Case Study : Bachan Singh V State of Punjab
Introduction
The death penalty has been utilized as a kind of punishment since time
immemorial for the abolition of offenders and as a punishment for horrific
crimes. Indian criminal jurisprudence is founded on a mix of deterrent and
reformative punishment principles. Although the penalties are to be
administered with the intention to deter offenders it is also believed that the
opportunity for reformation must also be given to criminals.
The death penalty/capital punishment is one of the most controversial
issues in criminal law. In India, there has been a wide range of opinions on
the death penalty, with some advocating for its continued use as well as
others advocating for its abolition. The death sentence is still in effect in
India, despite the fact that it has been abolished in the majority of countries
throughout the world. For certain particular circumstances, such as
murder, rape, terrorism, offenses under defence legislation, and so on, the
Indian legislature and judiciary still believe capital penalty is justified.
After considering various arguments for and against capital punishment,
the Law Commission of India concluded that India is a diverse country in
regards to its population and very vast in area, in addition to it the social
upbringing of each inhabitant, as well as the level of their educational and
moral values, varies from one another. At such a place it is very difficult to
maintain law and order, which is the very need of the hour. Because of this,
at this crucial time, India cannot take the risk to do the experiment of
abolishing Capital Punishment.[1] Also, on the basis of the recommendation
of the Law Commission, the Criminal procedure Code was amended, in
which providing “special reason” was made a necessity before awarding
death sentence.
Background of Bachan Singh Vs State of Punjab Case
In the case of Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab, the 5 judge bench of
Supreme Court, including Justices YV Chandrachud, A. Gupta, N. Untwalia,
PN Bhagwati, R Sarkaria gave the landmark judgement and made this case
a turning point in the history of the Death penalty in India. By establishing
the “rarest of the rare” doctrine, the Supreme Court put major limits on the
death penalty in this case. The Supreme Court noted that a genuine and
enduring concern for the dignity of human life necessitates resistance to the
taking of a life by the use of the legal system and that this should only be
done in the rarest of circumstances where the other viewpoint is absolutely
foreclosed.
Facts of Bachan Singh Vs State of Punjab Case
In the present case, the appellant Bachan Singh had earlier been convicted
of his wife’s murder and sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 302
of the Indian Penal Code. He was released after serving his sentence and
spent around six months with his cousin Hukam Singh and his family. The
appellant’s living at Hukam Singh’s apartment was questioned by Hukam
Singh’s family members, including his wife and son.
After dinner on the night of the crime, i.e., July 4, 1977, the family went to
bed. The sleeping arrangement was such that in which Hukam Singh’s three
daughters, Durga Bai, Veeran Bai, and Vidya Bai, went to sleep in the inner
courtyard, while the appellant along with Hukam Singh, and Desa Singh
went to sleep in the outer courtyard. At around midnight, Vidya Bai saw
that the appellant was inflicting axe blows on the face of her sister, Veeran
Bai when she was awakened by the alarm. When she tried to stop him, the
appellant attacked her with the axe on the face and ear, making her
unconscious. Later, after hearing the shriek, Diwan Singh awoke from his
slumber and saw the appellant strike Desa Singh with the axe. In order to
arouse Gulab Singh, who was sleeping at a short distance from there, he
raised an alarm. When both of them saw the appellant with an axe in Desa
Singh’s face, they both rushed to stop him. When the witnesses raised an
alarm and the appellant noticed them approaching him, he dropped the axe
and fled. Diwan Singh and Gulab Singh pursued him but were unsuccessful
in apprehending him.
The appellant was later tried and found guilty by the Sessions Court of
murdering three people, including Desa Singh (Hukam Singh’s son), Durga
Bai and Veeran Bai (Hukam Singh’s daughters), and injuring Vidya Bai
(Hukam Singh’s another daughter) in the courtyard of Hukam Singh’s house
at about midnight, and was sentenced to death. The Death sentence
imposed by the Trial Court was upheld by the High Court on appeal. Also,
the injuries on Vidya Bai’s body were deemed inhumane by both the Trial
Court and the High Court. Bachan Singh then filed the special leave to
appeal in the Supreme Court, in which the question was raised regarding
the presence of “special reasons” in the facts of the case, which are
necessary for awarding the death sentence according to Section 354(3) of
Code of Criminal Procedure
Issues Involved In This Case
The main issues in the case were as follows:
1. Whether or not the death punishment provided in Section 302 of the
Indian Penal Code for the crime of murder was unconstitutional?
