Paderanga vs. CA – 247 SCRA 741 (1995) Doe as the alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of
the spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr.
However, only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was
apprehended, tried and eventually convicted. Galarion later
escaped from prison. The others have remained at large up to the
present.  2

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was
Manila implicated in the crime. In an amended information dated October
6, 1988, he was charged as a co-accused therein. As herein
SECOND DIVISION petitioner was his former employer and thus knew him well,
Roxas engaged the former's services as counsel in said case.
  Ironically, in the course of the preliminary investigation therein,
said accused, in a signed affidavit dated March 30, 1989 but
which he later retracted on June 20, 1990, implicated petitioner
G.R. No. 115407 August 28, 1995
as the supposed mastermind behind the massacre of the Bucag
family.
3

MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, petitioner,
vs.
Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
Oro City from the case per his resolution of July 7, 1989, the
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Department of Justice, at the instance of said prosecutor,
designated a replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F.
Gingoyon, for purposes of both the preliminary investigation and
prosecution of Criminal Case No. 86-39. Pursuant to a resolution
REGALADO, J.: of the new prosecutor dated September 6, 1989, petitioner was
finally charged as a co-conspirator in said criminal case in a
The adverse decision in this case promulgated by respondent second amended information dated October 6, 1992. Petitioner
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233 on November 24, assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all the way to this
1993, as well as its resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the Court in G.R. No. 96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs.
motion for reconsideration thereof, are challenged by petitioner Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick
Miguel P. Paderanga in this appeal by certiorari through a petition F. Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan." In an en
which raises issues centering mainly on said petitioner's right to banc decision promulgated on April 19, 1991, the Court sustained
be admitted to bail. the filing of the second amended information against him. 4

On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged in an Under this backdrop, the trial of the base was all set to start with
amended information as a co-conspirator in the crime of multiple the issuance of an arrest warrant for petitioner's apprehension
murder in Criminal Case No. 86-39 of the Regional Trial Court, but, before it could be served on him, petitioner through counsel,
Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro City for the killing of members of filed on October 28, 1992 a motion for admission to bail with the
the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which trial court which set the same for hearing on November 5, 1992.
petitioner was the mayor at the time. The original information, Petitioner duly furnished copies of the motion to State Prosecutor
filed on October 6, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog Henrick F. Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, and
City,  had initially indicted for multiple murder eight accused
1
the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On November 5,
suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, 1992, the trial court proceeded to hear the application for bail.
Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And Richard Four of petitioner's counsel appeared in court but only Assistant
 Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecution's perpetua, the evidence of guilt was strong as borne out by the
Office appeared for the prosecution. 5
fact that no bail was recommended by the prosecution, for which
reasons it held that the grant of bail was doubly improvident.
As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College Lastly, the prosecution, according to respondent court, was not
General Hospital due to "acute costochondritis," his counsel afforded an opportunity to oppose petitioner's application for bail
manifested that they were submitting custody over the person of contrary to the requirements of due process. Hence, this appeal.
their client to the local chapter president of the integrated Bar of
the Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail Petitioner argues that, in accordance with the ruling of this Court
application, he considered being in the custody of the law. in Santiago vs. Vasquez etc., et al.,  his filing of the aforesaid
9

Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand, informed the trial court that application for bail with the trial court effectively conferred on the
in accordance with the directive of the chief of their office, latter jurisdiction over his person. In short, for all intents and
Regional State prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado, the prosecution was purposes, he was in the custody of the law. In petitioner's words,
neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that the "invocation by the accused of the court's jurisdiction by filing a
they were submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trail pleading in court is sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction
judge.6
over the person of the accused and bring him within the custody
of the law."
Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo
announced that he was waiving any further presentation of Petitioner goes on to contend that the evidence on record
evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated November 5, negates the existence of such strong evidence as would bar his
1992, the trial court admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of provisional release on bail. Furthermore, the prosecution, by
P200,000.00. The following day, November 6, 1992, petitioner, reason of the waiver by Prosecutor Abejo of any further
apparently still weak but well enough to travel by then, managed presentation of evidence to oppose the application for bail and
to personally appear before the clerk of court of the trial court and whose representation in court in behalf of the prosecution bound
posted bail in the amount thus fixed. He was thereafter arraigned the latter, cannot legally assert any claim to a denial of procedural
and in the trial that ensued, he also personally appeared and due process. Finally, petitioner points out that the special civil
attended all the scheduled court hearings of the case. 7
action for certiorari was filed in respondent court after an
unjustifiable length of time.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution filed twenty
(20) days later on November 26, 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon who On the undisputed facts , the legal principles applicable and the
allegedly received his copy of the petition for admission to bail on the day equities involved in this case, the Court finds for petitioner.
after the hearing, was denied by the trial court in its omnibus order dated
March 29, 1993. On October 1, 1993, or more than six (6) months later, 1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security
Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matter to respondent Court of Appeals given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished
through a special civil action for certiorari. Thus were the resolution and by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearing before
the order of the trial court granting bail to petitioner annulled on any court as required under the conditions specified in said Rule.
November 24, 1993, in the decision now under review, on the ground that Its main purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors of
they were tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 8
imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance
at the trial.  As bail is intended to obtain or secure one's
10

Respondent court observed in its decision that at the time of provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody
petitioner's application for bail, he was not yet "in the custody of over him has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by
the law," apparently because he filed his motion for admission to his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender.  As this Court has put it in
11

bail before he was actually arrested or had voluntarily a case "it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free." 12

surrendered. It further noted that apart from the circumstance that

petitioner was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion
The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner to post a cash bail bond for
resort to the former pernicious practice whereby an accused her provisional liberty without need of her personal appearance in
could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without view of her physical incapacity and as a matter of humane
recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal consideration.
appearance therein and compliance with the requirements
therefor.  Thus, in Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al.,  where the
13 14
When the Sandiganbayan later issued a hold departure order
petitioner who had been charged with kidnapping with murder against her, she question the jurisdiction of that court over her
went into hiding without surrendering himself, and shortly person in a recourse before this Court, on the ground that "she
thereafter filed a motion asking the court to fix the amount of the neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside
bail bond for his release pending trial, the Supreme Court from the fact that she has not validly posted bail since she never
categorically pronounced that said petitioner was not eligible for personally appeared before said court" In rejecting her
admission to bail. arguments, the Court held that she was clearly estopped from
assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for by her own
As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have representations in the urgent ex parte motion for bail she had
either been arrested, detained, or other wise deprived of their earlier recognized such jurisdiction. Furthermore, by actually
freedom will ever have occasion to seek the protective mantle posting a cash bail was accepted by the court, she had effectively
extended by the right to bail. The person seeking his provisional submitted to its jurisdiction over her person. Nonetheless, on the
release under the auspices of bail need not even wait for a formal matter of bail, the Court took pains to reiterate that the same
complaint or information to be filed against him as it is available to cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been
"all persons"  where the offense is bailable. The rule is, of course,
15
acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
subject to the condition or limitation that the applicant is in the surrender.
custody of the law. 16

In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had

On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of indeed filed his motion for admission to bail before he was
the law (a) when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of actually and physically placed under arrest. He may, however, at
arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by warrantless that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be considered as
arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 being constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the
of the revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his bail
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by application with the trail court, for purposes of the hearing thereof
surrendering to the proper authorities.  in this light, the ruling, vis-
17
he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to
a-vis the facts in Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc., et al.,  should be
18
the custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the
explained. trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an
arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or
In said case, the petitioner who was charged before the merely by his submission to the custody of the person making the
Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt arrest.  The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called
19

Practices Act, filed through counsel what purported to be an "house arrest" or, in case of military offenders, by being "confined
"Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond." Said to quarters" or restricted to the military camp area.
petitioner was at the time confined in a hospital recuperating from
serious physical injuries which she sustained in a major vehicular It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel,
mishap. Consequently, she expressly sought leave "that she be emphatically made it known to the prosecution and to the trail
considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the court during the hearing for bail that he could not personally
Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol
proceedings." On the basis of said ex-parte motion and the College General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not
peculiar circumstances obtaining in that incident, the then obtain medical clearance to leave the hospital. The
 prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit now provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a
knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right.
it would have taken but the slightest effort to place petitioner in The right to bail, which may be waived considering its personal
the physical custody of the authorities, since he was then nature  and which, to repeat, arises from the time one is placed in the
21

incapacitated and under medication in a hospital bed just over a custody of the law, springs from the presumption of innocence accorded
kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement or placing him every accused upon whom should not be inflicted incarceration at the
under guard. outset since after trial he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
established beyond reasonable doubt. 22

The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the

constructive custody of the law. Apparently, both the trial court Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court
and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never of a criminal offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail as a
attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, matter of right, the present exceptions thereto being the instances where
he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his the accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable
person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trail court; by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment  and the evidence of guilt is
23

secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual strong. Under said general rule, upon proper application for admission to
whereabouts; and, more importantly, by unequivocally bail, the court having custody of the accused should, as a matter of
recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it course, grant the same after a hearing conducted to specifically
came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now,
issued, petitioner never made any attempt or evinced any intent Section 2) of Rule 114. On the other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a
to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts matter of judicial discretion on the part of the court under the exceptions
from the authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be summary
the submission application for bail, and until the day of the or otherwise in the discretion of the court,  is required with the
24

hearing thereof. participation of both the defense and a duly notified representative of the
prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is
At the hearing, his counsel offered proof of his actual confinement strong for the provisional liberty of the applicant.  Of course, the burden
25

at the hospital on account of an acute ailment, which facts were of proof is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the
not at all contested as they were easily verifiable. And, as a required quantum. 26

manifestation of his good faith and of his actual recognition of the

authority of trial court, petitioner's counsel readily informed the Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the
court that they were surrendering custody of petitioner to the prosecution must be give an opportunity to present, within a reasonable
president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Misamis time, all the evidence that it may want to introduce before the court may
Oriental Chapter.  In other words, the motion for admission to bail
20
resolve the application, since it is equally entitled as the accused to due
was filed not for the purpose or in the manner of the former process.  If the prosecution is denied this opportunity, there would be a
27

practice which the law proscribes for the being derogatory of the denial of procedural due process, as a consequence of which the court's
authority and jurisdiction of the courts, as what had happened order in respect of the motion or petition is void.  At the hearing, the
28

in Feliciano. There was here no intent or strategy employed to petitioner can rightfully cross-examine the witnesses presented by the
obtain bail in absentia and thereby be able to avoid arrest should prosecution and introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.  When,
29

the application therefore be denied. eventually, the court issues an order either granting or refusing bail, the
same should contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution,
2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before followed by its conclusion as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is
conviction, all indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those charged strong.  The court, though, cannot rely on mere affidavits or recitals of
30

with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of their contents, if timely objected to, for these represent only hearsay
guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as amended,
evidence, and thus are insufficient to establish the quantum of evidence the matter to its sound discretion. Obviously, what this meant was
that the law requires. 31
that the prosecution, at that particular posture of the case, was
waiving the presentation of any countervailing evidence. When
In this appeal, the prosecution assails what it considers to be a violation the court a quo sought to ascertain whether or not that was the
of procedural due process when the court below allowed Assistant real import of the submission by Prosecutor Abejo, the latter
Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecutor's Office to readily answered in the affirmative.
appear in behalf of the prosecution, instead of State Prosecutor Henrick
P. Gingoyon who is claimed to be the sole government prosecutor The following exchanges bear this out:
expressly authorized to handle the case and who received his copy of the
motion only on the day after the hearing had been conducted. PROSECUTOR ERLINDO ABEJO:
Accordingly, the prosecution now insists that Prosecutor Abejo had no
authority at all to waive the presentation of any further evidence in I was informed to appear in this case just
opposition to the application for bail and to submit the matter to the sound now Your Honor.
discretion of the trial court. In addition, they argue that the prosecution
was not afforded "reasonable time" to oppose that application for bail.
COURT:
We disagree. Firstly, it is undisputed that the Office of the Regional State
Where is your Chief of Office? Your office
Prosecutor acted as the collaborating counsel, with State Prosecutor
received a copy of the motion as early as
Henrick Gingoyon, in Criminal Case No. 86-39 on the basis of an
October 28. There is an element of
authority from then Chief State Prosecutor Fernando de Leon which was
urgency here.
sent through radio message on July 10, 1992 and duly received by the
Office of the Regional State Prosecutor on the same date. This
authorization, which was to be continuing until and unless it was PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
expressly withdrawn, was later confirmed and then withdrawn only on
July 12, 1993 by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon. This was I am not aware of that, Your Honor, I was
done after one Rebecca Bucag-tan questioned the authority of Regional only informed just now. The one assigned
State Prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado and State Prosecutor II Erlindo Abejo here is State Prosecutor Perseverando
to enter their appearance as collaborating government prosecutors in Arena, Jr. who unfortunately is in the
said criminal case.  It was in fact by virtue of this arrangement that the
32 hospital attending to his sick son. I do not
same Prosecutor Zozobrado and Prosecutor Perseverando Arana know about this but before I came I
entered their appearance as collaborating prosecutor in the previous received an instruction from our Chief to
hearing in said case.  Hence, on the strength of said authority and of its
33 relay to this court the stand of the office
receipt of the notice of the hearing for bail, the Regional State regarding the motion to admit bail. That
Prosecutor's Office, through Prosecutor Abejo, could validly represent the office is neither supporting nor opposing it
prosecution in the hearing held on November 5, 1992. and we are submitting to the sound
discretion of the Honorable Court.
Secondly, although it is now claimed that Prosecutor Abejo was
allegedly not familiar with the case, he nonetheless was explicitly COURT:
instructed about the position of the Regional State Prosecutor's
Office on the matter. Prosecutor Zozobrado, whose office Place that manifestation on record. For
received its copy of the motion on the very day when it was sent, the record, Fiscal Abejo, would you like to
that is, October 28, 1992, duly instructed Prosecutor Abejo to formally enter your appearance in this
manifest to the court that the prosecution was neither supporting matter?
nor opposing the application for bail and that they were submitting
 PROSECUTOR ABEJO: intention at all to oppose the motion for bail and this should be so
notwithstanding the statement that they were "neither supporting
Yes, Your Honor. For the government, the nor opposing" the motion. What is of significance is the
Regional State Prosecutor's Office manifestation that the prosecution was "submitting (the motion) to
represented by State Prosecutor Erlindo the sound discretion of the Honorable Court." By that, it could not
Abejo. be any clearer. The prosecution was dispensing with the
introduction of evidence en contra and this it did at the proper
COURT: forum and stage of the proceedings, that is, during the mandatory
hearing for bail and after the trial court had fully satisfied itself that
such was the position of the prosecution.
By that manifestation do you want the
Court to understand that in effect, at least,
the prosecution is dispensing with the 3. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons,  it was stressed
35

presentation of evidence to show that the that where the trial court has reasons to believe that the
guilt of the accused is strong, the denial . . prosecutor's attitude of not opposing the application for bail is not
. justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross error or a
dereliction of duty, the court, in the interest of Justice, must
inquire from the prosecutor concerned as the nature of his
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
evidence to determine whether or not it is strong. And, in the very
recent administrative matter Re: First Indorsement Dated July 21,
I am amenable to that manifestation, Your 1992 of Hon. Fernando de Leon, Chief State Prosecutor,
Honor. Department of Justice; Alicia A. Baylon, City Prosecutor of
Dagupan City vs. Judge Deodoro Sison,   the Court, citing Tucay
36

COURT: vs. Domagas, etc.,   held that where the prosecutor interposes

37

no objection to the motion of the accused, the trial court should

Final inquiry. Is the Prosecution willing to nevertheless set the application for hearing and from there
submit the incident covered by this diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter is
particular motion for resolution by this really not contesting the bail application.
court?
No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could
PROSECUTOR ABEJO: therefore be attributed to the trial court here as regards its order
granting bail to petitioner. A review of the transcript of the
Yes, Your Honor. stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of November 5,
1992 and the omnibus order of March 29, 1993 abundantly
COURT: reveals scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. As
summarized in its aforementioned order, the lower court
Without presenting any further evidence? exhausted all means to convince itself of the propriety of the
waiver of evidence on the part of the prosecution. Moreover, the
omnibus order contained the requisite summary of the evidence
PROSECUTOR ABEJO: of both the prosecution and the defense, and only after sifting
through them did the court conclude that petitioner could be
Yes, Your Honor. 34
provisionally released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no showing
that, since then and up to the present, petitioner has ever
It is further evident from the foregoing that the prosecution, on the committed any violation of the conditions of his bail.
instructions of Regional State prosecutor Zozobrado, had no
 As to the contention that the prosecutor was not given the Narvasa, C.J., Puno, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
opportunity to present its evidence within a reasonable period of
time, we hold otherwise. The records indicate that the Regional  
State Prosecutor's Office duly received its copy of the application
for bail on the very same day that the it was filed with the trial Footnotes
court on October 28, 1992. Counted from said date up to the day
of the hearing on November 5, 1992, the prosecution had more
1 Venue was later transferred to the Regional Trial Court
than one (1) week to muster such evidence as it would have
of Cagayan de Oro City, per Administrative Matter No. 87-
wanted to adduce in that hearing in opposition to the motion.
2-244; Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 32233, 5.
Certainly, under the circumstances, that period was more than
reasonable. The fact that Prosecutor Gingoyon received his copy
of the application only on November 6, 1992 is beside the point 2 Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 32233, 5-6.
for, as already established, the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor was authorized to appear for the People. 3 Ibid., id., 6.

4. What finally militates against the cause of the prosecutor is the 4 Ibid., id., 7.
indubitably unreasonable period of time that elapsed before it
questioned before the respondent court the resolution and the 5 Ibid., id., 22.
omnibus order of the trial court through a special civil action
for certiorari. The Solicitor General submits that the delay of more 6 Ibid., id., 23.
than six (6) months, or one hundred eighty-four (184) days to be
exact, was reasonable due to the attendant difficulties which 7 Ibid., id., 23-25; Rollo. 9-11.
characterized the prosecution of the criminal case against
petitioner. But then, the certiorari proceeding was initiated before 8 Ibid., id., 26-30; Rollo, 7-8, 56-58.
the respondent court long after trial on the merits of the case had
ensued in the court below with the active participation of
prosecution lawyers, including Prosecutor Gingoyon. At any rate, 9 G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 633.
the definitive rule now in that the special civil action
for certiorari should not be instituted beyond a period of the three 10 Almeda vs. Villaluz, etc., et al., L-31665, August 6,
months,  the same to be reckoned by taking into account the
38 1975, 66 SCRA 38.
duration of time that had expired from the commission of the acts
complained to annul the same. 39 11 Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc., et al., supra, Fn. 9.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA- 12 Mendoza vs. Court of First Instance of Quezon, etc., et
G.R. SP No. 32233, promulgated on November 24, 1993, annulling the al., L-35612-14, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA
resolution dated November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order dated March 369, citing Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al., L-14657,
29, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, as well as July 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 888.
said respondent court's resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the motion
for reconsideration of said judgment, are hereby REVERSED and SET 13 Aguirre, et al. vs. Belmonte, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-93-
ASIDE. The aforesaid resolution and omnibus order of the Regional Trail 1052, October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA 778.
Court granting bail to petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga are hereby
REINSTATED. 14 Supra, Fn- 12.

SO ORDERED.
15 De la Camara vs. Enage, etc., L-32951-2; September 29 Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55 (1946); Beltran vs.
17, 1971, 41 SCRA 1. Diaz, et al., 77 Phil 484 (1946).

16 Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, et al., 75 Phil. 634 30 People vs. Casingal, et al., G. R. No. 87173, March
(1945); Manigbas, et al. vs. Luna, etc., et al., 98 Phil. 466 29, 1995.
(1956) Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al., supra.

17 Dinapol vs. Baldado, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-92-898,

August 5, 1993, 225 SCRA 110.

18 Supra, Fn. 9. 31 Baylon, etc. vs. Sison, A.M. No. 92-7-360-0, April 6,
1995.
19 Section 2, Rule 113, Rules of Court.
32 Rollo, 69, 106, 115-116; Annex "A," Petitioners Reply.
20 Rollo, 101-102.
33 Ibid., 105.
21 People vs. Donato, etc., et al., G.R. No. 79269, June
5, 1991, 198 SCRA 130. 34 Ibid., 75-77.

22 De la Camera vs. Enage, etc., supra, Fn. 15. 35 Supra, Fn. 16.

23 Sec. 7, Rule 114, as amended; see also Borinaga vs. 36 Supra, Fn. 31.

Tamin, etc., A.M. Mo. RTJ-93-936, September 10, 1993,
226 SCRA 206. 37 A.M. No. RTJ-95-1286, March 2, 1995.

24 Go vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 106087, April 38 Caramol vs. National Labor Relation Commission, et
7, 1993, 221 SCRA 397; Aurilio, Jr. vs. Francisco, etc., et al., G.R. No. 102973, August 24, 1993, 225 SCRA
al., A.M. No. RTJ-93-1097, August 12, 1994, 235 SCRA 582, citing Philec Worker's Union vs. Young, G.R. No.
283. 101734, January 22, 1992, Minute Resolution, First
Division; Catalina Bermejo vs. National Labor Relations
25 Borinaga vs. Tamin, etc., supra, Fn. 23. Commission, et al., G.R. No. 102713, January 20, 1992,
Minute Resolution, First Division.
26 Section 8, Rule 114, as Amended.
39 Fernandez vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
27 People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al., G.R. No. 81389, et al., G.R. No. 106090, February 28, 1994, 230 SCRA
February 21, 1989, 170 SCRA 489; Lardizabal vs. Reyes, 460.
A.M. No. MTJ-94-897, December 5, 1994, 238 SCRA
640.

