Omoluabi: Re-thinking the Concept of

Virtue in Yoruba Culture

and Moral System
by

Olusola Victor Olanipekun

olanipekuno@oauife.edu.ng, solavy@yahoo.co.uk
Department of Philosophy
Obafemi Awolowo University
Ile-Ife, Osun State, Nigeria

Abstract
This paper suggests that the neglect cum negative disposition of people to certain ethical notions
and concepts is undeniably one of the factors responsible for moral decadence in contemporary
African societies. Hence, it argues that the cause of social disorder is traceable to lack of virtuous
qualities among people in the society. It focuses on how some of those virtues that make an
omoluabi got gradually not emphasized. Second, the concept of omoluabi in Yoruba moral
system and its significance which involves drawing contrasts and comparisons between the
concept of omoluabi and the Western philosophical approaches to the notion of virtue is
examined. The paper also argues that since culture, religion and education play pivotal roles in
the lives of African people, they should be engaged in reviving the omoluabi virtues and qualities
in people to ensure internalization. The presentation concludes that reviving and imbibing the
culture of omoluabi can serve as a heuristic device to achieving a well-ordered society.

Key words: Omoluabi, Virtue Ethics, Culture, Morality, Social Order.

Introduction
The questions such as; “how should I live?” and “what kind of person should I be?” are essential
normative questions for the ethicists as well as social and political philosophers. One
fundamental concern in ethics is the issue of the way human beings think or believe they should
conduct their lives. Coming from the background that morality is irreducibly social, the question
is that, are some ways of life better than others? If yes, on what basis can this be determined? If
no, can everybody be correct in the choices of life style? These are questions about one’s entire
life or the kind of person one ought to be in order to get it right morally all the time.

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This is unlike the question such as, “What is the right action?” which is the concern of the
consequentialist and the non-consequentialist theories. Scholars at different epochs have
attempted to answer the question of “what kind of person should I be?” by appealing to the
notion of virtue. Aristotle for instance proposed virtue as central to good living. That is, one
ought to be virtuous or live a virtuous life. Lynne McFall also considers virtue (integrity), as
important for the modern individual. Aristotle’s answer to these questions falls in line with the
Yoruba’s beliefs about how one should or ought to live and the kind of person one should strive
to be. My view is that, Aristotelian treatment of virtue is akin to Yoruba’s view that ki eniyan
gbe gege bi omoluabi1 (i.e one should live virtuously). This in Yoruba2 moral system means one
should be an omoluabi (virtuous person). Worthy of note is Aristotle’s conception of the study of
ethics as a practical endeavour, aimed not at theoretical knowledge, but at improving human
lives. In his view, ethics is properly conceived, not as a separate inquiry, but as part of political
theory. This work argues that Aristotle’s3 conception of virtue can be treated in the like manner
with the Yoruba’s conception of omoluabi with slight modification.

The presentation is divided into four main sections. The first section presents a clarification of
some ethical concepts in Yoruba moral philosophy. The second section examines the moral
decadence in Africa: the trend, the magnitude, and the consequences. The third considers
Aristotelian notion of virtue as well as the concept of omoluabi and its relation to the West.
Meanwhile, the last section focuses on the place of culture and religion in reviving the omoluabi
virtues in contemporary African societies.

Clarifying Some Ethical Concepts in Yoruba Moral Philosophy

In Yoruba language, according to Bewaji, ethical behaviour and morally approved conduct is
called, variously, “iwa rere (good character), iwa pele/ iwa tutu(gentleness) and iwa
irele/iteriba(respect)”4. One terminology that captures all these various names is called iwa
omoluabi. Also, other attributes or qualities of an omoluabi are: Oro Siso (Spoken word, the
Yoruba accord great respect for intelligent and expert use of language); Inu Rere (Goodwill,
Having a good mind towards others); Otito (Truth); Iwa (Character/behaviour); Akinkanju
(Bravery); Ise (Hardwork); Opolo Pipe (Intelligence); and Iwa Rere (Good character/behaviour).

Meanwhile, unethical behaviours and morally disapproved conducts are iwa buburu, aidaa (evil
or lawlessness), and iwa ibaje (bad characters) Imele/ole (laziness), ole jija (act of slealing), iro
(lies), ainiteriba (disrespectful attitude) and ojukokoro (covetousness). Arguably, some of the
qualities mentioned above could be categorised as either personal virtues or social virtues or both
depending on the manner of appraisal.

