Introduction

African social and political thought is deeply interlaced with the daily life of
African people. Therefore, the paper explores the development of this philosophy
in agreement with some major events characterizing African history from the
colonial period up to now. African social thought is a less explored field of study
in comparison to research areas such a metaphysics, anthropology, theology,
sociology and economics. Many people confine this discipline to theories of one or
another emblematic African leader such as Nkrumah (1909-1972), Senghor (1906-
2001) and Nyerere (1922-1999).

Others reduce this philosophy to both the vicissitudes and hazards of African
politics in considering it as a chronicle of ups and downs of African nations.
These two approaches deform the nature of this philosophy and they skip over the
effort of African people to frame rationally their social and political organization.
As a reflection on the polis, African political philosophy is concerned with
people’s everyday life, everyday experience of alliances and collective actions.
This reality constitutes its roots and nourishing sap. It is advisable speaking of
“common world”, to make use of Arendt’s expression (Arendt 1994). This idea
defines political sphere as a space where people reveal themselves to each other
as equal, and where they manifest their desire to build together a humanizing
community. This anchoring of political philosophy in the common world is
unavoidable and necessary at a time, because it is the means by which this
philosophy specifies its object and forges its identity.

African social Political Thought and Ontology

The relationship between political philosophy and ontology is a fundamental

issue because it concerns the relevance of ontological considerations in the sphere
of political philosophy, and vice versa. This issue is very complex about Africa:
on the one hand, some African philosophers consider the search of African
quintessence as an unavoidable background to analyze issues of the polis. On the
other hand, the political sphere is viewed as only a space of empirical attitudes
and pragmatism.

The debate on Tempels’ work, Bantu Philosophy (1947), contributed to denounce

epistemological and cultural imperialism denying the existence of any particular
philosophy beyond that inherited from the Greek genius. It also revealed the
difficulty for African philosophers to formulate a consensual definition of African
philosophy (Bell 2002, 21-22). However, it is convened –at expenses of the
concept of philosophy- that African philosophy exists even before the work of
Tempels (Bidima 1995, 9). This assertion can be also considered valid about
African political philosophy, as this philosophy has always accompanied African
people in their search for a better polis. The evoked debate allowed the
systematization of premises underlying this search. Theories of African
humanism and African socialism, for example, rest on this premise. For many
scholars and political leaders the ontology as sustained by Tempels constitutes an
invaluable vade mecum. The idea of Senghor concerning African peculiarity, for
example, rests on this background.

This ascendancy of ontology in African political philosophy rises suspicion

about two stumbling blocks of political philosophy, formerly denounced by
Strauss in his famous lecture: Qu’est-ce que la philosophie politique? (Strauss
1992). First of all, it can be mentioned the temptation to consider political
philosophy as a particular application or a subcategory of general philosophy, by
transposing problems and concepts of the latter in the sphere of politics. The
search for African quintessence characterizing political reflection of many
African thinkers made this deviation more than likely. Theories such as negritude,
African socialism and African humanism are likely the most affected by this
criticism, because they put more emphasis on ontological speculation than on the
daily struggles of African people. This attitude can be compared to what Arendt
denounced in her criticism of Plato’s political philosophy: the withdrawal of the
thinker from the world (Arendt 1994). According to Arendt’s view, the concept of
“world” refers to the notion of “common world” which includes factors that are
essential and essentially not philosophical at a time, and they cannot be reduced to
metaphysical category. Such is the case of poverty, social exclusion and gender,
for example. The second stumbling block concerns the propensity to perceive
political philosophy as a systematization of opinions that are already present in the
polis. This perception is the Achilles' heel of trends of African political philosophy
relying on the exhumation of African past and the rehabilitation of African
cultures.

Slave Trade

The history of ideas cannot oversee events that have marked the development of
Africa, such as slavery and slave trade, colonization, African emancipation and
globalization. This section introduces some antecedents of today’s African
political philosophy, particularly personalities such as Africanus J. B. Horton
(1835-1883), Edward W. Blyden (1832-1912) and J. E. Casely Hayford (1866-
1930).
The interdiction of the slave trade propelled England to the rank of the most
active marine police in tracking recalcitrant slave-traders. The concern to assure a
land of freedom for freed slaves and to re-locate “slaves to become” captured in
the triangular trade led British authority to establish, in 1787, the colony of Sierra
Leone whose capital city took the name of Freetown (Wesseling 1991, 142).
According to Ilife, approximately 74,000 freed slaves were deported to this
colony that they dominated soon after thanks to the education received from
Church Missionary Society (Ilife 1998, 203), which was based on British cultural
model. Taking stand on this education, many people from Sierra Leone dreamed
about their political freedom. Horton embodied this aspiration.
Horton was born from parents of Igbo origin who have been captured by British
police on their crossing to slavery, and were relocated in Sierra Leone. He
studied at King’s College of London and at University of Edinburgh where he got
his doctorate in medicine. During his stay in London and Edinburgh, he adopted
the nickname of Africanus which will be associated with his identity and his
political engagement. This choice was very challenging in a context where to be
different – to be "someone colored" - was not the best asset, as it was during this
period that pseudo-scientific racist doctrines, of which Gobineau is one of the
striking names, were expanding.