28 People vs. San Diego, etc., et al., L-29676, December

24, 1968, SCRA 523; Carpio, etc., et al. vs. Malalang,
etc., et al., G.R. No. 78162, April 19, 1991, 196 SCRA 41.
 Delos Santos-Reyes vs. Judge Montesa – August 7, 1995 In the decision promulgated on 21 February 1994,  this Court dismissed
2

G.R. Nos. 108478-79. The complainant then filed on 23 November 1994

a motion to revive this complaint.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT On 23 February 1995, the respondent judge filed an Additional Comment
Manila and Observation to stress that what he did was to quash the warrant of
arrest, determine probable cause on the basis of the record and
documents available, order the arrest of the accused, and grant bail to
EN BANC
those against whom the evidence of guilt was weak.
 
Issues having been joined and the revival of this complaint being in order,
this Court required the parties to manifest whether they agree to submit
A.M. No. RTJ-93-983 August 7, 1995 this case for decision on the basis of the pleadings they have submitted.
In their separate manifestations, the parties responded in the affirmative.
GUILLERMA DE LOS SANTOS-REYES, complainant,
vs. The antecedent facts which gave rise to the instant complaint (as well as
JUDGE CAMILO O. MONTESA, JR., Pairing Judge, Branch 18, to G.R. Nos. 108478-79) are summarized in the decision in G.R. Nos.
Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, respondent. 108478-79 as follows:

On November 4, 1990, Patrolman Celso Reyes, Bgy. Captain

Pedro Panganiban and Armando Vitug were ambushed along
PER CURIAM:
Ipo-road, Kay-Pian, San Juan del Monte, Bulacan, resulting in the
untimely death of Reyes and Panganiban. The National Bureau of
In her complaint filed on 23 March 1993, Guillerma de los Santos-Reyes Investigation conducted an inquisition of the incident and after
charges the respondent judge with gross ignorance of law and evident which charged petitioners Estelita Hipolito and Alfredo Bolsico,
dishonesty in the performance of his work in that he granted bail to the together with Romeo Adviento, Romeo Permejo, Rolando Gozum
accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 487-M-91, 488-M-91, and 488-M-91 and four (4) John Does with the crimes of murder and frustrated
without the required petition for bail and without conducting any hearing murder before the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose del Monte,
to accord the prosecution an opportunity to establish that the evidence of then presided over by Judge Virginia Pagarogon.
guilt of the accused was strong.
Judge Pagarogon conducted a preliminary investigation of the
In compliance with the resolution of 24 May 1993, the respondent judge witnesses and on November 14, 1990 issued an order admitting
filed his comment wherein he disclosed that the issue raised was the the complaint and ordering the detention of all the accused after
subject of G.R. Nos. 108478-79  pending before the Second Division of
1
finding that the crimes charged have been committed and there is
this Court. reasonable ground to believe that the accused are probably guilty
thereof. No bail was recommended.
On 22 September 1993, this Court, upon the recommendation of the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), dismissed this case, "the issues Judge Pagarogon then forwarded the records of the cases to the
raised . . . being sub-judice but without prejudice to its revival should the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Bulacan for appropriate action.
Court in G.R. Nos. 108478-79 find the orders to have been issued with The Investigating Prosecutor, without conducting a thorough
grave abuse of discretion." investigation of the cases, concluded that there was no probable
cause and ordered motu proprio the release of the accused from
custody. So, the widow of Patrolman Reyes petitioned the
Department of Justice to disqualify the Provincial Prosecutor's of the preliminary investigation of the cases within ten (10) days
Office from conducting the preliminary investigation and from notice.
prosecution of the cases.
On April 15, 1991, petitioners filed an urgent motion to quash the
In due course, the DOJ acted favorably on the petition and warrants of arrest alleging want of probable cause.
designated State Prosecutor Santiago Turingan to take over and
handle the cases. The State Prosecutor found probable cause for On April 22, 1991, the accused withdrew their motion for
murder and frustrated murder against all the accused and reinstatement of their petition for bail bond and opted to pursue
consequently, they were formally charged with said crimes on their motion to quash the warrants of arrest.
March 13, 1991, before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, docketed as Criminal Cases No. 487-M-91, 488-M-91 On May 2, 1991, the trial court quashed the warrants of arrest
and 489-M-91. No bail was recommended and the corresponding and set the hearing on May 15, 1991 for the purpose of
warrants of arrest were issued. determining the existence of probable cause.

The accused were quick to learn of the filing of the informations. On May 17, 1991, after examining the records of the cases as
On the same day (March 13, 1991), they filed a "Manifestation forwarded to him by the prosecution, the trial court found the
and Motion to Defer the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest," praying existence of probable cause but instead of issuing the
for the suspension of court proceedings on the ground that they corresponding warrants of arrest, for the purpose of acquiring
are filing a petition for review of the resolution of the State jurisdiction over the persons of the accused upon their
Prosecutor. apprehension or voluntary surrender, it ex mero motu granted
bail to them despite the absence of (because it was previously
On March 21, 1991, the accused, who were not yet arrested or withdrawn) a petition for bail and, worse, the lack of a hearing
placed under the jurisdiction of the trial court (after their wherein the prosecution could have been accorded the right to
precipitate release earlier), filed a "Petition to Grant Bail" in C.C. present evidence showing that the evidence of guilt is strong.
Nos. 487-M-91 and 488-M-91 and a "Petition to Reduce Bail in
C.C. No. 489-M-91. On August 23, 1991, the prosecution filed an omnibus motion
praying for the cancellation of the bail bonds as well as the
On March 25, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying the issuance of warrants of arrest on the fundamental ground that the
petitions since the accused had not yet surrendered and/or trial court could not legally grant bail in a capital offense without
apprehended and, therefore, the court has not acquired the prosecution being accorded the right to show that the
jurisdiction over their persons. evidence of guilt is strong.

On the same day (March 25, 1991), the accused filed another On October 28, 1991, the trial court denied the prosecution's
petition entitled "Reinstatement of the Petition to Grant Bail in the motion on the principal ground that its questioned orders had
above entitled cases and Motion to Reduce Bail Bond and Motion become final and executory. On December 2, 1991, the motion
to Set Petition for Hearing with Manifestation to Surrender the for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Accused on the Hearing of this Petition."
On March 3, 1992, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari,
On April 4, 1991, the trial court, apparently with a change of prohibition and preliminary injunction with prayer for a temporary
heart, issued an order consolidating the petitions for bail, set restraining order before respondent Court of Appeals, CA-G.R.
them for hearing on April 6, 1991, and directed the DOJ and/or S.P. No. 27430, assailing the following orders of the trial court:
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to forward to it the records the May 17, 1991 order which granted bail to the accused; the
October 28, 1991 order which denied the prosecution's omnibus
 motion praying for the issuance of warrants of arrest's as well as Nos. 108478-79, which, as earlier stated, was dismissed on 21 February
the cancellation of what it perceived to be irregularly posted bail 1994.
bonds; and the December 2, 1991 order which denied the
prosecution's motion for reconsideration. Upon the filing of said Respondent judge asserts that he is not administratively liable for what
petition, respondent court issued the temporary restraining order. he did because he was merely guided by the doctrine in Lim vs. Felix,  to 3

the effect that the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
On the other hand, petitioners filed a petition warrant of arrest should be personally determined by the judge. Since in
for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition before the same court, these cases the issuance of the warrants of arrest was based solely on
CA-G.R. S.P. No. 27472, seeking: (a) to annul the orders of the the certification of the state prosecutor, he granted the motion to quash
trial court resetting the hearings on different dates for being the warrants of arrest and, considering that on the date of the hearing to
dilatory and violative of their constitutional right to a speedy trial; determine probable cause the witnesses for the prosecution did not
(b) to command the trial court to dismiss with prejudice all the appear and the private prosecutor submitted the issue on the basis of the
criminal cases; and (c) to perpetually prohibit the prosecution of proceedings had at the preliminary investigation and the affidavits of
the criminal cases. witnesses, he formally resolved it on such basis. He further alleges that
since he found the evidence purely circumstantial, except as against
On July 31, 1992, respondent [Court of Appeals] ruled in favor of Romeo Permejo who was positively identified as the gunman, he
the prosecution. The dispositive portion of its consolidated believed that the evidence of guilt as against the others was not strong
decision reads: and, accordingly, admitted them to bail in the amount of P80,000.00
each.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition (SP No.
27430) is hereby granted and the questioned The explanation of the respondent judge is wholly unacceptable for,
orders of respondent Court dated May 17, 1991, contrary to his belief that he has shown perfect knowledge of the rules on
October 28, 1991, and December 2, 1991 are the issuance of warrants of arrest and grant of bail, he has demonstrated
annulled and set aside. Accordingly, the accused either gross ignorance of the constitutional and statutory principles and
herein (private respondents) are ordered settled jurisprudence thereon or gross incompetence which no claim of
arrested/committed pending the trial of their good faith can exculpate or even mitigate.
cases, without prejudice on their part to file in the
proper court a petition for bail after the arrest, From the above recitals of the factual and procedural antecedents of the
detention or deprivation of their liberty, wherein criminal cases before the trial court, it is obvious that the accused filed
the prosecution is accorded the right to present their petitions to grant bail and to reduce bail, motion to reinstate petition
evidence to prove that evidence of guilt is strong. to grant bail and urgent motion to quash warrants of arrests before the
SP No. 27472, on the other hand, is hereby court acquired jurisdiction over their persons either through the effective
DISMISSED for lack of merit, considering that the service and enforcement of the warrants of arrest or their voluntary
delays incurred herein were due to unavoidable surrender, i.e., before they were placed in the custody of the law or
circumstances and were therefore reasonable in otherwise deprived of their liberty. Such being so, the trial court, initially,
nature. denied correctly the petition for grant of bail but subsequently
disregarded law and jurisprudence when it favorably acted on the motion
No costs in both instances. to reinstate the petition for grant of bail and set the motion for hearing on
6 April 1991, directing, for that purpose the Department of Justice and the
SO ORDERED. Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to forward to it the records of the
preliminary investigation.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners
Hipolito, et al. filed with this Court a petition for review, docketed as G.R. In this jurisdiction it is settled that a person applying for bail should be in
the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty.  While it may
4
be true that the disregard of this precept was not consummated, it was prosecutor in the exercise of his quasi-judicial function during the
not because the respondent judge corrected himself, but because the preliminary investigation, which is executive in nature.  In such cases,
10

accused withdrew their petition for the grant of bail and opted to pursue once the court determines that probable cause exists for the issuance of
their urgent motion to quash the warrants of arrest grounded on want of a warrant of arrest, the warrant of arrest shall forthwith be issued and it is
probable cause. Instead of retracing his steps back to the proper judicial only after the accused is taken into the custody of the law and deprived of
path, the respondent judge, still forgetting that the accused remained his liberty that, upon proper application for bail, the court on the basis of
scot-free, not only quashed the warrants of arrest, but, thereafter motu the evidence adduced by the prosecution at the hearing called for the
proprio converted, in effect, the "hearing" for the determination of purpose may, upon determination that such evidence is not strong, admit
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest, which he set on the accused to bail.11

15 May 1991, to a hearing on the matter of admission to bail, as his order

of 17 May 1991 indisputably shows. In so doing, the respondent judge Since the accused unilaterally withdrew their petition for bail, there was
had either utterly confused the proceeding to determine probable cause then nothing to be heard or acted upon in respect thereof. Even if they
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the proceeding on a petition did not withdraw their petition, they have no right to invoke the processes
for admission to bail, order deliberately ignored the basic requisites for of the court since they have not been placed in the custody of the law or
the grant of bail. otherwise deprived of their liberty by reason or as a consequence of the
filing of the information. For the same reason, the court had no authority
The determination of probable cause in the issuance of a warrant of to act on the petition. 12

arrest is mandated by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.  Probable

5

cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest means such facts and Even if it be conceded for the sake of argument that the application for
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man bail was regularly filed, the respondent judge wantonly ignored the due
to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to process requirement of hearing to afford the prosecution reasonable
be arrested.  A hearing is not necessary therefor. In satisfying himself of
6
opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt of the applicants is strong.  To
13

the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, grant an application for bail and fix the amount thereof without such
the judge, following the established doctrine and procedure, shall either hearing duly called for the purpose of determining whether the evidence
(a) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents of guilt is strong constitutes ignorance or incompetence whose grossness
submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or excusable negligence  or 14

and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest, or (b) if on the face of constitutes inexcusable conduct which reflects either gross ignorance of
the information he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the the law or cavalier disregard of its requirements. 15

prosecutor's certification and require the submission of the supporting

affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the At the very least, the respondent judge exhibited gross incompetence.
existence of probable cause. 7
Gross ignorance of law and incompetence are characteristics and quirks
impermissible in a judge. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just
This procedure is dictated by sound public policy; otherwise judges would a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative
be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of that he be conversant with basic legal principles.  He should he studious
16

criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding of the principles of the law,   and he must be faithful to the law and must
17

cases filed before their courts.  At this stage of a criminal proceeding, the
8
maintain professional competence. 18

judge is not tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the
preliminary investigation; it is sufficient that he personally evaluates the The respondent judge does not have an enviable record as a living
report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecution in personification of justice and the rule of law. 19

determining probable cause. 9

In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-91-753,  for abuse of discretion, this

20

This judicial function does not carry with it a motu proprio review of the Court censured the respondent judge for issuing an order granting bail to
recommendation of the prosecutor in a capital offense that no bail shall
be granted. Such a recommendation is the exclusive prerogative of the
an accused without affording the prosecution the opportunity to present 4 Section 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court; Herras Teehankee vs.
evidence to show that the evidence of guilt was strong. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 [1945]; Manigbas vs. Luna, 98 Phil. 466
[1956]; Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, 2 SCRA 888 [1961]; Pico vs.
In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-91-742,  for gross ignorance of law and
21 Combong, 215 SCRA 421 [1992]; Medina vs. De Guia, 219
serious misconduct, the respondent judge was admonished to be more SCRA 153 [1993]; Dinapol vs. Baldedo, 225 SCRA 110 [1993].
circumspect in the resolution of the cases before him and given a last
warning that any form of infraction cases hereafter would be dealt with 5 It provides:
severely.
Sec. 2. The right of a person to be secure in their persons,
The respondent judge has indisputably failed to comply with the strict and houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
exacting demands of the public-trust character of his office. seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of law or incompetence and conduct except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, respondent Judge CAMILO judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
O. MONTESA, JR., Presiding Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
Court of Bulacan, is hereby ordered DISMISSED from the service with describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any be seized.
branch or service of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. His dismissal shall take effect immediately upon 6 JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, The Constitution of the Republic of the
his receipt of a copy of this decision which must be personally served by Philippines, A commentary, vol. I, 1st ed., [1987], 86-87.
the Office of the Court Administrator.
7 Supreme Court Circular No. 12, dated 30 June 1987; Soliven
Let a copy of this decision be attached to the records of the respondent vs. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Cruz vs. People, 233 SCRA
with this Court. 439 [1994].

SO ORDERED. 8 Soliven vs. Makasiar, supra note 7.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, 9 Cruz vs. People, supra note 7 at 455.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ.,
concur. 10 Id. at 453.

Hermosisima, Jr. J., took no part. 11 Section 13, Article III, Constitution, Sections 3-5, Rule 114,
Rules of Court, as amended.
Footnotes
12 Pico vs. Combong, supra note 4.
1 Entitled, "Estelita Hipolito, et al. vs. Court of Appeals."
13 People vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 [1968]; People vs. Bocar,
2 Reported in 230 SCRA 191. 27 SCRA 512 [1969]; Mendoza vs. CFI of Quezon, 51 SCRA 369
[1973]; People vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 [1981]; People vs.
3 194 SCRA 292 [1991]. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489 [1989]; People vs. Calo, 186 SCRA 620
[1990]; Cerpio vs. Maglalang, 196 SCRA 41 [1991]; Libarios vs.
Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 [1991]. See also, People vs. Nano, 205
SCRA 155 [1992]; Pico vs. Combong, supra note 4; Aurillo, Jr.
vs. Francisco, 235 SCRA 283 [1994]; Re: Report on the Judicial
Audit and Physical Inventory of Records of Cases in RTC, Branch
43, Roxas, Mindoro Oriental, 236 SCRA 631 [1994]; Estoya vs.
Abraham-Singson, 237 SCRA 1 [1994].

14 Estoya vs. Abraham-Singson, supra note 13.

15 Pico vs. Combong, supra note 4.

16 Estoya vs. Abraham-Singson, supra note 13, citing Garganera

vs. Jocson, 213 SCRA 149 [1992]; Aducayen vs. Flores, 51
SCRA 78 [1973]; Libarios vs. Dabalos, supra note 13; Ajeno vs.
Inserto, 71 SCRA 166 [1976]; Ubongen vs. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30
[1980]; Lim vs. Domagas, 227 SCRA 258 [1993].

17 Canon 4, Canons of Judicial Ethics.

18 Rule 3.01, Code of Judicial Conduct.

19 Supreme Court Circular No. 13, dated 1 July 1987; Cuaresma

vs. Aguilar, 226 SCRA 73 [1993].

20 Entitled, "Captain Jose Huevos vs. Judge Camilo Montesa,

Jr.," promulgated 3 March 1992.

21 Entitled, "Antonio C. Ramos vs. Judge Camilo Montesa, Jr.,"

promulgated 24 March 1994.
 B. Section 2 – Condition of the bail; requirements After her conviction in the two cases petitioner filed on December 24,
1993 a "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad" to seek diagnostic tests and
1. Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan – 247 SCRA 127 (1995) treatment by practitioners of oriental medicine in the People's Republic of
China allegedly because of "a serious and life threatening medical
condition" requiring facilities not available in the Philippines. Petitioner's
motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan for failure of petitioner to give
notice to the prosecution and because the time asked (December 29,
Republic of the Philippines 1993) was too close for the court to inform itself of the basis of the
SUPREME COURT motion.
Manila
On December 29, 1993, petitioner filed in another case (Criminal Case
SECOND DIVISION No. 18742)  an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Permission to Travel Abroad"
1

to undergo diagnosis and treatment in China. The motion was supported

  by Ambulatory BP Reports, Nuclear Medicine Reports and Computed
Tomography Scan Results prepared by her physician and cardiologist,
G.R. Nos. 115132-34 August 9, 1995 Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio, and other doctors at the Makati Medical
Center.
IMELDA R. MARCOS, petitioner,
vs. On January 4, 1994, petitioner filed In Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and the 17453 another "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad," to places including
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. the United States and Europe, "if necessary," for treatment of
"hypertensive heart disease, uncontrolled angina pectoris, and anterior
myocardial infarction." It was alleged that the tests needed were not
available in the Philippines.
MENDOZA, J.:
The Chairman of respondent court's First Division, Presiding Justice
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside as arbitrary and in grave abuse Francis E. Garchitorena, contacted Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil, Officer-in-
of discretion resolutions of the Sandiganbayan's First Division denying Charge of the Philippine Heart Center, and later wrote him a
petitioner's motion for leave to travel abroad for medical treatment. letter,  asking for "expert opinion on coronary medicine," particularly on
2

the following questions:

Petitioner, former First Lady and widow of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, is the defendant in several criminal cases for violations of the 1. Is [petitioner's] condition life-threatening?
Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) now pending in the
Sandiganbayan and in the regular courts. In two of these cases, i.e., 2. What are the "sophisticated biochemical tests" necessary (not
Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and 17453, petitioner was found guilty by the merely desirable), if any are needed at all, to ascertain and
First Division of the Sandiganbayan of violating § 3(g) of the Anti Graft remedy her condition?
and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and was sentenced to suffer in
each case imprisonment for an indeterminate period of 9 years and 1 day 3. Are these tests available here?
as minimum to 12 years and 10 days as maximum, with perpetual
disqualification from public office. Petitioner filed a motion for 4. Is the present level of expertise in the Philippines adequate to
reconsideration, which is pending resolution in the Sandiganbayan. respond to her condition?
The Presidential Commission on Good Government filed a manifestation (d) two letters, both dated January 3, 1994 from China, one from
interposing no objection to petitioner's motions "primarily on humanitarian the Tranjin Medical College, and another without letterhead from
grounds provided that the accused comply with the terms and conditions one F.S. Tsui, both letters offering their facilities for diagnosis and
for travel as may be imposed" by respondent court. The Office of the treatment of hypertension and related illness through the "Classic
Special Prosecutor,  on the other hand, opposed the motions, contending
3
Art of Chinese Medical Technology."
that:
On January 20, 1994, the Sandiganbayan received by FAX machine the
1. the absolute necessity to go abroad was not demonstrated; report of the committee,  containing findings which were contrary to the
4

conclusions of petitioner's physicians. The Presiding Justice immediately

2. no statement was made by the accused that medical informed by phone petitioner's counsel, Attorneys Vicente D. Millora and
equipment and facilities here were "sorrily" inadequate for the Manuel M. Lazaro, of the committee's report. Atty. Lazaro requested that
needs of the movant; a copy of the report be sent to him by FAX machine, while Atty. Millora
got his copy personally from the court.
3. the conviction of the accused in Criminal Cases No. 17450 and
No. 17453 might motivate her not to return if she were to be On January 26, 1994, Dr. Ramon F. Abarquez, Jr. was heard by the court
authorized to leave the country. on his committee's report. Present at the hearing were the two lawyers of
petitioner and Dr. Anastacio.
On January 7, 1994 hearing was held on petitioner's motion, during which
petitioner presented Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio. After the hearing, the On February 11, 1994, the court accepted petitioner's "Supplemental
Sandiganbayan informed the parties that a copy of petitioner's first Motion to Travel Abroad" and heard the rebuttal testimony of Dr. Roberto
motion and its supporting documents had been sent to Dr. Patacsil for V. Anastacio, as well as the testimony of Dr. Jorge Garcia, heart surgeon
study and comment by a committee of cardiologists. from Washington, D.C., in support of petitioner's motion to travel abroad.