2. Is Article 19 applicable in determining the constitutionality of the
contested provision in Section 302 of the IPC?
3. Whether the disputed limb of Section 302 of the IPC in violation
of Article 21 of the Constitution?
4. If the answer to the preceding question is in negative, is Section
354(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, which provides for the
procedure of sentencing, unconstitutional on the grounds that it vests
the Court with unguided and unrestricted discretion and allows the
death penalty to be imposed arbitrarily on a person found guilty of
murder or any other capital offense punishable under the Indian
Penal Code?
Judgment of Bachan Singh Vs State of Punjab Case
The constitutional challenges to Sections 302 of the Indian Penal
Code and Section 354(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code were dismissed by
the Supreme Court with a majority decision of 4:1. According to this court,
the six essential rights provided by Article 19(1) are not absolute rights and
are subject to the reasonable restrictions which can be imposed by the state
and the inherent restraint. This restraint arises from the reciprocal
obligations of the members of civil society according to which one member of
the society is obligated to use his rights in such a way as not to infringe or
harm similar rights of another member of society. The court held that
Section 302 neither violates Article 19 nor Article 21 of the Constitution.
It was also determined that Section 354 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code
was not unconstitutional and that the term “special reason” in the section
refers to “exceptional reasons” arising from the extraordinarily serious
circumstances of a particular case involving both the crime and the
criminal. In awarding the death penalty, the Supreme Court established the
principle of “rarest of the rare cases.” It was reaffirmed that life
imprisonment is the rule for individuals convicted of murder, but the death
penalty is an exception.
Ratio Decidendi
It was determined that the granting of the death sentence as an alternative
punishment for murder under Section 302 is not irrational or contrary to
the public interest. It does not contravene either the letter or the spirit of
Article 19 of the Indian Constitution. It satisfies the requirements of the
Constitution. Furthermore, Article 21 and other provisions of the
constitution clearly imply that the founding fathers recognized the state’s
right to deprive a person of life or personal liberty in line with fair, just, and
reasonable procedures established by legitimate legislation.
The constitutionality of Section 354(3) of CrPC was questioned on the
grounds that “a sentence of death is the most severe penalty of law, and it is
only reasonable that when a Court grants it in a case where a life sentence
is also available, it should present exceptional reasons in support of the
sentence.”As a result, Section 354(3) of the current Code states: When a
conviction is for an offense punishable by death or, in the alternative, by life
imprisonment or a term of years in prison, the judgment shall state the
reasons for the sentence awarded, and, the special reasons for such
sentence if it is a case of a death sentence.
The judges of Supreme Court also relied on the judgments of Jagmohan
Singh vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh[3], in which the question of the
constitutionality of the death penalty was addressed by the Supreme Court
for the first time, and Rajendra Prasad vs. State of Uttar Pradesh[4]. In
the case of Jagmohan, it was decided that the death penalty does not
abridge all of the freedoms protected by Article 19(1), and that it does not
violate Article 14 of the Constitution because judges have unrestricted and
uncontrolled authority to impose either capital punishment or life
imprisonment. As a result, the death penalty became more of an exception
than a rule. In case of Rajendra Prasad, it was determined that when a
person is sentenced to death, he loses his right to life, thereby infringing on
his fundamental right.
Dissenting Opinion
In dissenting from the majority opinion, Bhagwati, J. stated that the
imposition of the death sentence as an alternative to life imprisonment in
Section 302 of the IPC is ultra vires and unlawful since it violates Articles 14
and 21 of the Constitution. He held this stance because he believes the
contested provision lacks any legislative guidance as to when an accused’s
life can be taken by the imposition of a death sentence.
Guidelines Provided
1. Except in the gravest cases of extreme culpability, there is no need to
opt for the sentence of death penalty.
2. Before providing the sentence of death penalty, the judge should
consider the circumstances of the crime along with the circumstances
of the offender.
3. It was stated by the bench that “life imprisonment is the rule, whereas
death sentence is the exception.” Therefore, we can say that, after
looking at the circumstances of the case, the death penalty should be
given only in those cases, where even the penalty of life imprisonment
seems inadequate
4. Before the option can be exercised, a balance sheet containing
aggravating and mitigating conditions must be created, with the
mitigating circumstances given full weightage and a just balance
struck between the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Overview of Bachan Singh Vs State of Punjab Case
The decision given by the Supreme Court in this case is welcomed as one of
the landmark judgements on the issue of death penalty. Whenever a death
sentence is imposed on someone, that sentence grabs the attention of the
whole nation. In this case also, the whole nation was eagerly waiting for the
judgement of the Supreme Court, when the court in its majority decision
observed that Section 302 of Indian Penal Code and Section 354(3) of
Criminal Procedure code are valid on the touchstone of constitutionality.
