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AUDIT EXPECTATION GAP:
CAUSES AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Teck Heang Lee
Faculty of Accountancy and Management
University Tunku Abdul Rahman
Azham Md. Ali
Faculty of Accountancy, Universiti Utara Malaysia
Abstract: The auditing profession believes the increase of litigation and criticism
against the auditors can be contributed to the audit expectation gap. The audit
expectation gap is defined as the difference between what the public expects from
‘an audit and what audit profession accepts the audit objective to be. The audit
expectation gap is critical to the auditing profession because the greater the
unfulfilled expectations from the public, the lower is the credibility, earning
potential and prestige associated with the work of auditors. The objectives of the
paper are two-fold. Firstly, it attempts to uncover the causes of an audit expectation
gap. Secondly, it reviews the possible solutions in narrowing the gap. This paper
aims to provide an insight into issues of the audit expectation gap which in tum
enable the audit profession and the profession's regulatory bodies to take effective
steps in narrowing the audit expectation gap.
Keywoods : Auditing, Audit Expectation Gap
1 fedooesian 1. Introduction
Management & For decades the auditing profession has been troubled with high level of litigations
ae and accusations. Such problems have reached an unprecedented level as a result of
the spectacular fall of well publicized corporations like Enron and WorldCom
Porter & Gowthorpe, 2004). The increase in criticism and litigation against
auditors shows that “modern auditing is in a period of serious turmoil and doubt”
(Lee, 1977, p. 105) and that auditors are also facing “a liability and a credibility
crisis” (Russell, 1986, p. 58). According to Power (1993, p. 292), “when innocent
Parties suffer losses as a result of fraud or the economic collapses of apparently
healthy companies, institutional processes of blame allocation are set in motion”.
The editorial comment in the September 1990 issue of Accountancy (the journal of
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales cited in Humphrey et
al. 1992, p. 137) urged the media to stop blaming auditors as business failures have
nothing to do with the standards of auditing. In line with this, Almer and Brody
(2002) asserted that a business failure is always interpreted as an audit failure in
spite of the level of procedures and tests performed by auditors. They further
claimed that an auditor can carry out his audits in accordance with the generally
accepted auditing standards and still be found negligent in not preventing risks to
financial statement users. Hence, it is shown that the nature and objectives of
auditing have been perceived differently by the users and these misperceptions are
knownas the “audit expectation gap”.
Sikka et al. (1998, p. 299) highlighted that the audit expectation gap is a
detrimental issue to the auditing profession as “the greater the gap of expectations,
the lower is the credibility, earning potential and prestige associated with the
auditors’ work”. They also claim that the audit expectation gap is harmful to the
public, investors and politicians as, in a capitalist economy, the process of wealth
creation and political stability depend heavily upon the confidence in the processes
of accountability. An external audit of financial statements is considered to be an
important part as auditing adds credibility to these financial statements. Hence, to
mitigate the litigation and accusation against the auditors; and, more importantly, to
restore public confidence in the financial reporting process and audit functions, the
audit expectation gap should be eliminated, ifnot significantly reduced.
The aims of the paper are two-fold. Firstly, it attempts to uncover the
causes of an audit expectation gap. Secondly, it reviews the possible solutions in
narrowing the gap. It is hoped that such an attempt will provide some valuable
insights into the audit expectation gap.
The rest of this paper is structured whereby section two reviews the factors
which contribute towards the existence of an audit expectation gap. Section three
evaluates some of the suggested solutions to reduce the expectation gap. Finally,
section four provides the overall conclusion of this paper 2. Factors Contributing To The Expectation Gap
Areview of the literature identifies various causes which contribute to the existence
ofan audit expectation gap. This section attempts to do more than merely outline the
causes but rather to provide an in-depth evaluation and discussion on the matter. Itis
hoped that such an attempt will present the audit expectation gap problems in amore
objective and meaningful manner.