After consulting Dr. Anastacio, petitioner's counsel asked the court to On February 18, 1994 the court denied petitioner's motions. The
include among the questions to the committee the following: "Without the dispositive portion of its resolution reads:
Biochemical test, may proper treatment be administered to Mrs.
Marcos?" Petitioner's counsel also asked the court to include the list of IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is the judgment of this Court
medicine being taken by petitioner as part of the study. These requests that the imperative necessity of the accused to undertake a trip
were granted by the court. abroad for diagnosis and treatment has not been established and
for this reason DENIES the various motions of accused Imelda R.
Thereafter, a "Supplement to the Motion for Leave Abroad" was filed on Marcos to leave for abroad.
January 17, 1994 together with additional documents, consisting of the
following: SO ORDERED.

(a) a faxed letter from Dr. Denton A. Cooley of the Texas Heart Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a "Motion to Admit
Institute dated January 11, 1994; Clinical Summary and to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration." The
Clinical Summary was a recent medical report on petitioner's condition
(b) a letter dated May 9, 1990 from David B. Case, M.D. after she had undergone another medical examination at the Philippine
addressed to lawyer Gerry Spence; Heart Center  Petitioner also filed a "Motion to Admit Recognizance in
5

Support of, and to Resolve Soonest, the Motion for Reconsideration to

(c) a letter dated May 23, 1990 from Dr. Vincent De Quattro of the Travel Abroad." Attached to the motion were letters of Vice President
University of Southern California Hypertension Diagnostic Joseph E. Estrada offering to be guarantor for the return of petitioner and
Laboratory;
those of twenty four members of the House of 4(b). Respondent court violated the cluster of rights of
Representatives  requesting the court to allow petitioner to travel abroad.
6
"personhood", "privacy" or "personal liberty".

In a resolution dated April 19, 1994, respondent court denied petitioner's 5. It perceived that there is no "imperative necessity" for petitioner
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit even as it expressed to avail of medical examination and treatment abroad not
disapproval of the intervention of the Vice President and the twenty four withstanding that such perception/conclusion cannot constitute a
congressmen and warned them and petitioner's counsel, Atty. Rodolfo U. cause to deny or deprive petitioner of her constitutional rights, nor
Jimenez, that "repetition of any attempt to influence the resolutions, can it refute the medical findings of petitioner's attending
decisions or orders or any judicial action of [respondent court] will be physicians.
responded to appropriately."
Called upon to comment, the Solicitor General, in representation of the
Hence, this petition for certiorari to set aside the resolutions dated prosecution in the criminal cases, contends that respondent court acted
February 18, 1994 and April 19, 1994 of the First Division of the properly in seeking the advice of medical experts in regard to petitioner's
Sandiganbayan on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of motion to travel; that in any event petitioner is estopped from questioning
discretion, amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner claims the referral of her medical condition to other experts by agreeing to
that submit additional questions for their consideration; and that the right to
life is not absolute but must be balanced by the State's right to prosecute
1. [The Sandiganbayan] arbitrarily disregarded or misinterpreted and enforce the judgments of its courts, and that petitioner's conviction in
the testimonies, medical findings and recommendations of two cases is relevant along with "humanitarian and equity"
petitioner's attending physicians and relied on or substituted them considerations.
with the academic views of Dr. Abarquez and the Committee,
who never examined or treated personally the petitioner, and The question for decision is whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused
erroneously concluded "that the necessity for trip abroad by the its discretion in denying petitioner's request to travel abroad for medical
accused for diagnosis and treatment has not been established"; treatment. After due consideration of the parties' arguments, we find that
it did not.
2. It adopted an unusual and unorthodox conduct of trial as
demonstrated by the following: (a) it motu propio contacted a Respondent court had to seek expert opinion because petitioner's motion
third party asking the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's was based on the advice of her physician. The court could not be
motion and medical findings; (b) it unusually participated in the expected to just accept the opinion of petitioner's physician in resolving
examination of petitioner's witnesses; (c) thru its PJ, it presented her request for permission to travel. The subject lay beyond its
as own witness; (d) it requested the formation of a committee to competence and since the grant of the request depended on the
study the evidence presented; (e) it did not decide the case on verification of the claim that petitioner was suffering from a medical
the basis of the evidence presented; (f) it decided on the basis of condition that was alleged to be serious and life threatening, the
evidence (academic) it sought; respondent court, we think, followed the only prudent course available of
seeking the opinion of other specialists in the field.
3. It failed to resolve that, in the clash between basic
constitutional rights of the petitioner and the authority of the court Indeed, when even in their own field of expertise (law) courts are allowed
over the petitioner, the basic constitutional rights must prevail; to invite amici curiae to shed light on recondite points of law, there is no
reason for denying them assistance on other subjects. Presiding Justice
4(a). It considered the conviction of petitioner in two (2) criminal Garchitorena's letter to Dr. Patacsil is notable in this regard for its
cases which are pending reconsideration as factors in denying sedulous concern for "greater need for information and expert advise" to
the rights of petitioner to life, health and liberty and depriving the end that respondent court may be able to determine "whether or not it
the penumbras of such right to give life and substance; is necessary and urgent for petitioner to travel abroad."
What would be objectionable would be if respondent court obtained from coronary artery disease and uncontrolled high blood pressure (labile
information without disclosing its source to the parties and used it in hypertension).
deciding a case against them. Then the parties could justifiably complain
that their right to due process has been violated. But, in this case, The claim that petitioner is suffering from a life threatening medical
everything was on the level, with the parties taking part in the condition is based on a letter dated November 4, 1993 of Dr. Roberto V.
proceedings of the court. Anastacio, cardiologist at the Makati Medical Center, to Dr. Jorge M.
Garcia, heart surgeon of the Washington Heart Institute at Washington
At all events if petitioner did not agree to the procedure adopted by the D.C., recommending diagnostic tests abroad for petitioner. In his letter
court, her counsel should have objected when informed by the court on (marked Annex B of petitioner's first "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad")
January 7, 1994 that it had referred Dr. Anastacio's report to the Dr. Anastacio claimed that petitioner complained of chest pains; that she
Philippine Heart Center for advice and opinion. Counsel did not object. had an uncontrolled high blood pressure with "a spread of 200/100-
Instead, after consulting Dr. Anastacio, he requested the court to submit 100/70;" that the ambulatory blood pressure monitoring device showed
additional questions for referral to the Philippine Heart Center and later her highest systolic BP to be from 184 to 204 mmHg at 6 P.M., 1:35 A.M.
took part in cross examining Dr. Abarquez, Jr. when the latter testified. and 3 A.M., and her highest diastolic pressure to be 120 mmHg; that an
Petitioner is thus estopped from questioning what she now calls the Electrocardiogram indicated a myocardial infarction; that an Exercise-
"unusual and unorthodox" manner of resolving her request for permission HexaMibi Tc-99m myocardial perfusion imaging showed an "abnormal
to travel abroad. myorcardial injury in the anterior region." Dr. Anastacio concluded:

Now, if the respondent court disregarded the findings and Definitely, we have established that Mrs. Marcos is suffering
recommendations of petitioner's physician, it was because in light of the from a dangerous level of rises in blood pressure provoked by
report of the panel of experts which reviewed the findings and high level of emotional stress and now complicated with a strong
recommendations of petitioner's physicians, petitioner failed to prove the evidence of myocardial injury.
necessity for a trip abroad. It should be emphasized that considering the
fact that she is facing charges before the courts in several cases, in two Her significant family history of hypertension in her father and
of which she was convicted although the decision is still pending siblings (eldest sister and brother) and that indeed two of them
reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the have experienced sudden cardiac death as complicating
country and the burden was on her to prove that because of danger to manifestations of uncontrolled high blood pressure of this
health if not to her life there was necessity to seek medical treatment in type place this patient in the high risk category of sudden cardiac
foreign countries.7
death. (Emphasis added)

Nor is there warrant for the claim that respondent court acted arbitrarily in He recommended:
disregarding the findings of petitioner's physicians and relying on the
opinion of specialists from the Philippine Heart Center because the latter Definitely, Mrs. Marcos should undergo immediate studies
did not personally examine her and for that reason their opinion is [abroad] to define the following:
allegedly "academic." The question raised by petitioner's motion was not
whether petitioner was suffering from a serious and life threatening
1. To investigate invasively (Coronary Arteriogram) to correlate
medical condition. Rather the question before the Sandiganbayan was
the severity of coronary obstruction and the recent development
whether on the basis of reports attached to the motions for travel there
of myocardial infarction in relation to sudden cardiac death.
was evidence to show that she was suffering from such ailments (i.e.,
coronary artery disease and labile hypertension) and there was need for
diagnostic tests which could only be performed abroad. Consequently, it 2. To do biochemical studies at the same time e.g. Continuous-
was unnecessary for the Philippine Heart Center's specialists to examine Serial Vasopressine-Arginine and Catecholamine level
the petitioner personally. Given the findings of petitioner's own determination in relation with her uncontrolled high, dangerous
physicians, they found that petitioner had not been shown to be suffering level of high blood pressure not only in the stratification of her
 "Sudden Death" risk staging but likewise, equally important is the As to the ambulatory blood pressure monitor reports, the Abarquez panel
control of her uncontrolled high blood pressure. noted:

3. The observed sensitiveness to the drugs administered, makes The diagnosis of hypertensive heart disease is questionable. Mrs.
drug therapy risky without a concomittant close monitoring of the Marcos has transient (labile) hypertension. In the ambulatory BP
hemodynamic and biochemical parameters which will help avert a monitoring records — there were only 2 transient rises of
possible iatrogenic, fatal cardiovascular event. elevated systolic pressure and 3 episodes of elevated diastolic
pressure. 5 episodes of transient systolic BP elevation and 5
Based on these findings, Dr. Roman F. Abarquez, Jr., Dr. Homobono B. episodes of transient elevated diastolic pressure occurred in the
Calleja and Dr. Romeo A. Divinagracia, however, found the diagnosis of 2nd ambulatory recording. The patient did not submit a diary
"definite coronary artery disease" to be "questionable" for the following during both occasions when her ambulatory BP recording was
reasons: performed.

1) The location and character of the chest pain (sharp pain lasting A patient is considered to have sustained hypertension if 30% or
for a few seconds left mid axillary and not related to effort) is not more of the recorded blood pressures on ambulatory monitoring
the common presentation of pain due to coronary artery are hypertensive levels. The term hypertensive heart disease is
disease (angina pectoris). used to denote heart involvement due to effects of long standing
(chronic) hypertension. There is no evidence in the medical brief
2) The Stress Test done during the Thallium Scan was to show that there is left ventricular hypertrophy or left ventricular
adequate (maximum predicted heart rate of 106%) and yet was dysfunction. In fact, the previous echocardiogram was reported to
negative for ischemia. be normal.

3) The Thallium Myocardial imaging (Nuclear scan) showed only For this reason the committee questioned the need for petitioner to have
a small questionable perfusion defect on the anterior wall. It can biochemical tests abroad. Even without these tests, it noted, Dr.
also be considered as a false positive finding due to soft tissue Anastacio had "already been treating her with medicines that are used for
artifacts as mentioned in the report. (Emphasis added) hypertension and coronary heart disease."

In fact the finding that petitioner did not have ischemia  and that there
8 With respect to Dr. Anastacio's claim that petitioner is in the high risk
was only a small perfusion defect on the anterior wall which could be group of sudden cardiac death, the committee stated that a history of
considered a "false positive finding" is based on petitioner's own nuclear sudden death in the family alone will not support such a conclusion:
medical report.  prepared by the Makati Medical Center, which contains
9

the following conclusions: The known direct determinants for sudden cardiac death are: (1)
ventricular electrical instability (ventricular arrhytmias), (2)
CONCLUSIONS: ABNORMAL MYOCARDIAL PERFUSION extensive coronary artery narrowing, (3) abnormal left ventricular
IMAGING. EVIDENCE FOR PRIOR MYOCARDIAL INJURY IN function, (4) electrocardiographic conduction and repolarization
THE ANTERIOR REGION. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE FOR abnormalities.
STRESS INDUCED MYOCARDIAL ISCHEMIA.
In the absence of the above factors for sudden cardiac death, the
ALTHOUGH THESE FINDINGS ARE SUGGESTIVE OF presence of a family history of sudden cardiac
CORONARY ARTERY DISEASE, PHOTON ATTENUATION death alone cannot stand as a strong argument for a high risk of
SECONDARY TO SOFT TISSUE ARTIFACTS CAN BE sudden cardiac death. Even the family history of sudden cardiac
EXCLUDED. death in this case is still questionable since we are not furnished
 with definite evidence that the said members of the family actually refute Dr. Abarquez, Jr.'s conclusions. Instead it appears that he
died of sudden death. performed the tests recommended by the committee, namely:

In summary, the evidence submitted do not confirm the allegation 1) Coronary Angiography — to definitely establish the presence
that Mrs. Marcos is in the high risk group for sudden cardiac or absence of coronary artery obstruction and severity of the
death. (Emphases added) disease.

The group made the following conclusions and recommendations: 2) 2-D Echo Doppler Echocardiography — to demonstrate the
presence of ventricular dysfunction or hypertrophy.
RECOMMENDED TESTS:
3) Ambulatory Holter Monitoring — to find out whether serious
1) Coronary Angiography — to definitely establish the presence arrhythmias (irregularities of heart beat) are present or not.
or absence of coronary artery obstruction and severity of the
disease. The results, as the Sandiganbayan said in its resolution, were:

2) 2-D Echo Doppler Echocardlography — to demonstrate the Dr. Roberto Anastacio, accused Marcos' attending physician,
presence of ventricular dysfunction or hypertrophy. appears to have subsequently subjected accused Marcos to
another set of tests during her latest confinement at the Makati
3) Ambulatory Holter Monitoring — to find out whether serious Medical Center, principally the Echo Doppler Test and the Holter
arrhythmias (irregularities of heart beat) are present or not. 24-hour monitoring test.

CONCLUSIONS: The 2-D Echo Doppler test, which the Committee of Cardiologists
recommended was administered on February 1, 1994 (Exhibit "D-
1) The diagnosis or significant coronary heart disease Supplemental") and all findings read normal.
is not confirmed from the brief presented.
Dr. Anastacio said that the handwritten notes of Drs. Dy and
2) Marcos has transient elevation of blood pressure" which be Lapitan who had read the results of the Ambulatory Hotter
reactive to situations but there is no evidence to indicate the Monitor, i.e., an ambulant electrocardiogram, and the readings
presence of hypertensive heart disease. did not show that there was anything wrong with accused Marcos.
In fact, the readings themselves said that the average pulse rate
was at 68 beats per minute (from 50 to 134) no blockages, no
3) The tests we have recommended are available in the
PVCs, no PACs, no indication of arrythmia.
Philippines. Proper treatment can be given to Mrs. Marcos even
in the absence of the suggested biochemical tests. (Emphasis
added) It would appear that earlier on January 31, 1994, petitioner had also
undergone electrocardiogram tests at the Makati Medical Center in which
cardiologists are rotated to do the readings. Dr. Esperanza Cabral found
4) The present facilities and expertise in the Philippines are more
the electrocardiogram results to be "Normal." The results of the
than adequate to diagnose and treat patients with hypertension
echocardiogram were read by another cardiologist, Dr. Adoracion
and/or coronary heart disease. (Emphasis added)
Nambuyan-Abad, and her finding was approved by Dr. Benjamin N.
Alimurong. The results were also "Normal."
Dr. Abarquez, Jr. testified on January 26, 1994 on the report of his
committee. Dr. Anastacio was present at that hearing, but he did not
Although Dr. Anastacio subsequently conducted another
electrocardiogram test on petitioner and found the existence of
myocardial infarction, as the Sandiganbayan noted, Dr. Anastacio's While judges should as much as possible refrain from showing
finding was not read or concurred in by another cardiologist, contrary to partiality to one party and hostility to another, it does not mean
the procedure followed at the Makati Medical Center.  It is, therefore,
10
that a trial judge should keep mum throughout the trial and allow
also questionable. parties to ask the questions that they desire, on issues which they
think are the important issues, when the former are improper and
The evidence submitted to it, according to the Abarquez committee, "[did] the latter, immaterial. If trials are to be expedited, judges must
not confirm the allegation that Mrs. Marcos is in the high risk group of take a leading part therein, by directing counsel to submit the
sudden cardiac death." Perhaps the best proof that she is not in the evidence on the facts in the dispute by asking clarifying
group is the fact that she ran in the last election for a seat in the House of questions, and by showing an interest in a fast and fair trial.
Representative and won. It may be assumed that she waged an arduous Judges are not mere referees like those of a boxing bout, only to
political campaign but apparently is none the worse for it. watch and decide the result of a game; they should have as much
interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of
Considering the foregoing we cannot say that respondent court trifled evidence, calling attention of counsel to point at issue that are
with petitioner's constitutionally guaranteed right to life, health and liberty. overlooked, directing them to ask the question that would elicit
What petitioner denounces as the "unusual and unorthodox conduct of the fact on the issues involved, clarifying ambiguous remarks by
the trial" by the court's Presiding Justice owed more, it would seem, from witnesses, etc. Unless they take an active part in trials in the
the latter's robust and rather active personality rather than to any ill above form and manner, and allow counsel to ask questions
motive or hostility he entertained toward petitioner, the latter's counsel or whether pertinent or impertinent, material or immaterial, the
her witnesses. It is matter of record that on three different occasions, speedy administration of justice which is the aim of the
petitioner had been permitted to travel abroad. But her later conviction in Government and of the people cannot be attained. Counsel
two cases dictated the need for greater caution. To be sure, conviction is should, therefore, not resent any interest that the judge takes in
not yet final view of a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. But a the conduct of the trial, they should be glad that a trial judge takes
person's right to travel is subject to the usual contraints imposed by the such interest and help in the determination of truth.
very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases,
whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for The active participation of respondent court in examining petitioner's
humanitarian reason is a matter of the court's sound discretion. witnesses in the case merely indicated the court's deep concern with the
truth of petitioner's medical condition.
The active intervention of respondent Presiding Justice in the trial the
case was justified by the fact that the subject with which the court was What perhaps should have been done was for petitioner to request an
dealing was a highly technical one and he wanted to clarify for himself a examination of her medical condition by a joint team of cardiologist and
number of medical question. That a judge has the power — if not indeed other medical experts instead of having the findings of her physician
a duty — to do this teaching of People v. Obngayan;  11 reviewed by the other specialists. A joint investigation will have the
advantage of not being unduly adversarial since the purpose is the
There are obviously certain rights to the trier of facts due to the common objective of arriving at a consensus among the experts.
nature of (a judge's) function. Among these is the right to
question a witness with a view to satisfying his mind upon a It is not late for the petitioner to ask for this. She can file another motion
material point which present itself during the trial as to the before the Sandiganbayan. This observation is made because after the
credibility of such witness. petitioner in the case had been filed, petitioner filed a motion for leave to
travel, this time on the ground that she is suffering from a difficult type of
This Court quoted the following from Justice Labrador's opinion Ventura glaucoma which threatens to make her blind. Her motion is supported by
v. Judge Yatco:  12 a medical certificate of Dr. Manuel B. Agulto, opthalmologist and
glaucoma expert, who recommends that petitioner see Dr. Richard J.
Simmons of Boston, Massachusetts, and avail herself of his
"internationally renowned expertise and recognized authority in this condition is question of fact to be made in the first instance by the
particularly difficult glaucoma type."   Dr. Agulto's certificate states:
13
Sandiganbayan. The court should order a joint examination of petitioner's
eye condition and resolve her motion accordingly.
This certifies that above patient has been treated by the
undersigned by since 1980 for Low Tension Glaucoma which was WHEREFORE, the petitioner is DISMISSED without prejudice to the
initially diagnosed by Richard J. Simmons, M.D. of Harvad filling of another motion for leave to travel abroad, should petitioner still
Medical School and New England Glaucoma Research desire, based on her heart condition. In such an event the determination
Foundation of Boston, Massachussetts. of her medical condition should be made by joint panel of medical
specialists recommended by both the accused and the prosecution.
Since then the patient has been monitored closely to prevent
irreversible visual field and acuity loss. Lately we have noted a Petitioner's motion for leave to travel for medical treatment of her alleged
progression of her visual field changes. failing eyesight is hereby referred to the Sandiganbayan with directive to
the latter to appoint a joint panel of eye specialists as outlined above.
Latest pertinent clinical findings (as of April 19, 1994) include the
following: SO ORDERED.

Corrected Vision: 20/20, Jaeger 1 Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Automated Visual field: positive paracentral depression, both
eyes (April 11, 1994, copies of result appended)  
Tensions: (Diurnal Range) 13-15mm Hg, right eye
13-16mm Hg, left eye Footnotes
Disc: Cupping of 0.6-0.7, both eyes
1 For violation of §3(h) of the Anti Graft and Corrupt
Remarks: Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019).

We suggest that the patient see her primary eye physician in 2 The letter, dated January 4, 1994, reads in full:
Boston so as to avail herself of his internationally renowned
expertise and recognized authority in this particularly difficult
This is further to my conversation with you over the
glaucoma type.
telephone this afternoon with respect to the need of the
Sandiganbayan for expert opinion on coronary medicine.
Considering the irreversible nature of glaucoma blindness and the
documented progression of her field changes plus additional and
At this time Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos is requesting
strong clinical evidence of the unrelenting course of visual loss as
permission from this court to travel abroad for medical
was recently documented in a younger brother and patient,
reasons, through a motion dated December 24, 1993,
Alfredo T. Romualdez, who was recently declared legally blind
copy of which is enclosed herewith together with
from the same familial glaucoma, we urge Mrs. Marcos who is
correspondence and technical data in support thereof.
much older and therefore at greater risk, to consult immediate Dr.
Normally, requests for travel such as this would be
Simmons so as to delay if not prevent the onset of very real and
granted as a matter of course. Considering, however, that
absolute blindness.
Mrs. Marcos has been convicted in two cases (Although
the decision thereon is not yet final), the Court must
This motion should be addressed to the Sandiganbayan not only respond with greater caution, and, therefore, with a
because whether petitioner should be allowed to leave the country is its greater need for information and expert advise.
primary concern but also because the determination of petitioner's eye
Mrs. Marcos will present her evidence in justification of N. Villespin, pulmonologists, Dr. Avenilo P. Aventura,
her request on January 7, 1994 at 2:00. p.m. The Court cardiovascular surgeon, and Dr. Santos-Jose G. Abad,
would certainly want independent verification of the facts cardiologist.
and professional opinion presented at that time.
6 Speaker Jose de Venecia Speaker Protempore Raul
Our primary concern on the basis of the motion filed with Daza, and Majority Floor Leader Ronaldo Zamora and
us together with its annexes are the following general Congressmen Antonio Abaya, Jose Aspiras, Luz
areas of inquiry: Bakunawa, Benjamin Bautista, Elias Balut, Samuel
Dangwa, Renato Diaz, Ali Dimaporo, Salvador Escudero
Is her present condition life threatening? if so, to what III, Arnulfo Fuentebella, Nur Jafaar, Edgar Lara, Simeon
extent? Maguindanao, Roger Mercado, Victor Ortega, Pedro
Pancho, Amadeo Perez, Mariano Tajon, Asani Tammang,
What are the "sophisticated biochemical tests" necessary Alberto Veloso, and Dominador Venegas.
(not merely desirable), if any are needed at all, to
ascertain and remedy her condition? 7 See Manotoc v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 142
SCRA 149 (1986); Silverio v. Court of Appeals, 195
Are these test available here? SCRA 260 (1991).

