
other material consideration to influen e, induce or corrupt the voters or
public officials performing electoral unctions; (b) committed acts of
terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by t is Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited unde Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104;
or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 5 and 261 , paragraphs d, e, k, v,
and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be di qualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected,, fr m holding the office. Any person
who is a permanent resident of or an i1 igrant to a foreign country shall
not be qualified to run for any elective ffice under this Code, unless said
person has waived his status as perm 1ent resident or in1migrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the r sidence requirement provided for
in the election laws.

135
See Republ ic Act 7 160, Sec. 40, or the LOCAL G VERNMENT CODE (LGC), for grounds for
disqualification for candidates to local elective positio s.

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The followin~ persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense i va lving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, ithin two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an adm ini trative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgme nt for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political c ses here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or thqse wl o have acqu ired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avai l of the same right after the effectivity fthis Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-m inded.
Decision 25 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

A. A petition to deny due c urse or to

cancel a COC shares simil rities with
a petition for disqualificati n

Apart from having the same res ondent, these consolidated petitions
share further similarities. For one, they re both pre-election remedies with a
similar objective: to prevent a purporte ly ineligible candidate from running
for an elective position. 136 In addition, hey can be filed by any registered·
voter or any duly registered political party, organization, or coalition of
political parties. 137

On this score, and based on ou examination of the records, there

appears to be no real disagreement on t e matter of petitioners' standing to
file these cases. The records show that the present Petitions were filed by
petitioners Buenafe, et al. and Ilagan, t al. in their capacities as citizens,
registered voters, martial law victims nd rights advocates. 138 Although the
COMELEC did not appear to have any ssues on the matter initially, it now
contests petitioners' standing, on the t ory that the instant petitions have
been rendered moot by respondent Marc s, Jr. 's supervening proclamation. 139
The COMELEC maintains that since t e issues raised against respondent
Marcos, Jr.'s qualifications are essentiall election contests, which fall under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the PET, 140 petitioners, to have standing, must
show proof that they were either a regi tered candidate for the presidency
who received the second or third highe t number of votes, or a voter who
voted in the May 2022 elections. 141

We will discuss the questions of ootness and jurisdiction in another

part of this Decision. Nevertheless~ and or purposes of settling the issue of
standing, suffice to state that petitione s, as the parties aggrieved by the
denial of their respective petitions befor the COMELEC, are allowed under
the Rules of Court to assail the judgme or final order or resolution of the
COMELEC before the Supreme Court t ough a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 .142 Significantly, respondent Mar os, Jr. never challenged petitioners'
standing in any of the pleadings he fil d before the COMELEC and this
Court. 143

136
Munder v. COMELEC, 675 Phil. 300 (2011 ).
137
COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, Rules 23 and 5, as amended by Resolution N o. 9523 .
138
Rollo (G.R. No. 260374), pp. 8-9; rollo (G.R. No. 260 26), p. 61.
139
ld. at 664-669.
140
ld. at 672.
14 1
Id. at 672-674.
142
RULES OF COURT, Rule 64, Sec. 2.
143
See Rollo (G.R. No. 260374), pp.306-31 2.
Decision 26 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

B. A petition to deny due cou 'Se to or to

cancel a COC and a · etition f or
disqualification are differe t remedies

Ultimately, however, a petition o deny due course to or to cancel

COC and a petition for disqualificatio are "different remedies, based on
different grounds, and resulting in differ nt eventualities." 144

First, the two remedi_e s are· anch red on distinct grounds: whereas an
action under Section 78 of
the O C is concerned with the false
representation by a candidate as to m terial information in the COC, 145 a
petition for disqualification relates to the declaration of a candidate as
ineligible or lacking in quality or a complishment fit for the elective
position said candidate is seeking. 146 To rosper, the former requires proof of
deliberate attempt to mislead, mis.info , or hide a fact 147 relating to the
candidate's requisite residency, age, citizenship, or any other legal
qualification necessary to run for electiv office; 148 the latter, possession of a
disqualification as declared by a final d cision of a competent court, or as
found by the Commission. 149 •

Second, they have different p resc iptive p eriods : a petition to deny

due course to or cancel a COC may be 1led within five days from the last
. day of filing of COCs, but not later than 5 days from the filing of the COC
sought to be canceled; a petition for dis ualification may be filed any day
after the last day of the filing of COC, but not later than the date of the
proclamation. 150

Third, both have markedly distin t effects: a disqualified person is

merely prohibited to continue as a ca didate, while the person whose
certificate is canceled or denied due co ·se is not treated as a candidate at
all. 151 Moreover, a disqualified candidate may still be substituted 152 if they

144
Dela Cruz v. COMELEC, 698 P hil. 548 (2012), citing ermin v. COMELEC, 595 Phil. 449 (2008).
145
Munder v. COMELEC, s upra.
146
Amora, J,: v. COMELEC, 655 Phil. 467 (20 I I).
147
Hayundini v. COMELEC, 733 Phil. 822 (2 01 4).
148
Maruhom v. COMELEC, 6 11 Phil. 50 I (2009).
149
Francisco v. COMELEC, 83 1 Phil. 106 (201 8).
150
Munder v. COMELEC, s upra.
151
Fermin v. COMELEC, supra.
152
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification r withdrawal of another. - lf after the last day
for the fili ng of certificates of candidacy, an official and idate of a registered or accredited political
pa1ty dies, withdraws or is disqualified fo r any cause, nly a person belonging to, and certified by, the
same po litical party may file a ce1tificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, w ithd rew or
was disqualified. The substitute candidate nomina ted by the political party concern ed may fi le his
certificate of candi dacy for the office affected in accor ance with the preceding sections not later than
mid-day of election day of the e lection. ff the deatl , withdrawal or disqualification should occur
between the day before the election a nd mid-day of ele tion day, said certificate may be filed with any
board of e lection inspectors in the political subdivision here he is candidate or, in case of ca ndidates to
be voted fo r by the enti re e lectorate of the country, with he Commission.
Decision 27 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

had a valid C0C in the first place. Ho ever, one whose C0C was denied
due course or canceled cannot be subsf uted because the law considers him
or her to not have been a candidate at al .153

While the grounds for a petitio for disqualification are limited to

Sections 12 and 68 of the OEC, and, for local elective officials, Section
40 of the LGC, the sa~e grou~ds ma .be invoked in a petition to deny
due course to or cancel COC if t e_se Involve the representations
required under Section 78 . . -

The case of Chua v. COMELEC 15 (Chua) is instructive on this point.

In Chua, a Petition to Deny Due Cour e to and/or Cancel C0C was filed
against Arlene Chua on the date of her roclamation as councilor based on
the allegation that she was a dual citiz n and a permanent resident of the
United States of America (U.S .). Notwit standing the caption of the petition,
the CO.MELEC considered the same a one for Disqualification since the
ground cited falls under Section 40 of he LGC. As such, the C0MELEC
found that the petition was timely led pursuant to Rule 25 of the
C0MELEC Rules of Procedure, as a ended. The Court, faced with the
issue of whether the petition was for di ualification or to deny due course
to or cancel C0C, elucidated that th choice of remedy lies with the
petitioner, to wit:

It is true that under Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code,

persons who file their certificates of c idacy declare that they are not a
permanent resident or immigrant to a for ign country. Therefore, a petition
to deny due course [to] or cancel a cert·ficate of candidacy may likewise
be filed against a pe1n1anent resident f a foreign country seeking an
elective post in the Philippines on the ground of material
misrepresentation in the certificate of c didacy.

What remedy to avail himself or herself of, however, depends on

the petitioner. If the false material rep esentation in the certificate of
candidacy relates to a ground for disq alification, the petitioner may
choose whether to file a petition to d ny due course [to] or cancel a
certificate of candidacy or a petition fo disqualification, so long as the
petition filed complies with the require ents under the law.

Before the Commission on Elect ons, private respondent Fragata

had a choice of filing either a petition t deny due course [to] or cancel
petitioner's certificate of candidacy or a etition for disqualification. xxx
(Emphasis supplied.)

As in Chua, Section 12 of the 0 C may likewise be invoked as a

ground for a petition to deny due course o or cancel C0C since Section 74
of the 0 EC requires a person filing a CO to declare that he is eligible for
153
Miranda v. Abaya, 370 Phil. 642 ( 1999).
154
783 Phil. 876 (20 I 6).
Decision 28 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

office. Thus, in Ty-Delgado v. HRET 55 Ty-Delgado), We found that therein

petitioner committed fals.e material re !esentation in his COC as to his
eligibility given that he had been convi ted by a final judgment for a crime
involving moral turpitude, which is a ground for disqualification under
Section 12 of the OEC.

II This Court has jurisdiction over the

present petitions

A. The p etitions are not moot

A case is moot when a superven ng event has terminated the legal

issue between the parties, such that this ourt is left with nothing to resolve.
It can no longer grant any relief or enfor e any right, and anything it says on
the matter will have no practical use or alue. 156 This is not the scenario We
have here.

The issues raised in both the Bue afe and Ilagan Petitions - whether
respondent Marcos, Jr. is guilty of aterial misrepresentation of his
eligibility and whether he suffers any o the grounds for disqualification -
are not rendered moot by his receipt of th highest number of votes or by his
subsequent proclamation. The petitions aise fundamental questions as to
whether respondent Marcos, Jr. is qualifi d to be a candidate for President.
These are actual and justiciable controve sies that the Court must resolve in
the exercise of its judicial power. • W cannot stress enough that the
qualification of th_e candidate is not waiv d by his or her subsequent election
to the office. A candidate may obtain 99° of the votes cast, but if he or she·
is found to possess any of the grounds fo disqualification, our laws prohibit
such candidate from occupying public office.

In its Comment, the CO:l\.1ELEC a ues that the case was mooted by
the completion of the electoral proces , where respondent Marcos, Jr.
obtained an overwhelming number of v tes, . and his proclamation as the
President-elect. 157

However, the cases relied upon by t e COMELEC are not on all fours
with the present Petitions. In Perez v. Pro ·ncial Board ofNueva Ecija, 158 We
ruled that a provincial fiscal is deemed ip o facto resigned from office upon
his filing of a COC for Mayor of Cabana an City, Nueva Ecija. Meanwhile,

Ill 779 Phil. 268 (20 16).

156
Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. v. AZ Cornmuni ations, Inc. , G.R. No. 196902, 13 July 2020,
citing Penafrancia Sugar Mill, Inc. v. Sugar Regulato,y dminislration, 728 Phil. 535 (20 I 4).
157
Rollo (G.R. No. 260374), pp. 665-666.
158
198 Phil. 572 ( 1982).
Decision 29 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

in Morelos v. Dela Rosa, 159 .We dismisse a petition to annul the election of
barrio officials for being moot due to th expiration of their term of office.

The COMELEC's use of 0 pronouncement in Quizon v.

COMELEC' (Quizon) should likewise e clarified. To justify overlooking
60

irregularities in the COC, We explained:

As to the alleged irregularity · the filing of the certificate of

candidacy, it is important to note that t 1is Court has repeatedly held that
provisions of the election law regarding certificates of candidacy, such as
signing and swearing on the san1e, as ell as the information required to
be stated therein, are considered m ndatory prior to the elections.
Thereafter, they are regarded as merely irectory to give effect to the will
of the people. In the instant case, Puno on by an overwhelming number
of votes. Technicalities should not be p rmitted to defeat the intention of
the voter, especially so if that intentio is discoverable from the ballot
itself, as in this case. 161 (Emphasis suppli d and citations omitted.)

We underscore, however, that ur pronouncement in Quizon is

limited to technical irregularities in the OC (such as signing and swearing
on the same and information required to e stated) and not the eligibility of a
candidate.

B. The conditions for the zling of

petitions before the Pres dential
electoral Tribunal have not b en met

Respondent Marcos, Jr. and the C MELEC argue that this Court has
no jurisdiction over the Petitions since e elusive jurisdiction now lies with
the PET. 162

The last paragraph of Section 4, ticle VII of the 1987 Constitution

provides that "[t]he Supreme Court, sittin en bane, shall be the sole judge
of all contests, relating to the election, etums, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may pro ulgate rules for the purpose." This
is echoed in Rule 13 of A.M. No. 10-4 9-SC, or the 2010 Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, which rea s:

Rule 13. Jurisdiction. - The Tribur al shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, tetur s, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President of the Philippi es.

159
190 Phil. 562 (1981 ).
160
569 Phil. 323 (2008). See also Sinaca v. Mula and COM LEC, 373 Phil. 896 (1999).
161 Id.
162
Rollo (G.R. No. 260374), pp. 542-543 and 669-672.
Decision 30 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

1. An election is initiated
through a petition against .a
winning candidate w o has assumed
office

The 1987 Constitution mandates the creation of Electoral Tribunals

for only four offices: President, Vice-Pr sident, Senator, and Member of the
House of Representatives. It is -recogniz d that Section 4, Article VII, which
refers to the President and Vice-Presi_den, is similarly worded to Section 17,
Article VI, which refers to Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives. Both provisions describe the respective Electoral Tribunals
as being the "sole judge" of all contests elating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective subjects The rulings on the trigger point for
the exercise of the jurisdiction of the S nate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and
the House of Representatives Electoral T ibunal (HRET) are thus instructive
for identifying when the jurisdiction oft e PET should be invoked.

Our ruling in Reyes v. Com 1.ission on Elections 163 (Reyes)

painstakingly described the conditions fi the exercise of the jurisdiction of
the BRET:

First, the HRET does not acqui e jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner's qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions, unless a petition is duly fil d with said tribw1al. Petitioner
has not averred that she has filed such ac ion.

Second, the jurisdiction of the BRET begins only after the

candidate is considered a Member oft House of Representatives, as
stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 17. The Sena e and the House of

Representatives shall each ha e an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of 11 contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifica ions of their respective
Members.

As held in Marcos v. C, the HRET does not have

jurisdiction over a candidate who is n t a member of the House of
Representatives, to wit:

As to the House of epresentatives Electoral

Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the
issue of petitioner's qualificatior s after the May 8, 1995
elections, suffice it to say that T's jurisdiction as the
sole judge of all contests relatin to the elections, returns
and q·ualifications of members f Congress begins only
after a candidate has become a ember of the House of

163
712 Phil. 192 (20 13).
Decision 31 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426 .

Representatives. Petitioner n t being a member of the

House of Representatives, it s obvious that the HRET
at this point has no jurisd ction over the question.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The next inqu1ry, then, is · wh n is a candidate considered a

Member of the House of Representative '?

In Vinzons-Chato -~-- c;oMELE .citing Aggabao V. COMELEC

and Guerrero v. COMELEC, the.
Court
. r led that:
.,.. . '

The Court has invariably held that once a winning

candidate has been proclaim d, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Me ber of the House of
Representatives, the COME EC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to I is election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the - RET's own jurisdiction
begins. (Emphasis supplied.)

This pronouncement was reiterat d in the case of Limkaichong v.

COMELEC, wherein the Court, referr ng to the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC vis-a-vis the HRET, held tha:

The Court has invariably eld that once a winning

candidate has been proclaim d, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Mem er of the House of
Representatives, the COME EC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to l s election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the RET's own jurisdiction
begins. (Emphasis supplied.)

This was again affirmed in Gonza z v. COMELEC, to wit:

After proclamation taking of

oath and assumption of office y Gonzalez, jurisdiction
over the matter of his qualificati ns, as well as ·q uestions
regarding the conduct of election and contested returns -
were transferred to the HRET a the constitutional body
created to pass upon the same. (E phasis supplied.)

From the foregoing, it is then lear that to be considered a

Member of the House of Representatives, here must be a concurrence of
the following requisites: (1) a ·valid procl ation, (2) a proper oath, and
(3) assumption of office. 164 (Citations omit ed)

Applying the ruling in Reyes to the ·esent petitions, this Court, sitting
En Banc, can only take cognizance of an election contest if the following
requisites concur: (a) a petition is filed be re it; and (b) the petition is filed
against a Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidate who has been validly
proclaimed, properly t~k~n his_or her oath, nd assumed office.
164 Id.
Decision 32 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

These conditions are not prese t here. The Buenafe and Ilagan
Petitions are filed under Rule 65 assailin the Resolutions of the COMELEC
En Banc. While respondent Marcos, Jr. has been proclaimed as the
Presidential candidate with the highest umber of obtained votes, he has yet
to take his oath and assume .office. As A~sociate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez
astutely pointed out, the tel?l of offi_ce b gins at noon on the 30 th day of June
following the election. Hence, as lo~g as the petitions remain with this Court
before 30 .June 2022, this Court.has
- ,. .
juris
. iction to resolve them.165

2. No petition has been zled before the

PET
Based on current records, no petit on for an election contest has been
filed before the PET. An election protes should be filed within thirty days
after the proclamation of the winner. 166 0 the other hand, a petition for quo
warranto should be filed within ten d ys after the proclamation of the
winner. 167

The petit10ner in an election pr test is limited to the registered

candidate for President or Vice-President f the Philippines who received the
second or third highest number of votes. n the other hand, a quo warranto
case may be filed by any registered vo er who has voted in the election
concerned.

An election protest is anchored n allegations· of electoral frauds,.

anomalies, or irregular1ties in the prates ed precincts, while a petition for
quo warranto attacks the protestee's ineligibility or specific acts of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philipp in s. 168

In any case, the proclamation, o h-taking, and assumption of the

President result in removing from the j risdiction of this Court any pre-
proclamation remedy elevated to the Cou from the COMELEC.