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The Concept of “Omoluabi”: What is it?
Yoruba people of Western-Nigeria have a long tradition and a cherished culture that must not be
allowed to pass into oblivion. Yoruba consider the issue of ethics or morality as one of the most
essential issues of life for any human being on this planet earth. One moral concept that is highly
valued is the concept of omoluabi. Conceptually, the concept Omoluabi is a derivative noun
which has the words – "Omo + ti + Olu-iwa + bi" as its morphological components. Literally
translated and separately, omo means 'child', ti means 'that or which', Olu-iwa means the chief or
master of Iwa (character), bi means 'born'. When combined, Omoluabi translates as "the baby
begotten by the chief of iwa". Such a child is thought of as a paragon of excellence in character.5
Who then is an Omoluabi? Generally, an Omoluabi is one who combines all virtues. For
Akinyemi, the principles of Yoruba traditional education are based on the concept of Omoluabi
translated loosely as an "ideal being".6 Akanbi and Jekayinfa also held similar view. According
to them,

The end of Yoruba traditional education is to make every individual

''Omoluabi'. To be ''Omoluabi' is to be of good character. That is why the
goal of Yoruba traditional education has always been to foster strong
character in the individual and to prepare each person to become a useful
member of the community. (Jekayinfa, 2016:13)

Also for Johnson (1921:101), the concept of 'Omoluabi' is the standard which determines the
morality and the immorality of an act in Yoruba society in Africa.

In Yoruba ethics, iwa (character/behaviour) is one thing that should not be underemphasized if
we really want to have a well ordered society. Just as we have the moral concepts such as good,
bad, right, and wrong in any moral setting or ethical system in the world, so we have iwa rere
and iwa buburu (i.e good character and bad character) as well as iwa toto and iwa tikoto (right
behaviour and wrong behaviour) in Yoruba ethics or moral system. One of the examples of iwa
rere (good character) that was mentioned above is iwa omoluabi (virtuous character).
Meanwhile, Omoluabi is a Yoruba word for a virtuous person. Iwa omoluabi (virtuous
character) as it is referred is an aspect of behaviour that is considered valuable which is
expected to be imbibed or embraced by all. In fact, as far as Abimbola is concerned (1975:401),
“iwa rere is the most valuable thing among all other things in Yoruba value system.”

In Philosophy and the Africa Prospect: Fadahunsi and Oladipo (2004:23) suggest that the
Yoruba term “omoluabi” – very inadequately translated by the English language “gentleman”- is
appropriate. Furthermore, Barry Hallen also commented on this issue. Hallen opines, …but, as
often as the case, the original Yoruba term “ omoluabi”- is much richer in meaning because it
begins from what a person really is like ‘inside’ when it is associated with ‘good character’ (iwa
rere).7
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In other words, Hallen’s interpretation of omoluabi suggests that it is an internal thing which is
reflected in the outside through human character. This I consider to be an appeal to moral
psychological explanation. One notable fact about the concept of omoluabi is that being an
omoluabi goes beyond oneself but it also speaks volume about your family and the society that
you belong to. According to Bewaji (2004:395), Africans believe that “each person is a
representative of himself or herself as well as his/her family” and by extension, his/her
community. The point Bewaji is making is that, by implication, an individual has to consider not
only how a course of action contemplated by him will affect him personally, but also how will
affect his family directly or indirectly and community at large.

Moral Decadence in Africa: The Trend and the Consequences

In African society today, low level of governmental legitimacy, voracious poverty,
infrastructural decay, electoral crisis, contract killing, political assassination, insecurity and
generally, developmental problems are prevalent issues in the society. Even the youths who are
supposed to be the bridge between the present and future generation are not exempted. We see
promiscuity, fraudulent acts, examination malpractices, drunkenness and all sorts of moral
pervasiveness become the order of the day in their midst. The above problems and challenges
are pathological effects of moral degradation which results from deemphasizing omoluabi
qualities among Africans today. In essence, the decline or decay in a societal moral attitude has a
way of affecting every aspect of that society due to the fact that morality is essential a social
phenomenon. The apparent solution to the prevalent moral decadence in Yoruba land, Nigeria
and Africa by extension is a mode of value reformation and reorientation.

