This is a preprint of an article published in the Journal of the American Society of

Information Science 42:5 (June 1991): 351-360, published for the American Society for
Information Science by Wiley and available online to ASIS members and other
registered users at http://www.interscience.wiley.com/. This text may vary slightly from
the published version. Similar discussion occurs in the authors Information and
Information Systems (Greenwood Press, 1991; Paperback: Praeger).

INFORMATION AS THING

by Michael Buckland,
School of Information Management and Systems,
University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720-4600

Abstract

Three meanings of "information" are distinguished: "Information-as-process";

"information-as-knowledge"; and "information-as-thing", the attributive use of
"information" to denote things regarded as informative. The nature and characteristics
of "information-as-thing" are discussed, using an indirect approach ("What things are
informative?"). Varieties of "information-as-thing" include data, text, documents,
objects, and events. On this view "information" includes but extends beyond
communication. Whatever information storage and retrieval systems store and retrieve
is necessarily "information-as-thing".

These three meanings of "information", along with "information processing", offer a

basis for classifying disparate information-related activities (e.g. rhetoric, bibliographic
retrieval, statistical analysis) and, thereby, suggest a topography for "information
science".

INTRODUCTION: THE AMBIGUITY OF "INFORMATION"

An exploration of "information" runs into immediate difficulties since information has

to do with becoming informed, with the reduction of ignorance and of uncertainty, it is
ironic that the term "information" is itself ambiguous and used in different ways. (For a
concise and convenient introduction to varieties of meanings of "information" and some
related terms see Machlup (1983). See also Braman (1989), NATO (1974, 1975, 1983);
Schrader (1983), Wellisch (1972), Wersig & Neveling (1975)). Faced with the variety
of meanings of "information", we can, at least, take a pragmatic approach. We can
survey the landscape and seeking to identify groupings of uses of the term
"information". The definitions may not be fully satisfactory, the boundaries between
these uses may be indistinct, and such an approach could not satisfy anyone determined
to establish the one correct meaning of "information." But if the principal uses can be
identified, sorted, and characterized, then some progress might be made. Using this
approach we identify three principal uses of the word "information":

1. Information-as-process: When someone is informed, what they know is changed. In

this sense "information" is "The act of informing...; communication of the knowledge or
`news' of some fact or occurrence; the action of telling or fact of being told of
something." (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989, vol. 7, p. 944).
2. Information-as-knowledge: "Information" is also used to denote that which is
perceived in "information-as-process": the "knowledge communicated concerning some
particular fact, subject, or event; that of which one is apprised or told; intelligence,
news." (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989, vol. 7, p. 944). The notion of information as
that which reduces uncertainty could be viewed as a special case of "information-as-
knowledge". Sometimes information increases uncertainty.

3. Information-as-thing: The term "information" is also used attributively for objects,

such as data and documents, that are referred to as "information" because they are
regarded as being informative, as "having the quality of imparting knowledge or
communicating information; instructive." (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989, vol. 7, p.
946).

A key characteristic of "information-as-knowledge" is that it is intangible: one cannot

touch it or measure it in any direct way. Knowledge, belief, and opinion are personal,
subjective, and conceptual. Therefore, to communicate them, they have to be expressed,
described, or represented in some physical way, as a signal, text, or communication.
Any such expression, description, or representation would be "information-as-thing".
We shall discuss implications of this below.

Some theorists have objected to the attributive use of the term "information" to denote a
thing in the third sense above. Wiener asserted that "Information is information, not
material nor energy." Machlup (1983, p. 642), who restricted information to the context
of communication, was dismissive of this third sense of information: "The noun
'information' has essentially two traditional meanings... Any meanings other than (1) the
telling of something or (2) that which is being told are either analogies and metaphors or
concoctions resulting from the condoned appropriation of a word that had not been
meant by earlier users." Fairthorne (1954) objected scornfully to information as "stuff":
"... information is an attribute of the receiver's knowledge and interpretation of the
signal, not of the sender's, nor some omniscient observer's nor of the signal itself."

But language is as it is used and we can hardly dismiss "information-as-thing" so long

as it is a commonly used meaning of the term "information." Indeed, languages evolve
and with the expansion of information technology, the practice of referring to
communications, databases, books, and the like, as "information" appears to be
becoming commoner and, perhaps, a significant source of confusion as symbols and
symbol-bearing objects are easily be confused with whatever the symbols denote.
Further, "information-as-thing", by whatever name, is of especial interest in relation to
information systems because ultimately information systems, including "expert
systems" and information retrieval systems, can deal directly with information only in
this sense. The development of rules for drawing inferences from stored information is
an area of theoretical and practical interest. But these rules operate upon and only upon
information-as-thing.

