56 - RAMCAR INC. vs. DE LEON (G.R. No.

L-1329; 1947)
RULE 111 – PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION

FACTS: On December 26, 1946, Ramcar, Inc. initiated a civil action for damages against defendants
in CFI-Manila for his stolen taxicab, praying that defendants be sentenced to pay the sum of P5,000,
value of a stolen taxicab among other damages.

Two days later, on December 28, an information for the theft of the above-described taxicab and
based on the same facts alleged in the complaint, was filed with the court of first instance against
the said three defendants.

On Jan. 2, 1947, after Ramcar had filed a 5,000 bond, a writ of attachment was issued against the
properties of defendants. Defendants prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside of
the writ of attachment. Judge De Leon DENIED the dismissal but GRANTED the petition to set aside
the writ upon the theory that it was improperly issued because at the time of its issuance the
information in the criminal case had already been filed, the theory being based on the lower
court's interpretation of section 1 of Rule 107* in which it is read:

(b) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has
been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action; chanrobl virtual law libr

(c) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted; and the
same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court was, after the filing of the information in the criminal case, ipso
facto deprived of the power to issue preliminary and auxiliary writs, such as attachment.

RULING: NO.  The writ of attachment is maintained. The suspension of the civil action does not
carry with it the suspension to issue preliminary and auxiliary writs in the civil action. Respondent
judge set aside the writ of attachment upon the theory that it was improperly issued because at the
time of its issuance the information in the criminal case had already been filed, basing on section 1
of Rule 107*: xxxx (c) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted; and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found,
until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered.  Under the subsection in question,
the civil action undergoes a procedural freezing. But the procedural freezing does not have
the effect of wiping out all manifestations of the existence of the suspended civil action. In
meantime, while it is waiting to be tried and decided on the merits, it may avail itself of the
ancillary processes which, expressly authorized by law, will permit it to accomplish its
purposes efficaciously.

57 - BABALA  vs. HON. ABAÑO (G.R. No. L-4600 ; 1952)

FACTS: A criminal information for grave coercion was filed in CFI-Camarines Norte, against
petitioner at the instance of respondent. Respondent also filed in said court a civil action for
damages and prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Petitioner
insisted that the criminal case should have precedence. CFI ordered that the trial of the civil case
upon the merits was suspended until after the criminal case shall have been decided and
terminated, but that the hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction might be proceeded with.
ISSUE:  Whether the criminal case likewise suspended the matter of the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction.

RULING: NO. In the case of Ramcar, Inc., vs. De Leon, the Court has already ruled that, although the
civil action is suspended until final judgment in the criminal case, the court is not thereby deprived
of its authority to issue preliminary and auxiliary writs, such as preliminary injunction, attachment,
appointment of receiver, fixing amounts of bonds, and other processes of similar nature which do
not go into the merits of the case. It was reasoned out that "if those ancillary processes cannot be
resorted to during the suspension, there is no sense in the rule providing only for suspension, when
its effect is to kill the action."

58 - Dreamwork v. Janiola, G.R. No. 184861, 30 June 2009

FACTS: A criminal complaint for violation of BP 22 was filed against Cleofe Janiola. 2 years
thereafter, Janiola instituted a Complaint for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement
between the parties, as well as for damages. Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases
before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement. Janiola filed a Motion
to Suspend Proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question, alleging that the civil and criminal
cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues
in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

Petitioner opposed because (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the
contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue
of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that "the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action";
thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.

TC granted the motion to suspend proceedings of the criminal action.

ISSUE: Whether the civil action must precede the filing of the criminal action for a prejudicial
question to exist or w/n there is prejudicial question.

RULING: YES. SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.—The elements of a prejudicial question are:
(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)

The phrase, "previously instituted," in Section7 Rule 111 was inserted to qualify the nature of the
civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This interpretation is
further buttressed by the insertion of "subsequent" directly before the term criminal action. There
is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and
criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action. 

A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and
which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with
which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the
institution of the criminal action.

The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal
Action. In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is,
still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal case. The fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of the
check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up the elements of
the crime of violation of BP 22. 

59- First Producers Holdings Corp. v. Co, G.R. No. 139655, 27 July 2000
Prejudicial Questions

FACTS: A criminal case for estafa was filed before the RTC-Makati against Luis Co for his failure to
return, upon his separation from service, the certificate of stock representing some shares he held
in trust for the corporation.

During the pendency of the criminal case, Co filed an action for damages against complainants. In
the said complaint, he claimed ownership over questioned Manila Polo Club Proprietary Share. 

ISSUE: Is the suspension of the criminal proceeding on the ground of prejudicial question proper?

RULING: NO. A criminal proceeding, as a rule, may be suspended upon a showing that a prejudicial
question determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused is the very issue to be decided in a
civil case pending in another tribunal. However, such suspension cannot be allowed if it is
apparent that the civil action was filed as an afterthought for the purpose of delaying the
ongoing criminal action. 