Is the present level of expertise in the Philippines 8 Lack of blood supply in a tissue or organ.
adequate respond to her condition?
9 Petition, Annex J.
The answer to the above question will lead us to
determine whether or not it is necessary (not merely 10 Resolution, p. 17.
desirable) and urgent for her to travel abroad, whether to
the People's Republic of China, the United States and/or 11 55 SCRA 465, 471 (1974).
to Europe.
12 105 Phil. 287, 294 (1959).
Your comment either personally or through a referral to
competent specialists in the Heart Center will be 13 Annex B-1, Petition.
appreciated.

Should you feel need for it, may call me at the following
telephone numbers: 481-333; 475-387.

3 Through Prosecutor Erdulfo O. Querubin.

4 Composed of Dr. Ramon F. Abarquez, Jr., chairman,

Dr. Homobono B. Calleja and Dr. Romeo A. Divinagracia,
members.

5 The examination was conducted by a new team of

doctors composed of Dr. Teresita S. de Guia and Dr. Ivan
 law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell, trade,
deliver and give away to another, sixty (60) pieces of blue-colored tablets
C. Section 3 – Release only upon court order or bail
1. Obre vs. Digandang – September 3, 2009
with Motorala (M) logos, contained in six (6) self-sealing transparent
plastic sachets with recorded total net weight of 9.8388 grams, which
when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for
presence of METHAMPHETAMINE, a dangerous drug.2

Also on April 16, 2009, the State, also through the Office of the City
Republic of the Philippines
Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, filed another information charging only
SUPREME COURT
Brodett with a violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, docketed as
Manila
Criminal Case No. 09-209, with the information alleging:
FIRST DIVISION
That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of
Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
G.R. No. 196390               September 28, 2011 Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his possession,
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), Petitioner, custody and control the following:
vs.
RICHARD BRODETT AND JORGE JOSEPH, Respondents. a. Four (4) yellow tablets with Playboy logos and ten (10)
transparent capsules containing white powdery substance
DECISION contained in one self-sealing transparent plastic sachet having a
net weight of 4.9007 grams, which when subjected to laboratory
BERSAMIN, J.: examination yielded positive results for presence of METHYLENE
DIOXYMETHAMPHETAMINE (MDMA), commonly known as
Objects of lawful commerce confiscated in the course of an enforcement "Ecstasy", a dangerous drug;
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (Republic Act No.
9165)that are the property of a third person are subject to be returned to b. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing
the lawful ownerwho is not liable for the unlawful act. But the trial court white powdery substance with total recorded net weight of 1.2235
may not release such objects pending trial and before judgment. grams, which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded
positive results for presence of COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
Antecedents
c. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing
On April 13, 2009, the State, through the Office of the City Prosecutor of white powdery substance, placed in a light-yellow folded paper,
Muntinlupa City,charged RichardBrodett (Brodett) and Jorge Joseph with total recorded net weight of 2.7355 grams, which when
(Joseph) with a violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 26(b), of subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for
Republic Act No. 91651 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in presence of COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
MuntinlupaCity,docketed as Criminal Case No. 09-208,the accusatory
portion of the information for which reads as follows: d. Three (3) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing
dried leaves with total recorded net weight of 54.5331 grams,
That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive
Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable results for presence of TETRAHYDROCANNABINOL, a
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together dangerous drug.3
and mutually helping and aiding each other, they not being authorized by
In the course of the proceedings in the RTC, on July 30, 2009, Brodett issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
filed a MotionToReturn Non-Drug Evidence. He averred that during his jurisdiction.
arrest, Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) had seized several
personal non-drug effects from him,including a 2004 Honda Accord car On March 31, 2011, the CA promulgated its Decision,8 dismissing the
with license plate no. XPF-551;and that PDEArefused to return his petition for certiorari thusly:
personal effects despite repeated demands for their return. He prayed
that his personal effects be tendered to the trial court to be returned to xxxx
himupon verification.4
Here it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition is
On August 27, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted its owned by and registered in the name of Myra S. Brodett, not accused
Comment and Objection,5 proposingthereby that the delivery to the RTC Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of the case
of the listedpersonal effects for safekeeping, to be held there throughout that said Myra S. Brodett has been charged of any crime, more
the duration of the trial, would be to enable the Prosecution and the particularly, in the subject cases of possession and sale of dangerous
Defense to exhaust their possible evidentiary value. The Office of the City drugs. Applying Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We therefore
Prosecutor objected to the return of the car because it appeared to be the see no cogent reason why the subject Honda Accord may not be
instrument in the commission of the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. exempted from confiscation and forfeiture.
9165 due to its being the vehicle used in the transaction of the sale of
dangerous drugs.
xxxx
On November 4, 2009, the RTC directedthe release of the car, viz:
We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject car, being
an instrument of the offense, may not be released to Ms. Brodett and
WHEREFORE, the Director of PDEA or any of its authorized officer or should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law are plain and
custodian is hereby directed to: (1) photograph the abovementioned unambiguous. Being so, there is no room for a contrary construction,
Honda Accord, before returning the same to its rightful owner Myra S. especially so that the only purpose of judicial construction is to remove
Brodett and the return should be fully documented, and (2) bring the doubt and uncertainty, matters that are not obtaining here. More so that
personal properties as listed in this Order of both accused, Richard S. the required literal interpretation is consistent with the Constitutional
Brodett and Jorge J. Joseph to this court for safekeeping, to be held as guarantee that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property
needed. without due process of law.

SO ORDERED.6 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and consequently

DISMISSED for lack of merit.
PDEA moved to reconsider the order of the RTC, but its motion was
denied on February 17, 2010 for lack of merit, to wit: SO ORDERED.9

WHEREFORE,premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is Hence, PDEA appeals.

hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the Court dated November
4, 2009 is upheld.
Issues
SO ORDERED.7
Essentially,PDEA asserts that the decision of the CAwas not in accord
with applicable laws and the primordial intent of the framers of R. A. No.
Thence, PDEA assailed the order of the RTC in the Court of Appeals 9165.10 It contends that the CA gravely erred in its ruling; that the Honda
(CA) by petition for certiorari, claiming that the orders of the RTC were Accord car, registered under the name of Myra S. Brodett (Ms.Brodett),
had been seized from accused Brodettduring a legitimate anti-illegal
operation and should not be released from the custody of the law;that the such disposition being an accessory penalty to be imposed on the
Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidencedid not intimate or allege that the accused, unless the property belongs to a third person not liable for the
car had belonged to a third person; and that even if the car had belonged offense that it was used as the instrument to commit.14
to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso facto authorize
its release, because she was under the obligation to prove to the RTC In case of forfeiture of property for crime, title and ownership of the
that she had no knowledge of the commission of the crime. convict are absolutely divested and shall pass to the Government.15 But it
is required that the property to be forfeited must be before the court in
In hisComment,11 Brodettcounters that the petitioner failed to present any such manner that it can be said to be within its jurisdiction.16
question of law that warranted a review by the Court;that Section 20 of R.
A. No. 9165 clearly and unequivocally states that confiscation and According to the Rules of Court, personal property may be seized in
forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the supposed unlawful act in connection with a criminal offense either by authority of a search warrant
favor of the Government may be done by PDEA, unless such proceeds or as the product of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. If the search is
or instruments are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful by virtue of a search warrant, the personal property that may be seized
act; that PDEA is gravely mistaken in its reading that the third person may be that which is the subject of the offense; or that which has been
must still prove in the trial court that he has no knowledge of the stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; orthat
commission of the crime; and that PDEA failed to exhaust all remedies which has been used or intended to be used as the means of committing
before filing the petition for review. an offense.17 If the search is an incident of a lawful arrest, seizure may be
made of dangerous weapons or anything that may have been used or
The decisive issue is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the orderfor may constitute proof in the commission of an offense.18 Should there be
the release of the car to Ms.Brodett. no ensuing criminal prosecution in which the personal property seized is
used as evidence, its return to the person from whom it was taken, or to
Ruling the person who is entitled to its possession is but a matter of
course,19 except if it is contraband or illegal per se. A proper court may
The petition is meritorious. order the return of property held solely as evidence should the
Government be unreasonably delayed in bringing a criminal
prosecution.20 The order for the disposition of such property can be made
I
only when the case is finally terminated.21
Applicable laws and jurisprudence on releasing
Generally, the trial court is vested with considerable legal discretion in the
property confiscated in criminal proceedings
matter of disposing of property claimed as evidence,22 and this discretion
extends even to the manner of proceeding in the event the accused
It is not open to question thatin a criminal proceeding, the court having claims the property was wrongfully taken from him.23 In particular, the trial
jurisdiction over the offense has the power to order upon conviction of an court has the power to return property held as evidence to its rightful
accusedthe seizure of (a) the instruments to commit the crime, including owners, whether the property was legally or illegally seized by the
documents, papers, and other effects that are the necessary means to Government.24 Property used as evidence must be returned once the
commit the crime; and (b) contraband, the ownership or possession of criminal proceedings to which it relates have terminated, unless it is then
which is not permitted for being illegal. As justification for the first, the subject to forfeiture or other proceedings.25
accused must not profit from his crime, or must not acquire property or
the right to possession of property through his unlawful act.12 As
II
justification for thesecond, to return to the convict from whom
thecontraband was taken, in one way or another,is not prudent or proper,
because doing so will give rise to a violation of the law for possessing the Order of release was premature and made
contraband again.13 Indeed, the court having jurisdiction over the offense in contravention of Section 20, R.A. No. 9165
has theright to dispose of property used in the commission of the crime,
It is undisputed that the ownership of the confiscated car belonged to Ms. guarantee that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property
Brodett, who was not charged either in connection with the illegal without due process of law.26 (emphases are in the original text)
possession and sale of illegal drugs involving Brodett and Joseph that
were the subject of the criminal proceedings in the RTC, or even in any The legal provision applicable to the confiscation and forfeiture of the
other criminal proceedings. proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act, including the properties or
proceeds derived from illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and
In its decision under review, the CA held as follows: precursors and essential chemicals,is Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, which
pertinently providesas follows:
A careful reading of the above provision shows that confiscation and
forfeiture in drug-related cases pertains to "all the proceeds and Section 20.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of
properties derived from the unlawful act, including but not limited to, the Unlawful Act, Including the Properties or Proceeds Derived from the
money and other assets obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs and/or Precursors and Essential
with which the particular unlawful act was committed unless they are the Chemicals. – Every penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, sale,
property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act." Simply put, the trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution, transportation
law exempts from the effects of confiscation and forfeiture any property or manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
that is owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act. essential chemical, the cultivation or culture of plants which are sources
of dangerous drugs, and the possession of any equipment, instrument,
Here, it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition is apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs including other
owned by and registered in the name of Myra S. Brodett, not accused laboratory equipment, shall carry with it the confiscation and forfeiture, in
Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of the case favor of the government, of all the proceeds derived from unlawful act,
that said Myra S. Brodett has been charged of any crime, more including, but not limited to, money and other assets obtained thereby,
particularly, in the subject cases of possession and sale of dangerous and the instruments or tools with which the particular unlawful act was
drugs. Applying Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We therefore committed, unless they are the property of a third person not liable for the
see no cogent reason why the subject Honda Accord may not be unlawful act, but those which are not of lawful commerce shall be ordered
exempted from confiscation and forfeiture. destroyed without delay pursuant to the provisions of Section 21 of this
Act.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and
unambiguous, the court has no alternative but to apply the same After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal
according to its clear language. The Supreme Court had steadfastly case filed, the Court shall immediately schedule a hearing for the
adhered to the doctrine that the first and fundamental duty of courts is to confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the offense and all the
apply the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called assets and properties of the accused either owned or held by him or in
only when such literal application is impossible. No process of the name of some other persons if the same shall be found to be
interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision of manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful income: Provided, however,
law peremptorily calls for application. That if the forfeited property is a vehicle, the same shall be auctioned off
not later than five (5) days upon order of confiscation or forfeiture.
We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject car, being
an instrument of the offense, may not be released to Ms. Brodett and During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property,
should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law are plain and or income derived therefrom, which may be confiscated and forfeited,
unambiguous. Being so, there is no room for a contrary construction, shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be in
especially so that the only purpose of judicial construction is to remove custodialegis and no bond shall be admitted for the release of the same.
doubt and uncertainty, matters that are not obtaining here. More so that
the required literal interpretation is not consistent with the Constitutional The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any property confiscated or
forfeited under this Section shall be used to pay all proper expenses
incurred in the proceedings for the confiscation, forfeiture, custody and However, the Office of the City Prosecutorproposed throughits Comment
maintenance of the property pending disposition, as well as expenses for and Objection submitted on August 27, 2009 in the RTC31 that the
publication and court costs. The proceeds in excess of the above delivery to the RTC of the listed personal effects for safekeeping, to be
expenses shall accrue to the Board to be used in its campaign against held there throughout the duration of the trial, would be to enable the
illegal drugs.27 Prosecution and the Defenseto exhaust their possible evidentiary value.
The Office of the City Prosecutor further objected to the return of the car
There is no question, for even PDEA has itself pointed out, that the text because it appeared to bethe vehicle used in the transaction of the sale
of Section 20 of R. A. No. 9165relevant to the confiscation and forfeiture of dangerous drugs, and, as such, was the instrument in the commission
of the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act is similar to that of the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.
ofArticle 45 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
On its part, PDEA regards the decision of the CA to be not in accord with
Article 45.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of applicable laws and the primordial intent of the framers of R. A. No.
theCrime. – Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall 9165,32 and contends that the car should not be released from the
carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the custody of the law because it had been seized from accused Brodett
instruments or tools with which it was committed. during a legitimate anti-illegal operation. It argues that the Motion to
Return Non-Drug Evidencedid not intimate or allege that the car had
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited belonged to a third person; and that even if the car had belonged to Ms.
in favor of the Government, unless they be the property of a third person Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso facto authorize its
not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful release, because she was under the obligation to prove to the RTC that
commerce shall be destroyed. she had no knowledge of the commission of the crime. It insists that the
car is a property in custodialegis and may not be released during the
pendency of the trial.
The Court has interpreted and applied Article 45of the Revised Penal
Codein People v. Jose,28 concerning the confiscation and forfeiture of the
car used by the four accused when they committed theforcible abduction We agree with PDEA and the Office of the City Prosecutor.
with rape, although the car did not belong to any of them, holding:
We note that the RTC granted accusedBrodett’sMotion To Return Non-
xxx Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and Drug Evidence on November 4, 2009 when the criminal proceedings
forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the commission of the crime if were still going on, and the trial was yet to be completed. Ordering the
such "be the property of a third person not liable for the offense," it is the release of the car at that pointof the proceedings was premature,
sense of this Court that the order of the court below for the confiscation of considering that the third paragraph of Section 20, supra, expressly
the car in question should be set aside and that the said car should be forbids the disposition, alienation, or transfer of any property, or income
ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the derived therefrom, that has been confiscated from the accused charged
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in replevin case. xxx29 under R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency of the proceedings in the
Regional Trial Court.Section 20 further expressly requires that such
property or income derived therefrom should remain in custodialegis in all
Such interpretation is extended by analogy to Section 20, supra. To bar
that time and that no bond shall be admitted for the release of it.
the forfeiture of the tools and instruments belonging to a third
person,therefore, there must be an indictment charging such third person
either as a principal, accessory, or accomplice. Less than that will not Indeed, forfeiture, if warrantedpursuant to either Article 45 of the Revised
suffice to prevent the return of the tools and instruments to the third Penal Code and Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, would be a part of the
person, for a mere suspicion of that person’s participation is not sufficient penalty to be prescribed. The determination of whetheror not the car (or
ground for the court to order the forfeiture of the goods seized.30 any other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) would be
subject of forfeiture could be made only when the judgment was to be
rendered in the proceedings. Section 20 is also clear as to this.
The status of the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the favor of the government and accordingly transmitted to the National
unlawful act) for the duration of the trial in the RTCas being in Treasury for proper disposition. (emphasis supplied)33
custodialegisisprimarily intended to preserve it as evidence and to ensure
its availability as such. To release it before the judgment is rendered is to The directive to return the non-drug evidence hasovertaken the petition
deprive the trial court and the parties access to it as evidence. for review as to render further action upon it superfluous. Yet, the Court
Consequently, that photographs were ordered to be taken of the car was seizes the opportunity to perform its duty to formulate guidelines on the
not enough, for mere photographs might not fill in fully the evidentiary matter of confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug articles, including those
need of the Prosecution. As such, the RTC’s assailed orders were issued belonging to third persons not liable for the offense, in order to clarify the
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction extent of the power of the trial court under Section 20 of R.A. No.
for being in contravention with the express language of Section 20 of 9165.34 This the Court must now do in view of the question about the
R.A. No. 9165. confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug objects being susceptible of
repetition in the future.35 
1âwphi1

Nonetheless, the Court need not annul the assailed orders of the RTC, or
reverse the decision of the CA. It appears thaton August 26, 2011 the We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts shall comply strictly
RTC promulgated its decision on the merits in Criminal Case No. 09-208 with the provisions of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, and should not
and Criminal Case No. 09-209, acquitting both Brodettand Joseph and release articles, whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial
further ordering the return to the accused of all non-drug evidence except and before the rendition of the judgment, even if owned by a third person
the buy-bust money and the genuine money,because: who is not liable for the unlawful act.

The failure of the prosecution therefore to establish all the links in the IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review isDENIED.
chain of custody is fatal to the case at bar. The Court cannot merely rely
on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official function in The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to disseminate this
view of the glaring blunder in the handling of the corpus delicti of these decision to all trial courts for their guidance.
cases. The presumption of regularity should bow down to the
presumption of innocence of the accused. Hence, the two (2) accused
SO ORDERED.
BRODETT and JOSEPH should be as it is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crimes herein charged for Illegal Selling and Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, RICHARD WE CONCUR:
BRODETT y SANTOS and JORGE JOSEPH y JORDANA are
ACQUITTED of the crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos. 09-208 and TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
09-209. Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
The subject drug evidence are all ordered transmitted to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition. All the non- MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ*
drug evidence except the buy bust money and the genuine money are Associate Justice Associate Justice
ordered returned to the accused.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**
The genuine money used in the buy bust operation as well as the
genuine money confiscated from both accused are ordered escheated in ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in 7
 Id., p. 110.
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.  Id., pp. 37-46; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso,
8

with Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta and Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Ramon A. Cruz, concurring.
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson 9
 Id., pp. 44-46.

CERTIFICATION 10
 Id., pp. 2-32.

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Acting 11
 Id., pp. 158-177.
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had beenreached in consultation 12
 24 CJS, Criminal Law, § 1733.
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division. 13
 Villaruz v. Court of First Instance,71 Phil. 72 (1940).
RENATO C. CORONA 14
 United States v. Bruhez, 28 Phil. 305 (1914).
Chief Justice
15
 United States v. Surla, 20 Phil. 163 (1911).

16
 United States v. Filart and Singson, 30 Phil. 80 (1915).
Footnotes 17
 Section 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court.
* Vice Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. per Special Order 18
 Section 13, Rule 126, Rules of Court.
No. 1080 dated September 13, 2011.
 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Samson, G.R. No. 164605, October 27,
19
** Vice Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, per Special order No.
2006, 505 SCRA 704, 711.
1093 dated September 21, 2011.
 24 CJS, Criminal Law, §1733, c., citing United States v.
20
1
 Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Premises Known as 608 Taylor Ave., Apartment 302, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, C.A. Pa., 584 F. 2d 1297.
2
 Rollo, p. 51.
21
 Padilla v. United States, C.A. Cal., 267 F. 2d 351
3
 Id., pp. 54-55.
 24 CJS, Criminal Law, §1733, c., citing State v. Allen, 66 N.W.
22
4
 Id., pp. 58-61. 2d 830, 159 Neb. 314.
5
 Id., pp. 63-64.  Id., citing Hutchinson v. Rosetti, 205 N.Y.S. 2d 526, 24 Misc. 2d
23

949.
6
 Id., p. 107.
24
 Id., citing United States v. Estep, C.A. 10(Okl.), 760 F. 2d 1060.

 Id., citing United States v. Premises Known as 608 Taylor Ave.,

25

Apartment 302, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, C.A. Pa., 584 F. 2d

1297.

26
 Rollo, pp. 44-45.

27
 Emphasis supplied.

28
 No. L-28232, February 6, 1971, 37 SCRA 450.

29
 Id., p. 482.

30
 I Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 15th Edition, pp. 638-639.

31
 Rollo, pp. 63-64.

32
 Id., pp. 2-32.

 Judgment dated August 26, 2011 rendered in Criminal Case

33

No. 09-208 and Criminal Case No. 09-209.