In this case, the Indian judiciary has made it clear what they think about
the death sentence, stating that it should only be used in “rarest of rare”
circumstances. This Supreme Court viewpoint was strongly in favour of
minimizing the use of capital punishment to punish criminals. In essence,
the death sentence is an exception to the rule of life imprisonment.
The interpretation of the last half of the dictum – ‘that ought not to be done
except in the rarest of rare instances when the alternative option is
absolutely foreclosed’ is one aspect of the doctrine of “Rarest of Rare” that
requires considerable examination. In this case it was suggested that the
death punishment should be awarded only when the judges feel that it is
the last resort, as the alternative punishment is not sufficient enough.
The doctrine of “rarest of rare case” for awarding death penalty has its great
relevance and is followed even today. The judgement in this case, however,
did not go into detail on the criteria for defining “rarest of rare” cases. It also
doesn’t say what constitutes a “rarest of rare case.”
Conclusion
Capital Punishment or Death Penalty is such a punishment which once
given, it becomes irrevocable. This type of punishment is declared illegal in
most of the countries but in India, we still have it. The controversy regarding
the Capital Punishment, its relevance and constitutionalism has been going
for years and has been considered in various judgements. But in the case
of Bachan Singh vs State of Punjab [5], the Supreme Court of India gave a
watershed judgement in which it upholds the constitutionalism of death
penalty by the majority of 4:1, while Justice PN Bhagwati gave his
dissenting view. It was also opined that Capital Punishment should be
awarded in the “rarest of rare cases”. Also, the judge or the bench of judges
should take into consideration various factors like the circumstances in
which crime was committed and if there is any alternative punishment
sufficient and so on.
The “Rarest of Rare” doctrine was proposed by the judges because at first
glance, the death penalty appears to have a greater deterrent effect on
ordinary people than any other form of punishment. Furthermore, once a
death penalty is imposed, it is irreversible, even if new evidence is
discovered that has the potential to change the decision. Furthermore, this
doctrine is provided to reduce the number of cases in which the death
penalty can be awarded. As a result, in this case, the death penalty is
viewed as an exception rather than the rule.
Case Law- Nilabati Behera v State of Orissa
Nilabati Behera vs State of Orissa is a significant case and is
considered a landmark case, which changed the course of custodial
deaths in India. The precious right guaranteed by Article 21 of the
Constitution of India cannot be denied to convicts, under trials, or
other prisoners in custody, except according to procedure established
by law. There is a great responsibility on the police or prison
authorities to ensure that the citizen in its custody is not deprived of
his right to life.
FACTS:
i. In the instant case, a letter was sent by Smt. Nilabati Behera
to the Supreme Court stated that her twenty-two-year-old
son, Suman Behera had died in police custody after being
inflicted with several injuries.
ii. The honorable court took suo moto action and converted it
into a writ petition under Article 32 of the Indian constitution.
iii. The petitioner claimed compensation for the violation of her
son’s fundamental right to life guaranteed under Article 21.
iv. The Orissa police had arrested Suman Behara for
investigation involving the offence of theft and he was
detained at the police outpost.
v. The very next day, his dead body was found near the railway
track. The lacerations on his body indicated an unnatural
death.
vi. The admitted facts are, that Suman Behera was taken into
police custody on 1.12.1987 at 8 a.m. and he was found dead
the next day on the railway track near the Police Outpost
Jeraikela, without being released from custody, and his death
was unnaturally caused by multiple injuries sustained by
him.
vii. The burden is, therefore, clearly on the respondents to explain
how Suman Behera sustained those injuries which caused
his death.
Issues:
Whether the Indian constitutional courts, while exercising their
jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 226 of the Indian constitution,
give monetary compensation for violations of basic rights regarding
the idea of sovereign immunity.
Contentions-
Appellant’s contention
The main contention was that Suman was a victim of police
brutality and his death was a typical case of custodial death.