165
See J. J.Y. Lopez's Reflections, p. 4.
166
The 20 IO RULES OF THE PRESlDENTlAL ELECTO L TRJBUNAL, Rule 15.
167
Id. at Rule 16. See also J. Brion's Dissent in Reyes:
In the context of the present case, by holding th t the COMELEC retained jurisdiction
(because Reyes, although a proclaimed winner, ha not yet assumed office), the majority
effectively emasculates the HRET of its jurisdicti n as it allows the fil ing of an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto only after th assumption to office by the candidate
(i.e, on June 30 in the usual case). To illustrate u ing the dates of the present case, any
election protest or a petition for quo warranto filed after June 30 or m'o re than fifteen (15)
days from Reyes' proclamation on May 18, 2013, hall certainly be dismissed outright by
the HRET for having been filed out of time under t e HRET rules.
168
Id. at Rule 17.
Decision 33 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

C. The PET is a function of th Supreme

Court En Banc

The peculiar scenari9_·availing h e· is that the present Petitions are

pending before Us after the sanie_ were levated from the COMELEC after
the conduct of the elections. Th~ PET, hich is this Court sitting en bane,
has to exercise exclusive jurisdiction. ove · ·the issues of election, returns, and
qualification upon the assumption to o 1ce of respondent Marcos, Jr. The
question then is: should We dismiss th se petitions and wait for the same
petitions to be filed before Us sitting as t e PET?

To aiTive at the answer, We revi it the history of the PET and its
relation to the Court as elucidated in acalintal v. Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, 169 thus:

Article VII, Section 4, paragrapl 7 of the 1987 Constitution is an

innovation. The precursors of the pres nt Constitution did not contain
similar provisions and instead vested u on the legislature all phases of
presidential and vice-presidential electi ns - from the canvassing of
election returns, to the proclamation of the president-elect and the vice-
president elect, and even the determin tion, by ordinary legislation, of
whether such proclamations may be c ntested. Unless the legislature
enacted a law creating an institution tha would hear ekction contests in
the Presidential and Vice-Presidential r ce, a defeated candidate had no
legal right to demand a recount of the vo es cast for the office involved or
to challenge the ineligibility of the pr claimed candidate. Effectively,
presidential and vice-presidential contest were non-justiciable in the then
prevailing milieu.

The omission in the 1935 Con itution was intentional. It was

mainly influenced by the absence of a si11ilar provision in its pattern, the
Federal Constitution of the United Stat s. Rather, the creation of such
tribunal was left to the determination oft e National Assembly. xxx

To fill the void in the 1935 Con titution, the National Assembly
enacted R.A. No. 1793, establishing an i dependent PET to try, hear, and
decide protests contesting the election f President and Vice-President.
The Chief Justice and the Associate Just ces of the Supreme Cowt were
tasked to sit as its Chairman and Memb s, respectively. Its composition
was extended to retired Supreme Comt ustices and incumbent Court of
Appeals Justices who may be appointed as substitutes for ill, absent, or
temporarily incapacitated regular member. .

The eleven-inember tribunal was mpowered to promulgate rules

for the conduct of its pr9ceedings. It s mandated to sit en bane in
deciding presidential and vice-president al contests and authorized to
exercise . powers similar to those co · rred upon courts of j ustice,
including the issuance of subpoena, ta ing of depositions, an-est of

169
650 Phil. 326 (20!0).
Decision 34 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

witnesses to compel their appearance, roduction of documents and other

evidence, and the powet to punish cm temptuous acts and bearings. The
tribunal was assigned a C lerk, sub rdinate officers, and employees
necessary for the efficient performance fits functions.

· R.A. No. 1793 was implicitly re · ealed and superseded by the 1973
Constitution which replaced the bic 1eral legislature under the 1935
Constitution with the unican1eral body fa parliamentary government.

With the 1973 · Constitution, PET was rendered irrelevant,

considering that the President was not irectly chosen by the people but
elected from among the. members of he National Assembly, while the
position of Vice-President was constituf nally non-existent.

In 1981 , several modificati ns were introduced to the

parliamentary system. Executive power as restored to the President who
was elected directly by the people. An ~xecutive Committee was fo1med
to assist the President in the perform ce of his functions and duties.
Eventually, the Executive Committee as abolished and the Office of
Vice-President was installed anew.

These changes prompted the Nat onal Assembly to revive the PET
by enacting, on December 3, 1985, B tas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.)
884, entitled "An Act Constituting an I, dependent Presidential Electoral
Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Elec ion Contests in the Office of the
President and Vice-President of the ilippines, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes. " Thi tribunal was composed of nine
members, three of whom were the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and
two Associate Justices designated by . im, while the six were divided
equally between representatives of them jority and minority parties in the
Batasang Pambansa.

Aside from the license to wield ewers akin to those of a court of

justice, the PET was permitted to reco1 end the prosecution of persons,
whether public officers or private indi iduals, who in its opinion had
participated in any irregularity connec ed ,;vith the canvassing and/or
accomplishing of election returns.

The independence of the tribuna was highlighted by a provision

allocating a specific budget from the nati nal treasury or Special Activities
Fund for its operational expenses. It wa empowered to appoint its own
clerk in accordance with its rules. Howe er, the subordinate officers were
strictly employees of the judiciary or oth officers of the government who
were merely designated to the tribunal.

With R.A. No. 1793 as ork, the 1986 Constitutional

Commission transformed the then stat tory PET into a constitutional
institution, albeit without its traditional n enclature:

FR. BERNAS.
Decision 35 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

. '
. . . . So it became iJ.ecessa y to create a Presidential
Electoral Tribunal. Wha we have done is to
constitutionalize what wa · statutory but it. is not an
infringement on the separa ion of powers because the
power being giv·e n to the upreme Court is a judicial
power.

Be that as it may, we hasten to cl rify the structure of the PET as a

legitimate progeny of Section 4, Article II of the Constitution, composed
of members oftbe Supreme Court, sittin en bane. xxx

The "constitutionalization" of t e PET has been described as

independent but not separate from the Ju iciary. As such, the PET cannot be
considered distinct from the Supreme Co ·t, thus:

A plain reading of Article VII, paragraph 7, readily

reveals a grant of authority to the Supr 1e Court sitting en bane. In the
same vein, although the method by wh ch the Supreme Court exercises
this authority is not specified in the prov sion, the grant of power does not
contain any limitation on the Suprem Court's exercise thereof. The
Supreme Court's method of deciding residential and vice-presidential
election contests, through the PET, is act ally a derivative of the exercise
of the prerogative conferred by the afor quoted constitutional provision.
Thus, the subsequent directive in the pr vision for the Supreme Court to
"promulgate its rules for the purpose."

The conferment of full authority t the Supreme Court, as a PET, is

equivalent to the full authority conferred pon the electoral tribunals of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e. the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET) and the House of Representati es Electoral Tribunal (HRET),
which we have affirmed on numerous occ sions.

Particularly. cogent are the dis ussions of the Constitutional

Commission on the parallel provisions f the SET and the HRET. The
discussions point to the inevitable concl sion that the different electoral
tribw1als, with the Supreme Comt · unctioning as the PET, are
constitutional bodies, independent o the three . departments of
government -- Executive, Legislative, an Judiciary - but not separate
therefrom.

XXX

MR. MAAMBONG.
Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate
Electoral Tribunal or the Hou e Electoral Tribunal is a
constitutional body?

MR.AZCUNA.
Decision 36 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

It is, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG.
If it is a constitutional ody, is it then subject to
constitutional restrictions?

MR.AZCUNA.
It would be subject •to constitutional restrictions
intended for that body.

MR. MAAMBONG.
I see. But I want to find o if the ruling in the case of
Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 19 , will still be applicable to
the present bodies we are creating since it ruled that
the electoral tribunals are ot separate departments of
the government. Would tha ruling still be valid?

MR.AZCUNA.
Yes, they are not separate departments because the
separate departments re the legislative, the
executive and the ju iciary; but they are
constitutional bodies.

The view taken by Justices Ad lfo S. Azcuna and Regalado E.

Maambong is schooled by our holding in Lopez v. Roxas, et al.:

Section 1 of Republic ,A ct No. 1793, which provides

that:

"There shall be an dependent Presidential

Electoral Tribunal . : . which shal be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, eturns, and qualifications
of the president-elect and the v ce-president-elect of the
Philippines."

has the effect of giving said de:fi ated candidate the legal
right to contest judicially the elec ·on of the President-elect
or Vice-President-elect and to d mand a recount of the
votes cast for the office involved · the litigation, as well as
to secure a judgment declaring at he is the one elected
president or vice-president, as the ase may be, and that, as
such, he is entitled to asswne th duties attached to said
office. And by providing, forth r, that the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal "shall be comp sed of the Chief Justice
and the other ten Members of t e Supreme Court," said
legislation has confen-ed upon s ch Court an additional
original jurisdiction of an exclusiv character.

Republic Act No. 1793 h s not created a new or

separate court. It has merely confi rred upon the Supreme
Court the functions of a Presidentia Electoral Tribw1al. The
result of the enactment may be ikened to the fact that
Decision 37 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

courts of first instance perfo m the functions of such

ordinary courts of first instan e, those of court of land
registration, those of probate ·c urts, and those of courts of
juvenile and domestic relation . It is, also, comparable to
the situation obtaining when the municipal court of a
provincial ca:pital exercises its authority,· pursuant to law,
over a limited numoer of ca es which. were previously
within the exclusive jurisdict~o of courts of first instance.

In all of these instan·c_e ·, the court (court of first

instance or municipal court) is only one, although the
Junctions may be distinct an , even, separate. Thus the
powers of a court of first inst ce, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases, are broader than, as
well as distinct and separate fr m, those of the same court
acting as a court of land registr tion or a probate court, or
as a court of juvenile and do1 estic relations. So too, the
authority ()f the municipal co rt of a provincial capital,
when acting as such municipal court, is, territorially more
limited than that of the sam court when hearing the
aforementioned cases which are primary within the
jurisdiction of courts of first ins ance. In other words, there
is only one court, although it ay perform the functions
pertaining to several types of ourts, each having some
characteristics different from tho e of the others.

Indeed, the Supreme C urt, the Court of Appeals

and courts of first instance, e vested with original
jurisdiction, as well as with appellate jurisdiction, in
consequence of which they a e both trial courts and,
appellate courts, without detracti g from the fact that there
is only one Supreme Cowi, one ourt of Appeals, and one
court of first instance, clothed ith authority to discharge
said dual functions . A court of first instance, when
performing the functions of a p ·obate court or a court of
land .registration, or a court f juvenile and domestic
relations, although with powers ess broad than those of a
court of first instance, hearing ordinary actions, is not
iriferior to the latter, for one ca1 ot be inferior to itself. So
too, the Presid~ntial Electoral Tri unal is not inferior to the
Supreme Court, . since it is the <wme Court although the
functions peculiar to the said Tri unal are more limited in
scope than those of the Supreme ourt in the exercise of its
ordinary functions. I-Jenee, the e actment of Republic Act
No. 1793, does not entail an ass 1ption by Congress of the
power of appointment · vested b the Constitution in the
President. It merely co1motes th imposition of additional
duties upon the Members of the S preme Cowi.

By the same token, the PET is n t a separate and distinct entity

from the Supreme Court, albeit it ha functions peculiar only to the
Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of
Decision G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

Section 4, Article VII of the Constituti , and it faithfully complies - not

unlawfully defies - . the . constitutio al directive. The adoption of a
separate seal, as well as the change· n_the nomenclature .of the Chief
Justice and the Associate Justices int Chai1m.ari and Members of the
Tribunal, respectively, was design~d. s mply to highlight the singularity
and exclusivity of the Tribunal's furict-_ons as a special electoral court. 170
(Emphasis supplied and citations omitte .)

When the Court acts as the PET, ·t is not a separate and distinct body
from the Court itself. The ·coristituti nal provision refers to the same
"Supreme Court sitting en bane." Howe er, it should be recognized that the
proceedings before the PET require a dis inct set of rules of procedure owing
to the very specific nature of its functio s. Thus, the exercise of jurisdiction
of the Court En Banc as the PET is likened to the characterization of
specialized courts in relation to the the Courts of First Instance. They are
the same courts having the same jurisdic ion, only that specialized courts are
intended for practicality. Section 4, Ar icle VII of the 1987 Constitution.
therefore should not be considered as a imitation on the jurisdiction of the
Court over the pending petitions.

111. Respondent Marcos, Jr. possesses all

of the qualifications and does wt
possess any of the grounds
disqualification

Any person intending to run fo public office needs to have the

qualifications required under the law fo the position he or she intends to
hold. 111 At the same time, he or she must lso possess none of the grounds for
disqualification under the law and the rel vant regulations. 172

We reiterate that the qualification for President and Vice-President

are prescribed in Section 2, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. These
qualifications are also found in Section 6 of the OEC.

There is no question that resp ndent Marcos, Jr. has all the
qualifications of a candidate for President as provided under the Constitution
and the OEC. Notably, neither the Buen fe Petition nor the Ilagan Petition
alleges that respondent Marcos, Jr. lacks ny of these qualifications: natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, a register d voter, able to read and write, at
least forty years of age-on the day oft e election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years jmmediat ly preceding such election.

110 Id.
171
Chua v. COMELEC, supra .. .
172 Id. .
Decision 39 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

Petitioners Ilagan, et al. instead ar ue that respondent Marcos, Jr. has

been convicted of a c·r ime ir1volving mor 1 turpitude and is thus disqualified
from being a candidate and hol~ing an government office under Section
12 113 of the OEC.

Notably, Section 68 of the OEC, hich provides additional grounds

for disqualification, namely, being fou d to have committed an election
offense, 174 or being a permanent residen of, or an immigrant in, a foreign
country, is not being invoked in the p esent case. Hence, We limit Our
discussion to the alleged disqualificatim of respondent Marcos, Jr. under
Section 12 of the OEC.

A. Respondent Marcos, Jr. s to file

income tax returns is a crime
involving moral turpitude

The CA found respondent Marcos, Jr. guilty of failing to file income

tax returns for the taxable years 1982 to 985 in Criminal Cases No. Q-91-
24391 ; Q-92-29212, Q-92-29213 and Q- 2-29217.175 Petitioners Ilagan, et
al. argue that this amounts .to a convi tion of a crime involving moral
turpitude, which has the effect of disquali ing 1;espondent Marcos, Jr. from
being a candidate and from holding any overnment office. Failure to file
income tax returns may or may not be a er me involving moral turpitude. We
explain this below.

Not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, nor do they

necessarily have to be heinous. Moral 'turp tude has bee1i. often understood to
mean acts that are "contrary to justice, m desty, or good morals; an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the priv te and social duties which a man
owes his fellowmen, or to society in gener l." 176 It does not include such acts
as are not of themselves immoral but w ose .illegality lies in their being
positively prohibited. 177

173
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who xxx has be n sentenced by final judgment xxx for a crime
involving moral'turpitude, shall be: tfaqualificd to be a _c _ndidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. xxx .
174
(a) given money or other material consideration to inf! ence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; .
(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
(c) spent in his election ca1npaig[). an amount in excess of hat allowed by this Code;
(d) solicited, received or made any contributjon prohjbite under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or
(e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261 , para ·aµhs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall
be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he ha been e lected, from holding the office.
115
Rollo (G.R. No. 260374), pp. 225-238. , .
116
Teves v. COMELEC, 604 Phil. 717 (2009), citing Soriano . Dizon, 5 15 Phil.-635 (2006).
177
Id.
Decision 40 G.R. Nos, 260374 and 260426

Associate justice Arturo D. Brion in his ·separate concurring opinion

in Teves v. COMELEC, 178 "laid ·down the historical roots of moral turpitude.
He explained:

I. Historical Roots

The term 'moral turpitude' first t ok root under the United States
(US.) immigration laws. Its history ·cai: be traced back as far as the 17th
century when the States of _Virginia and Pe1rnsylvania enacted the
earliest immigration resolutions exclu ing criminals from America, in
response to the British goveriunent's p ,licy of sending convicts to the
colonies. State legislators at that time strongly suspected that Europe
was deliberately exporting its human iabilitie_s. In the U.S., the term
'moral turpitude' first appeared in th ·Immigration Act of March 3,
1891, which directed the exclusion of p rsons who have been convicted
. of a felony or other infamous crime o misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude; this marked the first time t e U.S. Congress used the term
' moral turpitude' in immigration la s. Since then, the presence
of moral turpitude has been used as a test in a variety of situations,
including legislation governing the di barment of attorneys and the
revocation of medical licenses. Moral t itude also has been judicially
used as a criterion in disqualifying nd impeaching witnesses, in
determining the measure of contributio between joint tortfeasors, and
in deciding whether a certain language i slanderous.