 Salonga v. Cruz Paño, No. L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134

34

SCRA 438, 463; David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396,

May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 215.

 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006,

35

489 SCRA 160, 215;Albaña v. Commission on Elections, G.R.

No. 163302, July 23, 2004, 435 SCRA 98; Acop v. Guingona,
Jr., G.R. No. 134855, July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 577;Sanlakas v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421
SCRA 656.
 accused in Criminal Case No. 10963 for murder, from the provincial jail of
Eastern Samar to the residence of petitioner, then Governor Ruperto A.
Ambil, Jr. In a Report6 dated January 4, 1999, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) recommended the filing of criminal charges against
petitioner Ambil, Jr. for violation of Section 3(e)7 of Republic Act (R.A.)
. Ambil, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan – July 6, 2011
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
  as amended. On September 22, 1999, the new President of the IBP,
Eastern Samar Chapter, informed the Ombudsman that the IBP is no
Republic of the Philippines longer interested in pursuing the case against petitioners. Thus, he
SUPREME COURT recommended the dismissal of the complaint against petitioners.8
Manila
Nonetheless, in an Information9 dated January 31, 2000, petitioners
FIRST DIVISION Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. were charged with violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, together with SPO3 Felipe A. Balano.
Upon reinvestigation, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a
G.R. No. 175457               July 6, 2011
Memorandum10 dated August 4, 2000, recommending the dismissal of the
complaint as regards Balano and the amendment of the Information to
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., Petitioner, include the charge of Delivering Prisoners from Jail under Article 15611 of
vs. the Revised Penal Code, as amended, (RPC) against the remaining
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. accused. The Amended Information12 reads:

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x That on or about the 6th day of September 1998, and for sometime prior
[or] subsequent thereto, [in] the Municipality of Borongan, Province of
G.R. No. 175482 Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, [the] above-named accused, Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.[,] being then
ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR., Petitioner, the Provincial Governor of Eastern Samar, and Alexandrino R. Apelado,
vs. being then the Provincial Warden of Eastern Samar, both having been
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. public officers, duly elected, appointed and qualified as such, committing
the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and
DECISION mutually helping x x x each other, with deliberate intent, manifest
partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: criminally order and cause the release from the Provincial Jail of
detention prisoner Mayor Francisco Adalim, accused in Criminal Case
No. 10963, for Murder, by virtue of a warrant of Arrest issued by
Before us are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed by
Honorable Arnulfo P. Bugtas, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 2, Borongan,
petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.1 and petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado
Eastern Samar, and thereafter placed said detention prisoner (Mayor
Sr.2 assailing the Decision3 promulgated on September 16, 2005 and
Francisco Adalim) under accused RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR.’s custody,
Resolution4 dated November 8, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
by allowing said Mayor Adalim to stay at accused Ambil’s residence for a
Case No. 25892.
period of Eighty-Five (85) days, more or less which act was done without
any court order, thus accused in the performance of official functions had
The present controversy arose from a letter5 of Atty. David B. Loste, given unwarranted benefits and advantage to detainee Mayor Francisco
President of the Eastern Samar Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Adalim to the prejudice of the government.
Philippines (IBP), to the Office of the Ombudsman, praying for an
investigation into the alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco Adalim, an
CONTRARY TO LAW.
BAIL BOND RECOMMENDED: P30,000.00 each.13 clenched fist. Sensing danger, he called on his sister for help. Adalim
admitted staying at Ambil, Jr.’s residence for almost three months before
On arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty and posted bail. he posted bail after the charge against him was downgraded to
homicide.17
At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the allegations in the Information.
They reason, however, that Adalim’s transfer was justified considering Petitioner Apelado, Sr. testified that he was the Provincial Jail Warden of
the imminent threats upon his person and the dangers posed by his Eastern Samar. He recalls that on September 6, 1998, SPO3 Felipe
detention at the provincial jail. According to petitioners, Adalim’s sister, Balano fetched him at home to assist in the arrest of Mayor Adalim.
Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White, had sent numerous prisoners to the same Allegedly, Atty. White was contesting the legality of Mayor Adalim’s arrest
jail where Mayor Adalim was to be held. and arguing with the jail guards against booking him for detention. At the
provincial jail, petitioner was confronted by Atty. White who informed him
Consequently, the prosecution no longer offered testimonial evidence that he was under the governor, in the latter’s capacity as a provincial
and rested its case after the admission of its documentary exhibits. jailer. Petitioner claims that it is for this reason that he submitted to the
Petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence with governor’s order to relinquish custody of Adalim.18
Reservation to Present Evidence in Case of Denial14 but the same was
denied. Further, petitioner Apelado, Sr. described the physical condition of the jail
to be dilapidated and undermanned. According to him, only two guards
At the trial, petitioners presented three witnesses: petitioner Ambil, Jr., were incharge of looking after 50 inmates. There were two cells in the jail,
Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White and Mayor Francisco C. Adalim. each housing 25 inmates, while an isolation cell of 10 square meters was
unserviceable at the time. Also, there were several nipa huts within the
perimeter for use during conjugal visits.19
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. testified that he was the Governor of Eastern Samar
from 1998 to 2001. According to him, it was upon the advice of Adalim’s
lawyers that he directed the transfer of Adalim’s detention to his home. On September 16, 2005, the Sandiganbayan, First Division, promulgated
He cites poor security in the provincial jail as the primary reason for the assailed Decision20 finding petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e)
taking personal custody of Adalim considering that the latter would be in of R.A. No. 3019. The court ruled that in moving Adalim to a private
the company of inmates who were put away by his sister and guards residence, petitioners have conspired to accord him unwarranted benefits
identified with his political opponents.15 in the form of more comfortable quarters with access to television and
other privileges that other detainees do not enjoy. It stressed that under
the Rules, no person under detention by legal process shall be released
For her part, Atty. White stated that she is the District Public Attorney of
or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to
Eastern Samar and the sister of Mayor Adalim. She recounted how
bail.21
Mayor Adalim was arrested while they were attending a wedding in Sulat,
Eastern Samar, on September 6, 1998. According to Atty. White, she
sought the alternative custody of Gov. Ambil, Jr. after Provincial Warden The Sandiganbayan brushed aside petitioners’ defense that Adalim’s
and herein petitioner Apelado, Sr. failed to guarantee the mayor’s transfer was made to ensure his safety. It observed that petitioner Ambil,
safety.16 Jr. did not personally verify any actual threat on Adalim’s life but relied
simply on the advice of Adalim’s lawyers. The Sandiganbayan also
pointed out the availability of an isolation cell and nipa huts within the 10-
Meanwhile, Francisco Adalim introduced himself as the Mayor of Taft,
meter-high perimeter fence of the jail which could have been used to
Eastern Samar. He confirmed his arrest on September 6, 1998 in
separate Adalim from other prisoners. Finally, it cited petitioner Ambil,
connection with a murder case filed against him in the Regional Trial
Jr.’s failure to turn over Adalim despite advice from Assistant Secretary
Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar. Adalim confirmed Atty. White’s
Jesus Ingeniero of the Department of Interior and Local Government.
account that he spotted inmates who served as bodyguards for, or who
are associated with, his political rivals at the provincial jail. He also
noticed a prisoner, Roman Akyatan, gesture to him with a raised
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan sentenced petitioner Ambil, Jr. to an WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF FULFILLMENT OF A DUTY
months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months. In favor OR THE LAWFUL EXERCISE OF A RIGHT OR OFFICE.
of petitioner Apelado, Sr., the court appreciated the incomplete justifying
circumstance of obedience to a superior order and sentenced him to VI
imprisonment for six (6) years and one (1) month to nine (9) years and
eight (8) months. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN
ACQUITTED BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE DID
Hence, the present petitions. NOT ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.22
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. advances the following issues for our consideration:
For his part, petitioner Apelado, Sr. imputes the following errors on the
I Sandiganbayan:

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3(e) REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, I

AS AMENDED, APPLIES TO PETITIONER’S CASE BEFORE
THE SANDIGANBAYAN. THERE WAS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND/OR
MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
II CONVICTING ACCUSED APELADO, EITHER AS PRINCIPAL
OR IN CONSPIRACY WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED AMBIL.
WHETHER OR NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER SUCH AS
PETITIONER IS A PRIVATE PARTY FOR PURPOSES OF II
SECTION 3(e), REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED.
IN THE ABSENCE OF COMPETENT PROOF BEYOND
III REASONABLE DOUBT OF CONSPIRACY BETWEEN
ACCUSED AMBIL AND HEREIN PETITIONER, THE LATTER
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER ACTED WITH DELIBERATE SHOULD BE ACCORDED FULL CREDIT FOR THE
INTENT, MANIFEST PARTIALITY, EVIDENT BAD FAITH OR JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE UNDER PARAGRAPH 6,
GROSS INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 11 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
SAID SECTION 3(e).
III
IV
THE COURT A QUO’S BASIS IN CONVICTING BOTH
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER AS PROVINCIAL ACCUSED AMBIL AND HEREIN PETITIONER OF HAVING
GOVERNOR AND JAILER UNDER SECTIONS 1730 AND 1733, GIVEN MAYOR ADALIM "UNWARRANTED BENEFITS AND
ARTICLE III, CHAPTER 45 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ADVANTAGE TO THE PREJUDICE x x x OF THE
OF 1917 AND SECTION 61, CHAPTER V, REPUBLIC ACT 6975 GOVERNMENT IS, AT THE MOST, SPECULATIVE.23
HAS THE AUTHORITY TO TAKE CUSTODY OF A DETENTION
PRISONER. The issues raised by petitioner Ambil, Jr. can be summed up into three:
(1) Whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
V 3(e), R.A. No. 3019; (2) Whether a provincial governor has authority to
take personal custody of a detention prisoner; and (3) Whether he is
entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under Article Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
11(5)24 of the RPC. or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which provides:

Meanwhile, petitioner Apelado, Sr.’s assignment of errors can be Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or
condensed into two: (1) Whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019; and (2) Whether he is entitled to following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
the justifying circumstance of obedience to an order issued by a superior hereby declared to be unlawful:
for some lawful purpose under Article 11(6)25 of the RPC.
xxxx
Fundamentally, petitioner Ambil, Jr. argues that Section 3(e), R.A. No.
3019 does not apply to his case because the provision contemplates only (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
transactions of a pecuniary nature. Since the law punishes a public giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
officer who extends unwarranted benefits to a private person, petitioner preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
avers that he cannot be held liable for extending a favor to Mayor Adalim, functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
a public officer. Further, he claims good faith in taking custody of the inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
mayor pursuant to his duty as a "Provincial Jailer" under employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant
the Administrative Code of 1917. Considering this, petitioner believes of licenses or permits or other concessions.
himself entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or
lawful exercise of duty. In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following
elements must concur: (1) the accused must be a public officer
Petitioner Apelado, Sr., on the other hand, denies allegations of discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he must have
conspiracy between him and petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Apelado, Sr. acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
defends that he was merely following the orders of a superior when he negligence; and (3) his action caused any undue injury to any party,
transferred the detention of Adalim. As well, he invokes immunity from including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted
criminal liability. benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.26

For the State, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) points out the As to the first element, there is no question that petitioners are public
absence of jurisprudence that restricts the application of Section 3(e), officers discharging official functions and that jurisdiction over them lay
R.A. No. 3019 to transactions of a pecuniary nature. The OSP explains with the Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over public
that it is enough to show that in performing their functions, petitioners officers charged with violation of the Anti-Graft Law is provided under
have accorded undue preference to Adalim for liability to attach under the Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606,27 as amended by R.A. No.
provision. Further, the OSP maintains that Adalim is deemed a private 8249.28 The pertinent portions of Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
party for purposes of applying Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 because the read as follows:
unwarranted benefit redounded, not to his person as a mayor, but to his
person as a detention prisoner accused of murder. It suggests further SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
that petitioners were motivated by bad faith as evidenced by their refusal original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
to turn over Adalim despite instruction from Asst. Sec. Ingeniero. The
OSP also reiterates petitioners’ lack of authority to take custody of a
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
detention prisoner without a court order. Hence, it concludes that
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of any justifying circumstance.
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions
After a careful review of this case, the Court finds the present petitions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
bereft of merit. the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional "Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a
6758), specifically including: dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang partakes of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so defined
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or
provincial department heads[;] omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently
but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to
xxxx consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the
omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never
fail to take on their own property." x x x31
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to Salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, In this case, we find that petitioners displayed manifest partiality and
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper evident bad faith in transferring the detention of Mayor Adalim to
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s house. There is no merit to petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their contention that he is authorized to transfer the detention of prisoners by
respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as virtue of his power as the "Provincial Jailer" of Eastern Samar.
amended.
Section 28 of the Local Government Code draws the extent of the power
xxxx of local chief executives over the units of the Philippine National Police
within their jurisdiction:
Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is
beyond question. The same is true as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As SEC. 28. Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units of the
to him, a Certification29 from the Provincial Government Department Head Philippine National Police.—The extent of operational supervision and
of the HRMO shows that his position as Provincial Warden is classified control of local chief executives over the police force, fire protection unit,
as Salary Grade 22. Nonetheless, it is only when none of the accused and jail management personnel assigned in their respective jurisdictions
are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher shall shall be governed by the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine
exclusive jurisdiction be vested in the lower courts. Here, petitioner hundred seventy-five (R.A. No. 6975), otherwise known as "The
Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-principal with Governor Ambil, Jr., over Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990," and the
whose position the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto.
correctly tried jointly with said public officer in the proper court which had
exclusive original jurisdiction over them – the Sandiganbayan. In particular, Section 61, Chapter 5 of R.A. No. 697532 on the Bureau of
Jail Management and Penology provides:
The second element, for its part, describes the three ways by which a
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed, that is, Sec. 61. Powers and Functions. - The Jail Bureau shall exercise
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable supervision and control over all city and municipal jails. The provincial
negligence. jails shall be supervised and controlled by the provincial
government within its jurisdiction, whose expenses shall be subsidized
In Sison v. People,30 we defined "partiality," "bad faith" and "gross by the National Government for not more than three (3) years after the
negligence" as follows: effectivity of this Act.
The power of control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set province, supply proper food and clothing for the prisoners; though
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his the provincial board may, in its discretion, let the contract for the feeding
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the of the prisoners to some other person. (Emphasis supplied.)
latter.33 An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If
they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or This provision survived the advent of the Administrative Code of 1987.
re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.34 But again, nowhere did said provision designate the provincial governor
as the "provincial jailer," or even slightly suggest that he is empowered to
On the other hand, the power of supervision means "overseeing or the take personal custody of prisoners. What is clear from the cited provision
authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform is that the provincial governor’s duty as a jail keeper is confined to the
their duties."35 If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their administration of the jail and the procurement of food and clothing for the
duties, the official may take such action or step as prescribed by law to prisoners. After all, administrative acts pertain only to those acts which
make them perform their duties. Essentially, the power of supervision are necessary to be done to carry out legislative policies and purposes
means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully already declared by the legislative body or such as are devolved upon
executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law.36 The supervisor it38 by the Constitution. Therefore, in the exercise of his administrative
or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he powers, the governor can only enforce the law but not supplant it.
does not lay down the rules, nor does he have discretion to modify or
replace them.37 Besides, the only reference to a transfer of prisoners in said article is
found in Section 173739 under which prisoners may be turned over to the
Significantly, it is the provincial government and not the governor alone jail of the neighboring province in case the provincial jail be insecure or
which has authority to exercise control and supervision over provincial insufficient to accommodate all provincial prisoners. However, this
jails. In any case, neither of said powers authorizes the doing of acts provision has been superseded by Section 3, Rule 114 of
beyond the parameters set by law. On the contrary, subordinates must the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended. Section 3, Rule
be enjoined to act within the bounds of law. In the event that the 114 provides:
subordinate performs an act ultra vires, rules may be laid down on how
the act should be done, but always in conformity with the law. SEC. 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail.-No person
under detention by legal process shall be released or transferred except
In a desperate attempt to stretch the scope of his powers, petitioner upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail.
Ambil, Jr. cites Section 1731, Article III of the Administrative Code of
1917 on Provincial jails in support. Section 1731 provides: Indubitably, the power to order the release or transfer of a person under
detention by legal process is vested in the court, not in the provincial
SEC. 1731. Provincial governor as keeper of jail.—The governor of the government, much less the governor. This was amply clarified by Asst.
province shall be charged with the keeping of the provincial jail, and Sec. Ingeniero in his communication40 dated October 6, 1998 addressed
it shall be his duty to administer the same in accordance with law to petitioner Ambil, Jr. Asst. Sec. Ingeniero wrote:
and the regulations prescribed for the government of provincial
prisons. The immediate custody and supervision of the jail may be 06 October 1996
committed to the care of a jailer to be appointed by the provincial
governor. The position of jailer shall be regarded as within the GOVERNOR RUPERTO AMBIL
unclassified civil service but may be filled in the manner in which Provincial Capitol
classified positions are filled, and if so filled, the appointee shall be Borongan, Eastern Samar
entitled to all the benefits and privileges of classified employees, except
that he shall hold office only during the term of office of the appointing
Dear Sir:
governor and until a successor in the office of the jailer is appointed and
qualified, unless sooner separated. The provincial governor shall,
under the direction of the provincial board and at the expense of the
This has reference to the letter of Atty. Edwin B. Docena, and the reports In the case at hand, the Information specifically accused petitioners of
earlier received by this Department, relative to your alleged action in giving unwarranted benefits and advantage to Mayor Adalim, a public
taking into custody Mayor Francisco "Aising" Adalim of Taft, that officer charged with murder, by causing his release from prison and
province, who has been previously arrested by virtue by a warrant of detaining him instead at the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner
arrest issued in Criminal Case No. 10963. Ambil, Jr. negates the applicability of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 in this
case on two points. First, Section 3(e) is not applicable to him allegedly
If the report is true, it appears that your actuation is not in accord with the because the last sentence thereof provides that the "provision shall apply
provision of Section 3, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which mandates to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
that an arrested person be delivered to the nearest police station or jail. with the grant of licenses, permits or other concessions" and he is not
such government officer or employee. Second, the purported
Moreover, invoking Section 61 of RA 6975 as legal basis in taking unwarranted benefit was accorded not to a private party but to a public
custody of the accused municipal mayor is misplaced. Said section officer.
merely speaks of the power of supervision vested unto the provincial
governor over provincial jails. It does not, definitely, include the power to However, as regards his first contention, it appears that petitioner Ambil,
take in custody any person in detention. Jr. has obviously lost sight, if he is not altogether unaware, of our ruling
in Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan42 where we held that a prosecution for
In view of the foregoing, you are hereby enjoined to conduct yourself violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of
within the bounds of law and to immediately deliver Mayor Adalim to the whether or not the accused public officer is "charged with the grant of
provincial jail in order to avoid legal complications. licenses or permits or other concessions." Following is an excerpt of what
we said in Mejorada,
Please be guided accordingly.
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt
practices of any public officers (sic) declared unlawful. Its reference to
Very truly yours,
"any public officer" is without distinction or qualification and it specifies
the acts declared unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the
(SGD.) Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph [Section 3] (e) is
JESUS I. INGENIERO intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers
Assistant Secretary (sic) or government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of
"public officers" may not come within the term. It is a strained
Still, petitioner Ambil, Jr. insisted on his supposed authority as a construction of the provision to read it as applying exclusively to public
"provincial jailer." Said petitioner’s usurpation of the court's authority, not officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other
to mention his open and willful defiance to official advice in order to concessions.43 (Italics supplied.)
accommodate a former political party mate,41 betray his unmistakable
bias and the evident bad faith that attended his actions. In the more recent case of Cruz v. Sandiganbayan,44 we affirmed that a
prosecution for violation of said provision will lie regardless of whether
Likewise amply established beyond reasonable doubt is the third element the accused public officer is charged with the grant of licenses or permits
of the crime. As mentioned above, in order to hold a person liable for or other concessions.45
violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, it is required that the act
constituting the offense consist of either (1) causing undue injury to any Meanwhile, regarding petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s second contention, Section
party, including the government, or (2) giving any private party any 2(b) of R.A. No. 3019 defines a "public officer" to include elective and
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge by the appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in
accused of his official, administrative or judicial functions. the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving
compensation, even nominal from the government. Evidently, Mayor
Adalim is one. But considering that Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
punishes the giving by a public officer of unwarranted benefits to a threat of aggression, the same would still not constitute a special and
private party, does the fact that Mayor Adalim was the recipient of such compelling reason to warrant Adalim’s detention outside the provincial
benefits take petitioners’ case beyond the ambit of said law? jail. For one, there were nipa huts within the perimeter fence of the jail
which could have been used to separate Adalim from the rest of the
We believe not. prisoners while the isolation cell was undergoing repair. Anyhow, such
repair could not have exceeded the 85 days that Adalim stayed in
In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use "private party" petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s house. More importantly, even if Adalim could have
rather than "private person" to describe the recipient of the unwarranted proven the presence of an imminent peril on his person to petitioners, a
benefits, advantage or preference for a reason. The term "party" is a court order was still indispensable for his transfer.
technical word having a precise meaning in legal parlance46 as
distinguished from "person" which, in general usage, refers to a human The foregoing, indeed, negates the application of the justifying
being.47 Thus, a private person simply pertains to one who is not a public circumstances claimed by petitioners.
officer. While a private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean
either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to Specifically, petitioner Ambil, Jr. invokes the justifying circumstance of
protect his personal interest. fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of right or office. Under paragraph 5,
Article 11 of the RPC, any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or
In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the in the lawful exercise of a right or office does not incur any criminal
provincial jail and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s residence, they liability. In order for this justifying circumstance to apply, two requisites
accorded such privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity as a mayor, must be satisfied: (1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or
but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus, for purposes of applying in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and (2) the injury caused or the
the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was a private party. offense committed be the necessary consequence of
the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or
Moreover, in order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices office.50 Both requisites are lacking in petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s case.
that the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another in the
exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions.48 The word As we have earlier determined, petitioner Ambil, Jr. exceeded his
"unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; authority when he ordered the transfer and detention of Adalim at his
unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" house. Needless to state, the resulting violation of the Anti-Graft Law did
means a more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit not proceed from the due performance of his duty or lawful exercise of
or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action. "Preference" his office.
signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation
above another.49 In like manner, petitioner Apelado, Sr. invokes the justifying circumstance
of obedience to an order issued for some lawful purpose. Under
Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim and detained him in paragraph 6, Article 11 of the RPC, any person who acts in obedience to
a place other than the provincial jail. The latter was housed in much more an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose does not incur any
comfortable quarters, provided better nourishment, was free to move criminal liability. For this justifying circumstance to apply, the following
about the house and watch television. Petitioners readily extended these requisites must be present: (1) an order has been issued by a superior;
benefits to Adalim on the mere representation of his lawyers that the (2) such order must be for some lawful purpose; and (3) the means used
mayor’s life would be put in danger inside the provincial jail. by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.51 Only the first
requisite is present in this case.
As the Sandiganbayan ruled, however, petitioners were unable to
establish the existence of any risk on Adalim’s safety. To be sure, the While the order for Adalim’s transfer emanated from petitioner Ambil, Jr.,
latter would not be alone in having unfriendly company in lockup. Yet, who was then Governor, neither said order nor the means employed by
even if we treat Akyatan’s gesture of raising a closed fist at Adalim as a petitioner Apelado, Sr. to carry it out was lawful. In his capacity as the
Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar, petitioner Apelado, Sr. fetched WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED. The Decision of
Mayor Adalim at the provincial jail and, unarmed with a court order, the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25892 is AFFIRMED WITH
transported him to the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. This makes him MODIFICATION. We find petitioners Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and
liable as a principal by direct participation under Article 17(1)52 of the Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
RPC. Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. is,
likewise, sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for nine
An accepted badge of conspiracy is when the accused by their acts (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four
aimed at the same object, one performing one part of and another (4) months.
performing another so as to complete it with a view to the attainment of
the same object, and their acts although apparently independent were in With costs against the petitioners.
fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal
association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.53 SO ORDERED.