Respondent’s contention
i. The respondents argued strongly that the injuries to the
deceased’s head and face could not have been caused by the
claimed police torture, and that the District Judge’s
conclusion to the contrary was incorrect.
ii. The State argued that the medical evidence established that
the deceased’s injuries were caused by lathi blows, but that
the nature of the injuries on the face and left temporal region
could not have been caused by the lathis, and that the death
had therefore occurred in the manner suggested by the police
in a train accident and that it was not caused by the lathis.
Ratio Decidendi:
i. This case was adjudicated by Justice Jagdish Sharan Verma,
Justice A.S. Anand, Justice, N. Venkatachala
ii. The court observed through the facts and pieces of evidence of
the case with arguments of both the counsels that there was
no cogent evidence of any search by the police to find Suman
Behara and of his escape from police custody.
iii. The police also reached out much later to take charge of the
body, after it was reported by railwaymen, which raised
questions as to its credibility. Further, a doctor before the
court deposed that the injury was caused by a blunt object,
which may have been lathi blows.
iv. All the injuries found on his body could not have been caused
by a train accident. The court also drew the distinction
between the liabilities of the State in public law as opposed to
private law.
v. It clearly mentioned that a proceeding under Article 32 before
the Supreme Court or any High Court is a remedy available in
public law and the principle of sovereign immunity does not
apply in the case of public law. It is only a defense in private
law based on tort.
vi. It also stressed that it would be highly unjust to expect a
person socio-economically disadvantaged person to pursue
ordinary civil proceedings under private law. And the Apex
Court held the Petitioner awarded compensation of
Rs.1,50,000 and a sum of Rs.10,000 to be paid to the
Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee.
vii. The Supreme Court also ordered the State of Orissa to initiate
criminal proceedings against those who killed Suman Behara.
Decision:
i. The decision of this case, therefore, made sure that the state
could no longer escape liability in Public law and had to be
compelled to pay compensation when it committed such gross
violations of one’s fundamental rights and very basic human
rights.
ii. The liability of the State of Orissa in the present case to pay
the compensation cannot be doubted and was rightly not
disputed by the learned Additional Solicitor General.
iii. It would, however, be appropriate to spell out clearly the
principle on which the liability of the State arises in such
cases for payment of compensation and the distinction
between this liability and the liability in private law for
payment of compensation in an action on tort.
Conclusion:
i. In this case, the honorable court considered whether Article
32 of the Constitution, which is without prejudice to any
other action in relation to the same matter that is lawfully
available, merely extends to a declaration that there has been
a violation and infringement of the guaranteed fundamental
rights and rests content with that by relegating the party to
seek relief through civil and criminal proceedings, or can it go
further and grant redress also by the only praetorian remedy.
ii. It is an obligation of the State to ensure that no infringement
of a citizen’s indefeasible right to life occurs while the citizen
is in its custody, unless under the law.
Case Law – Ajay Hasiya V Khalid Mujab
The case of ‘Ajay Hasia’ is considered an important case in two
aspects,
First, it is an authoritative decision to the different aspects that
may arise in regard to an authority to be recognized as a state
under Article 12,
Second, it also has a strong authority on the ‘maximization of
interviews’ marks’ as deciding factor.
Facts of the case ----
Background of the Case ----
Some writ petitions were filed under Article 32 of the Constitution
challenging the validity of the admissions made to the Regional
Engineering College, Srinagar for the academic year 1979-80.
The Regional Engineering College, Srinagar (hereinafter referred
to as the College) was (now as NIT) one of the fifteen
Engineering Colleges in the country sponsored by the
Government of India.
The College was established and its administration and
management were carried on by a Society registered under the
Jammu and Kashmir Registration of Societies Act, 1898.
Vide sub clause (i). The Society is empowered by clause 3 sub-
clause (ii) of the Memorandum of Association to make rules for
the conduct of the affairs of the Society and to add to, amend,
vary or rescind them from time to time with the approval of the
Government of Jammu and Kashmir State and the Central
Government.
Sub-clause (v) of clause 3 of the Memorandum of Association
contemplates that monies for running the college would be
provided by the State and Central Governments.
There was a provision made in clause 7 of the Memorandum of
Association that in case the Society or the college is not
functioning properly, the State Government will have the power
to take over the administration and assets of the college with
the prior approval of the Central Government.
The founding members of the Society were enumerated in
clause 9 of the Memorandum of Association and they are
the Chairman to be appointed by the State Government with
the approval of the Central Government, two representatives of
the State Government, one representative of the Central
Government, two representatives of the All India Council for
Technical Education to be nominated by the northern Regional
Committee, one representative of the University of Jammu and
Kashmir, one non-official representative of each of the Punjab,
Rajasthan, U.P. and Jammu and Kashmir States to be
appointed by the respective Governments in consultation with
the Central Government and the Principal who shall also be the
ex-officio Secretary.