The purpose of this examination of the notion of "information-as-thing" is to:

(1) Clarify its meaning in relation to other uses of the term "information;"

(2) Affirm the fundamental role of "information-as-thing" in information systems; and

(3) Speculate on possible use of the notion of "information-as-thing" in bringing
theoretical order to the heterogeneous, ill-ordered fields associated with "information
science."

The distinction between intangibles (knowledge and information-as-knowledge) and

tangibles (information-as-thing) is central to what follows. If you can touch it or
measure it directly, it is not knowledge, but must be some physical thing, possibly
information-as-thing. (This distinction may be overstated. Knowledge may well be
represented in the brain in some tangible, physical way. However, for present purposes
and for the time being, treating knowledge in the mind as importantly different from
artificial stores of information seems reasonable and useful. Academic examinations test
individuals' ability to answer questions or to solve problems, which is presumed to
provide indirect measures of what they know. But that is not the same.) Knowledge,
however, can be represented, just as an event can be filmed. However, the
representation is no more knowledge than the film is the event. Any such representation
is necessarily in tangible form (sign, signal, data, text, film, etc.) and so representations
of knowledge (and of events) are necessarily "information-as-thing."

Information-as-thing is of special interest in the study of information systems. It is with

information in this sense that information systems deal directly. Libraries deal with
books; computer-based information systems handle data in the form of physical bits and
bytes; museums deal directly with objects. The intention may be that users will become
informed (information-as�process) and that there will be an imparting of knowledge
(information-as-knowledge). But the means provided, what is handled and operated
upon, what is stored and retrieved, is physical information (information-as-thing). On
these definitions, there can be no such thing as a "knowledge-based" expert system or a
"knowledge access" system, only systems based on physical representations of
knowledge.

This introductory discussion can be rounded out by reference to a fourth element:

information processing, the handling, manipulating, and deriving of new forms or
versions of information-as-thing. (One could regard the process of becoming informed
as a sort of information processing, but, to reduce confusion, we prefer to separate and
exclude mental information�as-process from the scope of "information processing.")

Our discussion thus far can be summarized in terms of two distinctions:

(1) Between entities and processes; and

(2) Between intangibles and tangibles.

Taken in conjunction, these two distinctions yield four quite different aspects of
information and information systems. See Fig. 1.

INTANGIBLE TANGIBLE ENTITY 2. Information-as-knowledge 3. Information-as-

thing Knowledge Data, document PROCESS 1. Information-as-process 4. Information
processing Becoming informed Data processing
FIG. 1. Four aspects of information.

REVERSE APPROACH: WHAT IS INFORMATIVE?

Instead of the tedious task of reviewing candidate objects and inquiring whether or not
they should be considered to be examples of information-as-thing, we can reverse the
process and ask people to identify the things by or on account of which they came to be
informed. People will say that they are informed by a very wide variety of things, such a
messages, data, documents, objects, events, the view through the window, by any kind
of evidence. This point was recognized by Brookes (1979, p. 14): "In the sciences it has
long been recognized that the primary source of information is not the literature of the
sciences but observation of the relevant natural phenomena. Scientists (and others) find
'sermons in stones and books in the running brooks'." How might we best sort out these
candidates for being regarded as information? (Note we are restricting our attention to
physical things and physical events. Some people would say that some of their
knowledge comes from paraphysical sources, notably from divine inspiration. Others
would deny any such non-physical source of information, but, to the extent that it may
exist, information science would have to be incomplete if it were excluded. Not
knowing what to say on the subject we merely note it as a possible area of unusual
interest within information science.)

Information as evidence

One learns from the examination of various sorts of things. In order to learn, texts are
read, numbers are tallied, objects and images are inspected, touched, or otherwise
perceived. In a significant sense information is used as evidence in learning - as the
basis for understanding. One's knowledge and opinions are affected by what one sees,
reads, hears, and experiences. Textbooks and encyclopedias provide material for an
introduction; literary texts and commentaries provide sources for the study of language
and literature; arrays of statistical data provide input for calculations and inference;
statutes and law reports indicate the law; photographs show what people, places, and
events looked like; citations and sources are verified; and so on. In each case it is
reasonable to view information-as-thing as evidence, though without implying that what
was read, viewed, listened to, or otherwise perceived or observed was necessarily
accurate, useful, or even pertinent to the user's purposes. Nor need it be assumed that
the user did (or should) believe or agree with what was perceived. "Evidence" is an
appropriate term because it denotes something related to understanding, something
which, if found and correctly understood, could change one's knowledge, one's beliefs,
concerning some matter.