Aristotelian Notion of Virtue

Ethics is a subject about which there has been an immense amount of different opinion, in spite
of all the time and labour which have been devoted to its studies. Ethical theories and principles
primarily focused on moral evaluation of human actions, inactions and behaviours based on
“right” or “wrong” as well as “good” or “bad”. However, Aristotelian ethics that is, virtue ethics
changes the kind of question we ask about ethics. Where consequentialism and deontology
concern themselves with right or wrong actions, Aristotelian ethics is concerned with the good
life and what kinds of person we should be.

In the western tradition, Aristotelian ethics is primarily considered to be the beginning of virtue
ethics. Nicomachean ethics is not a type of ethical theory, addressing morally good or bad acts
based on deontological or teleological principles. Instead, it is about the question of moral
excellence that focuses on whether moral agent is virtuous or not. Essentially, the virtue ethics
makes a central use of the concept of character to prescribe how best a moral agent should live.

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That is, a moral agent should live virtuously and exhibit a virtuous character. In other words,
Aristotelian ethics is character –based because virtue was emphasized to play a central role in
understanding morality. Further, Aristotle’s account of rational agents, choice, deliberation and
action is considered as an appropriate starting point for his ethical theory.

The thesis of Aristotle in this exercise is that, the best way of living is to strive for moral
excellence that produces happiness. The specific concern and focus of Aristotle in Nicomachean
ethics is not aimed at theoretical knowledge, neither is his inquiry aimed at knowing what virtue
is, but in order to become good and virtuous person that will lead a life of moral excellence.

One of the benefits of the ethical theories is that they provide a clear road-map to arrive at moral
decision or judgment. Thus, the position maintained by Aristotle on ethics is that, the good and
moral life that is worthy of pursuit for a rational being should be the chief good. That is, the good
that is sought as an end in itself; never desirable for the sake of something else (Perry,
1986:610). Such a life Aristotle describes as a happy life. For Aristotle, Happiness is something
final.8Thus, the most qualitative moral life worthy of pursuit for a moral agent is life of
“Happiness”.9 The term “happiness” as used in this context is akin to the Yoruba concept of
omoluabi. This is because; part of the beliefs of the Yoruba is the view that the very essence of
one’s life is good character. According to Abimbola (1975:401), Yoruba belief system enjoins
one not to disengage oneself from the path of good character lest one loses the very essence and
value of one’s life. In the realm of normative ethics, if the traditional ethical view that every
ethical theory must be underwritten by theory of value is to be granted intelligibility in the light
of the above discussion, then impliedly, in Aristotelian view, every good life or happy life (i.e
highest form of moral live) must as well be underwritten by virtuous activities.

Virtue could be defined as the character traits or inner disposition that makes a man good.10
Aristotelian virtue is, importantly about state of being. It is about having appropriate inner states.
For example, the virtue of kindness involves right kind of emotions and inner state with respect
towards others. Virtue ethics specifically makes central use of the concept of character.
According to Aristotle; …the virtue of man will be the state of character which makes a man
good and which makes him do his work well.11 Thus, Aristotelian theory is a theory of action
since having the virtuous inner dispositions will also involve being moved to act in accordance
with them. Virtue, being a form of moral excellence such as goodness, honesty, kindness and so
on are said to be of two types. Aristotle argues; virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and
moral virtue. Intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth of teaching, while
moral virtue comes about as a result of habit.12

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Consequently, awarding praise or blame to moral agents depends on their choice of actions and
the virtue of a man will be the state of character which makes him do what he does. In Aristotle’s
word; A virtuous person makes a decision to do virtuous action for its own sake and takes
pleasure in virtuous action.13 Thus, a virtuous person does not just act out of unreflective
response, but has come to recognize the value of virtue and why it is the appropriate response
being a purposive disposition chosen knowingly for its own sake.

Furthermore, in respect to human actions, Aristotle’s emphasis of moral virtue reveals the
presence of excess, defect and the intermediate qualities attributed to human actions. Aristotle
argues similarly, with regard to actions; also there is excess defect and intermediate. Now virtue
is concerned with passions and actions in which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect while
the intermediate is praised and is a form of success and being praised and being successful are
both characteristics of virtue. Therefore, virtue is a kind of a means, as we have seen; it aims at
what is intermediate.14 Consequently, excess and defect in human actions are characteristics of
“vice” and “mean” which the intermediate will be the quality of virtue. Aristotelian virtue is
defined in Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics as a purposive disposition, lying in a mean and
being determined by the right reason. Virtue “lies in a mean” because the right response to each
situation is neither too much nor too late. Also, it can as well be supported that virtue lies in a
mean because it involves displaying the mean amount of emotion, where mean stands for
appropriate.