In 1951 , the U.S. Supreme Court uled on the constitutionality of

the term 'moral turpitude' in Jordan v. e George. The case presented
only one question: whether conspiracy o defraud the U.S. of taxes on
distilled spirits is a crime involving mor l turpitude within the meaning
of Section 19 (a) of the Immigration ct of 1919 (Immigration Act).
Sam de George, an Italian immigrant wa convicted twice of conspiracy
to defraud the U.S. government o taxes on distilled spirits.
Subsequently, the Board ofimmigratior .Appeals ordered de George's
deportation 011 the basis .of the Immigr _tion Act provision that allows
the deportation of aliens who commit ultiple- crimes involving moral
turpitude. De George argued that he sho Id not be deported because his
tax evasion crimes did not involve mor l turpitude. The U.S. Supreme
Court, through Chief Justice Vinzon, di agreed, finding that 'under an
unbroken course of judicial decisions the crime of conspiring to
defraud the U.S. is a cdri1e. involving 1oral turpitude.' Notably, the
Court determined that fraudulent con uct involved moral turpitude
without exception:

Whatever .the phrase ' inv )lving moral turpitude'

may mean in peripheral cases, t e decided cases make it
plain that crimes in which frau . was an ingredient have
always been regarded as invo.lv ng moral turpitude, ...
Fraup fa the touchstone by w ·ch this case should be
judged. . . . · We therefore decide that Congress
sufficiently forewarned · ent that the statutory
178
Teves v. COMELEC, supra.
Decision 41 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

consequence of twice conspi ing to defraud the United

States is depci1i~tion.

Significantly, the U.S. Congres . has.never exactly defined what

amounts to a 'crime involving moral rpitude.' The legislative history
of statutes containing the moral rpitud~ standard indicates that
Congress ieft the interpteta(ion of the term t ·o U.S. courts and
administrative agencies. In the ,il;)s nee of legislative history as
interpretative .aid, American. courts ave resorted to the dictionary
definition -- 'the last reso1i of the b ffled judge.' The most common
definition ofmoral turpitude is similar o one found in, the early editions
· of Black's Law Dictionary:

[An] act of baseness, vil .ness, or the depravity in

private and social duties whi h man owes to his fellow
man, or to society in general contrary to the accepted
and customary rule of right a d duty between man and
man.. . . Act or behavior t at gravely vio lates moral
sentiment or accepted moral st <lards of community and
is a morally culpable quaHty eld to be present in some
criminal offenses as distingui bed from others.· . . . The
quality of a . crime involving rave infringement of the
moral sentiment of the comm nity as distinguished from
statutory malu. prohibita." 179 . (Emphasis supplied and
citations omitted.)

Based on the foregoing, it 1s · lear that the concept of "moral

turpitude" can be traced back to the im igration laws of the U.S. It is thus
not surprising that in determining whethe a crime involves moral turpitude,
this Court has earlier used definitions fr01 U.S. cases as reference.

It may be worth noting that under the 1J.S. Foreign Affairs Manual,
the following are considered common cri1 es involving moral turpitude:

(a) crimes committed against prop rty - making false representation,

knowledge of such faJse representation y the perpetrator, reliance on the
false representation by the person defrau ed, intent to defraud, actual act of
committing fraud, arson, blackmail, b"Lirgl ry, embezzlement, extortion, false
pretenses, forgery, fraud, larceny (grand r petty), malicious destruction of
property, receiving stolen goods (with uilty knowledge), robbery, theft
(when it involves the·-intention of perm nent faking), transp01iing stolen
property (with guilty know·l~dge), animal 1ghting, credit card/identity fraud,
damaging private -property (where int t to damage is not required),
breaking and entering (if the statute doe not require a specific or implicit
intent to commit a crime involving mor 1 turpitude), passing bad checks
(where intent to defraud .is not required by the statute), possessing stolen
property (if guilty knowledge is not ess ntial for a conviction under the
179
Separate Concurring Opinion of J. Brion in Teves "I\ CO, 4ElEC, s upra .
 ,' '
' '.

Decision 42 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

statute), joy ridinii (where· the .intention to take . the vehicle permanently is
not required under the statute), and juve il~ delii-?_quency;
. .
(b) crimes committed · against government authority - bribery,
counterfeiting,· fraud• against revenue 01 other government functions, mail
fraud, perjury, harbor1ng a fugitive from ustice (with guilty knowledge), and
tax evasion (willful); arid

(c) crimes committed against_·per n; family relationship, and sexual

morality - abandonment of a· minor t ·1.d (if willful and resulting in the
destitution of the child), assault with i tent to kill, assault with intent to
commit rape, assault with intent to cm mit robbery, assault with intent to
commit serious bodily hann, assault .wi h a danierous or deadly weapon,
bigamy, contributing to the delinquency fa minor, gross indecency, incest
(if the result of an improper sexual r ationship), kidnapping, lewdness,
voluntary manslaughter, involuntary 1anslaughter (where the statute
requires proof of recklessness general y will involve moral turpitude),
mayhem, murder, pandering, possession of child pornography, prostitution,
and rape (including statutory rape). 180

In 1955, the Supreme Court of . alifornia, in Call v. State Bar of

California 18 ', characterized moral turpitu e as one that involves fraud, and
must be distinguished from mere neglect_ r unintended failure, viz:

"The term moral tw-pitude inclu es fraud and has been said to
mean dishonesty and conduct not i accordance with good morals;
being based on moral guilt, it impli s ai;i. intentional breach of the
duty owed to a client as distinguishe from an unintended failure to
discharge his duties to the best of his bility." 182

In the l 990 case of In Re 'Gri es, 181 it was ruled that willful
commission of a crime does. not autom ically mean fraudulent, hence, it
does not per se involve moraJ turpitude In said case, petitioner attorney
pleaded guilty to three (3) counts of will lly failing to file a tax return. The
Supreme Court of California found tha petitioner's misconduct did not
involve moral turpitude, but it did warrant discipline.

In the Philippines, we can trace the en11 moral turpitude as far back as
1901 i!1Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Actio sand Special Proceedings). This
law provided that a member of the bar m y . be removed.or suspended from
180
US Foreign Affairs Manual avai lable at <httµs: //fam.state.gov/search/viewer?
format=html&query=moral+
turpitude&links= MORAL,TURPITU D&url=/FAM/09F M/09FAM0:10203.html#M302_3_2_8 _2>
(visited 24 May 2022). .
181
Call v. State Barc>(Cal., 45 Cal. 2d 104,287 P.2d 76'1 (J ,55).
182
Supra.
183
51 Cal. 3d l 99, 270 Cal. Rptr. 855, 793 P.2d 61 ( I 990).
 . ~
-. •:, ,
: .. ; ..., ·. . . .. • •'

Decision 43 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

his office as lawyer by the' Supreme conviction of a cnme

involving moral. turpitude. _Subsequent! , moral' turpitude found its way in
statutes governing disqualificat1ons ofn taries public, priests and ministers
in solemnizing marriages-, ·registration ·o military service, exclusion and
naturalizatiqn of. aliens., discharge of. t e accused to be a state witness,
admission to the bar,:·susp~nsion and r~ oval .of
elective local officials, and
disqualification of per.sons from iunning or any elective local position. 184

We first had occasion to characteri e moral turpitude in the 1920 case

of In Re Basa. 185 This involves an i11terpr tation of Section 21 of the Code of
Civil Procedure on the disbarment of a lawyer for conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. Carlos S. Ba a, a lawyer, was convicted of the
crime of abduction with consent. The, so e question presented was whether
the crime of abduction with consent, as p nished by Article 446 of the Penal
Code of 1887, involved moral turpitu e. The Court, finding no exact
definition in the statutes, turned to Bou ier's Law Dictionary for guidance
and held:

'Moral turpitude,' it has been sai , 'includes everything which is

done contrary to justice, honest modesty, or good morals. '
(Bouvier's Law Dictionary, cited by rnmerous courts.) Although no
decision can be found which · has ecided the exact question, it
cannot admit of doubt · that crimes of this character
involve moral turpitude. The .inheren nature of the act is such that it
is against good morals and the accept d. rule of right conduct. 186

Thus, early 1,m, the Philippines . allowed the American lead and
adopted a general dictionary definition· o interpret the concept of moral
turpitude.

In subsequent cases, We continued bmTowing definitions established

in U.S. jurisprudence. In the 1959 case f Tak Ng v. Republic 181, We cited
U.S. cases defining moral turpitude to pe in to an act of baseness, vileness,
or depravity in the private and social _dutie that a man owes his fellow men,
or to society in general, contrary to the ac epted and customary rule of right
and duty between man and man 188 or co duct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals. 189
"

Twenty years- later, in 1979, 111 Zarz v. Flores 190 , We added that moral
turpitude implies something. immoral in tself, regardless of whether it 1s
184
Separate Concurring Opinion of J: Urio~ in Teves v. CO EL/!.C, supra. C itations omitted.
ISS 4 1 Phil.275([920). .. ,.
1s6 ld.
187
106 Phil. 727 ( 1959).
188
Tak Ng v. Republic, sur.r.a, citi.ng Traders ? General Ins. .o. 1\ Rusell, Tex. Civ. App., 99 S. W. [2d] l 079.
189
Supra, citing Ma,ah. v. Stc1te.Bar ufCalifomi.a, 2 10 CaL 03, 219 P. 5 83 .
190
183 Phil. 27 (1979) . .
Decision 44 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

punishable by law or ·n ot .It must not me ely be mala prohibita, the act itself
must be inherently immor~l.- The . doi g of_the act itself, and not its
prohibition .by statute~ establishes moral-turpitude. 191 Moral turpitude does
not, however, include such acts as ~te .n t of themselves immoral but whose
illegality lies in the-fact of their being po itively prohibited. 192

Meanwhile, in other cases, We examined the existence of moral

turpitude based on the :fraudulent inten of the offender. The Court in its
1964 decision in Ao Lin v._Republic 193 ex ained:

·We hold that the use of a meter stick without the corresponding
seal of. the Internal Revenue Office y one who has been engaged in
business for a long time, involv s moral · turpitude because it
involves a fraudulent use of a met stick, not necessarily because
the Government is cheated of the re enue involved in the sealing of
the meter stick, but because it mani sts an evil intent on the part of
the petitioner to defraud customers urchasing from him 'in respect
to the measurement of the goods pur hased. I 94

Then, in 1975, in the case In Re L nuevo 195 , We declared that it is for

the Supreme Court to determine what cri e involves moral turpitude. 196 This
became the foundation of the jurisprude tial doctrine holding that whether
or not a crime involves moral turpitude i · ultimately a question of fact and
frequently depends on all the circumstanc s surrounding the violation of the
statute. 197

Over the years, We adjudged the fol owing as crimes involving moral
turpitude:

1. Abduction ,v:ith consent I 98

Bigamy1 99
2. ·
3. Concubinage200
4. Smuggling 201
5. Rape202

191
Supra, citing 41 C.J. 212.
192
Supra, citing State Medical Board\-: Rogers. 79 S. W. 2d 3.
193
Ao Lin v. Republic, 1.19 Phil. 2 84 (1964).
194
Supra.
19
~ i n Re: Lanuevo, 160 Pllil. 935 (l 975).
196
Supra.
197
Dela Torre v. COMEl,EC, 327 Phil. l1 44 ( 1996), citing RR!v. NLRC, G.R. No. 97239, 12 May 1993,
citing In Re: La nuevo, supra.
19 8
Id. c iting in Re Basa, supra.
199
ld . citing In Re Marcelino Lontok, 43 Phil. 293 ( 1922).
200
Id. citing In Re Juan C. Jsada, 60 Phil. 915 (1934); J\1. arrnho v. ,'vfacarrubo, 468 Phil. 148 (2004),
citing laguilan v. Tiniv, 259 Phil. 322 (I 989).
201
Id. citing in Re Ally. Rovero, 92 Phil. .128 ( 1952).
202
Id. citing Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143 (1955).
 Decision 45 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

6. Estafa through faisification of document201 ·

7. Attemptefl Bribery204
8. Profiteedng_205
9. Robbery 206
10. Murder, whether consummated·or attempted201
11. Estafa208
12. Theft:209
13. Illicit Sexual Relations with a F llow Worker210
14. Violati~n of BP Blg. 22211_
15. Falsification ofDocument2 12
16. Intriguing against Honor213
17. Violation of the Anti-Fencing L w 214
18. Violation of Dangerous Drugs ct of 1972 (Drug-pushing)2' 5
19. Perjury2 16
20. Forgery2 ' 7
21. Direct Briberym
22. Frustrated Homicide 219
23. Adultery220
24. Arson221
25. Evasion of income tax222
26. Barratry 223
27. Blackmail224
28. Criminal conspiracy to smuggle opium225
29. Dueling226
30. Embezzlement227
203
ld. citing In the Matter ofEduardo A. Abesamis, 102 Pl ii. 1182 (1958).
204
Id. citing ln Re Dalmacio De Los Angeles, I06 Phil 1 ( 959).
205
Id. citing Tak Ng v. Republic, s upra.
206
Id. citing Paras v. Vailoces, 111 Phil. 569 (196 l ).
207
ld. citing Can v. -Galing, 239 Phil. 629 (1987), citing n Re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. L-363, 3 1 July
(1962).
208
Id. citing in Re.· Atty. Vinzon, 126 Phil. 96 (1967).
209
Id. citing Philippine Long Distance Telephone Compan v. NLRC, 248 Phil. 655 (1988).
210 Id. ·
211
Jd. citing People v. Tuanda, A.M. No. 3360, 30 Janu ry 1990; Paolo C. Villaber v. COMELEC, 420
Phil. 930 (200 I); Lao v. Atty. Medel, 453 Phil. 11 ~ (200 ).
212
Id. citing UP v. CSC, 284 Phil. 296 (1992).
213
ld. c iting Betguen .: Masang,:ay, 308 Phil. 500 (1994).
2 14

215
Id. citing Dela Torre v. COMELEC, 327 Phi l. J 144 ( 199 ·), citing Zari v. Flores, s upra.
Id. citing OCA v. Librada, 329 Phil. 432 (1996).
216
Id. citing People v Sorrel, 343 Phil. 890 ( 1997).
2 17
ld. citing Campi/an v. Campilun Ji:, 431 Phi l. 223 (7-00? .
218
Id. citing Magno v. COMEJ,EC, 439 Phil. 339 (2002).
2 19
fd. citing Soriano.: Dizon, supra,,
220
rct. citing Zari v. Flores, supra.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 .Id.
224 Id.
22s Id.
226 Jd.
221 rd.
Decision 46 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

31. Extortion228
32. F orger.y229:
33. Libel23°:
34. Making fraudulent proof of los on iqsu~ance contract231
35. Mutilation ofpublic records232
36. Fabrication of evidence233
es·
3 7. Offens ~gainst pen"siori laws23
38. Seduction-under the promise of marriage235
39. Falsification of pµblic'·docume1 t23(\ . _

40. Esta/a thru falsification ofpubl c document237

Indeed, in Zari v. Flores, 238 We said that tax evas10n 1s a cnme

involving moral turpitude. On whether n act or omission constitutes tax·
evasion, We certainly agree that it depen s on the totality of circumstances.
As such, it must be clarified that failure o file income tax return does not
always amount to tax evasion. Tax eva ion connotes fraud through the use
of pretenses and forbidden devices to 1 ssen or defeat taxes.239 The fraud
contemplated by law is actual and not onstructive. It must be intentional
fraud, consisting of deception willfully d deliberately done or resorted to
in order to induce another to give up so e legal right. Negligence, whether
slight or gross, is not equivalent to the raud with intent to evade the tax
conternplated by law. It must amount to intentional wrong-doing with the
sole object of avoiding the tax. 24° Furt rmore, tax evasion connotes the
integration of three factors: (a) the end t be achieved, i.e., the payment of
less than that known by the taxpayer to e legally due, or the non-payment
of tax when it is shown that a tax is due; ) ·an accompanying state of mind,
which is described as being "evil," in "b d faith," "willful," or "deliberate
and not accidental"; and (c) a course of action or failure of action that is
unlawful. 24 1

On the other hand, failure t_o file in ome tax return may be committed
by neglect, without any fraudulent intent an.d/or willfulness. In fact, under

228
Id.
229 Id .
2JO ld.
231 Id.
232
Id.
m Id.
234 Id.
23s Id.

236 Id.

231 Id.

238 Supra.
239
J UST ICE JAPAR B. DtMAAM?AO, TAX P RiNCIPLES ANO R EM 'DIES 174 (202 I); Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. v.
CTA, 110 Phil. 75 1 (1961). . ·
24
241
° CIR v. !::>pauses Magaan, G.R.. No. 21:2663,. 03 May 202 1 citing CIR v. Javier, Jr., 276 Phil. 9 14 (199 1).
CIR v, Toda. 481 Phil. 626 (2004).
Decision 47 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

Section 248 of the 1997 NIRC, the la treats "failure to file any return"
differently from "willful neglect to file t e return." The former is meted with
a surcharge of 25%, while the latter, 501/o. 242 The 50% rate is referred to as
the fraud penalty. 243 Previously, unde Section 72 of the 1939 NIRC, a
taxpayer may be excused from the 25% surcharge if the taxpayer
subsequently files the return despite ab ence of BIR notice and the earlier
failure is due to a reasonable cause. S ction 248 of the 1997 NIRC and
Section 72 of the 1939 NIRC respective! state:

Sec. 248. Civil Penalties. -

(A) There shall be imposed, in additi n to the tax required to be paid,

a penalty equivalent to twenty-five per ent (25%) of the amount due, in
the following cases:

(1) Failure to file any retur and pay the tax due thereon as
required under the provisions o this Code or rules and regula-
tions on the date prescribed; or

(2) Unless otherwise authoriz d by the Commissioner, filing a

return with an internal revenu officer other than those with
whom the return is required to be filed; or

(3) Failure to pay the defic· ncy tax within the time pre-
scribed for its payment in the no · e of assessment; or

(4) Failure to pay the full' or art of the amount of tax shown
on any return required to be fil d under the provisions of this
Code or rules and regulations, o the full amount of tax due for
which no return is required to be filed, on or before the date pre-
scribed for its payment.