Further, the term "evidence" implies passiveness. Evidence, like information-as-thing,

does not do anything actively. Human beings do things with it or to it. They examine it,
describe it, and categorize it. They understand, misunderstand, interpret, summarize, or
rebut it. They may even try to fake it, alter it, hide it, or destroy it. The essence of
evidence is precisely that perception of it can lead to changes in what people believe
that they know.

Dictionary definitions of "evidence" include: "An appearance from which inferences

can be drawn; an indication, mark, sign, token, trace. ... Ground for belief; testimony or
facts tending to prove or disprove any conclusion. ... Information, whether in the form
of personal testimony, the language of documents, or the production of material objects,
that is given in a legal investigation." (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989, vol. 4, p. 469).
If something cannot be viewed as having the characteristics of evidence, then it is
difficult to see how it could be regarded as information. If it has value as information
concerning something, then it would appear to have value as evidence of something.
"Evidence" appears to be close enough to the meaning of information-as-thing to
warrant considering its use as a synonym when, for example, describing museum
objects as "authentic historic pieces of evidence from nature and society." (Schreiner,
1985, p. 27).

One area in which the term "evidence" is much used is in law. Much of the concern is
with what evidence -- what information -- can properly be considered in a legal process.
It is not sufficient that information may be pertinent. It must also have been discovered
and made available in socially approved ways. However, if we set aside the issues of the
propriety of the gathering and presentation of evidence and ask what, in law, evidence
actually is, we find that it corresponds closely to the way we are using it here. In
English law, evidence can include the performing of experiments and the viewing of
places and is defined as: "...First, the means, apart from argument and inference,
whereby the court is informed as to the issues of fact as ascertained by the pleadings;
secondly the subject matter of such means." (Buzzard et al., 1976, p. 6; also Wigmore,
1983).

TYPES OF INFORMATION

Pursuing the notion of information as evidence, as things from which one becomes
informed, we can examine more specifically what sorts of things this might include.

Data

"Data", as the plural form of the Latin word "datum", means "things that have been
given." It is, therefore, an apt term for the sort of information-as-thing that has been
processed in some way for use. Commonly "data" denotes whatever records are stored
in a computer. (See Machlup (1983, p. 646-649) for a discussion of the use and mis-use
of the term "data".)

Text and documents

Archives, libraries, and offices are dominated by texts: papers, letters, forms, books,
periodicals, manuscripts, and written records of various kinds, on paper, on microform,
and in electronic form. The term "document" is normally used to denote texts or, more
exactly, text-bearing objects. There seems no reason not to extend the use of "text" and
"document" to include images, and even sounds intended to convey some sort of
communication, aesthetic, inspirational, instrumental, whatever. In this sense, a table of
numbers can be considered as text, as a document, or as data. Text that is to be analyzed
statistically could also be regarded as data. There is a tendency to use "data" to denote
numerical information and to use text to denote natural language in any medium.
Further confusion results from attempting to distinguish two types of retrieval by
making and compounding two unwarranted assumptions about "data" and "document":
(i) that "data retrieval" should denote the retrieval of records that one wishes to inspect
and "document retrieval" should denote references to records that one may wish to
inspect; and (ii) that "data retrieval" would be a "known item" search, but that
"document retrieval" would be a "subject search" for an unknown item (van Rijsbergen,
1979, p. 2; Blair, 1984). The former assumption imposes an odd definition on both
terms. The second is illogical and contrary to practical experience (Buckland, 1988b, pp
85-87). It is wise not to assume any firm distinction between data, document, and text.

Objects

The literature on information science has concentrated narrowly on data and documents
as information resources. But this is contrary to common sense. Other objects are also
potentially informative. How much would we know about dinosaurs if no dinosaur
fossils had been found? (Cf. Orna and Pettit (1980, p. 9), writing about museums: "In
the first stage, the objects themselves are the only repository of information.") Why do
centers of research assemble many sorts of collections of objects if they do not expect
students and researchers to learn something from them? Any established university, for
example, is likely to have a collection of rocks, a herbarium of preserved plants, a
museum of human artifacts, a variety of bones, fossils, and skeletons, and much else
besides. The answer is, of course, that objects that are not documents in the normal
sense of being texts can nevertheless be information resources, information-as-thing.
Objects are collected, stored, retrieved, and examined as information, as a basis for
becoming informed. One would have to question the completeness of any view of
information, information science, or information systems that did not extend to objects
as well as documents and data. In this we, like Wersig (1979), go further than Machlup
(1983, p. 645) who, like Belkin & Robertson (1976), limited information to what is
intentionally told: "Information takes at least two persons: one who tells (by speaking,
writing, imprinting, signally) and one who listens, reads, watches." Similarly Heilprin
(1974, p. 124) stated that "information science is the science of propagation of
meaningful human messages." Fox (1983) took an even narrower view, examining
information and misinformation exclusively in terms of propositional sentences.
Brookes (1974), however, was less restrictive: "I see no reason why what is learned by
direct observation of the physical environment should not be regarded as information
just as that which learned by observing the marks on a document." Wersig (1979)
adopted an even broader view of information as being derived from three sources: (i)
"Generated internally" by mental effort; (ii) "Acquired by sheer perception" of
phenomena; and (iii) "Acquired by communication." We view "information-as-thing" as
corresponding to Wersig's phenomena (ii) and communications (iii).