The Rules of the Society are also important as they throw light on
the nature of the Society.
The procedure for admission process----
Pursuant to clause (iv) of Rule 15 of the Rules, the Board of
Governors laid down the procedure for admission of students to
various courses in the college by a Resolution dated 4th June,
1974.
Under this Resolution admission to the candidates belonging to
the State of Jammu and Kashmir were to be given on the basis
of comparative merit to be determined by holding a written
entrance test and a viva voce examination and the marks
allocated for the written test in the subjects of English, Physics,
Chemistry and Mathematics were 100, while for viva voce
examination, the marks allocated were 50.
The provision made with regard to seats reserved for candidates
belonging to Jammu & Kashmir State was that “apart from 2
seats reserved for the sons and daughters of the permanent
college employees, reservations shall be made in accordance
with the Orders of Jammu and Kashmir Government for
admission to technical institutions and the seats shall be filled
up on the basis of comparative merit as determined under the
following scheme.
The bone of Contention ----
In or about April 1979, the college issued a notice inviting
applications for admission to the first semester of the B.E. course
in various branches of engineering and the notice set out
the above admission procedure to be followed in granting
admissions for the academic year 1979-80.
The petitioners applied for admission to the first semester of the
B.E. course in one or the other branch of engineering and they
appeared in the written test which was held on 16th and 17th
June, 1979.
The petitioners were thereafter required to appear before a
Committee consisting of three persons for viva voce test and
they were interviewed by the Committee.
The case of the petitioners was that the interview of each of
them did not last for more than 2 or 3 minutes per candidate
on an average and the only questions which were asked to them
were formal questions relating to their parentage and
residence and hardly any question was asked which would be
relevant to any of the four factors for which marks were
allocated at the viva voce examination.
When the admissions were announced, the petitioners found
that though they had obtained very good marks in the
qualifying examination, they had not been able to secure
admission to the college because the marks awarded to them at
the viva voce examination were very low and candidates who
had much less marks at the qualifying examination, had
succeeded in obtaining very high marks at the viva voce
examination and there by managed to secure admission in
preference to the petitioners.
The petitioners feeling aggrieved by this mode of selection filed
the present writ petitions challenging the validity of the
admissions made to the college on various grounds.
Respondent Contention-- Society is not an authority under
Article 12
The respondent raised an objection against the maintainability of
the writ petition. The respondents contended that,
the college is run by society which is not a corporation created
by a statute but is a society registered under the Jammu &
Kashmir Societies Registration Act, 1898 and it is therefore not
an ‘authority’ within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution
and no writ petition can be maintained against it, nor can any
complaint be made that it has acted arbitrarily in the matter of
granting admissions and violated the equality clause of the
Constitution.
Because, the only ground on which the validity of the
admissions to the college can be assailed is that the society
adopted an arbitrary procedure for selecting candidates for
admission to the college and this resulted in denial of equality
to the petitioners in the matter of admission violative of Art. 14
of the Constitution. It would appear that prima facie protection
against infraction of Art. 14 is available only against the State
and complaint of arbitrariness and denial of equality can
therefore be sustained against the society only if the society can
be shown to be State for the purpose of Art. 14.
Answer of the court ---
While approving the following tests laid down by the supreme
court in R.D. Shetty v. international Airport authority,
“One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the
corporation is held by Government it would go a long way
towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or
agency of Government.”
“Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to
meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would
afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated
with governmental character.”
“It may also be a relevant factor…….whether the corporation
enjoys monopoly status which is the State conferred or State
protected.”
“Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an
indication that the Corporation is a State agency or
instrumentality.”
“If the functions of the corporation of public importance and
closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant
factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or
agency of Government.”
“Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a
corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this
inference of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency
of Government.”
The court concluded on the issue that in the given case, society is
under control to the government and comply all tests laid down
by the court in ‘Shetty case’. Therefore, the society in the present
case is an authority under article 12.
Petitioners’ Contention- the admission procedure was arbitrary
and against Article 14
The principal contention that was advanced was that the society
acted arbitrarily in the matter of granting of admissions,
first by ignoring the marks obtained by the candidates at the
qualifying examination;
Secondly by relying on viva voce examination as a test for
determining comparative merit of the candidates;
Thirdly by allocating as many as 50 marks for the viva voce
examination as against 100 marks allocated for the written test
and
Lastly, by holding superficial interviews lasting only 2 or 3
minutes on an average and asking questions which had no
relevance to assessment of the suitability of the candidates with
reference to the four factors required to be considered at the viva
voce examination.