(B) In case of willful neglect to fil the return within the period
prescribed by this Code or by rules and egulations, or in case a false or
fraudulent return is willfully made, the enalty to be imposed shall be
fifty percent (50%) of the tax or of tl e deficiency tax, in case, any
payment has been made on the basis of s ch return before the discovery
of the falsity or fraud: Provided, That a ubstantial under-declaration of
taxable sales, receipts or income, or substantial overstatement of
deductions, as determined by the Commi sioner pursuant to the rules and
regulations to be promulgated by th Secretary of Finance, shall
constitute prima facie evidence of a false or fraudulent return: Provided,
further, That failure to report sales, rec ipts or income in an amount
exceeding thirty percent (30%) of that de lared per return, and a claim of
deductions in an amount exceeding (30 o) of actual deductions, shall
render the taxpayer liable for substant al under-declaration of sales,
receipts or income or for overstatemen of deductions, as mentioned
herein.

242
THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF l 97, Sec. 248.
243
ERIC R. RECALDE, A TREATISE ON T AX P RINCIPLES AND
R · DIES 465 (2016).
 ..
, ,;, . ' ·:·:'

Decision 48 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

Sec. 72. Surcharges for Failur to Render Returns and for

Rendering False .a nd Fi:audulent Retu ns. - The Collector of Internal
Revenue shall assess all incoine taxes . . n case of willful neglect to file
the return or list.within the time prescr bed by law, or in case a false or
fraudulent ·return - or·
list is willfully ade, the Collector of Internal
Revenue shall add to the tax or to the _de 1ciency tax, in case any payment
has been made on the basis.of such re um before the discovery of the
falsity or fraud, or surcharge of fifty pe centum of the amount of such
tax or deficiency tax. In case of any fail re to make and file a return or
list within the time prescribd by la or by the Collector or other
internal-revenue officer, ·not due to w llful neglect, the Collector of
Internal Revenue shall add to tax twent)-five per centum of its amount,
exce t that when a return is voluntari and without notice from the
Collector or other officer filed after s ch time and it is shown that
the failure to file it was due to a reas nable cause no such addition
shall be made . to •the tax. The amoun so added to any tax shall be
collected at the same time and in the ame manner as part of the tax
unless the tax has been paid before the iscovery of the neglect, falsity,
or fraud, in w hich case the amount so dded shall be collected in the
same manner as the tax. (Emphases and derscoring supplied.)

The foregoing discussion illustrates that omission to file a tax return is

not fraudulent per se.

As Associate Justice Amy C. Lazar -Javier eloquently declared, taken

in its proper context, the failure •to_file a omp~nsation income tax return is
far from being "everything which is do e contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals; an act of baseness, vilene s or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes his fellow nen, or to society in general." 244

Although petitioners suggest tha We reexamine the totality of

circumstances surrounding respondent M rcos, Jr.'s non-filing of an income
tax return, We deem it unnecessary to go hrough the same exercise because
of this Court's Decision involving the sam facts. In Republic v. Marcos JI, 245
We already declared that respondent Marc s Jr. 's non-filing of an income tax
return is not a crime involving moral turpi ude, viz:

The 'failure to file an income tax return' is not a crime

involving moral turpitude as the ere omission is already a
violation regardless of the fraudule t intent or willfulness of the
individual. This conclusion is suppo ted by •the provisions of the
NIRC as well as previous Court de isions which show that with
regard to the filing of an income tax re n, the NIRC considers three
distinct violations: (1) a false return, (2 a fraudulent return with intent
to evade tax, an<l (3) failure to file a re
244
Citing Teves v. COMELEC, s upra.
245
6 12 Phil. .35.5 (2009),
Decision 49 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

The same is illustrated in Sectio 51 (b) of the NIRC which reads:

. .
(b) Assessment and payment of e:ficiency tax - xxx

In case a person fails to make a 1d file a return or list at the time

prescribed by law, or makes willfull or otherwise, false or fraudulent
return or list ·x x x.

Likewise, inAz~ar v. Court ofT,i Appeals, this Court observed:

To our minds we c n dispense with these

controversial arguments on fac s, although we do not deny
that the findings of facts by he Court of Tax Appeals,
supported as they are by very ubstantial evidence, carry
great weight, by resorting to a proper interpretation of
Section 332 of the NIRC. We elieve that the proper and
reasonable interpretation of ·sai provision should _be that
in the three different cases of ( 1) false return, (2)
fraudulent return with intent to vade tax, (3) failure to file
a return, the tax may be assesse , or a proceeding in court
for the collection of such ta may be begun without
assessment; at any time wi hin ten years after the
discovery of the (1) falsity, (2 fraud, and (3) omission.
Our stand that the law should be interpreted to mean a
separation of the three diffi rent situations . of false
return, fraudulent return .wit intent to evade tax, and
failure to file a return is str ngthened immeasurably
by the _last portion of the pr vision which segregates
the situations into three di ferent classes, namely,
"falsity/' "fraud" an,d "o~issi n."

Applying the foregoing considera_ ions to the case at bar, the filing
of a 'fraudul.erJ:t return with intent to vad_e tax' is a crime involving
moral turpitud~ as it entails willfuln s and fraudulent intent on the
part of the individual. The same, how ver, cannot be said for 'failure
to file a. return' where the mete mission already constitutes a
violation. Thus, this Court holds t at even if the conviction of
respondent Marcos II is affirmed, e same not being a crime
involving moral turpitude . cannot serve as a ground for his
disqualification. (Emphases supplied.)

Significantly, Republic v. .Marcos . I involved the same Decision in

CA-G.R. CR No. 18569 and considered th same act of non-filing of income
tax returns at issue in the present Petiti s. We held in the said case that
respondent Marcos~ Jr. is not disquali:fie from being an executor of his
father's will since the crime of failure t file income tax returns does not
involve moral turpitude. Thus, consistent with our earlier pronouncement,
respondent Marcos, Jr. 's failw-e to file in ome tax returns does not involve
moral turpitude.
Decision 50 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

The foregoing militates against t e notion that non-filing of income

tax return by an individual taxpayer rec iving purely compensation income
involves moral turpitude, or is against good morals and accepted rule of
conduct. 246 It is not in itself immoral, an neither does it constitute an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the pr vate and social duties which a man
owes his fellowmen, or to society i general. 247 Thus, We sustain the
CO:MELEC's ruling that the omission of respondent Marcos Jr. to file
income tax returns does not involve mor 1 turpitude.

As We sustain CO:MELEC's nili g, We, however, address and state

Our disagreement with the argument th t the omission to file income tax
returns does not involve moral turpitu e because the offense has already
been decriminalized by RA 10963, othe ise known as the Tax Reform for
Acceleration and Inclusion (TRAIN) La .

At this juncture, We clarify that n n-filing of income tax returns has

not been decriminalized under the 997 NIRC and its subsequent
amendments. Rather, what our current t laws introduced are classifications
of taxpayers who are not required to file n income tax return and who may
file a tax return under the substituted filin system.

This clarification starts with a dist nction between taxpayers who are
not required to file income tax returns fi om taxpayers who file tax returns
under the substituted filing system. Un er Section 5l(A)(2) of the 1997
NIRC, as amended, a minimum wage ea er is exempt from income tax and
is not required to file an income tax r~tur . On the other hand, an individual
earning purely compensation income frm a single employer whose income
tax has been correctly withheld by said mployer is not required to file an
annual income tax return. 248 Over the ye s, the BIR recognized the need to
simplify the filing of individual inco e tax returns. It introduced the
246
In Re Basa, supra.
247
Teves v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180363, 2 April 2009, citing Soriano v. Dizon, supra.
248
SECTION S I. Individual Return.-
(A) Requirements.-
xxx
(2) The following individuals shall not be required to tie an income tax return:
(a) An individual whose gross income does n t exceed his total personal and add itional
exemptions for dependents under Section 35: Pro ided, That a citizen of the Phil ippines and any
alien individual engaged in business or practice o profession within the Philippines shall file an
income tax return, regardless of the amount of gro s income;
(b) An individual with respect to pure compe1 sation income, as defined in Section 32(A)
(I), derived from sources within the Philip ines, the income tax on which has been
correctly withheld under the provisions of S ction 79 of this Code: Provided, That an
individual deriving compensation concurrently fr m two or more employers at any time during
the taxable year shall file an income tax return: Pr vided,furthe,; That an individual whose pure
compensation income derived from sources within the Philippines exceeds Sixty thousand pesos
(P60,000) shall a lso file an income tax return;
Decision · 51 G.R. Nos. 2603 74 and 260426

substituted filing system in Revenue egulations (R.R.) No. 3-2002,249

which was further amended by R.R. No 19-2002.250 Substituted filing took
effect in taxable year 2001 and was m· de mandatory starting the taxable
year 2002.

The substituted filing system e it. easier for pure compensation

earners to file their income tax returns ecause the relevant information is
more accessible to their employers. ·In substituted filing, the employer's·
annual return for the employee is corisi . red as the employee's income tax
return because they contain identical · nformation. Employers, or other
persons who are required to deduct and ithhold the tax on compensation,
furnish their employees with a Certifi ate of Income Tax Withheld on
Compensation, or BIR Form No. 231 .25 1 After the issuance of a joint
certification by the employer and the employee, the employee who is
qualified for substituted filing is no longe required to file an Annual Income
Tax Return, or BIR Form No. 1700. 252 ·

"Substituted filing" was distinguis ed from "non-filing" of income tax

returns in Revenue Memorandum Circul (RMC) No. 1-2003. RMC No. 1-
2003 further clarified the provisions of .R. No. 3-2002, as amended by
R.R. No. 19-2002 .

Under "substituted filing", · an individual taxpayer although

required under the law to file his income ax return, will no longer have to
personally file his own income tax re um but instead the employer's
annual information return fikd will b considered as the "substitute"
income tax return of the employee ina uch as the information in the
employer's return is exactly the same information in the employee's
return.

"Non-filing" is applicable to taxp yers who are not required under

the law to file an income tax return. An example ·i,s an employee whose
pure compensation income does not ex eed P60,000, and has only one

(c) An individual whose sole income has been ubjected to final withholding tax pursuant to
Section 57(A) of this Code; and
(d) An individual who is exempt from income ta pursuant to the provisions of this Code and
other laws, general or special. xx.x (Emphasis supf lied)
249
Amending Section 2.58 and Further A.mending Secti n 2.83 of Revenue Regulations No. 2-98 as
Amended, Relative to the Submission of the Alphabeti al Lists of Employees/Payees in Diskette Form
and the Substituted Filing oflncome Tax Returns of Pa ees/Employees Receiving Purely Compensation
Income from Only One Employer for One Taxable Yea Whose Tax Due is Equal to Tax Withheld and
Individual-Payees Whose Compensation Income is Subj ct to Final Withholding Tax.
250
Amend'ing Revenue Regulcl.tions No. 3-2002 and urther Amending Section 2.83 of Revenue.
Regulations No. 2-98 as Amended, Relative to Suhstit ted Filing of Income Tax Return of Employees
Receiving Purely Compensation Income from On ly O e Employer for One Taxable Year Whose Tax
Due is Equal to Tax With11eld and -LridividuaJ-Payees \\ ose Compensation lncome is Subject to Final
Withholding Tax.
251
Revenue Regulation No. l 9-:.:002, Sec. 2.
252
No. 11, Revenue Memoran<;lum Circular No. 1-2003.
 ~ I

DecisiQn . 52 G.R. Nos. 2603 74 and 260426

employer for the taxable year and who e tax withheld is equivalent to his
tax due. 253 ·

The substituted filing system did · ot dispense with the requirement of

filing income · tax returns for pure co pensation earners. Neither did it
exempt qualified taxpayers from filing income tax returns as required by
Section 51 of the 1997 NIRC.

Prior to the enactment of the T · IN Law m · 2017, an individual

whose pure compensation · income is derived from sources within the
Philippines exceeds :?60,000.00 is stil mandated to file an income tax
return.254 H~nce, even if an individuc1l t xpayer is qualified to avail of the
substituted filing of income tax return, e or she is still not excused from
filing an income tax return. The TRAIN Law, in amending the 1997 NIRC,
added a new section, 51-A, to incorp rate the substituted filing system
established by BtR practice into law.255 ,

Sec. 51-A. Substituted Filing of ncome Tax Returns by Employees

Receiving Purely Compensation Income - Individual taxpayers receiving
purely compensation income, • regardl ss of amount, ·from only one
employer in the Philippines for the cale dar year, the income tax of which
has been withheld correctly by the sa d employer (tax due equals tax
withheld) shall not be required to file n annual income tax return. The
certificate of withholding filed by the re pective employers, duly stamped
' received' by the BIR, ·shall be tanta1 ount to the substituted filing of
income tax returns by said employees.

Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaa pao states256 that, in adopting the

system of substituted filing under Secti n 51-A of the 1997 Tax Code, as
amended by the TRAIN Law, Congress id not decriminalize the non-filing
of income tax returns. It merely ordaine , for the convenience of individual
taxpayers, a _practice already established and observed by the BIR. What is
clear, however, is that the non-fi ling o income tax retuins by those who
have not duly met the r_equirements an conditions may still be penalized
under both the 1997 NIRC and the TRA Law.

In any event, as discussed abov , the COMELEC concluded that

respondent Marcos; )r.'s failure to file in ome tax returns does not constitute
a crime involving . moral turpitude. d We affirm the COMELEC's
conclusion.

m No. 2, Revenue Menwrandum Circular No. 1-2003 . . he threshold amount is now f>250,000.00 under
the TRAIN Law.
254
NATlONAL fNTERNALXEVENlJE CODE OF 1997 5 1(A)(2)(b).
255
Bicameral Conference Comrnittee Meeting on the Dis greeing Provisions uf HB No. 5636 and SB No.
1592 Re: Tax Refonn .for Ac~eleration, and lnclusi_on, 0 D~cernl;>e; 2017, KMS/ VI I1-3, p. 35.
256
J. Dimaampao's Reflections, p. 3. · · ·
Decision 53 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

B. Conviction for non-filing of income tax

returns is not a ground for isqual[fzcation

The RTC convicted respondent M rcos, Jr. and meted out the penalty
of imprisonment and fine. However, the A modified this ruling and limited
the penalty to the p·ayinent of fine. 257

In arguing that Sectiop 12 of the · EC should still apply to disqualify

respondent Marcos, ]~-, .p~titioners Tl gan, . et al. asserted before the
COMELEC that the CA Decision is voi for failing to follow the penalty
provided under Section 254 of the 1977 · RC, which expressly imposes the
penalty of both imprisonment and a fine.

Further, petitioners Ilagan, et al, in ist that,.even if the CA did not err
in deleting the penalty of imprisonm t in resolving the case against
respondent Marcos, Jr., he is still perpetu Uy disqualified on the basis of the·
unequivocal language of PD 1994, whi h amended the 1977 NIRC. They
argue that a mandatory accessory penal y of perpetual disqualification is
imposed by PD 1994 in addition to the enalties provided under the 1977
NIRC. 258 For their parf,.petitioners Buena , et al. assert that the consequence
of perpetual disqualification applies to a l convictions of crimes under the
NIRC, regardless of the imposed penalty. 1 9

We agree with the COMELEC, tha the introduction of the penalty of

both imprisonment and fine in Section 2 4 only became effective in 1998
when the 1997 NIRC was passed. Conseq ently, this cannot be retroactively
applied to the prejudice of respondent arcos, Jr., who was convicted for
failure to file the required tax returns foi; t e years 1982 to 1985. Well-settled
is the rule that penal laws cannot be given etroactive effect, unless favorable
to the accused. 260

Following the doctrine on immu ability of judgments,261 the CA

Decision has long attained finality and an no longer be modified in any
respect. Nevertheless, .We deem it neces ary to restate and clarify which
laws apply to the different violations.

For respondent Marcos, Jr's. failur to file income tax retmns for the
years 1982 to 1984, ~vhat should apply i . stead is Section 73 of the 1977
NIRC, which states:

m Rollo (G.R. No. 260<!26), pp. 168-182.

2 18
· Id. at 35.
259
Rollo·(G .R. No. 260374), p. 42.
260
Nasi-Villar v. People, 591 l'hii. 804 (2008).
261
Tauingco v. Fernan.dez., G .R. No. 1 1561 5, 09 December 020.
 . , ,

Decisioµ -. .. . ·.. .,: .

~ ; .54·.. G,R Nos. 260374 and 260426

Sec. 73. Penalty for failure to fil return or to pay tax. - Any one
liable to pay the tax, to make a return r to supply information required
under this Code, who refuses or neglec s to pay such tax, to make such
return or to supply such information at he time or times herein specified
in each year, shall be punished by a fin of not more than two thousand
pesos or by imprisonment for not mo e than six months, or both. xxx
(Emphasis supplied.)