Some informative objects, such as people and historic buildings, simply do not lend
themselves to being collected, stored, and retrieved. But physical relocation into a
collection is not always necessary for continued access. Reference to objects in their
existing locations creates, in effect, a "virtual collection." One might also create some
description or representation of them: a film, a photograph, some measurements, a
directory, or a written description. What one then collects is a document describing or
representing the person, building, or other object.

What is a document?
We started by using a simple classification of information resources: data, document,
and object. But difficulties arise if we try to be rigorous. What, for example, is a
document? A printed book is a document. A page of hand-writing is a document. A
diagram is a document. A map is a document. If a map is a document, why should not a
three-dimensional contour map also be a document. Why should not a globe also be
considered a document since it is, after all, a physical description of something. Early
models of locomotives were made for informational not recreational purposes (Minns,
1973, p.5). If a globe, a model of the earth, is a document, why should one not also
consider a model of a locomotive or of a ship to be a document? The model is an
informative representation of the original. The original locomotive or ship, or even a
life-size replica, would be even more informative than the model. "The few manuscript
remains concerning the three ships that brought the first settlers to Virginia have none
of the power to represent that experience that the reconstructed ships have." (Washburn,
1964). But by now we are rather a long way from customary notions of what a
document is.

The proper meaning of "document" has been of concern to information scientists in the
"documentation" movement, seeking to improve information resource management
since the beginning of this century. The documentalist's approach was to use
"document" as a generic term to denote any physical information resource rather than to
limit it to text-bearing objects in specific physical media such as paper, papyrus, vellum,
or microform. Otlet and others in the documentation movement affirmed:

(1) That documentation (i.e. information storage and retrieval) should be concerned
with any or all potentially informative objects;

(2) that not all potentially informative objects were documents in the traditional sense of
texts on paper; and

(3) that other informative objects, such as people, products, events and museum objects
generally, should not be excluded. (Laisiepen, 1980). Even here, however, except for
Wersig's contribution (Wersig, 1980), the emphasis is, in practice, on forms of
communication: data, texts, pictures, inscriptions.

Otlet (1934, p. 217), a founder of the documentation movement, stressed the need for
the definition of "document" and documentation (i.e. information storage and retrieval)
to include natural objects, artefacts, objects bearing traces of human activities, objects
such as models designed to represent ideas, and works of art, as well as texts. The term
"document" (or "documentary unit") was used as a specialized sense as a generic term
to denote informative things. Pollard (1944) observed that "From a scientific or
technological point of view the [museum] object itself is of greater value than a written
description of it and from the bibliographical point of view it should be regarded
therefore as a document." A French documentalist defined "document" as "any concrete
or symbolic indication, preserved or recorded, for reconstructing or for proving a
phenomenon, whether physical or mental." ("Tout indice concret ou symbolique,
conservé ou enregistré, aux fins de représenter ou de prouver un phénomène ou
physique ou intellectual." (Briet, 1951, p.7)). On this view objects are not ordinarily
documents but become so if they are processed for informational purposes. A wild
antelope would not be a document, but a captured specimen of a newly discovered
species that was being studied, described, and exhibited in a zoo would not only have
become a document, but "the catalogued antelope is a primary document and other
documents are secondary and derived. ("L'antilope cataloguée est un document initial et
les autres documents sont seconds ou dérivés." (Briet, 1951, p. 8). Perhaps only a
dedicated documentalist would view an antelope as a document. But regarding anything
informative as a "document" is consistent with the origins and early usage of the word,
which derived from the Latin verb docere, to teach or to inform, with the suffix "-ment"
to denoting means. Hence "document" originally denoted a means of teaching or
informing, whether a lesson, an experience, or a text. Limitation of "document" to text-
bearing objects is a later development (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989, vol. 4, p. 916;
Sagredo & Izquierdo, 1983, pp. 173-178). Even among documentalists, however,
including anything other than text-bearing objects in information retrieval appears to
occur only in theoretical discussions and not always then (Rogalles von Bieberstein,
1975, p. 12). Meanwhile the semantic problem remains: What generic term for
informative things is wide enough to include, say, museum objects and other scholarly
evidence, as well as text-bearing objects? Objecting to the use of "information" or of
"document" for this purpose does not remove the need for a term.