A report of the House of Commons of 1865 proposing the disengagement of

British in Western Africa was the opportunity for Horton to express his political
concern. This report stipulated that British policy “should be to encourage in the
native the exercise of those qualities which may render it possible for us more and
more to transfer to the natives the administrations of all the Governments, with a
view to our ultimate withdrawal from all, except probably Sierra Leone”. In
reaction to this report, Horton published, in 1868, West African Countries and
Peoples. This work includes a description of Western British African communities
and proposals for the implementation of African institutions. Horton aimed at the
creation of autonomous West-African British colonies built according to the
example of Australia and Canada. Concerning his own native land, for example, he
notes that: constitutional form of government must form the basis of his
administration, consisting of House of assembly which should be composed of
men elected by the people, as it will be difficult for his Government to stand
without popular confidence, and the only means by which that can be secured is by
giving the people the power to elect one branch of the Legislature... Each member
should have landed property, be over the age of twenty-two, and be properly
educated.

By his work within African communities and thanks to his journeys inside
Africa, his studies of African cultures and history - including the study of Arabic
and Islamic culture-, Blyden enlarged his knowledge of Africa. This allowed him
to make an epistemological break with regard to his original perception of Africa.
He got rid of Christian abolitionist hypothesis leaning on a pejorative image of
African cultures to justify their eviction. Paradoxically to his position as a
Presbyterian worship minister, Blyden does not consider any more Christianity as
a universal paradigm and as a suitable factor to regenerate Africa. For him,
African cultures must not be annihilated for the benefit of Christianity or in order
to regenerate Africa. They must be protected because they are essential to African
identity and they hold values that don’t exist in Western culture. Standing on his
epistemological break, Blyden develops a new perception of African
Regeneration which excludes the purification of black Africa of its alleged
paganism. This regeneration must be rooted in African cultures.

The premise according to which all black people of the world are a single
nation, and consequently they must unite is one of Blyden’s main ideas. It also
constitutes the background of pan-Africanist movement. For Blyden, every race is
a natural unit with its own territory and specific mission. He is proud to be black,
and he exhorts his fellow black men to behave in the same way: the
consciousness and the pride to be black are essential to the progress of Blacks.
Following his abandonment of Christian abolitionist view, Blyden became critical
about the mixing of races being even against the idea of identifying as black
someone having a drop of black blood. In this respect, his attitude seems rather
close to the theory of racial purity. To put things positively, he developed an
antiracist racism.

Colonization

African colonization and its subsequent economic exploitation always did not go
without awakening the resistance of local communities. Such was the case, for
example, in Sierra Leone, about a colonial law of 1890 aiming at the attribution
of idle lands to the Crown (Waste lands, crown lands). This law hurt the patriotic
feeling of Sierra Leone’s leaders because, in addition to the land concern, it
affected the foundation of their culture and social organization. As a result, «West
Africans felt cheated of their land, deprived of their right of self-government,
defrauded of their economical resources and stripped of the very essentials of
their culture and way of life» (Quoted in Boele van Hensbroek s.d., 63).
In reaction to this law, Sierra Leone‘s intelligentsia set up an association to
defend their rights and to protect their social and cultural assets, named the
"Aboriginals Rights Protection Society" (ARPS). This association also developed
political ambition as it claimed the right of indigenous to their own educational
system and self-government. We want our education to enable us to develop and
to improve our native ideas, customs, manners and institutions» (Ibid., 62). For
the ARPS leaders, Japan represents the model to follow because this country
rested successfully on its values and traditions while undergoing the assaults of
Western culture under Meiji era.
Contrary to a wide-spread prejudice considering African cultures as conservative,
he was optimistic and he believed in the potential modernization of these cultures.
For him, there was no contradiction between modernization and African cultures.
He thought that like Japanese traditions, African traditions were able to match the
requirements of modernization if such an opportunity is offered to them.

Ethnophilosophy
The Word and the Thing. The term Ethnophilosophy was successful in the
euphoria subsequent to the debate on the existence of African philosophy.
Contrary to a wide-spread opinion (Appiah 1992, 85-106; Hallen 2009), this
concept did not appear in the 1970s, particularly as a consequence of the usage
that thinkers such as Hountondji (1970) and Towa (1971) made of it. Its earliest
usage in African philosophy is attributed to Nkrumah. After his Master's degree
in philosophy, in 1943, Nkrumah intended to present a doctoral thesis in
Ethnophilosophy at the American university of Pennsylvania. He drafted a
doctoral dissertation entitled: “Mind and Thought in Primitive Society: A Study
in Ethno-Philosophy with Special Reference to the Akan Peoples of the Gold
Coast, West Africa”.