On the other _hand, PD 1994 is he applicable law for respondent

Marcos, Jr. 's failure to file his 1985. inc me tax return. Section 288 of said
law imposes the penalty of a fine or impr' sonment or both:

Sec. 288. Failure to file return supp(v information, pay tax,

withhold and remit tax. - Any person equired under this Code or by
regulations promulgated thereunder to ay any tax, make a return, keep
any records, or supply any information who willfully fails to pay such
tax, make such return, keep such recor s, or supply such information,
or withhold or remit taxes withheld, at e time or times required by law
or regulations, shall, in addition to ot er penalties provided by law,
upon conviction thereof, be fined not ess than five thousand pesos
nor more than fjfty thousand pesos, o imprisoned for not less than
six months and one day but no·t more ban five years, or both.
Any person who attempts to mak it appear for any reason that he
or another has in fact filed are turn o · statement, or actually files a
return or statement and subsequently ithdraws the same return or
statement after securing the official rece ving seal or stamp of receipt of
an internal revenue office wherein the same was actually filed shall,
upon conviction therefor be fined not le s than three thousand pesos or
imprisoned for not more than one year, r both. (Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly1 the CA had the discretion o impose the penalty of a fine or

imprisonment or both, upon respondent Marcos, Jr. The CA's Decision
imposing only the penalty of a fine is valid: Consequently, respondent
Marcos, Jr. cannot be disqualified on the· ground that he was sentenced by
final judgment to a penalty':of more than· ighteen months under Section 12
of the OEC.

Similarly, as will be expounded later on, We agree with the

COMELEC's finding that respondent Ma cos Jr. was not imposed with the 1

penalty of perpetual disqualification from unning for public office.262

The said accessory pena1t.y was not riginally provided for in the 1977
NIRC, ~s this was only imposed upon t e effectivity of PD 1994 in O1
January 1986.263 Hence, again, respon~ent Marcos, Jr. may be imposed with
262
Rollo (G.R. No. 260426}, pp. 2 17-?.2-2.
263
Sec. 286. General prov.isions. Y (l'i) Any person <.:onvict·d (l f a crirni:: penalize<.1 by this Code shall, in
addition to being liable for tt,e paym~nt of the;: tox, be su ject to the penalti~s imposed herein: Provided,
Decision 55 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

the accessory penalty only for his failure to file his income tax return for the
year 1985.

However, a perusal of the dispos tive portion of the CA Decision264

would reveal that the accessory penalty f perpetual disqualification was not
imposed on respondent Marcos, Jr. Evid ntly, this this CA Decision has long
attained finality, and can no longer be to ched upon by this Court. 265 To alter
the same would be extremely prejudic al to respondent Marcos, Jr., and
would create a precedent contrary to e basic principle that all doubts
should be construed against the State and in favor of the accused. 266

IV The COMELEC did not gravely ab

its discretion in refusing to deny e
course to or to cancel respond t
Marcos, Jr. s COC

Respondent Marcos, Jr. raises the rgument that petitioners Buenafe,

et al. violated Section 1, Rule 23 of the OMELEC Rules of Procedure, as
amended, which states:
Sec. 1. Ground for Denial or Cancellation of Certificate of
Candidacy. -
XXX

A Petition to Deny Due Course to or ancel Certificate of Candidacy

invoking grounds other than those tated above or grounds for
disqualification, or combining grounds ·or a separate remedy, shall be
summarily dismissed. 267

Petitioners Buenafe, et al. count r that their pet1t10n before the

COMELEC did not violate the cited pro ision since it only raised grounds
relating to the falsity of the material representation of eligibility in
That payment of the tax due after apprehension shall n t constitute a valid defense in any prosecution
for violation of any provision of this Code or in any acti n for the forfe iture of untaxed articles.
(b) Any person who willfully aids or abets in the c mmission of a crime penalized herein or who
causes the commission of any s uch offense by another, 1all be liable the same manner as the principal.
(c) If the offender is not citizen of the Philippines, he shall be adopted immediately after serving the
sentence without further proceedings for deportation lf he is a public officer or employee, the
maximum penalty prescribed for the offense shall be i posed and, in addition, he shall be dismissed
from the public service and perpetually disqualified om holding any public office, to vote and to
participate in any election. If the offender is a certified public accountant, his certificate as a certified
public account shall, upon conviction, be automatically voked or cancelled.
(d) In the case of associations, partnerships, or corp rations, the penalty shall be imposed on the
partner, president, general manager, branch manage treasurer, officer-in-charge, and employees·
responsible for the violation.
264
Rollo (G.R. No. 260426), pp. 181-182.
265
LBP v. Arceo, 58 J Phil. 77 (2008).
266
De Leon v. Luis, G.R. No. 226236, 06 July 2021.
267
As amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, e titled " ln the Matter of the Amendment to
Rules 23, 24, and 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Proced re for purposes of the 13 May 2013 National,
Local and ARMM Elections and Subsequent Elections."
 ·...

Decision 56 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

respondent Marcos, Jr. 's COC. 268 Thus, he COMELEC erred in ruling that
their petition was susceptible to summar dismissal for invoking grounds for.
disqualification.269 '

For their part, respondent Marcos Jr. and the COMELEC claim that
the petition may be summ.a rily ·dis issed for · raising grounds for
disqualification,-· such as respondent Ma ·cos, Jr.'s conviction for an offense
involving moral turpitude ~d. a- cri e that ca1Ties the penalty of
imprisonment of more than eighteen ( 18) months. 210

However, these arguments are neit . er decisive of, nor relevant to, the
present controversy. The COMELEC d d not :dismiss the petition on the
ground of violating · Section 1, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. Instead, it proceeded to rule n the substantive issues raised and
denied the petition for lack of merit 271 The pertinent portion of the
COMELEC Second Division's Resolutio dated 17 January 2022 reads:

Despite summary dismissal bein warranted in the case at bar, We

shall nevertheless relax compliance wit the technical rules of procedure
and proceed to discuss the merits if o y to fully and finally settle the
matter in this case because of its paramo t importance.272

The COMELEC En Banc further oted that "despite the finding that
the Petition may be summarily dismis ed for noncompliance with the
requirements under the law, the Com ission (Second Division) relaxed
compliance with technical rules and pro eeded to discuss the merits of the
case." 273 Given that, there is no need to be abor the procedural correctness of
petitioners Buenafe, et al. 's submissions before the COMELEC. Whether
petitioners Buenafe, et al. raised argume ts more appropriate for a petition
for disqualification274 1s now irrelevant . to this Court's resolution of the
present petitions~

Moreover, the Court has ruled th t, even without a pet1t1on under

Section 78 of the OEC, "the COMELpC s under a legal duty to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of anyone suffer ng from the accessory penalty of
perpetual special disqualification to run£ r public office by virtue of a final
268
Rollo (G .R. No. 260374), pp. 35-38.
269
l.d. at 35.
270
ld. at 547-549 and 684-687.
271
Id.at 125.
272
Id. at 102.
273
Id. at 78.
274
See rol/o (G.R. N o. 260374), p. l "/1 (Petition. dated. 02 N ovember 202 l filed before the COME LEC):
" Respondent Marco~, .fr. was convicted of a crime invo ving moral turpitude, thereby disqualifying him
under the Omnibus Election Code to be a candidate nd to ho ld an.y public office." (Capita lization
omitted); See also id. at 179 · " The conviction of Respo dent Marcos, Jr: in the tax evasion cases carries
the mandatory penalty of imprisooment of more than I months as imposed by law, disqualifying him
under the Omnibus E lection Code from runni ng fo r any ublic office." (Capitalization omitted).
 . - . , . .. -

Decision 57 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426 .

judgment of conviction.mis Thus, eve procedural defects in petitioners

Buenafe at al. 's COMELEC petition .wi l not save respondent Marcos, Jr.'s
COC from scrutiny.

In passing upon the·merits of thes petitions, We are mindful that the

scope of Our review in a petition for ce tiorari is limited. Pursuant to Rule
64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules f Court, petitioners Buenafe, et al.
must show that the COMELEC acted wi hout or in excess of its jurisdiction,
or with . grave · abu$e of . discretion to lack or excess of
276
jurisdiction.

Grave abuse of discretion gen rally refers to a "capricious or

whimsical exercise of judgment as is• e uivalent to lack of jurisdiction." 277
Thus, mere abuse of discretion is not eno gh. 278 The abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as to amount to . "evasion of a positive duty or to a·
virtual refusal to perform a duty enj ·ned by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the po er is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion a d hostility." 279 Unless it is firmly
established that the COMELEC commit ed grave abuse of discretion, We
would not interfere with its _decision.280 .indings of fact of the COMELEC,
when supported by substantial evidence~ hall be final and non-reviewable. 28 1

We find no grave abvse of discret ort in this case. The COMELEC's

ruling is amply supported by law, jurispru ence, and the evidence on record.

As previously i.nentioned, Sections 74 and 78 of the OEC govern the

cancellation of, or denial of due course to, COCs on the ground of false
material representation. Under Section 74 a person filing a COC must state
therein that "he is eligible for said of:q.ce,' among other information. On the
other hand, Section 78 expressly . provide that the denial of due course or
cancellation of a COC may be filed e. .Iusively on the ground that the
information the candidate provided under ection 74 is false.

Notably, not every false represent tion warrants the denial of due
course to or cancellation of a COC. I must be shown that the false
representation pertained to_ mate1:ial in£ rmation and was made with an
"intention to deceive the electorate as t one's qualifications for public
office."282 Thus, a candidate's disqual1fic~ ion to run for public office does

275
Jalosjos, J1: v. COMELEC, 696 Phil. 601 (2012).
276
RULES OF COURT, Rule 64. Sec. 2, in relation to Rul e 65. Soc. I.
271
Varias v. COMELEC, 626 Phil. 292 (201 0). .
278
Suliguin v. COMELEC, 520 Phil. 92 (2006).
279
Penasv. COMELEC, UDK-16915, 15 Fe bruary 2022 .
280
Pagaduan v. COMELEC, 548 Phil. 427 (2007).
281
RULES OF COURT; Rule 64, Sec. 5:
282
Salcedo 11 v. COMELEC, supra.
Decision 58 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

not, in and of itself,_justify the cance lation of his or her COC. 283 The
requisites of materiality and i11tent must e present.

A. R~~pondf!nt }vfarcos, Jr. '.s epresentations

that are subject of the P(!titi s are material

Section 78 does not specify the parameters of a "material

representation." N_o n_et~eless, this Court as had numerous occasions in the
past to expound on the concept.

In Villafuerte v. COMELEC, 284 We eld that, for a representation to be

material, it must "refer to an eligibility or qualification for the elective office
the candidate seeks to hold." Thus, acts pertaining to a candidate's
residency, age, citizenship, or any other legal qualification are considered
material under Section 78 of the OEC. 285 · ·

Further, in Salcedo · 11 v. COM EC, 286 the Court explained the

rationale behind the requirement of mate ·iality, and concluded that the law
should not be interpreted to cover innocu us mistakes:

Therefore, it may be concluded tl t the material misrepresentation

contemplated by section 78 of the Coder fer to qualifications for elective
office. This conclusion-is strengthened b the fact that the consequences
imposed upon a candidate guilty of hav· g made a false representation in
his [or her] certificate of candidacy are g ave - to prevent the candidate
from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him [or her] for
violation of the election laws. It could n t have been the intention of the
law to deprive a person of such a basic an substantive political right to be
voted for 1:r public office upon just an innocuous mistake. (Citation
omitted.)

In this case, petitioners Buenafe, et l . assert that respondent Marcos,

Jr. made a false material representation w en, in his COC, he certified under
oath the statement, "I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to." 287
Respondent Marcos, Jr. also allegedly mis epresented his eligibility when he
checked the box "No" in response to the question, "[h]ave you ever been
found liable for an offense which carries with it the accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification to hold public o fice, which has become final and
executory?" 288 Petitioners Buenafe, et al. c aim that respondent Marcos, Jr. 's

283
Ugdoracion, Jr. v. COMELEC, supra.
284
G. R. No. 206698, 25 Februa1y 2014.
285 Id . .
286
371 Phil. 377 ( 1999).
287
Rollo (G .R. No. 260374), pp. 21-'22.
288
Id. at 22-23.
Decision 59 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

conviction for violation of the NIRC ca ied with it the penalty of perpetual
disqualification, thereby repdering the t_· stateni.ents false. 289

The assailed representations pass he test of materiality because they

pertain to respondent ·Marcos, Jr. 's eli ibility to hold elective office. In_
Dimapilis v. COMELEC-90(DimapilL ), We _ ruled that perpetual
disqualification is a material fact bee use it directly affects a person's
capacity to be elected and to hold public ffice, thus:

A CoC is a formal requiremen for eligibility to public office.

Section 74 ·of the OEC provides that th CoC of the person filing it shall
state, among others, that he is eligible r the office he seeks to run, and
that the facts stated therein are true to he best of his knowledge. To be
"eligible" relates to the capacity of holdi1 g, as well as that of being elected
to an office. Conversely, " ineligibili .y" has been defined as a
"disqualification or legal incapacity to b elected to an office or appointed
to a particular position." In this relation a person intending to run for
public office must not only possess th required qualifications for the
position for which he or she intends to un, but must also possess none
of the grounds for disqualification und r the law.

In this case, petitioner had been fi und guilty of Grave Misconduct

by a final judgment, and punished with ismissal from service with all its
accessory penalties, including perpetu disqualification from holding
public office. Verily, perpetual disquali cation to hold public office is a
material fact involving eligibility whic Tendered petitioner's CoC void
from the start since he was not eligible t run for any public office at the
time he filed the same. (Emphases an underscoring in the original;
citations omitted.)

When respondent Marcos, Jr. decla ed that he has not been convicted
of an offense that canies with it the .accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to· hold office, he made ·· Ihaterial representation regarding
his eligibility to run· for and hold elect ve office. This representation, if
proved false, would fall within the ambit o Section 78 of the OEC.

Similarly, respondent Marcos, Jr. m de a material representation when

he signed and subscribed to his COC, whi h states that, "I am eligible for the
office I seek to be elected to." 291 In Ara ea v. COMELEC- 92 (Aratea), the
Court emphasized that disqualification to run for office is an ineligibility.
Consequently, a ?tatement _in the COC tha one is eligible, when such is not
the case, is a false material represent.a ion constituting ground for the·
application of Section 78 of the OEC:

269
Id. at 23.
290
808 Phil. 1108 (201 7).
291
Rollo (G.R. No. 260374), pp. 2 1-'22.
292
696 Phil. 700 (201 2).
Decision 60 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

Perpe.tual _special disqualificat on is a g!·ound for a petition under

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election C · de because this accessory penalty
is an ineligibility, which rn'e ans that th convict is not eligible to run for
public office, . contrary to the stateme that Section 74 requires him to
state under oath in his certificate of andidacy. As this Court held in
Fermin v. Commis.sion on Elections, th false material representation may
refer to "qualifications or ·eligibility." One who suffers from perpetual
special disqualification is ineligible to run for public o(fice. If a person
suffering . from perpetual ·spe·cial disq aJification files a certificate of
candidacy stating under oath · that ''h is eligible to run for (public)
office," as expressly required under ection 74, then he clearly makes
a false material representation that ·s a ground for a petition under
Section 78. As thi s Court explained in F, rmin:

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to

or the cancellation of the CoC i not based on the lack of
qualifications but on a finding hat the candidate made a
material representation that i~ £ lse, which may relate to
the qualificati.ons required oft 1e public office he/she is
running for. It is noted that the candidate states in
his/her CoC that _h e/she is elig ble for the office he/she
seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, t erefore, is to be read in
relation to the constitutional nd statutory provisions
on qualifications or eligibility or public office. If the
candidate s·ubsequently states · material representation
in the CoC that is false, the C MELEC, following the
law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a
proceeding under Section 78 to· a quo warranto proceeding
under Section 253 of the OEC si e they both deal with the
eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the
distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is
filed before proclamation, wh le a petition for quo
warranto is filed after procl ation of the winning
candidate. (Emphasis and ita.lics in the original; citations
omitted.)

The Court came to the same cohcl sion in the cases of Ty-Delgado, 293
cited earlier, and Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMEL C-94 (Jalosjos, Jr.). In these cases,_
the Court ruled that petitioners therein, -w . o had filed their respective COCs,
made false material representations when they declared themselves eligible
to hold public office, despite prior convict ons that rendered them ineligible.

Dimapilis involved a candidate fou d guilty by a final judgment of the

administrative offense of Grave · Mis onduct. Meanwhile, in Aratea,
Jalosjos, Jr. and '.(y-Delgado, the candid.at s seeking to run for public office
had criminal convictions under the RPC. one of these cited cases pertains

293
Supra.
294
696 Phil. 60 I (20 12).
Decision 61 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

to a conviction under the NIRC, specific lly the application of Section 286,
as amended by PD 1994.
. .
Nonetheless, We find no reason to depart from these cases' ruling on
the effect of perpetual ·disqualification t . hold public office on a person's
representation of eligibility in his or her OC. Accordingly, We hold that the
assailed representations iri this case are aterial for the purpose of applying
Section 78 of the OEC. ·

Respondent Marcos, · .Jr. clai s that his alleged perpetual

disqualification to hold public office d_oe not bear on his eligibility because
it does not pertain to any of the requirem nts under Section 2, Article VII of
the 1987 Con:stitution:m He argues that ese requirements are exclusive. 296
Hence, in determining his eligibility to run for President, only the
requirements under this constitutional pr vision must be considered, to the
exclusion of any other grounds for disqua ification under other laws.297

The Court has ruled that, as used i Section 74 of the OEC, the word
"eligible" means having "the right to r for elective public office, that is,
having all the qualifications and none· o the ineligibilities to run for the
public office." 298 Perpetual disqualificati n is an ineligibility. Necessarily,
therefore, it directly affects one's eligi ility to run for office. Equally
established is that the ~numeration of qual ti.cations in the 1987 Constitution,
as reiterated in Section 63 of the OEC, is ot exclusive. Other pertinent laws
lay down requirements for qualification nd eligibiljty to run for and hold
elective office. These considerations are ufficient to meet the requirement
of materiality under Section 78 of the OE

Having established that the subjec representations are material, We

now resolve whether· they are false, i. e. ·whether respondent Marcos, Jr.·
misrepresented himself to be eligible an · ..not .disqualified from running as
president. Relevant to its resolution is w ether respondent Marcos, Jr. was
indeed perpetually disqualified from holdi g public office in light of the CA
Decision.