Most documents in the conventional usage of the word -- letters, books, journals, etc. --
are composed of text. One would include diagrams, maps, pictures, and sound
recordings in an extended sense of the term "text". Perhaps a better term for texts in the
general sense of artifacts intended to represent some meaning would be "discourse". We
could also characterize these texts as "representations" of something or other. However,
we could hardly regard an antelope or a ship as being "discourse". Nor are they
representations is any ordinary sense. Their value as information or evidence derives
from what they signify about themselves individually or, perhaps, about the class or
classes of which they are members. In this sense they represent something and, if not a
representation, they could be viewed as representative. If an object is not representative
of something, then it is not clear how far it can signify anything, i.e. be informative.

One might divide objects into artifacts intended to constitute discourse (such as books),
artifacts that were not so intended (such as ships), and objects that are not artifacts at all
(such as antelopes). None of this prevents any of these from being evidence, from being
informative concerning something or other. Nor does it prevent people from making
uses different from that which may have been intended. A book may be treated as a
doorstop. Illuminated initial letters on medieval manuscripts were intended to be
decorative, but have become a major source of information concerning medieval dress
and implements.

"Natural sign" is the long-established technical term in philosophy and semiotics for
things that are informative but without communicative intent (Clarke, 1987; Eco, 1976).

Events

We also learn from events, but events lend themselves even less than objects do to
being collected and stored in information systems for future edification. How different
the study of history would be if they could! Events are (or can be) informative
phenomena and so should be included in any complete approach to information science.
In practice we find the evidence of events is used in three different ways:
1. Objects, which can be collected or represented, may exist as evidence associated with
events: bloodstains on the carpet, perhaps, or a footprint in the sand;

2. There may well be representations of the event itself: photos, newspaper reports,
memoirs. Such documents can be stored and retrieved; and, also,

3. Events can, to some extent, be created or re-created. In experimental sciences, it is

regarded as being of great importance that an experiment -- an event -- be designed and
described in such a way that it can be replicated subsequently by others. Since an event
cannot be stored and since accounts of the results are no more than hearsay evidence,
the feasibility of re-enacting the experiment so that the validity of the evidence, of the
information, can be verified is highly desirable.

Regarding events as informative and noting that, although events themselves cannot be
retrieved, there is some scope for recreating them, adds another element to the full range
of information resource management. If the recreated event is a source of evidence, of
information, then it is not unreasonable to regard the laboratory (or other) equipment
used to re-enact the event as being somehow analogous to the objects and documents
that are usually regarded as information sources. In what senses does it matter whether
the answer to an inquiry derives from records stored in a data base or from re-enacting
an experiment? What significant difference is there for the user of logarithms between a
logarithmic value read from a table of logarithms and a logarithmic value newly
calculated as and when needed? The inquirer might be wise to compare the two, but
would surely regard both as being equally information. Indeed it would be a logical
development of current trends in the use of computers to expect a blurring of the
distinction between the retrieval of the results of old analyses and the presentation of the
results of a fresh analysis.

To include objects and events, as well as data and documents, as species of information
is to adopt a broader concept than is common. However, if we are to define information
in terms of the potential for the process of informing, i.e. as evidence, there would seem
no adequate ground for restricting what is included to processed data and documents as
some would prefer, e.g. by defining information as "Data processed and assembled into
a meaningful form." (Meadows, 1984, p. 105). There are two difficulties with such a
restricted definition:

Firstly, it leaves unanswered the question of what to call other informative things, such
as fossils, footprints, and screams of terror. Secondly, it adds the additional question of
how much processing and/or assembling is needed for data to be called information. In
addition to these two specific difficulties there is the more general criterion that, all
things being equal, a simpler solution is to be preferred to a more complicated one.
Therefore we retain our simpler view of "information-as-thing" as being tantamount to
physical evidence: Whatever thing one might learn from (cf. Orna & Pettit, 1980, p. 3).
Fortunately there are moves in the English-language literature of information retrieval
toward a more ecumenical approach to information and information systems (Bearman,
1989).

WHEN IS INFORMATION NOT INFORMATION?