However, Aristotle’s description of the virtuous person seems to attribute to decision a role that
is excluded by his explicit account. If we are to accept Aristotle’s argument that a virtuous
person makes decision to do a virtuous action, how do we then account for a virtue such as
nobleness that is earned as a result of birth and good up-bringing? Knowing full well that moral
agents make no decision in this case, it thus becomes difficult to justify this in the manner by
which Aristotle earlier explained. Also, experience has shown that it is possible for people to
exhibit virtuous characters for the sake of personal gain contrary to Aristotelian view that
virtuous person makes a decision to do virtuous action for its own sake. On this note, virtuous
character or action could be a means to an end.

In addition, Aristotle fails to account for how we can conceive the objective definition of the
“mean”. This is owing to the fact that, this middle ground is the target of all our actions: don’t
spend too much money, but don’t spend too little money either instead, spend just the right
amount of money. The problem here is this, how do we know the right amount? This seems to be
confusing and obscure because the right amount may not necessarily be the modest amount.
Consequently, there arises a difficulty in apportioning praise or blame to human actions for no
one can adjudge precisely what the mean or the intermediate of human action should be since
there is no any objective criteria to determine the mean given that what John considers to be
mean may be Peter’s excess.

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The Concept of Omoluabi and its Relation to the West
Now, bearing in mind the two earlier mentioned fundamental questions; how should I live? And
what kind of person should I be? The quick answer that could be easily deduced from
Aristotelian ethics and the Yoruba moral system to the first question is that; one should live a
virtuous life (i.e ki eniyan gbe igbe aye omoluabi). In Christopher Taylor’s reflection, the
fundamental question in ethics is “How should one live?” This question is not to be understood
as “What is the morally best way to live?” since a possible answer to it is that one should cast off
the restraints of morality in the pursuit of one’s own interest. Rather, the sense of the question is
“How can one achieve the best possible life?,” where “best” is understood both as “best from the
point of view of the agent’s interest,” as distinct from, e.g. “best from a standpoint of total
impartiality,” and “best objectively,” as opposed to “best in the agent’s own opinion.”(Taylor,
2010:41). While to the second, one should strive to be a virtuous person (i.e., ki eniyan gbiyanju
lati je omoluabi). Some elements of virtue found in Aristotelian ethics includes; justice, honesty,
generosity and courage. Incidentally, these same elements form the core attributes of an
omoluabi in Yoruba land. Others are; Oro siso (spoken word, the Yoruba accord great respect for
intelligent and expert use of language), Iteriba (Respect), InuRere (Goodwill, Having a good
mind towards others), (Respect), Otito (Truth), Iwa (Character), Ise (Hardwork), Akinkanju
(Bravery), and OpoloPipe (Intelligence).

With the understanding that the above characteristics and qualities define an omoluabi, it should
however be noted that most of these characteristics are actually missing in the society today
thereby undermining the Yoruba traditional value system. The level of corruption in
contemporary societies is partly due to lack of proper moral education and misconstrued idea that
you can easily escape justice if you are highly connected. The value-added culture, religion and
education could help in eliminating this mindset.

Aristotle's view that virtue lies in the observance of a mean has been criticized on various
grounds. I argue for a more charitable interpretation of the view. It should be noted that Yoruba
moral system as well emphasises the place of moderation in human character. It is part of their
beliefs that iwontun wonsi lo ye omoluabi (moderacy should be practised by a respectable
person) (Lawuyi, 1988:29). This from my point of view captures Aristotle’s theory of mean.