The criminal action for estafa had been lodged with the Office of the City Prosecutor on March 13,
1997. Yet, respondent filed the civil case only eight months later, on November 18, 1997. Indeed, as
early as 1994, a written demand had already been served on him to return the said share. He did
not contest petitioners claim; in fact, he filed the present civil action several months after the
institution of the criminal charge. Verily, it is apparent that the civil action was instituted only as an
afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal case. 

In any event, the issue of ownership is not a necessary element of estafa

60 - San Miguel v. Perez, G.R. No. 166836, 4 September 2013

FACTS: San Miguel Properties purchased from B.F. Homes, Inc. 130 residential lots. BF Homes
withheld the delivery of 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver
at the time of the transactions. 

Thus, San Miguel Properties filed a complaint charging respondent directors/officers of BF Homes
with non-delivery of titles in violation of Presidential Decree No. 957. At the same time, it sued
BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20
TCTs in its favor.
ISSUE: Whether the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the delivery of the TCTs could
be a reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question.

RULING: YES. There is prejudicial question even if the other case is pending with a quasi-judicial
body. This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an action civil in nature
but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB whose jurisdiction over the action was
exclusive and original in this case.
The action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not San Miguel
Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal
action would decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and officers were criminally liable for
withholding the 20 TCTs. 

The resolution of the former must obviously precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold
San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did
not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership having been
terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the
criminal case.

Case No. 73
RULE 112 – PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Racho v. Miro, G.R. No. 168578, 30 September 2008, 567 SCRA 213

FACTS: In this case, petitioner claims a denial of due process because of the fact that the Omb
handled the preliminary investigation as well as the reinvestigation of the cases. In both instances,
the latter found probable cause to indict petitioner for falsification. He insists that respondent
director had lost the cold neutrality of an impartial judge when she found probable cause against
him on preliminary investigation. Petitioner penultimately questions the haste with which the
reinvestigation was concluded and the lack of hearing thereon. 

ISSUE: W/N petitioner was denied due process when no hearing was conducted on his motion for
reinvestigation.

RULING: NO. A clarificatory hearing is not required during preliminary investigation. Rather than
being mandatory, a clarificatory hearing is optional on the part of the investigating officer as
evidenced by the use of the term "may" in Section 3(e) of Rule 112, thus:

(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to
propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be
afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine.

This rule applies equally to a motion for reinvestigation. As stated, the Office of the Ombudsman has
been granted virtually plenary investigatory powers by the Constitution and by law. As a rule, the
Office of the Ombudsman may, for every particular investigation, whether instigated by a complaint
or on its own initiative, decide how best to pursue such investigation. In the present case, the OMB
found it unnecessary to hold additional clarificatory hearings. Notably, a hearing was conducted
during preliminary investigation where petitioner invoked his right to remain silent and confront
witnesses who may be presented against him, although there was none presented.
Besides, under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Administrative Order
No. 07), particularly Rule II, Section 7(a),42 in relation to Section 4(f),43 a complainant's active
participation is no longer a matter of right during reinvestigation. Admittedly, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings. Thus, it is settled
that administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense.

Case No. 74
RULE 112 – PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Tolentino v. Paqueo, G.R. No. 150606, 7 June 2007, 523 SCRA 377

FACTS: Petitioner, State Prosecutor Tolentino filed an information charging private respondent for
violation of R.A. No. 8282, for failing to remit SSS premiums due to his employee. Accused, private
respondent filed a motion to quash the information of the ground that Petitioner, Prosecutor
Tolentino has no legal personality and authority to commence such prosecution without the
approval of the City Prosecutor.
Petitioner contends that he was designated as Special Prosecutor by the Regional State Prosecutor
by virtue of a Regional order.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner State Prosecutor is duly authorized to file the subject Information without
the approval of the City Prosecutor.

RULING: NO. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states that "[n]o complaint or
information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written
authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy." Since the provision is couched in negative terms importing that the act
shall not be done otherwise than designated, it is mandatory. 

Since the Regional State Prosecutor is not included among the law officers authorized to approve
the filing or dismissal of the Information of the investigating prosecutor, the Information filed by
petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino did not comply with the requirement of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the non-compliance was a ground to quash the
Information under Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Case No. 75
RULE 112 – PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Crespo v. Mogul, L-53373, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 462
FACTS:  An information for estafa against Crespo was filed by Assistant Fiscal de Gala with the
approval of the Provincial Fiscal. When the case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a motion
to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the SoJ
of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. The motion
was denied by Mogul the presiding judge, as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: W/N the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial
Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may
refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.
 
RULING: Yes. Once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while
the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. 

It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the existence of a
prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. It is not prudent or even permissible
for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an
information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. Neither
has the Court any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a certain
period of time.

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is subject to the approval of the provincial or city
fiscal or the chief state prosecutor and it maybe elevated for review to the SoJ who has the power to
affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently, the SoJ may direct that a
motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court.