The answer of the court on the question ----
The court concluded on this issue that,
As far as the challenge on the first count is concerned, we do
not think it is at all well-founded. It is difficult to appreciate
how a procedure for admission which does not take into
account the marks obtained at the qualifying examination, but
prefers to test the comparative merit of the candidates by
insisting on an entrance examination can ever be said to be
arbitrary.
The entrance test also facilitates the assessment of the
comparative talent of the candidates by application of a uniform
standard and is always preferable to evaluation of comparative
merit on the basis of marks obtained at the qualifying
examination, when the qualifying examination is held by two or
more different authorities, because lack of uniformity is bound to
creep into the assessment of candidates by different authorities
with different modes of examination.
We would not, therefore, regard the procedure adopted by the
society as arbitrary merely because it refused to take into
account the marks obtained by the candidates at the qualifying
examination, but chose to regulate the admissions by relying on
the entrance test.
The second ground of challenge questioned the validity of viva
voce examination as a permissible test for selection of
candidates for admission to a college. On this, the court said
that the oral interview test is undoubtedly not a very
satisfactory test for assessing and evaluating the capacity and
calibre of candidates, but in the absence of any better test for
measuring personal characteristics and traits, the oral
interview test must, at the present stage, be regarded as not
irrational or irrelevant though it is subjective and based on first
impression, its result is influenced by many uncertain factors
and it is capable of abuse.
The court pointed out that in the matter of admission to college
or even in the matter of public employment, the oral interview
test as presently held should not be relied upon as an exclusive
test, but it may be resorted to only as an additional or
supplementary test and, moreover, great care must be taken to
see that persons who are appointed to conduct the oral interview
test are men of high integrity, calibre and qualification.
So far as the third ground of challenge is concerned, the
argument of the petitioners under this head of challenge was
that even if oral interview may be regarded in principle as a
valid test for selection of candidates for admission to a college,
it was in the present case arbitrary and unreasonable since the
marks allocated for the oral interview were very much on the
higher side as compared with the marks allocated for the
written test.
The court while agreeing with the contention said that,
“Now there can be no doubt that, having regard to the drawbacks
and deficiencies in the oral interview test and the conditions
prevailing in the country, particularly when there is deterioration
in moral values and corruption and nepotism are very much on
the increase, allocation of a high percentage of marks for the oral
interview as compared to the marks allocated for the written test,
cannot be accepted by the Court as free from the vice of
arbitrariness. …..
It is significant to note that even for selection of candidates for
the Indian Administrative Service, the Indian Foreign Service and
the Indian Police Service, where the personality of the candidate
and his personal characteristics and traits are extremely relevant
for the purpose of selection, the marks allocated for oral interview
are 250 as against 1800 marks for the written examination,
constituting only 12.2% of the total marks taken into
consideration for the purpose of making the selection.
We must, therefore, regard the allocation of as high a percentage
as 33 1/3 of the total marks for the oral interview as infecting the
admission procedure with the vice of arbitrariness and selection
of candidates made on the basis of such admission procedure
cannot be sustained.
Decision of the Court ----
The court, however, denied to cancel the admission of those
candidate who got admission on this criteria of qualification
because it might affect their study, but the court cautioned the
government that the selections made for the subsequent
academic years would run the risk of invalidation if such a high
percentage of marks is allocated for the oral interview.
Therefore, the court decided that, under the existing
circumstances, allocation of more than 15% of the total marks for
the oral interview would be arbitrary and unreasonable and
would be liable to be struck down as constitutionally invalid.
Crux of the case ----
The final crux of the case is that,
“If the marks allocated for the oral interview do not exceed 15% of
the total marks and the candidates are properly interviewed and
relevant questions are asked with a view to assessing their
suitability with reference to the factors required to be taken into
consideration, the oral interview test would satisfy the criterion of
reasonableness and non-arbitrariness.
The court also suggested that it would be desirable if the
interview of the candidates is tape-recorded, for in that event
there will be contemporaneous evidence to show what were the
questions asked to the candidates by the interviewing committee
and what were the answers given and that will eliminate a lot of
unnecessary controversy besides acting as a check on the
possible arbitrariness of the interviewing committee.”