Even if we dismiss the argument that untrue information is not information, we could
still ask what could not be information? Since being evidence, being information, is a
quality attributed to things, we may well ask what limits there might be to what could or
could not be information. The question has to be rephrased as "What things could not be
regarded as informative?" We have already noted that a great variety of things can be
regarded as informative so the range is clearly very large.

We might say that objects of which nobody is aware cannot be information, while
hastening to add that they might well become so when someone does become aware of
them. It is not uncommon to infer that some sort of evidence, of which we are not
aware, ought to or might exist and, if found, would be of particular importance as
evidence, as when detectives search, more or less systematically, for clues.

Determining what might be informative is a difficult task. Trees, for example, provide
wood, as lumber for building and as firewood for heating. One does not normally think
of trees as information, but trees are informative in at least two ways. Obviously, as
representative trees they are informative about trees. Less obviously, differences in the
thickness of tree rings are caused by, and so are evidence of, variations in the weather.
Patterns reflecting a specific cycle of years constitute valuable information for
archaeologists seeking to date old beams (e.g. Ottaway, 1983). But if lumber and
firewood can be information, one hesitates to state categorically of any object that it
could not, in any circumstances, be information or evidence. We conclude that we are
unable to say confidently of anything that it could not be information.

This leads us to an unhelpful conclusion: If anything is, or might be, informative, then
everything is, or might well be, information. In which case calling something
"information" does little or nothing to define it. If everything is information, then being
information is nothing special.

Being information is situational

Information-as-process is situational. Therefore, evidence involved in information-as-

process is so situationally also. Hence, whether any particular object, document, data, or
event is going to be informative depends on the circumstances, just as the "relevance" of
a document or a fact is situational depending on the inquiry and on the expertise of the
inquirer (Wilson, 1973). It follows from this that the capability of "being informative",
the essential characteristic of information-as-thing, must also be situational. We may
say of some object or document that in such-and-such a combination of circumstances,
in such-and-such a situation, it would be informative, it would be information, i.e.
information-as-thing.

But, as noted above, we could in principle say that of any object or document: One just
has to be imaginative enough in surmising the situation in which it could be
informative. And if one can describe anything this way, we are making little progress in
distinguishing what information-as-thing is. Further, it is a matter of individual
judgement, of opinion:

(1) whether some particular thing would be pertinent; and, if so,

(2) whether the probability of it being used as evidence would be significant; and, if so,
(3) whether its use as evidence would be important. (The issue might be trivial or, even
if important, this particular evidence might be redundant, unreliable, or otherwise
problematic.) And, if so,

(4) whether the importance of the issue, the importance of the evidence, and the
probability of its being used -- in combination -- warrant the preservation of this
particular evidence.

If all of these are viewed positively, then one would regard the thing -- event, object,
text, or document -- as likely to be useful information and, presumably, take steps to
preserve it or, at least, a representation of it.

Information by Consensus

We have shown that (i) the virtue of being information-as-thing is situational and that
(ii) determining that any thing is likely to be useful information depends on a
compounding of subjective judgements. Progress beyond an anarchy of individual
opinions concerning what is or is not reasonably treated as information depends on
agreement, or on at least some consensus. We can use an historical example to illustrate
this point. It used to be considered important to know whether a woman was a witch or
not. One source of evidence was trial by water. The unfortunate woman would be put in
a pond. If she floated she was a witch. If she sank she was not. This event, the outcome
of the experiment, was, by consensus, the information-as-thing needed for the
identification of a witch. Nowadays it would be denied, by consensus, that the exact
same event constituted the information that it had previously been accepted, by
consensus, as being.

Where there is a consensus of judgement, the consensus is sometimes so strong that the
status of objects, especially documents, being information is unquestioned, e.g.
telephone directories, airline timetables, and textbooks. In these cases arguments are
only over niceties such as accuracy, currency, completeness, and cost. As a practical
matter some consensus is needed to agree on what to collect and store in retrieval-based
information systems, in archives, data bases, libraries, museums, and office files. But
because these decisions are based on a compounding of different judgements, as noted
above, it is not surprising that there should be disagreement. Nevertheless, it is on this
basis that data are collected and fed into databases, librarians select books, museums
collect objects, and publishers issue books. It is a very reasonable prediction that copies
of the San Francisco telephone directory will be informative, though there is no
guarantee that each and every copy will necessarily be used.