For Taylor, Aristotle defines virtue of character in general as a stable state of character which is
in a mean relative to us, a mean determined by the reason or reasoning by which the person of
practical wisdom would determine it (1106b36–1107a2). By a state of character in a mean
relative to us Aristotle means a certain stable state of responsiveness to a given motivation or
motivations (e.g. courage to fear and boldness, temperance to the desires for bodily pleasures),
namely the state of being neither excessively swayed by that motivation nor insufficiently
responsive to it. Excessive and insufficient responsiveness is not a simple matter of intensity of a
given feeling; there are many ways in which one may manifest excess or deficiency in feeling
and in action, e.g. by feeling angry or acting angrily at the wrong time, with the wrong people,
for the wrong reasons, etc. (1106b18–24).
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A careful examination of both Aristotelian ethics and the Yoruba moral system reflects that the
virtues are dispositions to obey moral rules; and the virtues have only instrumental value (as
motives for obeying those rules). It may be argued that the virtues of benevolence, gratitude, and
self-respect may not conform to the view presented above. Analysis of these recalcitrant virtues
as treated by Aristotle offers support for the following conclusions: (a) the duty of benevolence
and self-respect is best understood as requiring persons to cultivate the corresponding virtues. It
is also believed among the Yoruba that an omoluwabi is expected to exhibit the act of
benevolence. The point of disagreement may then be that, while Aristotle is of the view that the
duty of benevolence requires the cultivation of corresponding virtue, the Yoruba do not see the
act of benevolence as duty that must be performed, but they see it as one of the qualities that is
required of an omoluabi; (b) persons lacking the virtue of gratitude, for example, cannot perform
acts of gratitude, for the latter just are actions motivated by gratitude (and the same is true from
the Yoruba’s perspectives as well); and (c) the motive of duty is not always an adequate
substitute for these virtues. Acts of gratitude and sympathy, for example, cannot be motivated by
disposition but only by those virtues.

I discuss the virtue of courage with these remarks in mind, and argue that certain contemporary
discussions of the doctrine neglect matters which Aristotle plainly wants to emphasize. The
doctrine of the mean does not and is not intended to offer detailed and unambiguous guidance to
deliberating agents. What a particular virtue calls for by way of act and emotion depends on
many things which cannot usefully be determined and weighed in advance. The deliberating
agent, like an archer aiming at a target, must be aware of and adjust for subtle changes which
would cause her to miss the mark.

The Place of Culture in Reviving the Omoluabi Virtues

It is an established fact that morality has a foundational crisis in Africa. While some scholars
strongly maintain that religion is the determinant of morality in Africa, some other scholars
argue otherwise. As far as they are concerned, it is the society and the traditions that determine
the morality of its members but not religion. For Wiredu, morality in Africa is founded on
culture. According to Gyekye (1995), morality is not determined by religion rather society itself.
15
My understanding of the word ‘society’ as used by Gyekye in this place implies culture. What
is culture? Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, defines culture in more than one
sense. In an intellectual sense, culture is said to be the “act of developing by education,
discipline, social experience; the training or refining of the moral and intellectual faculties.”16 In
this regard, the purpose of education (formal and informal) is the entrenchment of the
community’s culture. According to Akanbi and Jekayinfa (2016:15), “The end of Yoruba
traditional education is to make every individual ‘omoluabi’. To be ‘omoluabi’ is to be of good
character.” That is why the goal of Yoruba traditional education has always been to foster strong
character in the individual and to prepare each person to become a useful member of the
community. In fact, in Wande Abimbola’s view, the belief of the Yoruba people is that morality
is the essence of man. For him,
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 Being moral is regarded by the Yoruba as one of the very aims of
human existence. Every individual must therefore strive to be
moral in order to be able to lead a good life in a belief system
dominated by many supernatural powers and a social structure
controlled by hierarchy of authorities (Abimbola,:1975:395).

For the Yoruba people of western Nigeria, moral values are taken to be a set of institutional
ideals, which guide and direct the patterns of life. One of the main goals of human existence is to
strive towards achieving moral excellence by becoming an omoluabi who is an embodiment of
iwa rere i.e. good character. This is in a way similar to Aristotelian argument in Nicomachean
ethics that men should strive towards achieving a virtuous way of living. Also, Yoruba enjoins
one to be committed to the culture of an omoluabi.

As far as Gyekye is concerned, he explains that in Akan moral system (or African moral system
generally), good or moral value is determined in terms of its consequences for humankind and
human society. As a matter of fact, it is my submission for moral decadence in African societies,
blame culture and religion. Society is what it is today because of the absence or lack of the
omoluabi’s attributes among the majority of the people in the society. Why do we have the cases
of corruption being reported on the pages of newspapers on daily basis? What about the issue of
kidnapping and violence everywhere?