Conspiracy was sufficiently demonstrated by petitioner Apelado, Sr.’s MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
willful cooperation in executing petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s order to move Associate Justice
Adalim from jail, despite the absence of a court order. Petitioner Apelado,
Sr., a law graduate, cannot hide behind the cloak of ignorance of the law. WE CONCUR:
The Rule requiring a court order to transfer a person under detention by
legal process is elementary. Truth be told, even petitioner governor who
RENATO C. CORONA
is unschooled in the intricacies of the law expressed reservations on his
Chief Justice
power to transfer Adalim. All said, the concerted acts of petitioners Ambil,
Chairperson
Jr. and Apelado, Sr. resulting in the violation charged, makes them
equally responsible as conspirators.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO* LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice
As regards the penalty imposed upon petitioners, Section 9(a) of R.A.
No. 3019 punishes a public officer or a private person who violates
Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 with imprisonment for not less than six (6) MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
years and one (1) month to not more than fifteen (15) years and Associate Justice
perpetual disqualification from public office. Under Section 1 of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law or Act No. 4103, as amended by Act CERTIFICATION
No. 4225, if the offense is punished by a special law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that
of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
same. 1avvphi1
Division.

Thus, the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan upon petitioner Ambil, RENATO C. CORONA
Jr. of imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to Chief Justice
twelve (12) years and four (4) months is in accord with law. As a co-
principal without the benefit of an incomplete justifying circumstance to
his credit, petitioner Apelado, Sr. shall suffer the same penalty.

Footnotes
* Designated additional member per Raffle dated July 4, 2011 in 10
 Id. at 102-104.
lieu of Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro who
recused herself due to prior action in the Sandiganbayan. 11
 Art. 156. Delivering prisoners from jail. - The penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
1
 Rollo (G.R. No. 175457), pp. 8-34. minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who shall
remove from any jail or penal establishment any person confined
2
 Rollo (G.R. No. 175482) pp. 8-15. therein or shall help the escape of such person, by means of
violence, intimidation or bribery. If other means are used, the
3
 Id. at 16-24; rollo (G.R. No. 175457), pp. 35-43. Penned by penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed.
Associate Justice Roland B. Jurado with Presiding Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro (now a member of this Court) xxxx
and Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (also now a member
of this Court) concurring. 12
 Records, Vol. I, pp. 100-101.

4
 Id. at 26-44; id. at 44-62. 13
 Id. at 100.

5
 Exhibit "D". Dated September 11, 1998. 14
 Id. at 314-316.

6
 Records, Vol. I, pp. 10-18. 15
 TSN, October 8, 2001, pp. 7, 23-30, 33.

7
 SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts 16
 TSN, October 9, 2001, pp. 5-7, 22-24.
or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law,
the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer 17
 TSN, March 11, 2002, pp. 4-6, 16, 21.
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
18
 TSN, March 12, 2002, pp. 11-17, 32.
xxxx
19
 Id. at 21, 60-61.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted 20
 Supra note 3.
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through 21
 Sec. 3, Rule 114, Rules of Court.
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged
22
 Rollo (G.R. No. 175457), pp. 16-17.
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
23
 Rollo (G.R. No. 175482), pp. 11-12.
xxxx
 Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur
24

8
 Records, Vol. I, pp. 64-65. any criminal liability:

9
 Id. at 1-2. xxxx
 5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the 36
 Id.
lawful exercise of a right or office.
37
 Drilon v. Lim, supra at 142.
xxxx
38
 H.C. Black, Black’s Law Dictionary, 1979 Ed., 42.
 Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur
25

any criminal liability: 39

 SEC. 1737. Transfer of prisoners to jail of neighboring
province.-In case there should be no jail in any province, or in
xxxx case a provincial jail of any province be insecure or insufficient for
the accommodation of all provincial prisoners, it shall be the duty
6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued of the provincial board to make arrangements for the safe-
by a superior for some lawful purpose. keeping of the prisoners of the province with the provincial board
of some neighboring province in the jail of such neighboring
 Ong v. People, G.R. No. 176546, September 25, 2009, 601
26 province, and when such arrangement has been made it shall be
SCRA 47, 53-54. the duty of the officer having custody of the prisoner to commit
him to the jail of such neighboring province, and he shall be there
detained with the same legal effect as though confined in the jail
 Revising Presidential Decree No. 1486 Creating a Special
27
of the province where the offense for which he was arrested was
Court to be known as "Sandiganbayan" and for Other Purposes.
committed.
 An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
28
40
 Exhibit "Q."
Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes. 41
 TSN, October 8, 2001, p. 55.
29
 Records, Vol. I, p. 43. 42
 Nos. L-51065-72, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 399.
 G.R. Nos. 170339, 170398-403, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA
30

670.
43
 Id. at 405.

31
 Id. at 680.
44
 G.R. No. 134493, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 52.

 An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a

32
45
 Id. at 60.
Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government,
and for Other Purposes.
46
 H.C. Black, Black’s Law Dictionary, 1979 Ed., 1010.

 Drilon v. Lim, G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA

33 47
 Id. at 1028.
135, 140-141.
48
 Sison v. People, supra at 682.
34
 Id. at 142.
49
 Id. at 681-682.
 Joson v. Torres, G.R. No. 131255, May 20, 1998, 290 SCRA
35

279, 301.  Valeroso v. People, G.R. No. 149718, September 29, 2003,
50

412 SCRA 257, 261.

 51
 L.B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book One, p. 213. of respondent Judge dated July 7, 1987 granting bail to the accused
Rodolfo Salas alias "Commander Bilog" in Criminal Case No. 86-48926
52
 Art. 17. Principals. - The following are considered principals: for Rebellion,  and the subsequent Order dated July 30, 1987 granting
1

the motion for reconsideration of 16 July 1987 by increasing the bail bond
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act; from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 but denying petitioner's supplemental
motion for reconsideration of July 17, 1987 which asked the court to allow
petitioner to present evidence in support of its prayer for a
xxxx
reconsideration of the order of 7 July 1987.

D. Section 4 – Bail as a matter of right The pivotal issues presented before Us are whether the right to bail may,
under certain circumstances, be denied to a person who is charged with
1. People vs. Donato – 198 SCRA 130 an otherwise bailable offense, and whether such right may be waived.

The following are the antecedents of this petition:

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT In the original Information  filed on 2 October 1986 in Criminal Case No.
2

Manila 86-48926 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, later amended in an

Amended Information  which was filed on 24 October 1986, private
3

respondent Rodolfo Salas, alias "Commander Bilog", and his co-accused

EN BANC
were charged for the crime of rebellion under Article 134, in relation to
Article 135, of the Revised Penal Code allegedly committed as follows:
G.R. No. 79269             June 5, 1991
That in or about 1968 and for some time before said year and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, continuously thereafter until the present time, in the City of Manila
vs. and elsewhere in the Philippines, the Communist Party of the
HON. PROCORO J. DONATO, in his official capacity as Presiding Philippines, its military arm, the New People's Army, its mass
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch XII, Manila; RODOLFO C. infiltration network, the National Democratic Front with its other
SALAS, alias Commander Bilog, respondents. subordinate organizations and fronts, have, under the direction
and control of said organizations' leaders, among whom are the
The Solicitor General for petitioner. aforenamed accused, and with the aid, participation or support of
Jose Suarez, Romeo Capulong, Efren Mercado and Movement of members and followers whose whereabouts and identities are still
Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity, Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI) for unknown, risen publicly and taken arms throughout the country
Rodolfo Salas. against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for the
purpose of overthrowing the present Government, the seat of
which is in the City of Manila, or of removing from the allegiance
to that government and its laws, the country's territory or part of it;

DAVIDE, JR., J.: That from 1970 to the present, the above-named accused in their
capacities as leaders of the aforenamed organizations, in
The People of the Philippines, through the Chief State Prosecutor of the conspiracy with, and in support of the cause of, the organizations
Department of Justice, the City Fiscal of Manila and the Judge Advocate aforementioned, engaged themselves in war against the forces of
General, filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a the government, destroying property or committing serious
prayer for restraining order/preliminary injunction, to set aside the order
 violence, and other acts in the pursuit of their unlawful purpose, an Opposition filed on 27 May 1987  on the ground that since rebellion
10

such as . . . became a capital offense under the provisions of P.D. Nos. 1996, 942
and 1834, which amended Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, by
(then follows the enumeration of specific acts committed before imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on those who
and after February 1986). promote, maintain, or head a rebellion the accused is no longer entitled
to bail as evidence of his guilt is strong.
At the time the Information was filed the private respondent and his co-
accused were in military custody following their arrest on 29 September On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing,
1986 at the Philippine General Hospital, Taft Ave., Manila; he had earlier among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force
escaped from military detention and a cash reward of P250,000.00 was and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the
offered for his amendatory decrees. Thus, the original penalty for rebellion, prision
capture.4 mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000.00, was restored.

A day after the filing of the original information, or on 3 October 1986, a Executive Order No. 187 was published in the Official Gazette in its June
petition for habeas corpus for private respondent and his co-accused was 15, 1987 issue (Vol. 83, No. 24) which was officially released for
filed with this Court  which, as shall hereafter be discussed in detail, was
5 circulation on June 26, 1987.
dismissed in Our resolution of 16 October 1986 on the basis of the
agreement of the parties under which herein private respondent "will In his Order of 7 July 1987  respondent Judge, taking into consideration
11

remain in legal custody and will face trial before the court having custody Executive Order No. 187, granted private respondent's petition for bail,
over his person" and the warrants for the arrest of his co-accused are fixed the bail bond at P30,000.00 and imposed upon private respondent
deemed recalled and they shall be immediately released but shall submit the additional condition that he shall report to the court once every two
themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their person. (2) months within the first ten (10) days of every period thereof. In
granting the petition respondent Judge stated:
On November 7, 1986 , private respondent filed with the court below a
Motion to Quash the Information alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not . . . There is no more debate that with the effectivity of Executive
constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense Order No. 187, the offense of rebellion, for which accused
charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the Rodolfo Salas is herein charged, is now punishable with the
defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00,
extinguished,  to which petitioner filed an Opposition  citing, among other
6 7
which makes it now bailable pursuant to Section 13, Article III,
grounds, the fact that in the Joint Manifestation and Motion dated 1986 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114, 1985 Rules of
October 14, 1986, in G.R. No. 76009, private respondent categorically Criminal Procedure. Unlike the old rule, bail is now a matter of
conceded that: right in non-capital offenses before final judgment. This is very
evident upon a reading of Section 3, Rule 114, aforementioned, in
x x x           x x x          x x x relation to Section 21, same rule. In view, therefore, of the
present circumstances in this case, said accused-applicant is now
Par. 2 (B) — Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody entitled to bail as a matter of right inasmuch as the crime of
and face trial before the court having custody over his person. rebellion ceased to be a capital offense.

In his Order of March 6, 1987,  respondent Judge denied the motion to

8 As to the contention of herein petitioner that it would be dangerous to
quash. grant bail to private respondent considering his stature in the CPP-NPA
hierarchy, whose ultimate and overriding goal is to wipe out all vestiges
of our democracy and to replace it with their ideology, and that his
Instead of asking for a reconsideration of said Order, private respondent
release would allow his return to his organization to direct its armed
filed on 9 May 1987 a petition for bail,  which herein petitioner opposed in
9
struggle to topple the government before whose courts he invokes his through armed struggle and replace it with an alien system based on a
constitutional right to bail, respondent Judge replied: foreign ideology is attained."

True, there now appears a clash between the accused's On 17 July 1987, petitioner filed a supplemental motion for
constitutional right to bail in a non-capital offense, which right is reconsideration  indirectly asking the court to deny bail to the private
13

guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and, to quote again the respondent and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof
prosecution, "the existence of the government that bestows the considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply
right, the paramount interest of the state." Suffice to state that the with this main condition of his bail –– to appear in court for trial," a
Bill of Rights, one of which is the right to bail, is a "declaration of conclusion it claims to be buttressed "by the following facts which are
the rights of the individual, civil, political and social and economic, widely known by the People of the Philippines and which this Honorable
guaranteed by the Constitution against impairment or intrusion by Court may have judicial notice of:
any form of governmental action. Emphasis is placed on the
dignity of man and the worth of individual. There is recognition of 1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and
certain inherent and inalienable rights of the individual, which the was an escapee from detention when arrested;
government is prohibited from violating" (Quisumbing-Fernando,
Philippine Constitutional Law, 1984 Edition, p. 77). To this Court, 2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known
in case of such conflict as now pictured by the prosecution, the address;
same should be resolved in favor of the individual who, in the
eyes of the law, is alone in the assertion of his rights under the
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the
Bill of Rights as against the State. Anyway, the government is
time of his arrest and presented a Driver's License to substantiate
that powerful and strong, having the resources, manpower and
his false identity;
the wherewithals to fight those "who oppose, threathen (sic) and
destroy a just and orderly society and its existing civil and political
institutions." The prosecution's fear may or may not be founded 4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to
that the accused may later on jump bail and rejoin his comrades be also a false address;
in the field to sow further disorders and anarchy against the duly
constituted authorities. But, then, such a fear can not be a reason 5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a
to deny him bail. For the law is very explicit that when it comes to declared owner whose identity and address were also found to be
bailable offenses an accused is entitled as a matter of light to false;
bail. Dura est lex sed lex.
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a
In a motion to reconsider  the above order filed on 16 July 1987,
12 reward of P250,000.00 was offered and paid for his arrest,
petitioner asked the court to increase the bail from P30,000.00 to
P100,000.00 alleging therein that per Department of Justice Circular No. which "clearly indicate that the accused does not entertain the slightest
10 dated 3 July 1987, the bail for the, provisional release of an accused intention to appear in court for trial, if released." Petitioner further argues
should be in an amount computed at P10,000.00 per year of that the accused, who is the Chairman of the Communist Party of the
imprisonment based on the medium penalty imposable for the offense Philippines and head of its military arm, the NPA, together with his
and explaining that it is recommending P100,000.00 because the private followers, are now engaged in an open warfare and rebellion against this
respondent "had in the past escaped from the custody of the military government and threatens the existence of this very Court from which he
authorities and the offense for which he is charged is not an ordinary now seeks provisional release," and that while he is entitled to bail as a
crime, like murder, homicide or robbery, where after the commission, the matter of right in view of Executive Order No. 187 which restored the
perpetrator has achieved his end" and that "the rebellious acts are not original penalty for rebellion under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code,
consummated until the well-organized plan to overthrow the government yet, when the interest of the State conflicts with that of an individual, that
of the former prevails for "the right of the State of self-preservation is
paramount to any of the rights of an individual enshrined in the Bill of THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J.
Rights of the Constitution." Petitioner further invokes precedents in the DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND
United States of America holding "that there is no absolute constitutional IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION, AND IN TOTAL
barrier to detention of potentially dangerous resident aliens pending DISREGARD OF THE PREVAILING REALITIES, WHEN HE
deportation proceedings,  and that an arrestee may be incarcerated until
14
DENIED PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR
trial as he presents a risk of flight;  and sustaining a detention prior to trial
15
RECONSIDERATION WITH PRAYER TO BE GIVEN THE
of arrestee charged with serious felonies who are found after an OPPORTUNITY TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS
adversary hearing to pose threat to the safety of individuals and to the OPPOSITION TO THE GRANT OF BAIL TO THE
community which no condition of release can dispel. 16
RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.

On 30 July 1987 respondent Judge handed down the Order  adverted to

17
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J.
in the introductory portion of this decision the dispositive portion of which DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND
reads: IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN HE GRANTED BAIL
TO THE RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the
Court finds the "supplemental" motion for reconsideration to be in support of which petitioner argues that private respondent is estopped
without merit and hereby denies it but finds the first motion for from invoking his right to bail, having expressly waived it in G.R. No.
reconsideration to be meritorious only insofar as the amount of 76009 when he agreed to "remain in legal custody and face trial before
bail is concerned and hereby reconsiders its Order of July 7, 1987 the court having custody of his person" in consideration of the recall of
only to increase the amount of bail from P30,000.00 to the warrant of arrest for his co-petitioners Josefina Cruz and Jose
P50,000.00, subject to the approval of this Court, and with the Concepcion; and the right to bail, even in non-capital offenses, is not
additional condition that accused Rodolfo Salas shall report to the absolute when there is prima facie evidence that the accused is a serious
court once every two (2) months within the first ten (10) days of threat to the very existence of the State, in which case the prosecution
every period thereof (Almendras vs. Villaluz, et al., L-31665, must be allowed to present evidence for the denial of bail. Consequently,
August 6, 1975, 66 SCRA 58). respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he did not
allow petitioner to present all the evidence it may desire to support its
In denying the supplemental motion for reconsideration the respondent prayer for the denial of bail and when he declared that the State has
Judge took into account the "sudden turn-about" on the part of the forfeited its right to do so since during all the time that the petition for bail
petitioner in that a day earlier it filed a motion for reconsideration wherein was pending, it never manifested, much less hinted, its intention to
it conceded the right of the private respondent to bail but merely asked to adduce such evidence. And that even if release on bail may be allowed,
increase the amount of bail; observed that it is only a reiteration of respondent judge, in fixing the amount of bail at P50,000.00 (originally
arguments in its opposition to the petition for bail of 25 May 1987; P30,000.00 only), failed to take into account the lengthy record of private
asserted that the American precedents are not applicable since the cases respondents' criminal background, the gravity of the pending charge, and
involved deportation of aliens and, moreover, the U.S. Federal the likelihood of flight.
18

Constitution does not contain a proviso on the right of an accused to bail

in bailable offenses, but only an injunction against excessive bail; and In Our resolution of 11 August 1987  We required the respondents to
19

quoted the concurring opinion of the late Justice Pedro Tuason in the comment on the petition and issued a Temporary Restraining Order
cases of Nava, et al. vs. Gatmaitan, L-4853, Hernandez vs. Montesa, L- ordering respondent Judge to cease and desist from implementing his
4964 and Angeles vs. Abaya, L-5108, October 11, 1951, 90 Phil, 172. order of 30 July 1987 granting bail to private respondent in the amount of
P50,000.00.
Unable to agree with said Order, petitioner commenced this petition
submitting therein the following issues: In his Comment filed on 27 August 1987,  private respondent asks for the
20

outright dismissal of the petition and immediate lifting of the temporary

restraining order on the following grounds:
 I In their respective manifestations and motions dated 5 November  and24

23 November 1987  petitioner and private respondents asked to be

25

RESPONDENT SALAS NEVER WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BAIL; excused from filing their Memoranda and that the petition and reply be
NEITHER IS HE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING SAID RIGHT. considered as the Memorandum for petitioner and the Comment as the
ON THE CONTRARY IT IS PETITIONER WHO IS ESTOPPED Memorandum for private respondent, which We granted in Our resolution
FROM RAISING THE SAID ISSUE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON of 19 November 1987  and 1 December 1987,  respectively.
26 27

APPEAL.
In Our resolution of 14 September 1989 We required the Solicitor
II General to express his stand on the issues raised in this petitions,  which
28

he complied with by filing his Manifestation on 30 May 1990  wherein he

29

RESPONDENT SALAS ENJOYS NOT ONLY THE manifests that he supports the petition and submits that the Order of
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT BUT respondent Judge of July 7, July 17 and July 30, 1987 should be
ALSO THE RIGHT TO BAIL. annulled and set aside asserting that private respondent had waived the
light to bail in view of the agreement in G.R. No. 76009; that granting bail
to him is accepting wide-eyed his undertaking which he is sure to break;
III
in determining bail, the primary consideration is to insure the attendance
of the accused at the trial of the case against him which would be
RESPONDENT SALAS IS NOT CHARGED WITH A CAPITAL frustrated by the "almost certainty that respondent Salas will lump bail of
OFFENSE (RECLUSION PERPETUA), HENCE HE HAS THE whatever amount"; and application of the guidelines provided for in
RIGHT TO BAIL AS MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION. Section 10 of Rule 114, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure on the
amount of bail dictates denial of bail to private respondent. The Solicitor
IV General likewise maintains that the right of the petitioner to hearing on
the application of private respondent for bail cannot be denied by
THE ORDER OF JULY 30, 1987 DENYING PETITIONER respondent Judge.
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IS CORRECT.
PETITIONER'S ALLEGED RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IS And now on the issues presented in this case.
NON-EXISTENT AND/OR HAD BEEN WAIVED.
I.
V
Unquestionably, at the time the original and the amended Informations
THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IN for rebellion and the application for bail were filed before the court below
THIS CASE VIOLATES NOT ONLY RESPONDENT SALAS' the penalty imposable for the offense for which the private respondent
RIGHT TO BAIL BUT ALSO HIS OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL was charged was reclusion perpetua to death. During the pendency of
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. the application for bail Executive Order No. 187 was issued by the
President, by virtue of which the penalty for rebellion as originally
We required the petitioner to reply to the comment of private provided for in Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code was restored. The
respondent.  The reply was filed on 18 September 1987.
21 22
restored law was the governing law at the time the respondent court
resolved the petition for bail.
In Our resolution of 15 October 1987  We gave due course to the petition
23

and required the parties to file simultaneously their memoranda within We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the
twenty days from notice. private respondent for he is charged with the crime of rebellion as defined
in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is attached the penalty
of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00.  It is, therefore,
30
a bailable offense under Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15),
which provides thus: (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section (1) to the protection of
several aspects of freedom.
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to bail by explicitly
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, providing that it shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
or be released on recognizance as may be prescribed by law. of habeas corpus is suspended. This overturns the Court's ruling
The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, et al., supra., to wit:
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must,
indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides: government's campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be
enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be
Bail, a matter of right: exception. — All persons in custody shall, demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those
before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be
except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their
under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of
application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or
evidence of guilt is strong. insurrection.

Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion
It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the
penalty lower than reclusion perpetua.  To that extent the right is
31 evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining
absolute.32 whether or not evidence of guilt is strong.  But once it is determined that
33

the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right.
And so, in a similar case for rebellion, People vs. Hernandez, et al., 99 In Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, supra., We held:
Phil. 515, despite the fact that the accused was already convicted,
although erroneously, by the trial court for the complex crime of rebellion The provision on bail in our Constitution is patterned after similar
with multiple murders, arsons and robberies, and sentenced to life provisions contained in the Constitution of the United States and
imprisonment, We granted bail in the amount of P30,000.00 during the that of many states of the Union. And it is said that:
pendency of his appeal from such conviction. To the vigorous stand of
the People that We must deny bail to the accused because the security The Constitution of the United States and the constitution
of the State so requires, and because the judgment of conviction of the many states provide that all persons shall be
appealed from indicates that the evidence of guilt of Hernandez is strong, bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses,
We held: where the proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is
great, and, under such provisions, bail is a matter of right
. . . Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too which no court or judge can properly refuse, in all cases
transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours, to be not embraced in the exceptions. Under such
derived upon mere general principles and abstract consideration provisions bail is a matter of right even in cases of capital
of public safety. Indeed, the preservation of liberty is such a major offenses, unless the proof of guilt is evident or the
preoccupation of our political system that, not satisfied with presumption thereof is great! 34

guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of section

(1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted
Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to present Article 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup
evidence for the denial of bail in the instances where bail is a d'etat. ––– Any person who promotes, maintains, or
matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail is heads a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty
discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must be of reclusion perpetua.
given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the
evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should Any person merely participating or executing the
resolve the motion for bail.
35
commands of others in a rebellion or insurrection shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
We agree, however, with petitioner that it was error for the
respondent court to fix the bond at P30,000.00, then later at x x x           x x x          x x x
P50,000.00 without hearing the prosecution. The guidelines for
the fixing of the amount of bail provided for in Section 10 of Rule This amendatory law cannot apply to the private respondent for
114 of the Rules of Court are not matters left entirely to the acts allegedly committed prior to its effectivity. It is not favorable
discretion of the court. As We stated in People vs. Dacudao, et to him. "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
al., 170 SCRA, 489, 495: favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal,
as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code,
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the although at the time of the publication of such laws a final
presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity for sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the
the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature same. 36

and circumstances of the crime, character and reputation

of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, III.
the probability of the accused appearing at the trial,
whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and
We agree with Petitioner that private respondent has, however,
whether or not the accused is under bond in other
waived his right to bail in G.R. No. 76009.
case. . . .
On 3 October 1986, or the day following the filing of the original
In the instant case petitioner has sufficiently made out allegations
information in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 with the trial court, a
which necessitate a grant of an opportunity to be heard for the
petition for habeas corpus for herein private respondent, and his
purpose of determining the amount of bail, but not for the denial
co-accused Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion, was filed with
thereof because aforesaid Section 10 of Rule 114 does not
this Court by Lucia Cruz, Aida Concepcion Paniza and Beatriz
authorize any court to deny bail.
Salas against Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel Ramos, Brig. Gen.
Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montaño, and Col. Saldajeno
II. praying, among others, that the petition be given due course and
a writ of habeas corpus be issued requiring respondents to
It must, however, be stressed that under the present state of the produce the bodies of herein private respondent and his co-
law, rebellion is no longer punishable by prision mayor and fine accused before the Court and explain by what authority they
not exceeding P20,000.00. Republic Act No. 6968 approved on arrested and detained them. The following proceedings took
24 October 1990 and which took effect after publication in at least place thereafter in said case:
two newspapers of general circulation, amended, among others,
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalty 1. In a resolution of 7 October 1986 We issued a writ of habeas
for rebellion such that, as amended, it now reads: corpus, required respondents to make a return of the writ on or
before the close of office hours on 13 October and set the petition
for hearing on 14 October 1986 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning.
2. On 13 October 1986 respondents, through the Office of the Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released
Solicitor General, filed a Return To The Writ of Habeas immediately.
Corpus alleging therein that private respondent and Josefina
Cruz alias "Mrs. Mercado", and Jose Milo Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez, also in open Court,
Concepcion alias "Eugene Zamora" were apprehended by the confirmed the foregoing statement made by petitioners'
military on September 29, 1986 in the evening at the Philippine counsel regarding the withdrawal of the petition
General Hospital Compound at Taft Ave., Mangga being leaders for habeas corpus, declaring that no objection will be
or members of the Communist Party of the Philippines, New interposed to the immediate release of detainees Josefina
People's Army and National Democratic Front, organizations Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, and that no bond will be
dedicated to the overthrow of the Government through violent required of them, but they will continue to face trial with
means, and having actually committed acts of rebellion under their co-accused, Rodolfo Salas; further, that they will not
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. After their be rearrested on the basis of the warrants issued by the
arrest they were forthwith charged with rebellion before Branch trial court provided that they manifest in open Court their
XII of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region in willingness to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the
Criminal Case No. 86-48926 and on 3 October warrants for their Court and to appear in court when their presence is
arrest were issued and respondents continue to detain them required.
because of the warrants of arrest and the pendency of the
criminal cases against them. Respondents further allege that, In addition, he stated that he is willing to confer with
contrary to the allegation in the petition, herein private respondent petitioners' counsel today relative to the compromise
was not a member of the NDF panel involved in peace agreement that they have previously undertaken to
negotiations with the Government; neither is he and his submit.
companions Cruz and Concepcion covered by any, safe conduct
pass issued by competent authorities.
Upon manifestation of petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo
Capulong, that on his oath as member of the Bar, the
3. At the hearing on 14 October 1986 the parties informed the detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion have
Court of certain agreements reached between them. We issued a agreed to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial
resolution reading as follows: court, the Court ordered their immediate release.

When this case was called for hearing this morning, Thereafter, the Court approved the foregoing
Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H. manifestations and statements and required both parties
Mercado, Edgardo Pamin-tuan, Casiano Sabile, Ramon to SUBMIT to the Court their compromise agreement by
Cura, and William Chua appeared for the petitioners with 4:00 o'clock this afternoon. Teehankee, C.J., is on official
Atty. Capulong arguing for the petitioners. Solicitor leave.
General Sedfrey Ordonez, Assistant Solicitor General
Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue E.
4. At 3:49 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 October 1986 the parties
Villanueva appeared for the respondents, with Solicitor
submitted a Joint Manifestation and Motion duly signed by Atty.
General Ordoñez arguing for the respondents.
Romeo Capulong, counsel for petitioners, and Solicitor General
Sedfrey Ordoñez, Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la
Petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, manifested Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue S. Villanueva, counsel for
in open Court that in conformity with the agreement respondents, which reads as follows:
reached with the government, the petition for habeas
corpus will be withdrawn with detainee Rodolfo Salas to
remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina
COME NOW petitioners and the respondents, assisted by manifestation in compliance with the resolution
their respective counsel, and to this Honorable Tribunal announced in court this morning.
respectfully manifest:
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the petition for habeas
1. That in the discussion between Romeo Capulong, corpus be dismissed.
petitioners' counsel, and Solicitor General Sedfrey A.
Ordoñez on October 13, 1986 exploratory talks were 5. On 16 October 1986 We issued the following resolution:
conducted to find out how the majesty of the law may be
preserved and human considerations may be called into G.R. No. 76009 [In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas
play. Corpus of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion, et al. v. Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel
2. That in the conference both counsel agreed to the V. Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon
following terms of agreement: Montaño and Col. Virgilio Saldajeno] considering the Joint
Manifestation and Motion dated October 14, 1986 filed by
a. The petition for habeas corpus will be Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H.
withdrawn by petitioners and Josefina Cruz and Mercado and Ricardo Fernandez, Jr. as counsel for
Jose Milo Concepcion will be immediately petitioners and Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordonez and
released but shall appear at the trial of the Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial
criminal case for rebellion (People v. Rodolfo Attorney Josue S. Villanueva as counsel for respondents
Salas, et al., Criminal Case No. 4886 [should be which states that they have entered into an agreement
86-48926], Regional Trial Court, National Capital whereby: [a] the petition for habeas corpus will be
Judicial Region) filed against them under their withdrawn by petitioners, and Josefina Cruz and Jose
personal recognizance. Milo Concepcion will be immediately released but shall
appear at the trial of the criminal case for rebellion
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal [People vs. Rodolfo Salas, et al., Criminal Case No. 4886,
custody and face trial before the court having Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
custody over his person. Branch XII, Manila], filed against them, on their personal
recognizance; [b] petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in
c. The warrant of arrest for the persons of legal custody and face trial before the court having
Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion is custody over his person; and [c] the warrant of arrest for
hereby deemed recalled in view of formal the person of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion is
manifestation before the Supreme Court that they hereby deemed recalled in view of the formal
will submit themselves to the court having manifestation before this Court that they will submit
jurisdiction over their person. themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their
person and in view of the said agreement, the petition
for habeas corpus be dismissed, the Court Resolved to
3. That on October 14, the Solicitor General was able to
DISMISS the petition for habeas corpus but subject to the
obtain the conformity of the Government to the foregoing
condition that petitioners' lead counsel, Atty. Capulong,
terms which were likewise accepted by petitioner (sic)
upon his oath as member of the Bar, shall abide by his
and their counsel of record.
commitment to ensure the appearance of Josefina Cruz
and Jose Milo Concepcion at the trial of the criminal case
4. That the two counsel submitted their oral manifestation for rebellion filed against them. Teehankee, C.J., is on
during the hearing on October 14 and the present official leave.
It is the stand of the petitioner that private respondent, "in agreeing to of arrest against them; they agreed, however, "to submit themselves to
remain in legal custody even during the pendency of the trial of his the court having jurisdiction over their persons." Note should be made of
criminal case, [he] has expressly waived his right to bail."  Upon the other
37
the deliberate care of the parties in making a fine distinction
hand, private respondent asserts that this claim is totally devoid of factual between legal custody and court having custody over the person in
and legal basis, for in their petition for habeas corpus they precisely respect to Rodolfo Salas and court having jurisdiction over the persons of
questioned the legality of the arrest and the continued detention of his co-accused. Such a fine distinction was precisely intended to
Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, which was not emphasize the agreement that Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but
resolved by this Court or by the compromise agreement of the parties but should remain in custody. Had the parties intended otherwise, or had this
left open for further determination in another proceeding. Moreover, the been unclear to private respondent and his counsel, they should have
matter of the right to bail was neither raised by either party nor resolved insisted on the use of a clearer language. It must be remembered that at
by this Court, and the legal steps promptly taken by private respondent the time the parties orally manifested before this Court on 14 October
after the agreement was reached, like the filing of the motion to quash on 1986 the terms and conditions of their agreement and prepared and
7 November 1986 and the petition for bail on 14 May 1987, were clear signed the Joint Manifestation and Motion, a warrant of arrest had
and positive assertions of his statutory and constitutional rights to be already been issued by the trial court against private respondent and his
granted not only provisional but final and permanent liberty. Finally, co-accused. The stipulation that only the warrants of arrest for Josefina
private respondent maintains that the term "legal custody" as used in the Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion shall be recalled and that only they shall
Joint Manifestation and Motion simply means that private respondent be released, further confirmed the agreement that herein petitioner shall
agreed to continue to be in the custody of the law or in custodia legis and remain in custody of the law, or detention or confinement.
nothing else; it is not to be interpreted as waiver.
In defining bail as:
Interestingly, private respondent admits that:
. . . the security given for the release of a person in custody of the
"Custody" has been held to mean nothing less than actual law, . . .
imprisonment. It is also defined as the detainer of a person by
virtue of a lawful authority, or the "care and possession of a thing Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court admits no other
or person." (Bouviers Law Dictionary, Third Ed, Vol. I, pp. 741- meaning or interpretation for the term "in custody of the law" than that as
742 citing Smith v. Com. 59 Pa. 320 and Rolland v. Com. 82 Pa. above indicated. The purpose of bail is to relieve an accused from
306) imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the
trial.  It presupposes that the person applying for it should be in the
39

He further admits that, in the light of Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of custody of the law or otherwise deprived of liberty. 40

Court and settled jurisprudence, the "constitutional right to bail is subject

to the limitation that the person applying for admission to bail should be in Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in legal
the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty." 38
custody, private respondent had unequivocably waived his right to bail.

When the parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that: But, is such waiver valid?

b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
trial before the court having custody over his person.
Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law,
they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein respondent, will remain in public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial
actual physical custody of the court, or in actual confinement or to a third person with a right recognized by law.
detention, as distinguished from the stipulation concerning his co-
petitioners, who were to be released in view of the recall of the warrants
Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into
abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or two classes: (a) those in which the state, as well as the accused,
privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the is interested; and (b) those which are personal to the accused,
voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right which are in the nature of personal privileges. Those of the first
known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered class cannot be waived; those of the second may be.
and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as
warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the It is "competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by the
intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it."
41
Constitution, and to consent to action which would be invalid if taken
against his will."
44

As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled:

This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as, for
. . . the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any example, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures;  the 45

character, and, since the word "waiver" covers every conceivable right to counsel and to remain silent;  and the right to be heard.
46 47

right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter
which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a waiver of rights
which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is guaranteed by its Bill of Rights.  Section 12(l) of Article III thereof on the
1âwphi1

legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel,
statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and preferably of his own choice states:
privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit,
do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the . . . These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does presence of counsel.
not contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that
everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage
This provision merely particularizes the form and manner of the waiver; it,
of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the
nevertheless, clearly suggests that the other rights may be waived in
individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and
some other form or manner provided such waiver will not offend Article 6
relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without
of the Civil Code.
detriment to the community at large. . . .
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights
Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred
which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and
by statute or guaranteed by constitution may be waived, a waiver
whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy,
in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or
recognized by law.
would be against public policy or morals and the public interest
may be waived.
The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion
in granting bail to the private respondent.
While it has been stated generally that all personal rights
conferred by statute and guaranteed by constitution may be
waived, it has also been said that constitutional provisions WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Judge of July 7, 1987 and July
intended to protect property may be waived, and even some of 30, 1987 in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 entitled People of the
the constitutional rights created to secure personal liberty are Philippines vs. Rodolfo C. Salas alias Commander Bilog/Henry, Josefina
subjects of waiver. 42 Cruz alias Mrs. Mercado, and Jose Milo Concepcion alias Eugene
Zamora, for Rebellion, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
In Commonwealth vs. Petrillo,  it was held:
43

SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Calderon, but who was convicted only of two (2) counts of
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and homicide by the trial court, may be granted bail after such
Regalado, JJ., concur. conviction for homicide, a non-capital offense. The Regional
Sarmiento, J., took no part. Trial Court of Makati answered in the affirmative but the Court
of Appeals ruled otherwise.

Petitioner thus asks this Court to resolve said issue in this

petition under Rule 65 assailing the two Resolutions2 of
Footnotes respondent Court3 promulgated on November 19, 1993 and
March 9, 1994, respectively. The first Resolution4 of November
19, 1993 disposed as follows:5 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

"WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Solicitor General's motion

to cancel accused-appellant Jose T. Obosa's bailbond. The Court
E. Section 5 – Bail as a matter of discretion
NULLIFIES the lower court's order dated May 31, 1990, granting
1. Omosa vs. Court of Appeals – January 16, 1997 FOROSUELO bail to accused Obosa.

Let warrant issue for the arrest of the accused-appellant Jose T.

Obosa."

On the same date, November 19, 1993, an Order of Arrest

against petitioner was issued under signature of then Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo. 6 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On December 7, 1993, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash

Warrant of Arrest and to Set Aside and Reconsider Resolution of
THIRD DIVISION November 19, 1993.7 The second assailed
Resolution8 promulgated on March 9, 1994 denied the motion as
[G.R. No. 114350. January 16, 1997] follows:

JOSE T. OBOSA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and "IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby DENIES accused Obosa's
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. 'Motion to quash warrant of arrest and to set aside and
reconsider the resolution of November 19, 1993' dated
DECISION December 4, 1993, for lack of merit.

PANGANIBAN, J.: Let a copy of this resolution be given to the Honorable, the

Secretary of Justice, Manila, so that he may issue the
The main issue in this case is whether petitioner Jose T. Obosa, appropriate directive to the Director, Bureau of Corrections,
who was charged with two (2) counts of murder (a capital Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, for the rectification of the prison
offense)1 for the ambush slaying of former Secretary of Interior record of accused Jose T. Obosa."
and Local Governments Jaime N. Ferrer and his driver Jesus D.
 The Facts While accused Obosa was out of prison, he was able to
participate in the commission of the double murder now
Aside from the disagreement as to the date when notice of charged against him as principal for the ambush-slaying of
appeal was actually filed with the trial court,9 the facts Secretary Ferrer and his driver (Lorenzo vs. Marquez, 162 SCRA
precedent to this petition are undisputed as set out in the first 546, 553).
assailed Resolution, thus: 10
Witnesses positively identified accused Jose T. Obosa as one of
"On December 4, 1987, Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. three assassins firing at a car near the canteen at the corner of
Trampe charged the accused Jose T. Obosa and three others Victor Medina Street and Quirino Avenue, Para()aque, Metro
with murder on two counts, by separate amended informations Manila. It was the car of Secretary Ferrer. He sustained eight
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 56, for the entrance gunshot wounds on the right side of his head, neck
ambush-slaying of Secretary of Local Governments Jaime N. and body, while his driver sustained three entrance wounds on
Ferrer and his driver Jesus D. Calderon, which occurred on the left temple, right side of the neck, right arm, chest and right
August 2, 1987, at about 6:30 in the evening, at La Huerta, hip. They died on the spot.
Para()aque, Metro Manila, as Secretary Ferrer was riding in his
car, going to the St. Andrew Church near the plaza of La In its decision dated May 25, 1990, the lower court found the
Huerta, to hear Sunday mass. accused Obosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide on
two counts.11 In ruling that the crime committed was homicide,
Each information alleged that the killing was with the not murder as charged in the informations, the lower court
attendance of the following qualifying/aggravating declared that there was no qualifying circumstance attendant.
circumstances, to wit: treachery, evident premeditation, abuse In fact, however, the lower court itself found that the accused
of superior strength, nighttime purposely sought, disregard of shot the victims while the latter were inside the car, unwary of
the respect due to the victim on account of his rank and age (as any danger to their lives, for unknown to them, were the
to Secretary Ferrer), and by a band. The Prosecutor assassins lurking in the dark, firing their guns from behind, a
recommended no bail, as the evidence of guilt was strong. circumstance indubitably showing treachery (People vs.
Tachado, 170 SCRA 611; People vs. Juanga, 189 SCRA 226).
During the trial of the two cases, which were consolidated and There is treachery when the victims were attacked without
tried jointly, the accused Obosa was detained at Camp Bagong warning and their backs turned to the assailants, as in this case
Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila. (People vs. Tachado, supra). There is treachery when the
unarmed and unsuspecting victim was ambushed in the dark,
At the time of the commission of the two offenses, the accused without any risk to his assailants (People vs. Egaras, 163 SCRA
Obosa was a virtual 'escapee' from the National Penitentiary at 692). Moreover, the crimes could be qualified by taking
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, particularly, at the Sampaguita advantage of superior strength and aid of armed men
Detention Station, where he was serving a prison term for (People v. Baluyot, 170 SCRA 569). Where the attackers
robbery as a maximum security prisoner. cooperated in such a way to secure advantage of their
combined strength, there is present the qualifying circumstance
Indeed, by virtue of a subpoena illegally issued by a judge of of taking advantage of superior strength
the Municipal Trial Court of Sariaya, Quezon, accused Obosa (People v. Baluyot, supra; People v. Malinao, 184 SCRA 148).
was escorted out of prison to appear before said judge on the
pretext that the judge needed his presence so that the judge On May 31, 1990, the lower court promulgated its decision and
could inquire about the whereabouts of the accused therein. on the same occasion, accused Obosa manifested his intention
to appeal and asked the Court to allow him to post bail for his
provisional liberty. Immediately, the lower court granted which he was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
accused Obosa's motion and fixed bail at P20,000.00, in each months and one (1) day of prision  correccional, as minimum,
case. to four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as maximum, and (c) evasion of service of
On June 1, 1990, accused Obosa filed a written notice of sentence, for which he was sentenced to six (6) months
appeal, dated June 4, 1990, thereby perfecting appeal from the of arresto mayor. These sentences are to be served
decision (Alama v. Abbas, 124 Phil. 1465). By the perfection of successively not simultaneously (Article 70, Revised Penal
the appeal, the lower court thereby lost jurisdiction over the Code; People v. Reyes, 52 Phil. 538; Gordon v. Wolfe, 6 Phil.
case and this means both the record and the person of the 76; People v. Medina, 59 Phil. 134; United States v. Claravall,
accused-appellant. The sentencing court lost jurisdiction or 31 Phil. 652; People v. Olfindo, 47 Phil. 1; People v. Tan, 50
power to do anything or any matter in relation to the person of Phil. 660). In successive service of sentences, the time of the
the accused-appellant (Director of Prisons v. Teodoro, 97 Phil. second sentence did not commence to run until the expiration
391, 395-396), except to issue orders for the protection and of the first (Gordon v. Wolfe, supra).
preservation of the rights of the parties, which do not involve
any matter litigated by the appeal (People v. Aranda, 106 Phil. He commenced service of sentence on October 11,
1008). 1979 (with credit for preventive imprisonment) and was
admitted to the New Bilibid Prisons on January 5, 1980 (See
On June 4, 1990, accused Obosa filed a bailbond in the amount prison record attached to Supplement, dated January 31, 1994
of P40,000.00, through Plaridel Surety and Assurance of the Solicitor General; Cf. prison record [incomplete] attached
Company, which the lower court approved. On the same day, to Manifestation dated February 2, 1994 of the Accused
June 4, 1990, the lower court issued an order of release. The Appellant).
prison authorities at the National Penitentiary released accused
Obosa also on the same day notwithstanding that, as On December 25, 1980, he escaped from detention at Fort
hereinabove stated, at the time of the commission of the double Del Pilar, Baguio City, where he was temporarily working on a
murder, accused Obosa was serving a prison term for robbery." prison project (See decision, Crim. Case No. 4159-R, Regional
Trial Court, Baguio City, People v. Jose Obosa y Tutaa). While a
The respondent Court likewise discoursed on the service of fugitive from justice, he committed other crimes, in Quezon
sentence made by the accused. Thus, it extensively discussed City, Makati, and Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. The cases are
the following computation on the penalties imposed upon the pending (See prison record, supra).
petitioner for his previous offenses, which all the more
convinced respondent Court that petitioner was not entitled to He was recaptured on August 27, 1986. Under prison
bail on the date he applied therefor on May 31, 1990 and filed regulations, he forfeited his allowance for good conduct
his bailbond on June 4, 1990, as follows: 12 prescribed by law (Article 97, Revised Penal Code; Act 2489 of
the Philippine Legislature). In addition, he must serve the time
"At the time the accused committed the crimes charged, he was spent at large (TSAL) of five (5) years, eight (8) months and
an inmate at the National Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prisons, two (2) days, and the unserved portion of his successive
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. He was in jail, but was able to sentences for robbery in band, theft and evasion of service of
commit the Ferrer assassination. He was serving imprisonment sentence aforementioned. In sum, he has to serve the balance
by final judgment in each of three (3) cases, namely, (a) theft, of his sentence for robbery in band of four (4) years, two (2)
for which he was sentenced to eleven (11) months and fifteen months and one (1) day of prision correccional; the sentence
(15) days of prision correccional; (b) robbery in band, for for theft of eleven (11) months and fifteen (15) days of prision
correccional; and the sentence  for evasion of service of