"Information-as-thing", then, is meaningful in two senses: i) At quite specific situations

and points in time an object or event may actually be informative, i.e. constitute
evidence that is used in a way that affects someone's beliefs; and (ii) Since the use of
evidence is predictable, albeit imperfectly, the term "information" is commonly and
reasonably used to denote some population of objects to which some significant
probability of being usefully informative in the future has been attributed. It is in this
sense that collection development is concerned with collections of information.
COPIES OF INFORMATION AND REPRESENTATIONS

Copies: Type and Token

In the provision of access to information by means of formal information systems, the

question of whether or not two pieces of information are the same (or, at least,
equivalent) is important. When copies are identical one would speak formally of types
and tokens. Examples that are not the same as each other are referred to as different
types; identical copies are referred to as tokens. If only one example exists, then one
would say that there is only one "token" of that "type".

The creation of identical, equally authentic copies is the result of particular technologies
of mass production, such as printing. If you want to re-read a particular title (type), you
would want to read some copy (token) of it, but you would not insist on re-reading the
exact same copy as before. Similarly, if you had read a book on some subject and
wanted to know more, you would ordinarily move on to reading a copy of another
different title in preference to reading a different copy of the same title.

This feature of equally acceptable copies can be found in other examples of information
systems. Some sorts of museum objects are mass-produced, such as telephones. With
telephones as with printed books, one example is as acceptable as any other from the
same production run. There is, however, a major qualification. In archival practice, as in
museums, two physically identical documents are regarded as different if they occur in
different places in the original order of the files. The rationale is that their unique
positioning in relation to other documents makes them unique by association and,
thereby, different.

In electronic data bases the situation is a little less clear. One can have copies of two
sorts: There can be temporary, virtual copies displayed on a screen; or one can make
copies of a longer lasting form on paper or other storage medium. These copies might
not, from some engineering error, be quite the same as the original. However, it is
ordinarily assumed that either the copy is authentic or that errors will be so marked as to
be self-evident. There may be difficulty in knowing whether the copy is a copy of the
latest, official version of the database, but that is a different issue. With handwritten,
manuscript texts, one should expect each example to be at least slightly different, even if
it purports to be a copy. The person making a copy is likely to omit, add, and change
parts of the text. A significant feature of medieval studies is the necessity of examining
closely all copies of related manuscripts not only to identify the differences, but also to
infer which might be the more correct versions where they do differ.

In general, then, the existence of identical, equally informative, equally authoritative

copies is unusual. Printed materials in libraries are a notable exception. More general is
the case where copies are not altogether identical, though they may be equally
acceptable for most purposes.

Interpretations and Summaries of Evidence

Progress in information technology increases the scope for creating and using
information-as-thing. Much of the information in information systems has been
processed by being coded, interpreted, summarized, or otherwise transformed. Books
are a good example. Virtually all of the books in the collections are based, at least in
part, on earlier evidence, both texts and other forms of information. Scholarship is
permeated with descriptions and summaries, or, as we prefer to call them,
representations.

Representations have important characteristics:

(1) Every representation can be expected to be more or less incomplete in some regard.
A photograph does not indicate movement and may not depict the color. Even a color
photograph will generally show colors imperfectly -- and fade with time. A written
narrative will reflect the viewpoint of the writer and the limitations of the language.
Films and photographs usually show only one perspective. Something of the original is
always lost. There is always some distortion, even if only through incompleteness.

(2) Representations are made for convenience, which in this context tends to mean
easier to store, to understand, and/or to search.

(3) Because of the quest for convenience, representations are normally a shift from
event or object to text, from one text to another text, or from objects and texts to data.
Exceptions to this, such as from object to object or from document back to object
(physical replicas and models) can also be found (Schlebecker, 1977).

(4) Additional details related to the object but not evident from it might be added to the
representation, either to inform or to misinform.

(5) Representation can continue indefinitely. There can be representations of

representations of representations.

(6) For practical reasons representations are commonly (but not necessarily) briefer or
smaller than whatever is being represented, concentrating on the features expected to be
most significant. A summary, almost by definition, is an incomplete description.

Progress in information technology continually permits improvements in our ability to

make physical descriptions, examples of information-as-thing. Photographs improve on
drawings; digital images improve on photographs. The voice of the nineteenth century
singer, Jenny Lind, was described by Queen Victoria as "a most exquisite, powerful and
really quite peculiar voice, so round, so soft and flexible..." (Sadie, 1980, v. 10, p. 865).
Although this description is better than none, we could learn much more from a
phonograph recording.

Reproductions of works of art and of museum artifacts may suffice for some purposes
and have the advantages that they can provide much increased physical access without
wear and tear on the originals. Yet they will always be deficient in some ways as
representations of the original, even though, as in the case of works of art and museum
objects, even experts cannot always identify which is an original and which is a copy
(Mills & Mansfield, 1979).