2.1 The complicated nature of an audit function
The general public's poor understanding of the complicated audit function is likely
to contribute towards the existence of an audit expectation gap (e.g. Baron et al,
1977; Campbell & Michenzi, 1987, Ellis & Selley, 1988). According to Lee and
Azham (2008), the complexity of auditing could be due to the fact that the objective
of auditing and the role of auditors have always been a dynamic rather than a static
one. This is because they are highly influenced by contextual factors such as the
socio-economic environment of a particular period, the critical historical events that
have taken place (e.g. the collapsed of big corporations), the verdict of the courts,
and technological developments (e.g. advancement of computing systems and
CAATs). Therefore, any major changes in these contextual factors are likely to
cause a change in the auditing function as well as the role ofauditors.
‘The complicated nature of an audit function can also be seen by achangein
the auditing paradigm over the years. According to Leung et al. (2004) the audit
practice for the past centuries had undergone various evolutions. For example in the
mid 1800s to early 1900s an auditing function can be regarded as “traditional
conformance role of auditing” as the role of auditors was mainly concemed with
ensuring the correctness of accounts and detecting frauds and errors. Over the past
30 years or so, the auditor played an “enhancing role” by enhancing the integrity and
credibility of the financial information. Boynton and Johnson (2005) are of the
opinion that present-day auditing is not restricted in enhancing the credibility of the
financial statement, but also to provide value-added services, such as reporting on
irregularities, identifying business risks and advising management on the internal
control environment. However, as pointed out by Leung et al. (2004), following
extensive reforms in various countries as a result of the collapse of big corporations
such as Enron and WorldCom, it is expected that the role of auditors will converge
ie. refocusing on the public interest, redefining audit relationship, ensuring
integrity of financial reports, separation of non-audit function and other advisory
services. The audit methods have reverted to the basics i.e. risk attention, fraud
awareness, objectivity and independence, and increase attention on the needs of
financial statement users. In view of the substantial changes to the audit practice
over the years, itis not surprising that the public has failed to recognize the essence
of an audit. In addition, the lack of understanding among members of the public
3
‘Audit Expectation
Gap : Cause and
Possible Solutions Indonesian
Management &
‘Accounting
Research
may be due to the subjective nature of terms and concepts in auditing such as the true
and fair view, reasonable, materiality, adequacy, reliability and relevance
(Humphrey, 1997). For instance, the term “‘true and fair” in the audit reports are not
explained in detail to ease the understanding of the users. It is also important to note
that most of these terms and concepts are not defined in the Accounting and
Auditing Standards. As such, auditors are required to exercise their judgment while
applying them in the course of the audit. Given the complicated nature of auditing
and the objective of an audit, confusion is likely to exist among those who have
limited knowledge and exposure in auditing.
2.2, Conflicting role of auditors
According to Gloeck and Jager (1993) conflict of interest arising from the provision
of “non-audit services” for audit clients contributes a gréat deal to the expectation
gap. Leung et al (2007) pointed out that presently accounting firms have diversified
by providing a wide range of services and products which include engagements for
risk assessment, business performance measurement, information reliability
systems, electronic commerce and health and elder care performance measurement.
A.survey conducted by Institutional Analysis of the top 100 Australian Companies
on non-audit services in 2002 showed that 27 of the 58 respondents disclosed the
nature and amount of payments they received from their auditors for providing such
services. The results of the survey are summarized in Table 1.
A similar situation also existed in the United States of America where
accountants have become increasingly dependent on consulting. The International
Accounting Bulletin cited in Bymes et al (2002) revealed that in 1993, 31% of the
‘Table 1: Non - audit services received by respondents of Top 100 companies in 2002
a ‘Number of A ent
Category of non-audit services reporting 7158) amie toe
“Taxation planning and advice 27 ‘$935,810
‘Due diligence services 16 ‘$754,078
Strategic consulting 7 $1,618,821
‘Accounting and bookkeeping 7 ‘$601,714
‘Statutory and regulatory compliance services 5 $531,800
‘information technology services and advice 5 $531,800
‘Miscellaneous, 19 $606,212,
Source: T Watts, Non-audit fees Survey: A Review of the Non-audit Services Performed by the
Auditors of the ASX Top 100 from 1992-2002, ntutional Analysis, Melbourne, November 2002,
P. 19 (cited in Leung et al. 2007, p. 39)
auditing industry's fees came from consultancy. By 1999, that amount has increased
to 51%. In 2001, for instance, PricewaterhouseCoopers eamed only 40% of its
worldwide fees from auditing, 29% came from management consulting and most of the rest from tax and corporate finance work. Cited also in Brynes et al, 2002 is a
study of 563 companies conducted by Bailey from the University of Ilinois' in 2001
where it was found that on average, for every dollar of audit fees, clients paid their
independent accountants, $2.69 was for non-audit services. Bailey found that Puget
Energy, based in Bellevue, Washington, had the greatest imbalance, paying
PricewaterhouseCoopers only $534,000 for its audit, but over $17 million in
consulting fees. Marriott International Inc. had a similar imbalance. It paid
Andersen just over $1 million for its audit, but more than $30 million for
information technology and other services.