In traditional Yoruba society, there are verses of odu ifa17 that place emphasis on the importance
of good character as a panacea to a well ordered society. According to this particular odu ifa,
moral principle demands you behave virtuously. Thus we were told:

Aimowahu ni ko je ki aye gun. Ologbon ni eni ti oti ko eko ogbon

mimowahu. Ogberi ni eni ti ko ko ogbon.

It is want of knowledge of right conduct that has made the world a horrible
place to live in. He is a wise man who has studied the possession of the act
of good, moral conduct. He who has not done so is a novice (Makinde,
2007:306).

In the same spirit, Akinpelu also made a point. As far as he is concerned, the traditional values
required of an omoluabi are multi-dimensional. For Akinpelu, an omoluabi is to be described as
one who:

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combines expertise in some specific economic skills; with soundness of character and skills; and
wisdom in judgment equipped to handle successfully the problems of living in his immediate and
extended family; well versed in the folklores and genealogies of his ancestors; that possesses
practical skills to handle some minor health problems and knows where to obtain advice and help
in major ones; stands well with the ancestral spirits of the family; knows how to observe their
worship; and is endowed with the ability to discharge his social and political duties.

The values essential for an Omoluabi go on and on, but also include such pragmatic feats as
wisdom and shrewdness in judgment, oratory skills, self-control especially when under
provocation, dignified in sorrow and restrained in success, and most importantly, an excellent
character18. Considering the social relevance of the culture of omoluabi in the society, iwa rere
(good character) which is one of the qualities of a virtuous person is regarded as the most
valuable thing among the Yoruba people. The end result of this iwa rere is to have a well ordered
society. According to Abimbola (1975:401), it is believed by the Yoruba that without morality or
morally good persons (that we referred to as omoluabi) “the world will be a very difficult place
to live in” due to vices of different sorts and disorderliness.

How Far Can Religions Go in Reviving the Omoluabi Virtues?

Many African scholars defended the position that morality in Africa is founded on religion.
Scholars such as John Mbiti, M. Akin Makinde, P.A. Dopamu, J.O. Awolalu supported this
view. As John Mbiti (1969:62) clearly stated, “African moral system has a religious foundation”
As a matter of fact, Mbiti emphatically stressed that Africans are notoriously religious because it
is believed that they live in a religious universe.

According to African people, man lives in a religious universe, so that

natural phenomena and objects are intimately associated with God. They
not only originated from Him, but also bear witness to Him. Man’s
understanding is strongly coloured by the universe of which man is
himself of a part. Man sees in the universe not only the imprint but a
reflection of God; and whether that image is marred or clearly focused
and defined, it is nevertheless an image of God, the only image known in
traditional African societies. Mbiti(1969:62).

Makinde’s reflection on the above passage is that, Mbiti’s finding is quite tenable in the light of
African tradition and cultures and his own African experience. Makinde submitted that:

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 We can derive from it the view that religion plays a great role in
the lives of African peoples. Perhaps a more general deduction
from this is that since, according to John Mbiti, the Africans live in
a religious universe, then, all their activities must be influenced by
one kind of religion or the other. From this, it can be more
specifically stated that an African system of morality, based on
African cultural beliefs must have a religious foundation
(Makinde, 1988:27).

Unlike Makinde and Mbiti who are more general in their approaches, Idowu was so specific in
his approach. He narrowed down the focus of his research to the Yoruba communities.

According to Idowu, Morality is certainly the fruit of religion (and

that) they do not make any attempt to separate the two...what have
been named tabu took their origin from the fact that people
discerned that there were certain things which were morally
approved or disapproved by the deity. So the Yoruba call tabu
eewo-‘things forbidden’, things not done (Idowu, 1962:45).

From the above background, some doubt had cleared because it is so evident that religion plays a
crucial role in the lives of the Yoruba and other Africans. Thus, in traditional African societies,
religion defines and shapes the moral values and characters of the people. The whole essence of
defining and shaping peoples’ characters is to transform them to an omoluabi.

However, the negligence of our religious leaders in telling the truth and preaching morals in
contemporary time precipitates the cold attitude of the members of the societies towards moral
values. This is so evident in a place like Nigeria because it is so obvious that the more religious
Nigerians are, the more immoral they seem to become. The fear of God is no longer reining.
Instead, people are now worshipping money and material things within the purview of religion.
Many pastors, imams and the traditional priests are now money conscious and no longer ready to
say the truth especially when the morally perverted rich followers of theirs come to them.