INFORMATION, INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INFORMATION SCIENCE

We started with two academically respectable usages of the term "information"
("information-as-knowledge" and "information-as�process") and we noted that
information systems can deal directly only with "information-as-thing". Stating this
paradox differently, information systems handle information only in a sense of
information dismissed by leading theorists of information. We also concluded that
anything might be information-as-thing. Small wonder that progress in the development
of paradigms for describing and explaining phenomena in the shapeless, ill-defined
reaches of "information science" has been slow. But, perhaps, "information-as-thing"
could be used to provide some order or arrangement with respect to information-related
activities, along with the two more respectable definitions.

First, although all information systems deal directly with "information-as-thing", we

might create some order within this area if we could identify a subset of information-
handling activities that are concerned with information only in this sense. As examples
we might choose Information Theory (in the sense of the mathematical theory of signal
transmission associated with Shannon and Weaver and that has nothing to do with
semantic content (Bar-Hillel, 1964); historical bibliography (the study of books as
physical objects); and statistical analysis (identifying and defining patterns in
populations of objects and/or events). Each of these fields has refined techniques for
developing and formalized ways of describing concise and effective representations of
their particular kind of information-as-thing. The findings of these useful arts may well
be of great significance, but their concern is primarily with the evidence itself. An
analysis of a channel, a book, or a population would cease to be valid if the physical
characteristics of the channel, book, or population were changed.

Second, information storage and retrieval systems can deal directly only with
"information-as-thing", but the things that can be stored for retrieval in actual or virtual
collections vary in significant ways. Historic buildings, films, printed books, and coded
data impose different constraints on the tasks associated with information retrieval
systems: selection, collection, storage, representation, identification, location, and
physical access. Put simply, a museum, an archive, library of printed books, an online
bibliographic database, and a corporate management information system of numeric
data can all validly be regarded as species of information retrieval system. But
differences in their physical attributes affect how the stored items can be handled
(Buckland, 1988a). These differences provide one basis for the comparative analysis of
information storage and retrieval systems.

Third, representations of knowledge form a distinguishable subset of information-as-

thing and so could, in principle, be used to identify and define another class of
information systems in which the primary concern is based on the knowledge
represented. This is the conventional area of information storage and retrieval, subject
bibliography, and "knowledge bases" for expert systems. In these cases the information-
as-thing is unavoidably of concern, but only a means for dealing with information-as-
knowledge and, being merely a means, considerable latitude is imaginable. In providing
an information service different physical forms of information and different text-bearing
media (texts on paper, on microform, or displayed on a terminal) may be equally
acceptable. Further, a wide variety of variant texts would be more or less substitutable --
in English or in French, lengthy or concise, recent or old -- if they represented the same
knowledge to an acceptable degree.
Fourth, similarly information-as-process could be the basis for defining a class of
information-related studies. Here again, information-as-thing cannot be ignored, but is,
again, of secondary interest as a means. Cognitive psychology, rhetoric, and other
studies of interpersonal communication and persuasion would be examples. Alternative
means, i.e. alternative physical media, might be equally acceptable. Indeed, inasmuch as
the primary interest is on cognition and persuasion, the actual information-as-
knowledge, also a necessary ingredient, may also be of little direct interest. The focus
could well be more on how beliefs change than on which beliefs are changed or which
knowledge is represented.

It is not asserted that sorting areas of information science with respect to their
relationship to information-as-thing would produce clearly distinct populations. Nor is
any hierarchy of scholarly respectability intended. The point is rather that examination
of "information-as-thing" might be useful in bringing shape to this amorphous field and
in avoiding simplistic, exclusive boundaries based on past academic traditions.

SUMMARY

Numerous definitions have been proposed for "information". One important use of
"information" is to denote knowledge imparted; another is the denote the process of
informing. Some leading theorists have dismissed the attributive use of "information" to
refer to things that are informative. However, "information-as-thing" deserves careful
examination, partly because it is the only form of information with which information
systems can deal directly. People are informed not only by intentional communications,
but by a wide variety of objects and events. Being "informative" is situational and it
would be rash to state of any thing that it might not be informative, hence information,
in some conceivable situation. Varieties of "information-as-thing" vary in their physical
characteristics and so are not equally suited for storage and retrieval. There is, however,
considerable scope for using representations instead.

Acknowledgement. This work was partially supported by a Fulbright Research

Scholarship at Graz University of Technology, Austria, during sabbatical leave from the
University of California at Berkeley.

The helpful comments of William S. Cooper, Brian Peaslee, W. Boyd Rayward, and
Patrick Wilson are gratefully acknowledged.

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