In view of the provision of extra services to the audit clients, auditors are
playing multiple roles at the same time i.e. (i) as an advisor to the management; and
(ii)as an independent attestor to the shareholders. Hence, auditors are likely to bein
aconflicting position because shareholders expect the auditor to identify and report
all problems with the financial statements while management expects the auditors
to ignore financial statement manipulation (Koo and Sim, 1999). Hence, auditors
are placed in “multi-role, multi expectation situations “(Davidson, 1975, p.7).
Rizzo et al. (1970) regards such conflict of interest as “Inter-sender role conflict”
where an individual occupies two or more position simultaneously which give rise
to opposing expectations, conflicting policies, needs and incompatible criteria.
Research [e.g. Johnson, 1988; and English 1989] found that the auditors’
role conflict is seen to have negative implications on the auditor's independence and
their ability to perform a just audit. This is because if the auditor tries to be
obstinately ethical in a situation of conflict, management may seek to replace the
auditor for a more cooperative one. Consequently, the auditor may buckle under
management's pressure, resulting in a compromise of auditor independence. Hence,
given the lucrative remuneration from the “non- audit services”, auditors may be
perceived to have acted in a manner that is unfavorable to the public in order to
protect their self-interest i.e. to secure their income from the provision of non-audit
services, As a result, auditors are likely to be seen as not fulfilling their regulatory
role of providing independent assurance to stakeholders and the general public on
the relevance and reliability of financial statements issued by public corporations
(Hendrickson, 1998).
2.3 Hindsight evaluation of auditors' performance
Shaked and Sutton (1982) claimed that the accusation crisis of the auditing
profession may be due to the fact that society does not have the ability to evaluate
the quality of an audit and the performance of the auditors. This is because the
quality of an audits difficult to determine as the public cannot differentiate between
the quality of one audit versus another, Furthermore, they also asserted that the
measure of audit quality comes from subsequent events that demonstrate that an
5
Audit Expectation
Gap : Cause and
Possible Solutions audit was not performed at an acceptable level for a particular engagement.
Humphrey etal (1992) are of the opinion that this hindsight evaluation of auditors is
deemed to be unfair as the perceived quality of the auditors has been judged using
the benefit of knowledge after the event has taken place to argue that auditors are not
performing adequately. The accusation against auditors through hindsight
evaluation is evident in the following quotation of the executive vice-president of
the AICPA, Olson (1993, p.9): As long as investors suffer losses from a sudden and
drastic drop in earnings or the bankruptcy of a corporation which was widely
regarded as a good investment, our profession is going to be criticized in the new
‘media. And since such situations are not likely to disappear completely, we ought to
become more mature in our reactions to criticisms and recognize that this is an
inescapable part of our life
Given the significant amount of negative publicities against auditors, the
hindsight method of evaluation is likely to bring about an impression that auditors
may not have performed their work diligently. However, the blame should notbe put
onthe auditors’ shoulder alone when a bankruptcy of a corporation is reported in the
media. This is because there are many reasons that may cause the fall of a
corporation. These reasons, among others, could be: mismanagement; bad strategic
decisions, industry downturns, competition, and poor oversight by boards of
directors or fraud by senior managements (Phelan & Villareal, 2006). Hourguebie
(2004, p.59), the CEO of Emst & Young has highlighted that it is important to
distinguish between a “business failure” and an “audit failure” as a business failure
is always interpreted as an audit failure in spite of the level of procedures and tests
performed by the auditor. Lee and Azham (2008) argued that auditors could have
performed the required duties but yet failed to prevent the financial scandals,
Hence, itis shown that the quality of an audit and the performance of auditors have
been perceived differently by the users and these misperceptions are likely to give
tise to an audit expectation gap.