Out of the evoked reference, there is no comment about the meaning of this
expression. Considering this want of explanation, Hountondji formulated the
hypothesis to search for the meaning of this word in the domain of “ethnic
sciences”. For him, when Nkrumah elaborated his doctoral project
discipline. In using this expression, Nkrumah sought to promote the idea
according to which anthropology should, by going beyond its traditional topics,
set up "a synthetic ethno-philosophy" through which “[elle] s’efforcerait . The
attempt to trace the genesis of the concept Ethnophilosophy clarifies the
very contribution of Hountondji and Towa, which consisted in that these two
philosophers diverted this expression of its previous and positive meaning, and
they consequently assigned to it a pejorative content consisting in a criticism of
some philosophical method and attitude. They denounced «une pratique de la
philosophie qui se donnait pour tâche de décrire les visions du monde collectives,
pratique qui (...) trahissait la vision première de la philosophie qui est non de
décrire, mais de démontrer ; non de reconstituer de manière conjecturale le
système de pensée de tel ou tel peuple, de telle ou telle société, de tel ou tel
groupe de personnes, mais de prendre soi-même position, de manière responsable,
sur des questions posées en acceptant la contrainte de justifier de manière
rationnelle ces prises de position» (Hountondji, art. cit.). According to
Hountondji’s own words: “Le mot existait bien avant les années soixante-dix.
Towa et moi ne l’avons pas forgé. Notre seule originalité était de l’utiliser dans
un sens péjoratif et polémique pour stigmatiser une pratique que nous rejetions,
alors qu’il était jusque-là, quand il était employé, le nom d’un projet
consciemment revendiqué” (Ibid. Underlined in the text).
It is advisable to note that Hountondji and Towa evolved in their perception
and criticism of ethnophilosophy, as they both recognize some positive
contribution of this trend of thought to the development of African philosophy
(Ibid.). However, some scholars denounce the silence of Hountondji and Towa on
the limits of scientific methods that both thinkers consider as essential to African
philosophy. Bidima, for example, criticizes the positivist attitude underlying the
thought of both the mentioned thinkers and their lack of coherence regarding
epistemological imperialism and obscurantism. He notes: “Hountondji et Towa
ont le réflexe d’un positivisme du XIXème siècle qui faisait de la science le
sauveur. On surprend chez une attitude bizarre se traduisant par la suspension de
l’esprit critique. Tout se passe comme si la réflexion critique qui les anime
s’arrêtait au seuil de la science (...) Towa et Hountondji se taisent quand il s’agit
de la technoscience, on ne critique plus, on fait confiance à la science qui sauve
des impérialismes et obscurantisme. Il y a un glissement d’une attitude critique
(...) à une attitude de foi. Leur discours sur la technoscience est celui de
l’idéologie dominante qui, pour mieux capter, saisit chaque objet en le coupant de
la réalité de ses contradictions”.

Ethnophilosophy and African Social Thought

Ethnophilosophy is based on the assumption that “there is a metaphysical system,

and an ideology, embodied in the traditional wisdom, the institutions and the
languages of Africa”. It aims at trashing out from myths, folktales, beliefs,
proverbs, and languages, “the quintessential African approach to the world”. This
project aims at disqualifying the racist discourse defending the ruling system.
Thinkers such as Hegel, Kant, Hume, count among those who shared this
discourse. Hegel’s attitude to reject Africa from the world history under the pretext
that this continent doesn’t have any contribution to the history of the world is one
of the most frequently evoked illustration in this respect. Against this attitude,
protagonists of ethnophilosophy looked for equivalences between African heritage
and Western culture. Some among them dedicated themselves to make the
inventory of African contributions to the history and development of humankind.
Standing on this background, ethnophilosophy can be viewed as both a political
attitude and a research method. To consider philosophy as a collective thought
implies the exemption of thinkers from their statements by covering them with the
authority and the anonymity of cultural traditions. As a result, this approach
cancels all responsibility of African leaders and thinkers on their own action and
thought. It is worth reminding that this perception gave support to authoritarianism
as it sterilized all political debate in the name of African cultural traditions. The
search for unicity favors the escape into ontology, as it promotes the ignorance of
the common world. This attitude encourages what Arendt called the "retreat of the
thinker from the world" (Arendt 1994), and that Césaire qualified as the search for
“ontological satisfaction” in his criticism of Tempels.

Conclusion

This work explored the nature, features and trends of African social thought.
This philosophy is rooted in everyday life of African people, and it has as main
objectives the well-being of African populations, both the nature and
legitimization of power, as well as the search for a well-suited paradigm of social
organization. Topics analyzed included the question of negro-African identity and
solidarity, African revival and the building of modern African states. The struggle
against colonization put forward ideas of African emancipation and cultural
rehabilitation, particularly through discourses of negritude, African humanism,
African socialism and Pan-Africanism. Standing on the changes which occurred
at the end of the twentieth century, we examined new challenges including
democracy, human rights, cultural diversity, gender, sustainable development and
globalization. These challenges represent a long-term duty for African thinkers
who are called to get out of their ivory tower and join the common world,
assuming a permanent reflexive equilibrium between their philosophical
intuitions and constraints of people’s daily life, in order to bring successfully to
completion such a mission. The future of African depends on such a critical
attitude.
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