B. In the Philippines, disqualffic tion from

public office is l/. long-establis ed penalty

The concept of disqualification fron public office has been present in

Philippine laws for more than a centur It figure? several times in the
295
Rollo (G.R. No. 260374}, p. 55 1.
296
Id. at 550-55 1.
297
Id. at 55 I.
298
Aratea v COiv!El.EC, suµra.
 '· , ' ' ...

Decision G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

various Acts enacted by the First Philip . ine Commission between 1900 to
1907. Under Act No. 5,299 disloyalty tot e U.S. as the supreme authority in
the Islands was declared a ground for c mplete disqualification for holding
office in the Philippinedvil service. 300 •

Act No . . ll 2_6301 empowe_red the ivi\ .Governor not only to remove

any municipal officer froi:n office, but lso,. in his discretion, declare such
official either te.tp.porarily or perman_ntly disqut;ilified thereafter from
holding office.

Moreover, Act No. 1582, or the Election Law of 1907, 302 which
governed the country's very first nationa elections through popular votes, 303
provided that "xxx no person who has een convicted of a crime which is
punishable by imprisonment for two ye s or more shall hold any public
office, and no person disqualified from h lding public office by the sentence
of a court xxx shall be eligible to hold ublic office during the term of his
disqualification. " 304 Prior to this, perso s who meet the minimum age,
residence and literacy requirements305 ca become municipal officers, unless
they are ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries
from provincial,. departmentai, or govern ental funds, contractors for public
works of the municipality,306 or someo e who habitually smokes, chews,
swallows, injects, or otherwise consm es or uses opium in any of its
forms.307

In addition, Act No. 1582 provide for a penalty of disqualification

from any public office, for. a period of fi e years, upon certain officials who
shall "aid any candidate or influence in y manner or take any part in any
municipal, provincial, or Assembly electi

299
"Establishment and Maintenance of an Efficient and .H nest Civil Service," 19 September 1900.
300
Section 15 of Act No. 5.
301
"An Act for the Purpose of Empowering Provincial oards to Subpoena Witnesses and to Require
Testimony under Oath in Conducting Certain lnvestiga ons, and for Other Purposes," 28 April 1904.
302
" An Act to Provide for the Holding of Elections in th Philippine Islands, for the Organization of the
Philippine Assembly, a nd fo r Other Purposes," 09 Janu ry 1907.
103
· "The History of the Philippi11e Assembly ( 1906- 191 )," <https://nhcp. gov. ph/the-historv-of-the-tirst-
philippi ne-assemblv-1907-·l 916/> (visited IO June 202 ).
304
Section 12, Act No. 1582. See also the case of Topacio '. Paredes, 23 Ph il. 238 (1912), where the Court
had the occasion to discuss the qualifications and disq t a lifications (Jf elective provincia l and municipal
officers based on the laws in effect at the time.
305
THE MUNJCJPAL CODE or Act No. 82, Sec. 15 ..
306
Id. at Sec. 14
307
Act No. 1768, " An Act to Amend Act N umbered fift en Hundred and Eighty-Two, Known As 'The
Election Law; as Amended by Acts Numbered Sevent en Hundred and Nine and Seventeen Hundred.
and Twenty-Six, by Disqualifying Habitual Users of pium From Holding Provincial or Municipal
Officers," 11 October 1907.
308
Act No. 1582, Sec. 29. This provis ion, among othei·s, as subsequently amended by Act No. 1709 (31
August 1907) which expanded the li1;t -of public office who may be d isqualified from holding public
office if found to have committed the offenses proscribe under said Act
 .. ' . ... . . ~. .: - ~

Decision 63 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

Under Section 11 of Act No. 145 ,309 which amended Act No. 136,310
the penalty·or' disqualificatiqn .fro~ hof·di g office may also be meted by the
Governor Generai'- upon justices of the peace found "not performing his
duties prqperly". or "unfit for the service.. A person may also be disqualified .
from running from office ·by· reason of the·: non-payment of taxes, which
disqualification can be removed by payin .· the delinquent taxes after election
and before the ciat~. fixed -by law for ass ming office, but not afterwards. 311
Persons convicted. of offen$es connecte _. \vith administration of the then
Bureau of Audits (such as. embezzleme t or malversation in office) were
likewise "ipso facto forever disqualified from holding any public office or
employment of any nature whatever withi the Philippine Islands." 312

Further back in history,' ·disqual fication from public office was

already recognized as a penalty even he re the American occupation. The
Penal Code for the Philippine Island (old Penal Code), which was
promulgated in 1884 under the Spanish Constitution, 313 state in pertinent
part:

A1.t. 31. The · penalty . o perpetual absolute

disqualification shall produce the follow· g ·effects;

1. The deprivation of all :h nors :and of any public

offices and employments which the offe der may have held, even
if conferred by popular election.
. .
2. The de rivation of the ri t to vote in any election
for any popular elective office or to be ~le ted to such office.

3. The. disqualification for an honor. office. or ublic

em lo ment and for the exercise of an o the ri hts mentioned.

4. The loss of all right lo etirement pay or other

pension for any office formei·ly held, but ithout prejudice to any
allowance for living expenses which the overnment may see fit to
grant the d~fendant for any distinguished s rvice.
~ . .
The provisions of this article sh II not affect any rights
acquired at the time of the conviction by he widow or children of
the offender.

309
An Act Amending Certain Sections of' Act~ Numbered ne Hund1:ed and Thirty-Six, One Hundred and
Ninety, and One Hundred and Nirn:ty-Four, and Maki1 g Additional Provisions so as to Increase the
Efficiency of Courts of Justices of the Peace, 03 Fe ruary 1906, as amended by Act No. 1627,
"Amending General Orders No. 58, s. 1900 and Arts o. 82, 136, 183, 190, 194, 787 and Repealing
Acts No. 590, 992 and 1450," 30 March 1907.
1 10
An Act Providing for the Organization of Courts in the Pl ilippine Islands, 11 .June 190 l .
1 11
ADM1NISTRATIVE CODE, Act No. 2657, Sec. 504.
312
Id. at Sec. 2662. ·
313
U.S. v. Balcorta, 25 Phil, 273 ( 19 I 3).
 • 1 •• '. " I ,'•"

Decision 64 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

Art. 32. · · The · · penalty .o temporary.. absolute

disqualification shall produce the follo ing effects:

1. · The deprivation of .all l onors and of any public

offices and employments which the offi nder ·may have held, even
if conferred by popular .e lection: ·

2. . The de rivation of the ri ht to vote in any election

for any popular efedive office or to' e elected to· such office.
during-the term of the sentence.

3. The disqualification fo · of the honors;

employments, offices, and rights me in paragraph one
hereof, during the tem1 of the sentence.

Art. 33. The penalty of perpetu· 1special disqualification

for public office shall produce the follo ing effects:

1. The deprivation of the offi e or employment thereby

affected and of the honors thereto appert ining.

2. The dis ualification for similar offices or

employments.

Art. 34. The penalty of perpetu l special disqualification

for the right of suffrage shall forever d rive the offender of the
ri ht to vote at an election for the ubl c office in uestion or to
be elected to such office.

Art. 35 . The penalty o temporary special

disqualification for public office shal produce the following
effects:

1. The deprivation of the o -ice or . employment m

question and ofalf hcniors appurtenant the eto.

2. The dis ualification for h ldin an ' similar office

during the term of the sentence.

Art. 36. . The . penalty of . temporary special

disqualification for the exe1·cise of the right of suffrage shall
deprive the offender durino the term of th sentence of the rioht to
vote in any electi9n for the office to whic the sentence refers or to
be elected to such .office. (Emphases and t nderscoring supplied.)

It was then considered both an affli tive·q4 and accessory penalty. As a

stand-alone penalty, disqualification from ublic office can be imposed for a
duration of six years and one day to tw lve years.m On the other hand,
314
THE PENAL CODE,/\rticl-e 2 5 .
315
Id. at Article 27.
Decision 65 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

when imposed as an accessory to r penalties,316 its duration was as

provided by law. 317 •

In 1930, the old Penal. .Code· wa repealed by Act No. 3815, or the
RPC. Although the provisions relating t disqualification from public office
were essentially retained, there were s ill notable changes: first, from six
separate Arti~les under the · old enal Code, the prov1s10ns on
disqualification were thereafter COf!lpres ed into two provisions, which now
read:

6
" Art. 53. The death penalty, when it shall not be exec ted by reason of the pardon of the offender, shal l
carry with it that of perpetual absolute disqualifi ation and subjection to the survei llance of the
authorities during the lifetime of the offender, unless uch accessory penalties shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon.

Art. 54. The penalty of cadena perpetua carries with·i the following:
l . Degradation, in case the principal penalty of caden perpetua be imposed upon any public employee
for any official misconduct, if the office held by I im be such as to confer permanent rank.
2. Civil interdiction.
3. Subjection to the surveillance of the authorities duri g the lifetime of the offender.
Even though the offender be pardoned as to the prin ipal penalty, he shall suffer perpetual absolute
disqualification and s ubjection to the survei llance o the authorities during his lifetime, unless these
accessory penalties shall have been expressly remi ed in the_ pardon granted with respect to the
principal penalty.

Art. 55. The penalties of rech1si6n perpetua, releg ion pe1petua and extranamiento pe,petuo shall
carry _with them the penalties of perpetual absolute d squalification and subjection to the surveillance
of the authorities for the lifetime of the offender, whi h penalties he shall suffer even though pardoned
as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have een remitted in the pardon.

Art. 56. The penalty of cadena temporal shall carry wi h it the following penalties:
I. Civil interdiction of the convict during the term oft e sentence.
2. Perpetual absolute disqualification.
3. Subjection to the surveillance of the authorities duri g the lifetime of the offender.

Art. 57. The penalty ofpr~:sidio. mayor shaU carry with it those_of temporary absolute disqualification
to its full extent and subjection to the surveillance f the authorities for a term equal to that of the
principal penalty; the term of the latter accessory pen lty shall commence upon the expiration of the
principal penalty.

Art. 58. The penalty of presidia correccionrl shall car , with it that of suspension from public office,
from the right to fol°Iow a profession o r calling and froi the exercise of the right of s uffrage.

Art. 59. The penalties of reclusion te1riporal, relega ion temporal and extranamiento temporal shal l
carry with them the penalties of teq1_porary absolute, isqualification to its full extent and s ubjection
to the surveillance of the authorities· during the term f the sentence, and for another equal period to
commence at the expiration of the term of the principal pena.lty.

Art. 60. The penalty of confinamiento shall c,my with t those of temporary absolute disqualification
and subjection to the surveillance of the authorities du ing the term of the sentence, and for another
equal period to commence at the_expiration of the te m of the principal penalty.

Art. 61. The penalties of prisi6n mc-0101; pr if ion e;orre cional and arresto mayor shall carry with the m
suspension of the right to hold public office an<:! he right of suffrage during the term of the
sentence.
317
TH E PENAL CODB, Article 29.
 ~• • - • : l • ••· • . ·

Decision 66 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

..
Art. 30 ..Effects of the penalties o pe,petual or temporary absolute
disqualification. - The penalties of p petual · or temporary absolute
disqualification for public office shall roduce the following effects:

l. The deprivation of the publi · offices and employments which

the offender may have held even if cop£ -~ed by po.pular election.

2. Ti1e. de rivation of the rioht to vote in an , election for an

o ular office or to be elected to such o ice. . ,·

for the exercise of anv of the ri hts ment oneci.

In case of temporary disqualifi ation, such disqualification as is

comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this rticle shall last during the term of
the sentence.

4. The loss of all rights to retire ent pay or other pension for any
office fonnerly held.

Art. 32. Effect of the penalties o perpetual or temporary special

disqualification for the exercise of the r ht of suffrage. - The perpetual
or temporary special disqu·alification or the exercise of the right of
suffrage shall de rive the· o°ffender e tuall or durin the term of the
sentence accordin to the nature of said enalt . of the ri crht to vote in any
popular election for any public office r to be elected to such office.
Moreover, the offender shall not be er itted to hold an ublic office
durin the eriod of his dis ualificatio . (Emphases and underscoring
supplied.) •.

The Court, in Lacuna v. Abes, 3 18 cl ified the distinction between the

different kinds of disqualification as dis~il ed in these tw·o provisions:

The accessory penalty of temp rary absolute disqualification

disqualifies the convict for public office and for the right to vote, such
disqualification to last only during the ten 1 of the sentence xxx

But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory
penalty of perpetual special disqualificati n for the exercise of the right of
sujji-age. This accessory penalty deprives he convict of the right to vote or
to be elected to or hold public office pe petual~v. as distinguished from
temporary special disqualification, whic lasts during the term of the
sentence. xxx

XXX

The word " perpetually" . and the hrase '·cturing the term of the
sentence" should be applied distributive!) h> their respective antecedents;
thus, the ,vord "perpetually'' refers to the pe1vetual kind of special
disqualification, while. the plrrase "during he term of the sentence" refers

3 18
133 Phil. 770 ( 1968).
Decision 67 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

to the temporary special· disqualifica ion.··The "duration between the

perpetual and th,e temporary (both s ecial) are necessarily different
because the proYision, instead of mergi g their .durations into one period,
states that such. duration· is "according to "the nature of said penalty" -
which. means according to whether th penalty is the perpetual or the
temporary special disqualification.

Second, ·in addition· to 'peing clas _ified as an accessory penalty, the

penalty of disqualification from public ffi,ce 3 19 is also specifically imposed
by the RPC as a penalty for the commissi n of the following crimes:

a. Knowingly rendering unj tju<lgment (.Art. 204);

a. Judgment rendered throug 1 negligence (Art. 205);
b. Direct bribery (Art. 2 10);
c. Other frauds (Art. 2 14);
d. Malversation of public s or property (Art. 217);
e. Illegal use of public funds r property (Art. 220);
f. Conniving with or consent ng to evasion (Art. 223);
g. Evasion through negligen (Art. 224);
h. Removal, concealment·or estruction of documents
(Art.226);
1. Officer breaking seal (Art. 227);
J. . Opening of closed docwne .ts (Art. 228);
k. Revelation of secrets by officer (Art. 229);
I. Open disobedience (Art 2 l);
m . Disobedience to Order of uperior Officer, ,:vhen said
order was suspended by inferior fficer (Art. 232);
n. Refusal of Assistance (A11. 233); .
o. Maltreatment of Prisoners Art. 235);
p. Prolonging performance o duties and powers (Art.
237);
q. Usmpation of Legislative owers (Art. 239);
r. Disobeying request for dis ualification (Art. 242);
s. Abuses against chastity (A t. 245);
t. Corruption of minors (Art. 40);
u. Liability of ascendants, gu dians, teachers, or other
persons entrusted with the custod of the corrupted/abused
minor (Art. 346);
v. Simulation of births, substi ution of one child for an-
other and concealment or abando m1ent of a legitimate child
(Art. 347).

Third, under the old Penal Cod , accessory penalties must be

explicitly imposed. 320 Thus, in People v. P ·ez, 3 i , this Court held:
3 19
THE REVISED PENAL CODE ( RPC), Article 25, 08 ece~ber 1930. It is considered as an accessory
to the following penalties: Death (Article 40), Reclusio 1 perpetua and reclusion temporal (Article 4 I),
Prision Mayor (Article 42), Prision Correccional (A1 icle 43), and Arresto Mayor (Article 44). See
also Article 58 (on Additional pena.lty to be imposed up n certain accessories).
320
Art. 90. Whenever the courts shall impose a penalty w ich, by provision of law, carries with it other
penalties, accord ing to the proyisions of _S ection llJ f the nex~ preceding chapter, they shall also
expressly impose upon the convict the latter penalties.
321
47 Phil. 984 (1924)
Decision 68 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

The first question · that presents itself for consideration is

whether or not by .virtue of the ju gment imposing two years,
four months and on~ day of pri ion . ~orreccional upon the
accused in the aforesaid criminal c.ase for assault against a
person in. authority, . .the. appellant became disqualified from
assuming said. office of.municipal p: esident. . ·

If we confine ourselves to . the fiel of tµe Penal Code now in

force, our answer wquld . be in th . neg~tive for two reasons:
First,-because in :faid judgment, wh se disposing part is set out
hereinabove, he is not expressly s ntenced to be disqualified,
which disqualification would have een an accessory penalty in
the form of suspe\1sion from office and from the right of
suffrage during the life of the s~nte ce, according to article 61
of the Penal Code. Article 90 of is Code provides that the
accessory penalties are to be i posed upon the convict
expressly, and, according to Viada, ey are not to be presumed
to have been imposed xxx

In contrast, Article 73 of the C categorically provided for a

presumption regarding the automatic imp sition of accessory penalties, thus:

Art. 73. Presumption in Re ard to the Imposition of

Accessory Penalties. - Whenever the courts shall impose a
penalty which, by provision of law, arries with it other penalties,
according to the provisions of articl s 40, 41 , 42, 43, 44, and 45
of this Code, it must be unde stood that the accessory
penalties arc also imposed upo the convict. (Emphases
supplied.)