2.4 Time lag in responding to changing expectations
Humphrey et al. (1992) pointed out that an expectation gap may occur as a result of
time lags between the accounting profession identifying and responding to
continually changing and expanding public expectations. Tricker (1982) argued
that corporate crises lead to new expectations and requirements of accountability
which in tum lead to new demands on the audit function and eventually to changes
in auditing standards and practice. Ticker (1982) noted that issuance of accounting
standards is particularly evident during periods of major crises in the corporate
sector. This in turn suggests that the accounting profession is gradually and
constructively responding to the changing expectations of society (Humphrey et all
1992). Such assertion can be validated through the actions taken by the AICPA. Auditing Standards Board as a result of the financial scandals in the 80's. In
response to the high litigations against the auditing profession, the AICPA Auditing
Standards Board produced a series of new statements on auditing standards (known
as “expectation gap” standards), covering issues such as the detection of fraud and
illegal acts, the assessment of internal controls and audit reporting (Guy & Sullivan,
1988). These standards were issued with the aim of improving the quality of an audit
by extending the duties of auditors, Even though efforts have been taken to mitigate
the accusation against auditors and to provide remedies in satisfying the
requirement of the public, it is accepted that the accounting profession could still be
criticized by the public for failing to react and evolve rapidly enough to keep pace
with the changing business and social environment (Humphrey 1997). This is
because it can be observed that actions are only taken by the relevant authorities
after critical events such as major financial scandals occurred. Hence, the auditing
profession has taken a rather retrospective approach in ensuring auditors’
performance. As such, this is evident that there is a time lag for the auditing
profession to live up to the expectations of the public.
2.5 Self-regulation process of the auditing profession
The auditing profession, like many other professions, operates under a self-
regulatory framework (Humphrey et al. 1992). Shaked and Sutton (1981)
highlighted that the rationale for self-regulation by a profession is premised on the
ground that service quality may be maintained through self-regulation when the
consumers (i.e. audit beneficiaries) are unable to measure the audit quality
themselves. Byington and Sutton (1991, 316) claimed that the consequence of self-
regulation is the creation of licencing boards and other government regulations that
restrict practices of the profession and hence create rents that arise from a
professional monopoly which controls the minimum acceptable level of service
quality and entry into the profession. The weakness of self regulation was also
highlighted by the following remark of Humphrey et al. (1992, p. 138): The audit
profession is not regarded as selfless, neutral body, responding diligently to the
changing dictates and expectations of society. Rather, it is seen in a more proactive,
economically interested light, needing to maintain the appearance of independent,
highly technically competent individuals in order to defend and advance its
members’ interest. Symbolic traits of independence, trustworthiness, altruism and
expertise are viewed as professional mystiques that together with the existence of a
professional monopoly of labour give rise to a mutually dependent relationship with
the state and serve to enhance the remuneration of members of the profession.
In a similar vein, Shaked and Sutton (1981) claimed that the potential
problem that may exist with a professional monopoly is lack of incentive to provide
a service at a level of quality that exceeds the minimum level that the public will
7
‘Audit Expectation
Gap : Cause and
Possible Solutions Indonesian
‘Management &
Research
accept. This implies that auditors are likely to compromise the audit quality at the
expense of the clients by limiting their auditing work in order to maximize their
personal interests. As a result, it is likely that auditors may have fallen short of the
“expected performance”. Such assertion is empirically supported by various studies
found in different countries. Evidences of deficient performance of auditors are
‘Table 2: Deficient Performance of auditors
Porter (555) Porter and Gowthorpe Tes etal @007
(2004)
Detect theft of corporate aseis| ~ Disclose in the auditrepont | - Detect delibente
bynon- doubt distortion ofthe figures
managerial employees. about audite’s continued | inthe company's
= Detect thet of corporate asses
by, Detecttheftof amateial | - Report privately toa
company directors/senior amount of regulatory authority:
‘management. the audte’s anacts by its | theft hao Been
director! commited by non-
+ Disclose in the audit report | senior management ‘managerial employees.