sentence of six (6) months of arresto mayor, reaching a total Petitioner promptly filed an opposition,14 to which respondent
of five (5) years, seven (7) months and sixteen (16) days. People submitted a reply.15 Thereupon, respondent Court issued
Since his commitment to jail on October 11, 1979, to the time its first questioned Resolution dated November 19, 1993:16 a)
he escaped on December 25, 1980, he had served one (1) year, canceling petitioner's bail bond, b) nullifying the trial court's
two (2) months, and fourteen (14) days, which, deducted from order of May 31, 1990 which granted bail to petitioner, and c)
the totality of his prison term, would leave a balance of four (4) issuing a warrant for his immediate arrest.
years, five (5) months and two (2) days. Thus, he must still
serve this unserved portion of his sentences in addition to the Petitioner's twin motions for reconsideration17 and quashal of
time spent at large. Counting the time from his re-arrest on warrant of arrest proved futile as respondent Court, on March 9,
August 27, 1986, and adding thereto five (5) years, eight (8) 1994, after the parties' additional pleadings were submitted and
months and two (2) days (time spent at large), the result is after hearing the parties' oral arguments, issued its second
that he must serve up to April 29, 1992. To this shall be added questioned Resolution denying said motions for lack of merit.
the remaining balance of his successive sentences of four (4)
years, five (5) months and two (2) day(s). Consequently, he The Issues
has to serve sentence and remain in confinement up to
October 1, 1996. Of course, he may be given allowance for The petitioner worded the issue in this case as follows: 18
good conduct. But good conduct time allowance can not be
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

computed in advance (Frank vs. Wolfe, 11 Phil. 466). This is "The principal constitutional and legal issues involved in this
counted only during the time an accused actually served with petition is (sic) whether petitioner as accused-appellant before
good conduct and diligence (Frank v. Wolfe, supra; See Aquino, the respondent Honorable Court of Appeals is entitled to bail as
The Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., pp. 803-804). a matter of right and to enjoy the bail granted by the Regional
However, accused Obosa can not avail himself of this beneficent Trial Court, in Makati, Metro Manila, pending appeal from the
provision of the law because, while he was at large, he judgment convicting him of Homicide on two (2) counts though
committed infraction of prison rules (escaping) and other charged with Murder; and assuming that bail is a matter of
crimes, including the Ferrer assassination, and for which he was discretion, the trial court had already exercised sound discretion
placed under preventive imprisonment commencing on in granting bail to accused-appellant, now petitioner in this
December 4, 1987, the date the informations at bar were filed case, and respondent Court of Appeals is devoid of jurisdiction
against him. Because he was then under custody, no warrant of in cancelling said bailbond."
arrest or commitment order need be issued
(Asuncion v. Peralejo, G.R. No. 82915, June 22, 1988, minute
The Solicitor General stated the issues more clearly, thus: 19
resolution; Cf. People v. Wilson, 4 Phil. 381; Umil v. Ramos,
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

187 SCRA 311). Allowance for good conduct does not apply to
"I
detention prisoners (Baking v. Director of Prisons, 28 SCRA
851). Consequently, by all reckoning, accused Obosa could not
be released from prison on June 4, 1990, when he was Whether or not the trial court still have (sic) jurisdiction over
admitted to bail. His release was illegal. He still has to serve the the case when it approved petitioner's bail bond on June 4,
balance of his unserved sentences until October 1, 1996." 1990.

On September 6, 1993, respondent People, through the Office II

of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with respondent Court an
urgent motion,13 praying for cancellation of petitioner's bail Considering that the murder charge against petitioner still
bond. stands pending his appeal and strong evidence of guilt actually
exists based on respondent Court of Appeals' own preliminary same day (June 4, 1990), it no longer had jurisdiction over the
determination and the lower court's initial finding as well, is case." 21
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

petitioner entitled to bail as a matter of right pending review of

his conviction for homicide? The respondent Court found that "(o)n June 1, 1990, accused
Obosa filed a written notice of appeal, dated June 4, 1990,
III thereby perfecting appeal from the decision x x x."22 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

How does petitioner's prison record affect his alleged right to We reviewed the page23 cited by respondent Court, and found
bail?" that indeed, the written notice of appeal, although dated June
4, 1990, was made and actually served upon the trial court on
The Court's Ruling June 1, 1990. Such being the case, did the trial court correctly
approve the bail bond on June 4, 1990? To answer this, there is
First Issue: Trial Court's Jurisdiction a need to revisit Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court:

To decide the issue of whether the cancellation of bail bond by "Sec. 3. How appeal taken. (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial
the respondent Court was correct, we deem it necessary to Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
determine first whether the trial court had jurisdiction to grant Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
bail under the circumstances of this case. shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or order appealed from, and by serving
Petitioner contends that the trial court was correct in allowing a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
him to post bail for his provisional liberty on the same day, May
31, 1990 when the judgment of conviction of (sic) homicide was xxx xxx xxx."
promulgated and the accused-appellant (petitioner) manifested
his intention to appeal the judgment of conviction. At the time, Since petitioner did file the written notice of appeal on June 1,
the lower court still had jurisdiction over the case as to 1990, petitioner's appeal was, perforce, perfected, without need
empower it to issue the order granting bail pending appeal. of any further or other act, and consequently and ineluctably,
Appellant filed his notice of appeal only on June 4, 1990, on the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case, both over the
which date his appeal was deemed perfected and the lower record and over the subject of the case.24 As has been ruled: 25
court lost jurisdiction over the case. Hence, the grant of bail on
May 31, 1990 cannot be validly attacked on jurisdictional "The question presented for our resolution is: Did the Court of
grounds." 20 First Instance that convicted respondent Lacson have the power
and authority to issue the writ of preliminary injunction,
Through its counsel, the Solicitor General, respondent People prohibiting the transfer of said Lacson from the provincial
admits that petitioner manifested his intention to appeal on May hospital of Occidental Negros to the Insular Penitentiary at
31, 1990 and filed his written notice of appeal on June 1, 1990. Muntinlupa, Rizal? While there is no express provision on this
But the Solicitor General nevertheless contends that "x x x it point, it is contrary to the generally accepted principles of
was only on June 4, 1990, or three (3) days after perfecting his procedure for said court to be invested with said power or
appeal that petitioner posted his bail bond in the amount of authority. A necessary regard for orderly procedure demands
P40,000.00 through Plaridel Surety and Assurance Company. that once a case, whether civil or criminal, has been appealed
Clearly, when the lower court approved the bail bond on the from a trial court to an appellate (sic) court and the appeal
therefrom perfected, the court a quo loses jurisdiction over the
case, both over the record and over the subject of the case. Petitioner answers by saying that "once the accused who is
Thus in civil cases the rule is that after the appeal has been charged with a capital offense is convicted not of the offense for
perfected from a judgment of the Court of First Instance, the which he is charged but for a lesser one which is not capital or
trial court losses (sic) jurisdiction over the case, except to issue punished with reclusion perpetua, he is entitled to bail as a
orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the matter of right because the fact that the evidence of his guilt of
parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal a capital offense is not strong is necessarily to be inferred from
(Rule 41, Sec. 9). The jurisdiction of the court over the matters his conviction of the lesser offense." 28
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

involved in the case is lost by the perfected appeal, save in

those cases which the rules expressly except therefrom." On this point, respondent Court ratiocinated: 29 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(Underscoring supplied).
"In this case, although the accused is charged with murder on
But it should be noted that the bail was granted on May 31, two counts, and evidence of guilt is strong, the lower court
1990 by the trial court.26 The validity and effectivity of the found him guilty of homicide also on two (2) counts. He has
subsequent approval of the bail bond by the trial court on June appealed. An appeal by the accused throws the whole case open
4, 1990 is therefore the matter at issue. We agree with for review and this includes the penalty, the indemnity and the
respondent Court and respondent People that, while bail was damages awarded by the trial court which may be increased
granted by the trial court when it had jurisdiction, the approval (Quemuel v. Court of Appeals, 130 Phil. 33). The appellate
of the bail bond was done without authority, because by then, court may find the accused guilty of the original crime charged
the appeal had already been perfected and the trial court had and impose on him the proper penalty therefor
lost jurisdiction. Needless to say, the situation would have been (Linatoc v. People, 74 Phil. 586). By virtue of the appeal, the
different had bail been granted and approval thereof conviction for the lesser offense of homicide is stayed in the
given before the notice of appeal was filed. meantime. Hence, the accused is back to the original situation
as he was before judgment (Cf. Peo. v. Bocar, 97 Phil. 398),
As the approval was decreed by the trial court in excess of that is, one charged with capital offenses where evidence of
jurisdiction then the bailbond was never validly approved. On guilt is strong. Bail must be denied."
this basis alone, regardless of the outcome of the other issues,
it is indisputable that the instant petition should be dismissed. To resolve this issue, we refer to Section 13, Article III of the
1987 Constitution which provides:
Second Issue: Is Petitioner Entitled To Bail
As A Matter of Right? "Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
The second issue, while no longer critical to the disposition of strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
this case, will nevertheless be tackled, in view of its importance. sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
The Solicitor General argues that "(f)or while petitioner was privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
convicted of the lesser offense of homicide, the fact that he has bail shall not be required."
appealed resultantly throws the whole case open for review and
reverts him back to his original situation as a person charged In the case of De la Camara vs. Enage,30 we analyzed the
with the capital offense of murder on two (2) counts against purpose of bail and why it should be denied to one charged with
whom a strong evidence of guilt exists as initially found by the a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong:
trial court during the bail proceedings a quo." 27
"x x x Before conviction, every person is bailable except if an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission
charged with capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable
strong. Such a right flows from the presumption of innocence in by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong."
favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss (Underscoring supplied).
of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a In Borinaga vs. Tamin,32 which was promulgated in 1993, this
regime of liberty is honored in the observance and not in the Court laid down the guidelines for the grant of bail:
breach. It is not beyond the realm of probability, however, that
a person charged with a crime, especially so where his defense "The 1987 Constitution provides that all persons, except those
is weak, would just simply make himself scarce and thus charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a evidence of guilt is strong shall, before conviction, be bailable
guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the by sufficient sureties or be released on recognizance as may be
language of Cooley, a 'mode short of confinement which would, provided by law. Corollarily, the Rules of Court, under Section
with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused' 3, Rule 114 thereof, provides that all persons in custody shall,
for the subsequent trial. Nor is there anything unreasonable in before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right,
denying this right to one charged with a capital offense when except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which,
evidence of guilt is strong. as the likelihood is, rather than await under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of
the outcome of the proceeding against him with a death the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua,
sentence, an ever-present threat, temptation to flee the when evidence of guilt is strong.
jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted." (Underscoring
supplied). As now revised in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure and
provided in Rule 114 thereof, the rules on availability of bail to
The aforequoted rationale applies with equal force to an an accused may be restated as follows:
appellant who, though convicted of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, was 1. Admission to bail is a matter of right at any stage of the
nevertheless originally charged with a capital offense. Such action where the charge is not for a capital offense or is not
appellant can hardly be unmindful of the fact that, in the punishable by reclusion perpetua; [Sec. 3, Rule 114, 1985 Rules
ordinary course of things, there is a substantial likelihood of his on Crim. Procedure]
conviction (and the corresponding penalty) being affirmed on
appeal, or worse, the not insignificant possibility and infinitely 2. Regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution, no bail
more unpleasant prospect of instead being found guilty of the shall be allowed if the accused is charged with a capital offense
capital offense originally charged. In such an instance, the or of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua and the
appellant cannot but be sorely tempted to flee. evidence of guilt is strong; [Idem].

Our Rules of Court, following the mandate of our fundamental 3. Even if a capital offense is charged and the evidence of guilt
law, set the standard to be observed in applications for bail. is strong, the accused may still be admitted to bail in the
Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal discretion of the court if there are strong grounds to apprehend
Procedure,31 as amended, provides: that his continued confinement will endanger his life or result in
permanent impairment of health, [De la Rama v. People's
"Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in Court, 43 O.G. No. 10, 4107 (1947)] but only before judgment
custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a in the regional trial court; and
matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or
4. No bail shall be allowed after final judgment, unless the (b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from
accused has applied for probation and has not commenced to legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the
serve sentence, [Section 21, Rule 114, 1985 Rules of Court] the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
penalty and offense being within the purview of the probation
law." (c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation,
parole, or under conditional pardon;
However, the above guidelines, along with Rule 114 itself, have
since been modified by Administrative Circular No. 12-94, which (d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate
was issued by this Court and which came into effect on October the probability of flight if released on bail; or
1, 1994. Verily, had herein petitioner made application for
bail after the effectivity of said circular, this case would have (e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the
been readily and promptly resolved against petitioner. For, appeal, the accused may commit another crime."
quite recently, in Robin Carino Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.,33 we held, making reference to said administrative circular: It will be readily noted that, pursuant to the foregoing
amendments, not only does the conviction of petitioner for two
"Bail is either a matter of right, or of discretion. It is a matter of counts of homicide disqualify him from being admitted to bail as
right when the offense charged is not punishable by a matter of right and subject his bail application to the sound
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other discretion of the court, but more significantly, the circumstances
hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense enumerated in paragraphs a, b, d and e above, which are
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life present in petitioner's situation, would have justified and
imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion. Similarly, if warranted the denial of bail, except that a retroactive
the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) application of the said circular in the instant case is barred as it
years but not more than twenty (20) years then bail is a matter would obviously be unfavorable to petitioner.
of discretion, except when any of the enumerated
circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is But be that as it may, the rules on bail at the time of
present then bail shall be denied. But when the accused is petitioner's conviction (i.e., prior to their amendment by Adm.
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable Circular 12-94) do not favor petitioner's cause either.
by reclusion perpetua  or life imprisonment, and evidence of In Quemuel vs. CA, et al.,34 this Court held that the appeal in a
guilt is strong, bail shall be denied, as it is neither a matter of criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes
right nor of discretion. If the evidence, however, is not strong the penalty, which may be increased. Thus, on appeal, as the
bail becomes a matter of right." (Citations omitted; entire case is submitted for review, even factual questions may
underscoring supplied). once more be weighed and evaluated. That being the situation,
the possibility of conviction upon the original charge is ever
And, as above adverted to, the circumstances mentioned in present. Likewise, if the prosecution had previously
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1994 Revised Rules demonstrated that evidence of the accused's guilt is strong, as
on Criminal Procedure the presence of any of which could it had done so in this case, such determination subsists even on
preclude the grant of bail are as follows: appeal, despite conviction for a lesser offense, since such
determination is for the purpose of resolving whether to grant
"(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual or deny bail and does not have any bearing on whether
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the petitioner will ultimately be acquitted or convicted of the
circumstance of reiteration; charge.
We have previously held that, while the accused, after Third Issue:  Petitioner's Record
conviction, may upon application be bailed at the discretion of
the court, that discretion particularly with respect to extending Petitioner claims that respondent Court of Appeals erred in
the bail should be exercised not with laxity, but with caution concluding "that at the time the bail was granted and approved
and only for strong reasons, with the end in view of upholding by His Honor of the trial Court, he has still to serve sentence
the majesty of the law and the administration of justice. 35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
and remain in confinement up to October 1, 1996" and hence
was not entitled to bail.37 Petitioner, citing Luis B.
And the grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial Reyes,38 maintains that the Bureau of Corrections properly
discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is best released him from prison on July 18, 1990.
illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94
amending Rule 114, Section 5 which now specifically provides We find it unnecessary to address this issue in the resolution of
that, although the grant of bail is discretionary in non-capital the instant petition. Having already determined that the bail
offenses nevertheless, when imprisonment has been imposed bond was approved without jurisdiction and that the Court of
on the convicted accused in excess of six (6) years and Appeals was correct in issuing the two questioned Resolutions,
circumstances exist (inter alia, where the accused is found to we thus hold that, petitioner cannot be released from
have previously escaped from legal confinement or evaded confinement. The determination of whether or not petitioner
sentence, or there is an undue risk that the accused may should still be imprisoned up to October 1, 1996, and only
commit another crime while his appeal is pending) that point to thereafter may possibly be released on bail is no longer material
a considerable likelihood that the accused may flee if released for the disposition of this case. Thus, we shall longer burden
on bail, then the accused must be denied bail, or his bail ourselves with the resolution of this academic issue.
previously granted should be cancelled.
EPILOGUE
But the same rationale obtained even under the old rules on bail
(i.e., prior to their amendment by Adm. Circular 12-94). In sum, we rule that bail cannot be granted as a matter of right
Senator Vicente J. Francisco's36 eloquent explanation on why even after an accused, who is charged with a capital offense,
bail should be denied as a matter of wise discretion after appeals his conviction for a non-capital crime. Courts must
judgment of conviction reflects that thinking, which remains exercise utmost caution in deciding applications for bail
valid up to now: considering that the accused on appeal may still be convicted of
the original capital offense charged and that thus the risk
"The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying attendant to jumping bail still subsists. In fact, trial courts
principle that bail should be granted only where it is uncertain would be well advised to leave the matter of bail, after
whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where conviction for a lesser crime than the capital offense originally
that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally charged, to the appellate court's sound discretion.
speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been
tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be We also hold that the trial court had failed to exercise the
relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is degree of discretion and caution required under and mandated
upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another by our statutes and rules, for, aside from being too hasty in
point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of granting bail immediately after promulgation of judgment, and
ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the acting without jurisdiction in approving the bailbond, it
accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on inexplicably ignored the undeniable fact of petitioner's previous
bail than before conviction. x x x" escape from legal confinement as well as his prior convictions.
Upon the other hand, the respondent Court should be
commended for its vigilance, discretion and steadfastness. In
ruling against bail, it even scoured the records and found that
treachery attended the killing thereby justifying its action. The
trial court's literal interpretation of the law on bail was forcefully
debunked by the appellate courts' excellent disquisition on the
rationale of the applicable rules. Truly, law must be understood
not by "the letter that killeth but by the spirit that giveth life."
Law should not be read and interpreted in isolated academic
abstraction nor even for the sake of logical symmetry but
always in context of pulsating social realities and specific
environmental facts. Truly, "the real essence of justice does not
emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It
proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role
of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social
edifice." 39

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is

hereby  DENIED and the two assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.