To be sure, disqualification from p blic office has also been provided

as a principal penalty for the commissio of crimes identified and defined
under special laws. These include~among thers:

(1) RA 9165 322 imposes maximu n penalties for the unlawful acts
provided for in this law, in ddition to absolute perpetual dis-
qualification from any publi office, if those found guilty of
such unlawful acts are gove.r nent officials and employees;

(2) RA 10845,323 · which provides that government officials or em-

ployees found guilty of large ·cale agricultural smuggling shall
be meted the _maximum of th penalty prescribed, in addition to
the penalty of perpetual disqua[tfication from public office, to
vote and to participate in any ublic election;

322
Also known as " The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs ct of2002," 07 June 2002. See Sec. 28.
323
Also known as the "Anti -Agricu.lturn l Smuggli.ng Act of 0 16, 2:; M:.ly 20 16_S ee Sec. 4 .

....
 ... ' . : - ... ; . : ..... . ..:. • • # • •..

Decision 69 . G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

(3) RA 10863 324 states that if a ublic officer or employee commits

. any of the acts proscrib~d th reh1,:th,e· p~rtalty next higher in de-
gree shall· be imposed in a diti.on ,to the penalty of perpetual
di_squalification from public office, disqualification to vote and
- to participate fn any.public e ection; 9-nd ·.

(4) RA 11479,325 _which declares that public officials or employees

found .· guilty of any act .P mished under said law shall be
· charged with the administr t.ive offense of grave misconduct
and/or disloyalty to the Rep1 blic of the Philippines and the Fil-
ipino people and meted witl the penalty of dismissal from the·
service, with the _a ccessory p nalties of cancellation of civil ser-
.vice eligibility, ·forfeitui·e of retirement benefits and perpetual
absolute disqualification fro running f or any elective office or
holding any public office.326

Disqualification from public office may also be imposed as a penalty

in administrative cases. Section 51 of t e 2017 Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service,327 for exam le, specifically provides that the
grave administrative ·. _o ffense of fixing and/o~ collusion with fixers in
consideration of economic and/or other g in or advantage shall be penalized
by dismissal and perpetual disqua.lificatio .from public service.

Generally, however, perpetual dis ualification from holding public

office is among the disabilities cons_ide d inherent in, and follows as a
consequence of, the penalty of dismiss· l. 328 Such penalties are, in tum,
imposed for the commission of acts cons ituting grave misconduct, that is,
misconduct attended by any ·of the additio al. elements of corruption, willful
intent to violate the law or disregard of est blished rules:

xxx This gi·avity means that miscond ct was committed with such
depravity that it justifies not only putt ng an end to an individual's
current engagement as a public servan , but also the foreclosure of
any further opportunity at occupying ublic office.

XXX

One who GOni.n1its grave mi sconduct i one who, by the mere fact
of that misconduct, has proven himsel _,or herself unworthy of the
continuing GOIJfidence of the pubic. By his or her very
- - - - -- --
Customs Modernization a1Jd TarifJAct, J () May 201 6. S .. ScG. 143 1.
324

m "The An ti-Terrorism Act of2020," 03 July 2020,

326
Sec. 15. ·
327
C ivil Service Commission Resolution No. ]70 1077, 03 J ly 20 17.
328
2017 Rules on AdministTative Cases i.n the C ivil Servic , Sec. 58. See alsv C ivil Service Comm iss ion
Resolution No. 1 JO1502, Sec. 52, or the Revised Unifo m Ru les 0 11 Admin istrative Cases in the C ivi l·
Service, 08 Nove mbe r 20-1I; C ivil Service Commi·s sfon· e.s olution No. 991936, Secs. 57 and 58, or the
U niform Rules on Administrative Cases_in the C iv il Serv ce. 14 September 1999.
Decision 70 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426 ·

commission of that grave offense, • he offender forfeits any right

to hold public office: 329

1. · Respondent .Marcos, . Jr, was not

imposed . .the incipal penalty
of perpetual disqu lification from
public office ·: _ ..
, .
Petitioners Ilagan, et ·al . .maintain·: hat the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion · when . it deda:red .. that respondent Marcos, Jr. was not
disqualified from running for public offi e for the following reasons: (1) PD
1994 clearly and unequivocally impose a mandatory penalty of perpetual
disqualification as an accessory penalty n top of the ·penalties provided by
the 1977 NIRC; 330 (2) respondent Marco , Jr. was a public official until 1986_
and there was no abandonment of office that would justify his failure to file
the required income tax retums; 331 (3) t e CA Decision imposing only the
penalty of fine is void as it complete! ignored a mandatory directive to
impose the maximum penalty prescri~ed as well as the accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification from public office; 332 ( 4) in any case, since
respondent Marcos, Jr never filed the re uired income tax returns, he is, to
date, considered to be in continued violat on of the NIRC.333

As the foregoing issues are interre ated, this Court shall address them
jointly.

Section 45 334 of the 1977 NIRC re uired every Filipino citizen having
a gross annual income of at least P l ,800.00, whether residing in the
Philippines or abroad, ~-O file an income x return on or before the fifteenth
day of March of each year, covering jnc >me of the preceding taxable year.
Failure to so ·file was originaily punished_, under Section 73, by "a fine of not
329
Office of the Ombudsman v. Regalado, G.R. Nos. 2084 1-82, 07 February 20 I 8.
330
Rollo (G.R. No. 260426), pp. 23-24.
331
1d. at 28-29.
332
Id. at 34-36.
333
Jd. at 25-27.
334
Sec. 45. Individual returns._:_ (a) Requirements. - ( I The following individuals are required to fi le an
income tax return, if they have a gross income of at lea t P 1,800 for the taxable year:
(A) Every Filipino citizen, whether residing in th Philippines or abroad and,
(B) Every alien residing in the Philippines, regard ess of whether the gross income was derived
from sow·ces within or outside the Philippines.
xxxx
(c) When to fi le. ---- The return of the following individ ials shall be filed on or before the fifteenth
day of March of each year, coveriog income of the pre ding taxable year:
(A) Residents of the Philippines, whether citize s or ·;)liens, whose income have been derived
solely fro m salaries; · wages, interest, dividen s, allowances, ·commissions, bonuses, fees,
pensions, or any combination thereof. ·
(B) The return of all otb<.:r inri;ividuaJs not met tioned above, including non-resident citizens
shall be filed on or before the fifteenth day u Ap!'il of each year covering income of the
preceding ·raxab le year.
xxxx
Decision 71 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

more than two thousand pesos or by 1 ·prisonment for not more than six
months, or both."

On 05 November·-1985, ·po 1994 was issued, introducing substantial

amendments to the 1977 NIRC. These a endments included Section 286, to
wit:

Sec. 286. Genera~ provisions. (a) Any person convicted of a

crime penalized by this Code shall, i . addition to being liable for the
payment -of the tax, be subject to the penalties imposed herein:
Provided, That payment . of the tax ue after apprehension shall not
constitute a valid defense in any prosec tion for violation of any provision
of this Code or in any action for the for iture of untaxed articles.

(b) A.ny person who willfully ai s or abets in the commission of a

crime penalized herein or who causes t commission of any such offense
by another, shall be liable in the same m nner as the principal.

(c) If the offender is not a citiz n of the Philippines, he shall be

deported immediately after serving the sentence without further
proceedings for deportation. If he is a public officer or employee, the
maximum penalty prescribed for the ffense shall be imposed and, in
addition, he shall be dismissed from t e public service and perpetually
disqualified from holding any public ffi_ce, to vote and to participate
in any election. If the offender is a certified public accountant, his
certificate as a certified public t shall, upon conviction, be
automatically revoked or canceled.

(d} fn the case of associations, artnerships, or corporations, the

penalty shall be imposed on the part er, president, general manager,
branch manager, treasurer, officer-in-ch ge, and employees responsible
for the violation. (Emphases supplied.)

We agree with petitioners Ilagan et al. that Section 286 clearly

provides for the· imposition of disqual fication from public office as a
penalty upon pub.lie officials or emplo ees found guilty of violating the
provisions of the 1977 NIRC, as amend d by PD 1994. It is, however, not
disputed that the fallo of the CA Decisio 335 adjudging respondent Marcos,
Jr. 's guilt for non-filing of the required i come tax return makes absolutely
no mention of said penalty. We again uote the dispositive portion for
emphasis:

WHEREFORE, the Decision ofth trial court. is hereby

MODIFIED as follows:

1. ACQUI1TING the accus d-appellant of the

clu:,rges of violation of Secti n 50 of the NIRC for
. \.

335
Rollo (G. R. No. 260.426). pp. 1. 81- 18'..!.
 . .
.. . ' ·.· . ,.,·., . ,•

Decision 72 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

non-payment of deficien y taxes f~r the taxable

years 1982 -to 1985 in cr·111nal Cases Nos. Q-92-
29216, Q-92-29215, Q-92 29214 ·and Q-92-24390;
and FINDINO him-guilty eyond reasonable doubt
·.: of violation cif Section 45 of the NIRC for failure
to file /nco~e ~ax .retur for the taxable years
1982 to 1985 in, Criminal Cases No. Q-91-24391,
.Q-92-29212, Q-92~29213 d Q-92-29217;
1, OrderiI).g th~ appellant t pay · to : the • BIR the
deficiency income taxes ue· with interest at the
l_egai"rate un,til·fully paid;
2. O_rdering .the appellant to ay a fine of P2,000.00
for each charge i.il Crim nal Cases Nos. Q-92-
29213, Q-92-29212 and Q 92-29217 for failure to
file income tax returns f r the years 1982, 1983
and 1984; and the fine of P30,000.00 in Criminal
Case No. Q-91-24391 for ailure to file income tax
return for 1985, with surch ges.

so_ ORDERED."

Petitioners Ilagan, et -al. advanc the view that the imposition of

disqualification from public office as an ccessory penalty is mandatory and
that, since courts have no power to im ose a lower penalty than what is
authorized by law, the CA ·Decision is oid· as it "completely ignored the
mandatory directive of S_ection 286 of P 19.94." 336

However, it must be emphasized that in criminal cases, the party

affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is. the State. The interest of
the private offended party, if any, is re icted only to the civil liability. 337
Thus, in Yokohama Tire Philippines, c. v. Reyes/38 We sustained the
dismissal of the petition for the annulme · t of a decision of acquittal on the
ground that the same ·would "necessaril . require a "review of the criminal
aspect of the case and, -as such, is prohi ited. xxx [O]nly the State, and not
herein petitioner, who is the private . ffended party, may question the
criminal aspect of the case.'~

The offense of non-filing of incoir e tax returns does not conceivably

implicate any private interests, much 1 ss those pertaining to petitioners
Ilagan, et al. As in malversatio1:1 of ptiblj funds or property, tax evasion, or
violations of RA 3019, the government i the offend_ed party that sustainecl
actual .and direct injury. as ,a _result of he commission .of the offense in
question and the one e·ntitied tq the civil jabilities, if any, of the accused.339
On this score alone_, petitioner Ilagan, et a :'s ·contentions should be rejected.
336
Id. at p. 35.
337
JCLV Realty & Development Corp. v. Mangali, G.R.. N . 2366 l 8, 17 August 2020.
338
G.R. No. 236686, 05 Ft:bruary 2020:
m Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandigunbayun, 487 Phil. 384 (2004); · nriayu v. People•, 526 Phil. 480 (2006).
 .. ~-: . :·•. : ".'

Decision 73 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

Even granting ex· gratia · argumen · s_tanding. in petitioners Ilagan, et

al. 's favor, the CA Decision has long be ome final and executory as in fact
Entry of Judgment ··was issued more t an twenty -(20) years ago, on 31
August 2001. 340 It can no longer be.modi ed, eve~ by this Court.

Finally, in Estarija v. ·People, 34 1 · e ·uph.eld- the erroneous penalty

imposed by the RTC upon Estarij~ for vi lation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019.
The trial .court· impo.s ed upon Estai:ija · straight penalty of seven years,
without any accessory penalty. The corr ct penalty under the law, with the
application of the Indeterminate Se tence .Act, would have been
imprisonment ranging from six years an one month, as minimum, to nine
years as maximum, with perpetual di qualification from public office.
However, the decision of the RTC had a ready become final and executory
because Estarija mistakenly appealed his conviction with the CA instead of
the Sandiganbayan. In .resolving the case, e held:

[The RTC DecisionJ may no 101 ger be modified in any respect,

even if the modification is meant to co rect what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law; a d whether or not made by the
highest court of the land. The reason s grounded on the fundamental
considerations of public policy and so nd practice that, at the risk of
occasional error, the judgments or orders of courts must be final at some
definite date fixed by law.

The RTC imposed upon Estarija he- straight penalty of seven (7)
years. This is erroneous·. The penalty f r violation of Section 3 (b) of
Republic Act No. 3019 is imprisonment fi r not less than six years and one
month nor more than fifteep years, · and perpetual disqualification from
public office. Under the Indeterminate entence Law, if the offense is
punished by a special law, the Court s all sentence the accused to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum ten of vv·li.ich shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law, aod the mini num term shall not be less than
the minimum prescribed by the same. T us, the correct penalty should
have been imprisonment ranging fro six (6) years and one (1)
month, as minimum, to nine (9) years as maximum, with perpetual
disqualification from public office. Ho ever, since the decision of the
RTC has long become final and execut ry, this Court cannot modify
the same. 342 (Emphasis supplied)

In another case, Tan v. · People,34· V..'e set aside the amendatory

judgment of the trial comi increasing the enahy imposed on petitioner for
340
Rollo (G.R. No. 260374), p. 241.
341
619 Phil. 457 (2009).
342
See also People v. Paet, I 00 Phi!. 35 7 l 1956), where ti e Court refused to modify the decis ion of the
trial court (which has already become tinal) to incl cle the a~cessory penalty of confiscation or
forfeiture, of the undeclared dollars, in favor of the gove· ment. .
343
430 Phil. 685 (2002).
Decision 74 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

bigamy after it had already ptonounc· d.jlidgment, on the basis of which

petitioner had applied for probation,.. orecl,osing his right to appeal and
rendering the previous, verdict to -lapse into finality. Thus, even if the trial
court erred in _the_p~nahy .imposed,' the dec~si.on can no longer be amended
after it has attained finality.

This is not to say, however, that t re was,. in fact, error or grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the CA whe1 it _saw fit to modify the conclusions
reached, and penalties imposed, by the t ial cowt.

In the landmark case of People v. , imon, 344 We have already settled the
matter of treatment of penalties found in special laws and the RPC :

.xxx [W]here the penalties un er the special law are different

from and are without reference or rel tion to those under the Revised
Penal Code, there can be no suppl tory effect of the rules for the
application of penalties under said Co e or by other relevant statutory
provisions based on or applicable onl to said rules for felonies under
the Code. In this type of special law, th legislative intendment is clear.

The same exclusionary rule wou d apply to the last given example,
Republic Act No:5639. While it is true hat the penalty of 14 years and 8
months to 17 years and 4 months is vi ally equivalent to the duration of
the medium period ·of reclusion ternpor 1, such technical term under the
Revised Penal Code is not given ~o tha penalty for carnapping. Besides,
the other penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying
circumstances stated in the law do not onespond to those in the Code.
The rules on penalties in the Code, ther fore, cannot suppletorily apply to
Republic Act No. 6539 and spe_c ial laws· fthe same fommlation.

On the other hand, the rules for tl e application of penalties and the
correlative effects thereof under the Rey sed Penal Code, as well as other
statutory enactments founded ·upon and applicable to such provisions of
the Code, have suppletory effect to 1e penalties under the former
Republic Act No. · 1700 and those n w provided under Presidential
Decrees Nos. 1612 and 1866. While the e are special laws, the fact that
the penalties for offenses thereunder are those provided for in the
Revise~ Penal Code lucidly reveals t e statutory intent to give the
related provisions on penalties for felonies under the Code the
corresponding application to said spe ial laws, in the absence of any
express or implici~ proscription in thes special laws. To hold otherwise
would be to sanction an indefensible ju icial truncation .of an integrated
system of penalties under the Code anc;l i ·s allied legislation, which could
never have -been the intendment of c ·o ngr ss.34:i (Emphases supplied.)

344
304 Phil.725 (1994),
345
See also Cahulogan v. PeC>ple, 828 Phil. 742 (20 I 8); uimvel v. People, 808 Phil. 889 (20 I 7); AAA v.
People, G.R. No. 22976'.'J,, 28 Nov~moer 2tll 8; PW>['/.e ·.,_ Molejon, 830 Phil. 519(2018).
Decision 75 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

Here, petitioners.Ilagan, et al:'s t eory that perpetual disqualification

was automatically imposed with the me e fact of conviction finds basis from
jurisprudence involving disqualificati ns .under the RPC. Respondent
Marcos, Jr.'s conviction, on the other 1 ·nd~ · is for the non-filing of income
tax return under the. J977 NIR.C.· Whe as the RPC contained a system of
penalties categorize.cl between principal or accessory penalties, 346 as well as
an express presumption in rega~ct' to .tlie imposition.of certain penalties upon
the mere fact of conv.iction,34_7 the 1977 RC did not.