delberte
distortion of financial * Detecttheftofamatcial | «company
‘information. amount of direetor/senior
the auditee’s asset by non- ‘management has
~ Disclose in the audit report ‘managerial ‘misappropriated
‘misappropriation of company employees. ‘company assets.
asseisby
company directorssenior | - Inthe absence of regulated | + information presented
‘management. industry in the financial
uty report to an appropriate | statements hasbeen
/~ Detect illegal acts by company| authority deliberately distorted.
officials ileal arts by auite oficial.
which directly affect the + suspicious
‘company’s accounts. + Detect illegal act by auditee circumstances are
officials: ‘encountered in the
~ Rxpress doubts inthe audit | which directly impact onthe | aut suggesting that
report about audits thef or deliberate
the company's continued financial statements. distortion of financial
existence. information may have
~ Disclose in the audit report occurred in the |
Disclose inthe audit report | deliberate company
legal acts Aistortion of the audite's
which directly affect ‘aancial = Disclose inthe
companys sccounts statements. published auditors
report:
+ Inabseoce ofa regulated | « company director/enior
istry |” management have
Feport to an appropriate | misappropriated
authority, embezzlement of | company ase.
suditee's «information presented
asseis by dzectom/senior |” in the financial
‘management. statements has been
deltbertely
distorted illegal acts
commited by the
company's
=
on the company's
accounts, found, among others, in the research of Porter (1993) in New Zealand; Porter and
Gowthorpe (2004) in the UK and Lee et al. (2007) in Malaysia. Their findings
revealed that auditors are perceived to have underperformed in their various duties.
‘These duties are summarized in the following table 2: In addition to the above, the
allegation against the disciplinary process under the self-regulation framework can
be seen from the following quotations of Mitchell (1990) and Witten (1990): The
profession's disciplinary procedures are even more feudal. Occasionally, in secret
‘meetings, from which its own membership, press and public are excluded, it
suspends some individuals from membership...And what about the big fish? To
date, no partner from any major firm has ever been barred from practice by the
Institute, even though the same firm has been ci ed by the DTI inspectors again
and again...The Institute is completely dominated by the interests of major firms
and their financial might (Mitchell, 1990, p. 21). The disciplinary process has tobe
‘more open in a profession based on self-regulation. Washing hands quietly in back
rooms doesn'tcut it anymore (Witten, 1990, p.28)
In view of the flaws in the disciplinary process of the self-regulatory
framework, it is not surprising that auditors are motivated only to deliver a
minimum level of service quality to their clients. However, this is likely to be in
contrast with the expectation of the public as they may expect auditors to provide a
good auditing service and to have better accountability of their performance.
Hence, it is believed that the process of self-regulation and its attendant factors
contributes materially to enlarging the expectation gap (Gloeck and Jager 1993).
2.6 Theignorance, naivety and unreasonable expectation of non-auditors
Humphrey et al. (1993) had associated the problem of expectation gap problems
with the misconception of the nature, purpose and capacities of an audit function.
The ignorance and naivety of the public are likely to cause unreasonable
expectations being imposed on the duties of the auditors. The unreasonable
expectations of the public are revealed in the following comment of the AICPA
secretary in 1939 in the aftermath of the McKesson Robbins scandal: We find that
the public believed that the certified public accountant was an infallible superman;
that the signature of a CPA invariably meant that ‘everything was perfect; that it was
unnecessary to read the accountant's certificate or the financial statements to which
it was appended as long as the three major letters were in evidence........ Whether
through its own fault or not, the accounting profession seems to: have been oversold.
Its limitations have been overlooked, while its abilities have been emphasized. Now
the public has been somewhat shocked to find that even auditors can be fooled by
clever criminals. (quoted in Miller, 1986, p.35)
‘According to Lee and Azham (2008) unreasonable expectation of auditors
may have harmful implications on the audit profession as the public may not be able
9
Audit Expectation
Gap : Cause and
Possible Solutions uodos ‘wdn0o compa
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