Now, the antidote to all these moral problems is that the religious leaders themselves should
cultivate the culture of an omoluabi. After this, they can then pass the message across to their
followers. In Nigeria and Africa as a whole, most politicians have spiritualists who may be
pastors, imams or traditional priests that they do consult for spiritual assistance from time to
time. The moral values held in high esteem in our religions should be spelt out and encouraged
to be internalized by the politicians who should be role models.

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Furthermore, many of the religious leaders are caught in the web of what Moses Oke calls
‘human plastics’. ‘Human plastics’ are those persons of good morals rather than morally good
persons; even though they are immoral in practice, they are masters at moralizing and they show
great love for moral theorizing (Oke,1988:90).

Conclusion
As we conclude, it is my opinion that the analysis of the concept of omoluabi noted in Yoruba
moral philosophy has to be tailored towards the directions of the Yoruba cultural, religious and
social history to be fully appreciated. This is imperative due to the essential roles that culture and
religion play in the lives of African people. It is our submission that a well-ordered society is
possible with everyone imbibing omoluabi’s attributes. If our society is restructured in such a
way that immoral attitudes with impunity is vehemently frown at, our societies will be better for
it. If there is a society where dominant social values provide for greed and graft, where
mediocrity and indolence, in the name of state interest, where wealth is celebrated irrespective of
its source, where commitment and probity draw opprobrium, where exceptional diligence and
patience are rebuked, where excellence and perseverance are not eminently cherished, then,
omoluabi attributes and qualities as described above are clearly missing. One of the main goals
of human existence, according to the Yoruba is to strive towards achieving moral excellence by
becoming an omoluabi. In this process of becoming an omoluabi, culture and religion must be
engaged.

Endnotes

1
“Omoluabi” is a Yoruba terminology for a virtuous person or a morally upright person.
2
Yoruba as used in this article is one of the major groups in Nigeria that dominates the Western
part of the country. They are also found in Brazil, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, in Europe and
the United States of America.
3
Aristotle is an ancient philosopher. He is one of the leading philosophers of the western
tradition. He was a student of Plato who some think he surpassed his teacher.
4
Bewaji, John Ayotunde, “Ethics and Morality in Yoruba Culture” in Kwasi Wiredu (ed.)
Companion to African Philosophy,London: Blackwell,2004) p. 399
5
Fayemi, Ademola Kazeem, Department of Philosophy, Lagos State University Ojo, Lagos -
"Human Personality and the Yoruba Worldview: An Ethico-Sociological Interpretation"

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6
Akinyemi, A. (2015). Orature and Yoruba riddles. New York: Palgrave Macmillan Civic
Education, Peace Building and the Nigerian Youths. Accessed on Thursday, October 2, 2014 at
http://www.thetidenewsonline.com/2017/07/22/civiceducation-peace-building-and- the-nigerian-
youths-2/.
7
Barry Hallen, “The Philosophical Humanism of J. Olubi Sodipo” in Akinrinade Sola, Fasina
Dipo and Ogungbile David(eds.) The Humanities, Nationalism and Democracy (Ile-Ife: Faculty
of Arts, Obafemi Awolowo University publications,2006) p.361
8
Ibid, p.620
9
This “happiness” is not the same as Epicurean and Utilitarian happiness that is synonymous to
pleasure. It is about highest form of moral life.
10
John Perry and Michael Bratman (eds.) Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and
Contemporary Readings (New York: Oxford University Press,1986) p. 627
11
John Perry and Michael Bratman (eds.) Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and
Contemporary Readings (New York: Oxford University Press,1986) p. 626
12
John Perry and Michael Bratman (eds.) Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and
Contemporary Readings (New York: Oxford University Press,1986) p. 623
13
John Perry and Michael Bratman (eds.) Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and
Contemporary Readings (New York: Oxford University Press,1986) p. 626
14
John Perry and Michael Bratman (eds.) Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and
Contemporary Readings (New York: Oxford University Press,1986) p. 630
15
Gyekye, K. (1995). An essay on African philosophical thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme,
(rev. ed.). Philadelphia: Temple University Press
16
Third New International Dictionary (1982)
17
Ifa Literary Corpus
18
Akinpelu, J.A., An Introduction to Philosophy of Education (London: Macmillan Publishers,
1987) pp.178-179).

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