People v. Silvallana, 348 the case ited by petitioners Ilagan, et al. to

support their argument that the accessor penalty need not be written in the
judgment of conviction·, clearly states th t the presumption on the automatic
imposition of accessory pen.aides appli s only to Articles 40,349 41,350 42,351
43,352 44, 353 and 45 354 of the RPC, in rela ion to Article 73 355 thereof. In that
case, We explained:

The defendant must suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual

special disqualification, not because a icle 217 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that ·i n all cases persons g ilty of malversation shall suffer

346
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 25.
347
Id. at Article 73.
348
6 I Phil. 636 (1935).
349
Art. 40. Death - Its Accessory Penalties. - The de th pr::nalty, when it is not executed by reason of
commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of pe etual absolute disqual ification and that of civil
interd_iction during thirty years following the date o sentence, unless such accessory penalties have
been expressly remitted in the pardon.
350
Art. 41. Reclusion Perpetua and Reclusion Temporal Their accessory penalties. - The penalties of
reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall car with them that of civil interdiction for life or
during the period of the sentence as the case may b , and that of perpetual absolute disqualification
which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned s to the principal penalty, unless the same shall
have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
35 1
Art. 42. Pris ion Mayor - Its Accessory Penalties. - he penalty of prision mayor sha ll carry w ith it
that of temporary a bsolute disqualification and that o perpe tual special d isqualification fro m the right
of suffrage which the offender sha ll suffer although ardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the
same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
352
Art. 43. Prision Correccional - Its Accessory Penalt1 s. - The penally of prision correccional shall
carry with it that of suspension from public office, fj-01 the right to follow a profession or calling, and
that of perpetual special disqualification from the right f suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment
shall exceed eighte~n months. The offender shall su er the disq ualification provided in Lhis article
although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless th same shall have been expressly remitted in the
pardon.
353
Art. 44. Arresto - Its Accessory Penalties. - The penalty of arresto shall carry with it that of
suspension of the right to hold office and the right of :;u frage during the term of the sentence.
354
Art.45. Confiscation and Fo,feiture of the Proceeds r Instruments of the Crime. - Every penalty
imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry wi h it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime
and the instruments or tools with which it was coni.mitte .
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confis ated and forfei ted in favor of the Government,
unless they be the property of a third person not liable or the offense, but those articles which are not
subject of lawful commerce ,shall he destro)'ed.
355
Art. 73. Presumption in regard (o the impositio1:i of ac essory penalties. -- Whenever the courts shal l
impose a penalty whi ch, l;>y provi5ion of law, ca1Ties wi h it other pe nalties, according to the provis ions
of Article 40, 41 , 42, 43, 44, and 45 of this Code, it mu· be unde rstood that the accessory penalties are
also imposed upon the i.;on vict. ·
Decision 76 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

perpetual 4isqualification in addition t the principal penalty, but as a

consequence of the penalty of prision 1 ayor provided in article 171. In
accordance with article 42 of _the Re ised Penal Code -the penalty of
prision mayor carries with'it that of te porary_absolute disqualification
and that of perpetual special disqualifi ation from the right of suffrage,
and article 32 provides that during the eriod of his disqualification the
offender shall not be p~rmitted to ho d any public office. Moreover,
article 73 of the Revised · Penal Co e ·provides that whenever the
courts shall impose a penalty which, y provision of law, carries with
it other penalties, according to the. p ovisions of articles 40, 41, 42,
43, 44, and 45.of the Revi_sed Penal C de, it must be understood that
the accessory penalties· .are also im osed upon the convict. It is
therefore unnecessary to express t e accessory penalties in the
sentence. (Emphasis supplied:)

Further, a more careful reading of Section 286 would also show

details that militate against petitioners I agan, et al.'s reading of automatic
imposition of the penalty of perpetual dis ualification from public office. We
refer to the following portion of Section 86:

[c] If the offender is not a citizen of.the hilippines, he shall be deported

immediately after serving the sente·nce without further proceedings for
deportation. If he is a public officer or mployee, the maximum penalty
prescribed for the offense shall be impo ed· and, in addition, he shall be
dismissed from the public service an perpetually disqualified from
holding any public office, to vote and to articipate in any election. If the
offender is a certified ublic account t his certificate as a certified
ublic account shall. u on conviction be automaticall revoked or
canceled. (Emphasis and underscoring s plied.)

As c01Tectly pointed out by respo dent Marcos, Jr., 356 while Section
286( c) specifies that the revocation · or cancellation of a certified public
accountant's certificate is automatic up n conviction, the same is not true
with respect to the -imposition of the p alty of perpetual disqualification
from public office. If indeed the legislativ . intent is such that a public officer
or employee found guilty of violating t provisions of the 1977 NIRC is
automatically perpetually disqualified fr m holding public office, then the
law could have so easily stated. It, howev r, did not do so.

In dubiis ·rew: est absolvendus -· all doubts should be resolved in favor

of the accused.357 .This Court thus hold . that, unless explicitly provided
for in the fa/lo., the penalty of disquali 1cation from public office under
Section 286(c) is not deemed automati ally imposed on a public officer
or employee found to have violated the rovisions of the 1977 NIRC. We

356
Rollo (G.R. No·.- 260374), pp. 555-557.
357
People v. Sul/ano, 827 Ph.il. 6 13 (201 8).
Decision 77 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

find this interpretation to be more in keeping with the . intention of the

legislators, as well as being more favora le to th~ accused. 358

Applying the ·same principle,· pe itioriers Ilagan, et al. 's claim of a

continuing violation on the part -ofresp ndent Marcos, Jr. also lacks merit.
There is nothing in either th.e 1977 NI C or ·PD 1994 that speaks of the
continuing nature of
the off~nse of non- iling of income tax returns. In fact,
in case a person fails to make and fil.e a· eturn at the time prescribed by law,
the law a·l lows the . Commissioner o Internal .
Revenue to make the
return from his own: knowledge and ·rom such information as he can
obtain through testimony or otherwis . Such return shall be prima facie
good and sufficient for all legal purpose , unless the taxpayer can prove the
contrary under proper proceedings. 359

2. Respondent Marcos, J . served the

penalties for his c·o n ;ictions

We reiterate that all doubts sh uld be resolved in favor of the

accused. 360 Indeed, penal statutes are stri tly construed against the State and
all doubts are to be resolved liberally in · vor of the accused. 361 Additionally,
We stress that execution must always conform to that decreed in the
dispositive part of the decision, because t e only portion thereof that may be
subject of execution is that which is pr cisely ordained or decreed in the
dispositive portion. 362

Further, it is axiomatic that ~naJ _a nd executory judgments can no

longer be attacked by any of the parties o be modified, directly or indirectly,
even by the highest court of the land. 3 3 To be sure, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable in accordance with the
principle of finality of judgment or imm tability of judgment and may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is intended to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law and whether it may have been
made by the court that rendered it or by the Supreme Court itself. Any act
that violates this principle must be immed_ately struck down. 364

We emphasize that the CA Decisi n365 has long attained finality. A

plain reading of the said decision would eveal that the penalty was limited
to the imposition of the payment of fine , and respondent Marcos, Jr. was
358
See David v. People, 67,5 Phil.I 82. (2011 ).
359
NATIONAL 1NTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 199 , Sec. S l(b). See ·GlsCI id. at Sec. 16(b), after
amendment by PD 1994.
360
People v. Sullano, supra.
36 1
De Leon i i Luis, supra.
362
NPC v. Tarcelo, 742 Phil. 463 (2014).
363
Peralta i : De Leon, 650 Phil. 592 (20 I 0).
364
FGU insurance Corporation v. RTC af1\,fakati City, Br 1ch 66, 659 Phi l. 11 7 (201 I).
365
Rollo (G.R. No. 260426) pp. 168- 182.
Decision 78 G.R.. Nos. 2603 74 and 260426

. .

neither sentenced . to .imprisonment- no · ·meted the penalty of perpetual

disqualificationfrom _holding public offi e. Verily, this Court cannot add to,
nor modify, the_penalties imposed ther . in. Moreover, as discussed above,
respondent Marcos·, Jr. 's failure to file an income tax return is not an offense
involving moral" turpitude.
. .

At any rate,. respondent Marcos, r. has .already paid the deficiency

taxes and fines imposed in the CA Decisi n. ·

To prove payment of the defici ncy taxes and fines, respondent

Marcos, Jr. presented a BIR Certificatio and a Landbank Official Receipt
dated 27 December 2001. 366

This notwithstanding, petitioners lagan, et al. assert that these are

insufficient to prove satisfaction of the deficiency taxes and fines, as an
order of payment must first come from the court before payment may be
made. 367 Further, they argue that nowhe e in the BIR Certification does it
state that the payments were made in sa isfaction of the imposed penalties
rendered by the court. To support their su missions, petitioners Ilagan, et al.
presented a Certification issued by the .R C stating that there is no record on
file of: (1) compliance of payment or sa i:5faction of its Decision dated 27
July 1995 or the CA Decision dated 31 ctober 1997; and (2) entry in the
criminal docket of the RTC Deci ion dated 27 July 1995 as
affirmed/modified by the CA Decision. 368

On the other hand, the <:;:OME.L.E Former First Division found as

sufficient the BIR Certification and a La dbank Official Receipt presented
by respondent Marcos, Jr. Specifically~ s regards the Landbank Official
Receipt, the COMELEC Former First Di ision concluded that the payment
was indeed for the deficiency taxes and ees as evidenced by the amounts
indicated therein, and the writing of the umber "0605."369 It was explained
that BIR Form 0605 is a payment form sed by taxpayers to pay taxes and
fees that do not require a tax return, inclu ing deficiency taxes.370 Moreover,
the COMELEC Former First Division onsidered that the breakdown of
amounts indicated in the Landbank Official Receipt already includes the
payment of fines ordered to be paid by th CA. 371 Consequently, it ruled that
respondent Marcos, Jr. has already paid t e deficiency taxes and fines in the
total amount of P67, 13 7 .27, in complianc with the CA Decision.
. ,. ' .
We agree w jth the COMELEC.
366
ld. at 232-233.
367
Id. at 22.
368
Id.at 183.
369
ld. at 233.
3,o Id.
37 1
Id. at 232-233.
Decision 79 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

It bears stressirig that- BIR Form 0605 is accomplished every time a

taxpayer pays_taxes and fees that do no require fhe use of a tax return such
as second installment payment for inco e tax, deficiency tax, delinquency
tax, registration fees, penalties, advan~e payments, deposits, and installment
payments, among others. 372 The same h also been considered by the Court
as proof of payment of deficiency taxes. 73 We likewise reiterate that the best.
evidence for proving payment is by evid nee of receipts showing the same. 374
Thus, .We agree that respondent Marcos Jr. has indeed submitted sufficient
evidenc·e to prove the payment of the eficiency taxes and fines imposed
upon him.

In contrast, the RTC Certification presented by petitioners Ilagan, et

al. is insufficient to establish that resp< ndent Marcos, Jr. did not pay the
deficiency taxes and fines because it r erely establishes that there is no
record on file showing compliance wit the RTC and the CA Decisions.
Basic is the rule that one who alleges a act has the burden of proving it by
means other than mere allegations. 375 He , petitioners Ilagan, et al. failed to
substantiate their allegations through this mere RTC Certification, especially
when weighed against_(he evidence prese ted by respondent Marcos, Jr.

On this note, We stress that the 19 7 NIRC provides that the failure to
file return or to pay tax shall be punishe by a fine or by imprisonment or
both. There is therefore no merit to the llegation that the CA, by limiting
the penalty to the payment of fines in its Decision, failed to c01Tectly apply
the provisions of the law effective at he time of the offense. The CA
imposed a penalty that is within the ra ge of penalties provided by law.
Thus, it is erroneous to say that respond t Marcos, Jr. has yet to serve his
penalty. Respondent Marcos, Jr. has alre dy paid the deficiency taxes and
fines imposed upon him.

Pertinently, it bears noting that respondent Marcos, Jr. was a

government employee for the years 1982 to 1985. The COMELEC Former
First Division considered the Certificati n issued by the Local Finance
Committee of the Province of Ilocos,376 wh ch stated that taxes were withheld
from his compensation received for the ye rs 1982 to 1985. There is basis to
conclude that any deficiency taxes due om his compensation should be
attributable to the provincial goven1Inent s the withholding agent, and not
to respondent Marcos, Jr. 377 •

m See <htLps://w ww.bir.gov.p hlindex.p hpl bir forms/puym nt-remittance-f orms.html> (visited 23 May
2022). .
373
See Kepco Philippines Corp. v. CIR, G ..R. Nos. 225750-5 1, 28 July 2020.
374
Towne & City Development Corp. v. CA, 478 Phil. 466 (2 04), citing PNB v. CA, 326 Phil. 326 ( 1996).
375
SSS v. COA, G.R. No. 243278, 03 November 2020.
376
Rollo (G .R. 260426), p. 231.
377 Id,
Decision 80 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

In any case; .non-payment of fine is not a.ground for disqualification

under Sectio'n 12 of the OEC, which co template,s only three instances when ·
a person may be disqualified to.hold pubic office, thus:

1. Declared by competent auth rity insane or incompetent;

or

2. Sentenced by final for subversion,

insunection, rebellion or for an · fot which he has
been sentenced to a penalty of mo e than eighteen months; or

3. Sentenced by final judgm nt for a crime involving

moral turpitude.

Verily, whether or not respondent arcos, Jr: satis.fied the payment of

fines and penalties with the lower courts ·s immaterial since his sentence did
not fall within the purview of Section i2 fthe OEC.

V Conclusion

"In free republics, it is most eculiarly the case: In these,.

the ·will of the people makes th essential principle of the
govermnent,· and the laws which c _ntro! the comnnmi'ty, receive
their tone and ()pirit frorn the pub/.i wishes. ":m

Vox populi, vox Dei - In the 09 M y .2022 elections, over half of the
electorate chose to stake the fate of the e 1tire nation on respondent Marcos,
Jr. Only time can unravel the Vilisdom ehind the overwhelming support
given to him. In the meantime, no one c n argue that the electoral exercise
is an essential part of our democracy.

Equally important to the lifo of .om Republic is the acknowledgement

that it is founded upon the rule of
law. ' hus, even the will of the majority
cannot subvert what the law has made obl gatory. Candidates are expected to·
abide by the procedural and substantive r quirements for running for public
office.

As such, inquiring upon a candidat 's qualifications and compliance is

not just a right but a responsibility of ev ry citizen. Petitioners Buenafe, et
al. and petitioners Ilagan, et al. have exer ·is.eel such responsibility which, in
turn, brought these cases to light. In reso_l ing these Petitions, the Comt also
378
Alexander Hamilton, First Speech, · New Yor Ratifying· ·convention, 2 1 June 1787
<https://founders.an.:hivcs.gov/d.ocum ents/Hamilton/0 l- 5-02-·00 l 2··00 11> (visited 17 June 2022).
 '· • • ••. ·, ti • • .. ., .. . . .

Decision 81 G ..R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

made its own determination not only as l art of its constitutional duty, but in
its role as a pillar of our democracy.

This Decision. was never in tende . to validate the 31 ,629,783 who

expressed their faith on respondent Marc· ·s, Jr. In.stead, this Decision aims to
confirm the eligibility and qualification . of respo.ndent Marcos, Jr. for the
highest position of.the land. After much s rutiny, We come to the conclusion
that our laws do' not support the position aken by petitioners Buenafe, et al.,
who declared th.at ·res'pondent Marcos, Jr. nade false material representations
as to his eligibility; ·nor the assertions o petitioners Ilagan, et al., who put
doubt on respondent Marcos, Jr. 's qu ifications by .alleging that he is
perpetually disqualified fr()m running fro public office and convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude: ·

Indeed, the exercise of this Co i's power to decide the present'

controversy has led to no other conclusio but that respondent Marcos, Jr. is
qualified to run for and be elected to publ c office. Likewise, his COC, being
valid and in accord with the pertinent l ws, was rightfully upheld by the
COMELEC.

WHEREFORE, in view of the fo egoing, the Petitions in G.R. Nos.

260374 and 260426 are hereby DIS ISSED. The Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections in SPi,\.. No. 21 156 (DC) dated 17 January 2022
and 10 May 2022, and in SPA No. 21-21? (DC) dated 10 February 2022 and
10 May 2022 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Decision 8 G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426

WE CONCUR:

On Official Leave but left his vote

See Separate Opinio
C M. V. F. LEONE~ FREDO BENJAMIN. S. -CC>.A..r,ILJ'..IC
Associate Justice · ~ . Associate Justibe
171 Cun~

A~1-~A~IER

~- '~ ~' Uv\,,;z t.4,,7 ,--..

Associate Justice · . ,

No part
HENRY JEAN PAUL B. INTING
Associate Justice
Ak . ..tu . .J.'1'ct ~-u
-- »><- ,
r- . , '1 ~l'Vf c-.f:Y
c9 ·~ ~ .
~'.rn
. SMIU~N
Associate Justice

~~
JHOSE~-~OPEZ . .
Associate Justice

~f'~~
Associate Justice P41!-.r J}I)
Decision 8. G .R. N os. 260374 and 260426

CERTI F I ATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Arti le VIII of the Constitution, I certify

that the conclusions in the above Decis ·on had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writ r of the opinion of the Court.